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
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ART. I.—*The Inspiration of Holy Scripture: its Nature and Proof. Eight Discourses preached before the University of Dublin. By WILLIAM LEE, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College. London: Rivingtons, 1854.*

WE should be doing great injustice to Mr. Lee, were we to withhold from him the credit of having made, in this work, a valuable and in many respects a remarkable contribution to our Biblical literature. It would, indeed, be difficult to name a more ample and varied storehouse of information, bearing upon the general question of the matter and manner of Holy Scripture. In point of range, it may really be said to be coextensive with the literature of its subject, from the earliest to the latest day; while its tone, viewing it as a controversial work, is perfectly free from asperity, and renders it almost a model of calm and dignified argument.

At the same time, we cannot forbear, at the very outset, from pointing out, that writers as well as readers of works of this class are in great danger of over-estimating, and indeed of misconceiving altogether, their bearing upon the subject to which they refer. The idea under which a treatise of this sort, making some pretensions to completeness and exhaustiveness, is taken in hand, whether by author or student, is apt to be something of the following kind:—

‘Here, it is thought, ‘is a great question upon which one can-
‘not but feel a little uneasy, and about which countless volumes
‘have been written, and continue to be written daily:—here it is
‘going to receive a full investigation, and, we may hope, a satis-
‘factory settlement. So much has been said, of late years more
‘especially, on this subject of Inspiration, that it is most desirable
‘that we should at length come to understand the exact nature
‘of it; and be put fully in possession of the various and
‘irrefragable proofs that doubtless may be alleged for its
‘existence.’ Such, accordingly, is the title of Mr. Lee’s volume:
‘Inspiration: its Nature and Proof.’ Of course, this title

might, on inquiry, be found to mean no more than that the author was about to tender such *illustrations* as the subject admits, of the nature of that influence under which the sacred penmen produced the Holy Scriptures. And again, the *proof* offered by him might turn out to be no other than that one and only kind which can be strictly so called, or properly accepted as proof; of which more presently. Such, however, is not the case. On perusal, we find that Mr. Lee's design is no less than to give a full, satisfactory, and conclusive account of what Inspiration is, or was rather; how it acted on the subjects of it, where its operation began and where ended, and the like. On these points it is assumed that we are or may be perfectly informed. Such exact knowledge is conceived to be, somehow or other, a part of the Church's heritage. A Christian has a right, it is represented, (in effect, if not in so many words,) to full satisfaction on these matters. And it is supposed to be the business of theologians and doctors of the Church to render them such satisfaction—to furnish, in a word, a full and exact 'Theory of Inspiration:' and that too not merely as a topic of interesting and instructive inquiry, which of course it is, but as a matter of life and death for the Church; so that if she cannot make good her 'theory' against all the world—then *actum est*—it is all over with her, and with Christianity.

It is not improbable that both Mr. Lee and the majority of his readers will, at first sight, think that we have not a little misrepresented him in what we have now said. But we may challenge any person, writer or reader, on calm consideration of this book as a whole, to gainsay that its entire drift, and the idea upon which it really proceeds, is apparently such as we have represented. The line taken throughout is that there are no difficulties which are not either actually solved or soluble by the application of a just method of exegesis. The preface, for example, sets forth very distinctly that the thing that needs and has long needed to be done, is to produce an absolutely unexceptionable theory. All who in time past have sought to elaborate such a theory, are by no means represented as having been mistaken in their general aim, but only unfortunate in the particular theory adopted by them.

* The vagueness which too often characterises the language employed by writers who, in modern times, have treated of its Inspiration, seems to render a fundamental examination into the nature of this divine influence daily more desirable. So long, indeed, as the "mechanical" theory of Inspiration was generally maintained, there was no want of distinctness or consistency in the views put forward. So long as it was believed that each word and phrase to be found in the Bible, nay, even the order and grammatical connexion of such words and phrases, had been infused by the Holy Ghost into the minds of the sacred writers, or dictated to them

by his immediate suggestion, so long must the opinion held respecting Inspiration have been clear, intelligible, and accurately defined. But such a theory could not stand the test of close examination. The strongest evidence against it has been supplied by the Bible itself; and each additional discovery in the criticism of the Greek or Hebrew text confirms anew the conclusion that the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture can no longer rely upon such a principle for its defence. The "mechanical" theory having been tacitly abandoned, at least by all who are capable of appreciating the results of criticism, and *no system altogether satisfactory* having been proposed in its stead, there has gradually sprung up a want of definiteness, and an absence of consistency in the language used when speaking of Inspiration, owing to which those who are most sincere in maintaining the divine character of the Bible have not unfrequently been betrayed into concessions fatal to its supreme authority. And not only is there a vagueness in the language which most writers employ when approaching this topic, there is also a want of *completeness in the method* usually adopted when discussing. With reference to the nature of Inspiration itself, and to the possibility of reconciling the unquestionable stamp of humanity impressed upon every page of the Bible, with that undoubting belief in its perfection and infallibility which is the Christian's most precious inheritance, it may safely be maintained that in English theology almost nothing has been done; and that no effort has hitherto been made to grapple directly with the difficulties of the subject.—*Preface, p. iii.*

It will be observed that the *desiderata* intended to be supplied by the work are: 'a system altogether satisfactory;' 'completeness of method;' such a treatise, in short, as will expound the *nature* of Inspiration, with especial reference to 'the possibility of reconciling the unquestionable stamp of humanity impressed upon every page of the Bible, with an undoubting belief in its perfection and infallibility.'

And such as the preface is, such, as in duty bound, is the book. It proceeds from first to last upon the plan of stating, candidly and dispassionately, the difficulties alleged by rationalistic, or infidel, or otherwise 'scientific' writers, and then showing that there is, in fact, in each several instance, no difficulty at all. There are, it is represented, certain distinctions, more especially one between Revelation and Inspiration—treated in a sufficiently interesting way—by duly bearing which in mind, we shall see our way through whatever of cloud or mist may have gathered around the subject.

We trust it will be understood—and if not, we shall abundantly make it clear hereafter—that we by no means deprecate, nor have any wish to depreciate, the very interesting discussions upon which Mr. Lee has entered, and from which we ourselves, at any rate, have gathered much both of instruction and interest. The mistake against which we would most earnestly warn the reader, is that of representing the *summa rei* of Christianity as being at stake in these encounters. What we do deprecate is this *arrière pensée* with which these studies are

entered upon. For it is manifest, that to attach this degree of importance to them, is to suspend the Christian faith on the issue of a contest between human wits. This is admitted by Mr. Lee to be involved in the line taken in his volume. Speaking of the character of his work, he says:—

‘My object throughout has simply been to collect as many facts and results as my acquaintance with ancient and modern researches into the text or interpretation of Scripture could supply; and thence to declare what appeared to be the necessary inference. In every inquiry so conducted, the safety of the inference must, of course, depend on the extent of the induction; and, consequently, the success of the method which I have ventured to suggest is susceptible of being indefinitely increased, in proportion to the number of new facts and results, which may hereafter be accumulated by those whose learning and attainments far surpass any that I can pretend to possess.’—P. v.

‘The safety of the inference,’ he truly observes, ‘must depend upon the extent of the induction.’ So that, according to this view, our faith in the authority and credibility of Holy Scripture hangs upon the soundness or unsoundness of an inductive conclusion: in other words, upon the success of ‘ancient and modern researches,’ designed to maintain that authority and credibility. The obvious corollary is, that if, in any single case, all our research fails to give a satisfactory account of apparently contradictory phenomena in the Scriptures, we must give up our reliance upon them. It is very true that, as is here said, ‘new facts and results’ may, and in all probability will, hereafter be accumulated, of a kind favourable to the authority of Scripture. But, then, new objections may be, and are accumulated likewise; and, in striking a balance, we have no reason for saying that it will be *pro* rather than *con*. It is surely a naïve admission, and points to something defective in the whole treatment of the subject, that ‘the success of the method’ pursued in this work ‘is susceptible of being indefinitely increased.’ We profess ourselves unable to comprehend a *graduated success* in a matter of this kind. If the proof alleged for the divine authority of Scripture is sufficient, why, it is successful, and there is an end of the matter. It may receive fresh illustrations, confirmations, and the like, but more successful it can never be.

The truth is, that in some respects the able and learned author of the book before us has, in common with many, perhaps with the great majority, of those who think about such subjects at all, suffered himself to be beguiled into placing the authority and credibility of Scripture upon a wrong issue—upon one which the Church has never accepted, nor can for a moment consent to be bound by. A few clever but unstable, and, it must be added, notwithstanding their pretensions that way, really unphilosophical men, have managed to persuade a good part of the religious and

literary 'public' that a more formidable onslaught than the world has yet witnessed is in preparation, or indeed is in a measure already come, against the Holy Scriptures, considered as the written depositories of the Christian faith. The slogan of this onset was thus sounded by Dr. Arnold, speaking of the late S. T. Coleridge's speculations, in a letter to Mr. Justice Coleridge:—

'Have you seen your uncle's "*Letters on Inspiration*," which, I believe, are to be published? They are well fitted to break ground in the approaches to that momentous question, which involves in it so great a shock to existing notions; the greatest probably that has ever been given since the discovery of the falsehood of the Pope's infallibility.'

On this Mr. Lee remarks:—

'It cannot be doubted, I apprehend, that Dr. Arnold's remark is, to a certain extent, well founded; and that this treatise of Mr. Coleridge has done more than any modern work to unsettle the public mind in these countries, with respect to the authority due to the Bible as a whole.'

Now, it may be very true that increased vehemence and some novelty of tactics have of late been displayed, and that the minds of not a few have been in a measure disquieted by this treatise of Coleridge and similar works. But what we would most strongly affirm is, that this by no means proves the real formidableness of the attack, but only the weakness and unpreparedness of the general mind. And we hasten to reassure plain people, hearers, perhaps, rather than readers of these things, that there is not the least occasion for any uneasiness. The evidence for the authenticity, inspiration, the divine origin, or call it what you will, of the Scriptures, stands exactly where it did some seventeen hundred years ago. When we come to look into the matter, we find that, vehement as the assault and battery may have been, nothing can well produce less effect than have these missiles on the real position and *status* of the Scriptures. To the superficial eye, they may have done somewhat of the indignity they were intended to do to the outward shell and surface, but that is all. The actual damage to the fortress is, as we shall point out presently, absolutely inappreciable. The only real mischief is not so much a material as a moral one. Such a bruit and storm has been raised about the ears of the Church's defenders, that unwary men have been prevailed upon to leave their stronghold, and to descend into a battle-field upon which they have no sort of commission or warrant for risking her cause.

This is by no means an unnatural or an uncommon result of assaults of this nature. A special onslaught is observed to be made against some outwork or other; the defenders muster around it with an eagerness quite disproportioned to its importance, and fare as they may in the defence of it; and if in any

single point they fail to make it good for their side, immediately the cry is that all is lost. But all is not lost, it may be, for all that; nor perhaps anything that the defenders were really interested to maintain.

And now, to drop our metaphors. When the Church is asked for her proofs of the divine authority of the Scriptures, her first word is—Testimony; and her second is—Testimony; and her third is—Testimony. It is true there are countless subsidiary confirmations of their claim to be what she says they are; just as there were many subsidiary things which went, in Demosthenes' view, to make an orator. But in the last resort, when pressed with the inquiry as to what her mind rests on as ultimate and beyond appeal and gainsaying, the proof which the Church alleges is one, and one only. The whole thing has been a matter of testimony from the beginning. Before the Scriptures of the New Testament existed, Christianity rested upon testimony; and when they were written, it rested upon testimony still. The original testimony deposed to a vast body of facts, relative both to our Lord and to His disciples,—among them, to that inspiration and divine commission imparted, in all necessary measure, to the latter. And after a little while, the testimony on which the Church relied included one fact more, or rather one peculiar development of a fact all along testified to. A divine commission *to speak*, to teach authoritatively with the mouth concerning the Gospel, had been from the first deposed to; and it was quite as probable, neither less so nor more, for aught that appears, that men should be divinely commissioned to write, as to speak. Accordingly, side by side with the original undoubting belief that the apostles and others *spoke* the truth,—side by side with this, only a little junior in point of time, and incapable of being disentangled from it by us,—had grown up the no less undoubting belief that the same persons *wrote* the truth; that they taught, to all intents and purposes, correctly and effectually by writing, no less than by words. You cannot, we repeat, disentangle or discriminate between the belief and *fiducia* reposed in the oral teaching of apostolic days and men, and that reposed in their written teaching. The same men who unhesitatingly accepted the one, unhesitatingly accepted the other also. What was the *kind of evidence*, or the *amount of it*, which satisfied them on the subject, we are more or less ignorant, perhaps absolutely so. But what we do know is, that the evidence, whatever it was, *did* satisfy them; that they accepted what we now call the New Testament Scriptures, as coming undoubtedly from God,—as teaching soundly and truly concerning the faith: just as they accepted the apostolic verbal teaching as good for the same purposes. And exactly as the original deposit of the faith, *i.e.*

the facts of Christianity, and the bearings of them, embodied mainly in the Creed and the Sacraments,—exactly as these were handed on from mouth to mouth, and from each generation to the next, just so was the slightly newer adjunct—the deposition as to what was authentic Scripture, or, in other words, ‘the Canon of Scripture,’—handed on likewise. So that, as we have said, the Church knows no difference as to the grounds on which she believes the New Testament to be Scripture—*i.e.* divinely authorized and originated writing—and those on which she believes that the apostles were apostles, (*i.e.* divinely authorized and empowered messengers and teachers,) at all. She never saw the apostles in the flesh, nor can she, perhaps, point with a certainty to a single historical monument of any one of them; ‘their sepulchres’ may, or may not, ‘be with us to this day.’ But she is quite sure that there were such persons, for all that; and that they were what they represented themselves to be. How? Simply by the evidence of those who lived at the time; who had seen them in the flesh, and who could satisfy themselves, and were perfectly satisfied of the genuineness of their pretensions and of the truth of their wondrous story. We cannot shake that evidence, were it only because we do not know what it was.

Will any in later times rise up and say they are not satisfied with this proof? Be it so. But then, be it observed, they must give up at the same time all historical belief whatsoever. They must absolutely give up, for example, all belief in the existence and the received accounts of Julius Cæsar. Why? Because the evidence for his existence and actions is precisely of the same kind, and can be of no other kind than that which exists for the existence and actions of the apostles, of our Lord Himself; with only this difference, that the evidence in the latter case is ten-fold—we might say ten thousand-fold—greater than in the former. Not merely the vast number of Churches throughout the world, who were found (say, at the time of the Nicene Council) to believe precisely the same general facts, *and every one of which represented ultimately one or more contemporary witnesses*; not this merely, but the immense interests at stake in the first instance; the radical change in ways and notions involved in the act of becoming a convert:—these, and various other well-known circumstances tending to impede the acceptance of the apostolic teaching in the first instance, serve to swell the amount of evidence for the reality of the alleged facts of Christianity, far beyond anything that can be adduced for any common historical fact, or set of facts, such as the history of Julius Cæsar. What do these facts rest on, setting aside for the moment written testimony? On a very vague and loose tradition indeed. Certain monu-

ments at Rome or elsewhere, certain coins bearing his image and superscription, are held to be sufficient evidence that there was such a man, that he was a general and a ruler, and the like. But who sees not that these monuments themselves require to be shored up by many a buttress of 'common belief'—these disjointed links of evidence to be woven together by many a cramping ring of testimony; and that, after all, the strength of the evidence lies in this, that, looking at the entire case, no reasonable, or otherwise than very captious person can doubt of the truth of the facts alleged; simply because it never was doubted of. And why never doubted of? Because fame and common rumour, more or less vague—nothing very systematised, or that you could lay your finger upon—always represented that there had been such a person; those who lived at or near the time could not well be deceived about it; the story must have originated with them, or it would not be so general:—and the like arguments. It will be seen that we have only applied here the well-known 'historic doubts' argument. Now who will think of comparing this amount of traditional evidence with that which upholds the general facts of Christianity? Where are the societies of men, independent more or less of each other, and scattered over the face of the whole earth, who, with perfect unanimity, have believed these things as far back as the alleged time of their occurrence, on the strength, we must needs suppose, of original and ocular witnesses? Where is the uniform document or symbol, common to numerous and very various nations and lands, embodying any such belief in the existence of the Roman conqueror, as that in which the Christian creed has been conserved? Where are the rites or customs equally pervaded with the same belief? There is nothing of the kind, or in the slightest degree approaching to it.

We repeat, then, first, that the grounds on which the Church believes in the general facts of Christianity must be accepted as sufficient and satisfactory, unless we are prepared to give up all history besides; those grounds being from first to last of the nature of testimony—testimony which satisfied the first receivers of the facts, and which, therefore, have always satisfied her. And next, that the divine character and commission of the Scriptures is only one particular item in the sum of those things which are thus believed on the strength of primeval testimony. As we never saw the apostles in the flesh—have no ocular or personal evidence of our own of their existence or fidelity, to allege—cannot scrutinise their claims—cannot demand to see their credentials, but only know, as certainly as anything of the kind can be known, that *there were those who did*—even so is it with the Scriptures. We know not, any otherwise than by

testimony reaching back to the time of their being written, who wrote them; or that the writers had a divine commission to write them; or that they are to be accepted as teaching no less soundly concerning the faith than did the apostles, and other inspired teachers, by word of mouth. But we do know that those who lived nearest to the time of the writings *did* put these two sources of teaching perfectly on a par: the same men who appealed to one appealed to the other; taught, reasoned, dwelt on the written words, exactly as on the spoken teaching: and that is enough.

Nor can we reasonably be called upon to give up our belief of the divine origin and authority of the New Testament Scriptures on any other grounds than such as would deprive the historical existence of the whole Christian story of all claim upon credibility, since the historical facts and the written accounts of them both rest on precisely the self-same evidence, viz. contemporary testimony, which there are no means of shaking.

The following passage will illustrate the manner in which the acceptance of the apostolic and other writings grew up, inseparably interwoven with the acceptance of the original oral teaching, as has been here represented:—

‘We may remark,’ says Mr. Keble, in his Sermon on ‘Primitive Tradition,’ ‘the comparative rareness of quotations from the New Testament in writings of the first century:—in the Epistle of Clement, for instance, who, while he produces in almost every paragraph some testimony from the Jewish Scriptures, has only three or four references to the New Testament. Where such might be expected, he rather uses to remind men of “the depths of divine knowledge into which they had looked;” of the “immortal knowledge whereof they had tasted,” and of the apostolical examples which they had seen. Whereas the writers of the following age—Irenæus, Tertullian, and the rest—add to the argument from tradition—on which, in itself, they lay as much stress as S. Clement—authorities and arguments from the New Testament, much in the manner of controversialists of our own time.’

‘And thus,’ as the same writer observes elsewhere (Note E), ‘when exact traditions, of all at least but fundamental doctrine, would have become gradually more uncertain, its place was providentially supplied by the Canon of Scripture becoming fixed, and thoroughly known all over the Christian world.’ And the point which we are now concerned to dwell upon is, that it is absolutely impossible that these Scriptures could have thus come to be accepted as equivalent, for all purposes of teaching, argument, &c., to the living voices of the first preachers of Christianity, had not irresistible evidence been possessed, and possessed universally, that the one were as divine as the other—the writings as the men.

In a word, supposing these two points admitted—1, that there is a God, and 2, that it is not inconceivable or impossible that

He should open a communication between Himself and man,—*the divine origination of the New Testament Scriptures is as perfectly authenticated a fact as the whole range of history presents*—if, indeed, there be any which can, for certainty, be compared to it: so absolutely unassailable is the TESTIMONY upon which it rests. As we have already said, in speaking of the original oral account of Christianity, so we repeat with regard to the divine origin of Scripture—you may call it in question if you will, but you must give up with it the whole fabric of history.

And it is remarkable enough, that the latest and not least acute or laborious *redacteur* of the results of modern inquiry into the circumstances under which the New Testament Scripture originated, makes out that, judging by internal evidence, early quotations, and other symptoms, they cannot possibly be detached from the apostolic period. Mr. Westcott, in his recent work on the Canon of the New Testament, speaks as follows:—

‘Modern scholars, from various motives, have distinguished its constituent parts, and shown in what way each was related to the peculiar circumstances of its origin. Christianity has gained by the issue; for it is an unspeakable advantage that the Books of the New Testament are now felt [qu. ? probably shown] to be organically united with the lives of the Apostles, that they are recognised as living monuments, reared [qu. ? to all appearance] in the midst of struggles within and without by men who had seen Christ, stamped with the character of their age, and inscribed with the dialect which they spoke. It cannot be too often repeated, that the formation of the whole canon involves little less than the history of the building of the Catholic Church.’

This, we say, is valuable enough in its way, as an incidental confirmation, and as a remarkable conclusion for one to have arrived at, who has trodden the whole circle of German theology. But we utterly disallow the claims of any such merely scholastic and scientific conclusions to take their place in the highest rank of evidence; were it only that some yet more knowing man than Mr. Westcott may give, or seem to give, a serious shake to the whole fabric, by the help of the same scientific processes which have reared its imposing but precarious structure. For the truth is, we can, in this department, *prove* nothing; we may point to certain indications, but beyond this we cannot go.

There is, we repeat, but one absolutely unassailable ground to take. This, and this alone, is left perfectly untouched by rationalistic attacks on the Scriptures, from Celsus to Spinoza, and from Spinoza to F. Newman. Nor can anything be more weak than to descend from this vantage-ground to do battle over ‘difficulties,’ ‘discrepancies,’ and the like, under any such understanding as that the authority of Scripture hangs upon the issue of such discussions. The Church has never lacked among her sons those who are fully able to deal with these matters, as

far as they need to be dealt with; Celsus will ever, as of old, be sufficiently answered by Origen, and Spinoza by Butler. But for the entire security of her position, it may confidently be said that

‘Non eget his armis, neque defensoribus istis.’

Her grounds of belief are exactly what they have been from the beginning, whether such defenders are raised up or not. Clouds may pass over her sun, or spots be detected upon its disk; but the orb itself has in no whit the less certainly, on the evidence of irrefragable testimony, been placed in her firmament by Almighty God Himself. ‘He hath made it fast for ever and ever; He hath given it a law which shall not be broken.’

The Church’s reply, then, to all exceptions on the score of discrepancies, inconsistency with results of scientific research, or the like,—in a word, to the threatened extinction, by the powers of modern exegesis and science, of the claim set up for the Scriptures, as being of divine authority,—is not unlike that which was made on the occasion of a similar threat by a power no less would-be tyrannical, and equally illogical and inconclusive: ‘We are not careful to answer thee in this matter. If it be so, our God whom we serve is able to deliver us from the burning fiery furnace, and he will deliver us out of thine hand, O king. *But if not*, be it known unto thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up.’ These cavils will ever be made to the end of time, and be gloried in by some, and dreaded by others, as fatal to the authority of Scripture; and sometimes they will be better answered, and sometimes worse. But whether they are answered well or ill, or not at all, the Church utterly refuses to suspend her faith on any such issues. In testimony, the sources of which lie so deep that they cannot be meddled with, she has just such a ground of confidence as ‘the Three Children’ had in the goodness of the cause which they represented. Whether their God would save them on the instant,—how they should pass through that particular trial, they had no certainty: of one thing only, on grounds of old Israelitish faith, they were quite certain, viz. that the test proposed was a fallacious one altogether; the burning fiery furnace had no sort of commission to serve, *negatively*, as an assay of their pretensions as servants of the Most High God; though it might *positively*, as in the event it did, confirm the truth of them.

The application of all this is obvious; so much so, that it would have been superfluous to dwell upon it, but that, as we have said, the impugnors of Scripture have contrived to mystify the defenders of it, as to the true issue upon which alone they have any commission to rest their cause. Books on exegesis, harmonies,

and *hoc genus omne*, are useful enough to confirm the authority of Scripture, but they are absolutely without power to shake it; just as the experiment tried upon the persons of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, turning out as it did, was a valuable confirmation enough of the existence of the God of Israel, but would have been absolutely null and void (and was indeed protested against before trial) as a presumption against it. And we do not hesitate to say that more harm than good is done to the Christian cause by the best and most 'successful' book that can be written in its defence, if it proceeds upon the notion that Christianity depends for its position upon answering all possible cavils and objections: first, because it is impossible that all cavils can be answered, either in themselves or to the satisfaction of all men,—*ἀπλῶς* or *πρὸς τινας*; and next, because such a course involves the abandonment of the one ground which no cavil can touch or reach.

Mr. Lee's, then, is an excellent book; but not for the particular purpose for which it seems to have been written; viz. to give the true bearings of the whole question of the inspiration of Scripture. It does not do this. On the contrary, by its structure and its line, it entirely misleads the unwary as to the relative importance they should attach to the different kinds of alleged proof in the matter of Inspiration; and as to our capacities for defining with exactitude the nature and limits of that divine agency. Its *chiaro oscuro*, so to speak, is defective in more ways than one. It does not assign to different kinds of proof their due proportions; and it magnifies unduly our faculties for separating and discriminating the human and the divine. This defect is not peculiar to Mr. Lee; it is the fault incident to the whole class of writings—such, for example, as Mr. Westcott's otherwise valuable 'Elements of the Gospel Harmony.' All such works are apt to be looked upon as so many advances towards a sort of exegetical millennium, in which all 'difficulties' will have disappeared in the light of a 'science' at once sound in its processes and orthodox in its results; their appearance is hailed as if they were the great discoveries of the day—the very saviours, *pro tanto*, of the Christian cause. Whereas, except so far as their true place is clearly understood and habitually assigned to them, their influence, on the whole, will be, as we have already ventured to affirm, rather mischievous than beneficial.

We cannot better illustrate what it is that we desiderate in Mr. Lee's work, as far as regards the importance to be attached to different species of proof, than by drawing attention to his second lecture, entitled, 'The Immemorial Doctrine of the urch of God.'

‘No inquiry,’ says Mr. Lee, ‘respecting the subject of Inspiration *can possess greater importance* than that which will exhibit the degree and kind of estimation in which the writings, which contain those “oracles,” have been always held. . . . I propose, in the present discourse, to give the leading outlines of the doctrine respecting the Inspiration of the Divine Scriptures held by the Jews, as well as by the Christian Church from the earliest period. The importance of such external evidence is too obvious to permit us to pass it over without due consideration, or, as is too frequently the case, to assign it a subordinate place in our chain of proofs.’—P. 40.

So far, good. Shortly after, he well states what we may call the phenomena of the original testimony, as follows:—

‘The facts to be explained are briefly as follows:—Firstly, from a multitude of writings extant among the ancient Jews and Christians, a selection of certain books was made, to the exclusion of others. Secondly, the several books thus selected were received as infallible and divine; those which were excluded being regarded as fallible and human. Thirdly, in defence, not merely of the doctrines and religious system contained in these books, but of the very books themselves, both Jews and Christians have submitted to persecution and death.

‘To the first class of facts I can only advert in the most cursory manner. The selection of the writings acknowledged as sacred by the Jews cannot have been owing to their antiquity merely, for we learn from the Book of Numbers, that even in the days of Moses, there was extant a record entitled, “The Book of the Wars of the Lord.” Nor, in order to confer divine authority upon any book, was the fact sufficient, that it had been written by a prophet known to have received revelations from Heaven; for, if so, why do we not find in the Canon “The acts of Uzziah first and last,” written by “Isaiah the Prophet, the son of Amoz?” Nor, again, did the circumstance of a document having been composed in the Hebrew language secure its recognition as divine; for the Jews never admitted among their sacred writings the Book of Ecclesiasticus, which was undoubtedly drawn up in Hebrew, and whose author, moreover, assumes the prophetic tone, and lays no small claim to authority. Add to all this, the astonishing fidelity and affection with which the Jews preserved the writings which they did receive into their Canon,—writings, too, which were not the memorial of their glory, but of their shame; and in which their lawgiver, from the very first, calls heaven and earth to witness against them.

‘The case of the New Testament is no less peculiar. It is plain that the primitive Christians did not consider apostles as alone qualified to compose inspired documents; for, were such their belief, how can we account for the reception of the Gospels of S. Mark and S. Luke? Nor is the admission of these Gospels to be explained by saying, that no other memorials of the life of Christ existed than the four evangelical narratives, and that the early Christians gladly collected every fragment of their Master’s history: for not only, as the best criticism explains, does the introduction of S. Luke’s Gospel refer to “many who had taken in hand to set forth” a narrative of the works of that period, but the earliest of the Fathers also (*e. g.* S. Irenæus, A.D. 167) describe the Apocryphal Gospels as being “countless in number.” Nor, again, can we account for the admission into the New Testament of the writings of S. Mark and S. Luke, by alleging that, as companions and friends of the Apostles, these Evangelists had opportunities of gaining such accurate information respecting the doctrines of the Christian faith as was not within the reach of others: for, if this be so, why did the Church never recognise as canonical the Epistle of S. Clement of Rome—“my fellow-labourer,” writes S. Paul, “whose name

is in the Book of Life;" or, which is still more remarkable when we recollect the relation of S. Barnabas to S. Paul, how comes it to pass that the Epistle of S. Barnabas was rejected from the New Testament, while the Gospel of S. Mark, "his sister's son," was received?—Pp. 43—46.

But then follows the conclusion, containing our author's comment on these correctly-stated phenomena.

'The several details connected with the general question here considered belong, (?) however, to another department of theology. I would merely add, and this even the most reluctant are forced to admit, that the reception of the different parts of the New Testament as Scripture, took place without external concert,—from an inward impulse, as it were, at the same time and in the most different places; and that, with scarcely an exception, each writing which it contains was all at once, and without a word of doubt, placed on a level with the Old Testament, which had hitherto been regarded as exclusively divine. In short, the authority conceded to this new component of the Scriptures, seems to have grown up without any one being able to place his finger upon the place or moment when adhesion to it was first yielded.'—P. 47—49.

This extract contains a singular mixture of correct and incorrect conception. It is rightly pointed out, that with scarcely one exception, each writing was, all at once and without a word of doubt, placed on a level with the Old Testament, and that the authority conceded to them 'seems to have grown up without any one being able to place his finger on the place or moment when adhesion to it was first yielded.' But it is surely most surprising that our excellent author should, after predicating such great things of it at the outset, treat this part of his subject so slightly and cursorily after all; saying that 'the details of it belong to another branch of theology,' (we would fain know what branch.) But the account itself, rendered or suggested, of the universal reception of the New Testament Scriptures, manifests a strange misapprehension as to the real state of the case. It is set down to 'some inward impulse pervading the Church.' We are unable to see the difference between this view and that of Dr. Tholuck, which Mr. Lee himself seems to disallow; viz. that the primitive Church was led, 'by an unconscious but sure historico-religious tact,' to receive such and such writings into the Canon. This is only one instance out of many in which Mr. Lee has allowed himself to be led away from the plain state of the case by his German guides, and by the mysterious phraseology in which they couch their oracles. The whole thing was, as we have said again and again, a matter of *testimony* from beginning to end. On that ground, and on no 'inward impulse,' by no 'historico-religious tact,' were the pretensions of candidates for admission to the Canon decided. Another and equally feeble reason is given in the following passage:—

'It may be urged, in explanation of such facts, that the very nature of the books themselves occasioned the preference given to them. It may be

said, that the difference in point of style, and manner, and contents, as well of the books of the Old Testament from the Apocrypha, as of the New Testament from the writings of the Apostolical Fathers, is such as admits of no comparison; that the superiority of the books of Scripture is uncontested and incontestable; and that, as Hooker observes of the sacred writers, "a greater difference there seemeth not to be between the manner of their knowledge, than there is between the manner of their speech and others." And, finally,—it may be further argued,—without any need of supposing special divine guidance, the simple facts of the case account for the formation of the Canon, and enabled the early Christians, not only to judge certain writings to be unworthy of the name of Scripture, but also to select others as deserving such acknowledgment. Be it so; such an explanation but serves to exalt the critical accuracy, the profound insight, the refined taste, of those who passed that judgment, and made that selection. The admission which such an explanation involves I claim wholly on the side of the present argument, and at once transfer it to the cause of Inspiration. That continued exercise of solid judgment, which selected such writings, and such writings only; that critical sagacity, which the most ingenious and subtle investigations of modern times have never been able to prove at fault; that unceasing caution and anxious vigilance, which never admitted into the Canon a single book for the rejection of which any valid reasons have ever been shown—such qualities, conceded to the Fathers of the first ages of the Church, only serve to enhance the value of their opinions upon every point connected with the Scriptures, and, above all, upon the subject of their Inspiration.'—P. 50.

This time we are invited to repose our belief in the authenticity of the Canon on the 'critical sagacity,' 'taste,' 'solid judgment,' &c. of the first ages, exercised in the selection and discrimination of the true Scriptures from the false. Was ever anything much more preposterous? It is true this is only thrown out as an *argumentum ad hominem*. But why suggest so baseless a view at all?

The pith of the whole matter has been correctly enough stated by authors referred to by Mr. Lee,—Doddridge, for example :—

'I greatly revere the testimony of the primitive Christian writers, not only to the real existence of the sacred books in those early ages, but also to their divine original: their persuasion of which most evidently appears from the veneration in which they speak of them, even while miraculous gifts remained in the Church.'

And again, by Sack :—

'The recognition of any book by the Churches of either Old or New Covenant, is a fact at least as important as its having been written by such or such a person. For the question does not so much relate to the author in his individual capacity, as to the circumstance that, as a matter of fact, he was acknowledged by the Church as a person divinely qualified or called to write of divine things for the Church.'

We are glad, again, to find Mr. Westcott, in his work on the Canon, already referred to, speaking in the following terms :—

'It is of the utmost importance to remember that the Canon was never referred, in the first ages, to the authority of Fathers or Councils. The

appeal was made, not to the judgment of men, but of churches. . . . Its limits were fixed in the earliest times *by use, rather than by criticism, and this use itself was based on immediate knowledge.*'

And he proceeds to relegate internal criticism to its due place.

'But though external evidence is the *proper proof* both of the authenticity and authority of the New Testament, it is *supported* by powerful internal testimony, drawn from the relations of the books one to another, and to the early developments of Christian doctrine. Subjective criticism, when used as an independent guide, is always uncertain, and often treacherous; but when it is confined to interpretation and comparison of historic data, it *confirms as well as illustrates.*'—*Westcott*, p. 539.

Elsewhere he remarks (p. 548), in full accordance with what has been said above, that 'the idea of the New Testament and 'the Creed grew out of the same circumstances, and were fixed 'by the same authority.'

We trust we have now made good, to the satisfaction of all reasonable persons, the assertion hazarded by us some pages back; viz., that the proof of the authenticity and divine character of the Holy Scriptures stands exactly where it did from the beginning; that the Church's principal *pièce de résistance* is absolutely untouched by arguments directed against their contents and character.

We would now briefly point out how this fact affects the attitude to be assumed towards such objections. For it is one thing to show that such and such a line of argument, considered abstractedly, is invalid, and quite another to deprive it of its disquieting effects on the mind of particular persons.

It is then notorious, that a class of writers has risen up in England, who, with various degrees of boldness, and motives scarcely less various, impugn the divine authenticity [of the Scriptures on the following ground (to which, it will be found, all their objections reduce themselves):—that they contain certain elements visibly human. Were they really divine, it is argued—were they accredited channels of divine teaching—they would be absolutely raised above all inaccuracy whatsoever; inaccuracy rhetorical, descriptive, pictorial, or whatsoever. And, in particular, the narrator's own view of anything, the aspect under which it appeared to him, would nowhere be allowed to influence the narration. The absolute, strict, literal truth about everything—that, no more and no less, would be told us. The reason for exacting this species and this degree of accuracy is, we are told, that, if the narrator, viewed as a teacher, is (in any sense, and from whatever cause) incorrect as to a single particular,—we cannot tell but that he may be deceived in the main circumstances and events of Christianity.

M. Gaussen and his school have accepted the challenge, and maintain that it is even so, as the objectors require. But are the objectors themselves willing to follow their demand out to its logical results? We are sure they dare not. Strictly speaking, it is simply impossible to give in words an absolutely accurate account of anything. Events, nay objects, are not so absolutely translatable into language, as that the language shall perfectly reflect and render them. To use an illustration. A mirror, or a smooth expanse of water, cannot correctly reflect the whole of an object or a landscape; it can only reflect that side of either which is turned towards it. And just so language cannot go round about an object or an event, and so render all the sides and aspects of it, that the narrative shall omit nothing that is in the object, and exhibit nothing that is not. And yet, for all that, events are said to be correctly described, and may, for all human purposes, be described sufficiently, so that a man may say that the account is true and not false. What these objectors then ask for, is simply an entirely new machinery for the rendering and narrating of facts. To follow out our illustration: something of the nature of the stereoscope ought, according to them, to have been provided; a narrative professedly divine ought to exhibit objects to the eye with a solidity, a rotundity, and a completeness beyond what is exacted in ordinary narrations. If it does not do this, but shares the ordinary limits and incapacities, so to speak, of ordinary language, it cannot be a safe or reliable vehicle of knowledge.

This is, in fact, to demand the supposed Septuagint miracle over again. Two different narrators, as long as they continue men, and have the natural use of their faculties, will unavoidably narrate the same event with more or less of discrepancy. One will say merely that there was 'a storm;' another would describe it as 'a great storm of wind'—words conveying a much enlarged idea. And this kind of variation may take a very wide range without impairing the truthfulness of the narration.

The question, then, is not whether there should be, in written accounts of divine events, discrepancies, either with each other or with the absolute, abstract facts of the case. Such discrepancies there must and ought to be. You may call it a 'difficulty' that there should be such variations; but it would be a much greater 'difficulty' if there were none. The only question that can properly be entertained is, what amount of discrepancy would Almighty God be likely to overrule and prevent, in writings destined to be the deposit of Christian truth? And this is a question which we can only answer, if at all, by the help of very general analogies, and by looking to the scheme of God's dealings on a large scale. Thus we know that there

are ingredients and elements of injury in the most necessary and healthful products of the universe. It would surprise an unchemical, but very logical person, to have it proved to him that there is in the air he breathes a certain amount of *azote*—an element altogether uncondusive to life, if not absolutely, in its proper nature, destructive of it. Yet this *azote* is not only an ingredient of air, but, as it should seem, a condition of its respirability. So too in food, pure, unmixed nutritiousness is not only unattainable in the abstract, but all food, to be practically nutritious, must contain some parts which do not redound to nourishment. In a word, a certain coarseness of process seems inseparable, as far as we know, from the finest results. The most perfect products reach us in a certain follicle or husk, which is not, indeed, that which we seek, yet is inseparable from it, considered as communicable to us. What, then, if it pleased the Creator of all speech and all writing to take them such as He found, or rather such as He made them? Is it, of the two, more or less probable, that he should interfere to disengage from what we may call its *azote*—that is to say, from the ordinary imperfections inseparable from language as a vehicle—the divine knowledge of Himself which breathes in the Scriptures? Is it philosophical, is it reasonable, to conclude, that because some trifling and unimportant variations—for no one pretends that they are important in themselves, or in their bearing upon divine truth, but only as affecting the veracity and credibility of the writers—that because these exist, amounting even, as far as we can perceive, to irreconcilability, that therefore the whole narrative is deprived of its claims, however strong otherwise, to divine origination? Is the slightest imperfection of statement as to the entire facts of the case—the smallest difference of rendering between two narrators, such as, for example, the mention of one or two blind men—is this to be held ruinous to the entire fabric of Scripture? Have we the slightest reason for asserting that He who permitted one Evangelist to speak of the ‘storm,’ the other of the ‘great storm of wind,’ would interfere precisely at this point, to secure the mention of the second blind man? Or, in general, shall the *humanity* of each several writer, manifestly appearing in his work—shall this create a moment’s misgiving as to his authority as a teacher?

For this line of argument, as we have before observed, cannot stop here. It must go on to the denial of the possibility of any communication between God and man, through man. If you cross-question S. John’s Gospel, you must cross-question S. John too. The same mind which doubts an Evangelist as an Evangelist, because he comes forth also as a man, must inevitably refuse to S. Peter the character of a divine teacher,

because once, in a matter demanding the wisdom of the serpent, he rather acted with the simplicity of the dove, and fell into the toils of Judaizers, so that S. Paul 'withstood him to the face.' Nay, a single lapse of memory on the part of an Apostle as to any minor event of our Lord's days in the flesh, ought in reason to stagger such a mind as to his credentials, though he could show otherwise all 'the signs of an apostle.' And thus these miserable and absolutely unphilosophical objections land us on the dreary shore of the negation of all divine light as communicable to man at all. If they are worth a moment's thought, they claim hopelessly to shut the door between heaven and earth; because, on their showing, all communication is simply impossible. The archetypal mystery of the Incarnation is, we need not say, to such objectors an impossibility.

Nor can we forbear to dwell for a moment on the self-deception, if, indeed, it be not a form of hypocrisy, which pervades these works—the writings of the Froudes, the Newman, the Gregs of the day. It is, we are asked to believe, out of their exceeding zeal for the interests of truth, that they urge their objections against the divine authority of the Scriptures. So fearful are they of accepting anything that is not true, that they are bound in conscience to urge these objections. Now, if they had set out with saying that the whole or the greater part of the teaching of the Bible was shocking to their moral nature, they might have some reason for thinking that they were in earnest in this plea. But though one or two objections to the morality of Scripture have ever been harped upon—as, *e. g.*, the command to destroy the Canaanites—they cannot deny that nineteen-twentieths of its entire teaching, alike in morals and divinity, is incomparable: that no book or system in the world is anything near so pure and glorious in its conceptions either of the Divine Nature or of human duty. And they have great reason to mistrust the sincerity of their unwillingness to receive so excellent a gift of teaching, so lofty a theism, or so pure a morality. If they were really seeking, as they profess, for *wahrheit*, they would prefer running the slight risk—which is all they can prove, even on their own showing, against the reception of the Scriptures as God's truth—rather than, for fear of this trifling alloy, give up so great, even if it were conceded to be not an unmixed benefit. To be consistent, they ought to forbear to draw another breath, for fear of the azote; and to stand in awe of the medical science, which teaches us that we must needs receive into our bodily system much that is not food, or go without food at all.

The only intelligible attitude then, on grounds of common sense or reasonableness, for the mind to assume towards

writings accredited to us as divine by testimony which we cannot shake, and have no reason for questioning, is that of *reverence*; a deep sense of the mystery, which must encompass whatever reaches into two spheres of being, the divine and the human. To such as are armed with this, (and he who throws it away is in an untenable position,) 'the shock to existing notions,' in the matter of inspiration, need not be much, after all. When we look around and ask ourselves calmly what has been shaken by the concussion, we find that all that has been proved is, that there is a mystery in the matter; and this we knew before. And till it can be shown—which it never has and never can be—that the things which we believe at the bidding of Scripture are altogether, or even in any proportion worth speaking of, shocking to our moral nature, and to the rooted instincts of humanity; or, again, are absolutely contradictory in themselves, one great palpable and self-convicted falsehood—so long we may calmly and uniformly point to the original *testimony* on which the divine origination of Scripture rests, as an infinitely stronger ground of belief than any which can be alleged on the other side. And we sit down to the consideration of difficulties, discrepancies, &c., and to the general question of the kind of guidance under which the sacred writers wrote, without suspending one iota of our faith on discussions of the kind, and without in the least undertaking to frame, or expecting to find propounded, a 'Theory of Inspiration' which will exactly fit into all the intricacies of the mystery before us. We shall be prepared to find that our 'existing notions' were, more or less, crude and ill-considered. Our minds may have misconceived, in some respects, the phenomena of the mystery. It may never have struck us before, and may a little surprise us now, to notice this or that strongly human characteristic in a writing claiming to be divine. But what of that? It does but shift to a certain extent, as compared with our former conception, the conditions under which the human and divine element coexist; it cannot touch the original fact of such coexistence, which we have believed on grounds totally independent of these subordinate adjustments. Nor shall we be a whit the less satisfied with a Theory of Inspiration, for its not undertaking to explain everything.

In this spirit, then, we would approach, and counsel others to approach, discussions like those contained in Mr. Lee's volume. So entering on them, we may not, indeed, attach to them all the importance which seems to be claimed for them, but we may find in them an agreeable study, not the less so for being no longer an anxious one.

Mr. Lee insists very strongly, and of course with good reason,

on what is called—awkwardly enough, we must think—the ‘dynamical’ as opposed to the ‘mechanical’ theory of Inspiration; meaning thereby that the Holy Spirit operated as an influence, not reducing the subject of it to a mere machine. This, we say, is of course the true account of the matter; only we cannot think that any statement or nomenclature of this kind can have any pretensions to divest the subject of its inherent mystery, or to penetrate very far into that mystery. The union of human freedom of action with divine control—whether the latter be special, as in the case of apostolic teaching, or ordinary—must ever, as to the exact nature and limits of the two involved elements, elude our faculties of discrimination. Mr. Lee has well described the view of the early Church on this subject:—

‘The primitive Church did not shrink from expressing a decided opinion as to the effect produced upon the sacred penmen while actuated by the Spirit’s influence—an opinion clearly indicated by the series of similitudes which the different writers employed who approached the subject of Inspiration, and which were admirably calculated, had there been occasion to develop them, to illustrate that mutual cooperation of the divine and human agencies which, as we have seen, forms the first condition of our problem. The language made use of plainly denotes that the human element was not thought to have been suppressed or suspended, but to have been filled and exalted by the divine illumination: and to this notion belongs that entire system of illustration so familiar to the Fathers from the earliest times.

‘They compared the soul of the man of God, when subjected to the Divine influence, to an instrument of music into which the Holy Spirit breathes, or the strings of which He sways like the plectrum of a harp or lyre, in order to evoke its vital tones. Such illustrations were obviously suggested by the very etymology of the word Inspiration—or as S. Paul terms it [qu.?] *Theopneustia*; and when they are applied to men as the agents of the Holy Spirit, we should remember that the tone and quality of the note depend as much upon the instrument itself as upon the hand which sweeps over its strings. And, carrying out the analogy, we can easily see, when we reflect upon the full and deep harmonies of Scripture, how much of their power and beauty lies in the divine union of the different human instruments through which we listen to the breathings of the Spirit. Thus, Origen, speaking of the consistency of the various parts of scripture, finely observed, “Scripture, as a whole, is God’s one, perfect, and complete instrument; giving forth to those who wish to learn, its one saving music from many notes combined; stilling and restraining all strivings of the Evil One, as David’s music calmed the madness of Saul.” All such illustrations, no doubt, clearly recognise a relatively passive state in the sacred penmen; but they by no means imply that such a state involved inaction or unconscionness. On the contrary, the decided manner in which the very writers, who have made use of the similitudes in question, oppose the erroneous views as to Prophecy with which they had to contend, proves how sensibly they felt the distinction which subsists between the vibration of the strings of an instrument of music, and the pulsations of a human heart touched and animated by the Spirit of God. Add to this, the marked omission by the Fathers, while adopting the language and analogies employed by Philo, of any allusion to that suppression of intellectual

energy, and of the exercise of reason, which, as we have seen, was so much insisted on by the Jewish philosopher.—Pp. 79—81.

The treatment of the Old Testament is, we are disposed to think, the most successful part of this volume; it abounds in valuable disquisitions, as well as summaries of opinion, on many topics of interest connected with the elder Economy. The Second Person of the Holy Trinity, considered as revealing, even in the older times, the knowledge of God the Father, is dwelt on in a valuable chapter entitled ‘The Logos, the Revealer.’ After speaking, in language pervaded with the spirit of a sound and deep theology, of the Divine Word as the Creator, Mr. Lee thus proceeds:—

‘But the Old Testament does not confine itself to this representation of the fact, that the revelations which it contains are but new instances of Creative Power, thereby leading us back to the Author of all creation—the Eternal Son; it presents Him directly to our view, as unfolding in Person the divine counsels, under the mysterious character of the ANGEL OF JEHOVAH. To this title, employed for the first time to describe His appearance in the age of Abraham, laying the foundation, as it were, of all future revelations to the chosen race, some attention must be devoted.

‘The passages of the Old Testament which refer to this aspect of Revelation, may be reduced to three heads. In the first place, the Angel of Jehovah, by the use of the first person singular, identifies Himself with the Divine Nature. Thus, “The Angel of the Lord said unto Hagar, I will multiply thy seed exceedingly;” and in a subsequent verse we read, that “She called the name of Jehovah that spake unto her, Thou God seest me.” Secondly, reference is made to the Angel, so as to prevent our understanding any other than a Being essentially Divine. For example, Jacob says, “God, before whom my fathers Abraham and Isaac did walk, the God which fed me all my life long unto this day, the Angel which redeemed me from all evil, bless the lads;” where the identification of the Angel with Him from whom alone all blessing flows, and who redeems from all evil, cannot be doubted. Thirdly, a certain distinction is made between the Angel of Jehovah and Jehovah Himself; but in such a manner as to represent that the essence of Deity had become manifest and operative in the former. Thus, Jehovah says, “Behold I send an Angel before thee to keep thee in the way . . . Beware of Him, and obey His voice, provoke Him not, for He will not pardon your transgressions, for my Name is in Him;” where even without dwelling upon the signification of the phrase, “Name of Jehovah,” we can only understand such words as describing a distinct divine Personality. An expression in the Epistle to the Hebrews casts further light on the class of texts which have been just considered. The sacred writer observes: “Wherefore, holy brethren, partakers of the heavenly calling, consider the Apostle and High Priest of our profession, Christ Jesus.” The true force of these words will at once appear, if we compare the etymology of the expression “Apostle,” with that of the title applied in the Old Testament, as we have seen, to the Person of the Eternal Word, in His character of Revealer. Christ is here called “Apostle” or “Messenger,” with plain reference to His office, under the former dispensation, as “Angel of Jehovah.” The term “Angel,” indeed, could not have been employed without confusing the meaning; for in the two preceding chapters, it had been used to denote the species of Angels as distinguished from the human race; and hence, it could not fitly

describe in the passage before us the peculiar office of Christ as "the Angel;" the inspired writer accordingly selects for this purpose the term "Apostle," which equally denotes the same idea, and which is borrowed from a verb continually employed by S. John, in a strictly technical sense, to signify the "mission of the Eternal Son into the world," this Evangelist repeatedly describing Christ as "the Apostle," or as He "whom God *hath sent*." S. Paul, therefore, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, alludes to the Angel of Jehovah, who, under the Law, had revealed God to the people; referring at the same time to the High Priest, who was the representative of the people before God. With these features of the theocratic dispensation, he compares the Christian scheme. "Consider," he writes, "the Apostle and High Priest of our (*i. e.* the Christian) profession;" and he then goes on to develop at some length the comparison thus instituted.—Pp. 120—124.

In more than one passage, very interesting analogies and correspondences are pointed out between the treatment of the same subject in the Old Testament and the New—all of which are so many new vouchers for the unity of design which pervades the whole. The following is a good instance:—

'But even here we are reminded, notwithstanding all such traces of the prophets' own personality, how a higher principle moulds and directs their words. There was one topic which was not submitted to their own style of representation. Amid the copious and varied symbolism of Scripture, we can observe how the pictures of those visions in which Jehovah himself is revealed, always preserve a character quite peculiar; although, when describing certain attributes of Deity—which in no case can be described otherwise than by metaphors—each prophet still employs his wonted imagery. When Jehovah Himself appears, the sacred writers borrow no colouring from external sources;—were they to do so, indeed, they would manifestly abandon the whole genius and spirit of the Theocracy; and this uniformity in describing their visions of God, characterises the compositions of all the prophets, notwithstanding the prominence in other parts of their writings of their own individuality. To satisfy ourselves of this fact, it will be sufficient to compare the accounts of the visions of Jehovah vouchsafed to Isaiah, Daniel, and Ezekiel.'—Pp. 181, 182.

"It is unnecessary," a note adds, "to quote from the Apocalypse. Cf. *e.g.* Rev. iv."

Two of the Lectures are entitled 'Revelation and Inspiration.' As usual, there is a fund of valuable matter in them: but after the maturest consideration, we cannot but demur altogether to the distinction which our author here advances, and on which, indeed, he relies for the clearing up of all such difficulties as the 'dynamical theory of Inspiration' fails to solve. His view is, that 'revelation and inspiration are to be distinguished by the sources from whence they proceed; revelation 'being the peculiar function of the Eternal Word; inspiration 'the result of the agency of the Holy Spirit.' We are not indisposed, indeed, to admit that there are considerable indications in the *Elder Economy*, of such a distribution of offices, so to speak, between the Second and Third Persons of the Holy Trinity. That the Logos was emphatically the Revealer, is, as

we have already had occasion to recognise, a doctrine as true, probably, as it is old. Yet, certainly, on the other hand, the Spirit did *reveal* to those on whom it acted—as David—knowledge of future events, and the like. And God the Word did as certainly inspire the old prophets, since they ‘searched ‘who or what manner of time the *Spirit of Christ that was in them* ‘did signify when it testified beforehand,’ &c. So that even as regards the Old Testament, it is only true *in a sense*, that the Logos is the one Revealer; or the Spirit the one Inspirer. And much more, if possible, does this hold in the New Testament. There, as has been many times observed, it is impossible to dissociate any of the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity from agency in any of the great acts or processes of the Gospel. The Resurrection, for example, is at one time the act of the Father; at another, of the Spirit (Rom. i. 4); at another, of Christ Himself. And that entire influence under which the apostles and other persons discharged their great functions as messengers of Christ, is absolutely incapable of being exclusively assigned, as to any part of it, to any one Divine Person. ‘It ‘is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which ‘speaketh in you.’ And yet it is said again, ‘For I’ (that is, Christ) ‘will give you a mouth and wisdom which all your ‘adversaries shall not be able to gainsay or resist.’ And yet, after all, it was the Spirit that was thus to speak in them: ‘When He,’ the Spirit of truth, ‘is come, He will guide you into all truth.’ It is surely impossible, in the face of such passages as these—and the whole of S. John xiv.—xvi. is to the same effect—to lay down any such canon as Mr. Lee proposes. We cannot, we must not say, that the Holy Spirit alone dictated the New Testament Scriptures—that our Lord did but reveal, or make known, the Holy Spirit alone prompting the inditing of that which was known. We have no grounds whatever for drawing such distinctions; sound theology repudiates it: and it is indeed one which we have no faculties for entertaining. The very instance which Mr. Lee adduces in illustration, proves this: ‘Certain Tyrian prophets said to S. Paul, *through the Spirit*’—mark the expression—‘that he should not,’ &c. ‘To them,’ then, ‘had been *revealed* what the Holy Ghost was witnessing in every ‘city,’ &c. These prophets, however, *enjoyed no Inspiration*; (!) ‘they adulterated the *Revelation*, &c. which the guidance of the ‘Spirit enabled S. Paul to understand and obey.’ Surely there is an astonishing confusion here—men who ‘spoke by the Spirit’ had ‘no inspiration;’ and what Scripture plainly says came from the Spirit, really came from the Logos alone, &c. A passage no less self-contradictory, on the same subject, will be found in p. 268.

The truth is, that Mr. Lee does not take a sufficiently *large* view of the nature of the Apostolic inspiration. He evidently, in fact, though in one place he seems to protest against it, sets down their oral and their written teaching to two totally different influences—or, however, as he himself expresses it, ‘the difference was specific, or one of kind, not of degree.’ S. Paul preaching and S. Paul writing were evidently, he seems to think, two very different, or differently influenced persons. Surely there is not the slightest ground for any such view. To suppose that Christ spoke in his Apostles, or was ‘in them of a truth,’ as teachers by word of mouth, but withdrew Himself, and gave place to a separate operation of the Holy Ghost, when they sat down to write, is simply incredible and untenable. It is the more extraordinary that Mr. Lee should insist, as in effect he does, on this view; since in one place he states the true view of the matter:—

‘Such assurances of *Christ’s continued presence* with them in their teaching are most conclusive; for it cannot be regarded as just or reasonable to maintain that the Divine influence guarded the Apostles from error, when orally conveying the truth, but that they were left to all the hazard of human fallibility when instructing by letter their converts in Corinth or Colosse.’

It is evident that this is perfectly irreconcilable with the view of the Logos, or Christ, being the revealer only of the truth, not the co-inspirer also of the inditing of it.

The following passage, (deducting the untenable distinction between Revelation and Inspiration,) well describes some characteristics of the composition of the Scriptures:—

‘It forms a prominent feature, it will be remembered, of the theory of Inspiration maintained in these Discourses, that each writer of Scripture made use, on all occasions, of such materials as were in his power, whether supplied by his own experience or by the information of others. This principle, as we have seen, forms the foundation of the distinction between Revelation and Inspiration. The particulars recorded in the pages of Scripture were not all matters of Revelation; the sacred writers have touched upon many topics which were not originally communicated to them from Heaven; but this circumstance in no respect invalidates the assertion, that the narrative of each and every fact of which the Bible takes notice has been handed down to future ages, under the influence of Inspiration. In other words, the Holy Spirit provided that each portion of the Bible should convey such information as best subverted the Divine purpose, irrespectively of any consideration as to the character of that information, whether it consisted of plain historical facts, or of immediate disclosures of supernatural truths. Hence, therefore, any one of the hypotheses proposed in order to explain the origin of the Gospels may be accepted as true, without in the least affecting the force of a single argument put forward in this investigation. Each evangelist may have borrowed, to the fullest extent, from those sources which modern critics have attempted to define, and yet his entire composition will remain, in the most literal sense, inspired. But however irrelevant to the inspiration of Scripture, the fate of all or any of the hypotheses alluded to has thus been shown to be, it

would be ungrateful of the Biblical student to deny that the thorough ventilation which this question has received, has been productive of the most beneficial results as regards the elucidation of the New Testament.

'The mutual connexion of the different portions of the Gospel history has been more fully brought to light; the phraseology of the sacred writers has been more accurately analysed; and the structure of the whole Evangelical word more perfectly exhibited, in consequence of their discussion, than in any previous stage of Biblical exegesis.'—Pp. 319, 320.

The inspiration of the Old Testament is well deduced, on occasion, from phenomena in the New:—

'Under this class comes also a series of references by which the writers of the New Testament exemplify, in the plainest manner, their belief in the inspiration of the Old Testament; and from which it obviously results, that each portion of Scripture must be regarded as part of one divine whole:—I mean the system of collective quotations, where a number of passages are brought together, in the same connexion, from various books of the Bible, in order to establish some one point of Christian doctrine. Of this, the Epistle to the Hebrews affords many instances; but the most striking example is, perhaps, supplied by the passages commencing at the tenth verse of the third chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, where five different texts from the Psalms are combined in the same quotation, with a text from Isaiah,—the whole series commencing with the formula, "As it is written." It is plain that in these collective quotations, the Apostles adduce the several passages as all denoting, and from the first pointing to one great truth: although, separately, in their primary connexion, such statements of the Old Testament had often merely reference to more special relations.'—Pp. 332, 333.

Much curious illustrative matter will be found in Mr. Lee's notes, more especially Hebraic and Patristic learning. It is also shown in several places that the *novelty* of certain methods of attack on Scripture, and also of defence, has been assumed without any reason. See, *e.g.* p. 337. The learning and ingenuity displayed in these notes, indeed, would alone entitle Mr. Lee's volume to a place on any Biblical student's shelves: and we trust that, though we have been unable to assent to the general line taken in it, we shall have not ineffectually commended it, on other grounds, to the attention which it so well deserves.

ART. II.—*An Inquiry into the Credibility of the Early Roman History.* By the RIGHT HON. SIR GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS. 2 vols. London: J. W. Parker & Son. 1855.

WHAT we are to believe and what *not* to believe in the wide domain of history; how much is to be accepted as objective fact, and how much as mere legend or ingenious conjecture; where the line of demarcation is to be drawn between solid truth and the creations of fancy;—these are questions surely of no mean interest and importance, problems to be ranked among the deepest and most serious which can occupy the human mind. For such inquiry, when engaged upon the loftiest objects, is inseparably entwined with the eternal destiny of each one of us; when descending to matters of a somewhat lower nature, it is still intimately concerned with our inward life, as moral and spiritual beings; and, finally, even when occupied with questions of an apparently trivial character, it is probably tending, however unconsciously, to the formation of a habit of mind—a habit either of that easy acquiescence in all that is brought before us which leads to an excessive credulity and to superstition; or of a restlessly critical temper, which distrusts the surest evidence, and finally lands its possessor amidst the dreary, deadly wastes of universal scepticism.

These questions must, in some sort, be almost coeval with history itself. The rudest ballad which ever professed to impart to a nation in its infancy anything approximating to a true account of its heroes, and their achievements in peace or war, must have been framed with a view of satisfying the requirements of those who heard it. Untrustworthy as might be the matter, and uncritical the listeners, there were yet, doubtless, certain bounds to credulity, which the minstrel could not safely venture to transgress. Some criterion, however vague and shifting, would exist in the hearers' minds. The standard might be most illusory. We are all acquainted with the story of the King of Siam, who, very naturally, refused to believe in the existence of ice; and with that of the worthy pair who, after unquestioning acceptance of the greatest marvels which the imagination of their sailor son could impose upon them, were arrested in their career of belief, and *compelled* to reject the narrative, when it arrived at the mention of flying-fish. And in like manner the pilgrim of the eighth century, who was expected, says Amedée Thierry, if he would please the in-

mates of noble castles, to have visited the realms of fantasy, to bring news of their goings-on, and to have held intercourse with heroes who never lived, or at least were never so circumstanced, —even *he* would find a limit placed upon his powers of invention by the existence of certain conditions of fitness and probability to which he would be rigorously bound to conform. To this day, no ballad-singer in the streets of Naples would dare to cast an imputation upon the fair fame of that idol of popular esteem, *Rinaldo*. *Rinaldo* may have achieved much that is marvellous; he *could* not have done anything that is cowardly or base: the thing is simply incredible.

In times and in countries where the standard of education is high, we should naturally expect to find a correspondingly just and reasonable standard of criticism. This gift, however, appears to be very variable, and not necessarily referable to the amount of general information which is extant in a given age. Thus of medieval times it has been justly observed, that the *literati* who were giants in logic and the metaphysics of theology were but the merest children in criticism. Witness, for example, the unhesitating acceptance of the work upon the Angelic hierarchy which bore the name of Dionysius as its author, as a genuine production of S. Paul's distinguished convert, the Areopagite. In this too, as in other departments of human skill, original genius has frequently shone forth like a beacon, in solitary grandeur, amidst surrounding darkness. What writer of ancient Greece, early or late, has displayed the truly critical temper so fully as Thucydides? Among the Fathers of the Church, can even the great doctors of the fourth and fifth centuries be placed, in this respect, on a level with Origen? Nevertheless, there are seasons in which this faculty gains perceptible advancement. Increase of critical skill, as respects both history and literature, has been truly termed 'one of the real boasts of these later generations, over the most intellectual and able of the ancient world;' and if the possession of this faculty has been, and continues to be, very morbidly and mischievously abused, we must not on that account be betrayed into the denial of its real growth and stature, any more than of its interest and importance.

And for once,—a rare event, it must be owned, in a great question of mental philosophy,—the inquirer, who would fain make acquaintance with the most brilliant exhibitions of recent critical research in the field of history, need not be exclusively or even primarily referred to the learned labours of France and Germany. We are but giving utterance to the convictions of far better judges than ourselves, when we challenge for Great Britain the first place in this department of knowledge, on the

strength of the productions of Mr. Grote and Colonel Mure; and finally, though perhaps less confidently, of the present volumes of Sir G. C. Lewis.¹ It is likewise remarkable, that whereas the prizes of our bar and senate are supposed, and not without reason, to engross the powers natural and acquired which on the Continent would have been devoted to studies of a more abstract and recondite nature, these three distinguished authors all are, or have been, members of the house of 'Her Majesty's most faithful Commons.'

If, after all the toil and learning expended upon them, the present aspect of the questions connected with historic credibility remains somewhat shifting and unsettled in its character, it does not therefore follow that nothing has been gained by the examination which they have undergone. The profit has not been scanty; and even a hasty and imperfect survey may suffice to make good this assertion. The mere attempt to perform such a task may indeed appear to render us liable to a charge of presumption, inasmuch as it involves more or less of criticism upon very learned and highly gifted writers, and essays to arbitrate between conflicting opinions, of which each has been supported by deep research and consummate skill. But, on the other hand, the vast store of materials collected by several of the investigators, and more especially by Mr. Grote, are sufficient to enable a very inferior scholar to form *some* opinion of his own; and as in the most intellectual of games, that of chess, a bystander who is not comparable in ability to either of the combatants, may yet occasionally detect oversights in the play of both, even so too may the student of the very opposite theories of Mr. Grote and Colonel Mure, of Niebuhr and Sir G. C. Lewis, be alternately inclined to accept or reject the arguments of each, without making the slightest pretensions to one tithe of their ability and information.

All history may, for our present purpose, be divided into, *firstly*, that which rests, and, *secondly*, that which does *not* rest, upon contemporary written evidence: a distinction impressed upon us with great force and ability in the volumes of Sir G. C. Lewis. Such a division is, of course, an exhaustive one: but the former class may admit of a convenient subdivision into (1.) history which has remained, if we may so speak, untouched by the addition of legendary matter, and (2.) history which has become the groundwork of subsequent legends. Thus, for example, the lives of Pericles, of Scipio Africanus, of Louis XIV., appear to be the subject of narratives, which we may fairly

¹ For the sake of brevity, this work will be here cited simply as 'Lewis.'

entitle pure history: while, on the contrary, the career of a Cyrus, an Attila, or a Charlemagne (albeit each is as truly an historical personage as the preceding) has been made the basis of many a wild romance in Persia, or in Gaul and Spain, or again in Italy and Hungary. We shall thus obtain three main classes, each of which we propose to consider separately.

I. History which is based upon contemporary written evidence, and has not been made the subject of subsequent legend.

II. History which is based upon contemporary written evidence, and has likewise been made the subject of subsequent legend.

III. History which does not rest upon any contemporaneous written evidence.

I. Let us first look at the case where there is contemporary evidence, which has been preserved by writing and unmixed with the legends of after ages. Much that is valuable in connexion with this branch of our inquiry may be derived from the lectures (especially the final lecture) of Dr. Arnold, and the first lecture of Professor Smyth, upon Modern History; as also from one of the few (alas!) unexceptionable works of Mr. F. W. Newman, his very clever *Lectures on Logic*.

The first question to be asked is, whether the documents on which we rely are genuine. That this is a practical question must be known to all from sad experience. The case of the false Decretals of Isidore will at once occur to many. Or let the inquirer take up a single volume of the Benedictine edition, say of St. Augustine, and see how many pages of the smaller print mark the existence of treatises and sermons *falsely* ascribed to that great doctor. Such ascriptions, however erroneous, may indeed have been made innocently in an uncritical age. But modern times supply examples of a more direct and conscious forgery. In this very culpable species of deceit a melancholy preeminence must be ascribed to our neighbours across the channel. Thus (to take one example out of many which might be adduced) during the French Revolution there was published, in Paris, a collection of letters purporting to be the composition of the unfortunate Louis XVI. So skilful was the deception, that an English lady of much literary ability, Helen Maria Williams, paid handsomely for the manuscripts, and translated them. A leading Edinburgh Reviewer, Francis Horner, by no means a credulous person, criticised, and pronounced in favour of the authenticity of the work: and it was even quoted as genuine in one of the French Chambers after the restoration of the Bourbons. But doubts arose; and at length two men came forward, and avowed with easy effrontery, that they had

composed the letters as a literary speculation.¹ A very similar work, containing the observations of Louis XVIII. upon the events of his times, appeared in 1831 or 1832. This, too, was so cleverly constructed, as to incline Professor Smyth to accept it on the ground of *internal* evidence, though his knowledge of the previous forgery (and of many similar ones) preserved him from yielding a too hasty credence, and adopting the revelations it contained as trustworthy evidence whereon to comment. In course of time an *exposé* of the sources whence the work was derived, from the pen of Mr. Croker, appeared in the *Quarterly Review*; the book sunk, and has never more been heard of.²

Happily, however, there exists for the service of the historical inquirer a large mass of documents on which doubt has never cast its shadow, and whose genuineness lies beyond the possibility of reasonable dispute. The next question that arises is, the *intention* of the author in composing his work. For a mistake in this respect may lead us into serious error. Thus, for instance, we may imagine a compiler of history arguing against the truth of some famous achievement of a Greek or Roman worthy, on the ground that it was not mentioned by Plutarch in his biography of the personage in question. But by a reference to the *intention* of Plutarch, as stated by himself, we should at once discover the argument to be worthless. For at the commencement of his account of Alexander, he expressly states that he does not intend to relate everything in detail; that he is not writing history, but biography; and that, inasmuch as apparently trivial circumstances, an apophthegm or a jest, frequently furnish more indications of character than the conduct of the greatest siege or battle, he must be permitted to aim, like a portrait painter, at a real likeness, by taking pains with the more striking features, while he leaves to others the composition of a more circumstantial narrative.

Somewhat similar remarks may be applied to Xenophon's *Cyropædia*. Rollin and others accepted that work as authentic history, as being even more trustworthy than the accounts furnished by Herodotus. But, even waving the extreme improbability of its author having been able to collect information which could be fairly traced to sources contemporary with Cyrus, there is a growing, and apparently just, conviction among modern scholars, that Xenophon did not intend his book to be a perfectly exact portraiture of the great founder of the Persian monarchy. He appears to have aimed rather at the composition of a political romance, a sketch of what a perfect prince should be. And thus the dying speech of the hero, which Cicero

¹ Smyth on the French Revolution, vol. iii. pp. 277, 278.

² Ibid.

reproduces in his *De Senectute*, may very probably contain the sentiments of the biographer upon the immortality of the soul, but cannot be appealed to as the expression of the mind of Cyrus. Indeed the Roman author seems aware of this, as he elsewhere speaks of 'Cyrus ille à Xenophonte, *non ad historiæ fidem, scriptus, sed ad effigiem justî imperii.*'¹ We trust, however, to exhibit more fully the importance of this principle of regarding the intention of a writer, and its bearing upon historic credibility, when we arrive at the second division of our subject.

Supposing now that we are satisfied in these two respects; the genuineness of the work before us, and the intention of its author to write real history, we naturally proceed to ask what were the writer's opportunities of learning the truth. It is evident that the mere fact of his being a contemporary is of little avail, unless he enjoyed means of access to adequate sources of information. *We* are contemporaries of the present Shah of Persia: but not one Englishman in a million could be listened to, as a witness upon his character, or the events of his reign. Even of things much nearer home but few men are actual witnesses; and fewer still are acquainted with the secret springs of action in the case of individual rulers or of parties.

And then, again, when we are in possession of the narratives of those who were not merely passive witnesses, but positive actors in the scenes which they describe, we are compelled to consider how far either actual want of honesty or the unconscious working of self-love may have warped the fidelity of their account. Xenophon in his *Anabasis*, the Archduke Charles in his history of his campaigns in Germany and Switzerland, Cæsar in his Commentaries, Napoleon in the pages dictated to Montholon and Gourgaud, all occupy this vantage ground of having not merely seen but of having taken the leading part in the events narrated. But they do not all inspire equal confidence in the reader. Xenophon and the Austrian prince may respectively occupy a lower rank as generals, but they claim a far higher one as trustworthy narrators, than either Cæsar or Napoleon. As, however, in general, the actors in high places must necessarily be in danger of being unduly influenced by prejudice and passion, the historian of a generation just younger, who outlives them long enough to allow time for their secrets to ooze out, is in a better position for the attainment of truth. By the comparison of the accounts of foes, by the letters, speeches, and journals of great men, by cross-examination, as it were, of the evidence of each, by reference to codes of law, contemporary treaties, monuments, and medals, he must be able to elicit a vast

¹ Ad Quint, Frat. 1, I. § 8. (Cif. ap. Lewis, ii. p. 526, note.)

amount of sound and substantial information; and if he be free from that passive acquiescence in the popular view, that listless kind of investigation which Thucydides so laments,¹ we shall probably gain from him as high a standard of historical accuracy, as we can in this world hope to reach.

It is likewise justly observed that the internal evidence of a writer's style will furnish us with another test. The most feeble-minded observer may give us *some* insight into his own time, and will at least, even if unconsciously, draw a sort of portrait of himself. He who in some respects may be inclined to colour highly, as being the hero of his own tale, may be listened to without distrust in others. On many topics the commentaries of Cæsar and the *Memorial de Ste Hélène* of Las Casas are above all suspicion, inasmuch as there could be no motive to deceive; and falsehood, if attempted, would have been so easy to detect. And sometimes even the *prima facie* improbability of a story becomes in after times a claim upon our acceptance of it. A signal and well-known exemplification of the truth of this last remark is afforded by Herodotus. That historian informs us² that Necho, king of Egypt, sent certain Phœnicians to circumnavigate Africa. They started from the Red Sea, and having taken seed with them, (as Timour is said, in A.D. 1405, to have done, in his expedition against China,) sowed and gathered in the corn, which would grow in less than three months in those torrid regions. And thus in the third year they came through the Straits of Gibraltar, or Pillars of Hercules, as the ancients called them, and arrived in Egypt. One point alone in the narrative causes any difficulty to the Greek historian. These Phœnicians asserted that in the course of the voyage they had the sun on their right; that is to say, apparently to their north. This one circumstance Herodotus declines to believe. How surprised would he be, could he arise and learn that it is this very declaration of these bold mariners that in our day wins them credit. We know that when they had crossed the equinoctial line, and were descending deeply into the tropics, the sun *would* appear to be on their north: and this is precisely one of those circumstances which, being unexpected, and *a priori* incredible, men would not think of inventing with a view to deceive. Indeed the credit of Herodotus himself has in this way risen greatly during the present century: almost every traveller of note in Greece, in Egypt, and other parts of Africa, having brought home some fresh particulars in confirmation of his statements. One instance is so remarkable that we

¹ εἰ γὰρ ἀνθρώποι τὰς ἀκοὰς . . . ἀβασανίστως παρ' ἀλλήλων δέχονται . . . οὕτως ἀταλαί-
 ψυκτοι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, κ.τ.λ.—I. 20.

² Lib. iv. cap. 42.

cannot but notice it. Herodotus¹ asserts, as many will remember, that Xerxes cut a canal across the isthmus on which Mount Athos (now called, from the number of its monasteries, *Monte Santo*) stands. Thucydides² alludes to the "king's canal," as he terms it, as an unquestioned fact. But the Roman satirist selected this very topic as one of the legitimate subjects of his famous sneer at the kind of narrative which lying Greece had the presumption to put forth as history.

"Creditor olim
Velificatus Athos, et quidquid Græcia mendax
Audet in historiâ."³

Now, considering the opportunities enjoyed by both of the great writers above-named, and especially by Thucydides, who was well acquainted with those regions; considering that the numerous Greek settlements would have been able to test the accuracy of the report, and that Plato, Isocrates, Lysias, and Diodorus, all concur in believing it;⁴ an utter rejection of the story always appeared to us to be an unwarrantable degree of scepticism. Nevertheless, Juvenal had many modern partisans. Some began to utter doubts of the entire narrative, which could admit a fable so apparent: a French traveller, M. Cousinery,⁵ avowed that he could find no traces of such a work; and, above all, those who were disposed to accept the story were taunted with their inability to produce a rational motive for the accomplishment of such a work. And certainly this last point, however insufficient to shake the evidence, had always been felt by us to be a real difficulty. Herodotus, who had lived to see ships hauled by a mechanical process across the Isthmus at Corinth and elsewhere, expresses his surprise that the Persian monarch did not resort to this plan (with which he was probably quite unacquainted), and imagines the cutting to have arisen out of Xerxes' love of display and desire of leaving memorials of his greatness. But the question still arises in the mind of one who examines the map of those regions, why the king should undergo the delay and expense of cutting through the Isthmus of Mount Athos, when two other very similar tongues of land, those of Sithonia and Pallene, look equally formidable, and were yet left untouched. The acute observation of a recent traveller enables us to answer this question. Not only does Colonel Leake agree with Choiseul-Gouffier⁶ (who was previous to Cousinery) in finding traces of its existence, but he removes our remaining difficulties by the contribution of the following very important information:—

¹ VII. 22—24.

² IV., 109.

³ Juvenal, Sat. x. 173—5.

⁴ Stocker in *loc. Herodot.*

⁵ Bähr in *loc. Herodot.* Cf. Grote, vol. v. p. 29.

⁶ Cit. ap. Bähr in *loc. Herodot.*

'The canal seems not to have been more than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labour, be renewed: and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navigation of the *Ægean*; for such is the fear entertained by the Greek boatmen of the strength and uncertain direction of the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the mountain is subject half the year, and which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency of harbours in the Gulf of Orfaná, that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula to the western. *Xerxes therefore was perfectly justified in cutting this canal*, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former expedition, under Mardonius, had suffered, suggested the idea. The circumnavigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastræum [the headlands of Sithonia and Pallene] *was much less dangerous*, as the gulfs afford some good harbours, and it was the object of Xerxes to collect forces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed.'¹

But even apart from particular corroborations of this nature, there is frequently something about the general tone of a writer, which of itself creates a feeling of confidence, or the reverse. Thus, for instance, Colonel Mure, who is far from being lenient to the faults of the 'Father of history,' yet admits that 'every portion of his work is pervaded by an air of candour and honest intention, which the discerning critic must recognise as reflecting corresponding qualities in the author.'² And Hallam, in like manner, having occasion to refer to the authority of the Sire de Joinville's very beautiful and characteristic *Vie de St. Louis*, remarks with equal justice that 'Joinville is a real witness, on whom, when we listen, it is impossible not to rely.'³ Those who are acquainted with that interesting portraiture of 'the noblest and holiest of monarchs,'⁴ will easily call to mind many details which might be singled out, if necessary, as betokening the great honesty of this lively writer. His *naïve* confession of his own standard of duty and dread of sin being lower than that of the saintly king, his assertion of the good reputation which he enjoyed for his strength of understanding, his admission of the fright he suffered when he was taken prisoner by the Saracens, are instances in point. Hypocrisy is slow to grant that it *ever* adopts a moral standard short of the very highest; mock humility takes pains to conceal the very semblance of vanity; real cowardice is afraid to divulge the emotions of even the most reasonable fear. And where we can trace obvious signs of such wilful dishonesty, or of prejudice so deep as to cause unconscious dishonesty, it is natural and right

¹ Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. p. 145, (Cit. ap. Grote vol. v. p. 30.)

² Literature of Antient Greece, vol. iv. p. 351. ³ Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 32.

⁴ Arnold.

to be on our guard against the general representations of the writer. If, to adopt the suggestion of Arnold,¹ his narrative is filled with wondrous accounts of small forces triumphing over mighty hosts; if one party or nation be always described as foolish and treacherous, another always fair and upright; if every transaction be ascribed to the impulse of the very noblest, or (which is far more common) of the meanest and basest motives;—*that* history cannot possibly be trustworthy. And to sum up the internal evidence, arising from style, in the unimprovable language of the same author: ‘If it is very heavy and cumbrous, it indicates either a dull man or a pompous man, or at least a slow and awkward man: if it be tawdry and full of commonplaces enunciated with great solemnity, the writer is most likely a silly man; if it be highly antithetical, and full of unusual expressions, or artificial ways of stating a plain thing, the writer is clearly an affected man. If it be plain and simple, always clear, but never eloquent, the writer may be a very sensible man, but is too hard and dry to be a very great man. If, on the other hand, it is always eloquent, rich in illustrations, full of animation, but too uniformly so, and without the relief of simple and quiet passages, we must admire the writer’s genius in a very high degree, but we may fear that he is too continually excited to have attained to the highest wisdom: for that is necessarily calm.’²

The patient reader, who has thus far followed our somewhat (we fear) tedious course, has already gathered that we are not of that school of thinkers, who disbelieve in the truth of history at large: who dwell upon the possibility (and actual existence) of exaggerations, and the difficulties surrounding all human investigation, until the records of the past become in their eyes one vast moral and intellectual chaos—

‘rudis indigestaque moles,
Nec quicquam, nisi pondus iners, congestaque eodem
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum;’

from which no mortal skill can hope to extract the order and the beauty of truth. No; far be from us any such extreme and unmitigated scepticism! We agree with the distinguished historian just referred to, that such utter disbelief of the memory and the accuracy of the narratives of other men would naturally lead to distrust in the correctness of our own faculties, and thus ultimately to insanity: and, further, that thus to disannul the value of historical testimony, would indeed ‘touch us in one of the divinest parts of our nature, the power of connecting ourselves with the past.’ Nevertheless, the amount of difficulty

¹ Lectures on Mod. Hist. Lect. viii.

² Ibid.

inherent in all historical research appears to us to be very frequently underrated. It has been recognised probably by many great masters of this species of composition, by a Thucydides and a Tacitus, a Hallam and a Sismondi, but it seems to be virtually ignored by a large tribe of historiographers of *calibre* too small, or prejudice too ingrained, even to perceive the dangers by which they are beset. Some too of a more respectable class have been betrayed, we think, in a greater or less degree, into the same fault, from their very fondness and partiality for historic study, and their consciousness of its value. They cannot endure that any abatement should be made from the preciousness of the jewels which they have learnt to prize so highly. Among those who have thus erred we must venture to include the late Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, and (if we understand him aright) a French philosopher of great celebrity, M. Victor Cousin.

Professor Smyth observes, that 'history consists of the narrative of facts and the explanation of those facts; that the facts and events are points which are *perfectly ascertainable*;' and that the explanations must be 'traced out by the same processes of reasoning, which are applied on all similar occasions through life; from a comparison of events and of appearances with *the acknowledged principles of human actions*.'¹ Allowing that 'there are facts and events that have occurred in the world, of which history does not undertake to give any solution,' and 'that the moral character of statesmen may not always be exactly estimated,' he still evidently holds that no very serious difficulty is hereby incurred, and that on the whole we may, without any overwhelming trouble, arrive at satisfactory conclusions. Now *we* too trust, with him, that such conclusions may be arrived at in the main; but we are by no means prepared to grant that the task is so easy, nor so all but universally successful as he seems inclined to represent it. Let us try to analyse his statements.

'The facts and events of history are,' he tells us, 'perfectly ascertainable.' This broad assertion can only be accepted as true under very considerable limitations. There certainly are facts and events on record, which were either plainly cognisable by the senses of contemporaries, or which rest upon evidence that is equally valid. Thus, for example, no sane person doubts that Julius Cæsar was slain in the Senate-house at Rome, on the Ides of March, B.C. 44; that Lisbon was overthrown by an earthquake in A.D. 1755; or that the French were victorious at Austerlitz and Jena in 1805 and 1806, and defeated at Leipsic and at Waterloo in 1813 and 1815 respec-

¹ Lectures on Mod. Hist. (Introductory Lecture.)

tively. But it is truly surprising to observe how soon, as we proceed, we quit the sure and well-defined territory for the soil of a 'land debateable.' Take the last-named event, the battle of Waterloo. The fight itself, and the defeat of Napoleon, are, of course, as has been said, beyond the reach of any sceptical criticism. But it must be a fact, that the first corps of the Prussians did or did *not* arrive on the field as late as four o'clock P.M., and their main body at half-past seven at night; it must be a fact, that the absence of Grouchy, with more than 30,000 men, did or did *not* materially affect the result of the contest; and, finally, it must be a fact that the English and the Prussian commanders were or were *not* taken by surprise by their opponent's invasion of Belgium on the 15th of June. Now, will any reasonably impartial inquirer maintain that these facts can be perfectly ascertained and settled with ease? If they can be thus securely demonstrated, a vast quantity of ink and paper has been consumed which might have been spared. Yet this is only one obvious illustration out of hundreds that might be adduced, of the difficulty frequently attendant upon the *facts* which history discusses.

Moreover, the majority of readers who are merely acquainted with the text of some standard historians, and have never been engaged in verifying the authorities whom they quote, are scarcely conscious of the part which *hypothesis* is compelled to play in the arrangement of the sequence and connexion of events. 'The invasions of Italy,' says Mr. Stanley, in reference to Alaric, 'are involved in great confusion, . . . especially by Jornandes, who blends the battle of Pollentia in 403 with the 'massacre of the Goths in 408. *By conjecture and inference* they are reduced in Gibbon to the order which has been here 'followed.'¹ This is by no means the only instance in which the historian of the *Decline and Fall* is compelled to resort to narrative of an hypothetical character. That he has frequently applied such conjecture with marvellous skill² and success may be appealed to as one of the many evidences of the richness of his intellectual qualifications for his great task; but that powers such as his should be required in order to attain that success, is certainly no proof of the facility or the perfection with which the truth of events may be usually ascertained. And what is here said of Gibbon may be extended to most authors who have attempted to write history upon a large scale. The wit of a satiric novelist, in a recently completed tale, is not

¹ Smith's Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography. *Art.* Alaricus.

² This topic is treated with the author's invariable acuteness, though, of course, with a purpose, in a theological work of our time, the celebrated *Essay on Development*. (Chap. III. Sec. V.)

without foundation: it is 'the case with the most orthodox histories,' that 'the writer's own guesses or conjectures are 'printed in exactly the same type with the most ascertained 'patent facts.' Nor is it easy wholly to resist his conclusion: 'Blunders there must be in the best of these narratives, and more asserted than they can possibly know or vouch for.'

But the battle which is at times carried on with respect to *facts*, is light and trivial compared to that which is ever being waged concerning their *explanation*. We cannot resist citing from the clever writer just referred to, a few words which immediately precede our previous quotation. 'Where dialogues 'are written down, which the reporter can by no possibility have 'heard, and where motives are detected which the persons 'actuated by them certainly never confided to the writer, the 'public must once for all be warned that the author's individual 'fancy very likely supplies much of the narrative, and that he 'forms it, as best he may, out of stray papers, conversations 'reported to him, and his knowledge, right or wrong, of the 'characters of the persons engaged.' Is he not justified in more than hinting that there are histories extant which rest upon a very similar foundation?

Now, the danger respecting such interpretation of facts, as implies inquiry into human motives, will probably be found to be of a twofold character. In the first place, where the motive is tolerably clear, and proved by unimpeachable evidence, the historian may be so devoid of sympathy with the object of the character he is describing, or, on the other hand, so biassed in his favour, as to call the principles of action by their wrong names, and thus very seriously to mislead us. Let us suppose, for instance, that a statesman has been very determined in his resistance to some change in his country's policy. The historian happens to consider the point a trivial one, and accordingly terms his conduct *obstinacy*. But the historian is not infallible, and his judgment may herein be quite at fault. 'Obstinacy,' as Edmund Burke once told the House of Commons, 'is certainly 'a great vice; and in the changeful state of political affairs it 'is frequently the cause of great mischief.' 'It happens, however,' he continued, 'very unfortunately, that almost the 'whole line of the great and masculine virtues, constancy, 'gravity, magnanimity, fortitude, fidelity and firmness, are 'closely allied to this disagreeable quality, of which you have 'so just an abhorrence; and in their excess, all these virtues 'very easily fall into it.' Now let the reader only reflect with himself for one moment, how constantly the annalist and biographer are called upon to draw that line of demarcation, which

¹ Speech on American Taxation, April 19, 1774.

Burke so justly hints to be a narrow one, and then let him judge whether it be probable that a merely mortal pen can be expected to draw it in all cases correctly. How frequently are actions the most similar in character condemned or praised by the same censor, in consequence of some determining motive of his own. In A.D. 1442, one of the best and greatest of the Turkish sultans, Amurath II., abdicated his throne, and retired to the society of Moslem Dervishes in Magnesia. A famous French infidel applauds the act; but what is the slyly just comment on this applause which he obtains from his brother sceptic Gibbon? 'Voltaire admires "le Philosophe Turc;" "would he have bestowed the same praise on a Christian prince for retiring to a monastery? In his way, Voltaire was a bigot, an intolerant bigot."¹ But is Gibbon himself unimpeachable on this score? Does he not again and again refuse to give credit to the assertion of motives which he could not himself comprehend? S. Augustine, for instance, is found expressing his regret that so many came to ask for his decision in questions affecting their temporal goods. Gibbon records the fact, but cannot believe that the reluctance was sincere; it is evidently in his judgment incredible that a Christian bishop could be insensible to the honour, the pleasurable sense of power thus imparted to him; incredible that he should prefer to have his time unbroken, that he might devote himself to spiritual duties. Of course to a certain class of minds; which we will not pause to designate, it *must* be incredible. These things (to adapt a sentence from Lord Bacon) must continue as they have been; but so will that also continue which faileth not: *Justificata est Sapientia à filiis suis.*

And, secondly, where the motive has not been handed down to us, how commonly do men of narrow minds, or men who are under the influence of some strong prepossession, impute their own motives to those whom they describe and criticise. '*Ces coquins*,' Condé is reported by the Cardinal de Retz to have said of historians—'*ces coquins nous font parler et agir, comme ils auroient faits eux-mêmes à notre place.*' The temptation is indeed a sore one, and perhaps less frequently resisted than one might expect. This point demands a few illustrations. Professor Newman considers Polybius to be an unbiassed narrator, 'except when treating of his patrons, the Scipio family, and perhaps the Achæan towns, his native state.' We should venture at times to doubt his accuracy in another respect, namely, in attributing motives. Polybius is remarkably free from superstition. But it is a profound question (which must, we fear, be answered in the negative), whether a heathen can, without superstition, be religious. This generally careful and accurate

¹ Decline and Fall, chap. lxxvii. note 13.

observer by no means vilifies religion as regards its effects. He does not, with Lucretius, cull out any legends of the seemingly evil result of devotion:

Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.

On the contrary, he is at pains to express how fully he attributes to the influence of religion the exceeding good faith of the Romans, both in public and in private life. But, for all this, he cannot be said to believe in the supernatural. Religion is, in his mind, an instrument of state policy, an excellent moral police.¹ This, indeed, is an opinion very prevalent among public men, both in ancient Rome and modern Britain. Of its falsity, of its fearful danger to men's souls, we do not stop to speak; we are at present only concerned with it as an element in fitting men to judge of the motives of their fellow-creatures. And, assuredly, if there be a real world of deep and energising thought unrecognised by them, undreamt of in their philosophy, the holders of the opinion in question must needs be in a very bad position for rightly estimating character. Polybius tells us, that Scipio Africanus and Lycurgus appear to him to have used religion in this manner.² Both seemed very pious; the Spartan lawgiver got the sanction of the Pythia to his institutions, and the Roman general seemed attentive to dreams and omens; but, in either case, it was in order to influence the many to carry out their respective civil and military designs. Now admitting that in the case of Scipio the personal knowledge of the historian may have justified him in making the assertion, we should like to know on what ground he entertained the same conviction with respect to Lycurgus. For our own part, we believe that he reached it by a syllogism, in which the *major* premiss was tacitly assumed; that *major* being somewhat of this sort: 'No man of great intellectual powers can believe in religion, excepting as a useful state-engine.' The *minor*, that Lycurgus was a man of great intellectual powers, was indisputable; and the conclusion of course followed. How easy is it to imagine the kind of treatment which some of the facts of the Scripture history would have received from disciples of the school of Polybius, and far more of Lucretius! When the Syrian captain stood at the door of Elisha, and sought to be cured of his leprosy, how clearly would it have been shown that the conduct of the prophet in sending a messenger, instead of coming out in person, arose from priestcraft and spiritual pride! But we are not obliged in

¹ ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐστὶν ἐλαφρόν καὶ πλήρες ἐπιθυμιῶν . . . λείπεται, τοῖς ἀσέλοισι φέβοις καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραχυδίᾳ τὰ πλῆθη συνέχειν. Διόπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ δοκοῦσι μοι τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἑννοίας, καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ᾧδου διαλήψεις . . . εἰς τὰ πλῆθη παρεισαγεῖν.—Lib. vi. cap. 56, §§ 11, 12. See the whole passage, §§ 6—15. Cf. Lewis, vol. i. pp. 51 and 417 (note).

² Lib. x. cap. 2, §§ 8—12. Cf. Lewis, vol. i. p. 448 (note).

this matter to rely upon mere imaginations. Heeren, in an otherwise very useful 'Manual of Ancient History,' has given us actual specimens of this species of judgment. In *his* eyes, the policy of Joseph respecting the landholders of Egypt must have caused 'the troubles which already threatened the kingdom to assume a more dangerous and alarming aspect:.' Samuel 'desired to make the office of judge hereditary in his own family,' and though this plan was 'defeated by the conduct of his sons,' he displayed 'a crafty policy in that election' of Saul, 'which he could not impede:.' and Solomon exhibited 'the brilliant government of a despot from the interior of his seraglio.' Instances of a very similar assignment of motives have lately met our eyes in the pages of a contemporary Review. Yet these writers doubtless hold that they are following the rule prescribed by Professor Smyth; that they are judging 'from a comparison of events and of appearances with the *acknowledged* principles of human actions.'

The temper of mind displayed in the above passages is not the sole cause of error in this department of history. Not only from a want of reverence, and by ignoring (as Heeren has done) the very existence of spiritual motives, may the judgments of historians be led astray; it is evident that in many cases where the motive has come down to us on good authority, it is one which could scarcely by any possibility have been guessed aright. He who has stood within the Ducal Palace at Venice, will remember the noble hall which contains the portraits of the Doges. He will remember how his eye, as it glanced around the array of these memorials of the earthly greatness of the fallen city, alighted at length upon the spot where, in place of a portrait, is seen the imitation of a black curtain, with the inscription, most impressive, despite its unclassical Latinity, 'HIC EST LOCUS MARINI FALIERI DECAPITATI PRO CRIMINIBUS.' The story is known through the history of Sismondi¹ and the works of English poets. That Marino Faliero (or more correctly, we believe, Marin Falieri) should be beheaded, for attempting to overthrow the Venetian constitution, is not surprising. Such attempts must always be a game, in which the losers can expect but one result. Justly or unjustly, it has been the fate of many such bold adventurers, from Spurius Cassius at Rome, and King Agis of Sparta, down to the Scottish Lords Kilmarnock and Balmerino in 1746. But in most cases we can discover a motive not inadequate to the undertaking. Personal ambition, the hope of riches or a crown; the desire to rescue from oppression a hardly-used commonalty, or to restore a fallen and much-loved dynasty;—these are intelligible incite-

¹ Histoire des Républiques Italiennes, chap. xlii.

ments to such a course. The historian, therefore, who reasons 'from the acknowledged principles of human action,' would surely seek to detect some such grounds of proceeding in the case of Falieri: and if they were not to be found, might very possibly take the liberty of imagining them. Yet none of these ordinary motives had worked up Falieri to his desperate resolve. The mere circumstance of the Council of Forty having punished a personal insult to the Doge with less severity than he thought due (the offender being himself the president of that body) was sufficient to induce the Head of the Venetian State to attempt the overthrow, by a conspiracy, of the entire oligarchy which governed it. Strange, and antecedently improbable; yet not more strange, not more improbable, than many other links of cause and effect which may be found in the chain of human history. Men will from time to time prove wayward, inconsistent, enigmatical; will act upon principles the most alien from those which might naturally be expected to influence them. And can history *always* hope to have documents at hand, which will supply authentic information of these extraordinary influences? Is it not, on the contrary, notorious that those who have enjoyed opportunities of being behind the scenes of public life, do very frequently acquire, in consequence, an extreme (it may be, an exaggerated) distrust of the truthfulness of the goddess Clio? The *mot* of the Prince de Condé has already been quoted: who is ignorant of the kindred sentiment of an English premier, Sir Robert Walpole? 'Anything but history, for that *must* be false,' was his reply to the proposal of his son to amuse him by such reading. This speech is attributed by Smyth to the unconscious affectation of a man who had been habituated to power for forty years, and was desirous, like King James I., of making a mystery of state-craft. Yet even if we make some deduction on that score in this particular instance, there remains on record a great body of similar expressions, the force of which cannot be so easily evaded. Few men, perhaps, have lived to a mature age, even in private life, without having been engaged in scenes wherein their own conduct was determined by very different influences from those which appeared upon the surface.

We have spoken separately, for convenience sake, of facts and motives: but, in truth, they are wondrously intertwined. In how many narratives does some motive in the teller prompt him to suppress or colour facts! For *one* history that is rendered partial and unfair by the assertion of what is false, there are *twenty* which are made so by the suppression of what is true. Like the soothsayer Onomacritus at the court of Xerxes,¹ they

¹ Herodot. vii. 6.

only tell the oracles that suit their purpose. And that this tangled web of facts and motives cannot be so easily unravelled as some maintain, is constantly shown, we think, in our courts of law, and illustrated by works of fiction. It is shown in our law-courts, for (although we agree with De Maistre that upon the whole justice is administered more equitably than might be at first sight supposed, and that a prisoner who may chance to be innocent of a particular crime may morally deserve, for some other unknown offence, the punishment he suffers, yet) it cannot be said, that either in criminal or *nisi prius* courts is the process of eliciting truth an easy one. Yet here there is, for the most part, that confronting of face to face, and that power of personal cross-examination, for which the historian sighs in vain. Nevertheless, in most countries trials have occurred of which the decision has been mooted in society. Take, for instance, the case of Elizabeth Canning, which was hotly contested in London about a century since. Here was a girl convicted of perjury, after a trial of five days, by a jury of her countrymen; and yet not only was a mob enthusiastic in favour of her innocence, but numbers of respectable persons subscribed handsomely for her, and obtained permission that she should transport herself. Thirty-six pamphlets were published upon the subject. Even two of the jury who condemned her had misgivings, and swore that what they had done was contrary to their consciences: and like a sister adventurer (whose story was going the round of the newspapers in November 1855) the girl Canning had robbed for a time of their liberty, and almost of their lives, persons now generally presumed to be innocent.¹ This may be an extreme case, but there are numberless approximations to it. 'People talk,' said a late Lord Chancellor, 'as if the causes that come before me were black and white; I find that most of them are *grey*.' And, further, this difficulty is illustrated, as has been intimated, by works of fiction. For such works are intended to be portraiture of actual life, and, in the hands of men of genius, they do, to a very great extent, succeed in portraying it. Now what is more common than to find a hero represented as misjudged by society at large; and that, though most cruelly and unjustly, yet withal on the most plausible grounds? True, that for the sake of poetic justice, and that the reader may close the volume with pleasurable sensations, relief is generally at hand: some happy incident, some *Deus ex machinâ*, arrives in time to avert evil consequences, and everything is made clear and smooth. But we are always left to imagine that it might have

¹ The details may easily be met with. See e.g. Entinck's 'History of London,' vol. iii. p. 83; 'Beauties of England and Wales,' vol. x. part v. p. 729. The year was A. D. 1753.

happened far otherwise; that the explanation may not be forthcoming another time, and that injustice may have its way. The patronizer of circulating libraries, nay, even the occasional reader of novels, must be able to call to mind several instances of the kind of plot to which we allude. Two only shall here be named: the Comte de Jarnac's tale of 'Rockingham,' and Sir Walter Scott's 'Fortunes of Nigel.'

Smyth, however, ventures to suggest, that in many cases judgment may go by default:—

* Statesmen who perceive that their conduct may hereafter be liable to misrepresentation, have it always in their power, and have in general been induced, to leave documents to their family for the purpose of explaining their views, and justifying their measures; and as they know beforehand the nature of that tribunal of posterity, which is to determine on their merits, the conclusion is, if they refuse to plead, that they foresee a verdict, against which they have nothing satisfactory to urge, and which is therefore right.

The assertion, which we have here italicised, appears to us perfectly monstrous. A question might probably be raised as to the degree in which it is possible for men to anticipate 'the nature of the tribunal of posterity.' The early Greek navigators, who regarded piracy as a decidedly gentlemanly occupation, did not look forward to a day when such practices should die out, and be considered not merely wrong, but likewise low, and adverse to the growing spirit of civilization.¹ The Christians of the sixteenth century, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, disciples of John Knox, all agreed that the civil power had the right, nay, was in duty bound, to use the temporal sword against men believed to be heretics or idolaters. This has been proved by Robertson, Hallam, the Duke of Argyll, and others; but by none more amply than by Smyth himself, in this very course of *Lectures on Modern History*. Did the men who acted thus know what after-ages would say of their conduct in this respect? Did they care to leave on record a defence of what they supposed indisputably right? Examples of a like nature might be multiplied without end. S. Ambrose could never have imagined that his noble and righteous reproof of the Emperor Theodosius, at Milan, should, 1,000 years afterwards, be made the subject of the scorn and contumely of a Diderot. S. Dunstan could not anticipate that his rebuke of Edwin the Fair, for unkingly and very questionable conduct on the day of his coronation, should be represented by modern historians and dramatists as a cruel attempt to blight the happiness of an honourable and wedded love. There are many points whereon the thirteenth century could not dream what would be the decision of the eighteenth;

¹ Thucyd. I. v. Hom. Odys. III. 69—74.

many, respecting which our own age can have little idea of what may be the judgment of the twentieth, or twenty-first century.

But, waving this point as one which need not materially affect the case, (since allowance can always be made for its operation,) there would constantly be found men who, from pride, or from true self-respect, or from a yet deeper feeling of reverence, would altogether decline to plead. From pride, if they acted from a mere haughty disregard of the opinion of their fellow-men; from true self-respect, if they felt that they could not recognise the collective wisdom of those whose individual judgment they would repudiate, or if, strong in the convictions of the goodness of their cause, they cared but little for the sentiments of future ages, and could well nigh address to their own spirits the language of a living lyricist—

‘O thou lion-hearted warrior!

Reck not of the after time:

Honour may be deem’d dishonour,

Loyalty be called a crime.

Sleep in peace with kindred ashes

Of the noble and the true,

Hands that never fail’d their country,

Hearts that baseness never knew.’

From a still more deeply reverential feeling, if they bore in mind that their pleadings could hardly be fair, and would be certainly of no real benefit to themselves;—hardly fair, for that no man is a good judge in his own case,—of no real avail, because all is known, the good and its alloy, the evil and its palliation, to the righteous Judge, before whom each must finally stand.¹

We have taken these arguments as fair representations of a certain line of thought upon these subjects. Professor Smyth, however, it may be urged, though careful and conscientious in fulfilling the duties of his professorial chair, had no claims to the title of a deep thinker. But what shall be said of the following remarks of M. Cousin? He at least is upheld by his numerous followers as a great and profound philosopher; and although we have not by us the particular volume from which the following extract is made, we presume that it is neither garbled nor in any way unjust, seeing that we receive it at the hands of an evidently enthusiastic admirer:²—

‘The science of the just, of the good, of the beautiful, is subject to the same law of the absolute and the relative, the necessary and the contingent. The philosophic science of history cannot escape from it; and as the great facts of history are the decrees of the government of providence, as God or providence is in nature, in humanity, in history, and that humanity and

¹ 1 Corinthians iv. 3—5.

² M. Tissot (the French translator of Kant’s *Logic*), in the *Nouvelle Biographie Générale*, (Paris, 1855,) *Art. Cousin, Victor*. Tome xii. p. 260.

history have also their necessity, *the judgments of history are the judgments of God himself*. History being thus the government of God made visible; everything is in its place in history; all is right there. War itself has its own blessings; and the victory is necessary, useful, just in the strictest sense of the word; *the conqueror is always right*, and the people have always what they deserve. Generally, all is just in this world; both happiness and misfortune are distributed as they ought to be. Hence that historic optimism, the loftiest idea at which philosophy has hitherto arrived.

Strong indeed must be that man's conviction of the entire credibility of history who can thus speak of the justice of its judgments. There is surely great confusion here. That the judgments of history are identical with the Divine judgments (or in our author's own words, *les jugemens de l'histoire sont les jugemens de Dieu même*), may be understood to mean, either that the opinions taught by history concerning character are necessarily true, or that the events of history of themselves make manifest the Divine judgments. But in neither case is the sentiment defensible. If the decision of history upon character be always just, and a reflex of the judgment of the Most High, perhaps M. Cousin will in his next work be so good as to inform us what that decision *is* in the case of Mahomet, or of Hildebrand, or of Mary queen of Scots. Is Mahomet to be regarded as a mere imposter, or a self-deluded man; a very Antichrist, or a benefactor to the human race; or something between these two extremes, a blending and commixture of both? Must Pope Hildebrand be inexorably condemned as a tyrannical usurper of others' rights, or is he rightly canonised as S. Gregory? Is that winning beauty, in her very grave, as in life, the object of chivalrous adoration, to be described as the innocent victim of a rival queen, or to be branded for all time with the terrific names of hypocrite, murderer, and adulteress? If, however, it be meant that the events of history show clearly to mankind what the Divine judgments are, it must be suggested that though the page is frequently thus spread open, we may often prove incompetent to read its declarations aright. A man may have suffered death by the axe, or at the stake; but does the event, merely in and by itself, teach us whether he has suffered as a criminal or as a martyr? Two nations, each win a territory by the sword; the one loses, the other maintains its conquest: is the justice or injustice of the seizure to be decided by this retention? 'God ... hath judged already, and hath written his impartial sentence 'in characters legible to all Christendom.' So wrote one, who on a particular occasion chose to interpret the rules of Divine equity; so wrote Milton (they are his very words)¹ concerning the cause of Charles I. But does the event excuse the deed of

¹ *Iconoclastes*. Chap. I. (*sub fin.*)

blood enacted at Whitehall in 1649? Writers of the political school most opposed to Charles—as Macaulay and the Duke of Argyll—now at length term it ‘a crime,’ ‘an unwarrantable and needless crime.’

We had devoted a few pages to the examination of the ‘*might makes right*’ teaching of other portions of this passage, a teaching which in M. Cousin’s case, as in that of Mr. Carlisle, seems to harmonise but too well with a somewhat pantheistic system of philosophy. A few words had likewise been added upon this writer’s attempt to render philosophy wholly independent of religion, a feature in M. Cousin’s schemes which has been touched upon by continental pens, as that of Prince Albert de Broglie in his *Etudes Morales et Littéraires*, and of the Spanish divine, Balmes, in his *Cartas á un Esceptico*. But on second thoughts we cancel these sheets as being too divergent from the main subject of this article.

But we do not, we repeat, feel tempted to abandon history for its difficulties. Its treasures are, after all, far too ample, too edifying, to be lightly resigned, under the influence of apathy or despair. The most valuable things in life are not the most easy of attainment, nor always when attained the most complete. A lofty standard almost implies the existence of difficulties and imperfections. Truly says the ever-eloquent author of the *Stones of Venice* (so gloriously right when he *is* right): ‘The wild grass grows well and strongly, one year with another; but the wheat is, according to the nobleness of its nature, liable to the bitterer blight. And therefore, while in all things that we see or do, we are to desire perfection and strive for it, we are nevertheless not to set the meaner thing in its narrow accomplishment above the nobler thing in its mighty progress; not to esteem smooth minuteness above shattered majesty; not to prefer mean victory to honourable defeat; not to lower the level of our aim, that we may the more surely enjoy the complacency of success.’ All that we have been asserting is, the worldliness and carelessness of much that passes for history, and the danger of trusting too implicitly to the sole guidance of some one or two favourite authors. And it is with deep satisfaction that we are enabled, in confirmation of these remarks, to appeal to a living author among the very first for the depth of his research, perhaps the very first in his loftiness of conception of the true duties of an historian. ‘Clio,’ writes Sir Francis Palgrave, in his *History of Normandy and England*—

‘Clio has no toleration for the unprosperous: the mirror in which she reflects their images magnifies every blemish. She courses after the triumphal car, shouting like the crowd whom she encourages, and by whom she is encouraged:—Woe to the vanquished, woe to the weak, woe to the oppressed, woe to the humble, woe to the poor,—men, nations, kingdoms!

As in the world, so in the page of history.'

* * * * *

'All that we can expect from each historian is that he should stammer forth a few imperfect developments of truth: each inquirer partially elucidating some obscure passage in the progress of society: dispelling favourite or deluding visions or dreams: cutting, when practicable, the conventional pictures out of their frames, and replacing them by portraits taken from the life; but above all, uncramping or shattering the pedestals supporting the idols which have won the false worship of the multitude, so that they may nod in their niches or topple down.'

In the recognition of these and similar lessons appears to lie our best chance of attaining such truth as can be mastered here below. The real wish to be fair,—to know where there is evil, and hate it, to learn what is good, and cherish it,—is the best road to the knowledge alike of the present and the past. Our judgments cannot, it is true, affect the real condition of the departed, nor change their awful destiny for weal or woe; but they exercise an incalculable amount of influence upon our own inward life and principles. In the words of our departed Laureate—

'We live by Admiration, Hope, and Love;
And, even as these are well and wisely fix'd,
In dignity of being we ascend.'

And thus M. Cousin's identification of the judgments of history with the Divine judgments, though inadmissible as a fact, is admirable as a principle. Assuredly we *ought* to wish, that the opinions which we form upon the characters and events of history may be, however partial and incomplete, at least not opposed to that aspect in which they are viewed by an All-just and All-merciful God. *Some* such opinions we cannot avoid forming: in some instances we must *think*, as we are called upon to *act*, decidedly. And if there be cases wherein the veil appears too thick for mortal eyes to penetrate, let us be content to abide for a season in suspense. Great masters of physical science are, to say the least, as far from piercing the darkness which shrouds myriads of the secrets which they desire to know. The very deepest of such philosophers are among the first to make the most ample confessions upon this score: and good men of their number have imagined that the solution of their difficulties, and enlightenment of their ignorance, would prove an enjoyment even in the courts of Heaven. There is extant, if we mistake not, a prayer by Dr. Barrow (preserved in the library of the noble college over which he presided) in which that excellent mathematician and divine expresses his ardent desire for the day, when no longer by the slow steps of reasoning, but by the keen glance of intuition, he shall perceive the scientific truths which he is now engaged in painfully exploring. May not a similar thought occasionally cross the minds of those

¹ Vol. i. pp. 131, 353.

few (alas! that they have been and are so few) who, having been endowed with competent abilities, have approached in a religious temper the study of the vast, and often perplexing, problems of history?

II. We turn to what may be considered a connecting link between the history which does, and the history which does not, rest upon contemporaneous written evidence; we mean (as has been stated), the history which has a basis of tangible contemporary evidence, but has since become the subject of legendary additions. Our limits will compel us to treat this branch of the subject with comparative brevity, lest we encroach too much upon the space which will remain for the concluding section. But we may at any rate indicate sources of information, to which recourse may be had by any who shall be disposed to work out these problems more fully for themselves: and it will be hard if even a hurried comparison of the history and legend be not suggestive of many valuable hints.

The most obvious examples of legend engrafted upon true history are to be found in the medieval biographies of saints. There have been many holy men, of whose existence there is contemporary and satisfactory proof, but concerning whom, in the course of two or three centuries, a crowd of marvels has come to be related. This topic is so strictly connected with our subject, that we must venture to make a few remarks upon it.

If, as we trust to show, contemporary evidence is to be desired in the case of ordinary events, much more must it be requisite with respect to those of a supernatural character. There are, at least, three or four ways in which even contemporary narrators may, without the slightest intent to deceive, lend an air of supernaturalism to circumstances which are in reality non-miraculous. Such is, for example, the ignorance of physical facts. When we read in Eusebius of stones weeping, we may fairly suspect that the original witness had probably been unacquainted with the frequency of this phenomenon in hot climates, and thus associated it with the afflictions of the Church, over which Nature herself seemed to be lamenting. Then, again, there is that class of miracles, which Aquinas ranks as the lowest;¹ where, *e.g.* sickness is cured, or rain vouchsafed, at the instance of earnest prayer. An incredulous age, like our own, will doubtless often fail in such cases to recognise an extraordinary intervention of Divine power, where it is really granted: but, on the other hand,

¹ Sum. Theol. Pars 1. Qu. cv. Art. 8.

a credulous one will often pass the line of separation in an opposite direction, and term events *miraculous* which in truth were brought about by the ordinary workings of God's providence. Nor can we omit from this list the well-attested effects of imagination, which frequently take a form not easily to be distinguished from miracle. And, lastly, we must name what may be called the hardening into fact of metaphorical expressions; as where a devout person is said to overcome Satan, and the unlettered multitude (and subsequently even annalists) translate the saying into an actual combat with material weapons against the Evil One; or another is said to have borne Christ, *i.e.* in his heart, and is reported to have carried him on his shoulders.

Most Christians, we believe, would now acknowledge the necessity of vast deductions on this score from the hagiology of the middle ages. Bishop Kip, in his 'Christmas Holidays at Rome,' informs us that Italian clergy thus explained to him the history of S. Dunstan; and we ourselves have conversed in Paris with the estimable Curé of one of the principal churches of that city, who spoke similarly of the legend of S. Denis. Few indeed are the penmen of the present day who do not relate these narratives in an apologetic tone, and with lurking distrust. That they have lost their hold upon the great mass of the people, is shown by the manner in which French writers upon art allege the unfitness of such subjects for the painter. Artists cannot awaken interest by the representation of scenes no longer held to represent the truth.

Shall we then withhold our credence from all accounts of miracles, as miracles, saving and excepting those which are enshrined in the pages of Holy Scripture? Such a conclusion, however acceptable to many excellent persons, we believe to be utterly untenable. We doubt whether it would be now maintained by any men of really logical and, at the same time, reverent minds, who had given the subject a proper examination. And let those who may be inclined to consider such belief as superstitious and fanatical bethink them of the company in which they condemn us. In that company are numbered Grotius,¹ Bishop Warburton,² Milner, the Church historian,³ Burke,⁴ Dr. Arnold,⁵ and, probably, Neander.⁶ All these, and several others of less name, have expressed their belief in some one or more of the ecclesiastical miracles, and they are a strange assembly to be brought

¹ On S. Mark xvi. 17, *et alibi*.

² On Julian's attempt to rebuild the temple at Jerusalem.

³ On Julian's attempt, &c.

⁴ Fragment of English History.

⁵ Lectures on Modern History.

⁶ Church Hist. vol. vii. p. 356. (Bohn's English Edit.) His language is slightly ambiguous.

up upon a charge of credulity and superstition. The tests which have been mentioned in the preceding section, as genuineness of documents, intention of narrators, means of information, sources of prejudice, internal evidence of style, may of course be justly brought to bear upon the contemporaneous records of supernatural events, in addition to an examination of the possible causes of error just detailed. And further, it must, we think, be allowed that, by the constitution of the human mind, our judgment is in these cases greatly affected by our opinions concerning the antecedent probability of a special Divine interference in the particular instance under consideration. Let this last-named element be allowed, then, its due weight and influence upon the formation of our judgments: only let it be so employed that we forget not reverence and humility. For our ignorance herein is very great; we are but poor judges, *à priori*, of the kind of circumstances in which it would please an All-wise Creator to suspend or contravene the operation of his own laws. We are far from being able to guess what He may deem the *dignus vindice nodus*: will any pretend that we should *antecedently* have supposed that the loss of a borrowed axe-head, or the failure of wine at a marriage feast, or the need of money to pay the temple-tribute, were fit occasions for the intervention of miraculous power?

When, therefore, the question of historic credibility comes across the profound and solemn problems connected with the indefinable boundary of the visible and the invisible, it is obvious that we must look, even more closely than heretofore, to the tone and temper of our informant or our critic. He may doubtless be so prepared to look for special interference from on high, as to see the supernatural in many a circumstance, which can be easily and satisfactorily explained by natural causes; but he may, upon the other hand, be so incredulous of the very existence of the world of grace, as not to deserve the attention of a Christian, when the point at issue may possibly be concerned with the unseen.

Non-recognition of supernatural, as well as natural, causes is a blemish even in a heathen work. It is surely a defect in Polybius; and it injures the value of the ingenious replies of Cicero, in the second book of his '*De Divinatione*,' to the arguments which he puts into the mouth of his brother Quintus in the preceding book of the same treatise. For, when natural causes have been worked to the uttermost to solve the apparent instances of magic or divination, we may only have arrived at half the truth: and if so with respect to marvels among the heathen, much more so within the pale of Christ's Church. The very fact, that false prodigies have been narrated, is right-

fully appealed to as an argument, which favours the probability that there have been true ones likewise; just as usurpers, or base coins, or paste jewels, or forged notes, imply the existence of lawful monarchs, of good money, of real diamonds, and true bank paper. The manner in which this principle is ignored throughout an elaborate treatise, which has excited attention both on the Continent and in England,—we mean M. Alfred Maury's '*Essai sur les Légendes pieuses du Moyen-Age*,'¹—is, in our judgment, a stumbling-block upon the very threshold of its author's argument. M. Maury attempts, by an examination of authorities, and by the lights of modern science, to show that the entire mass of medieval accounts of miracles may safely be disposed of, as being either deficient in respect of attestation, or else referrible to natural causes. That his Essay displays great learning and considerable acuteness is not to be denied: nor indeed do we doubt but that its pages contain a large amount of truth. But this is not a subject to which the Baconian laws of induction can safely be applied. Nineteen instances of erroneous belief in a story of miracle, do *not* establish a general law, do *not* prove the twentieth to be false. Each case must be judged upon its own merits. But what are the qualifications of M. Maury to be guide in these delicate questions? His critical remarks are not faultless, his arguments frequently capable of introversion. No one, with any pretensions to scholarship, ought to dream of inventing for the origin of legends such a term as *legendogonie*. Well may he fear that he is framing *un mot trop barbare* (p. 40), seeing that the first half of his coinage is from the Latin, and the second from the Greek. Had he spoken of *mythogony*, the term, though not classical, might have honourably claimed a place beside the title of Hesiod's famous poem, the *Theogony*. We are likewise surprised to find that M. Maury's great research has not enabled him to perceive the origin of the horns with which Moses is frequently endowed in painting and in sculpture, as in the grand statue of Michael Angelo, to which he has himself referred (p. 197). Whatever amount of Jewish tradition may have been mixed up with the matter, there can be no doubt that the artists of the middle ages thus represented Moses because their one authority, the Vulgate, had rendered Exodus xxxiv. 29, by the words, '*Ignorabat quòd cornuta esset facies ejus.*' But these are trifles; it is more important to observe, that by approaching some parts of his thesis, as it were from the wrong side, this essayist represents symbols, which were typical of Christianity, and 'wrecks of paradise' preserved among pagans, to be mere

¹ Paris (Ladrange), 1843.

thefts of the primitive Christians, instead of property rightfully reclaimed. What if Paganism *did* employ the images of the lion, the wolf, the dragon, &c., with an aim not wholly unlike that of Scripture and the Church? Such usage cannot really prejudice the Christian's right to avail himself of them; and a reverent philosophy, such as that of Keble or M. Nicolas, will justly teach us how to see in these resemblances a confirmation of all holy truth. We will not stay to examine how far the materialising views, which M. Maury imputes (and not without reason) to the middle ages, may be justly charged, in many respects, upon himself. But since the merits of this work have been recognised in quarters wherein its grievous faults are either passed by, or perhaps not admitted to be faults at all, we take the opportunity of saying a few words upon its tone. M. Maury is simply a disciple of Strauss, who is anxious (as he informs us) to impart to ignorant France a share of the riches of Germany. With Strauss he sees in the history of Daniel a story made up from the salient points of that of Joseph (p. 7); the incident of the viper fastening upon the hand of S. Paul, is evidently to him a mere invention to confirm the truth of the evangelic prediction, recorded in the closing chapter of S. Mark (p. 141); the account of the wise men from the East is simply *ce mythe des Mages*, based upon astrological ideas; every instance of resuscitation to life in either Testament, inclusive of that Resurrection on which Christians base their faith, is cavilled at (p. 236); and the wondrous scene of the Transfiguration resolved into an ocular deception, such as is often witnessed on the Brocken (p. 244). Of what possible avail can it be to discuss with such a writer the evidence for a particular case, when that case is evidently prejudged by the admission of certain general principles? Why pause to weigh the credibility of exorcism, with one who clearly does not believe that there are any evil spirits to be exorcised; one, who appeals to the enlightenment of modern science, but on finding that a great physician believed that men might still be 'possessed,' coolly remarks, 'le célèbre 'médecin Frédéric Hoffmann admettait encore, *sans doute de 'préjugés religieux, des maladies démoniaques?*' Why argue that a given miracle may have truly happened, with one who asserts (p. 237) that from the point of view in which we of this age are placed, any further miracles and prodigies are impossible? The *abstract* possibility of miracles forms no part of our present subject. Many will remember that the reasoning of Hume has received a reply from the pen of Mr. J. S. Mill, which is satisfactory for the particular purpose. Further arguments, with special reference to our own times, may be found in the valuable works of Mr. R. C. Trench, and in M. Nicolas'

'*Études Philosophiques sur le Christianisme*;' but nowhere perhaps has the subject been handled in a more masterly manner than in the replies to Strauss by the late lamented Dr. Mill.

We have relegated, however, the subject of miraculous narratives to this division of our theme, because we do not doubt that the great majority are not traceable to contemporaneous witnesses, who have left behind them written evidence. It was observed, that in this section the question of the writer's *intention* must especially come under consideration. It is time to touch upon it in connexion with the marvellous. Did the author, whose book we may be reading, *intend* us to take this and that marvel for an objective fact? He may have had another purpose, which in his eyes justified the greatest laxity. Polybius affords a curious hint in this respect. He treats with skilful, and not perhaps unmerited, scorn, the story of a divine being having appeared upon the Alps to show the way to Hannibal; and again (in another part of his work) the account of a statue of Diana, which, though exposed to the air, is neither rained nor snowed upon; as also an assertion of the wonder-loving Theopompus, to the effect that those who enter into the sanctuary of Jupiter in Arcadia, anticipate Chamisso's Peter Schlemil, by becoming shadowless. Nevertheless, Polybius is for allowing historians to insert as many of these wonders as tend to preserve popular piety towards the Deity, and thinks that the quantity, though hard to limit, may yet be kept within due bounds.¹ Now, if a writer has only inserted marvels with such an intention as Polybius suggests, we shall of course fall into the greatest mistakes, if we accept for actual fact, things which he only meant to be understood as moral fiction. It is almost as if we should take up a fable or an allegory, and, not content with the moral, insist upon the objective accuracy of the narrative. 'But he,' says Origen, 'who reads histories with prudence, and desires to preserve himself from deception, will judge of the points to which he should yield acceptance, and of those which he should interpret figuratively, seeking out the intention of those who feigned such things (τὸ βούλημα ἐρευνῶν τῶν ἀναπλασμένων τὰ τοιάδε).'² There may at times be difficulty in following the whole of the advice here given us by this great and, if we may so term him, anticipatory genius; but his language will be seen to imply a clear admission of the principle, which is now being discussed by us.

And this brings us to another very important question connected with historic credibility, and one which may most fitly

¹ Lib. iii. cap. 47, 48; lib. xvi. cap. 12.

² Cont. Cels. lib. i. cap. 42.

be introduced at this point of our inquiry; namely, how far legends or anecdotes, which are not actually and objectively true, may be considered as being in certain cases as potentially true (as Aristotelians might call it, *δυνάμει*), and consequently a fair basis of argument. It will be easy to show that such cases may exist, but at the same time their treatment will be found to demand peculiar caution. Let us first then supply a few illustrations. We have been told of a farmer who, at the conclusion of an extraordinarily fine season, when every crop had been gathered in without stint or failure, grumbled because there was nothing spoilt to feed the pigs. Now, if name and time and place be required for this anecdote, they will probably be sought in vain; but we can all understand that there *is* a sense in which this farmer may be said to live in every shire, or rather in every country parish. And if a foreigner should adduce the story as a proof that this class of men were in England believed to be not easily satisfied with the weather, his conclusion would be just, whether the tale were a fact or an invention. There are numberless instances of a more serious character, where the value of the story consists, not in its having actually happened, but in its having been *believed* to have happened. For the existence of such belief is in itself a fact, though of a different character from the thing narrated. Thus divines may justly appeal to the story of a Codrus or a Decius, as instances of the idea of one man sacrificing himself for the good of a nation, prevailing at Athens and at Rome: for, prove the accounts to be traditionary and untrustworthy as you please, you do not thereby get rid of the evidence for heathen belief in the availing nature of such self-devotedness.

Or again, let us turn to that great work of S. Augustine, his '*De Civitate Dei*.' Therein, he is compelled to reply *in limine* to the assertion of the pagans, that Rome and Romans invariably prospered while Jupiter and the pantheon of Olympus were the objects of worship, but that disaster followed the acknowledgment of Christ. Among other examples of their erroneous connexion between virtue and the certainty of temporal prosperity, S. Austin appeals with forcible eloquence to the far-famed history of Regulus.¹ If, he argues, that pagan religion ensured happiness to its votaries, how came it that one, so nobly constant to his oath and duty, perished by a mode of death so terrible and unheard-of? But if his grand resolve to lose all outward and material blessings rather than offend the gods by whom he had sworn, was to win for Regulus felicity as a reward hereafter, why calumniate the Christians, who with sure faith

¹ Lib. i. cap. 15.

look for a home on high, and know that they are strangers upon earth? Now it is maintained by Niebuhr, that the fame of Regulus has been much exaggerated: that he was less skilful as a general, less great as a man, than has been commonly represented; that he had been overbearing in his conduct towards Carthage in its hour of weakness; that his martyrdom is apocryphal, and that his death most probably happened in the course of nature. Be it so, for argument's sake; yet who would therefore pretend that the inconsistency of which the bishop of Hippo complained is thereby lessened, or his argument against Paganism invalidated? The embassy and heroic death of Regulus, whether true or not in fact, had been sung by the poets and extolled by the orators of Rome, and, for the purpose in hand, at any rate *represented* the truth. A recent writer, Mr. Helps, thinks that fables, current opinions, and the like, have received too little attention from historians. We doubt the justice of the allegation, so far at least as regards the present century. Gibbon, Guizot, Lord Lindsay, Dean Milman, and others, occur to us as having fully recognised the worth of such materials, when properly employed; and Mr. Henry Taylor, after laying down the general principle, justly observes by way of instance, that however fabulous may be the first decade of Livy, 'the Discorsi of Machiavel, generalizing from them, have lost little or nothing of their value.'

The suggestion of Polybius, above noticed, justly offends the moral sense, because he supposes the historian to insert marvels of which he himself is utterly incredulous while he is telling them. But let us take the case where, in an uncritical age, the writer is far from imagining his narrative to be abstractedly incredible, though he may not be very particular in examining whether what he is telling appertains to the particular person to whom he assigns it. He would think with himself, that if these self-denying or those miraculous deeds were not true of *A* they were true of *B* or of somebody else: that he is only setting forth in a recognised form the holiness of the subject of his biography, and that since his knowledge is imperfect, the sketch may be profitably filled by the workings of imagination under the influence of religious feeling. There is a German proverb to the effect that everything is true, which makes you better (*es ist alles wahr, wodurch Du besser wirst*); and in the spirit of this saying appear to have been composed a vast quantity of mediæval legends. The writers did not, as Polybius recommends, invent or narrate what they actually disbelieved: far from it; but they did regard the moral and religious effect of what they were saying, far more than its objective truth. This seems to be admitted by thinkers of the

most varied schools; by Dr. Arnold and Dr. Newman, as well as by M. Maury and Mr. Grote. How fully these legends satisfied the cravings of men's souls in those tumultuous days; how amidst outward miseries the ideas of right and order, law and justice, were cherished and supported in their minds by these glimpses of a brighter sky, thus seen between the thunder clouds; how little the hearers would be disposed to ask for the evidence on which the story rested; how the love of novelty, of striking adventure thus portrayed, relieved the monotony and dreariness of existence, from which the mass of the population then suffered;—all this has been set forth and illustrated with his usual clearness and vigour, by M. Guizot in a well-known chapter (the seventeenth) of his '*Civilisation en France*.' Told by a thousand minstrels and reciters, reduced to writing by monks, and everywhere enshrined in the labours of artists, these legends, amidst a crowd of trivialities and absurdities, yet testified to the existence of an unseen world; and that in a manner perhaps more calculated to impress the medieval mind than any other which could have been chosen.

It was well that M. Guizot and the many authors who (like Dr. Arnold and Mr. Stanley) have followed in his wake, should thus proclaim the many excellences of the medieval legends, and shield their composers from the common charge of mere folly and deliberate intention to deceive. It was well that others, as M. Rio, Lord Lindsay, and Mrs. Jameson, should explain to us the bearing of these histories upon the wonderful creations of medieval art. One more excuse, too, for their authors shall be mentioned, because we do not feel sure that it is distinctly enunciated in the works to which we have referred; we mean, the great difficulty of teaching the uneducated to discern the difference between fact and allegory. The educated mind may cull the deep lessons to be drawn from one of our Lord's divine Parables, as *e.g.* that of the Good Samaritan, without supposing that the details of the narrative are binding upon the conscience as facts; but the poor and uninstructed accept parable and facts as one united whole, until at length (as has really happened) the place where the Samaritan found the object of his care is shown to the traveller in the Holy Land. In this manner do the humble parishioners of many an excellent pastor read the tracts which he purchases for their edification: can we wonder that, in a ruder age, the same (often very innocent) mistake was enacted upon a very extensive scale?

But while we show charity to errors which were frequently so venial, and recognise the benefits which this species of legendary literature conferred upon humanity, we must not be blind to its faults, nor forget that it had at least one very

injurious aspect. It is after all a grievous fault in any narrative *claiming* to be historical, that we should not (even the highly educated) be able to understand what portion rests upon the comparatively solid basis of sober contemporaneous evidence, and was intended by its author for fact, and what was merely allegorical, or the growth of later ages, when direct means of knowledge could no longer exist. For a day comes, when doubt is proved to be legitimate with reference to one portion of the story, and thence arises a sad amount of scepticism concerning the true and sound remainder. How much of modern unbelief may be connected with unwarrantable demands upon credulity, which have been made of old! How significant is the circumstance, that when the ablest living apologist for Christianity among French Catholics would defend the miracles of the Gospel, he is compelled, in the first place, to get rid of the objection arising out of the false miracles of the middle ages! Let us, by all means, make due use of the less trustworthy tales which have, as has been said, a value in their measure; only, if we really care at all to aim at discovering laws of historic credibility, let the line in this case be strongly drawn, lest that which is merely subjective and fanciful be confounded with objective truth.

It would assist the inquirer in these matters if he could examine any considerable number of histories in which the contemporary narratives and the later legendary additions can be compared. Thus, for example, it would be interesting to possess any earlier account of Cyrus than that of Herodotus, who lived when many of the Persians desired (as he himself informs us) to embellish and dignify the founder of their empire, that so we might contrast it with the later stories. It is curious to read the biography of Belisarius, and then turn to that, we suppose (*pace* Lord Stanhope) very questionable and subsequent, story of the *date obolum Belisario*, impressed upon the European mind by prints and pictures, and the romance of Marmontel. Or, again, to study Charlemagne, who is 'always in danger,' says Palgrave, 'of shading into a mythic Monarch. . . a personified theory,' in the light first of history and then of romance: a task in which much assistance may be derived from the writings of Sir F. Palgrave himself, and Sismondi, and, we presume, M. Fauriel.¹ But since a single specimen is all that

¹ Judging from other works of M. Fauriel, and from the specimen given by Mr. Grote, his papers on the romances connected with Charlemagne must be very valuable, but they appeared in the leading French Review so long ago that they have become extremely difficult of access.

we can here attempt to produce, we prefer to devote a page or two to the consideration of Attila. For in *his* case it is not only easy to turn to the pages of distinguished English writers for the history; but both history and legend have been recently given to the world with admirable distinctness and graphic effect in a series of articles contributed to the *Revue des deux Mondes*,¹ by the brilliant pen of M. Amédée Thierry. If our attempts at conciseness cause obscurity, the reader can hardly do better than refer to these papers. Nowhere perhaps in the same compass will he obtain an equally good example of the difference between history and legend.

The most prominent features of Attila's career admit of an easy and rapid sketch. Descended from the ancient kings of the Huns, he became, in A.D. 434, the sovereign of that vast array of tribes which extends from Gaul to China (exclusive of either of these countries); thus alone, in the history of the world, combining under his sway both the German and the Slavonic races. A Kalmuck in his physiognomy, which was repulsive, but not destitute of a certain awe and majesty; a heathen and savage conqueror, commanding an army of at least 500,000 men, he enjoys the terror which his approach everywhere excites, and is by no means unwilling that the scared hosts of Christendom should regard him as the personal Anti-Christ. But he can display generosity, and in discovering a plot of Theodosius II. against his life, will not wreak his vengeance, as most wild chieftains would have done, upon the Emperor's innocent ambassador. From the Eastern empire he gains a large tract to the south of the Danube, and an annual payment of tribute. As he subsequently marches onward against the Western Empire, in A.D. 450, whole nations are displaced, and their homes become the seat of other tribes and peoples. The Slavonic race descends to the Black Sea to take possession of the countries abandoned by the Ostrogoths; the white Huns and the dark Huns, the Avars, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Turks, hitherto external to Europe, each advance one step nearer to its frontiers. Beaten, with enormous loss, by the Roman general Aetius, at Chalons-sur-Marne, in June 451, he retreats to the Danube, recruits his forces, and succeeds in crossing the Alps in the very year of his defeat. Aquileia, though a strong city, is captured and utterly dismantled: Padua, Vicenza, Verona, Brescia and Bergamo fare but little better, and the flying inhabitants of the district take refuge in the seventy-two isles of the Adriatic lagoon, which are afterwards to become the city of Venice. Lombardy is overrun;

¹ Tom. xiii. (1852). Tom. xvi. (1852), and No. for 1 Août, 1855.

Milan and Pavia are pillaged. Rome trembles at her seemingly inevitable fate. But at this juncture a deputation comes to Attila from the Eternal City: it is composed of Trigetius and the Senator Avienus, headed by their Bishop, the holy Pontiff S. Leo. And the spell of Rome's greatness is upon him; sickness has begun to waste his army; he bethinks him that his predecessor, Alaric, did not live long after the capture of Rome, and even his own officers suggest to him, that a like destiny may await him if he advances. The majesty of Pope Leo's mien and the impressiveness of his words complete the charm; he accords a favourable truce and returns homewards. But the days of his life and his empire are numbered; in a year or two (the date is variously given) the king of the Huns adds a young beauty, Ildico, to the list of his numerous wives. The nuptials are celebrated with barbaric pomp and enormous feasting; but the morrow morn displays Attila dead in his tent. Some accounts have placed a dagger in the hand of the young spouse; but it is more probable that the bursting of a blood-vessel had caused suffocation, and that this hæmorrhage had been so brought about as to justify the quaint moralizing of our Chaucer,—

“Loke, Attila, the grete conquerour,
Died in his slepe, with shame and dishonour,
Bleding ay at his nose in dronkenesse:
A capitaine shulde live in sobrenesse.”

He is bewailed by his countrymen with savage rites and tears of blood: they bury him secretly by night, and the slaves who dig the grave are slain that they may not betray the spot. His empire dies with him.¹

Such is the Attila of history: history derived from contemporary witnesses. Turn we now to the Attila of legend, who is the same and yet another. In both he has won a place by the side of Alexander and Cæsar; if they have inspired admiration, he has at least inspired fear. Yet the fear, as Thierry justly remarks, seems to be less connected with his actual exploits, than the consciousness of what he *might* have done; and the shock that he gave to the prestige of the inviolability of Rome. Neither Genseric, who sacked both Rome and Carthage, nor Radagaisus, the most savage of conquerors, have left behind them a name so full of dread, as that of the monarch who failed to take Orleans, was defeated at Chalons, and who, yielding to

¹ This sketch is largely drawn from Mr. Stanley's excellent summary in Dr. Smith's Dictionary (*Art. Attila*), compared, however, with Thierry, Gibbon, and the '*Nouvelle Biographie Générale*.' In what follows Thierry is our chief, almost our only guide.

the prayer of S. Leo, spared the ancient capital of the world. Shall we see in this the mere caprice of fame, or recognise the prerogative of genius? Perhaps both elements are discernible; we must leave the decision to the reader. The Attila of legend has a threefold existence. In the traditions of the Latin races, he is mainly the destroyer; in the Germanic ones, he is the originator (as in truth he was) of a new national existence; in those of Hungary he is the ancestral king to whom indirectly, strange to say, the Christianity of the country is owing. The middle age in southern Europe, which assigned every anonymous building to the hand of Julius Cæsar, in like manner attributed every ruin to that of Attila. The two, says Thierry, were correlative types; the Roman of fructifying and civilizing conquest, the Hun of barren and exterminating warfare. There was no enormity, no pillage, massacre, or persecution of saints, so incredible, as to surpass belief, if its epoch were only made coincident with the invasion of the Huns: all was rendered easy of acceptance, by the bare pronunciation of the name of *Attila*. The death of S. Ursula and the supposed eleven thousand maiden attendants has been laid upon him. True, they were considered to have left Brittany in A.D. 383, and Attila was at Cologne in 451: but such trifles are as nothing in a legend. On the other hand, Treves and Strasbourg claim to have been enlarged and embellished, if not founded, by this destructive chieftain. Christian Strasbourg honoured the king of the Huns as her patron; while Christian Cologne execrated his memory as the slayer of S. Ursula and her virgins. Yet those who condemned ever asserted that the prayers of holy men had (either with the consent, or in despite of the will, of Attila) saved many cities from the terrors of the Hunnish brand. Not only had Rome been preserved by S. Leo; but Orleans was said to have been saved by S. Aignan; Troyes by S. Loup, and perhaps Paris by S. Geneviève, from the same danger. Here was another source of interest; here was an answer to such calumniators of Christianity as S. Austin had contended against in the *De Civitate Dei*: here was the voice of the Most High speaking from heaven in the barbarian's heart, and working the greatest of all miracles—that of making Attila merciful. Certainly, we incline to agree with Dean Milman and with Thierry, that the far later legend of the eighth century, which makes the Apostles S. Peter and S. Paul appear in the air behind S. Leo, as he pleads for Rome, is, however glorified by the art of Raphael and Algardi, in reality, more materialised and less spiritual and sublime than the simple fact of history, which exhibits the conquest of a wild and lawless ambition by the might and majesty of chastened holiness. Of the same date (at least it is not found sooner) is

the famous appellation of the 'Scourge of God' (*Flagellum Dei*), probably alluded to by Dante, when he speaks of

'Quell' Attila, che fu flagello in Terra,'¹

and which the conqueror is supposed in legends to have consciously adopted as his own title, until it ultimately became a kind of personification absorbing his historic reality. With the mention of one more feature, we must leave the Italian accounts of Attila. Just as the descendant of a Scotch Covenanter would delight to think that his ancestor, if he had fallen in the cause, had been slain by no meaner hands than that of Claverhouse himself; even so too, cities which the army of the Huns had not approached, boldly asserted that they had been besieged by Attila, and could furnish details as exact as those of the duel in a famous modern comedy: for to admit that the hero had not been there, was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in his days. Ravenna particularly distinguished itself in this way; and had two (very opposite) versions of an arbitration in a question of Christian orthodoxy, made by Attila between S. Leo and its Archbishop, Agnellus. So that while in parts of Germany the great Hun was made intimate with Satan, and almost his human counterpart, in Italy he could on occasion serve for a judge of doctrine, and moreover be recounted to have preached good morality to the Romans, and to have given dowries to their virtuous maidens.

But, northward, plentiful additions were in store. The most ancient monument of German poetry is concerned with Theodoric and Attila; and even Norway and Greenland sang of the mighty leader. And belief in the historic truth of these poems appears to have been unhesitating. Some well-read monks and bishops entered protests; but they could not find readers for their comparatively uninteresting narratives. So the character of the conqueror changes with the birth-place of the song: among the Scandinavian bards he acquires a sort of Norwegian fierceness; in the lays of the *Minnesingers* he is softened down to something like a specimen of Christian knighthood. In Norway his mother is a witch, and his sister a Valkyre; he is prudent, full of stratagem and finesse: while in Germany he is frank and open. Both agree, however, in making him a conqueror satiated with victory, and yearning for peace. We cannot follow these wild traditions of the North. Suffice it to say, that occasional gleams of an historic light dart, though but faintly, through their misty atmosphere; and certain vague hints incline M. Amedée Thierry to think that the accusation against Ildico may, after all, be just, and that Attila died a violent death.

¹ Inferno, xii.

But the tales of Italy and Germany, Gaul and Scandinavia, must yield in point of beauty to the Magyar legends respecting Attila. In these last he is surrounded with a very halo of poetic glorification: Attila is to the Hungarians their ancestor, their patron, the founder of their institutions. In the lapse of years their holy king, S. Stephen, was to obtain the sacred crown, the palladium of the Magyar empire. That is historic enough. But, say their traditions, that crown was gained in virtue of a compact between Attila and the Redeemer himself at the gates of Rome, as the ransom of the Eternal City and the tombs of the Apostles. Well may the distinguished historian, who is here our guide, pause, while he admits the fantastical character of this account, to admire its poetic beauty. We will venture one step further. Such as are in the habit of looking in legends for moral and spiritual truth, rather than absolute truth of fact, may surely perceive it here. The real retirement of Attila at the petition of one who had no earthly weapons to repel him, was a deed to be ridiculed by those who had no dread of what is supernatural. But elsewhere it may have been judged far differently. And there is nothing forced or violent in imagining that a special blessing may have been vouchsafed to it to be shed upon generations yet unborn; just as the holy deed of Rodolph, which has been sung by Schiller, has been regarded (and who shall presume to say, idly regarded?) as the charter of long prosperity to the house of Hapsburg. And as Italy changed the simple circumstance of the interview into a vision of Apostles; so Hungary made our Saviour appear in person to the king of the Huns, and bid him spare the tombs of the Apostles, and promise him, that in return for his docility, one of his successors should receive from a successor of S. Peter a grace which should be shed upon all his race.

We cannot spare any space for details; though the tale is but bare and lifeless without them. But the grand point for consideration in connexion with our present subject is this:—*These legends may be read in the light of authentic history.* By its aid we detect the degree of truth inherent in the varied versions of the events. We see, for instance, how *both* the legendary accounts (the Hungarian and Italian) of Attila's withdrawal of his troops from Italy, agree, amidst their differences, in portraying him as acting under the impulse of a religious awe. We see that the Attila of Hungary is much nearer the truth of history, than the Attila sung of by the Norwegians. But supposing, and it is no impossibility, that the works of Priscus and Jornandes had been lost, can we believe that a modern critic could have restored for us a satisfactory account of Attila out of these legendary materials?

There is a school of critics which will boldly answer, *Yes*. We must take the liberty of dissenting from them.

III. We now approach the most difficult portion of our subject, the treatment of that species of history which is not based upon contemporary written evidence. And here, where 'doctors disagree' so seriously, it becomes us to speak with diffidence, and to request, in all sincerity and earnestness, the kind indulgence of the reader. Far be it from us to dogmatise on such a theme; let our reflections not be taken for more than they assume to be: *valeant quantum valeant*.

It appears, then, that there are, in the main, four ways in which such history may be handled.

1. It may be accepted on almost precisely the same terms as history which *does* rest upon contemporary written evidence.

2. It may be utterly rejected, as a fiction.

3. It may be regarded as a mixture of truth and falsehood, fact and allegory, from which the skill of a critical mind is able to elicit a real history.

4. It may be contemplated, so to speak, as a substance *in vacuo*, of which the properties are thereby so changed, or rather, perhaps, rendered so difficult of analysis, that we are unable to arrive at a determinate conclusion concerning them. On this hypothesis we must be content to remain in a simply negative state of mind, unable to assert that the poem or narrative before us possesses, or does not possess, a substantial and historical basis; unable to decide how much is fact and how much fiction.

Let us view each of these methods separately.

1. To place such history almost upon a level with that which was witnessed to us by the writings of contemporaries, was the plan pursued by our forefathers in all lands, and the one which has been impressed upon the boyish minds of most men now living who have passed the age of thirty. Take, for instance, Roman history. We have recently had in our hands a copy of Goldsmith's *Rome*. In the edition we have glanced at, not a single authority is cited throughout two octavo volumes. We are left to suppose, that all which is recorded stands upon equally good testimony; Romulus is as real a personage as Julius Cæsar, and the battle of Lake Regillus as historical as that of Cannæ. Why is it that this confidence has ceased?

It has ceased, because it would not bear the light of honest and judicious inquiry; it has ceased, because all who will take the trouble to think over the subject for themselves, must (we believe) inevitably conclude that a real and definite line—how broad a one, is a further question—*must* be drawn between the

two kinds of narrative to which we refer. Where there exists no contemporary evidence in writing, we must needs fall back upon tradition. Now tradition is indeed of more use in the world than most people are apt to imagine. Our trades and the arts, and the learned professions, live upon it very largely. There are numberless 'secrets of the craft' which are never committed to writing, but orally learnt by each apprentice in his generation. But in handiwork of all kinds the result is a sort of check upon the wanderings of fancy and faithlessness of memory. If the work does not issue in the shape expected, the process must be taxed with faultiness.

'Amphora cœpit
Institui; currente rotâ cur urceus exit?'

Nor is this check confined to the useful arts; the painter, the sculptor, and the musician, may all avail themselves of it. Nay, even in pursuits less conversant with the tangible and material, the same rule is capable of application. The young physician may in some measure test the correctness of that which he has heard in a lecture, by the effect produced upon a patient; the lawyer, who receives from his instructor a traditional commentary upon certain statutes, may in time discover how far that interpretation is accepted by the authorities on the bench in our courts of law and equity; and even the divine, who in all communions receives *some* current view of religion, Roman, Genevan, Lambethian, from parents and instructors, will discover, as he grows older, a variety of tests (besides the sacred volume) which, though not necessarily easy of application, yet place a limit upon the power and influence of tradition. But in the case of history which is devoid of contemporaneous written evidence, where upon earth are we to find such checks to the licence of imagination, and who is interested in creating them? Even in our own century a false story does not fall to the ground at once. Barrère sent a flaming report to the French Convention, to the effect that a French ship, *Le Vengeur* (one of the fleet which was conquered by Lord Howe on the famous 1st of June), had gone down without striking her flag, while her crew shouted *Vive la République*. The French preserved a model of the patriotic vessel, and the story found its way into the pages of Alison and Carlyle. This theatrical performance, after a life of many years, has been proved not to possess one atom of truth.¹ Some Germans, with Goethe at their head, accounted for the plot of Lord Byron's *Manfred*, by a tale which attributed at least one murder to its author. The story ac-

¹ Carlyle's *Miscellanies*, vol. iv. (latest editions); Arnold on *Mod. Hist.* Lect. VIII.

counted for apparent difficulties in the drama, and this was enough for a large class of Teutonic critics. But it was a pure and baseless myth.¹ And let those who would trust to tradition unchecked by writing or by such means as have been just referred to, inquire (we borrow the hint indirectly from Sir G. C. Lewis) in any company of twenty persons, how much each can tell concerning his great-grandfather. There must be no appeal allowed to the family Bible, to histories of the borough or the county, to the Peerage or the Annual Register. If indeed the memory, unaccustomed to lean upon writing, has preserved that vigour which it seems to have possessed in Greece and some other countries, and if the oral accounts supplied to us can be confronted with similar reports concerning the same events and persons, we then do possess a real test, and the tradition may possess great value: though even here a searching examination is needed, lest our concurrent testimonies are, after all, derived from some one popular tale or poem, well known to all our informants, and employed as the groundwork of their narrative.² And just as such false tales as those respecting the ship *Le Vengeur* and the poem of *Manfred* can be tested, because produced in writing, while witnesses of their falsity were yet alive; while similar stories not attested by contemporaries cannot be thus examined; so too does it fare with monuments. They can hardly have been forged in the very sight of those who could at once denounce the forgery. If London's column used of old to lift its head and lie, the lie at least never went unprotected against, and has now disappeared for more than a quarter of a century. But monuments professing to represent bygone events, though not contemporary with those events—how much credence is due to them? A well-known college in Oxford bears the symbol of a brazen nose over its gateway, and now appears in the Latinized documents of the University as *Collegium Anei Nasi*. Does any antiquary on that account accept this Latin translation (which never, we believe, appears in the statutes of the college itself) as a true rendering of the original meaning of the name? We remember seeing, some ten years since, an ostensible tomb of Juliet at Verona. Among the ancients, we hear of the egg of Leda, hung up in a temple at Sparta; the ivory rib of Pelops; the tools wherewith Epeus made the Trojan horse, preserved at Metapontum; the sow which Æneas saw, pickled at Lavinium; and in several places,

¹ Edinburgh Review, for October, 1846 (vol lxxxiv. p. 350); Moore's Life of Byron; recent editions of *Manfred*.

² Have the consentient legends of the Maoris in New Zealand been thoroughly examined in this respect? If not, does not Sir F. Palgrave make too much of them? (Normandy and England, vol. i. pp. 13, 14.)

relics of the good ship *Argo*.¹ But who now appeals to such relics as proofs of the truth of the event, in and by themselves, apart from trustworthy contemporary history?

We cannot here stay to recount the numerous internal impossibilities of the earlier Roman history. Niebuhr, Arnold, Mr. Malden, Dean Liddell, and others have set them forth *in extenso*. That they did not ruin the credibility of that early history before they had been subjected to the criticisms of Perizonius, Vico, Beaufort, and finally Niebuhr, is only a proof that they 'lacked severe research.' But since the appearance of Niebuhr's far-famed book, how few men of name and authority have resisted the force of his destructive arguments, whatever they may have thought of his success in building up his own theories of the truth. Some indeed there are, who seem inclined to differ from Niebuhr, by believing more than he did. Such are Messrs. Gerlach and Bachofen; and perhaps Mr. F. W. Newman and Monsieur J. J. Ampère. With the first-named writers, who attempt to establish the historical character of the wars celebrated in the *Æneid*, we are not acquainted; nor do the specimens of their labours given by Sir G. C. Lewis at all tempt us to undertake the task of studying their volume.² Between Niebuhr and Mr. F. W. Newman, the difference is rather one of degree than principle. That a writer usually so incredulous should display a greater willingness of belief than the majority of modern scholars, respecting such annals as those of the early kings of Rome, is a strange, but by no means an unprecedented phenomenon. We can only afford space to remark, that when Professor Newman, in his *Regal and Republican Rome*, asserts the necessity of clinging to Livy and Dionysius, because if they are forsaken we have no one left to lean upon, he is asserting what no man would care to question in the abstract; the real question being (as has been observed) whether, with Rollin, Goldsmith, and the like, we cling to these writers absolutely; or, with Niebuhr and his followers, try to extract facts out of assumed legends; or, with Grote and Lewis, receive the narratives as they stand, not as history, but as a *mélange*, out of which no mortal skill can avail to distinguish with any security and precision between the sound and the fabulous, the true and false. A word, however, must be bestowed upon that very pleasing writer, M. Ampère. He has been recently publishing, in the valuable *Revue* of which he is an editor, a series of papers entitled *L'Histoire Romaine à Rome*.

¹ See Lewis, vol. i. pp. 211, 462; and many parts (notes and text) of Grote's *Greece*, vol. i.

² Lewis, vol. i. pp. 12, 131, 370.

We cannot say that he has treated the subject with his usual felicity. In defending the personal existence of Romulus against the attacks of scepticism, he remarks: '*On arrive ainsi à récuser sans preuves l'existence d'Homère, de Lycurgue et de Jésus-Christ.*' Surely, this is an ill-considered sentence. The followers of Strauss would accept the parallel and rejoice. But, for our own part, while we grant that the real personality of Lycurgus may possibly be questioned on grounds similar to that of Romulus, we utterly deny the similarity of the two other examples. Of Romulus we have no written word, no action attested by a contemporary. Of Homer, we have at least one poem, which, after the severest examination, has been conclusively proved from internal evidence to be the work of one man: that proof, though well supported by many prior writers, having been reserved as the crowning triumph of the toils of Colonel Mure. And of Him (may the association be pardoned) Who is the Life and Light of believing souls, it must be said, that *He* has in a most remarkable manner condescended to our needs, as in all the other circumstances of His marvellous Life and Death, even so too very specially in this; that He deigned to leave behind Him chosen witnesses of His Divine ministry, 'from the baptism of John, unto that same day that He was taken up,' who should hand down to us evidence, which (even apart from the claims of Inspiration) is *contemporary written evidence*. 'That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the word of life; . . . that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you.'

And, to return to that illustration of the case which is afforded by the early Roman history, let those who find it hard to reconcile themselves to such doubt concerning it as is here expressed, remember that we are not asserting positively the *non-existence* of Romulus and Numa, but only avowing that the evidence that they *did* exist is of an inconclusive unsatisfactory nature. And as a large creation of peers in any country is justly held to diminish the value of previously existing coronets, even so, in like manner, to rank Romulus and Augustus in the same category, is to run the greatest risk of ultimately ruining the proper and deserved credence which we yield to solid history, made known to us by the writings of contemporaries. Do even the most indulgent accept the early Roman narrative *pur et simple*? Even Goldsmith is compelled to commence with an allusion to the mists of fable, and he might have supported such language by references to Plutarch and Dionysius, Cicero and Livy. Of old they were compelled to *rationalise* more or less; and among moderns the tone of such as Hooke and the Abbé

Banier respecting the parentage of Æneas is but a specimen of a process which makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for its advocates to retaliate, with any effect, upon the disciples of Niebuhr. For to say with Banier, of the birth of Virgil's hero, '*que cette fable fut inventée pour cacher quelque galanterie, et calmer la jalousie de la femme d'Anchise*;¹ or to see, in the nurse of Cyrus, a woman named Cynos; or in the famous she-wolf, the nurture of Romulus and Remus by a person of bad character, called *Lupa*; these, and a thousand like instances of attempting to free such histories from their difficulties, can only be considered as a form of rationalism. Nor is M. Ampère free from a like inconsistency. After mentioning the well-known story of Hercules and the robber Cacus, he is led away by his love of geology, to wonder how any one can fail to recognise therein a poetisation of physical phenomena. 'Comment ne pas voir dans cette fable un souvenir des phénomènes physiques, qui ont dû se produire en ce lieu? ... *L'antiquité aimait à tout personnifier: la géologie, comme les autres sciences, se transformait en poésie.*' This is simply to give up the entire question. If M. Ampère does not see sufficient evidence for the existence of a real Cacus, why should he expect other men to give more credit to an actual Romulus?

But still, still, it will be urged, there is a sadness in resigning what we have so long believed. 'Those old and inborn kings, never to have been real persons, or done in their lives at least some part of what so long hath been remembered, cannot be thought without too strict incredulity.' Certainly it is a melancholy task. But, in the first place, let it be remembered, that this trial need only be endured by one, or at the most two generations. When once it has been established that the 'incredulity' is not 'too strict,' but reasonable, the junior minds are at least taught such history with less confidence, so that *they* cannot receive a shock in parting with that which they never firmly held. Few of us are now brought up to believe in that formidable bead-roll of the one hundred and four kings of Scotland, whose existence is represented by Sir Walter Scott as one of the main topics of feud between Sir Arthur Wardour and the Antiquary. Few are now trained to acceptance of that race of British monarchs who were said to have sprung from the consul Brutus, and to have lasted until the time of Julius Cæsar.

And yet those Scottish sovereigns were, as Sir Walter remarks, received by Boethius and rendered classical by Buchanan. It was as their lineal descendant that James VI. claimed his North British kingdom; and their alleged (but not,

¹ Cit. ap. Lewis, vol. i. p. 348, (note.)

we imagine, *contemporary*) portraits still hang in the gallery of Holyrood. And, again, it is to the *English*, and not, as might have been supposed, the *Roman* line of kings, that the words of Milton, which have just been quoted, refer. But if no one in our day thinks that incredulity is 'too strict' with reference to *them*: if all our recent historians, amidst the widest differences, religious and political, agree in ignoring that shadowy pageant of monarchs, and begin the real and trustworthy accounts of England with the invasion of Julius Cæsar; why should we doubt but that a day is near at hand when it will give no more pain to our posterity to give up Romulus and Numa, than it does to us (whatever it may have done to the contemporaries of Milton) to resign the substantial reality of the English kingdom being derived from Brute and the Trojans, or the long Scottish genealogy of the descendants from King Fergus?

And if to that generation which undergoes the process of disenchantment, the relinquishment of cherished visions, entwined as they were with so many bright and ennobling associations, must still appear a cruel sacrifice; what is this, but one of the many forms in which the sternness of duty will, throughout the course of this our mortal life, break in upon the witcheries of imagination, and demand the abandonment of fancies, however dear, however beneficial in their day, at the still holier and more sacred shrine of Truth? If once our reason has been convinced of the lack of evidence, the inconsistencies, the impossibilities of so much that passed for history, then there is neither wisdom, nor courage, nor true faith in shrinking from the inevitable conclusion.

* Forbear to deem the Chronicler unwise,
Ungentle, or untouch'd by seemly ruth,
Who, gathering up all that Time's envious tooth
Has spared of sound and grave realities,
Firmly rejects those dazzling flatteries,
Dear as they are to unsuspecting Youth.*

So sang Wordsworth, after the expression, in a previous sonnet, of his deep regrets at the disappearance of the morning splendours of infant Rome. Yet even the *remembrance* of what those tales had been to him brought comfort with it.

* One solace yet remains for us who came
Into this world in days when story lack'd
Severe research, that in our hearts we know
How, for exciting youth's heroic flame,
Assent is power, belief the soul of fact.*

And assuredly in this, as in the more directly serious problems of life, the truth, which has for the moment robbed us of many a gorgeous illusion, will in season reward us by the display of a loveliness and brilliancy peculiarly her own. It has

been well said, that it is one great duty of life to *face truth*. It has been the boast of Northern races, that they are capable of so doing; that, if not gifted with so keen a sense of beauty as the children of the sunnier South, they are more hardy and resolute in their willingness to track the road of honest, self-renouncing dutifulness; and to feel that there lies in such a course the surest pledge of glory and true greatness.

' Not once or twice in our rough island-story,
The path of duty was the way to glory :
He that walks it, only thirsting
For the right, and learns to deaden
Love of self, before his journey closes,
He shall find the stubborn thistle bursting
Into glossy purples, which outred
All voluptuous garden-roses.'

Happy indeed are those of whom such things may be predicated, without being an idle vaunt.

2. The second method of treating this branch of historical, or quasi-historical records,—namely, their rejection as so much absolute fiction,—need not occupy our attention long. For if it be irrational to accept their contents as pure history, it must needs be still more irrational to presume that they are wholly false. Differences of degree may of course exist: some such annals will contain more than others of the violently improbable, and of that which is incompatible with acknowledged truth: but, as a general rule, that want of evidence which prevents us from pronouncing a verdict of *moral* acquittal must equally preclude us from returning one of condemnation, and this principle of legal ethics may well be transferred from its own province to that of legendary history. In many cases, we are able to discover a solid basis for much that might, at first sight, seem the creation of the merest phantasy. Thus the Hesiodic and Ovidian accounts of a golden age are evidently based upon true, though transformed traditions of the garden of Eden; insomuch that Voltaire was fain to admit the natural connexion of this universally received legend with the truth of a lost Paradise of innocence and bliss. We have seen how incorrect would be the judgment of that critic who should deduce from the varied and conflicting legends respecting Attila, the conclusion that no such person ever existed. And it is quite conceivable, that the discovery of lost works, or of buried monuments, such as those of Nineveh, may, from time to time, give proof of the really historic character of heroes who had been deemed apocryphal. Nor indeed do any of the great writers, who have discussed these questions, ever seriously propound, so far as we are aware, any sweeping proposals for the utter rejection of these legends.

How far, indeed, their banishment from the realm of pure history into that of legend may tend towards their ultimate denial, is another question, which may be touched upon presently.

3. But if these non-contemporary poems, or annals, can neither be rationalised into sober history by the elimination of a few extravagancies, nor by a contrary treatment be safely consigned, as it were, to a limbo of extinction, there is open to us the ingenious, and certainly very interesting process, of attempting to extract from them the nucleus of fact, which is supposed of necessity to reside there. Such is the plan pursued by that remarkable writer Vico, in his '*Scienza Nuova*,' though not (as Mr. Grote has, we think, proved) with any great measure of consistency or success. Such is the plan now illustrated by many living writers of history, who adopt it because it has been enforced by the precept and example and apparent success of Niebuhr.

And here it is only right to say a few words with reference to the work of Sir G. C. Lewis, which we have placed at the head of this article as one of the most recent and illustrious examples of one branch of the inquiry here attempted, and to which we have already been indirectly much indebted. If we do not propose to place it upon precisely the same shelf with the volumes of Mr. Grote and Colonel Mure, the doubt does not arise from any impression that it is less accurate, less profoundly learned, or less calm and judicial in the tone and method of its investigations. In all these respects it may fairly vie with them: but it strikes us as being upon the whole less interesting, and (what is more important in an estimate of its merits) less original. We do not in this last remark refer so much to Sir G. C. Lewis' obligations to German writers, as *e. g.* to Professors Schwegler and Rubino: for all such treatises must needs draw largely from the stores of learning accumulated by the acuteness and indefatigable research of Germany: but when we compare the volumes of our Chancellor of the Exchequer with those of Grote or Mure, we cannot but think that the priority of publication on the part of those gentlemen is not merely one of time. They could have written, and in fact did write, without the aid of Sir G. C. Lewis; we much doubt if his book *could* have been produced without theirs. It appears to be, in great part, an application of the principles asserted in Mr. Grote's first volume, to Roman, instead of Grecian, history.

But, nevertheless, we feel very grateful to the author of this '*Inquiry*.' We know of no other author at once willing and able to undertake the task. Upon some minor points we might (if Mr. Editor had not—the reader will perhaps say, very

wisely—limited our space) have been inclined to raise an argument. We are not sure, for instance, whether we can quite sympathise with his tendency to leave unexamined what he calls the genesis of fables.¹ Then, again, we fancy that the utter dissimilarity of Sir G. C. Lewis's mind to that of Mr. Macaulay (these two writers being each amply provided with those articles of intellectual furniture in which the other is most deficient) has led him to treat with too much harshness the argumentative portion of the prose attached to the 'Lays of Ancient Rome.'² Mr. Macaulay, however, can fight his own battles, if he think it worth his while; and we are no such worshippers of his genius as to lament very sorely over his reception of a little sarcasm from his brother politician and essayist. But what we really do prize in the volumes now before us, and receive in the main (without binding ourselves to an unmodified acceptance of all Sir George's canons of credibility), is the careful, searching, and, in our judgment, triumphant exposure of the unsoundness of the principles of Niebuhr.

Now let us not be misunderstood. Niebuhr, by his profound learning and rare sagacity, created a new epoch in the study of ancient history. The novelty of his mode of treatment, the moderation of his political creed, the moral, and frequent religious, tone of his remarks, and the apparently sound and brilliant results of his inquiries, all conduced to the influence which he exercised upon the world of scholars. His genius wrought a kind of fascination upon the mind of many highly-gifted contemporaries. To Dr. Arnold the appearance of Sir G. C. Lewis's work would have probably been almost a shock. It would have been extremely difficult for him to have listened patiently to such an attack upon the authority of his guide through the mazes of Roman history. A feeling similar in kind, though less intense in its degree, may be traced in the preface to the new History of Rome, which has just been published by Dean Liddell; and it will probably be shared by many English students. In Germany, where the researches of Dr. Ihne and others have already to some extent shaken the validity of Niebuhr's conclusions, the criticisms of Sir G. C. Lewis may probably find more willing auditors.

For ourselves, never having followed at the chariot-wheels of Niebuhr, never having been satisfied of the soundness of his method of investigation, and having witnessed with regret its application to more solemn subjects (to which, to do him justice, he never intended it to be applied), we can witness with great complacency, on this score, the rise and progress of theories,

¹ Vol. i. p. 410; cf. however, pp. 434, 435.

² *Ibid.* p. 202, sqq., p. 217, sqq.

which, if true, must effectually ruin the larger portion of his speculations; and if *his*, much more those of subordinate followers in his track. The nature of those theories will come into consideration in our fourth and concluding section: at present, let us try to test, with the assistance of Sir G. C. Lewis, the value of Niebuhr's process in a few instances. If *Niebuhr* can be shown to have failed in his attempts at extracting solid truth from legends, who is he that can possibly hope to succeed?

It may be proper, in the first place, to remind the reader of Niebuhr's pretensions. This should be done by one or two extracts from his great work. Thus, in vol. iii. p. 159 of his history, we find him speaking of his own laborious researches, 'by which he has brought into order the chaos of the early 'times of Rome.' And in the preface to his second volume he speaks as follows:—

'My sight grew dim in its passionate efforts to pierce into the obscurity of the subject; and unless I was to send forth an incomplete work, which sooner or later would have had to be wholly remodelled, I was compelled to wait for what time might gradually bring forth. Nor has he been niggardly, but, though slowly, has granted me one discovery after another.'

In another place he speaks of history which is critically treated proving much richer in facts than mere credulous repetition of tales; and again, elsewhere, he speaks of his own power of discerning truth amidst fictions bearing resemblance to that kind of divination or instinctive sense, which the Greeks expressed by *μαντεία*, *μαντεύομαι*.¹

This last assertion of Niebuhr's, though not remarkable for modesty, at least embodies a truth. Those who believe that he possessed a faculty of divination, will still be ready to accept the main conclusions resulting from his inquiries. They will assert with Arnold and other enthusiastic admirers, that natural gifts, sharpened by long practice, may enable one man to penetrate secrets in physical science, in philology, and in legendary history, which would always elude the observation of the average mass of students. We answer, with Sir G. C. Lewis, that all this may be perfectly true, and yet fall very far short of what is needed for the establishment of the Niebuhrian hypotheses. It is perfectly true that a Harvey may discover the circulation of the blood, or a Newton the laws of gravitation, from *data* which have been open to the rest of the world for long ages, but have never suggested such truths to the mind of

¹ Most of these passages are cited by Sir G. C. Lewis: but we would not have quoted them here were we not convinced that they give a fair idea of Niebuhr's position.

the ordinary observer. But, then, these great discoverers must be able to *prove* the accuracy of their results. Harvey and Newton effected this in such wise, as to satisfy all competent judges; and the scientific world at large admits the principles thus gained, as now no longer needing proof, but forming a solid basis, whereon to erect new superstructures. But can the same thing be said of the theories of Niebuhr? Müller investigates the history of the Etruscans; the information afforded him by ancient authors is precisely the same as that possessed by Niebuhr; nevertheless, he arrives at the most opposite conclusions. Dr. Ihne, in like manner, examines the constitutional questions connected with ancient Rome; his views differ very considerably from those of Niebuhr: most scholars allow that it is a fair battle, and many think that Ihne has the best of it. Professor Newman's little volume, already referred to in this article, is expressly written with a view of controverting the decisions of Niebuhr. Unlike the great discoveries of physical philosophers, the theories of Niebuhr are losing ground, instead of becoming, day by day, more firmly rooted and established. Is there not then good reason to suspect that this method of treating legendary history may in itself be radically wrong? Such is the view adopted in the work before us:—

'The main cause of the great multiplicity and wide divergence of opinions, which characterise the recent researches into early Roman history, is the defective method, which not only Niebuhr and his followers, but most of his opponents, have adopted. Instead of employing those tests of credibility which are consistently applied to modern history, they attempt to guide their judgment by the indications of internal evidence, and assume that the truth can be discovered by an occult faculty of historical divination.'—Vol. i. p. 13.

Let us take the famous combat of the Horatii and Curiatii. It is deficient in respect of external evidence, and bears the air of a romance. Triple births are indeed no impossibilities; as they seem to happen in this country in a proportion of one in perhaps 25,000 cases. But the murder of a sister by a brother is an almost unheard-of crime in Europe, or even in Asia; and on the whole it seems reasonable to regard the entire story as highly apocryphal; possibly true, but more probably a striking fiction.¹ Niebuhr, however, expects us to see in the three brethren, on either side, a symbol of three tribes. Now, why are we to believe this? Simply because Niebuhr has so ruled it. On the part of the disciples of these theorists, it is a belief, not in history, but in the *ipse dixit* of the discoverer; on the part of the theorists, it is a belief, not in history, but in themselves.

A like verdict must be passed upon the ethnological speculations, which rest upon a similar basis. Those who have toiled

¹ See Lewis, vol. i. p. 464.

through the chapters of Niebuhr, of O. Müller, or of Mr. Malden, in his History of Rome, concerning the ancient races of Italy, and laid them down in despair of attaining to any clear and definite ideas upon the subject, or of retaining in the memory the isolated gleams of fact which were apparent here and there, will surely read with delight the following spirited characterization of the processes employed.

‘When we come to examine the evidence on which the ethnological theories of the majority of antiquarian researches are founded, our wonder at their wide, and indeed almost unlimited divergences, is at an end. No probability is too faint, no conjecture is too bold, no etymology is too uncertain, to resist the credulity of an antiquarian in search of evidence to support an ethnological hypothesis. Gods become men, kings become nations, one nation becomes another nation, opposites are interchanged, at a stroke of the wand of the historical magician. Centuries are to him as minutes; nor indeed is space itself of much account, when national affinities are in question. Chronology, as Niebuhr remarks in the passage quoted above [from Hist. of Rome, vol. i. p. 176], forms no part of such history; dates in such a context are misleading and deceptive. To ask for the ordinary securities of historical truth—determinate assignable witnesses whose credibility can be weighed and estimated—would be an impertinence; would imply an ignorance of the conditions of the problem, which are, that the events are antecedent to the period of regular history and contemporaneous registration.’—Vol. i. pp. 270, 271.

Niebuhr himself admits, as our author proceeds to observe, ‘that unless some boldness of divination be allowable, all ‘researches into the early history of nations must be abandoned.’ For detailed proofs of his many inconsistencies in this, as in other parts of his investigation, we must refer the reader to the elaborate examination of Sir G. C. Lewis, simply specifying, as peculiarly forcible, the remarks contained in vol. i. pp. 9, 93, 98, 115, 143, 192, 196, and in vol. ii. pp. 90, 124—126, 149, with the notes attached to them. He allows the great merit of Niebuhr in explaining and illustrating the nature of the agrarian laws; though, even here, he thinks that the leading point (namely, their reference to public, not to private land,) had already been clearly pointed out by Heyne. It may be, that the checks placed upon tradition, as we have previously remarked, by the existence of actual laws and a constitutional régime, have rendered Niebuhr’s task less hopeless in matters connected with government (as distinguished from accounts of foreign policy, &c.), than Sir G. C. Lewis is disposed to allow. It may be, that Niebuhr’s rare sagacity could, amidst a multitude of guesses, hit the truth more frequently than might *à priori* have been imagined possible. But it is certainly no reply to the numerous and specific accusations contained in these volumes, to be told that the Dean of Christchurch still retains his respect and admiration for Niebuhr.

Dean Liddell is a great scholar, and there is scarcely a classical student in Great Britain, or America, but must lie under the deepest obligations to his lexicographical labours. But if his fellow-collegian's strictures upon Niebuhr are to be refuted, it must be by something more definite than this.

Leaving Niebuhr and Roman history, we again invite the patient reader to consider, whether it would really have been a hopeful toil for any man to have attempted the construction of a trustworthy account of Attila, from the varied and conflicting legends of which we have previously given a sketch. We would further request his careful attention to one or two of the *jeux d'esprit* which have been published in connexion with this mode of treating history which is supposed to be legendary; that he may thence form an opinion of the probability of its success, when applied to actual legends. For this is certainly a case to which the Horatian—

———‘ridentem dicere verum
Quid vetat?’

is fairly applicable. If Archbishop Whately, in his well-known ‘*Historic Doubts*’ showed, no less wittily than powerfully, the absurdity of a kind of scepticism, which, if carried out consistently, would compel us to reject, as fiction, the entire history, nay, the very existence of Napoleon Buonaparte; with scarcely less ability is the danger of trying to settle the exact limits of truth and falsity, in a compound of the two, exhibited in a more recent pamphlet upon the same subject. Probability, our chief guide, can avail us but little here. The just and famous maxim of our neighbours, ‘*Le vrai n’est pas toujours le vraisemblable,*’ is capable of being read backwards: we may say with equal justice, ‘*Le vraisemblable n’est pas toujours le vrai.*’ In the case of the first Napoleon, for example, (and the remark might be extended to the lives of Louis Philippe, Napoleon III., and a hundred more,) many of the most patent facts of their career were antecedently well-nigh the most improbable, the most incredible things that could have occurred.¹ Or let the reader take the example given in Mr. H. Rogers’s ‘*Eclipse of Faith.*’ Therein he may see the selection of facts, made by a supposed critic, out of the mythical history of the event commonly known in England as the Papal Aggression of 1850. He may see how clearly it is proved, that the contradictory tendencies of two brothers, of the name of Newman, can only be regarded as symbols of the leanings of the *new men* of the generation referred to by the historian; how Cardinal Wiseman

¹ The pamphlet referred to, attributed to Professor Fitzgerald (or by some to Abp. Whately) was noticed by us on its appearance some three or four years since.

must needs represent a personified idea of the exclusive claims of Rome to the true wisdom; how Alderman Masterman is a mythical hero, embodying the characteristics of the class of *master men*, the leaders in the world of commerce; and, finally, how thoroughly the whole story is shown to be fallacious by the undoubted fact, that (long before the agitation consequent upon them is represented to have subsided) there was held in Hyde Park, in this season of alleged disturbance, a peaceful and most successful Exhibition of the Industry of All Nations. Or, once more, let the inquirer into these problems study the history of the composition of the tale of the 'Amber-Witch,' translated from the German by Lady Duff Gordon, and published in Mr. Murray's 'Home and Colonial Library.' In that instance, a pure fiction was subjected to the analysis of critics, who attempted to cull out the basis of facts contained in the narrative, and thus fell into the snare prepared for them by the ingenious author. These and similar instances appear to us to have, if an indirect, still a very real and important bearing upon this part of our subject. They will, if we mistake not, serve to deepen the distrust—in our opinion the well-merited distrust—which the works of Mr. Grote and Sir G. C. Lewis have already created with reference to the Niebuhrian mode of treating legendary history.

4. There remains, then, the plan of accepting legend simply as legend, admitting, wherever it is possible, its poetic beauty, or again, its ethical character; valuing highly the insight which it affords us into the genius of the races among whom it has obtained, and even into the history of the human mind at large, without making the attempt—so precarious, so questionable in point of utility—of extracting from it a substratum of facts, of marking out its boundaries of truth and fiction. Such is the course pursued, and defended with such remarkable power of argument and richness of illustration, by Mr. Grote; such is the course adopted in the main by Sir George Cornwall Lewis. The juxtaposition of a brief extract from their respective works will serve to show the practical identity of their views:—

Grote on the Siege of Troy.

'If we are asked whether it be not a legend embodying portions of historical matter and raised upon a basis of truth,—whether there may not really have occurred at the foot of the hill at Ilium a war purely human and political, without gods, without heroes, without Helen, without Amazons, without Ethiopians,

Lewis on the Foundation of Rome.

'The different foundation legends of Rome . . . are all mere frost-work; which on the first ray of critical investigation melt away and disappear, leaving behind them not a trace of solid and substantial fact. The whole is equally fictitious; there are no grains of corn in the chaff; no fragments of gold in the

under the beautiful son of Eôs, without the wooden horse, without the characteristic and expressive features of the old epical war,—like the mutilated trunk of Deiphobus in the under world—if we are asked whether there was not really some such historical Trojan war as this, our answer must be, that as the possibility of it cannot be denied, so neither can the reality of it be affirmed.'—*History of Greece*, vol. i. p. 434.

sand; no process of historical chemistry can extract truth from any of the stories; their origin and acceptance as history may to a certain extent be explained, but the facts, such as really occurred, were not registered before they were forgotten, and having once passed into oblivion, they can never be recovered or reproduced. . . . It is indeed impossible, with our means of information, to form a well-grounded opinion upon the origin of the received story of Romulus, and to assert that no part of it is true. It is however possible to maintain with confidence the position, that a person holding this story to have been formed, centuries after the time of the alleged events, from legendary materials and oral relations, is not entitled to select certain points from the aggregate, upon mere grounds of apparent internal credibility, and to treat them as historical.'—*Inquiry*, &c. vol. i. pp. 405, 439.

It may seem strange, at first sight, that we should recommend, as the safer and more trustworthy, a procedure which is more destructive than even that of Niebuhr. But if the belief of Niebuhrians be, as we maintain, simply an intense faith in their own ingenuity, then it is surely in every way better to confess our ignorance, than to parade a show of belief in what may so often prove the most unsubstantial of all possible figments, a finely-woven, self-spun theory. We are not, however, unaware of the existence of difficulties even in this method of handling legends. One we hasten to state, the rather that we fancy that it has been strangely overlooked by the leading contributors to the discussion. We allude to the real and serious difficulty of remaining in this negative state of mind. There are, indeed, two cases in which it is very possible so to remain. The one is, where the question is of such a nature that we do not feel the slightest interest in its solution. Such is that somewhere given by Mr. Grote, by way of illustration, when he compares the inquiries concerning the amount of fact embodied in a legend, to the question whether, on the day of the battle of Plataea, rain fell upon the place where New York now stands. It is curious to observe that Sir G. C. Lewis's examples of *his* position are of a very different character. 'The task which they [the Niebuhrians] have undertaken resembles an inquiry into the 'internal structure of the earth, or into the question whether

'the stars are inhabited' (vol. i. p. 13). Now, both of these problems excite in many minds a lively interest. The latter has, we know, been warmly discussed within the last few years by such men as Dr. Whewell, Sir D. Brewster, M. Babinet, and a host of minor celebrities; and if it be mentioned in any company of highly-educated persons, a manifest leaning towards one of the mooted views will probably be apparent in the majority of those present, and pure indifferentism prove quite in the minority. A second case, in which the mind may likewise be willing to acquiesce in a passive regardlessness, is that wherein the creations of the highest order of genius are brought before us. King Lear and Hamlet, Juliet and Imogen—we scarcely care to ask whether or not their names can be found in the records of authentic history. And even now the summer tourist, who visits Loch Katrine and the Trosachs, may find writers of hand-books, or may listen to guides, who speak of all the characters and events in the 'Lady of the Lake' as equally historic and real; who specify the point whence Fitz-James swam and Helen gazed, and track the path of Roderick Dhu when accompanying his disguised Sovereign. If there be a possibility of minstrelsy being received as history in the broad daylight of an age of railways, and steam-boats, and electric telegraphs, what must have been its chance in the twilight of the infant states of Greece, or Hungary, or Britain? Doubtless the entire lay was accepted *en masse*. And this seems to us a real reply to Colonel Mure, M. Ampère, and the *Quarterly Reviewers* of Mr. Grote's first volumes, who argue as if the leading characters in a popular poem must, of necessity, be historical. The majority of heroes and heroines may possibly be so; but we cannot admit the universality of the rule.

How far the upholders of this mode of treating legend are consistent, we must not stay to argue. One principle, however, we venture to assert; and that is, that in all cases of legend where neutrality of opinion appears impossible, *it is safer and wiser to incline towards the side of belief*. We may indulge such a feeling without placing legend on a level with history, and without pretending to cull out particular facts from amidst the poetry. Such would be our sentiments with regard to 'the tale of Troy divine.'

Meanwhile, let us thankfully acknowledge the exquisite beauty of many legendary narratives, and the undying truth which they enshrine, as testimonies of so much of nobleness that still abides even in man's unregenerate heart, and which has as often been displayed in real life as in poetry and fiction. Be Pylades and Orestes historic characters or creations of fancy, the idea of their heroic friendship still sheds a ray of golden

light upon that theatre of reiterated strife and war, the Tauric Chersonese. The heroes of the Iliad, and Romulus and Numa, Mucius and Clœlia, must enjoy an imperishable fame while earth shall last; King Arthur and his knights still live; and we can listen, in no coldly critical spirit, to the latest appeal of poesy which summons our attention to a legend.

‘Ye whose hearts are fresh and simple,
Who have faith in God and Nature,
Who believe, that in all ages
Every human heart is human;
That in even savage bosoms
There are longings, yearnings, strivings,
For the good they comprehend not,
That the feeble hand and helpless,
Groping blindly in the darkness,
Touch God’s right hand in that darkness,
And are lifted up and strengthen’d;—
Listen to this simple story,
To this song of Hiawatha.’

We have been trying to set forth and illustrate the following leading ‘Canons of Historic Credibility:’—

1. That the record must be a genuine and authentic production.

2. That regard must be had to the intention of the author.

3. That we must inquire whether the original authorities are contemporary with the events related.

4. That we must examine their means of information and probable prejudices.

5. That particular caution is needed in such parts as relate to the assignment of motives.

6. That, where it is possible, comparison should be instituted between the contemporary record of events, and the forms they have assumed in subsequent legend.

7. That a clear and firm line of demarcation must be drawn between history, which rests upon contemporaneous written evidence, and that which is not traceable to such testimony.

8. That the attempt to extract the supposed facts from mythical history is dangerous and untrustworthy.

9. That moral truth may be gleaned from many narratives, which we cannot trust for truth of fact.

We need scarcely say that nothing which has here been asserted has the slightest reference to such history as is written by Inspired Penmen. He who made man can dictate to an Isaiah the history of ages yet unborn; or reveal to a Moses the events of centuries that have passed away, either by teaching him to discern the true from the false in old traditions and records, or by special and direct communication from on high. Of the

impiety (far more subtle and perilous than a positive rejection) which would apply the Niebuhrian process to the Old Testament, nothing need be said by those who believe *that* process to fail even in matters of secular history. We feel grateful to the thinkers who have brought forward what seem to us far sounder theories. Such aid, often unintentionally given, is constantly coming to the support of holy Truth. But let us not be impatient, if the answer to each fresh cavil does not appear immediately. He who is Himself the truth (to adopt a sublime thought from Origen¹) stood in silence before his accusers; and still for ever, while evil dwells with men, is false witness continually borne against Him, and oftentimes He maketh no reply by word of mouth, but answers only by the lives of his true disciples. Wait we then His good time for triumph over every fresh assault of unbelief. *Non semper pendebit inter latrones Christus ; resurget aliquando crucifixa Veritas.*

¹ Cont. Cels. Præfat.

ART. III.—1. *The Statutes of "God's Gift College" in Dulwich.* Hansard. 1853.

2. *Heads of Proposed Scheme for Dulwich College.* Issued by the Commissioners for Charities. 1854.

DULWICH is no longer the obscure and unfrequented hamlet it used to be some very few years ago. Report had long spoken of it as one of the prettiest spots within many miles of the metropolis; but it was scarcely known to any but the inhabitants of the village and its immediate neighbourhood, and to the few stray tourists and votaries of the arts, who, within the last forty or fifty years, during the summer months, have been drawn thither by the attractions of the Bourgeois collection of pictures possessed by the College. The road to Dulwich, in fact, led to nothing beyond it. Even within the memory of persons now living who have not long passed the meridian of life, there was no road, only a footpath, which in winter was muddy and impassable, between the southern extremity of the village and the rising grounds of Norwood, which bound the view on that side. Literally, therefore, the Dulwich-road was an avenue of the Dulwich estate, which led only to the College, the mansion of the lords of the manor, and to the houses of their tenants which surround it. There was no need in those days for the College authorities (or whoever did it) to place the inscription, "*Siste, Viator,*" "*Stop, traveller, and refresh yourself,*" on the stone¹ which, until very recently, stood at the gate of the College: the traveller was obliged to stop, whether he refreshed himself or not; there was no thoroughfare; his only way was back again whence he came. Nobody, in fact, had a chance of becoming acquainted with Dulwich except by a journey undertaken for the express purpose; and although the hamlet is scarcely further from the city than Belgravia is, it was, until a very few years since, as unfrequented as any remote country village could well be.

Circumstances have entirely changed this state of things. In the first place, the College itself prepared the way for better acquaintance with the metropolis by the formation of excellent roads, which now branch off in various directions—two of them

¹ The story respecting this stone is, that it gave a *bonâ fide* invitation to any one who liked to accept of it to enter and partake of the hospitality of the College. For many years past, however, it has presented its back to the traveller, and has served only to tell him the length of his journey from town. Within the last year the stone has been moved from its original position to the road-side, where it now forms an ordinary mile-stone.

towards Norwood—and by the improvement of those which had previously existed. In consequence of these changes, the road through Dulwich became the shortest route to the City from Upper Norwood—a favourite place of residence with business men—as well as from certain parts of Lower Norwood, where the tide of population has been rapidly rising for some time past:—in short, from the whole of that amphitheatre of hilly ground which overlooks Dulwich from the south; and the establishment of traffic, and of *omnibus* conveyance through the village were the results. Dulwich was fairly opened up.

Then came the erection of the Sydenham Palace; and the once secluded Dulwich was immediately converted into a great thoroughfare, daily thronged by the crowds who wend their way to the attractions of that gigantic undertaking. And now the College came into view. Familiarity with the village naturally led to inquiry about the College. What was the object of it? asked the practical man. Was it rich? what use did it make of its money? inquired the Spirit of Commerce. These inquiries did not tend to raise the College in the estimation of what the newspapers term the 'general public.' It is, in fact, precisely one of those institutions which, on half emerging from obscurity, was likely to give a shock to the practical and commercial English mind, and to bring down a storm of public indignation on its head. Discovered to be immensely rich, it seemed to do nothing, or next to nothing, for the money. The picture which it presented, at the first view, was that of a wealthy, sleek, comfortable, antiquated, and useless asylum, the inmates of which, having nothing else to do, had fattened themselves on their own exuberant charities and had gone to sleep. What, it was asked, was the use of such an institution? Ought it not to be swept away, and the money with which it gorged itself be applied to some useful purpose? 'The income of Dulwich College,' writes the 'Times,' echoing the public clamour, 'is already 9,000*l.* a-year, and is soon to be 13,000*l.* a-year. How much more it will be, no man can say. 'What shall we do with this?'

But the question of the *future* of Dulwich College, though it has been popularized and rendered familiar to everybody by recent accidental circumstances and by the newspapers, is by no means a new one. In fact, it is a very old one, which, in some shape or other, has always existed since the founder's death. It has been raised, has died away, been smoothed over, postponed and raised again, to be again postponed without any real settlement. Of course we do not mean to say that it has ever been a question whether—as the Charity Commissioners, backed by popular clamour, now propose—the corporation of

Dulwich College should be dissolved, extinguished, and wiped out, and its funds appropriated by the Government for new purposes of education and charity: that is quite a modern idea. Nobody, until the other day, dreamed of asking the question put by the 'Times' newspaper, 'What shall we do with this 9,000*l.* a-year?' because the reply was obvious. We cannot do anything with it; it does not belong to us. It belongs to the corporation of Dulwich College. We might just as well ask (and indeed some people have already whispered the question) what we shall do with the funds of the Goldsmiths' Company, or the Fishmongers', or the Grocers', or any other of the City corporations? If, indeed, it should turn out that the members of the Dulwich corporation are trustees in respect to a certain portion of their funds for charitable purposes, the Charity Commissioners would then so far, we presume, have a right to interfere; but there is no doubt whatever that the bulk of the College property, that is to say, the whole of the original endowment, is held by the corporation in fee simple, and can therefore be touched only by the introduction of a principle of legislation of the most dangerous and sweeping description. No such question as this has ever been entertained until now. The question which has been agitated from the beginning has related to the legal power of the corporation to carry into effect the scheme of the founder, as it is detailed in the statutes of the College promulgated by him a few weeks before his death. In point of fact, that scheme as a whole has never been acted upon: the governing members of the corporation having always assumed, on the strength of certain *quasi* legal decisions, though their proceedings have scarcely ever been consistent with the assumption, that they had no power to appropriate their funds to any purposes not specially defined in the letters patent and the deed of incorporation. The funds accordingly have accumulated, and the purposes of the founder have remained unaccomplished. Dulwich College, in short, from the date of its founder's death, has been leading a sort of paralytic existence,—its powers crippled, its form but the shadow of its proper self; and although, from time to time, efforts have been made, both by the College itself, and by those external to it, to whom the statutes give a right to assist in its government, to throw off this lethargy, those efforts have proved ineffectual; and this, as it appears to us, because the main question in dispute has never been fairly brought to a legal issue.

But before proceeding further, it will be necessary to give some account of the College, of the nature of its foundation, and of the purposes which the founder intended it should accomplish.

The founder, Edward Alleyn, an actor of great repute, the friend of Shakspeare and Ben Jonson, and termed by old Fuller 'the Roscius of our age,'¹ obtained letters patent² from King James the First in 1619, by which licence was granted to him to found a College in Dulwich for the 'relief, sustenance, and maintenance of poor men, women, and children, and for the education and instruction of the said poor children.' The College was to consist of 'one master, one warden, four fellows, six poor brethren, six poor sisters, and twelve poor scholars,' who were 'to be maintained, sustained, educated, guided, governed, and ruled according to such ordinance, statute, and foundation,' as the founder, to whom licence was granted for that end, should by himself during his life, or by any other person or persons after his death, specially appointed by him during his life under his hand and seal, should ordain. 'Full power and ample authority' were given to him or his nominees to ordain, make, create, establish, and found ordinances, rules, constitutions, and statutes for the more better and orderly maintenance, sustenance, education, instruction, guiding, government, and rule of the master, warden, four fellows, six poor brethren, six poor sisters, and twelve poor scholars 'of the College, when and as often as need shall require.' These members of the College, poor scholars included, were to be 'in deed and name one body corporate and politic and one perpetual commonalty, and to have perpetual succession for ever to endure,' having a common seal, and liberty to sue and be sued, to plead and be impleaded by and under the name of the master, warden, &c. of the 'College of God's Gift' in Dulwich. The members of the College were to have 'especial licence, and free and lawful liberty, power and autho-

¹ T. Nash, in his *Pierce Pennylesse*; his *Supplication to the Devil*, 1592, says, 'Not Roscius nor Æsop, those tragedians admyred before Christ was borne, could ever performe more in action than famous Ned Allen.'

² 'Alleyn,' says Mr. Collier (*Memoirs of Edward Alleyn*), 'did not accomplish this great object of his life without much difficulty, for he had to encounter and overcome the opposition of Lord Chancellor Bacon.' The grounds of Lord Bacon's opposition are given by him in a letter to the Marquis of Buckingham, in which he explains his reason why he had 'stayed the patent at the great seal.' 'I now write,' says he, 'to give the King an account of a patent I have stayed at the seal; it is of licence to give in mortmain 800*l.* land, though it be of tenure in chief, to Allen that was the player, for an hospital. I like well that Alleyn playeth the last act of his life so well; but if his Majesty give way thus to amortize his tenures, the Court of Wards will decay. . . . But that which moved me chiefly is that his Majesty now lately did absolutely deny Sir Henry Saville for 200*l.* and Sir Edward Sandys for 100*l.* to the perpetuating of two lectures, the one in Oxford, the other in Cambridge, foundations of singular honour to his Majesty, of which there is great want: whereas hospitals abound, and beggars abound never a whit less.' He then proposes that the 800*l.* should be reduced to 500*l.*, if the King consented to Alleyn's request, and that the remainder should go to the Universities. Bacon proposed to deal in similar fashion with Sutton's foundation at the Charter-House.

'rity, to get, purchase, receive, and take to them and their 'successors for ever,' for their 'maintenance, sustentation, and 'relief, of and from Edward Alleyn, his heirs and assigns,' the manor of Dulwich, and the other lands purchased by Alleyn and devoted to the use of the College.

The Archbishop of Canterbury for the time being, in all succeeding times to come, is 'for ever to be visitor of the 'College, and to have full power and lawful authority the 'same College, and the persons therein being, to visit, order, and 'punish according to the ecclesiastical laws and constitutions 'of the realm of England, and according to such laws, consti- 'tutions, and ordinances as shall be made, ordained, and con- 'stituted by Edward Alleyn in his life-time, or after his death, 'by any person or persons nominated by him during his life; 'always provided, that such laws, constitutions, and ordinances 'shall not be repugnant to the Royal prerogative, the laws and 'statutes of the realm, nor the ecclesiastical laws, canons, and 'constitutions of the Church of England.'

In the same year, 1619, Alleyn signed the deed of foundation of the College, in which he recites the particulars mentioned in the letters patent, and directs that one copy of the deed should be kept in the common chest of the College, another in the vestry of S. Botolph's, Bishopsgate; a third in the vestry of S. Saviour's, Southwark; and a fourth in the vestry of S. Giles, Cripplegate (now S. Luke); a provision which it is important to notice as evidence that at this early period he had in view—and, in fact, that he contemplated from the very outset—the connexion which he afterwards established by the statutes between the College and those parishes, and which has proved so fertile a source of dispute and litigation.

The letters patent, it will have been observed, are dated 1619. The chapel of the future College, however, had not only been erected by Alleyn, but consecrated by Archbishop Abbot, under the title of 'Christ's Chapel, in the hamlet of Dulwich,' as early as 1616; and, which is singular, has a *quasi*-parochial character assigned to it. The deed of consecration is given in Wilkins, Conc. iv. pp. 455-459. After rehearsing that Edward Alleyn had erected and fitted up a chapel in his home at Dulwich, *which home he intended, with the leave of the king, to convert into a College for the poor*, and had set out and enclosed a plot of ground in the neighbourhood as a burial-place for the *inhabitants of the hamlet*; and that, in *his own name, and that of the inhabitants of the hamlet*, he had presented a petition to the Archbishop, praying that his Grace would be pleased to consecrate the same:—the deed proceeds to describe the consecration, from which it appears that the chapel was duly consecrated for the

performance of Divine service. 'Divino cultui,' runs the deed, divinatorum officiorum celebrationi ac tam ad sacramenta *cœnæ dominicæ* ac *baptismatis* sacri in eadem ministranda quam ad *matrimonia* inibi solemnizanda, divinas preces Deo fundendas et verbum Dei purè et sincerè predicandum ac ad mortuos precipue infra *Domum et predictam hamletam* decedentes in capella predicta sepellendos, ac cetera sacramentalia inibi exequenda et exercenda in Dei honorem, ac pro salute animarum et usu predicti Ed. Alleyn ejusque familie, ac præfecti, magistri, sive gubernatoris domûs prædictæ pro tempore existentis *omniumque inhabitantium nunc et in futurum in eadem domo et hamleta de Dulwich prædicta.*' A reservation is then made in favour of the rights and privileges of the parish church of Camberwell; and a *proviso* that Alleyn, or the Master, or Governor of the future College for the time being, shall find a fit presbyter for the service of the chapel, who shall be licensed by the ordinary for the time being, and whom Alleyn and his successors shall feed and maintain, and give to him an annual stipend of not less than twenty marks.

From these extracts, it is evident that 'Christ's Chapel, in the hamlet of Dulwich,' was intended to be what is termed a parochial chapel, which Lyndwood defines to be a chapel 'ubi Parochianis deservitur de Ecclesiasticis Sacramentis et sacramentalibus, sic quod non teneantur accedere ad Ecclesiam majorem pro divinis audiendis vel recipiendis Sacramentis et habent ad hoc Sacerdotem specialiter limitatum.' It was not, therefore, a chapel of ease, which has no font, and is designed only for the ease of the parishioners in prayers and preachings—sacraments and burials, being received and performed at the parish church; nor was it merely the private chapel of a college.¹

Alleyn appears to have been very deliberate in the preparation of the statutes and ordinances for the College, which the letters patent reserved power to him to 'make, order, constitute, and establish.' They were not completed by him until

¹ It may be here stated, as a proof of the loose manner in which the affairs of the College have been conducted, that so far as records go, there is no evidence of the granting of a licence by the ordinary to the first or *Preacher*-fellow, (as he is termed,) for the performance of the duties defined in the deed of consecration, and repeated in the statutes of the founder, though those duties have, in point of fact, always been performed by one or other of the Fellows, who are all of them to be Clergymen in holy orders. In the course of last year, a deputation of the inhabitants of Dulwich had an interview with the Bishop of Winchester, for the purpose of directing his Lordship's attention to the anomalous position of Dulwich, and of ascertaining his views as to the desirableness of forming Dulwich into a parish or district for ecclesiastical purposes. The Bishop replied, that he had never examined minutely into the position that the hamlet of Dulwich bore relative to himself; and that the College had a Visitor of its own, and was therefore in a manner extra-parochial—a statement which is clearly untenable.

Sept. 1626, shortly before his death; and it is owing to a supposed discrepancy between the constitution of the College as it is defined by the statutes, and its constitution as it is given in the letters patent and deed of foundation, that the controversies and litigation, which have been adverted to, have arisen. The letters patent gave to Alleyn power while he lived, or after his death to any person or persons nominated by him during his life, 'to make, ordain, constitute, and establish statutes, ordinances, constitutions, and rules for the good and better maintenance, relief, education, government, and ordering'—1st. Of the College; 2d. The members of the corporation; 3d. Of the lands and endowments given to them; and 4th. Of the rents, issues, revenues, and profits of the same. These statutes, &c. to stand for ever, 'and in all succeeding times be and remain inviolable and in full force and strength in law, to all constructions, intents, and purposes,' provided they were not repugnant to the Royal prerogative, and the laws, civil and ecclesiastical, of England.

No persons, it will be observed, are mentioned as sharing in the privileges and endowments of the College but the thirty members of the corporation. The letters patent, while they briefly state that the College is to be for the maintenance of poor men, women, and children, and for the education of the children, give us no hint whatever as to the precise manner in which these objects were to be accomplished. Who was to teach the children? How were the funds of the College, derived from lands of which the members of the corporation are freeholders, to be specially disposed of? Are the master, warden, and four fellows to be reckoned among the poor men for whose maintenance the College was founded? To the solution of these questions the letters patent afford no clue. It is at all events certain that Alleyn considered himself at liberty to make such statutes, as well for the internal economy and government of the College as for the education of the poor children, and the special disposal of the funds of the corporation, as should impart to the College the peculiar character which he designed to impress upon it. Now, let us see what kind of institution the founder intended his College to be.

In the first place, it was to be a charity for the maintenance of the poor. Six poor men and six poor women were to be members of the corporation, and to reside in apartments provided for them in the College. Thirty poor men and women were to be elected as candidates for the vacancies occurring among the poor brethren and sisters of the corporation, and, receiving certain half-yearly gratuities, were to reside in the almshouses erected by Alleyn and his executors in the parishes of S. Botolph, S. Saviour, and S. Giles.

Secondly, it was to be a school for the education of the young. The school—which was to consist of not more than eighty pupils at one time, of whom twelve, who were to be orphans or the children of poor people, were to be on the foundation—was to take Westminster or St. Paul's School as its model. The foundation scholars were to be maintained and educated by the College till they reached the age of eighteen; at which time they were, according to their several capacities, to be either sent to the Universities, or to be 'set and put to good 'and sweet trades and occupations, as near as may be, and to 'persons of good credit and sufficiency.' Any of the poor scholars sent to the Universities who had proceeded to be Bachelor or Master of Arts, was to be eligible, without a vote, to a vacant fellowship in the College. Children of parents residing in Dulwich, were to have the privilege of education in the College School for a nominal fee; children from other parts, at such a fee as the Master and Warden of the College should fix.

Thirdly, it was to be a religious house, in which particular regard was to be had to the daily celebration of Divine service in the chapel. The service was 'to be daily read and sung 'in such manner and form, as near as may be, as is usually 'observed in the King's Chapel, or in the collegiate church of 'St. Peter's, Westminster;' and particular regard was accordingly to be had to the cultivation of music by all the inmates of the College.

And, lastly, it was to be, in general, governed by the Master, or in his absence by the Warden, according to the statutes: in special cases by a majority of the votes of the Master, Warden, and Fellows; and in certain particulars by these, with the assistance of the churchwardens of the parishes of St. Botolph, St. Saviour, and St. Giles; the Archbishop of Canterbury for the time being acting as Visitor, and having full powers to enforce obedience to the statutes.

This general idea of the College, and of the machinery by which it was to be developed, will be evinced by reference to the statutes themselves.

After stating that the College was for ever to consist of the members of the corporation defined in the letters patent, the founder proceeds:—

'2. For the better furtherance of the honour and service of Almighty God, and for the good and welfare of the said College, I ordain and for ever establish, for all succeeding times to come, that there shall be continually *six* *chanters* for music and singing in the chapel of the said College . . . *six* *assistants* touching the ordering of the said College, and the rent and revenues thereof; and *thirty* *members*;—the said chanters, assistants, and members, to be employed and taken to such uses, intents, and purposes, as hereafter in these my orders and statutes I shall further direct and appoint.'

This being premised, he proceeds to define the qualifications

duties, and privileges, as well of the members of the corporation as of the chanters, assistants, and out-pensioners of the College. 'The Master,' he says (Art. 30), 'shall be the chiefest person in the said College. . . . He shall govern all the persons thereof, and admonish, correct, and punish them according to the statutes;' and so on. 'The Warden shall' (Art. 31) receive and take the rents, issues, and profits belonging to the said College, and pay, disburse, and defray all the rents, pensions, and all other payments which are to be made by the said College for the use and maintenance thereof, to 'all persons in any sort thereto belonging.' He is also to act for the Master during his absence, sickness, or infirmity; the Master doing the like for the Warden in case of his absence or sickness.¹

Of the four fellows of the corporation, two are to 'be in degrees, at least Masters of Arts of either of the Universities, Oxford or Cambridge, *preachers*;' the other two, 'Graduates and Divines: the first of them to be an *approved schoolmaster*, the second to be a sufficient scholar to be *usher of the school*.'

The two preacher-fellows are to

'preach two sermons every Sunday, one in the forenoon and the other in the afternoon, and one sermon on the first of September,' (*Alleyn's birthday, and the anniversary of the consecration of the chapel*), 'another on the Nativity of our Lord God; and on the several days set down, they shall also daily (as likewise all the fellows) attend (but on Sundays and holidays, Saturdays in the afternoon, and all holiday eves, in their surplices) the Master and Warden to the Chapel, and there continue during the whole service time, and they shall sing their parts in the quire: and if the third and fourth fellows (*who by the subsequent statute are to read prayers*) be absent both together, then they shall perform all ministerial duties in the chapel: the senior of them two shall keep the register book for christenings, weddings, and burials, and both of them shall do all offices belonging to their ministry, as celebrating the sacraments, wed, bury, christen, and visit the sick within² the said College; and if they be absent, then the third and fourth fellows shall perform the same.' (Art. 33.)

The third fellow is to be—

'Master of the school, and the fourth, Usher (who shall be obedient to the Master): both of them shall sing their parts in the quire, and shall have a special care for the good and virtuous instruction and education of the scholars committed to their charge; and they shall *alternis vicibus* read prayers weekly in the chapel.'

'The Master and Usher (Art. 65) of the school, and the two

¹ Both the Master and Warden are to bear the name of Alleyn, or as it is now spelt, Allen: a provision for the perpetuation of his name which the founder had every right to make. Still, looking to the future, it must be admitted that this restriction may prove an inconvenient one. Would it not be sufficient if the Master and Warden, if not bearing the name of Allen, were on their election to assume that name by the Queen's permission?

² 'Within' here evidently means 'within the bounds of the College, *i. e.* including the hamlet of Dulwich,' not within its walls. Marriages and baptisms could hardly be esteemed probable duties of clergymen in a college the members of which were bound to celibacy.

'Masters of Music,' (of whom presently) 'are to teach the twelve 'poor scholars in good and sound learning, writing, reading, 'grammar, music, and good manners, and are to admit no scholar' (*i. e.* besides the foundation scholars), 'nor put any out, but with 'the consent of the Master or Warden of the College for the 'time being; and are not, in regard of other scholars being 'taught in the school, to neglect the twelve poor scholars; but it 'shall be their principal and especial care to teach and instruct 'them with all care and diligence.' They are besides 'freely, 'without recompense or reward, to teach and instruct the children of the inhabitants of Dulwich in writing and grammar.' It appears by subsequent statutes that the instruction of these children was not to be in writing and grammar exclusively. They were to pay two shillings for admission, sixpence a quarter to the schoolmaster, and to give a pound of candles at Michaelmas for the use of the school. Other children, whose parents were not inhabitants of Dulwich, were to pay the schoolmaster and usher 'such allowance' as the Master and Warden should appoint; and the number of pupils, including the twelve poor scholars, was not to exceed eighty at any one time.

The Master and Usher of the school are 'to teach and 'instruct the scholars thereof according to the rules and precepts 'of the grammar allowed in England, and to teach and instruct 'in such other books as are commanded by public authority, 'and are usually taught in the free grammar schools of Westminster 'and Paul's.'

The scholars of the highest form are to be taken yearly to Westminster School or the Merchant Tailors' School in London, 'to hear and see the orations and exercises used and uttered by 'the scholars of those schools, on election days, to the end they 'may observe and mark the manner and form thereof.'

Of the chanters—(who, he says, are to be called and esteemed as junior fellows, and to have a vote according to the statutes in certain cases, with the fellows of the corporation, whom he terms the senior fellows)—of the chanters,—

'Two are to be men of approved skill in music, to sound the organ in the chapel and sing their parts in the quire, and shall prick all such services and anthems as the Master shall command for the use of the chapel into fair books, and also all other songs and musics for the private or public use of the College, both for viols and voices, and those they shall keep fair, and at their departure leave them to the College; and they shall teach the poor scholars to sing prick song, and to play upon the viols, virginals, organs, and other instruments, as they shall be found capable; and to teach and direct any other person or persons of the College that are to sing their parts in the Chapel, or any other whom the Master, Warden, and two senior fellows, *i. e.* fellows of the corporation, shall think fit.'

'The other four of the chanters, *alias* junior fellows, are to be singers in the chapel, and persons well skilled and exercised in prick song.' (Figured music.

Then follows a curious provision, which, however, in the view of any enlarged scheme of education for the College which may be proposed, offers, as we shall see, a hint as to the practical character which part of it ought to possess. Besides their skill in music, and their office as choristers, these four chanters are to be men of handicraft pursuits, who may be employed by the College in their crafts for its general good, if the Master, Warden, and senior fellows think it advisable; but whose statutory duty, in addition to singing in the chapel, is 'every day in the 'afternoon to teach and instruct, in their several manufactures, such 'and so many of the poor scholars as shall be found unfit for the 'University.' (Art. 35.)

The assistants, who are to be the two churchwardens of S. Botolph's, Bishopsgate, the two churchwardens of S. Saviour's, Southwark, and the two churchwardens of S. Giles, Cripplegate (S. Luke's), for the time being, are to repair to the College twice a year, to 'hear and see the audit, and view the 'accounts of the Warden and others . . . and also to be present when the Master and Warden are to be elected and sworn.'

The oath taken by the assistants on their admission is as follows:—

'You, A. B., churchwarden of the parish, &c., who are now admitted to be one of the assistants of this College of God's Gift in Dulwich, in the county of Surrey, do swear that you, for your part, shall not willingly or wittingly give consent at any time hereafter to the breaking or alteration of the foundation of this College, or of any ordinance or statute made concerning the same or the government thereof, but, so well as you may, see them truly kept and performed; and that you shall not consent, grant, or agree to the alienation, sale, or putting away any of the lands, tenements, rents, profits, goods, or other things that do belong or appertain, or shall hereafter belong or appertain, to the said College, *nor take of the said profits thereof, than what by the founder of this College has given or allowed to you*; and that you shall not do or consent to the doing of any act, acts, thing or things, to your knowledge which shall or may in any sort disturb, hinder, prejudice, or damage the College; all which you shall swear,' &c.

The poor scholars are—

'To be at the time of their election and admission, between the age of six and eight years, *or thereabouts*, and to remain as scholars in the College no longer but until they be eighteen years *at most*, and then, at the charge of the College, to be put forth either for scholars or trades, as their capacity will fit; all of them at the time of their admission to be *orphans*, without father and mother, or at least such as their parents receive the weekly alms of the parish where they live, or for want of such, any other poor children of the said parishes, such as the assistants of the parish shall think in most need.'

Nine of the poor scholars are to be elected from the parishes of S. Botolph, S. Saviour, and S. Giles—three from each of them,—the remaining three from the parish of Camberwell, preference being given to the lordship of Dulwich. Those of the scholars who have attained the age of eighteen years, and judged fit for the University, (the number, however, so sent

being fixed at neither more nor less than four at any one time,) are to be maintained there for eight years at the expense of the College, and receive such a quarterly allowance as shall be thought sufficient during that time, unless they should obtain preferment before the eight years have expired, in which case their pensions are to cease. They are, besides, to receive gratuities on taking degrees; and if any of them are duly qualified, they are to have the privilege of admission to a vacant fellowship in Dulwich College, without the customary form of election.

The school, it will have been noticed, was to consist of three classes of pupils,—1st. The twelve corporation scholars; 2nd. Children of parents residing in Dulwich; and 3rd. Children from other parts—‘town or foreign scholars,’ as the statutes call them. It would appear, from entries in Alleyn’s diary, that these foreign or town scholars were allowed, if their parents or friends desired it, to be boarded in the College. The entries are the following:—

15th June, 1620.—‘Mem. That Mr. Rogers sent this daye his three sones att boord and scholing for 12li. per Ann. a piece.’

And under date, 12th Sept. of the same year:—

‘This daye Mr. Woodward’s sone came to sojorne and be taught here at 20li. per Ann.’

Mr. Payne Collier, from whose ‘Memoirs of Ed. Alleyn’ these extracts are taken, notices the fact that boys were at that time ‘taken into the College to be boarded and educated:’ ‘but whether,’ he says, ‘the sums paid on this account went to the Master and Usher of the school, or to increase the general funds of the College, must be left to conjecture.’ This, however, is scarcely correct. In the first place, the 69th statute directs that the friends of the town and foreign scholars shall pay the schoolmaster and usher such allowance as the Master and Warden shall appoint. And, secondly, the next statute ordains that ‘all benefits, accruing to the College by reason of any town or foreign scholars, shall be continually divided into three parts, whereof the Master of the school shall have two parts, and the Usher one part; the charge of pens, ink, and paper, for the poor scholars, being first deducted.’

It is obvious from this that there were to be other ‘benefits accruing to the College by reason of the town and foreign scholars,’ besides the allowance to be paid for their instruction, referred to in the previous statute. But the very next statute settles the point. The two music-masters (the first and second chanter-fellows) are to teach any scholars ‘who desire to learn their music and song,’ and are to ‘receive such reward as the

¹ According to Mr. Collier’s estimate, these sums of £12 and £20 correspond to about £60 and £100 of money of our days.

‘Master and Warden for the time being shall appoint, the benefit of which or any otherwise accruing to the said two music-masters shall be equally divided between them, the charge of strings, pens, ink, and paper, *i.e.* for the poor scholars, deducted.’

It is clear from the fact that ‘foreign scholars’ were boarded and educated in the College during Alleyn’s lifetime, that the practice was contemplated by him as part of the College system; but indeed it is authorized by the statutes. There are four statutes which relate to ‘Lodgings in the College.’ The first (97) prescribes the lodgings of the Master, Warden, senior and junior fellows, poor brethren and sisters, poor scholars, and the servants. The next states that ‘all pensioners and commoners in the College shall be lodged at the discretion and appointment of the Master and Warden of the College.’ The next, ‘that it shall not be lawful for any person to lodge any person in the College without the consent or leave of the Master for the time being.’ The conclusion to be drawn from these statutes is obvious. They contemplate the lodging of pensioners and commoners in the College, who are neither members of the corporation, nor persons employed by the College, such as the chanters and servants. Who are these pensioners and commoners? They are not the thirty out-members, for their lodgings were to be in the almshouses, and they were only to come to the College four times a-year to receive their allowances. According to the modern acceptance of the word, ‘a pensioner’ is one who receives a pension or yearly allowance without an equivalent: and in this sense only the more recent dictionaries understand it. But it also signifies the very reverse, *viz.* one who pays a pension or periodical allowance for an equivalent. In French *pension* signifies a boarding-house, a school, the board paid, a pension, an annuity. So *pensionnaire* signifies boarder; and *pensionnat* a boarding-school, the boarder’s room in a college. The sums annually paid by the members of Gray’s Inn to the house are termed *pensions*; and Kersey (‘Dictionary of Law and other Technical Terms’) gives as one meaning of the word *pensioner*, ‘a scholar who pays for his commons.’ It is pretty clear, therefore, that the words ‘pensioners and commoners in the College’ mean simply the scholars boarded in the College; and the statutes accordingly direct—1st. That none are to be boarded without the Master’s consent; and 2nd. That, if admitted, they are to be lodged only where the Master and Warden shall appoint. All doubt, however, is set at rest by a passage in the 69th statute, which orders that ‘if there be any contagious or infectious sickness in Dulwich, it shall be lawful . . . to omit the public

'teaching of the said school of the inhabitants of Dulwich, and such other foreign scholars as do not lodge within the said College.'

If, then, we bear in mind that the foundation scholars, or some of them, were to be educated up to the point of fitness for the University; that their education was to proceed until they reached the age of eighteen; that there was to be no restriction as to the amount of education which the other scholars, either residing in Dulwich or boarded in the College, might receive, and that the instruction was to be such as is usually given in Westminster School, we shall have a tolerable idea of the sort of educational establishment contemplated by the founder. Even without the modifications and expansions which the 'Times' newspaper¹ considers to be necessary, by simply carrying into effect the views of the founder, 'Dulwich College would' not only 'take its place with the great public schools,' but, 'in conformity with the character of the founder, might be the seat of an education somewhat more practical and religious than our public schools supply.'

There are two other characteristic points in the founder's idea of his College which deserve special notice. Alleyn was not only a man of considerable general ability, but a man of taste. He was a musician as well as an actor, and, as it would seem, a great lover of the beauties of rural scenery. These tastes led him to make, what may be thought, more than ordinary provision for the cultivation of music, by every one immediately connected with the College,² and to lay down the most stringent rules for the preservation of the rural beauty of the College lands.

With respect to his desire for the cultivation of music in the College, notices occur in almost every part of the statutes. He appoints that the instruction to be given daily to the poor scholars in manufactures shall be given to half of them one day, and to the other half the next day, 'that they may not lose their music,' as the music-lessons were to be given during the same hours. Then in his 'orders for the chapel and the celebrating of Divine service,' after ordaining that the service shall be read and sung daily in such manner and form, as near as may be, as is usually observed in the King's Chapel, or the collegiate church of S. Peter at Westminster, and that the inmates of the College shall all be present on Sundays and holidays in *surplices*, and on working days in their *gowns*, to

¹ 'Times,' July 1, 1854.

² 'When Alleyn died,' writes Mr. Collier, 'he left behind him a lute, a pandora, a cythern, and six viols.' He was fond of music, entertained singers at his table, bought an organ for his chapel, and went to considerable expense for 'a music-room.'—'Memoirs,' p. 77. This music-room is noticed in the statutes, as the place where the music-lessons were to be given.

sing their parts in the choir, he directs that 'if the Master, 'Warden, or any of the senior fellows be not present in their 'singing, or *cannot sing their parts* in the quire, that then he or 'they that shall be defective therein *shall find every of them, at 'his and their own charge, a several person that can sing his part 'in the quire*, to supply his or their place that is defective, until 'he or they shall be able to perform the same.' And he further ordains 'that, if it may be, *all the other servants or officers of the 'said College* to have knowledge of prick-song (figured music), 'or learn the same after their coming to the said College, and to 'sing his or their part in the quire, *also at times convenient*.' These last words evidently imply what is also signified elsewhere, that the cultivation of music in the College was not solely with a view to the choral service of the chapel, but for recreation also; for it must be remembered that, at the time Alleyn wrote, *madrigal* singing was the almost universal and never-failing amusement of the middle classes.

Alleyn's desire to preserve the rural beauty of Dulwich is not less conspicuous. He will not suffer the home fields adjoining the College to be leased to any one, but to be preserved for ever as places for walking and exercise. No part of the two hundred acres of coppice or woodlands (now called Dulwich Wood), or of the arable and pasture land adjoining, is ever to be let on lease. The wood is never to be cut down, but only twenty acres of it felled annually for the use of the College. He *especially prohibits and forbids, for all succeeding times to come*, that any timber trees fit for shadow or shelter be cut and felled in any of the grounds adjoining or lying near to the west, south, and south-west parts of the College; and that no trees shall be felled on any lands belonging to the College, but such as are of necessity to be employed for building and repairing the College; and no timber is to be sold to any persons whatever but to the tenants of the College, and to them solely for the building or repairs of their houses.

It has been already noticed that among the recipients of the College bounties there were to be thirty poor men and women, who were to reside in almshouses built by Alleyn, or to be built by his executors in the parishes of S. Botolph, S. Giles, and S. Saviour. These thirty 'members of the College,' as he terms them, were to be probationers for admission to vacancies in the number of the poor brethren and sisters of the corporation; and were to receive 6*d.* a-week (equal to 2*s.* 6*d.* of our money), and a new gown once in every two years. The almshouses in the parish of S. Giles, only, were erected by Alleyn during his life; but he directed by his will that his executors should, within two years after his death, build the almshouses in the

other two parishes. Want of funds seems to have prevented the executors from fulfilling his benevolent intentions. Nothing, at any rate, had been done for six or seven years; and in 1633 the rector of S. Botolph and the churchwardens thought it necessary to institute a suit against Matthias Alleyn (the other executor being dead), for the purpose of enforcing the erection of the ten almshouses in that parish. A decree was pronounced by the Lord Keeper Coventry, in favour of the plaintiff; and subsequently the almshouses both in S. Botolph's and S. Saviour's were erected.¹

The pleadings in this suit contain the germ of all the disputes and litigations in which the College has ever since been more or less engaged. The question, it would appear, was then raised for the first time, whether the corporation of Dulwich College was legally bound to carry into effect the provisions of the statutes, not only with respect to the thirty out-members, but with respect to the other persons, such as the chanters or junior fellows, and the assistants who were not named in the letters patent and deed of foundation.

On the part of the defendant it was argued that—

'There was no power by the patent to alter or add more members to the corporation at the will of the founder, and that if there had been a power, yet the lands at the time of the foundation being at a rack-rent, were since, by decay of tenements and otherwise, much abated in the yearly value; besides, there were many necessary provisions, charges, quit-rents, duties to the King's charges in suits of law, reparations for the College, and other duties, *past and growing expenses which must be necessarily supplied out of the College revenue for the College*, which were never thought on by the founder at the time of the endowment, and when he made the ordinances for the College: and the defendant Matthias Alleyn did deny that he had assets sufficient, but offered, that if the plaintiffs would set him out ground he would buy so far as £120 would extend, which was the moiety of the assets he did acknowledge to be in his hands.'

This offer was accepted by the rector of S. Botolph and the others on the part of the parish; and it was

'Ordered, that upon payment of the said £120 to the said parish, the defendant Matthias Alleyn be from thenceforth acquitted and discharged against the said parish of S. Botolph, for or by reason of the bequest aforesaid.'

But it was at the same time ordered

'That if there shall any new addition of estate come to the College, or *that there shall be hereafter an overplus of value in the College revenue*, all the

¹ When the Report of the Charity Commissioners for 1835 was drawn up, the almshouses in S. Botolph's were in so ruinous a condition that the poor men and poor women sent to them only occupied them a few nights before they went thence to the College, in order to give them a qualification. Those of S. Saviour's were much dilapidated, but inhabitable, and those of S. Luke's were in good repair.—C. C. Rep. 893, Sept. 1835.

said duties and necessities to the same first discharged, then the said defendant shall be liable to pay such increase to *these additional charities of the founding*, as this court shall think fit.'

How the defendant should be discharged on payment of £120, and still be held liable to pay out of the College revenue such a sum towards the erection of the almshouses, as the court should think fit, does not seem clear; though it is clear enough that the court considered the College revenues chargeable with the erection of the almshouses under the contingencies mentioned. If this be the case, it would seem to follow that under the same contingencies, and with the sanction of the same court, the College was bound to keep the almshouses in repair, as the 103rd statute directs, and to pay the statutory allowances to the thirty inhabitants of them. At any rate, it is a fact, that the College did for certain periods of time, though not continuously, pay the allowances to the thirty out-members.

We learn from the 'Orders, Rules, and Injunctions for the better government of the College,' issued by Archbishop Sheldon in 1667, that no payments had been made to the 'thirty members' for many years previously. It is probable that the allowances had been stopped chiefly on account of the losses sustained by the College (some twenty years before the date of Archbishop Sheldon's visitation), by 'the decay of the 'Fortune playhouse, and the falling down of one whole side of 'the College and a great part of the other side, by which the 'College was not only out of stock, but run into debt.' But, however that may have been, it is certain that there existed also a reluctance on the part of the College to admit the claim of the thirty out-members; for we find that the third fellow was expelled by Archbishop Sheldon for refusing to agree to his order for renewing the payment of the allowances.

In 1724 a visitation of the College was held by Archbishop Wake, who, in the orders and injunctions subsequently issued by him, confirmed the rules laid down by Archbishop Sheldon respecting the disposal of the College revenues; and probably up to that time the allowances to the thirty members had been regularly paid.

The injunctions of Archbishop Wake, however, had the effect of raising a question respecting the rights of another class of the extra-collegiate members. Archbishop Sheldon had decreed that the six assistants and the thirty poor men and women were to be regarded as out-members of the College; and that their offices, duties, and allowances (unless dispensed with by the visitor for the time being) were to be as by the statutes it was set down and ordained. Archbishop Wake, exercising this assumed power of dispensation, limited the number of assistants to three.

'It appearing,' [says he,] 'highly probable to us that the founder—in appointing six churchwardens by the name of assistants, who might be a check upon the society in the management of their revenue, might moderate in all their differences, and take care of the poor of their respective parishes, to have certain allotments out of the College revenue—intended the number of the said assistants should be in proportion to the society as six to twelve (he having, at the same time, appointed a Master, Warden, and ten fellows); but whereas it is very clear that the founder never had any power or authority in law to appoint any such assistants at all, nor to enlarge the number of his fellows beyond four, so that what was done by him in that respect is indeed contrary both to the charter of incorporation and deed of uses; nevertheless, out of a due regard to what was done by him, and at the same time to prevent the many ill-consequences that may be justly apprehended from the said assistants out-numbering the said society, which consists only of a Master, Warden, and four fellows, and for preserving the balance intended by the founder, we are content to allow, and do hereby allow, as far as in us lies, that three churchwardens, which shall be the upper churchwardens of the three parishes out of which they have hitherto been taken, may continue to act as assistants, and have the usual allowances in proportion out of the revenue belonging to the said College.'

In consequence of this order, the churchwardens took in 1726 the opinion of the then Attorney-General, Sir Philip Yorke, as to its legality. The opinion he gave was as follows:—

'The six churchwardens, viz. two of each parish, are not part of the body corporate erected in this College, for that subsists entirely by the letters patent, 21 June, 17 Jac. I., whereby it is created to consist of the master, warden, fellows, brethren, sisters, and poor scholars, no mention being made therein of assistants, and the founder could not afterwards vary from that and add to the corporation. But notwithstanding this, I think the said churchwardens are lawfully entitled to such powers and authorities as were given to them by the ordinances and statutes of the founder of Sept. 29, 2 Car. I.; and such powers and authorities, or any of them, cannot be taken from them, but by some person having power to repeal or alter those ordinances. Therefore I apprehend the question upon which this matter will depend is, whether the Archbishop of Canterbury, being appointed visitor by the charter, has power by himself or his vicar-general to repeal or alter those ordinances or statutes. As to that, it is to be observed, that the appointment of his Grace to be visitor is accompanied with this special respective clause, with power to visit, order, and punish according to the ecclesiastical laws, and such laws as shall be made and ordained by the said Edward Alleyn in his lifetime, or after his death by any other person or persons to be appointed by him under his hand and seal. It does not appear that any such appointment was made by Mr. Alleyn to take place after his death, so that may be laid out of the case; but he did make laws or statutes in his lifetime by that instrument of 29 Sept., 2 Car. I.; and therefore it seems to me that they are binding upon the visitor, and he is obliged to visit and act according to them, and cannot repeal or alter them, for that would be to contradict the intent of the founder, and alter the foundation. Upon this ground, I apprehend that the above-mentioned exclusion of one of the churchwardens of each parish is not well warranted, and that the order for such exclusion being void, all the said churchwardens have (notwithstanding the same) a right to act as assistants pursuant to the said ordinances; and that, if they are hindered from so doing, they may, upon an information exhibited in Chancery in the Attorney-General's name at their relation, be decreed to be restored thereto.'

The College now sent a petition to the Archbishop, in which they represented that they had been informed by counsel learned in the law, that the pensions which, in obedience to Archbishop Sheldon's injunction, had been paid by them to the thirty poor people of the parishes of S. Botolph, S. Giles, and S. Saviour, were utterly illegal and inconsistent with the deeds of foundation; and they prayed that the Archbishop would so far relax or suspend the said injunction, as to leave them at liberty to try their right with the churchwardens by the law of the land.

To this memorial the Archbishop replied, that upon due consideration, he thought their request so reasonable that he had resolved to give his consent to it, and had directed a letter to be prepared for that purpose.

'But in the meantime,' [he continues,] 'the churchwardens laid a representation before me, wherein, among other things, they complained that the said pensions were not paid pursuant to the statutes¹ and the said injunction of my predecessor, and prayed my directions for the execution and enforcement of the said statutes and injunction on this behalf. This gave me occasion not only to reconsider the matter very carefully myself, but also to take the advice of counsel for my further direction herein; and, after mature consideration, I sent the said churchwardens the following answer to that part of their representation, viz., "For the pensions to the thirty out-members, the master, warden, and fellows have represented to me, that they are advised by their counsel, that the founder had no power to lay any such burden upon them; that the whole estate of their College, for several years before the making of the statutes by which these payments are appointed both by the King's charter and the founder's grant, had been legally vested in their corporation, and could not be applied to any other use; and thereupon they have desired my consent, that notwithstanding Archbishop Sheldon's injunction, they may be at liberty to bring the right of those payments to a legal determination. Upon this request made to me by the College, I have advised with counsel for my own satisfaction and direction in this matter, and am by my counsel informed that the College have good reason for what they desire, and that I ought not to deny them the justice they request of bringing this matter to a legal issue, which will be the best direction for us all to follow, and put a final end to all disputes about this matter; and this I have accordingly resolved to do."'

Notwithstanding this resolution of the Archbishop, the matter was not fully brought to a legal issue. An information was filed in the name of the Attorney-General, on the relation of Samuel Higgs and the other assistants, against the College and the Archbishop, and the case came on for hearing in April, 1728, before Lord Chancellor King; but the claim of the assistants only was dealt with. 'Edward Alleyn,' ran the

¹ From this it would seem that the College had not actually been paying the allowances to the thirty out-members, notwithstanding their profession of respect to the injunction of Archbishop Sheldon.

judgment of the Lord Chancellor, 'the founder of the College, 'could not by his said ordinances and statutes of 29th Sept., 1626, 'add any persons to the corporation, nor make any new 'person a member of the said body corporate, but he could appoint assistants to the said corporation;' and he ordered and decreed 'that the relators and their successors be admitted to 'be assistants to the corporation, according to the said ordinances and statutes, and are to be quieted in the possession thereof; but this is to be without prejudice to the defendant 'the Archbishop of Canterbury, his right of visitation, or of 'any application to be made to him to correct, alter, or amend 'any of the said ordinances, or to any correction, alteration, or 'amendment that the said Archbishop or his successors shall or 'may lawfully make or ordain.'

It seems to have been assumed by the College, as it in fact still is, that this decree met the case also of the chanter and thirty out-members. As the founder could not make them members of the corporation, so, it was argued, their appointment, and the allowances assigned them by the statutes, were illegal. This, however, has never been admitted by the assistants, so far as the thirty poor out-members are concerned. The Charity Commissioners, in their report for 1835, notice as matters still in dispute, 'the right of the three parishes to have the 'almshouses repaired by the College, and the right of the thirty 'out-members to the clothing, pensions, and proportion of the 'surplus revenue assigned to them by the statutes.' Nor does the matter seem to be cleared up by the recent judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench respecting the right of the assistants to vote in the election of a warden. The case of the chanter and thirty out-members was only incidentally referred to; but the Judges—viz., Lord Campbell, Mr. Justice Patteson, and Mr. Justice Coleridge, who also expressed the opinion of Mr. Justice Wightman—were equally divided on the question whether any real distinction could be drawn between the case of the assistants and that of the chanter and thirty members.

'As to that distinction,' [said Lord Campbell,] 'between the junior fellows and the assistants,' [the distinction he supposed Lord King to have made,] 'if it now arose for the first time, I am not prepared to say what my notion of it would be, or whether I should not say they were both in the same category; although it is very true that the junior fellows are directed by the statutes to have a voice equally and in the same manner with the senior fellows, and the assistants are only to have a voice in certain specified cases, which is not exactly the same; yet the same learned Judge, Lord King, held that the appointment of assistants was good, they not being intended to be members of the corporation, and quieted them in the possession of their office.'

So Mr. Justice Patteson :—

‘I may say in passing, as my brother Campbell has observed, I think that, if this were *res integra*, it would appear to me extremely questionable whether the six chanterers, as they are called, do not stand on the same footing, and have not the same rights, as the six assistants. And the more I examine this statute, the less am I satisfied that it was ever the intention of Alleyn to attempt to make these persons members of the foundation of the corporation. *In point of fact, it seems to me, if it is looked at, that the result is exactly the contrary, and that it is quite excluded; the simple circumstance that he gives the junior fellows votes, can, of course, make no difference.* The foundation of our present judgment is, and the point we are labouring at is, that the assistants are not adopted by any one as members of the foundation: but it is remarkable that, after going through, and stating what the junior fellows are to do, he says, “the six assistants, touching the ordering of the said College, and the rents, revenues, and profits thereof, and thirty members.” Now, if you add the junior fellows, you will find you have thirty-six members; but strike them out, the number is exactly thirty members of the College; so that it would have been inconsistent, I think, with this statute, to have supposed there was any intention to make the six junior fellows members of the foundation. Then he goes on, omitting those who are members. He says, “The said chanterers, assistants, and members to be employed and taken to such uses, intents, and purposes, as hereinafter in these my orders and statutes I shall further direct and appoint.”’

The latter part of Mr. Justice Patteson’s argument is, we apprehend, based on a mistake, into which an erroneous punctuation in the printed copies of the statutes has led him; but there does not appear to us any doubt on other grounds, that Alleyn never intended the chanterers, assistants, and poor out-members to be part of the corporate body. The ‘thirty members’ mentioned in this statute are not, as Sir John Patteson supposed, the thirty members of the corporation, but the thirty candidates for admission into the corporate body. As the statute is now pointed, it reads very like nonsense. The chanterers are to have votes, ‘as the four senior fellows have six assistants, touching the ordering of the College and its revenues, and thirty members.’ But the meaning of the statute is obviously this: that for certain specified reasons, viz. for the honour and service of God and for the good and welfare of the *said* College—*i. e.* of the College which in the first statute he had just defined to consist of a master, warden, &c.—the founder ordained that there should be: 1st. Six chanterers, with the privilege of being called junior fellows, and of voting according to the statutes with the fellows of the corporation; 2nd. Six assistants to the corporation in the government of the College, and the disposal of its revenues; and 3rd. Thirty poor members, who were to be candidates for admission to vacancies occurring among the poor brethren and sisters of the corporation; and that the said chanterers, assistants, and members, were to be

employed and taken to such uses as he should afterwards by his statutes direct. Whatever may have been his intentions in particular instances, it is plain that throughout the statutes the founder employed the word 'college,' and the terms '*of the college,*' '*belonging to the college,*' and the like, in more senses than one. *To belong to the college* does not always mean to be a *member of the corporation*. Membership of the College does not always signify membership of the corporation. Indeed, it is perfectly clear that, according to Alleyn's idea, persons might belong to, or be of the College, or be termed members of it, without being members of the corporation. Thus, though he terms the thirty pensioners in the almshouses, '*members of the College,*' yet they were to be so in another sense when they came to be elected poor brethren or sisters of the corporation. The 49th statute proves this. It runs: 'That none of the thirty poor members that have notice given them for their *'election to be of the College (i. e. to be members of the corporation), shall sell or give away any of their goods, &c., but bring them with them to the College.'* Then the 31st statute, which prescribes the duties of the warden, directs him to 'pay, disburse, and defray all the rents, pensions, and all other payments which are to be made by the said College for the use and maintenance thereof, *to all persons in any sort belonging thereto.*' And there is no doubt, as has been already noticed, that at the very outset of the statutes, Alleyn clearly distinguishes between the members of the corporation and those other persons who were to belong to the College for specific purposes contemplated by him. The first statute ordains that the College shall, as the letters patent define, consist of a master, warden, four fellows, six poor brethren, six poor sisters, and twelve poor scholars. The second then sets out with a preamble containing the reasons for what is to follow, viz.: that first, '*for the better furtherance of the honour and service of Almighty God,*' and secondly, '*for the good and welfare of the said College,* or for both these reasons, there shall be six men to sing in the chapel, six assistants to the corporation in the government of the College and the management of its funds, and thirty poor men and women, from whom the poor brethren and sisters of the corporation were to be chosen.

With regard, indeed, to the assistants and the thirty members, there is no room for conjecture respecting the intentions of the founder: he expressly mentions them in the 29th statute as distinct from the '*whole corporation of the College:*' 'Whensoever and as often as any master, warden, &c., shall be admitted to be of the College, and shall have taken his or her oath accordingly, then the senior fellow then present shall

'forthwith say as followeth:—Now, in the name of God and 'of the whole corporation of this College, the assistants and 'members thereof, I do pronounce you to be Master, Warden, '&c., of this College.' . . . The 'assistants' and 'members of the College,' in this instance, were certainly not regarded by the founder as members of the corporation. But did he, by omitting all mention of the chanters, suppose them to be included in 'the whole corporation of the College?' Nothing can be determined on this point, from the circumstance that the '*whole corporation*' is spoken of: for the 13th statute, which relates to the promotion of the warden to the office of master, simply directs that the oath is to be administered (and the foregoing declaration, of course, also made) 'in the presence of **THE** corporation then present;' and in this case the assistants were to be present. Or did he include under the words 'and members thereof' all who 'in any sort' belonged to the College? It is, at all events, very evident that throughout the statutes he speaks of the fellows of the foundation as **THE FELLOWS**. Thus the 21st statute:—'When any of the fellows' or¹ chanters' places shall be void,' &c. Then the 13th statute, which has just been referred to, and the 15th, 18th, 20th, and 21st, are so worded as to render it, to say the very least, extremely questionable whether the chanters, though present, had any voice in the election of the master, warden, fellows, or even of their own body. Within twenty-four hours after the place of master has become void, the warden is to take upon himself the office of master, and 'be admitted thereunto by the fellows, or 'the most part of them then residing in the College, and shall 'take the oath hereafter expressed, to be ministered unto him by 'the senior fellow then present'. . . where it is to be observed that 'senior fellow' does not mean the senior of all the fellows then present ('chanters, *alias* junior fellows,' included), but one of the preachers or first and second fellows of the foundation. So the 15th statute. On the day of the election of a warden, 'the master, the assistants, and fellows,' are to go into the chapel, 'and after service and sermon, made by one of the fellows,' (*i. e.* one of the four corporation fellows,) 'proceed 'to the election of a new warden; after that, the senior 'fellow then present shall read,' &c. So the 20th: 'If both 'the places of master and warden should happen to be void 'at one time, the senior fellow then present shall give notice 'to the assistants . . . to repair to the College . . . to join

¹ 'Or' is used here obviously in the sense of 'and.' All the fellows were not chanters; and those who were not were the fellows of the corporation.

‘with the fellows in the election of a new master,’ &c. Then follows the 21st, already referred to, in which the so-called *junior fellows* are for the first time referred to in these statutes relating to elections; but it is under their proper name of chanters: ‘When any of *the fellows*’ or chanters’ places shall be void . . . ‘then the master, warden, and the rest of the *surviving fellows* shall provide,’ &c. If the chanters were to have a vote in this case, it is remarkable that though they are mentioned as persons to be elected distinct from the fellows, they are not, as the parallelism would seem to require, named among the electors. If the statute had run in these words—‘When any of the senior ‘or junior fellows’ places shall be void . . . then the master, warden, and the rest of the surviving fellows shall provide,’ &c.—its meaning would have been plain enough: the ‘surviving fellows’ would have been the surviving senior and junior fellows. But as it stands, we cannot assume that the chanters were to have a vote at all. On the contrary, it seems to be a legitimate conclusion, from the wording of the statute, that they were not to have a vote; otherwise the statute would have run thus:—‘When any of the fellows’ or chanters’ places shall be void . . . ‘then the master, warden, and the rest of the surviving fellows ‘and chanters shall provide,’ &c. The same distinction is also preserved in the next statute, which speaks of the oath and formal admission of the fellows and chanters.

Against this view, it may be urged that the 2nd statute, in which the chanters are first introduced, gives them ‘a voice equally and in the same manner with the senior fellows.’ This is Lord Campbell’s construction of the statute; but with every deference to so eminent an authority, it must be observed that the statute does not say that the chanters are to have a vote in all cases along with the senior fellows, but only that, like the senior fellows, they are to have a voice ‘according to the statutes;’ so that, even admitting the wording of this statute to be ambiguous, we should still have to determine from the body of the statutes whether the chanters were to have a voice on *all* occasions along with the fellows of the corporation. If on the occasion of the elections they have no voice, it would follow, supposing the recent judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench, respecting the claim of the assistants to vote at the election of warden, to be correct, that the founder intended, which is very unlikely, to place the power of choosing the two candidates for that office virtually in the hands of the assistants; since they must always form a majority of the electors. The casting-vote allowed by the statutes to the master, can only be given when the voices are equal; but in this case they never can be equal—the number of the corporators being five at the most, that of the

assistants being always six. This, indeed, is the very contingency anticipated by Archbishop Wake, and which led to his attempt to reduce the number of assistants to three, 'in order,' as he says, 'to prevent the many ill consequences that may be justly apprehended, from the said assistants outnumbering the 'said society.' It is remarkable that the judges never seem to have considered how unlikely it was that the founder should for a moment have thought of making the corporators mere ciphers in a matter of such moment to them as the election of a master or warden; yet the judgment of the court has the effect of doing this. To us it appears more probable that the founder gave no voice either to the assistants or to the chanters, in the election of the governing members of the corporation: at least, that if he gave a voice to either, he gave it to both.

It is, however, as Mr. Justice Patteson observed, not material to the question respecting the intended *status* of the chanters in the College, whether they voted on all or on any occasions. If the founder, in virtue of the powers reserved to him by the charter, could, as the court has decided, give the assistants a vote on any occasion, he could have given them the privilege of voting on all occasions. This privilege did not make them members of the corporation; and the same may be said of the chanters. Besides, the poor brethren and sisters, and the poor scholars, who *are* members of the corporation, have no vote at all on any occasion. Then with respect to the title of junior fellow accorded to the chanters, it is noticeable that the founder, in the 2nd statute, does not say that the chanters are *to be the* junior fellows of the corporation, but only that they are *to be called and esteemed as* junior fellows of the College; and, consistently with this, he elsewhere terms them 'chanters, *alias* junior fellows';—a ridiculous phraseology, if he considered their *alias* as anything but a name and an honorary title; a privilege which it is probable he allowed them out of consideration for their constant and necessary association with the fellows of the corporation in conducting Divine service in the chapel.

But, in truth, it matters not what were the intentions of the founder, if what he did was contrary to law. If, however, what he did was not contrary to law, his erroneous intention, supposing it could be proved, which it cannot, would not render that illegal which in itself is not so. Assuming that he intended to make the chanters and the thirty poor members part of the incorporation: as he could not make them so, his intentions would not go for nothing; yet if his provisions respecting them were consistent with the powers granted him by the charter patent, those provisions must be held good whatever he intended. Much more must they be held good if we do not know what he

intended, and are obliged to interpret his intentions by his acts; and more still, if it can be shown, and we think it has been shown, that he had no intention whatever to make the chanter, assistants, and poor members part of the body corporate. 'The founder,' says Lord Campbell, 'could not add to the corporate body, or alter its component parts; therefore, the provision made by the founder as to the six junior fellows was held by Lord King to be void.' But does it follow that those provisions are void because the founder could not add to the corporation? Surely not. It only follows that the junior fellows were not and could not be members of the corporation. If the founder *could not add* to the corporation, of course he *did not add* to it, whatever he intended to do; but as we do not know for certain what his intentions were, his intentions may be laid out of the case, and the only question will be, whether his powers under the charter enabled him to make his statutory provisions respecting the six chanter?

On this question Mr. Justice Coleridge has, we apprehend, touched the point on which the whole matter turns. 'There is,' he says, 'a clear distinction to be taken between the assistants and the chanter . . . because the chanter were to receive emoluments out of the funds of the corporation.' The learned judge adverts to other particulars of difference between the case of the assistants and that of the chanter, which have been already disposed of; but we imagine that the very pivot of the inquiry is the question how far the founder's powers, under the letters patent, enabled him to deal with the funds of the corporation for specific purposes, deemed by him necessary to the good and welfare of the College.

Now, in regard to this, it is to be observed that the letters patent do unquestionably give him power to make ordinances, statutes, and so forth, respecting the management of the lands as well as the revenues of the College. What are the limits of such powers? In the first place, it is clear enough that he could not by his statutes alienate any part of the funds vested in the corporation for their use, relief, maintenance, sustenance, education, instruction, and the rest. The funds must be applied to those purposes. But then, secondly, it is equally clear that the corporation could *only* use its funds, be relieved, maintained, sustained, educated, instructed, guided, governed, and ruled, according to such statutes and ordinances as the founder should make, set down, establish, and ordain, 'for the more better and orderly maintenance, education, instruction, guiding, government, and rule' of the corporation. Though the funds of the corporation were vested in them for their use, they could only use them in the manner to be prescribed by the statutes, and

deemed necessary by the founder for accomplishing the objects of the foundation, as they are generally defined in the letters patent.

But the letters patent simply say that the College is to be 'for and towards the maintenance of poor men, women, and children; and for the education and instruction of the said children;' and that it is to 'consist of one master, one warden, four fellows, six poor brethren, six poor sisters, and twelve poor scholars.' Beyond this we learn nothing from the charter. The nature of the foundation, the manner of its government, the kind of education the College was to afford, the extent to which its instruction was to be carried, the apparatus by which it was to be given, the manner in which the revenues of the corporation were to be specially disposed of in relation to its two objects of charity and education, are points respecting which the letters patent are entirely silent. Though they say that the corporators are to have perpetual succession, they give no hint whatever of the manner in which the succession is to be perpetuated. Yet these were matters so essential, not only to the objects, but to the very existence of the foundation, that if the Crown did not exercise the power to regulate them, it was obviously because that power had been delegated to the founder; and so, the very meagreness and abstinence of the letters patent may be regarded as evincing the fulness of the powers granted to him. And, indeed, looking at the terms in which this power is allowed him, they seem to be so large and comprehensive as to leave him at full liberty to ordain and establish by his statutes whatever he considered necessary for the 'good and welfare' of the College. There are, it is true, *provisos* in the letters patent respecting the King's prerogative and the civil and ecclesiastical laws of the realm; but so far as the present question is concerned, the prerogative of the Crown had been already exercised. The founder could not vary from, nor add to the corporation defined by the letters patent, nor alienate the funds vested in them; nor could he alter the general purposes of the foundation set forth in the charter; but these conditions being fulfilled, he was left the sole judge of what was necessary for the good and welfare of the College, and for carrying into effect its double purpose of charity and education.

The funds of the College could only be expended for the benefit of the College and for the promotion of certain objects by it; but if the founder did not possess full discretionary power as to the *manner* in which the funds should be disposed of for the benefit of the College, and for the purposes of its foundation, there was no one else who had it. The Crown

possessed the power, but did not exercise it. For all that appears in the letters patent, the members of the corporation have a right to divide the funds among them in equal portions. There is not a word in the charter from which we can gather a hint as to the manner in which the poor scholars were to be educated, or the persons by whom they were to be taught. Is there a single word in the charter which rendered it compulsory on the founder to direct that *members of the corporation only* should be employed in the instruction of the poor scholars? As well might be said that the founder had no power under the charter to ordain that any but members of the corporation should act as cook, butler, bailiff, or ploughman.

Supposing, then, the founder, as it is clear he did, considered that a daily chapel service, performed after the best choral models in the metropolis, was necessary 'for the better furtherance of the honour and service of Almighty God,' in the College, and 'for the good and welfare' of the corporation—could he legally ordain that the College should appoint and perpetually have six singing men 'for music and singing in the chapel,' and pay them out of the corporation funds? Or, supposing that he judged it necessary, in furtherance of his views respecting the education of the poor scholars, that they should all be instructed in music, and some of them in handicraft trades, could he legally direct the appointment of persons, not members of the corporation, qualified to teach music and handicraft trades, who should be paid out of the College revenues? If he could do this, he could legally direct the appointment of the six chanters: for two of them were to be teachers of music to the poor scholars, and organists in the chapel, and the remaining four, singing men in the chapel, and teachers of handicraft trades in the school. So far as these duties were concerned, the chanters were the mere servants of the corporation,—they were to act entirely under the direction, as the case might be, of the master, warden, or fellows of the corporation.

If the founder could make no such provision for these purposes, one does not see how he could legally direct the appointment of 'a porter, a cook, a maltster and brewer, a butler, a bailiff to look to the woods, cattle, and husbandry, a ploughman, a kitchen-boy, or a ploughboy,' and ordain that they should be paid in precisely the same manner as every other person 'in any sort belonging to the College' is paid—that is, by a fixed statutory allowance and a contingent allowance out of surplus revenues,—one does not see how he could order the payment of the assistants' travelling expenses, or bind the corporation to provide them with dinners on the occasions of their visiting the College: And does not this small matter of the dinner involve the whole

question? If the founder could legally bind the corporation to feast the assistants at the expense of the College,¹ could he not bind them to give 6*d.* a-week to a certain number of poor people for another object equally deemed by him conducive to the welfare of the College?

But the case of the thirty out-members deserves more special notice. They were, it will be remembered, to be thirty poor men and women, ten of whom were to be chosen by the assistants out of each of the three parishes of S. Luke, S. Botolph, and S. Saviour; all of them were to reside in almshouses built at the expense of the founder, which were to be kept in repair at the expense of the College; they were to have an allowance of 6*d.* a-week each, and new gowns every two years, and, in addition, a proportionate share of the surplus revenue of the College; and out of their number, the vacancies occurring among the poor brethren and sisters were, with three exceptions, to be filled up. Now, supposing the founder thought it to be of the utmost importance to the well-being of the College, that great care should be exercised in the choice of the poor brethren and sisters, and that, with a view to prevent, as much as might be, the admission of unworthy objects to the privileges of the corporation, he considered it desirable that all candidates should be placed for a time under the superintendence of the assistants, and undergo a period of probation, in order that their character and habits should be duly ascertained by the College; supposing that this preparatory foundation was designed by Alleyn to serve the double purpose of securing the corporation against the intrusion, among its members, of persons of troublesome, vicious, or depraved habits, and of operating as a check on the assistants with whom the selection of the probationers, in the first instance, was to rest; could it be said, with the least shew of truth, that this was not a provision in the highest degree conducive to the good and welfare of the College, and therefore one on which the founder had no power under the charter to ordain any expenditure of the corporation funds? Lord Keeper Coventry termed these almshouses 'additional charities of the founding;' but, strictly speaking, they were not charities, because the expenditure incurred by the College on their account was for an equivalent. There was an object to be gained, which was not the maintenance of so many poor

¹ It appears, from the statement of accounts delivered by the College to the Charity Commissioners last year, that the present annual payment to the assistants for their biennial journey from London to Dulwich and back, is 48*l.* The statutory allowance for the assistants' dinners and the four feasting-days of the twelve poor brothers and sisters (the items are not separated) is 3*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* Besides this, there are $\frac{3\frac{1}{2}}{600}$ parts of the surplus revenue appropriated to the same purposes, which at present amount to 50*l.*, in all 53*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*

people, but another object, to the accomplishment of which the partial maintenance for a time of so many poor people was necessary.¹ And, besides, is not this a provision for perpetuating the succession of part of the corporate body?

The distinction, then, between the case of the assistants and that of the chanters, and, it may be added, that also of the thirty poor members, is not, we apprehend, so clear as Mr. Justice Coleridge supposes. All of them are to have allowances out of the funds of the corporation, and in every case for some purpose directly or indirectly beneficial to the College, and deemed necessary by the founder to its welfare. If the founder had power under the letters patent to appropriate any part of the corporation funds to the assistants who are not members of the corporate body, for purposes which he deemed expedient or necessary, he could do the same in the case of the chanters and thirty poor members. It is not material to the question to say that the allowances to the assistants are merely intended to defray their travelling expenses, and to provide refreshments for them during their visits to the College; because the principle involved is the same, whatever be the special purpose for which the College is compelled to expend part of its funds. There is no mention whatever of the assistants in the letters patent; the appointment of them was a matter depending solely on the judgment of the founder, yet he did appoint them, and compelled the College to incur considerable expense on their account. He considered the office of assistants desirable; and therefore he created it, and appropriated to it so much of 'the profits of the College' as, considering the nature of the office and the condition of the persons who were to fill it,² he judged to be necessary. In the case of the chanters he did no more. The duties of the chanters, as singers and teachers, required their constant residence in the College; they were of a class who could not afford to give their services gratuitously; it followed, therefore, as a matter of course, that they should be paid and maintained all the year round at the expense of the corporation. But there is no difference in principle between maintaining the

¹ It may be said, in opposition to this view, that three of the vacancies among the poor brethren and sisters were to be filled up by the College itself from the parish of Camberwell, and that the persons selected were not to undergo a probationary residence in the almshouses. But it is to be observed that, though the founder mentions the parish of Camberwell, he gave a preference to the lordship of Dulwich, and directed that, *if it might be, the persons chosen should be inhabitants of Dulwich, where the College stood*; evidently implying that the governing body would have, from that circumstance, sufficient opportunity of ascertaining the characters and habits of the persons on whom their choice was likely to fall. A probation elsewhere, therefore, was unnecessary.

² 'The churchwardens,' says Lord Campbell, 'at that time of day, I believe were generally persons of the greatest note and importance in the parish.'

assistants for a day and maintaining the chanters for a year. If the founder legally could order the one,¹ he could legally order the other.²

And so we may say of the titles and privileges of the assistants and chanters. If he could give the assistants votes in the management of the College, he could give votes also to the chanters. If he had chosen, he could have given to each of the assistants the title of 'Junior Warden,' just as he gave the chanters the *alias* of 'Junior Fellows;' but neither the payments, the privileges, nor the titles, constituted these persons members of the corporation.

In few words, then, until it can be shown that there is a single provision in the statutes respecting the expenditure of the funds of the corporation, which cannot be said in some sense or other to promote the interests and welfare of the corporation and the efficiency of the College, we must continue to believe that the founder has not exceeded his powers, and that his statutes are as much the act of the Crown as if they had been contained in the charter.

These observations, if they do not enable us to give an answer to the question put by the 'Times' newspaper, 'What shall we do with Dulwich College?' will at least convey to us some notion of what Dulwich College may do with itself. If it be true, as we really believe, that it rests entirely with the visitor of the College whether the statutes of the College shall be so acted upon as to bring the whole scheme contemplated by the founder into full operation, the question of the future of Dulwich College is greatly simplified; it becomes, in fact, only a question of modification, enlargement, and adaptation to existing circumstances. Let us consider this subject more particularly.

The statutes, it will have been noticed, range themselves under four heads: the first embracing the government of the College, and the management of its funds; the second, its charitable purposes; the third, its provisions for Divine service; and the fourth, its purposes of education.

Now, admitting—and, in fact, it is admitted on every side—that, considering the means at the command of the College, its

¹ Lord King's decree, by which the churchwardens of the three parishes, 'and their successors, were to be admitted to be assistants to the corporation, according to the ordinances and statutes of the College,' of course involves an admission of the legality of the allowances made to them out of the funds of the corporation.

² If the founder could not compel the corporation to spend their funds on purposes which he deemed necessary to their welfare, so neither could he deprive them of available resources or contingent profits from their lands for such purposes. Yet he did this last by prohibiting them for ever from leasing certain lands; and his prohibition has been held good. The College found it necessary to obtain an Act of Parliament to enable them to lease the lands in question.

sphere of usefulness might be greatly enlarged; admitting that its charities might cover a larger field, and the benefit of gratuitous education be afforded to a larger number of poor scholars and others than the founder contemplated,—are there any such radical and inherent defects in the general scheme of the College as to demand the interference of Parliament further than to enable the corporation to extend the benefits of the foundation to a degree commensurate with the largeness of its means, and to modify the plan of the founder, without altering its essential features, so as to adapt it to the circumstances of the times? We do not believe there are.

To evince the justice of that opinion, we can perhaps take no better way than to compare the scheme of the founder with that which the Charity Commissioners propose to substitute for it. The Commissioners, as it is pretty generally known, sent down their inspector, Mr. Hare, in the course of last year, to institute 'an inquiry into the state and administration of the charity.' As to the manner in which that inquiry was conducted, the less we say the better it will be for the credit of the Commissioners. A number of witnesses were examined in the most rambling and desultory way, seemingly for no other purpose than to throw odium on the governing body of the College, to show that the corporation was very rich, and that the poor scholars were very badly taught. The cry of 'Mad dog,' in short, was raised, and anybody who chose was admitted to throw a stone. With the evidence, however, such as it was, the Commissioners appear to have been satisfied. It was proved that the College was very wealthy, and that it did very little for the money; and from these premises, the Commissioners jumped at once to the conclusion that the corporation ought to be abolished, and its funds transferred to their own management. Assuming that they had the power to 'make an order' to put an extinguisher on Dulwich College, they forthwith issued a scheme to that effect; and although, as it turns out, they overrated their power,¹ and the scheme accordingly does not

¹ Twenty years ago the old Charity Commissioners made an attempt to interfere with the management of Dulwich College. In 1836 an information, on the basis of their Report of 1835, was filed in Chancery by the Attorney-General, which, after alleging various abuses, prayed for the interference of the court; but the real object of the suit was to prove that the corporation of Dulwich College were trustees in respect to part of their funds for the benefit of poor men and poor women not members of it. It is hardly necessary to say that the Master of the Rolls, before whom the case was heard, gave for judgment that the corporators held no part of the original endowments of the College in trust for the benefit of any persons not members of it, or for general purposes of charity, and that, as to the alleged abuses, they might, for all that appeared, be remedied by the visitor, who did not refuse to act for himself, although he was willing to concur in all necessary proceedings for introducing such regulations as the court might direct.

tell us what the Commissioners are going to do with Dulwich College, but what they would do with it if they could, their mistake has been attended with this good consequence, that we know beforehand what to expect, should the Commissioners obtain from Parliament such additional powers as are necessary to enable them to take in hand the affairs of the College.

Let us now see what this new scheme is to do with Dulwich College.

In the first place, the existing corporation is to be dissolved, and with it the idea of a College, in the sense in which the word was understood by the founder.

2. The College buildings are to be converted to the uses of a school, in which the masters of it are *not* to reside.

3. The chapel services are to be abolished; and instead, a district church is to be built and endowed at the expense of the charity funds. For all that appears, the boys who are to be boarded in the College to the number of sixty (in the first instance), are to be under no superintendence of any kind. The masters are to reside elsewhere, and to keep boarders themselves; and the warden, a new officer with the old name, a sort of steward, who is to superintend the establishment, keep the accounts, receive rents, &c., is to dwell in a residence provided for him: but where it is not said.

4. The poor brethren and sisters are to be turned out to make room for the boarders, and are to live elsewhere in houses to be provided for them. Their number is to be raised to twenty-four, if the circumstances of the charity permit; but they also may be reduced to *any lower number*. The rule laid down by the founder in the first selection of the poor men and women—that they shall be such as have *longest* received alms from their respective parishes—is reversed in the new scheme; they are not to be eligible if, within three years preceding, they have been in receipt of parochial relief. It is proposed also, that in lieu of the ‘thirty members,’ there shall be sixteen, *or any less number*, of out-pensioners.

5. The governing body of the College is to consist of a president and fifteen governors; of whom ten are to have the sole qualifications of being, in the judgment of the Charity Commissioners, ‘fit and proper persons,’ and of residing within twenty (!) miles of Dulwich. The remaining five are to be the incumbent of the proposed district church, and ‘four fit and proper persons’ elected by the vestry of each of the four parishes of S. Saviour, S. Luke, S. Botolph Bishopsgate, and Camberwell.

6. There are to be two schools, an upper and a lower: the former with a head and under master, and, if need be, assistant

masters and teachers; and the latter with a master, and, if need be, assistant teachers. The upper or 'classical school' to be located in the present College buildings, which are to be altered or added to for that purpose, is to consist of boarders, day-scholars, who may be partially boarded, and, 'when the circumstances of the charity permit,' of foundation scholars. The foundation scholars of the upper school are to be chosen for merit and good conduct from the day-scholars or boarders attending the upper or lower school, without any regard to the qualifications designed by the founder;¹ they are to wear a distinguishing dress, and to be clothed, maintained, and educated at the entire expense of the charity.

There are to be a certain number of exhibitions or scholarships (not exceeding eight) of £100 per annum each, open to the competition of all the boys at the upper school indiscriminately; but only two of them to be awarded in any one year. Each exhibition to be tenable for four years, or any less period: provided that the holder shall continue during his tenure to be a resident member of some one of the English Universities, or a *bonâ fide* student of some one of the learned or scientific professions, or of the Fine Arts.

The lower or grammar-school is to consist of foundation scholars (not exceeding sixty in number at any one time) and day-scholars, who may be partially boarded.

The foundation scholars are to be 'the children of deserving parents of the industrial or poorer classes resident in any one of the four parishes, one-fourth of the whole number being 'always elected from each parish.' These foundation scholars of the lower-school are to be clothed, maintained, and educated at the expense of the charity. Twelve or any less number of exhibitions or scholarships of £40 a-year each, tenable for four years, may be awarded by competition 'for the benefit or support' of foundation or day-scholars in the lower school.

Now, looking at the charitable and educational provisions of this scheme, we are not so much disposed to quarrel with the thing proposed to be done, so far as it goes, as with the proposed mode of doing it. The number of poor brethren and sisters and poor scholars might very well be doubled under the present circumstances of the College,—the College school, large as it was intended by the founder to be, might still be considerably enlarged, and the grammar-school (which has an

¹ It will have been noticed that, although it was the general intention of the founder that the scholars of the corporation were to be selected on the ground of poverty, yet his primary idea was that they were to be 'orphans without father or mother.' It seems to us that this circumstance puts it in the power of the assistants to recommend for nomination to the poor scholarships orphan children of any rank in life, if they are badly provided for.

endowment of its own) improved. But admitting the desirableness of these objects, one does not see any natural or necessary connexion between the accomplishment of them, and the dissolution of the existing corporation. It is, of course, nothing to the purpose to say that there are parts of the scheme which the existing corporation, bound as they are by their charter and statutes, cannot carry into effect; since the immediate question is, not whether the corporation can legally carry the Commissioners' scheme into operation, but whether, supposing the necessary powers were supplied to either the one or the other, the purposes of the scheme could not be accomplished by the corporation more simply, more efficiently, and more in accordance with the mind of the founder, than they could by the new governing body which the Commissioners propose to substitute.

In the first place, then, is the existing government of the College so defective in its plan,—does it present so many openings for abuse and mismanagement,—is it so unsuited to the working of that part of the Commissioners' scheme which relates to education, as to shut the door against any middle course, and make its entire reconstruction a matter of necessity? On the contrary, we believe that the existing form of the government of the College is of that very kind which experience has demonstrated to be the most efficient, and the most easily checked in any tendency towards abuse and mismanagement. The College, it will be remembered, is now placed under the ultimate responsibility of a single head, in the person of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The master governs by the statutes, and in ordinary matters, not statutory, by the votes of the other members of the College. All the proceedings of the corporation are under the *surveillance* of the assistants, who, besides, have to some extent a voice in the government of the College, particularly with respect to the disposal of its funds; and, above these, the ultimate responsibility for the whole management is vested in the archbishop, who, as visitor, is chargeable with every abuse, every neglect of duty, which he has not taken the necessary proceedings to correct. It does not seem to us easy to imagine any scheme offering fewer facilities for corruption and abuse, or greater facility, if not for correcting abuses, at least for laying the public finger on the parties in fault. And will anyone be bold enough to affirm that management by a large, unpaid committee, possesses these characteristics? Is not the reverse invariably true of such bodies?

But then, it may be retorted,—if the system you advocate be so good, why has it not worked better? Why? Simply

because it has not been worked at all; at any rate, for years past. From the days of Archbishop Wake down to the days in which we live, the successive archbishops of Canterbury have neglected their duties, and, for all that appears, seem to have almost forgotten the very existence of Dulwich College. To the credit of the present archbishop, it must be said that he has roused himself from this lethargy, and, having taken the initiative, we trust that his efforts will not cease until the affairs of the College shall have undergone a thorough revision; but during the long period we have mentioned, that is, for more than a century, interference on the part of the visitors seems never to have been thought of. Coming down to more recent times, we find, indeed, the record of some communication between the College and the visitor; but it is not much to the credit of the latter. The Commissioners of Charities, in their Report for 1835-6, state that 'they were informed by the late Master John Allen, that when he became warden in 1811, he communicated to the visitor his desire to make the school as efficient as possible, and that the visitor intimated to him in return that the school had engaged much of his own attention; but he found so many obstacles to any alteration in the course so long pursued, that he recommended the College to go on as they were then doing, and to qualify the boys for becoming respectable tradesmen.' If nothing was done at that time to render the school more efficient, it is clear enough on whose shoulders the blame rested.

And compare the position of the archbishop in the present system with that which the Charity Commissioners propose to assign to his Grace in the new governing body. We are still to have the archbishop as a sort of head to the College; but then, he is to be a head without individual responsibility. An archbishop as visitor of a College, vested with large powers, and ultimately responsible for its well-being, and an archbishop as chairman, merely, of a committee of fifteen governors, are not quite the same thing. In the latter capacity, can the public hook ever lay hold of him? He is one only of sixteen, and may be outvoted and obliged to agree to that which he disapproves of, in every case that comes before them; and, besides, is it likely that his Grace will feel the duty of presiding frequently over so numerous a body of 'fit and proper persons' to be a very pressing one?

But, secondly, is the staff at the disposal of the College for educational purposes insufficient for the working of such a scheme as the Commissioners propose? That cannot be said. The permanent staff contemplated by the Commissioners is precisely the same as that already possessed by the College, viz. one head master and one under master for the College school

ers in the College, and that solely with reference to the of instruction proposed by the Charity Commissioners ; will be remembered that Alleyn designed the College to be *an industrial* as well as a *classical* one. Four of *nters, alias* junior fellows, were, as we have seen, to give tion daily to a certain number of the poor scholars *licraft* trades, or manufactures of the better sort. Let r consider what is really involved in this idea of the

notion, of men being at once choristers in the chapel chers of handicrafts in the school, sounds, we admit, droll to modern ears ; but in Alleyn's days, the incon- of the occupations would not have occurred to any one.' deed, that there is any real incongruity. Everybody that Sir Thomas More, when he was Lord High Chan- of England, used to put on a surplice, and 'sing his part quire,' in the parish church of Chelsea ; and even now it ct that choral service is maintained in some churches r by amateurs of all ranks and pursuits. But passing t us confine ourselves to the educational employments of r chanters. Now, it must be borne in mind that the r wrote in the language and with the ideas of his time, all manufactures were termed trades, and when *there manufacture which was not handicraft*. Everything was ; time produced by *hand labour*. When, therefore, he d that the scholars should be taught, and afterwards 'put ; to good and sweet trades and occupations,' and among mples he gave, mentioned one at least which requires rable knowledge of design, he certainly did not mean ey were merely to be 'qualified to become respectable en' in the sense in which the words were employed by

(termed by the Commissioners the upper school); and one master (maintained by a separate endowment) for the grammar school, which the Commissioners propose to convert into the lower College school.

We wish, then, to know on what ground, so far as education is concerned, it is proposed to supersede the corporation of Dulwich College. Is there a single advantage to be gained by the substitution of a miscellaneous body of nondescript governors for the present authorities? On the contrary, does not experience warrant our believing that such a change would sooner or later prove the very reverse of beneficial? Or is there anything in the educational scheme of the Commissioners which the corporation itself, supposing they agreed to it and had the necessary powers, could not carry into effect? Nothing whatever that we can discover. By the statutes of the College, the corporation is bound to conduct its classical school on the model of Westminster. Can they do so? If they can,—and what is to hinder them if they choose?—what appreciable object should we gain by dismissing one staff of teachers, and setting up another precisely similar to it? The enlargement of the school is quite another question. Even admitting that the powers of the corporation are defective on that head, does it follow therefore that the corporation ought to be dissolved? No, truly. Just as well might we argue, that because the Commissioners of Charities have no power at all to meddle with Dulwich College, they therefore ought never to have any. If the necessary powers are wanting on both sides, the question is simply, whether the objects in view will be best accomplished by supplying what is deficient in the powers of the corporation, or by abolishing the corporation, and placing the necessary powers in the hands of the proposed new governing body. We do not believe, however, that the powers of the corporation are so deficient as they are supposed to be. What is to prevent them, if they choose, from increasing the pupils in the College school to the statutory number of eighty, the foundation scholars included. The founder considered it to be for the interest of the College that it should have such a school; and he accordingly made provisions for it by his statutes. One of those provisions was, that any number of the sixty-eight *non-foundation* scholars might be boarded in the College; and if the corporation chooses, it may make arrangements for boarding the whole of them, and so exceed the number proposed to be boarded by the scheme of the Charity Commissioners. Or if the corporation thought that the whole number of *non-foundation* pupils in the school might be doubled or trebled with advantage, would the visitor find any difficulty in obtaining power (if he needed it) to authorize such an increase?

The question of increasing the number of foundation scholars is a distinct one; but the solution of it does not appear to us to present any insurmountable difficulties. The power which originally created that section of the corporation still exists, and can mould it into any other shape.

There is, however, another view of the matter, which must be taken. Hitherto we have spoken only of the existing staff of educators in the College, and that solely with reference to the scheme of instruction proposed by the Charity Commissioners; but it will be remembered that Alleyn designed the College school to be an *industrial* as well as a *classical* one. Four of the chanters, *alias* junior fellows, were, as we have seen, to give instruction daily to a certain number of the poor scholars in handicraft trades, or manufactures of the better sort. Let us now consider what is really involved in this idea of the founder.

The notion, of men being at once choristers in the chapel and teachers of handicrafts in the school, sounds, we admit, rather droll to modern ears; but in Alleyn's days, the incongruity of the occupations would not have occurred to any one.¹ Not, indeed, that there is any real incongruity. Everybody knows that Sir Thomas More, when he was Lord High Chancellor of England, used to put on a surplice, and 'sing his part in the quire,' in the parish church of Chelsea; and even now it is a fact that choral service is maintained in some churches entirely by amateurs of all ranks and pursuits. But passing this, let us confine ourselves to the educational employments of the four chanters. Now, it must be borne in mind that the founder wrote in the language and with the ideas of his time, when all manufactures were termed trades, and when *there was no manufacture which was not handicraft*. Everything was at that time produced by *hand labour*. When, therefore, he directed that the scholars should be taught, and afterwards 'put and set to good and sweet trades and occupations,' and among the examples he gave, mentioned one at least which requires considerable knowledge of design, he certainly did not mean that they were merely to be 'qualified to become respectable tradesmen' in the sense in which the words were employed by the Archbishop in 1811, and in which we still use them. Undoubtedly he says that they were to be taught handicraft trades; but then, all handicraft pursuits, from painting and sculpture down to shoemaking, were trades in his days. We conceive,

¹ At the time Alleyn lived, music, especially vocal music, was universally cultivated. Mr. P. Collier mentions the well-known fact, that a gittern or a lute was invariably to be found in barbers' shops, in order that their customers might amuse themselves while waiting their turn for the barber's services.

therefore, that his intentions are to be taken in a larger sense than his words, interpreted by the modern use of them, seem to convey. It is not likely that there was in his mind any such hiatus, as there is in ours, between the notion of one scholar being sent to the University and another becoming a shoemaker. All the scholars, it must be remembered, were to be well educated, whether they went to the University or not; and as such an education as he provided, even for those who were judged unfit for the Universities, was not common at that time, except among persons of rank, or among those who were intended for the learned professions, we can hardly imagine his having contemplated for a moment that the poor boys should be elevated out of their sphere, educated, and then thrown back into a grade of society in which the education they had received would prove rather a curse than a blessing to them. It is more probable that he intended merely, in a general way, to signify that the scholars who had not ability enough to warrant their being sent to the University, were to apply themselves to manufactures, as far as might be, of the better sort; and his mention of embroidery (a favourite amusement of ladies of rank at that time), along with the crafts of the glover, the shoemaker, and tailor, as examples of the kind of trades which the scholars were to have, is strongly confirmatory of this. Embroidery is a species of painting, and even in its lower forms depends more on artistic design than on handicraft skill; and if it be remembered that the dresses, gloves, and shoes of the higher orders in the earlier part of the seventeenth century were elaborately ornamented, and far more costly than they are now, there will appear to be good reason for supposing that Alleyn more especially intended that the poor scholars should belong to that middle class of artist-workmen which existed in his time, and ranged between the artist and the mere mechanic, and which the substitution of machinery for hand labour has gradually, since then, almost entirely obliterated. And if the sort of instruction which he provided for had been given continuously from the commencement of the College, and had kept pace, and had been developed in accordance, with the varying circumstances, the requirements and progress of industry, no very great disparity would have existed by this time between the studies and pursuits of those scholars who were to be sent to the University, and of those who were to apply themselves to manufactures. Supposing Alleyn to reappear among us, and be made aware of the altered condition of manufactures, would he still say, 'Let those boys who are unfit for the University be put out apprentices to shoemakers, glovers, or tailors.' We cannot believe it. 'My object,' he would say, 'was that, in

'conformity with the superior education they were to receive, they should devote themselves to manufactures of the better sort; but the condition of that kind of industry which I had in view is now entirely changed. My object, therefore, must be accomplished by different means; and, looking at the present state of things, I should now say, let them be instructed in the scientific and artistic elements on which excellence of manufacture depends: instead of specific handicrafts, let them be taught generally the application of science and art to industry.' If the 'Department of Science and Art' had existed in Alleyn's days, is it not extremely probable that his alternative for the poor scholars would have been, either to go to the University, or to be sent to the schools of that department with a view to their becoming intelligent manufacturers, overseers of works, designers, engineers, artist-workmen, and the like; or, at the least, that he would have pointed out those schools as the models for the industrial section of the College school, just as he made Westminster and S. Paul's schools the models for the classical section of it?

It will be seen, then, that the endeavour we made to establish the legality of the founder's provisions respecting the chanter or junior fellows was not without an object. We recognised in those provisions, so far as the school was concerned, not only the germ of an important branch of education, but the means of developing it; and hence it became of consequence to show that it was in the power of the College itself, by means ready prepared to its hand, to promote a kind of instruction, the value of which, and its consistency with the general scheme of the founder, will not be questioned even by those who may take a lower estimate of his specific intentions in this particular than we do. Dulwich College has, we conceive, within it the elements of a great classical, scientific, and artistic, and, we will add, religious school; and if the visitor and the corporation itself have a mind, and will lay their shoulders to the wheel, they have it in power, with comparatively little aid from the Court of Chancery or the Crown, to make it not only take its place in the foremost rank of our public schools, but, as the 'Times' desires, 'become, in conformity with the character of the founder, the seat of an education somewhat more practical and religious than our public schools supply.'

Only two other points remain to be noticed. The Charity Commissioners propose to abolish the College chapel, and build in lieu of it a church, to which a district for spiritual purposes is to be assigned. Now, it will have been seen from the deed of consecration that the chapel is already a parochial one, and, saving the rights of the parish church of Camberwell, was con-

secrated for all spiritual purposes, for the use of the College and of the inhabitants who were then residing, or should for all time to come reside, in the hamlet of Dulwich. So far, then, as the inhabitants of that part of the Dulwich estates are concerned, the proposal of the Commissioners may be said to be in accordance with the founder's intention. But is that the case with respect to the College itself? Surely not. He did not, like the Commissioners, look on religious education as mere 'religious instruction in conformity with the doctrines of the Church of England.' He provided for that, and made the archbishop or his assessor the judge of the scholars' proficiency in that kind of teaching; but he also provided for more, viz. their religious training. Their heads were not to be *crammed* merely with doctrines—they were also to undergo a religious and æsthetic training by daily participation in the services of the Church, conducted after the best models, and by being placed under the constant supervision and guidance of its ministers. Nothing, indeed, is more marked than the founder's solicitude for the moral and religious welfare of every inmate of the College: and that he considered the services of the chapel a main instrument towards that end cannot be doubted. He obviously desired that those services should be attractive in themselves, and interesting to those who attended them. While he provided that the solemnity of Divine service should be enhanced by the best aids of music, he also sought to induce all the inmates of the College to qualify themselves to take part in the musical performance of it.

And then let it be considered how the poor brethren and sisters would fare under the scheme of the Commissioners. The infirm among them, the decrepit, the aged, those unable to move about, would be deprived of the privilege they now enjoy—perhaps the chief solace of their waning years—from inability to resort to the proposed district church. It is one thing to hobble or be wheeled along through the corridors of the College to the chapel on any day of the week when they may be able to attend, and quite another to have to travel perhaps a quarter of a mile to a church, the doors of which may be closed to them except on Sundays.

But it is doubtful whether the proposal of the Commissioners, even were it entertained by the College itself, could be now, at least, carried into effect. No district can be constituted, under the present Act of Parliament, containing within its limits any *consecrated church or chapel* in use for the purposes of Divine worship; and it is uncertain, besides, whether the whole number of inhabitants in Dulwich and its immediate neighbourhood comes up at present to the *minimum* required

by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners as a condition of their entertaining any application for a district. Still, even admitting that the ecclesiastical *status* of Dulwich is an anomalous one, and places the clergy of the College in a somewhat unfair position, we do not believe that the time has come for any further change than might be made through the intervention of the visitor and the bishop of the diocese, by some understanding with the incumbent of Camberwell. If the College were to emerge from its obscure inactivity, and develop itself into a large and important school for literature, and for science and art in their relation to industry, a necessity would arise for adding to the present College buildings, and for reconstructing the chapel on a larger scale. In that case, a fair opening would occur for defining the extra-collegiate duties of the College clergy; and it might then be determined whether their ministry should be confined to the College itself, or extended over the hamlet and its neighbourhood by the legal assignment of a district for spiritual purposes.

The other point remaining to be noticed is amusing. It is seldom that people are able to get up a good grievance—one, at least, which everybody can appreciate and sympathise with; but we think that the Royal Academy has really a strong case against the Charity Commissioners. We had always believed that 'feeding the hungry' was one of the works of charity; but this, it would seem, is not the opinion of the Commissioners for Charities. It is all very well for individuals to feed the hungry; but with Commissioners it is quite another affair; and so they propose to do the very reverse, and to close the doors of Dulwich College against the Royal Academicians, and deprive them of their accustomed feast on their patron S. Luke's day. The case is this: Sir Francis Bourgeois, who was a Royal Academician, in bequeathing his pictures to Dulwich, either directed, or intended to direct, that the President and Academicians of the Royal Academy should be invested with power of ascertaining from time to time that his collection of pictures, &c., was properly cared for, and that for this purpose they should be requested to visit the collection once in every year, on S. Luke's day, and give their opinion as to the state and preservation of the pictures. Though a Frenchman or a Swiss, Sir Francis entertained the very English notion that business is best discussed over a dinner; so he wished that the Academicians should dine together in the gallery on the occasion of their visit to the College. No provision, however, was made for the fulfilment of his hospitable intentions until the death of his executrix Madame Noel Desenfans, who by her will left to the

College a sum of money and other things for the purpose. After reciting the intentions of 'her late dear friend, Sir Peter Francis Bourgeois,' (to whom, by the way, the pictures had been bequeathed by her late husband,) she proceeds to say, that, highly approving as she did of this annual visitation of the Academy, 'she gave and bequeathed the sum of 500*l.* to the 'master and fellows of the College *upon trust*, to lay out and 'invest the same in Government or real securities at interest, 'and apply the interest to arise therefrom *for ever* towards the 'entertainment of the President and Academicians of the Royal 'Academy on their annual visit to Dulwich College; and in 'order that the said annual dinner and entertainment might be 'properly and suitably given, she bequeathed the following 'articles to the master and fellows of the College, which she 'directed should be preserved by them, and *never be used on any 'other occasion or for any other purpose whatsoever.*' Then follows a list of upwards of a hundred articles of silver-plate and other things of less value.

This annual visitation and dinner is the pet enjoyment of the Royal Academicians. It is their own; they have a right to it. Their tenure of the rooms in Trafalgar Square was always disputed by the late Joseph Hume, and is still reckoned questionable by others; some even go the length of saying that it is doubtful whether the funds of the Academy are its exclusive property; but here was an affair entirely its own:—Dulwich was to the Academicians what Greenwich is to Her Majesty's Ministers, and the Star and Garter at Richmond to City Corporations. But, alas, for the perpetuity of artistic felicity! alas, for this green spot in Academic existence! the Charity Commissioners are going to plough it up. The fifteen 'fit and proper persons' are to pack up the Dulwich pictures and send them elsewhere. With the approbation of the Charity Commissioners, they are to 'make provision for the deposit, custody, 'and exhibition of the pictures, either in connexion with the 'National Gallery or elsewhere;' but they are not going to make any provision for the Academic dinner. And what is to become of the hundred and six articles of silver-plate 'with the arms and crest of M. J. Noel Desenfans engraved thereon,' which the corporation was to preserve in trust for ever for the sole use of the Academic body?

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the foregoing was in type, the Commissioners for Charities have issued a second scheme 'for the application and management' of Dulwich College; or, to speak more accurately, they have, within the last few days, put forth the scheme of which the former document professed only to give the heads. So far as education and charity are concerned, the provisions of the scheme remain much as they were; but, in other respects, the Commissioners have introduced considerable modifications.

In the first place, the charity is no longer to be called the 'College of God's Gift,' but 'Alleyn's College in Dulwich.'

Secondly, the Archbishop is not to be President of the Governors, but Visitor of the College, as heretofore.

Thirdly, the Governors are to be twelve in number, instead of fifteen. Four of them are to be called 'Elective Governors,' and are to be chosen respectively by the vestries of the four parishes of S. Saviour, S. Luke, S. Botolph, and S. Giles, Camberwell. The remaining eight are to be appointed by the Court of Chancery in the first instance, but afterwards, subject to the approval of the Charity Commissioners, they are to be *self-elected*.

Fourthly, the Head Master of the Upper School is to be styled the 'Master of Alleyn's College,' and to have the general superintendence and control of the Charity and its establishment, subject to the direction of the Governors, to whom he is to be responsible for its conduct.

Fifthly, there is to be a Chaplain to the College, who is to perform Divine service in the chapel to be attached to it, and who, if an ecclesiastical district comprising the hamlet of Dulwich be created, may become the incumbent of it, subject and without prejudice to the performance of his College duties. Until the appointment of such Chaplain, the present first and other fellows of the College are to continue as heretofore to perform, or provide for the performance of Divine service, either in the present chapel of the College, or in some other building appointed by the Governors; and to discharge the other spiritual duties heretofore discharged by them; but they are to be exempted from residence in the College, and may marry.

Sixthly, 'A suitable chapel, in a convenient situation for the objects and purpose of the Charity, may be erected and fitted up by the Governors, upon a plan to be approved by the Visitor of the College, for the performance of Divine service, according to the rites and ordinances of the Church of England; and

‘suitable accommodation shall be provided in such chapel for the
 ‘Governors and the Masters and boys of both schools, and for
 ‘the establishment and servants of the College, and for the alms-
 ‘people, and for all other persons belonging or attached to the
 ‘Charity; and, in the construction of the chapel, arrangements
 ‘shall be made for affording to the inhabitants of the hamlet of
 ‘Dulwich an equal extent of accommodation to that heretofore
 ‘enjoyed by them in the present chapel of the College; having
 ‘regard also to the probable increase of population in the hamlet.’
 And the present chapel, until some other be erected, is to be
 used, as far as practicable, for these purposes; the Governors
 reserving the right to require pew-rent from persons not belong-
 ing to the establishment.

And, lastly, the officer termed ‘Warden,’ in the former
 document issued by the Commissioners, is now to be called
 ‘Receiver and Clerk;’ his duties being to manage the accounts,
 receive rents, &c.

These modifications of the original scheme of the Commis-
 sioners, while they evince the justness of the strictures we have
 passed upon several of its provisions, leave our general argument
 where it was. We still cannot regard the proposed scheme for
 the government of the charity as any improvement on the
 existing one, but the contrary. We still do not understand
 why the present corporation cannot do all that the Commis-
 sioners propose. The modifications introduced into the new
 scheme, so far as they go, are seeming approximations to the
 plan of the founder; and very possibly they were intended to
 have an air of respect to his intentions; but the approximation
 is only in appearance. Although the Archbishop is restored to
 his office of Visitor, ‘with the same authorities, rights, and
 privileges as heretofore,’ yet it is only ‘so far as the same shall
 not be inconsistent with the new scheme;’ a qualifying clause
 which, it is obvious, lops off the whole of his visitatorial powers,
 excepting those which relate to the enforcement of ecclesiastical
 laws (for which his special interference is not required), and to
 the general religious welfare of the institution. As to the
 management of the schools, and the other purposes of the
 charity, unless some ecclesiastical law might happen to be
 involved, it does not seem that his Grace would ever have any
 power to interfere; at all events, his interference would be
 unnecessary; and, indeed, the proposed new Governors con-
 template so small an amount of supervision on the part of the
 Archbishop, even where the offices of religion are concerned,
 that they are to take upon themselves to determine on what
 days and times, besides Sundays, Divine service shall be per-
 formed in the chapel. Perhaps, in this case, the Commissioners

abstained from inserting the clause, 'with the consent of the Visitor,' from a shrewd suspicion that his Grace could only in such a matter refer them to the Act of Uniformity for their guidance. But it is useless to disguise the case:—the Archbishop would have no real power whatever under the proposed scheme. The governing body is to be entirely independent of the Visitor: they are not to be accountable to him; so that, unless we suppose his Grace to act as a kind of inspector on behalf of the twelve 'fit and proper persons,' there does not seem to be anything left for the Archbishop to do,—at least there is nothing which might not and would not be done by the Bishop of the diocese in the ordinary exercise of his Episcopal functions.

With respect to the proposed governing body, there is one provision in the new scheme which deserves particular notice; not, indeed, because there is anything new or unusual in it. Far from it. Nothing, unfortunately, is more usual, in the appointment of large committees of management, than to anticipate and provide for the invariable fact, that one-half, at the least, of the members of such bodies never attend meetings at all, or only at rare intervals; and that, in the long run, the management virtually comes into the hands of a small minority. It never seems to occur to any one, that, if this be true—and nobody denies it—large committees of management are not desirable things; and that, if we are to have such managing bodies at all, they ought to consist of the smallest possible number of persons, whose attendance should all but be compulsory. This, however, is a point of 'administrative reform' which we have not yet reached. Large bodies of governors are reckoned, as yet, among the 'time-honoured institutions' of the country; they cannot be got rid of. Though we know perfectly well beforehand that a large proportion of the members of such bodies will never earnestly and heartily give themselves to the business to be transacted, we appoint them all the same, and content ourselves with laying down a rule that, if any one neglects his duties for a year or two, he shall be compelled to resign his office. Though we are perfectly certain that the management undertaken by a large body will virtually fall into the hands of a minority of its members, the utmost we do is to provide that the minority shall not descend below a certain number. There is, we confess, something to us inexpressibly ludicrous in the estimate which the Commissioners of Charities have gravely and coolly formed of the working of the large body of governors under whose management they propose to place Dulwich College. Experience, no doubt, guided them, when they anticipated that there would be Governors who, for *two*

whole years, would neglect the trust confided to them, and that *five* might be regarded as a reasonably good attendance out of a body of twelve; but surely the same experience might have led them to conclude that if they were to reduce the body of Governors to one-half the proposed number, and make the *quorum* a majority instead of a minority of the whole body, the business committed to it would be all the better transacted.

With reference, however, to the immediate purpose of these remarks, there is another point in which experience may afford us some insight into the probable working of the proposed new governing body. So far as conscientious motives, sense of propriety, and inclination are concerned, all the governors may be assumed to be on an equal footing; but if some of them, in addition to these general incentives to duty, are impelled besides by a special sense of responsibility for certain interests committed to them, we may be quite sure that, whatever others do, these will not be found wanting. Now, the delegates from the four parishes—the ‘Elective Governors’—will be precisely in this position; and it requires, we think, no great discernment to foretel that in the long-run they will form a majority of the *quorum* of the proposed governing body. There is no objection to this: on the contrary, it is just as it should be; but if so, two questions arise. In the first place, if the real governing body, notwithstanding the formidable array of twelve ‘fit and proper persons,’ will turn out, in the main, to consist only of the four representatives of the parishes, why not frankly and openly at once commit to them the government of the charity? Why not formally concentrate on them the responsibilities of its management? But, secondly, if the probabilities of the case are such as we suppose, is not the scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the government of Dulwich College precisely the same in principle and in effect as if they had abolished the corporation, and transferred the management of the charity to the assistants?

Then with respect to the proposed ‘Master of Alleyn’s College.’ We have here again a seeming approximation to the plan of the founder; but it is only nominal. The master is to have the general superintendence and control of the charity and its establishment, but subject to the authority and direction of the Governors; and there is, besides, an essential difference between the present and the contemplated mastership, of which the importance can hardly be over-estimated. The office of the present master consists solely in seeing that the statutes of the College are duly obeyed. To the performance of that duty he can be compelled, both by the assistants and the visitor; and if, in the performance of it, he meets with opposition, he can resort

to them for assistance. But he himself undertakes none of those special duties over the exercise of which his supervision extends.

The proposed 'master,' on the other hand, is to be Head Master of the Upper School,—that is to say, he is *to superintend on the part of the Governors*, the performance of duties, the chief part of which are to be done by himself. Can a man, placed in such a position, be expected to furnish to the Governors a very impartial account of the state of the school? Would he ever, under any circumstances, report unfavourably of his own teaching? He is at the best but a witness in his own cause; and we all know what the value of such testimony would be, if for any, or no reason, the governors had lost confidence in his management. The Governors, it is true, might satisfy themselves as to the state of the school by the employment of inspectors: granted. But does not the admission of the necessity of such an expedient only the more forcibly evince the wise simplicity of the founder's scheme, which already possesses, in several forms, this check on efficiency?

ART. IV.—*A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination.* By J. B. MOZLEY, B.D., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street. 1855.

'THE design of this treatise is to give an account of S. Augustine's doctrine of Predestination, together with such comments as may be necessary for a due examination of and judgment upon it.'

Such are the words in which its author commences a work which will be admitted by every competent reader to exhibit very remarkable powers. It is a work of no pretence or assumption, yet there is abundant evidence, in almost every page, that it has formed the careful labour of years. To give our readers any adequate idea of the subjects discussed, or the ground traversed in it, would require a volume of itself, and will therefore greatly exceed both our space and our ability. Almost identical in title with the ponderous folio of Jansen, though entirely free from his occasional Supralapsarian tendencies, it discusses several of the more important historical and doctrinal subjects contained in the work of that learned prelate. Having in his first and second chapters stated and examined the arguments for Predestination, Mr. Mozley's third chapter, like Jansen's first part, is occupied with an historical examination of the Pelagian controversy. His fourth chapter contains, like the Bishop of Ypres' second part, a statement of the doctrine of Original Sin, and of human nature in its fallen state, in relation to which Mr. Mozley, in his four following chapters, like Jansen in his third part, enters at length into S. Augustine's doctrines of Predestination, Grace, and Free-will. The ninth and tenth chapters contain an examination of the doctrines of the Schoolmen, as found in their chief doctor, S. Thomas Aquinas, on Necessity and Predestination; and after a summary of, and judgment on, the systems of S. Augustine and Pelagius, the present writer proceeds in his eleventh or concluding chapter to apply his work in a call to union upon those who, differing on Grace itself, differ also on the Sacrament of Baptism, as the means and instrument of its conveyance.

Mr. Mozley is no advocate for absolute Predestination; on the contrary, it is the object of his work to show that there is no authority for such a doctrine, either in philosophy or revelation; and, in consequence, in so far as S. Augustine does teach it, putting partial or relative for full and perfect truth, we must receive

with caution the writings of the great Western Doctor. Mr. Mozley himself commences his work by laying down the difference between the Predestination of the Predestinarian, and of the Necessitarian or Fatalist. While both agree that men act necessarily, and not by an original motion of the will, the fatalist draws his conclusion merely from philosophy, which teaches him, arguing backwards, that every event must have a cause. He is thus carried back from cause to cause, until he arrives at last at an external cause, by which the agent is moved to act independently of himself, so that to him free-will is proved to be not only false but impossible. The fatal flaw in this argument is, that by making the Divinity the original Source of all things whatever, the Necessitarian must make Him the Source of evil, otherwise he destroys his whole foundation, being compelled to admit that the Divine Omnipotence meets, as Mr. Mozley says, with 'something counter to it, and so cannot be argued upon as if it were the whole of the truth under consideration.' The Predestinarian, on the other hand, concluding from Revelation, and arguing from the great First Cause therein revealed, admits that the first man was created with free-will, and therefore believes its existence possible, though, warned by the Fall, he considers it an endowment no longer existing. S. Augustine and the Jansenists adopt mainly the latter ground, the mediævalist writers mostly the former; each, however, borrowing something from the chief source of the other, and both referring to the fact of the Fall as the ground of the doctrine of Predestination. The result of the Fall is the fact of original sin, which, in the system of S. Augustine, renders necessary to man restoration, not, as at his first creation, a merely conditional grace resting on a will, now overthrown and proved incapable of availing itself of such help, but an absolute and overruling act of Divine power, working in man, its subject, with irresistible might and certainty. From this follows Predestination—follows, that is, as a doctrine, not, of course, as a fact,¹ God necessarily foreseeing from all eternity what He would do. The condition on which He, in His secret counsels, allotted eternal life to those to whom He does allot it, is obedience and holiness, that they may possess which He, in Mr. Mozley's words, 'necessarily resolves to bestow some grace upon them, which will control their wills and insure this result . . . the 'Divine saving act being the bestowal of this irresistible grace.'

'Here, then,' he proceeds, 'it must be observed, is the real essence and substance of the doctrine of Predestination. Predestinarians do not differ from their opponents in the idea of eternal Divine decrees, which, though popularly connected with this system more than with others, belongs, in truth,

¹ Mozley, pp. 9, 12.

to all theological systems alike. For the believer in free-will, who only admits an assisting grace of God, and not a controlling one, must still believe that God determined to give that assisting grace, in whatsoever instances He does give it, from all eternity. Nor do they differ from their opponents in the ground or reason of God's final judgment, and dispensing of reward and punishment; for this takes place in both schemes wholly upon the moral ground of the individual's good or bad character. But the difference between the Predestinarians and their opponents is as to that act which is the subject-matter of the Divine decree, and as to the mode in which this difference of moral character is produced—that is to say, the two schools differ as to the nature, quality, and power of Divine grace under the Gospel; one school maintaining that that grace is only assisting grace, depending on the human will for its use and improvement; the other that it is irresistible grace. To the former school belong those who hold one interpretation of the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration; who maintain the Sacrament of Baptism to be the medium by which the power of living a holy life is imparted to the previously corrupt and impotent soul; which power, however, may be used or neglected according to the individual's own choice.

'The mode in which the doctrine of Predestination is extracted from the doctrine of original sin, being thus shown, it may be added that, by thus reducing as we have done, the former doctrine to its pith and substance, we evidently much widen the Scripture argument for it, extending it at once from those few and scattered passages where the word itself occurs, to a whole field of language. The whole Scripture doctrine of grace is now appealed to as being in substance the doctrine of Predestination, because there is only the Divine foreknowledge to be added to it, in order to make it such.'—P. 8.

If against this view it be urged that to ordain some to eternal life and others to eternal punishment is directly opposed, first, to our idea of justice, which teaches us that no man should suffer for another's sin, and secondly, to our experience, which shows us that we act, not as theoretical Predestination teaches, from compulsion, or an influence irresistible by us, but from choice; to the former objection it must be replied that the truth of original sin—that sin which descends from Adam to us, and makes us in God's secret counsels as verily guilty, and therefore as justly subject to punishment as he was, interposes.¹ And to the second objection, that this doctrine contradicts our experience, 'describing us,' to use Mr. Mozley's words, 'as acting from an irresistible influence, either for good or for evil; whereas we are conscious of will and choice, and feel that we are not forced to act in one way or another;' the Predestinarian replies in Mr. Mozley's statement, that 'it proceeds from a misapprehension as to the nature of this irresistible influence;' and Mr. Mozley concludes that, as far as the truth can be expressed in human language, these terms, which commonly signify an

¹ 'Original sins are therefore called the sins of others (*aliena*), because each derives them from his parents; but they are not without cause called our own also, because in that one parent, as the Apostle says, all sinned.'—S. Aug. de *Corr.* et *Grat.* § 2.

overwhelming power compelling a man to act against his inclination, are here used to express a power inclining the will itself, and not contradictory to an inclination already formed—the agent not being caused by it to act in spite of his will, but being caused to will. (Pages 14, 15.)

Having described the doctrine of Predestination, Mr. Mozley proceeds in his second chapter to the examination of the argument for it.

I. Philosophical Predestination, or Fatalism, stands chiefly on two grounds: first, the necessity (as before said) that every event must have a cause; and secondly, the idea of God as the Cause of all things. Mr. Mozley shows that the whole doctrine so supported is of the class not of absolute or complete, but of partial or indistinct, truths, because to the first premiss is opposed the fact, equally certain, that we have in ourselves the consciousness of our own power of free-will to do or not to do as we please. In like manner the second premiss—that the Divine Power is the cause of all things—is reduced from a perfect to a merely partial truth by the counter facts, first, of the existence of evil, and second, of the sense of free-will in ourselves, already alluded to.

“The two ideas of the Divine Power and free-will are, in short, two great tendencies of thought inherent in our minds, which contradict each other, and can never be united or brought to a common goal; and which, therefore, inasmuch as the essential condition of absolute truth is consistency with other truth, can never, in the present state of our faculties, become absolute truths, but must remain for ever contradictory tendencies of thought, going on side by side, till they are lost sight of and disappear in the haze of our conceptions, like two parallel straight lines which go on to infinity without meeting. While they are sufficiently clear, then, for purposes of practical religion (for we cannot doubt that they are truths so far as and in that mode in which we apprehend them), these are truths upon which we cannot raise definite and absolute systems. All that we build upon either of them must partake of the imperfect nature of the premiss which supports it, and be held under a reserve of consistency with a counter conclusion from the opposite truth . . . I will add, as a natural corollary from this relation of these two ideas, that that alone is a genuine doctrine of free-will which maintains such a free-will in man as is *inconsistent* with our idea of the Divine Power. There is a kind of free-will which is consistent with this idea. All men, whatever be their theory of the motive principle of, admit the *fact* of, the human will; that we act willingly, and not like inanimate machines: nor does the Necessitarian deny that the human will is will, and as far as sensation goes, free, though he represents it as ultimately moved from without. Here, then, is a sort of free-will which is consistent with the idea of the Divine Power. But this, as was above explained, is not such a free-will as meets the demands of natural consciousness, which is satisfied with nothing short of a characteristic of will which comes into collision with our idea of the Divine Power—viz., originality.”—P. 29.

And if it be asserted against the doctrine of free-will, and in favour of an absolute doctrine of predestination, that it would

remove our actions from the control of Divine Providence, and so reduce this whole moral scheme of things to chance; or again, that God is the Author of all good, from which it will follow that man derives all goodness from a source beyond himself, the result of which is a grace that is irresistible, and, with this, Predestination; Mr. Mozley replies to the former—and here, of course, he entirely differs from the Supralapsarian—that whatever contradiction to reason it may be to admit a Divine foresight and prearrangement of events merely contingent, in that both facts are true in themselves, although we cannot solve the manner of their coexistence, we must be content to take them as they are, leaving the difficulty where we find it; and for the latter, the fact of God being the Author of all good, is only a relative, and so an imperfect or partial truth; for we are conscious in ourselves, on the other hand, of possessing the power not only of doing but also of originating actions good in themselves.

II. So too with Theological Predestination. The maintainer of this doctrine has been shown to deduce it from the fact of original sin—the result of the fall; but in order to do this in his manner, viz. to teach it not as a partial but as an absolute truth, he must carry his opinion of the result to us of the fall much further than either Holy Scripture or our own experience and self-knowledge will allow—he must represent man to be so utterly and universally ruined by it, as to have no power to do any one good thing whatever, and to be capable of recovery only by an act of irresistible grace; whereas we have in ourselves the knowledge and feeling of a counter truth—that, namely, of being able to do good and avoid evil, which, as Mr. Mozley says, ‘so far as it goes, contradicts the doctrine of the fall.’

‘The doctrine of the fall,’ he continues, ‘is held under a reserve on the side of the contrary truth; the doctrine of irresistible grace, then, must be held with the same reserve. So far as man is fallen he wants this grace; but so far as he is not fallen he does not want it. One inference, then, from one part of the whole premiss, lies under the liability to be contradicted by another from another part; and the legitimate issue is no whole or perfect conclusion, but only a conditional and imperfect one.’

‘The Predestinarian, however, neglects this distinction, and upon an imperfect basis raises a definite and complete doctrine. Or, which is the same thing, he does not see that the basis is imperfect; he does not consent to holding the doctrine of the fall with this reserve, but imagines he has in this doctrine a complete truth, and he proceeds to use it as he would any ordinary premiss of reason or experience, and founds a perfect argumentative structure upon it.’—P. 33.

It is clear, then, that on the state of man after the fall will eventually turn the whole question. If he be as utterly ruined by it as is represented by the Predestinarian, nothing short of irresistible grace can recover him; but if he have any portion of

his original uprightness left, a grace which would assist and cooperate with it might be sufficient. Certainly there are two sides of this question revealed to us in Holy Scripture, and two separate lines of truth in consequence therein laid down. On the one hand our blessed Lord spoke—and not of necessity prophetically of Christians after Pentecost—of those who ‘in an honest and good heart bring forth fruit,’ and ‘of the just who need no repentance.’ On the other hand, S. Paul’s language in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans is as strong as it could well have been had he intended to teach in terms, that in no degree could any good act be performed by man not under grace. Still we understand his words of course with a limit, such as enables us to harmonize them with other portions of Scripture, *e. g.* the Dominical declarations above alluded to, and others like them.

And as the doctrine of original sin itself is a partial truth, so is that of the justice of our punishment for it, by which Predestination is defended. It is both just and, as it were, beyond justice, and each is true, though neither is the whole truth. Is it necessary to justice that God should act only in one manner to His creatures, and must that of necessity be on the side of favour? If a son be permitted to inherit good from his father, which he has not earned by his own labour, shall he not also inherit evil? On the other hand, how can the punishment of one for the sin of another, over which he neither had nor could have any control whatever, be reconciled with justice? Nor can the law which, sometimes at least, applies to inherited punishments under the second commandment, apply in this case. A son may be, and often is, punished for the sin of his father by some Divine act or arrangement, which may indeed be a punishment and a most sharp one to the parent, *i. e.* to the sin in his mind, yet be no punishment in itself or to the subject of it; perhaps even it may be a great blessing. Or he may be visited with some infliction of Divine displeasure, which is a real and undoubted punishment both in itself and to him, but which his probationary state may enable him to convert into a final reward. Yet in neither case can it be said that he is not punished. In the former, he will feel the punishment, not indeed in itself but in its effects; in the latter, he will feel it in itself. But the punishment of eternal death for the sin of Adam, considered in itself, is not of this kind; it is both a present punishment and a future; it is to this world and also to eternity; and it is, as far as the subject of it can act, immutable—he cannot convert it into a blessing hereafter. But there is, of God’s mercy, a counter truth to this arrangement of His justice. If we are warned in Scripture, on the one hand, that ‘in Adam all die,’

we are taught as clearly, on the other, that 'in Christ shall all be made alive.' If we are treated therein as creatures under an original sentence of condemnation, it is balanced by the revelation of an actual state of grace.

'If it is a truth of revelation,' says Mr. Mozley, 'that all men deserve eternal punishment in consequence of the sin of Adam, it is a truth of our moral nature equally certain, that no man deserves punishment except for his own personal sin. And the one is declared in revelation itself as plainly as the other; for it is said, "The soul that sinneth it shall die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son—the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." It is a truth, then, of reason and Scripture alike, that no man is responsible for another's sin; and so far as this is true at all, it is universally true, applying as much to the case of Adam's sin as to that of any other man. . . . The premiss, then, on which we proceed in this question is a divided one; and if the Predestinarian from one part of it concludes the justice of his doctrine, his opponent can from the other conclude the contrary. If the mystery of our responsibility for the sin of Adam justifies his scheme, the truth of our exclusive responsibility for our own sins condemns it.—P. 36.

Original sin and its punishment and correlative fact, death—
 death even to the best and most innocent—are, after all, facts which we cannot escape. God's justice, if we may so speak, is as much above us as His knowledge. We are punished for our fathers' sins, and are under or may pass under God's judgments, and feel ourselves to be so, for things which we have not done, and which we would order otherwise if we could. This is the very law of our being, and the only question is, whether we will submit and turn the arrangement to our grace, or rebel and make it our condemnation. Our children are punished for our sins as we are punished for our fathers' sins. This seems to us, perhaps, unjust. But yet, for *what we know*, it may in truth be the very height and perfection of justice. In a circle too vast for our comprehension, a part of the circumference may appear to us a right line, and yet if our eyes were opened to take in the whole figure, we should see that it was in truth a curve; and this the more so as the circle was vast and our vision defective. There can be but one justice—that of God who *is* Justice, and we can have no idea of justice at all otherwise than as it is His. God's justice, therefore, is not against our own; but it is so much above and beyond it, that its very vastness prevents us from seeing the whole—seeing what it really is. And is our simply being unable to comprehend or measure it, to be the determination of its truth—or that which shall change its nature and make it injustice? Faith bids us wait, and revelation tells us that the present medium of sight—the darkened glass—will in the end be removed, and that we shall then see God as He is—as He is in His attributes as well as in His essence; or because some will be lost, and God must foreknow who they will be,

shall we, therefore, who are joint-heirs with His only Son and His own temple, not say, 'Thanks be to Him for His unspeakable gift?'

As Holy Scripture has in truth two sides on the state of man's nature after the fall, so in like manner it has also two sides on the subject of Predestination. One speaks as if the result and the process alike were wholly in the hands of God, and were to be ordered purely as He wills, irrespectively of any other consideration whatever. The other speaks as if it had pleased Him to put the case wholly out of His own hands, and to leave it entirely in ours. Of the former class are such sayings as those in Matt. xxv. 34; Rom. viii. 29, 30; Ephes. i. 4, 5, 11; ii. 10; 1 Pet. 1, 2. Of the latter, Luke x. 28; John iii. 16; Acts x. 35; 1 Tim. ii. 4, 6. S. Paul had evidently no plenary revelation on predestination and free-will, probably because human nature could not comprehend nor human language express it. He simply states, as strongly as possible, that both are truths together, and there leaves them; God's foreknowledge being, like His justice, a truth to be received dutifully, and held firmly, although it be not seen yet, nor be ever fully discovered perhaps in this world. Indeed, a very little reflection will suffice to show that His dealings in this respect are based on the same general law of mercy to us as regulates His other actions. Ignorance is often our happiness. Take the case of probation and trial. If there were no half-discovered law and no hidden future, and we walked by sight instead of faith, how intolerable would be even the lightest calamity or affliction! If we could know beforehand that the result of our probation on earth would certainly be our salvation in heaven, how unendurable would be the probation itself! And as Christianity, by teaching of, and incorporating us into, a God at once revealed and hidden, has made it a fact that the affliction of to-day may be the happiness of to-morrow, the grief of the present life the express joy of the life to come; so, in the mysterious depths of God's omnipotence at once and omniscience, our ignorance in this world may prove our actual knowledge in the next. If, then, moral opposites may thus be true together, the same may also be the case in questions of merely intellectual difficulty. Predestination, then, on the part of God, the result of His foreknowledge, and free-will on that of man, are both clearly revealed as truths, though such as we cannot yet harmonize, and each acts upon the other. Without fearing, then, to derogate from the truth or dignity of Holy Scripture, which is surely strong enough to bear any weight which man can lay upon it, Mr. Mozley may safely say that 'Scripture as a whole makes no assertion, or has no determinate doctrine on the subject.' (Page 39.)

We have thus laid down, in connexion with the teaching of S. Augustine, two ideas opposite to each other of predestination and free-will. It will, therefore, be necessary for us to enter upon the history of the Pelagian controversy—following at once Mr. Mozley's arrangement and the nature of the case—if we would exactly comprehend both the system of doctrine which S. Augustine was called upon to oppose, and that which he constructed in its room. The result of this examination will surely be to show (as Mr. Mozley concludes) that the full and perfect truth lay neither with S. Augustine nor with his opponent; that if it were the heresy of Pelagius and his followers to insist too exclusively on, and greatly exaggerate, the line of truth which insists upon the power of the will, S. Augustine, on the other, cannot be wholly acquitted of having relied too entirely, and pushed too much to its naked and merely logical conclusion, the opposite system of predestination.

Pelagius came, as a Theologian, of a bad school. He had been an intimate and pupil of Ruffinus,¹ the opponent of S. Jerome, and a friend of John, the heretical Bishop of Jerusalem. Ruffinus had passed from twenty to thirty years in Syria among the nest of heretics found in that country, and especially at Antioch. Theodore the interpreter, one of their chief teachers, is said by his contemporary, Marius Mercator,² to have been among the first and chief authors of what is termed Pelagianism, and from Photius we learn that he taught the very essence of that heresy—that Adam was created mortal, and would have died whether he had sinned or not, and that infants have no original sin, but are born in a state of innocence such as that of the first parent before his fall. Theodore was made Bishop of Mopsuestia at the earliest in 392, and consequently Ruffinus might have been his occasional auditor—or that of some other of the school—for more than twenty years. From Syria Ruffinus returned to Rome, and there taught the heresy which afterwards received the name of its chief maintainer, Pelagius. Cælestius, 'Pelagius' pupil, asserted, in the council held at Carthage, A.D. 412, that he had heard many bishops hold different opinions on original sin, but when required by Paulinus, his accuser, to name them, he could only specify 'Ruffinus, priest of Aquileia, who lived at Rome.'³ Pelagius is termed by S. Augustine, in his Epistle to Paulinus of Nola, 'Brito,' to dis-

¹ S. Jerome's Preface to Jeremiah. Petavius de Pelag. et Semi-Pelag. 1, § v. Ittigius de Aramo Scriptore. Bened. Preface to S. Augustine, tom. x. § iii. Fleury Hist. book xxiii. § 1.

² Commonitory against the heresy of Pelagius and Cælestius.

³ As Marius Mercator calls Ruffinus a Syrian, it has been questioned whether the Ruffinus, who was the first author of Pelagianism in the West, is the priest of Aquileia, or another of the same name. The ancients seem unanimous in the former of these opinions, and we agree with Dupin that 'it is more natural to say

tinguish him from another Pelagius of Tarentum; and it is scarcely possible that a native of our island, in those times, should have introduced into the Western Church, and a city like Rome, a refined and systematized heresy. It is, in fact, found in the writings of Theodore, at least as early as Pelagius could have arrived in Rome, and although attributed originally to the teaching of Origen, it is evident that in denying original sin; and making actual sin depend solely on the will of each individual, destroying also, as a necessary consequence, the atonement of Christ, and reducing Him to be a mere teacher and example,—it is simply the logical and natural result of that body of Arian heresy which had so long been pestilently besetting the country, and especially that great University of the East, Antioch. We should however state, in justice to Pelagius himself, that no heresy on the subject of the natures or person of our blessed Lord Himself has ever attached itself to him. On the contrary, his creed (of which we shall speak presently) shows not only that he held the great Catholic verities of those mysteries, but that he had a clear and deep insight into them.¹

Of the undoubted works of Pelagius which remain entire, there are his creed, and a letter of much length to the virgin Demetrias. There is also a Commentary on the Epistles of S. Paul, which is assuredly Pelagian, and would even appear (though it is a disputed point) to be the production of Pelagius himself. The doubt, however, that has been made to rest on its actual authorship renders it of course useless as an appeal or an authority.²

On the subject of his peculiar heresy, his creed, addressed originally to Pope Innocent, contains nothing. It seems to have been composed with the view of proving that the faith of its author was in no respect worthy of censure. But it is not only insufficient for this end, but it is even suspicious, for it scarcely alludes to those charges of which we know that Pelagius was accused at the time of its composition. Nor does S. Augustine suffer this fact to escape his far-seeing eye. He continually upbraids its author for his silence on those very points, on which one of an honest self-trusting mind would in his

that Marius called Rufinus a Syrian because he dwelt long in Syria, and came from thence when he sowed the Pelagian doctrine in Rome.

¹ Wall's *Infant Baptism*, vol. i. chap. xix. § xxix. contains Pelagius' Creed, with Notes. Waterland on the Athanasian Creed, chap. vii. under A.D. 417.

² The evidences in its favour are the fact, that several passages cited by S. Augustine from a Commentary of Pelagius, and a long extract from the same by Mercator are actually found in it. We never doubted that it is the work of Pelagius himself, and we might ask an objector, who there was of that heresy in the West capable of composing such a work, for it is both lucid and forcible! 'Cælestius was, all through, nothing more than a mere mouthpiece of his master.'

position have said the most. Pelagius simply says, at the close of this prolix composition, 'The will is free so that we always need the auxilium of God;' and he anathematizes at once the heresy of the Manicheans, that men cannot avoid sin, and of Jovinian, that they cannot commit sin, for each removes the liberty of the will. 'We say,' he concludes, 'that men both can and cannot sin, that we may always confess ourselves to have free-will.'

The letter to Demetrias, written about the year 414, contains most decided statements of the power of the will, to the exclusion of grace. He says it is not the fault of nature if we sin, but of the will; for certain of the Old Testament patriarchs fulfilled the Christian and Apostolic law before in fact it was revealed, and previously to the gift of gospel grace. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob fulfilled the law of God so perfectly, that He was pleased especially to call Himself their God. Joseph also, even before that evangelical saying was uttered, 'Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart,' when provoked by his mistress, not only by look but even by an actual embrace, coveted her not. Job, too, before he had heard our Lord's command to love our enemies, was able to say, 'If I rejoiced at the destruction of him that hated me, or lifted up myself when evil found him; neither have I suffered my mouth to sin by wishing a curse to his soul,' (xxx. 29, 30.) And when the words had not been spoken, 'Give to every man that asketh of thee,' he said, 'If I have withheld the poor from their desire,' (xxx. 16.) He had not read the injunction of the Apostle, 'Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal,' (Coloss. iv. 1,) yet he cried confidently to the Lord, 'If I did despise the cause of my manservant or of my maidservant when they contended with me,' (xxx. 13.) Before the Apostle had commanded us not to trust in the uncertainty of riches, he so regarded them as to prove himself rich elsewhere: 'If I have made gold my hope, or have said to the fine gold, Thou art my confidence' (xxx. 24); 'Oh, man,' he continues, 'evangelic before the Gospel, and apostolic before the Apostles, who hast opened the hidden riches of nature, and by bringing them into the midst hast shown from thyself what we are all able to do, and taught how great is that treasure of the soul which we all possess without use, and which we are unwilling to bring forth, and scarce believe that we have.' In proof of his doctrine of the will he cites the following texts:—Gen. xlix. 5, showing the wilfulness of Simeon and Levi; Isaiah i. 19, 20; Jer. ix. 13, 14; Matt. xxiii. 37, and others. 'There is no other cause,' he says, 'of the difficulty of doing well but custom.' He admits, however, that if before the

law and advent of Christ men are related to have lived holily, much more are we to be believed capable of so doing who ought to be better either than those before or after the law. But chiefly, he tells Demetrias that whilst corporal nobility and wealth are of her relatives and not her own, no one can give her spiritual riches but herself. In these, therefore, he continues, 'she is rightly to be praised, and justly preferred to others, for they are not able to be except *of* her and in her.'

S. Augustine, in his 188th Epistle, which was written to Juliana, a widow, and the mother of Demetrias, cites these words, and comments on them with just severity. He accuses the author of saying, as of course he does say, that virtues which may be *in* us are *of* us, thereby doing away at once with the existence of all grace distinctive and properly so called, for the only grace is nature and learning, and all is to be referred to the will. The parts of the letter in question, he says, which seem to refer to grace, may really refer to nature, or doctrine, or the remission of sins. For even confessing that we pray not to enter into temptation, it may mean, according to them, that it is granted to us to have understanding of the truth, by which we may learn what we ought to do, and not that we may receive strength to do it. So, our Lord's example merely teaches and does not assist us.

Again, towards the close of the letter, Pelagius cites the words of S. James, iv. 7, to prove that we ought to resist the devil, if, indeed, we be subdued to God, and that by doing His will we may also *merit* divine grace, and the more easily, by the aid of the Holy Spirit, resist the wicked spirit. To these words S. Augustine refers in his '*De Gratia Christi*,' § 23, as proving with what dissimulation Pelagius condemned, at Diospolis, those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits, and therefore how certainly he holds and teaches that doctrine.

In his '*De Gratia Christi*' S. Augustine says that all Pelagius' confessions of grace apply, or can be made to apply, only to law and doctrine, or Revelation and Christ's example, which may all be included under the head of remission of sins, or recollection of Christ's example, by remembering and following which we may sin no more—§§ 1, 2. S. Augustine also asserts, that after a formal condemnation by him in council of the denial of grace, his books, sent to Rome, contain nothing else—placing grace in the revelation of what we ought to do, not in the help of doing it—§ 3. He says that Pelagius, in making grace to be merely the law and doctrine, does, from this aspect of the case also, undo the very work of grace; for the law had made us transgressors of the commandment, and sent us to grace, expressly that

we might, by grace, have strength and freedom to fulfil it—§§ 8, 9. He says, tersely, Pelagius should confess that grace by which ‘non solum *suadet*ur omne quod bonum est, verum et *persuadet*ur’—§ 11. If, he continues, Pelagius, in saying that the grace of coming to God, submitting the will to Him, closely adhering to Him, in a word, of our membership with Him, is to be ascribed to the mere will, what more *could* be given to grace?—§ 24.

Pelagius thinks the possibility of doing, speaking, and thinking well is of God, but that the actual doing, speaking, and thinking is of ourselves. This is summarily and effectually confuted by appeal to 2 Cor. xiii. 7, ‘Now I pray to God that ye *do* no evil.’ Matt. x. 20, ‘It is not ye that *speak*, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you.’ 2 Cor. iii. 5, ‘Not that we *are sufficient* of ourselves to *think* anything as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God.’ S. Augustine continues that Pelagius’ saying, that what men are commanded to do through free-will they may ‘more easily’ do through grace, would be right, omitting the ‘more easily.’ For the addition of those words signifies that a good work can be done even without the aid of God. Petavius says, that if he had omitted those words he would have been a sound Catholic doctor.¹ It follows that, in their scheme, prayer is useful only that divine doctrine may be revealed, not that we may have power to do it.

Lastly, and most significantly, Pelagius says, ‘To do well is our own;’ he had said, ‘and is God’s.’ Why not keep to that? Apparently, because if he had, it would be replied if to do well is ours and God’s, because He has given the ‘*posse ad utrumque*,’ to do evil must be ours and His also, for the same reason—and thus as we are praised with Him for good, we must be blamed with Him for evil. The clue, then, in S. Augustine’s opinion to Pelagius’ extreme statements of the power of the will is to be found in his desire to avoid the supposed necessity of making God the author of evil.

And here we trust our readers will excuse us for introducing a series of questions, sent by Cælestius to S. Augustine in the year 414. They are deserving of notice, not only as illustrating the remark last made, but also as being by far the most open avowal of the Pelagian tenets that we have. They show that the heresy was exclusively an intellectual system, and as such, one which, however formidable in mere words, must break down on the first practical trial. The original of these questions is given by Archbishop Ussher in his ‘*Antiquitates*,’ &c.

¹ De Pelagianismo, chap. 10, § 15.

and they are cited and replied to by S. Augustine in his 'De Perfectione Justitiæ.'

'1. Before all things ask him who denies that man can be without sin, what sin is? Whether it is what can be avoided, or what cannot? If the latter, it is not sin, and cannot be called such. If the former, man can therefore be without it; for no reason or justice suffers that to be called sin which can in no way be avoided.

'2. Is sin of will or of necessity? If of necessity, it is not sin; if of will, it can be avoided.

'3. Is it natural, or an accident? If the former, it is not sin; if the latter, it is able to recede, and we can avoid it, and be without it.

'4. Is it substantive matter, or an act? If the former, it must have an author, who must be other than God. If this is impious, it must be an act, and can therefore be avoided.

'5. Again, a man ought to be without sin, and if he ought to be without it, he can be without it. If he cannot, he ought not. If he *ought* not to be without it, he *cannot* be without it; and then he ought to be with it, and it is not sin. If this is absurd, he ought necessarily to be without it, and therefore he can be without it.

'6. Is a man commanded to be without sin? If he is not able to be without it, he is not commanded to be without it; or if he is commanded, he is able: for why should that be commanded which is impossible to be done?

'7. Does God will man to be without sin? Then assuredly he can be without it: for who can doubt that that can be which he does not doubt that God wills to be?

'8. Does God will man to be with or without sin? Assuredly He does not will him to be with sin. It is then blasphemy to say that man can be *with* sin, which God does not wish, and to deny that he can be without it, which He does wish—as if he had created anyone to be able to be what He wills not, and not to be able to be what He wills.

'9. By what is man made sinful? By necessity of nature, or by freedom of will? If by the former, there is no fault of his; if by the latter, from whom did he receive his will? from God. But it must therefore be good. Yet how is it so, if it is more prone to evil than to good? And it is more prone if a man can be with, but cannot be without sin. God also both made man good, and commanded him to do good. How then can we say that man *is* evil, which he was neither made nor commanded to be; and deny that he is good, which he was made and commanded to be?

'10. Sin can be in two ways. Either by those things being done which are forbidden, or by those not being done which are commanded. All things prohibited, therefore, can be avoided, and all things commanded can be done; or they are prohibited and commanded in vain. How then can we deny that man can be without sin, when we must necessarily confess that he can as well avoid what is forbidden, as do what is commanded?

'11. How are we able to be without sin? By will or by nature? If by nature, it is not sin; if by will, will can very easily be changed by will.

'12. If a man cannot be without sin, whose fault is it, his own or another's? If his own, how is it a fault that he *is* not that which he *cannot* be?

'13. If man's nature is good, which only Marcion or Manes will deny, how is it good, if it cannot be free from evil? for no one doubts that all sin is evil.

'14. God is certainly just; but He imputes sin to every man, and there is no sin which shall not be imputed as such. How then is God just, if He is believed to impute that which cannot be avoided?

The first Council in which this most iniquitous and offensive system was condemned—a system full of profanity and of the subtle sensuality of pride—a system which includes all God's immeasurable powers in a syllogism, and extends our own almost to immensity,—was held at Carthage in the year 412, when Cælestius was the defendant. He there denied that Adam's death followed his disobedience, saying that he was created mortal; and he would not admit that we derive any original sin from him. He said that children newly born are in the same state of sinlessness as that of Adam before the fall, and, consequently, that they receive eternal life without baptism; and that the death of Adam is not the cause of our death, nor the resurrection of Christ the source of our resurrection. He maintained that the law gave the kingdom of heaven, as well as the gospel, (but the Pelagians distinguished between the kingdom of heaven and salvation,) and that there had been sinless men before Christ. These, of course, are the tenets of pure Pelagianism.

At Jerusalem, three years later, Pelagius himself was arraigned in person; but although he expressly said that men may be without sin if they would,¹ John, the heretical Bishop of Jerusalem, who presided, received him as a friend, and forbore to pass any adverse sentence upon him. At Diospolis or Lydda, in the same year, Pelagius was again examined on the same subject, and required to condemn the above tenets of Cælestius, and others like them, among which was that saying which subsequently became the very mark and badge of Pelagianism, 'Grace is given according to merit,' so that S. Augustine used to express the whole doctrine in the short sentence, '*Gratiam Dei secundum meritum hominum dari.*'²

¹ S. Augustine and S. Jerome slightly differ on this point. S. Augustine says that we are not to deny the *possibility* of sinlessness, lest we take from man's free-will and God's mercy; but the *fact* of it, as Scripture says no one *is* without it. (*De Peccat. Merit. B. II. chap. vi.*) S. Jerome argues from the *facts* of the case, and concludes that as no man ever was, so none ever can be, without sin. (*Lib. I. Cont. Pelag.*)

² "That the Grace of God is according to nature," Pelagius in the East—that is in the province of Palestine, in which is the city of Jerusalem—when examined by the Bishops did not dare to affirm. For among other things that were objected to him was this also, that he said the Grace of God was given according to our merits, which is so alien to the Catholic doctrine and inimical to the grace of Christ, that unless he had anathematized it when urged against him, he himself would have gone thence anathematized. But that he anathematized it deceitfully, his subsequent books testify, in which he defends nothing else than that the Grace of God is given according to our merits.' S. Augustine *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, § 10. 'The Pelagians dared also to say that "Nature in which we are created is grace, in which nature we are so created as to have a rational mind, by which we are able to understand, being made to the image of God, that we might have rule over the fish of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all the cattle that creep upon the earth." But this is not the Grace which the Apostle commends through the faith of Jesus Christ. For it is certain that the latter is common to us with the impious and infidels; but the Grace through faith of Jesus Christ is theirs

Pelagius escaped condemnation himself by condemning, or rather by explaining away, the doctrines of his pupil. It is hopeless in our limited space to attempt to give any idea of the fallacies and subterfuges of Pelagius. The works of S. Augustine are full of exposures of them, and he has left an entire piece, 'De Gestis Pelagii,' on Pelagius' duplicity at the Council of Diospolis. But though he escaped condemnation here, we learn from Marius Mercator that he was detected and condemned at Jerusalem a year later. The Councils of Carthage and Milevis, in the year 416, at both of which S. Augustine was present, repeat that condemnation. A canon of the latter condemns a significant but natural result of the heresy—the denial of the need of prayer. 'If any say that the words "forgive us our sins" are uttered not for himself but for the multitude who are sinners, Anathema; for S. John said, "In many things we offend all;" and David, "Enter not into judgment with thy servant," &c.' To Innocent the Council writes, 'These enemies of the grace of Christ say, "God has made us men; we have made ourselves righteous." They declare that human nature is free, that they may not want a liberator; that it is safe, that they may not require a Saviour; that they are so strong, that they can of their own strength, received in their creation and without grace, overcome all lusts and temptations. They say *Pelagius was acquitted by the Eastern Bishops because he confessed the grace of God, which word they took in the usual sense of that by which we are justified from sin, not that by which we are created with free-will.* We pray not to receive the commandment, but to do it; although free-will not to sin is not to be doubted; yet its power is not sufficient unless our infirmities are assisted. Pelagius says that grace is nothing but nature. That by which we are created to something is grace; but *grace proper* is that by which we who are predestinate are called, justified, glorified. *The grace by which we are created is not denied to be grace, but it is not called grace properly.*' The letter, however, treats their assertion of the possibility of sin-

only whose is faith itself, for "all men have not faith." 2 Thess. iii. 2. De Grat. & Lib. Arbit. § 25. 'They affirm again and again that Grace is of merit, and when convicted they say, "although it is not given according to the merits of good works, because through it we work, yet according to the merits of good will it is given, because the good will of him that prays *precedes*, which good will the will of believing has preceded, that according to these merits the Grace of God who hears may follow." § 27. This last assertion is rather the doctrine of semi-Pelagianism than of Pelagianism proper, though on the prior motion of the human will to Grace, and the intrinsic goodness in consequence of the former, the two unite and become one; and S. Augustine confutes the semi-Pelagians to themselves by showing them that their system originally is and must be simply that of Pelagius himself, whom they admit to be a heretic.

S. Bernard also allows a 'Gratia Creans;' but he distinguishes it from 'Gratia Salvans.' De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. (Chap. vi.)

lessness merely as an error, adding, no one in the Catholic Church can say that he does not need to cry, 'forgive us our sins,' or 'that he has no sin.' The result of this condemnation of Pelagius and Cælestius was an imperial edict, directing that they with their followers should be banished beyond the hundredth mile from Rome, *i.e.* beyond the jurisdiction of the prefect of the city; and any bishop refusing to sign their condemnation should be expelled his bishopric, driven into banishment, and deprived of communion.

Such was Pelagianism—namely, such a denial of Grace properly so called, and of internal supernatural aid, as to cause both S. Augustine and Prosper to say, 'Grace with them is no grace, but merely nature.' 'In Pelagiana causa hujusmodi controversia versabatur, quod hæretici isti justitiam, et sanctitatem, ac demum gloriam adipisci homines putarent industria suapte, ac naturæ viribus, sine adjumento gratiæ. Sanctos inquam Deoque gratos fieri, et esse reipsa, nec posse tantum esse, dicebant Pelagiani, viribus suis homines. Contra quos contendens Augustinus, et gratiam, atque ejus necessitatem, usumque commendans, non quid illa posset, sed quid reipsa faceret in nobis, prædicare debuit; ut quemadmodum adversarii, quid naturali, et insita virtute sine gratia reipsa fieret, testimoniis Scripturæ, et exemplis adstruebant, sic ipse vicissim, quid nonnisi per Christi gratiam in nobis operaretur Deus, iisdem argumentis ostenderet.'¹ 'No one can give you spiritual riches but yourself,' says Pelagius himself to Demetrius; 'and these cannot be except of you and in you.' 'Every man,' says Fuller the historian, in his quaint style,—'every man is born a Pelagian, naturally proud of his power, and needeth little to teach him to think well of himself.' But, however truthful or attractive the heresy may appear from its harmony with nature, its condemnation, when viewed through the medium of Grace, is sealed at once. To a man who should honestly endeavour to rule himself by the Christian law—even in one act of his life alone—the real value of Pelagius' cardinal assertions, 'Grace is according to merits,' and 'nature is Grace,' will appear at once, and whatever he might be, he could never at least become a Pelagian.

But the opposition which Pelagius met with from the Church induced him to qualify his doctrine from time to time, and as far as possible to conceal the most repulsive features of it. Petavius classes his admitted Grace under six heads—nature and free-will, remission of sins, the law or preaching of Christ, inward mental illumination, adoption and sonship by baptism, and eternal life.

¹ Petavius de Prædestinatione, lib. X. chap. xvi. § 10.

S. Augustine concludes them under two, nature and law; and says that his Grace only helps our 'possibilitas,' not our 'velle,' or our 'agere;' and that he teaches that there are three requisites for an action—posse, which lies in nature, and is the gift originally of God; velle, which lies in our own will; esse, which lies in our 'effectus.'

It will be said, perhaps, that S. Augustine is here somewhat unjust to his opponent, for that Pelagius, in confessing Petavius' fourth Grace, inward mental illumination, confesses Grace; but, we ask, was it his meaning when he extended his Grace from an outward to an inward aid, to express by his grace the same thing as the Grace of the Church? He gives it the effects of Grace, indeed, but *what* was it with him that causes those effects? Was it not at most the natural endowments of man—his feelings, affections, emotions, &c.? putting for that which sanctifies and makes them able to work, the things sanctified and made able? Those qualities of our nature which we have in common with the brutes are not Grace; and whatever may be meant by Grace in the natural world, the kingdom of Grace is not ordinarily or properly to be identified with 'the kingdom of this world,' as Pelagius would identify it.

There rose, as might have been expected, a speedy reaction even in the Pelagian camp itself against the more repulsive of the tenets of their leader. From this cause came the less offensive, indeed, but still fundamentally erroneous phase of Semi-Pelagianism. We the rather dwell upon this, as we cannot but think that Mr. Mozley has on the whole done Pelagius something more than justice. By giving an idea of Pelagianism proper, which perhaps more truly applies to Semi-Pelagianism, Mr. Mozley has given the heresiarch himself the benefit of a scheme less faulty than his own—which in truth was not his own, but rather a protest against it—and seems to speak as if the only final difference between the Church and Pelagius were, whether our Grace be a Grace cooperative, or irresistible and controlling; whereas we cannot but think that S. Augustine, from whom Mr. Mozley confesses himself to differ, was correct when he said that the question was, whether there be any Grace properly so called or not. He did not say that the Pelagians deny all Grace, but they confess a Grace improperly so called. It is a Theological question. They admit Grace, but call that Grace which in Theology is not Grace. Pelagius deceived the bishops at Diospolis by the use of the term.

Unless, also, a wide difference be placed in fact between Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, we place S. Augustine's consistency and his work in the Church at stake; for whilst he never ceased to oppose Pelagius and Cælestius, he, like S.

Athanasius with the Semi-Arians, 'admitted the Semi-Pelagians to be both friends and Catholics.'¹

Petavius says that, at best, the Pelagians thought that grace was not necessary indeed, but that it was better to have it than not; but the Semi-Pelagians, with the Church, thought it strictly necessary, but that its gift depended on prior good in man. This was, of course, to make it subordinate to nature, and in this consisted the heresy of Semi-Pelagianism.

Semi-Pelagianism was caused by the misunderstanding of the doctrine of S. Augustine, who, as Petavius says, 'had seemed, against Pelagius, to ascribe our salvation and justification only to God, leaving nothing to human *συνεργία*. This greatly offended some, and especially the bishops and clergy of Lyons and Marseilles (where Cassian lived in great repute), the more so as he had a few years previously, when newly made bishop, spoken differently, as in his *Épistle* 49, that "faith was a nobis." They thought he had gone too far, giving too much to grace and God's help.'

That our readers may understand the Semi-Pelagian question the better, we will venture to give them some general idea of the chief contents of that particular piece of S. Augustine's which was the original cause of Semi-Pelagianism, the second and longer letter to Sixtus, priest and afterwards Bishop of Rome—a letter not only of singular power and vividness of description, but one which contains in itself an almost perfect system in outline of Augustinian Theology. It is the more free and original as the writer is not directly replying in it to particular assertions of his opponents, but is laying down what he conceives to be the revealed truth on Predestination and Grace.

He begins with saying that to deny free-will because it is not without the 'adjutorium' of God, is not to strengthen but to weaken it, by not basing it upon God. He complains of the Pelagians thinking God an acceptor of persons if He receives without previous merits; for they do not see, he says, that due punishment is given to the condemned, and undue mercy to the acquitted, that the former may not complain nor the latter glory. Nor may it be said that it is unjust that one should be condemned and another acquitted; rather is it just that both

¹ "Semi-Pelagianos minimè pro hæreticis habuit; sed Catholicos et amicos suos appellavit eodem libro." (De dono Perseverantiæ.) Petavius de Predest. lib. IX. chap. ii. § 4. This is, perhaps, more than the strict letter of the De dono Perseverantiæ would bear Petavius out in saying. S. Augustine, indeed, holds the Semi-Pelagians as friends, but at the same time he also treats them as men holding a very serious error, although, as they held it, it was in germ rather than in development.

² De Pelagianis et Semi-Pelagianis, chap. vii. § 1.

should be punished? Then we should give thanks if we escape the fate of others like ourselves. If all were acquitted there would be no punishment for sin; if none, there would be no gift of Grace.

S. Augustine, in explaining how it is that God will have all men to be saved, supposes that no man is saved except through the will of God, or that 'all' means not all men, but some out of all classes and ranks of men, on the same rule on which we understand the phrase, 'Ye tithe all herbs,'¹ as meaning not that the Pharisees gave literally a tenth of all the herbs in the world, but only of all kinds of herbs; or as in his 'De Correptione,' § 44—all the predestinate, because all the human race is in them.

To return to the letter to Sixtus. When all the lump is justly condemned, justice gives due punishment, and Grace gives undue honour. God's mercy and truth are both inscrutable; his mercy in having mercy not by justice but by Grace, and hardening not by injustice but by truth of vengeance. The Apostle says to such as Pelagius, 'Whom He will He pities, and whom He will He hardens;' and we say in his words, not having better of our own, 'O man, who art thou that repliest to God?' (Romans ix. 18, 20.)

'God hardens not by imparting malice, but by not imparting mercy. Those to whom it is not imparted are not worthy, and do not deserve it, but are worthy and do deserve that it should not be imparted. If we say that faith precedes, in which is the merit of Grace, *what* merit had a man *before* faith that he should receive faith? What has he that he did not not receive? and if he received, how can he boast as if he had not received? . . . And since only Grace works in us every good merit, when God crowns our merits He only crowns his own gifts. As we obtained mercy of faith in the beginning, not because we were, but that we might be faithful, so in the end, in which will be eternal life, He will crown us, as it is written, "in mercy and pity." . . . If sinners are vessels of wrath, let them impute it to Him who made them of that lump to which condemnation is justly given for the sin of one. If they are vessels of mercy, let them not boast, but glorify God who gave them a mercy not due. . . . In the meantime, it is enough for a faithful Christian to know and believe that God frees no one but by undeserved Grace, and condemns no one but by most just truth. *Why* He condemns one and not another, let him examine who can fathom the depths of his judgment.'

At the end of the letter he instances (as in many other of his writings) the case of Jacob and Esau, as a proof that there was no election for works but only by mercy and Grace. He says on Romans ix. 10, and following verses:—

'What does the Apostle mean by one concubitus—"when Rebecca also had conceived by one concubitus"—but to show that Jacob should not

¹ Mozley, p. 755.

boast of the merits either of his forefathers or of his own father, saying that he was beloved by his Creator, because his father when he begat him was worthy of greater praise (than when he begat Esau.) It was, he says, of one concubitus. There was, therefore, one desert of his father in begetting both, and one of his mother in conceiving both. The Apostle did not say, as Pelagius would, that God foresaw their future works, but he referred all to his grace and glory.'

This, however, is merely S. Augustine's own view. S. Chrysostom acknowledges an election for future foreseen merits; and Theodoret says that the difference made by God between Jacob and Esau arose from the same cause.¹ S. Chrysostom also says, that to be a vessel of mercy or wrath depends on ourselves under Grace. Here, we suspect, he would be found to differ widely from S. Augustine. He acknowledges two things in predestination — one the Divine will, the other the human working with it. S. Augustine only acknowledges the former, as in the case of Jacob and Esau; and he puts the act of predestination further back than S. Chrysostom, who indeed seems open to the objection that predestination proper must have taken place before the human will could have cooperated with the Divine. We should prefer S. Chrysostom as a safer teacher of predestination than S. Augustine, for the simple reason, which however may repel some, that he has no system on the subject—that is, he does not teach more on it than Holy Scripture warrants.

'S. Augustine, however,' to use the words of Mr. Mozley, 'takes that further step which Scripture avoids taking, and asserts a determinate doctrine of Predestination. He erects those passages of Scripture which are suggestive of Predestination into a system, explaining away the opposite ones; and converts the obscurity and inconsistency of Scripture language into that clearness and consistency by which a definite truth is stated. His was the error of those who follow, without due consideration, that strong first impression which the human mind entertains, that there must be some definite truth to be arrived at on the question under consideration, whatever it may be; and who therefore imagine that they cannot but be doing service, if they only add to what is defective enough to make it complete, or take away from what is ambiguous enough to make it decisive. Assuming arrival at some determinate truth necessary, he gave an exclusive development to those parts of Scripture which he had previously fixed on as containing, in distinction to any apparently opposite ones, its real meaning. But the assumption itself was gratuitous. There is no reason why Scripture should not designedly limit itself, and stop short of expressing definite truth; though whether it does so or not is a question of fact. If Revelation as a whole does not state a truth of predestination, that stopping short is as much a designed stopping short, as a statement would have been a designed statement. Nor are we to be discontented with the former issue, when the comparison of one part of God's word with another fairly leads to it; to suppose that an indeter-

¹ Petavius de Prædestinatione, lib. IX. chap. iii. §§. 7, 10, 11, 12.

minate conclusion must be a wrong one, and to proceed to obtain by forced interpretation what we had failed to do by natural. If Revelation as a whole does not speak explicitly, Revelation did not intend to do so; and to impose a definite truth upon it, when it designedly stops short of one, is as real an error of interpretation as to deny a truth which it expresses.—P. 156.

Whilst, however, S. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others of the Greek Church, may otherwise differ from S. Augustine, there is perhaps little real difference in their doctrine on the particular question of predestination for foreseen merits; and Mr. Mozley suggests a distinction, the substance of which, without suffering it to carry us into the particular tenet of Semi-Pelagianism, we may well make available to their harmony. Having alluded to the error of the Semi-Pelagian doctrine of election for future merits, *i. e.* because God foresees that men will believe, and not because He is about to make them believing, he adds:—

‘The ground of foreseen merits is expressly rejected by S. Augustine as the ground of predestination, which is referred, instead, to an absolute and inscrutable Divine choice. Though one distinction must here be made: the most rigid Predestinarian must in one sense allow that God predestinates the elect to eternal life, in consequence of goodness foreseen in them. For, however absolutely God may predestinate particular persons to eternal life in the sense of certainty, He plainly does not do it absolutely in the sense of requiring no qualifications. His predetermination, then, to give them eternal life must suppose the foresight of these qualifications for it in them, though it is the foresight of qualifications which He Himself has determined to give them by the operation of efficacious grace. “God foresees his own future work.” He has decreed from all eternity to make, and therefore foresees that He will make, Jacob of such a character. But this is predestination in consequence of foreseen goodness, in quite a different sense from that which is intended in the modification of the doctrine above referred to. The effect of that modification is to make the *whole* of predestination conditional—God predestinating persons to eternal life in consequence of something which, by virtue of the Divine attribute of foreknowledge, He certainly foresees, but which is in itself contingent, depending on the will and efforts of the persons themselves. But of the distinction now spoken of this is not the effect; for though, according to it, God predestinates the elect to their final reward relatively to their qualifications for it, He predestinates them absolutely to those qualifications; so that though one part of predestination is dependent upon another, the whole is unconditional.’—Pp. 148, 149.

The doctrine, then, of Semi-Pelagianism may assist us to see that there is no essential difference between that of S. Augustine and S. Chrysostom. If there were, the latter must inevitably be a Semi-Pelagian, but, in that we are sure that he is not, and never would or could have been, we may see that he intends to teach precisely the same system as S. Augustine on the point in question.

To continue the letter to Sixtus. With regard to election by

grace alone (as opposed to that for foreseen merits), as in the case of infants dying without baptism, S. Augustine says very strongly :—

‘If you consider the infants themselves, they have merits of their own ; if you consider the parents, theirs are good whose children are carried off by sudden death without the baptism of Christ ; and theirs are evil whose offspring, through the power of Christ, have come to the sacraments of the Church. This infant born of a faithful married pair, received with the joy of its parents, overlain and suffocated in the sleep of its mother or nurse, is an exile and alien from their faith : that one, the child of sacrilegious crime, exposed by the cruel fear of its mother, is taken up by the piety of others, baptized through their Christian solicitude, and made a consort and participator of the eternal kingdom. Let them think and consider of these things, who dare to say that God is either an acceptor of persons, or a remunerator of preceding merits.’—§ 32.

And here we will venture to observe, as bearing on original sin, that the difficult or rather inexplicable question of *how* the souls of infants can be sinful and subject to the punishment of sin, raised by Pelagius, latterly engaged much of S. Augustine’s most anxious thought. He seems to have been suddenly thrown back upon it as the first question in the controversy :—

‘How,’ (asks Mr. Mozley,) ‘could there be such a thing as hereditary sin ? sin transmitted from father to son, and succeeded to by birth ? How were moral dispositions involved in the operations of nature ? This appeal to reason was promptly answered by an appeal to mystery ; an answer, however, which was needlessly perplexed by too minute attempts to define the mode of the transmission of sin. The explanation of a mystery cannot really advance beyond the statement of it, but the too subtle explainer forgets his own original admission and the inherent limits of his task, and imagines himself solving what is inexplicable.’—P. 66.

This remark is true. There were, in fact, two attempts of S. Augustine to solve the difficulty ; and the answer from mystery alone not satisfying him (as it might have done, for it is a mystery only because God has been pleased not to reveal but to conceal it, and that which He has hidden from view no effort of ours can penetrate), he tacitly abandoned it by endeavouring to find another. He confessed himself without knowledge, and at a loss to understand *how* the souls of infants can in themselves be under the bond of birth-sin and its penalties. ‘If they come,’ he says, ‘immediately from the hand of God, how can they be made sinful by the mere contact of human bodies ? Whence are they, then,’ he asks, ‘originally ? Are they by immediate creation, or by propagation ?’ If by the latter, the question is answered at once, but for this Holy Scripture gives no warrant. S. Augustine has left us, besides other pieces, a letter of much length to Optatus, and another to S. Jerome, asking his opinion of the matter. It seems, indeed, to be a question of considerable interest both in itself, and as tending to perplex the mind of so great a doctor.

He evidently himself leans to the idea of propagation, but he does so from the necessity of the case alone, for he wishes to think that each soul is created afresh. S. Jerome, we must suppose, did not lay so much stress on the question, for he acknowledged S. Augustine's letter with thanks and commendations, but excused himself for not replying to it. We learn, however, from the letter to Optatus, that S. Jerome himself believed the soul to be created, but that the Western Churches held it rather to be by propagation.

The doctrines contained in this letter to Sixtus amount, it is evident, to nothing less than a statement of irresistible and therefore indefectible grace. S. Augustine, indeed, does not deal with every element of the question. It is true that he considers God's justice, His mercy, and sin with its results; but the individual sinner is left out of sight; the sin in him is considered, he in whom the sin exists, is forgotten. Nor would it satisfy any one to be told that for the sin that is in him he, of God's justice, is to be cast into hell, whereas another, as guilty as himself, is to be admitted to salvation only to show forth another of God's attributes, his mercy. S. Augustine's doctrine, (which is here the same as Calvin's) may be the logical, but it is not the full moral result of what Holy Scripture teaches of God's predestination. It does not harmonise with such declarations as that of our blessed Lord Himself—'God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him shall not perish, but have everlasting life. (John iii. 16.) It makes no allowance, or an insufficient one, for God's infinite and unfathomable mercy. It may be true in a measure as regards this world, but S. Augustine concludes it to be the whole truth, and then pushes it on to the next world—and here he clearly exceeds his warrant; for how can he or any man, at least any uninspired one, say what other and counteracting elements may be brought into action in a state of absolute perfection?

We do not wonder, then, that he was appealed to by the monks of Adrumetum to explain how, according to the scheme of predestination laid down to Sixtus, free-will could exist or self-discipline be required; for they said that infallible and efficacious (*efficacem*) Grace altogether abolished the freedom of man to either part. He wrote in reply his works, 'On Grace and Free-will,' and 'On Correction and Grace,' which satisfied them. But it was in Marseilles that this phase of the heresy formally arose and flourished; and first among its defenders, if indeed he be not its author, is Cassian, the pupil of S. Chrysostom and friend of Pope Innocent, who came from the East to Rome, and went thence to Marseilles. The Semi-Pelagians are very

close, indeed, at once to the Church and to the Pelagians. With the former they fully admit the necessity of preventing Grace; but, like the latter, they insist that the first motion towards its reception must come not from God, but from our own nature and will. If it be so, the beginning of the work of salvation is our own, and not God's in us. The difference between this and Pelagianism is evidently—in fact and at bottom—only accidental. Against the latter, the Council of Milevis or Carthage, in its 5th Canon, condemns those who say, 'That Grace is given to enable us to do more easily what we are commanded to do through free-will, as if without Grace we could fulfil the Divine commands, though not easily. Christ said not, "Without Me you can do with more difficulty," but, "Without Me you can do nothing."'

They thought that S. Augustine's doctrine involved a certain fatalist necessity either to good or to evil; and they appealed to the Apostolic words, 'To will is present with me.' S. Augustine met them by the others—'It is God that worketh in us both to will and to do.' They said, if there be any eternal, immutable decree of Providence, men are not born 'judicandi,' but judicati.¹ 'They put obedience before Grace, that the beginning of salvation may depend on him who is saved, not on God who saves; and that man's will may obtain by itself the aid of Divine Grace, not that Grace may subject the human will to itself.'² It is clear that they differ here not only from S. Augustine, but also from S. Chrysostom, when he says that, to show us that if a little is ours the chief part is God's, we are called vessels of mercy and not of good works, and that the being a vessel of wrath or of mercy depends on ourselves *after* Grace; whereas Pelagius and the Semi-Pelagians teach the exact converse, that it depends on Grace *after* ourselves. Their doctrine was condemned by the second Council of Orange, A. D. 529.

Here, then, is a plain and reasonable objection to S. Augustine's system of predestinarian doctrine: let us observe how he answers it. His writings to the Semi-Pelagians are two letters to Valentinus, the Abbot of Adrumetum, with the 'De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio,' which was objected to by them, whence he wrote in explanation the 'De Correptione et Gratia.' This being questioned by the Marseillois, he explained himself in the 'De Prædestinatione Sanctorum,' and 'De Dono Perseverantiæ.' He says, in the beginning of the 'De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio,' 'The Semi-Pelagians so teach free-will as to destroy Grace.' In other words, they did not see how, according to S. Augustine, the

¹ Petavius de Prædestinatione, bk. ix. chap. ii. § 3.

² Prosper to S. Augustine, Eph. 225. S. Augustine answered him and Hilary by his books, 'De Prædestinatione Sanctorum,' and 'De Dono Perseverantiæ.'

scheme of salvation could be any other than the following: absolute predestination either to life or death, the predestinated to life having given to them gratuitously Grace irresistible, and therefore indefectible, which is followed necessarily by justification here, and salvation and glorification hereafter; and the predestinated to death having this Grace withheld from them, and being, consequently, unable to obtain salvation. In fewer words, they thought the scheme of S. Augustine one of absolute predestination to necessary salvation through the gift of irresistible Grace, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, to helpless reprobation through the withholding of that Grace. Of course, this system *could* leave no place either for self-culture or for freedom of will. The question, therefore, for S. Augustine to decide is, first, whether free-will exists; and secondly, if so, how it can coexist with irresistible Grace? Mr. Mozley, in his 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Chapters, has entered very fully, and with singular power and lucidness of statement, into both these questions. S. Augustine's answer to the Semi-Pelagians may be said to contain two different sides or phases of statement,—one in which he repeats that general type of doctrine which he had laid down in his letter to Sixtus; the other in which, to answer the objections of his inquirers, he touches on certain lines of truth before omitted, which form the correlatives of those counterbalancing Divine attributes, and actions their results, the omission of which is so much felt in his Anti-Pelagian treatises, and tends to give his system so great a hardness. These writings embrace four chief subjects—Predestination, Grace, Perseverance, and Free-will. His system on these subjects is as follows. He lays down, in his 'De Correptione,' on the predestinarian side, a doctrine of perseverance depending on absolute election, which, from the words of the Evangelist, 'many are called but few chosen,' he distinguishes from being called, even in this world, saying that none of the really elect, according to God's propositum or purpose (Rom. viii. 28; ix. 11), can change from righteousness into sin, and end their lives in the latter, and perish. (§ 21.) And in § 44, 'God wills all men to be saved, *i.e.* all the predestinate' [who, however, cannot according to him be lost], 'for all men are *in* them.' So that the words of the Apostle become a mere truism; or, rather, he is made to say what he does not say.

S. Augustine, then, as Mr. Mozley says, does not hold 'a predestination by which God has determined from all eternity to admit a certain number of mankind to present religious privileges, and to reward the good with future salvation,'—the good, that is, who are made such by accepting and gaining increase of the Grace given to them, which was, on the whole, the

doctrine of the Church before his time,—but he holds an arbitrary predestination, a predestination not, indeed, like that of the Semi-Pelagians, for the sake of future foreseen good works; for if men were rewarded for virtues not possessed or good actions not performed by them, they must by the counter law be also condemned and punished for crimes which they had never committed—an idea which he admits to be too abhorrent to our sense of justice to be entertained for a moment;¹ (Calvin, however, did in fact hold it long afterwards, as we shall shortly see.)—but he held a predestination antecedent to all merit, which is hidden and arbitrary, and, as founded on a supposed Divine justice wholly different to our ideas of that quality, mysterious and perplexing, which must be received on faith, and which separates by God's will, and to show His different attributes of mercy and justice, the human race into two great sections, ordaining the one to eternal life, and consigning the other to everlasting misery. On the former, that they may attain salvation, S. Augustine teaches that there is bestowed a Grace, which not merely assists, but overrules the actions of men—a Grace which causes them to act—a Grace given to one and not to another—a Grace by which a man is made to be the good tree which *must* bring forth good fruit, as he who is without it is the evil tree which *can* only bring forth evil fruit; for he says that there is either a good root, and of necessity good actions, or an evil root, and evil actions. Before the fall, indeed, man had free-will, and therefore he only required cooperating Grace, but now he must have a Grace that shall master and control him. And as perseverance is a continuing in this Grace to the end, the Grace itself being purely God's free gift, perseverance must be the same, and, like Grace, also irresistible and indefectible. This doctrine of perseverance is accordingly laid down at much length, and repeated again and again, in his '*De Dono Perseverantiae*.' 'It is not given to us,' he says, 'according to our merits, but it is given to some by Grace, and is withheld from others by justice; and the giving and withholding are inscrutable mysteries.' With perseverance once given, he says, we cannot cease to persevere, for persevering is as much God's gift as the first coming to Him. It can be gained by supplication, but when given, it cannot be lost by contumaciousness.

On election, also, as regards this world, he lays down a doctrine which has taken no hold on the Church at large, the counter one of sacramental Grace having corrected it. He says there is an election according, and an election not according, to God's purpose, and that those who do not persevere are not

¹ *De Dono Perseverantiae*, § 22.

chosen, and though they live a holy life, are not even then, whilst so living, among the number of the chosen—they are not called according to God's 'propositum'—they are not *elect* or *chosen*—they are only *called*. Against this we may surely urge that our Lord said to the twelve, the year before His crucifixion, 'You shall sit upon twelve thrones,' and Judas was one of them. Had the traitor died then, should he not have received his throne, as being then verily elect with an election from which he fell away by, as S. Augustine would allow, a voluntary act which cannot be in any way charged to God? Though there was said to be a throne in store for him, was there none?

S. Augustine says on S. John vi. 66—'Those who went away were not disciples; those only were such who remained. Yet the former were called disciples, though proving themselves not to be, for both had not perseverance; for although we call those disciples whom we see to live piously, yet they are not truly such, and are not such if they have not perseverance, for they are not such with God, who knows that of good they will become evil.' But to this we may surely reply, that when called disciples by S. John, they were disciples. They were such whilst they staid with Christ, but they ceased to be such when they went away. Their having ceased to be disciples, is no proof that they never were disciples, as the corpse of a man is no proof that he never was a man; rather it is a proof that he was a man and is not one. The fact that Scripture calls them disciples at a particular time, is a proof unanswerable that they were disciples when so called. If, indeed, S. Augustine meant that they ceased to persevere, and therefore lost their Grace at last, it would be well,—but he does not mean this; he means that, because they did not keep it, they never had it, and therefore, of course, that it is not only irresistible, but also indefectible. S. Paul says, 'Receive not the Grace of God in vain;' but how, in S. Augustine's scheme, is this possible? A man may surely persevere in any kind of labour for a time, and then cease to do so. Every repetition of action is perseverance, and if he continues his perseverance he receives his reward—if he ceases to persevere he forfeits it—and in spiritual labours, if he die persevering, he insures his salvation. Thus, then, S. Augustine's argument is one which, if pushed to its extreme consequence, tends to defeat itself—it proves too much. It tells us more of God's secret counsels than he or any man could know. To lay down a canon of interpretation of Holy Scripture which shall establish that it does not mean what it says, but something not merely beyond, but very different or even opposite to what it says, may prove in the end highly perilous to, if not wholly destructive of the existence of, all true faith.

On the other hand, S. Augustine says of *free-will*:—"As the doctrine of Grace involves salvation, so does the doctrine of the judgment involve free-will, which is not to be denied, nor is it to be separated from Grace as if self-sufficient for thought or action. It is proved from Scripture, and shown in men both when they sin and when they act *secundum Deum*." It is shown as regards understanding, from Psal. xciv. 8, "Understand, ye brutish among the people;" but it is not to be separated from the adjutorium of God, Psal. cxix. 73, "Give me understanding," &c.² "The victory by which sin is conquered is nothing but the gift of God helping the free-will in the contest; *e.g.* the commandment, "Watch and pray," and neither without the other, shows the cooperation of Divine Grace and human will;" a sentence which may show what was the doctrine of the will when viewed by S. Augustine without relation to the opposition of the Pelagian heresy. He says again, "If you will, you will keep the commandments, that the man who wills and is not able may know that he does not yet will fully, and may pray to have so much will as suffices to fulfil them." So, "The sinner, after regeneration and justification, cannot say, "I have not received Grace," because the Grace of God which he had received he has lost through his free-will to evil. But to work and to believe," he continues, "are ours, because of our free-will, and both are given to us."³ "He does not mean to deny free-will, but to assert it." This chain of doctrine, however, leaves no room for the assertion of that independent self-action of free-will which constitutes free-will, and, consequently, Mr. Mozley, in his chapter on S. Augustine's doctrine of free-will, shows, first, that S. Augustine's language on this subject only comes up to the admission of the *existence* of the will, which is not denied; and secondly, that it not only does not state the doctrine of *free-will*, but in fact opposes it, "his language being that the will has, notwithstanding its freedom, no self-determining power, but is determined to evil and to good respectively by original sin and by Grace."

It is true that the Greeks, who had questions so widely different to settle, may have shown, on the subject of free-will, less of dialectical skill and more of faith, but we question whether, on close examination, it will not be found that the difference between them and S. Augustine on *the* point of pre-

¹ S. Augustine's doctrine, generally, is, that man is a free agent as to evil, but not as to good; he sins of himself, he does good not of himself, but only through the Grace of God in him. Pelagius' doctrine was that the will is able to do good of itself alone, without the aid of Divine Grace.

² Letter I. to Valentinus, § 7. ³ De Correptione, § 9. De Gratia Christi, § 30.

destination in itself and taken at large, is *not* merely one of accident, and whether their system does not contain at least the germ of a doctrine differing from that of S. Augustine. We think that they would say, that in such sense as that in which God gives us life, thought, power of motion, action, and the like, and having given them, makes them henceforth verily ours, He gave us power to choose good or evil; whilst S. Augustine's doctrine seems to resolve itself into one of two alternatives—either we have it given to us, and if so, we cannot but use it profitably, or we have it not. Calvin at least seems to have been of this opinion; for he says 'that the Greek fathers, and especially S. Chrysostom, are to be opposed to S. Augustine on 'the side of upholding the powers of the human will.'

In a word, the voice of the early Greek Church would seem to show that there may be an alternative between Semi-Pelagianism and Augustinianism; that the will must first be moved by Grace, and Grace must begin all motion of the heart towards Grace; but after that, the will receives or rejects Grace offered or bestowed by Baptism, *i. e.* Grace is first irresistible, and then cooperating. What else, in fact, does S. Paul teach when he says that Christians were in a state of nature (under different metaphors, and in different parts of his writings), but now, by no wish or act of their own, perhaps even by an overruling of their own wishes,—an irresistible Grace by an *opus operatum* (in ordinary cases the sacrament of Baptism) was given them, after which they are called on to keep their Grace, *i. e.*, not that they cannot lose it, and therefore it is indefectible, but that they can lose it, and therefore it is defectible and cooperative.

Even the case of Jacob and Esau, on which S. Augustine lays so much stress, and so frequently recurs to, hardly seems conclusive of his view, for the actual rejection of Esau was for the selling of his birthright. He had power to do this or not to do it, and he did it. He did it himself; God did in no manner compel him to do it; and because he did it, and committed the great sins which accompanied it and were signified by it, therefore he was cast out. Who can say but that if he had resisted that temptation, to give things heavenly for those earthly, to barter high Grace and blessing for 'a morsel of meat,' the birth curse might have been reversed at last? So God indeed hardened Pharaoh's heart, but He did so, as S. Augustine confesses, because Pharaoh had previously hardened his own heart.

The final question, then, is whether, in S. Augustine's opinion, the term *free-will* can be used of man at all or not. If

¹ Institutes, Book II, chap. ii.

it be said that, as creatures, there is no free-will properly to be predicated of us, the position is at least intelligible; but if free-will be allowed in any manner and in any degree, it remains to be asked on what authority it is decided to be wholly on one side. If reference is made, in reply, to S. Paul's words to the Romans, 'In me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing,' those words, if taken in the strictest and most exclusive sense, and applied, we suppose, not to Christians but to heathens, would seem to prove too much—to prevent the possibility of any action ever having been performed by men in any degree good, and so would reduce them to the condition of mere devils; but if they be granted to have been written in any degree generally, so far as such latitude of sense and meaning are extended to them, the free power to good as well as to evil must be granted to men, though the former may exist in no degree correspondingly to the latter; in fact, that the Apostolic doctrine is that the natural will, enslaved by nature and the law of Moses, is now made free by Christian Grace, and that our baptismal membership with Christ gives us this freedom. We are compelled, then, even from this brief view of S. Augustine's writings to the Semi-Pelagians, to conclude that, inasmuch as he still teaches an arbitrary election to salvation or to condemnation, a Grace which is strictly controlling, and a will which is only a will, and not a *free* will, he substantially and in fact repeats the system of doctrine laid down to Sixtus, to Paulinus, and in his Anti-Pelagian writings at large (defending it only by repeating it), but does not reply to the great question, or satisfy the natural doubts, of the Church of Marseilles; and therefore that the real objections raised by them to his teaching, based as they were on truth and reason, still remain.

Having considered at length the doctrines of S. Augustine on Predestination, Grace, and Free-will, Mr. Mozley passes on to the mediæval writers, from whom he selects as the most able exponent of Augustinianism S. Thomas Aquinas; alluding, at the same time, but without citing from their works, to Peter Lombard, S. Bernard, S. Anselm, and Bradwardine. With the works of Archbishop Bradwardine we cannot claim acquaintance; but the others are men of such weight and renown, and their writings for the most part so greatly qualify, in many respects, the stricter doctrines of S. Augustine, that we are ioth to pass them over in entire silence. We must first, however, following Mr. Mozley, state the system of Aquinas.

This, as Mr. Mozley shows, was, in essence, necessitarian. He teaches, in outline, that the Divine will and power was the first point from which everything flows, and the cause originally of the motions of the human will; for although the will has a

motion of its own, and is a principle of motion to itself, it is not the first principle, but the secondary one—that is, God supplies the moving power and principle by which it moves itself, and He is therefore in truth the real and only first cause of its motion. As, therefore, in Mr. Mozley's words, 'The will, as an original spring of action, is irreconcilable with the Divine power, or second cause in nature, being inconsistent with there being only one First Cause, it is plain that, according to S. Thomas, there can be no real free-will.'¹ But the objection 'Unde malum' here occurs with fatal force; and being quite unanswerable, it destroys the whole system. The answer indeed which Aquinas finally adopts from S. Augustine, is to deny that evil is a real entity. He teaches that it is a nullity, a privation of form, as of heat in fire, or of moisture in water. But this answer, as Mr. Mozley shows, is quite insufficient, or rather is no answer at all; for sense tells us that evil is a substantive matter, and, as such, has a real and positive existence. How, too, are we to conceive of a thing which is at once a nullity in itself, and yet a just cause of Divine anger and punishment? The practical danger of such a theory of evil had been pointed out ages before by S. Justin Martyr, to the heathen. That fate or necessity would be considered the cause of all things, and 'neither good nor evil would be any thing really and in themselves, but things would be considered 'to be good or evil by opinion alone.' Of this the result would either be a kind of Pantheism or Atheism, as one or the other should be thought to prevail in the world.

Mr. Mozley's answer to S. Thomas is both forcible and just. He says that the true solution of the question is our ignorance. The schoolmen treated the Divine power as a known premiss, with which it was necessary to reconcile facts; whereas, to use Mr. Mozley's very forcible words, 'As an unknown premiss, the Divine power is in no contradiction to the fact of evil; for we must know what a truth is before we see a contradiction in it to another truth, and, with no contradiction, no solution would have been wanted.'² Mr. Mozley is, we think, correct as well in history as in metaphysics. S. Augustine himself, indeed, seems to feel this difficulty, when in his 'De Hæresibus' he has to oppose, on the one hand, Colluthus, who denied that God was, in all senses, the author of evil; as contradicting the words of Isaiah, 'I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I, the Lord, do all these things' (xlv. 7); to which we may add Amos iii. 6, 'Shall there be evil in the city, and the Lord hath not done it?' And on the other, Florinus.

¹ Page 260.² Page 276.

who, in plain contradiction of Genesis i. 31, &c., 'God saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good,' taught that He directly created evil. We think that his explanation of the error of Colluthus will scarcely be thought final or satisfactory, 'Creat Deus mala, pœnas justas irrogando,' although his continuation against Florinus would appear both true and sufficient—'Non autem malas creando naturas atque substantias, in quantum sunt naturæ atque substantiæ.' Nor does this assertion at all involve the necessity of denying the substantial nature of evil; at least the adage, 'Ex nihilo nihil fit' would support us in saying, that if evil is a mere nullity, there can be no substantially evil work done, for something cannot be produced from nothing.

On this theory of necessity S. Thomas grafted, in the main, that of S. Augustine on predestination and irresistible Grace; that is, in Mr. Mozley's words, 'a Grace given in the first instance as a free gift of God, and sustained afterwards by the supporting power of God, exerted gratuitously and arbitrarily.' It was a Grace which depended neither in its first bestowal, nor in its continuance, on the will of the subject; but it is 'a gratuitous act of God's sustaining power, who keeps up the moral and spiritual fabric as He does that of the material world, so long as it suits His sovereign will and pleasure, and 'no longer.'" But although absolute predestination and irresistible Grace were thus taught by Aquinas, as they had been by S. Augustine, the former greatly modified the scheme of the latter. S. Augustine acknowledges predestination and reprobation as based on, and commencing from the Fall, and involving a distinction, as Mr. Mozley says, between positive good and positive evil, and as being their consequences. Aquinas reduced this distinction to one between higher and lower good. Giving more room to the remains of natural virtue in man, he admitted a kind of happiness adapted to the former; a happiness to be arrived at by nature, as that of heaven is the gift of grace. Yet, although he was compelled, as S. Augustine's disciple, 'formally to adopt his master's distinction between the natural and spiritual man, as one of positive good and evil, and to use the terms predestination and reprobation, as involving salvation or condemnation,

'Yet a careful observation of his language will detect a contest between two different rationales in his mind; the Clementine view of human nature struggling with the Augustinian. Reprobation, maintained on one side in full severity, is softened down on the other, and identified with a lower step in the scale of being; and the rigid Augustinian line of defence for the doctrine mixes with another, which implies a reduced

doctrine to be defended. We are referred, together with an original guilt in human nature, to a principle of variety in the constitution of things, which requires that there should be higher and lower places in the universe, down even to some lowest place of all, which must be occupied. 'The religious philosophy of Aquinas, then,' our author concludes, "tends simply to two different moral creations, a higher and a lower one. The natural man is created, and has the advantages of his creation; the spiritual man is created, and has the advantages of his; and predestination marks for a special glory, and a higher place in the universe; but exclusion from it does not involve positive evil or misery."¹

Aquinas, however, applies the distinction only to the case of infants dying unbaptized, although it would, of course, as Mr. Mozley observes, be equally applicable to adults; for it is a doctrine founded on nature, and nature is the same in adults as in infants.² S. Augustine had, as we have seen, from the effects of original sin, consigned unbaptized infants to eternal punishment: S. Thomas, taking original sin to be rather the corruption of natural good than the subtraction of supernatural, would only deprive them of the Divine vision. But this want, as Mr. Mozley says, is, according to S. Chrysostom, (and we may add, according to S. Augustine also in his other writings,) the severest punishment of the condemned. Thus, if S. Augustine seem to include in eternal punishment those whom he could not know to be included in it by God; Aquinas, on the other hand, by his doctrine of a reward for merely natural virtue, leans to the opposite inclination, and excludes some, at least, from it, who, we should fear, would be its just subjects. On this Mr. Mozley's words are well worth consideration. Having alluded to the tendency there has ever been in the Church to the doctrine of a middle state, he says:—

'In this state of the case it is needless to add that the plain statements of Scripture on this subject are to be implicitly received, as containing certain and important truth. One great division of mankind is seen there, that of good and bad; one great distinction of eternal lot, that of heaven and hell. It remains that those who have received this revelation should act accordingly, and, instead of forming conjectures about a middle state, live as for the highest. Those who accept a revelation generally, are bound in consistency to accept its plain assertions in particulars; nor does this obligation cease because difficulties may follow. Those who accept a revelation, accept, in doing so, a limitation to the rights of human reason. There are great and important differences in the Christian world as to the point at which such limitation comes in; but whether traditional interpretation of Scripture, or a present infallible one, or the letter of the Bible itself is the check, a check to private judgment is implied in the very fact of a revelation, and is the common admission of all who accept that revelation; who *so far*—and a very important and vital measure of agreement it is—agree with each other. But when men have accepted the check in general, they must submit to it in the particular case. There is no obligation indeed

¹ Mozley, pp. 304–306.² Mozley, pp. 307–310.

on any one, to think any individual either better or worse than his observation or knowledge of his character warrants; rather he is bound not to do so; nor because general statements are made in Scripture are we bound to apply them, and bring particular persons under one head or another. An impenetrable veil hides the heart of one man from another, and we see the manifestation but not the substance of the moral creature. In the application, then, of the scriptural assertion, all is mystery and uncertainty; but the statement itself is clear and distinct; and while that dispensation of ignorance under which we are placed, in mercy as well as in discipline, relieves us from the difficulties of the individual case, the general truth is calculated to produce the most salutary effect upon us.—P. 312.

We will now turn to the pages of the other mediæval writers lately referred to. Heavy indeed is the debt of our English Church to those saintly rulers of the middle ages who withstood the tyranny and foiled the rage of the fierce nobles and semi-barbarous kings who would fain have trampled the heritage of our Lord under their feet; who had no affections but for God's Church, no home but in her sanctuary, no object of life but her advancement and prosperity. First among these stands S. Anselm; and if he, like so many others of the Church's saints and doctors, now speaks rather in his actions than in his writings, we should yet remember that the latter had, in his own day, and long after it, an effect on the Church at large almost as great as his life had on that of England.

He has entered at some length on the subjects under discussion; but we regret that our limited space will scarcely allow us to give our readers more than a few of the more important points of his system of doctrine on them—for it is, we think, more carefully matured, if not more profoundly conceived, than, except S. Thomas Aquinas, that of any other mediæval writer. We may be wrong, and if we are, we owe an apology to Mr. Mozley; but we wish that he had discussed both S. Anselm and S. Bernard with S. Thomas Aquinas. It has struck us, from our first acquaintance with the former, that in him, if in no other, we may find, carefully laid down and accurately worked out, a system which is entire and consistent in itself—in perfect harmony with Revelation and fact; and which would show us, as we develop it in our minds, that there is a mean between the heretical opinion of Pelagius on free-will, and the hard predestination of S. Augustine, or rather of Calvin; for there are points in this doctrine considered in itself, on which, if we go with the former, we cannot refuse to go still further with the latter.

On the subjects under discussion, S. Anselm says, in his *Dialogue on Free-will*:—

'Free-will is not the power of sinning or not sinning, or neither God nor the angels could possess it, for they cannot sin, yet Satan and men sin through having it, but not because they have it. No thing and no necessity

compels them, but they both act "sponte," for they sinned through the will, not in that it was free, that is through their power of not sinning, but through the power which they had of sinning, by which they were assisted to freedom of not sinning, and were not compelled to the servitude of sin.'—Chap. ii.

'Yet after their sin they still had free-will, for although rectitude of will is absent, rational nature still has no less that which is its own; for we have no power which alone of itself suffices to action, and yet when those things are wanting, without which our powers cannot by any means be led on to action, we are not the less said to have them in us, as far as in us lies.'—Chap. iii.

'It is never in our power to take rectitude when we have it not; but it is always so to keep it when we have it. Hence, as we cannot go away from sin, we are servants; and hence also, because we cannot be drawn from rectitude, we are free; from sin and its service we can only be drawn by another; from rectitude we can only be led by ourselves; from our freedom we can be seduced neither by ourselves nor by others, for we are always naturally free to keep our rectitude if we have it, even when we have not that which we can keep.'—Chap. xi.

He here teaches the freedom of the will, even after the Fall, in a sense in which S. Augustine, who denies all freedom to good, would not admit it.

Again, in his piece 'On the Agreement of God's Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Grace, with our free-will,' he entirely opposes the doctrine of necessity; saying, that although God's foreknowledge, by which the future that He foreknows is said to be of necessity, seem to oppose our free-will, it can yet coexist with the freedom of the will, by which many things are done without necessity: for if God's knowledge and foreknowledge involve necessity on all things which He knows and foreknows, He wills and will do nothing of freedom, but all things must be of necessity; but if this is absurd even to think, everything which God knows or foreknows as to be or not to be, is not by necessity, whether it be or be not: and therefore, although God must know and foreknow all that is done in our actions and wills, or that is about to be through free-will, yet many things may be done by no necessity but by free-will. He answers the question as to the existence of evil, like S. Augustine, saying that evil is the absence of good:—

'God,' he says, 'does all things that are done, whether by a good or by an evil will; that is, good works or bad. In the good He causes both that they are, and that they are good; in the evil that they are, but not that they are evil. It is something to everything to be good, but it is not so to be evil. To be evil, or unjust, is not to have justice, which is not a thing, for justice is something, but injustice is not a thing. There is a good which is called *commodum*, and there is its opposite evil which is called *incommodum*, which is nothing, as blindness; and sometimes is something, a pain; God makes the latter, as in Isaiah xlv. 7, but to purge and exercise the just, and to punish the unjust; but He does not cause injustice, He does not cause anything to be unjust. The essence of this injustice is the

absence of rectitude, and it lies only in the *will* of the rational creature. Satan, therefore, has not justice, because he had it and deserted it; if man have it not also, he has either lost it in his first parent and not received it, or he has received it but has cast it away, and thus do the foreknowledge of God, and the free-will of the creature, coexist.'

On predestination and reprobation S. Anselm also, for the most part, follows S. Augustine, saying, that there is no necessity resulting from the former, nor any opposition to free-will *as* free; on the contrary, agreement. But here comes in the scriptural view, apparently contradictory, of Grace. Scripture, he says, sometimes speaks as if free-will avails nothing for salvation, but only Grace, and at others as if all depended on free-will. When it speaks for Grace, he continues, it does not take away free-will, nor when it speaks for free-will does it take away Grace, as if only the one or the other sufficed for our salvation, for when our Lord said, 'Without Me ye can do nothing,' He did not say your free-will is of no avail, but it can do nothing without my Grace; and when we read in Romans ix. 16, 'Neither of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy,' it means not that free-will is useless, but that the running and willing are not to be imputed to free-will, but to Grace; for when to one who is conceived and born in sin, and to whom nothing is due but punishment, God gives to will and to run, it is not of him that wills and runs, but of God who has mercy; and if any do not receive Grace, or, when he has received it, throws it away, it is not God's doing but his own, because he remains in his hardness. S. Anselm's doctrine on these points, then, seems to differ from S. Augustine's to the Semi-Pelagians only in containing a larger and broader confession of genuine free-will.

To S. Anselm succeed S. Bernard and Peter Lombard. S. Bernard has infused into his writings on this subject much of that humility and gentleness of mind for which he is so pre-eminent, with a portion at once of his own sweetness and loftiness of disposition, depriving it in a great measure—perhaps as far as possible—of that hardness with which it is invested in the pages of S. Augustine, and which Calvin restored to it with ten-fold force.

He says, that if things just or unjust can be done by necessity, without consent of the will, man ought not to be made miserable, and could not be made happy; for that would then be wanting in him, on either hand, which alone is capable of happiness or misery, namely, the will; for it is the consent of the will which makes men just or unjust, and therefore happy or unhappy. It is rightly called free-will, as being free of itself,

because of the will; and judge of itself, because of reason: but except in the single and peculiar case of original sin; where necessity is, there is no liberty, and if no merit, therefore no judgment. S. Bernard has a noble passage descriptive of the different kinds of grace; a passage which we will give entire, as it is well qualified to raise the thoughts, and enliven the mind when occupied on a subject like the present.

* A three-fold liberty is proposed to us, from sin, from misery, and from necessity; the last of these nature bestowed on us in our creation, to the first we are restored by Grace, the middle is reserved for us in our country (*patria*). The first may be called the freedom of nature, the second that of Grace; the third of life or glory. For in the first place, we were created to a free-will and voluntary liberty, a creature noble to God; in the second we are reformed in innocence, a new creature in Christ; in the third we are elevated to glory, a creature perfect in spirit. The first liberty has much of honour; the second, very much also of virtue; the last, the height of enjoyment. From the first we excel other animals; in the second, we overcome the flesh; in the third, we subject death; or as in the first God has placed under our feet sheep, and oxen, and the beasts of the field, so also, through the second, He equally overthrows and breaks under our feet the spiritual beasts of the air, of which He says, "Oh deliver not the soul of thy turtle-dove unto the multitude of the wicked," (*ne tradas bestiis animas confitentes tibi*), Psalm lxxiv. 19. In the last He will at length subject us to ourselves, through the victory of corruption and death, when the last death shall be destroyed, and we shall pass into the liberty of the glory of the children of God, by which liberty Christ shall make us free, when He shall deliver us up as the kingdom to God and the Father. Of this liberty, as also of that which I have termed the freedom from sin, I suppose He said to the Jews, "If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed," John viii. 36. Free-will signified that we had need of a liberator, but plainly of one who should free it, not from necessity—of which, since there was will, it was wholly ignorant—but from sin, into which it had rushed as freely as voluntarily; and at the same time from the punishment of sin, which it had incurred without caution, and which it bore unwillingly—from both which ills it could not be freed at all, except through Him who alone of men was made free among the dead, that is, free from sin among sinners.¹

S. Bernard holds, like S. Anselm, that freedom from necessity attaches equally to God and to every rational creature, good and evil alike, and that it is lost neither by sin nor by misery, and is no greater in the just man than in the sinner, in the angel than in the man. Indeed, he says, 'that as an angel
'or God Himself remains freely good by his own will and not
'by any extrinsic security, so Satan, with equal freedom,
'rushes into, and persists in, evil by his own voluntary consent
'and no foreign impulse.'²

But although S. Bernard may here seem almost, by implication, to leave open a possibility of Satan's future restoration,

¹ De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, cap. iii.

² Ibid, cap. iv.

this is not, in truth, his meaning, for he proceeds to assert, immediately afterwards, with great stress and earnestness, that 'although every creature has it from nature to will, yet Grace 'is necessary to will what is good;' so that return is, to him, no longer possible, the Grace by which he might do so being of course withheld. Hence, also, he holds, with S. Augustine, that the state of Adam before the Fall was one which could avoid sin, and will good; but after it, although he had still power to will, he had no power to will good. Henceforth he could will evil of himself, but his will could not rise to good again of its own power. His system is wrought out at much length. He also seems to give much more room to the genuine will than S. Augustine, and, therefore, to form another of those mediæval authorities who may be contrasted with him and Aquinas.

Peter Lombard is described by Mr. Mozley as 'more of a 'compiler and collector of facts and references, than an 'exponent and a constructor.' Such is, no doubt, in the main, the nature of his work, although we should, perhaps, ourselves, incline to place him somewhat higher as an exponent, at least on some of the subjects of which he treats, than Mr. Mozley does. The system of the Master of the Sentences, on predestination, is briefly this; he acknowledges, with S. Augustine, that there can be foreknowledge without predestination, for God foreknew those things which He was about to do, as also those which He was not. Predestination he defines to be 'A preparation of Grace, or Divine election, by which God 'chose whom He would before the foundation of the world;' and reprobation is 'A foreknowledge of the iniquity of some, 'and a preparation of their condemnation—a non-election.' 'He foreknew but did not prepare iniquity, He foreknew and 'prepared eternal death, not that, as He prepared the saints for 'justification, He prepared the wicked to lose it.'¹ There is nothing notable in the teaching of Lombard on the subject; he is merely, as far as he goes, the echo of S. Augustine.

Mr. Mozley has given, as we have seen, the system of his chief exponent S. Thomas Aquinas. It is, however, worthy of remark that after S. Thomas there come some commentators on Lombard, or rather on S. Thomas himself, of whom Estius is one of the most lucid, and, what is no slight merit, least voluminous, whose efforts were directed to a reassertion of the doctrine of free-will. The great authority of the modern Romanists, Father Perrone, is merely a compiler from S. Augustine, Lombard, Aquinas, and Petavius, and his pages contain nothing of

¹ Book I. Distinct. xl.

note on the subject. He simply gives a kind of familiar abstract of opinions on predestination, reprobation, &c. We prefer Petavius to him, both for learning and for depth. It is, however, scarcely fair to Father Perrone to institute this comparison, the object of his treatise being so different to that of the more profound and elaborate dissertations of his brother Jesuit.

We come now to the Reformed—and first of these is, of course, Calvin.—Mr. Mozley says, in a note at page 284, ‘Between the Augustinian and Thomist doctrine of predestination, and that of Calvin, I can see no substantial difference.’ On our first acquaintance with the writings of Calvin we thought as Mr. Mozley does, but further and more deliberate study of them has led us to the conclusion that there are, between S. Augustine and him, very wide differences. Enlarging our view beyond the mere subject of predestination, we see that Calvin holds a system of doctrine very different from that of S. Augustine, a system utterly contradictory of Revelation, and which is, if there can be one, a new Gospel and a heresy. We will commence this branch of our subject, by giving a definition of predestination from each. S. Augustine, in his ‘*De Dono Perseverantiæ*,’ says, ‘To dispose his future works in that foreknowledge of his which cannot be deceived or changed, this assuredly, and nothing else, is to predestinate,’ §. 41. ‘This predestination,’ he says, ‘is sometimes expressed by the term foreknowledge, as when the Apostle says, “God hath not cast away his people whom He foreknew,” Rom. xi. 2: that which he calls “foreknew,” is not rightly understood but by predestination, as the context shows, for he is speaking of the remnant of the Jews who were saved when the rest perished,’ §. 47. In his ‘*De Prædestinatione*,’ among many other passages to the same effect, is the following, which we cite as asserting essentially the same thing, but with a remarkable distinction: ‘Between Grace and predestination there is only this difference, that predestination is the preparation of Grace, but Grace is the giving it.’ The words of the Apostle, ‘Not of works, lest any man should boast, for we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works,’ are Grace; those which follow, ‘which God hath before ordained, that we should walk in them,’ are predestination; which cannot be without foreknowledge; for God, by foreknowledge, foreknew what He was about to do. Whence it is written, ‘He hath created the things which are to come,’ Isaiah xlv. 11, Sept. But He is able also to foreknow the things which He does not do, as some kinds of sins: for although there are some sins which are so sins as to be the punishment also of sins, whence it is

written, 'He gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient,' Rom. i. 28; it is not sin there, but the judgment of God, §. 19. To the same purpose, he says very strongly in his 13th Book, 'De Trinitate,' 'The manner in which man is delivered into the power of the devil, ought not to be so understood as if God did it or commanded it to be done, but only as if He permitted it, though justly,' chap. xii.

God, therefore, in S. Augustine's scheme, foreknows everything; but He does not cause or do everything. There are, he says, sins which He does not cause, and these are, in His eyes, sins proper or merely sins. There are sins which He does cause, and these are, as regards man indeed, sins proper; but, as regards God, sins improper, or rather not sins, but judgments. As they came out of His hand, which, as being His cannot be touched by sin, they are judgments; when they have passed through the corrupted nature of man they are defiled, and become sins. Water welling up from a spring is bright and pure; but if received into some unclean vessel, it is henceforth tainted by the impurities of its receptacle. The love which issues from Him is pure love—*i. e.* love—entering into man, it becomes changed by its contact with that which is sinful into lust, and lust is the parent of actual sin. The zeal which in God is zeal, is changed in man, through union with that selfishness which we know to be the final cause of sin, into wicked anger—for the nature of God in its purity, and the nature of man in its sinfulness, are (so far) hostile natures, and must remain such until the greater is reconciled to the less. That the wrong has been corrected and the evil principle restored to good by the Incarnation of the Godhead in Jesus Christ is indeed true; but is beyond our present question.

A consequence, of course, of the above doctrine of predestination and sin is, evidently, that S. Augustine contemplates the first man as created simply to holiness, and endowed with a will to choose, and a righteousness to perform, good works: and although, of course, liable to temptation, yet created that he should resist, and not that he should yield to it. We accordingly find him speaking as follows:—'He created the first man with free-will, and although ignorant of his future fall, yet therefore happy because he perceived that not to die and not to be made miserable were in his own power. In which state of rectitude and freedom from vice, if he had wished through his free-will to remain, assuredly without any taste of death and unhappiness he would have received that fulness of happiness deservedly, of this perseverance, by which the holy angels also

‘were happy—that is, not to be able to fall any more, and to know this most certainly. But because by free-will he deserted God, he experienced the just judgment of God, that he should be condemned with all his race, the whole of which (as yet in him) sinned with him.’¹ ‘Adam deserted God, and he was deserted.’ ‘The help given to him was such that he could desert God if he willed, not such that he was caused to will.’² God at that time, therefore, gave to man a good will, for in that will He created him, Who created him upright. He had a help given, without which he could not remain in that will if he wished; but that he should wish God left in his own will. He was able then to remain if he would, for there was not wanting the aid by which he might be able, and without which he could not, with perseverance, hold the good that he wished. But because he willed not to persevere, it was assuredly his fault, whose merit it would have been had he willed to persevere.’³ ‘We must distinguish between these aids. There is an aid without which a thing is not done, and there is another by which a thing is done; for without food we are not able to live; but yet food, when supplied, does not cause the man to live who wills not to live. To the first man, then, who, in that good in which he was created upright, received the ability not to sin, and not to desert that good, was given an aid to perseverance, not by which he was made to persevere, but without which he was not able, through free-will, to persevere. But now to the saints of God who are predestinated to the kingdom of God through the Grace of God, not such an aid as this to perseverance is given; but such that to them perseverance itself is given; not only that without that gift they cannot be persevering, but that through it they cannot *but* be persevering.’⁴ Finally, Of this number, which is so certain that no individual can be added to or taken from it, they persevere to whom God has given the Grace of perseverance. Their faith is not the faith of the solifidian, but one that works by love. ‘Men not understanding what the apostle says, ‘We conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law,’ have thought that he said faith is sufficient for us, even if we live unrighteously, and have not good works—which be it far from a vessel of election to think, for when he had said in one place “In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision,” he adds presently after, “but faith which worketh by love,” Gal. v. 6. This is the faith which separates the faithful of God from the unclean devils, for even they, as the Apostle James says,

¹ De Correptione et Gratia, § 28.

² Ibid. § 31.

³ Ibid. § 32.

⁴ Ibid. § 34.

‘ “believe and tremble,” but do not good works. They have not, therefore, that faith by which the just live, that is, the faith which worketh by love, that God may give them life eternal according to their works. But because even those good works themselves we have from God, from whom also is both our faith and love, therefore, the same teacher of the Gentiles has called even eternal life itself grace.’—*De Correptione et Gratia*, § 18.

This Grace, the gift of the predestinate, is to be held in no spirit of pride; but with humility and fear.¹ ‘If even to the saints, who are to persevere, it is . . . spoken as if it were uncertain that they would persevere, they ought so to receive it as they whom it becomes not to think highly, but to fear. For who, of the multitude of faithful, as long as he lives in this state of mortality may presume that he is in the number of the predestinate? For it is needful to be hidden in this place, where pride is so to be avoided, that so great an apostle was buffeted even by a messenger of Satan, lest he should be exalted. Hence it was said to the Apostles “If you remain in me,” by Him who assuredly knew that they would remain. And by the prophet “If ye be willing and obedient,” (and will hear me) when He himself knew in whom He would work even to will. And many like things are said—For, because of the usefulness of this secret, lest any one should by chance be exalted, and that all, even they who run well, may fear, whilst it is hidden who shall attain; we must believe that some of the sons of perdition, not having received the gift of perseverance to the end, began to live in the faith which works by love, and lived in it faithfully and justly for a time, and afterwards fell, nor were taken from this life before this happened to them. If it had happened to none of these, men should have a wholesome fear, by which the vice of pride is kept down, until they arrive at that grace of Christ by which they live holily. Now, from henceforth secure that they will never fall from Him. This presumption is not becoming in

¹ We will here observe, once for all, that there were three different doctrines of grace taught in the time of S. Augustine. 1. His own, which is that of a grace, *data gratis*. 2. That of Pelagius—‘Grace which is of you and in you, and which no one can give you but yourself, and you can merit it.’ This is a Grace which, as S. Augustine says, is not grace proper, because it is not given ‘gratis,’ but it depends on ourselves both to have and to use it. 3. The Semi-Pelagian grace. This is really grace as being given ‘gratis;’ but, as they taught, it depends on nature to have and to use it, for God chose to give us grace because we were faithful, as in the case of Cornelius, &c. The Semi-Pelagians, therefore, really confessed grace, but lowered it unduly, subjecting it, in fact, to nature. S. Augustine answers that grace was given us, not because we were, but that we might be faithful. Even to Cornelius, where the Semi-Pelagians take him up, grace, S. Augustine says, must have been given to him first, to make him what he was, and to this grace more grace was added.

‘that place of temptations where the infirmity is so great that security will generate pride. Lastly, this too, which is even now in the angels, will be in man also, but at that time when there will be no possibility of any pride having existence.’¹

The system of Calvin was very different. He defines predestination to be ‘The eternal decree of God by which He determined with Himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All men are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation, and accordingly, as each has been created to one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestined to life or to death.’ The presumptuousness of these words is only to be equalled by their heterodoxy. It is asserted in them, firstly, that God is the ultimate cause of sin—a conclusion of Calvin’s, on which we shall shortly speak at more length—and, secondly, that Calvin knows and can determine those mysteries and secret counsels of God, which are foreknown to Himself alone, and which will be published by Him at his own final judgment, and not before. The temper of mind which could make such assertions without the slightest misgiving of any kind, moral or intellectual, is indeed remarkable—we trust, however, that it will rather prove the Church’s caution than her imitation.

He continues thus, ‘We indeed ascribe both prescience and predestination to God, but we say that it is absurd to make the latter subordinate to the former.’² Again, ‘since all things are in the hand of God, since to Him belongs the disposal of life and death, He arranges all things by His Sovereign will and counsel in such a way that individuals are born who are doomed from the womb to certain death, and are to glorify Him by their destruction. If any one alleges that no necessity is laid upon them by the Providence of God, but rather that they are created by Him in that condition, because He foresaw their future depravity, he says something, but does not say enough. The Schoolmen again rest in it as if it could not be gainsaid; I, for my part, am willing to admit that mere prescience lays no necessity on the creature, though some do not assent to this; but hold that it is itself the cause of things. If God merely foresaw human events, and did not also arrange and dispose of them at his pleasure, there might be room for agitating the question how far His foreknowledge amounts to necessity; but since He foresees the things that are to happen, it is vain to debate about prescience whilst it is clear that all events take place by His sovereign appointment.’³

He speaks still more plainly in the following section; ‘Here

¹ De Correptione et Gratia, § 40.

² Institutes. Book 3, chap. 21. § 5.

³ Institutes. Book iii, chap. 23. §. 6.

‘they recur to the distinction between will and permission, the object being to prove that the wicked perish only by the permission, but not by the will of God. But why do we say that He permits, but only because He wills? Nor indeed is there any probability in the thing itself that man brought death upon himself merely by the permission, and not by the ordination of God—as if God had not determined what He wished the condition of the chief of his creatures to be.’ In the beginning of this book he says, (as against S. Bernard), ‘Many professing a desire to defend the Deity from an invidious charge, admit the doctrine of election, but deny that any one is reprobated. This they do ignorantly and childishly—since there could be no election without its opposite reprobation.’

We have heard S. Augustine on the original state of Adam. Let us now listen to the very different statement of Calvin. ‘They deny that it is even said in distinct terms that God decreed that Adam should perish by his revolt. As if the same God, who is declared in Scripture to do whatever He pleases, could have made his noblest creatures without any special purpose. They say that, in accordance with free-will, he was to be the architect of his own fortune, that God had decreed nothing but to treat him according to his desert. If this frigid fiction is received, where will be the omnipotence of God, by which, according to his secret counsel, on which everything depends, He rules over all? Again, how is it that the fall of Adam involves so many nations and their infant children in eternal death without remedy, unless that it so seemed meet to God? The decree I admit is dreadful, and yet it is impossible to deny that God foreknew what the end of man was to be before He made him, *and foreknew because He had so ordained by His decree.* Nor ought it to seem absurd when I say that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin of his posterity, but also at His own pleasure, arranged it. For as it belongs to His wisdom to foreknow all future events, so it belongs to His power to rule and govern them by His hand.’ And he concludes—‘The first man fell because God deemed it meet that he should fall—why He deemed it meet, we know not. It is certain, however, that it was just, because He saw that His own glory would thereby be displayed.’—Institutes, Book iii, Chap. 23, §§ 7, 8.

If in any manner reprobation is implied in the writings of S. Augustine, it is always as the result of Adam’s sin, and but for this he holds that it would not have been. Calvin, however, leaving that fact entirely out of sight, ascribes it wholly to God’s will, that so, as he assumes, His glory might be immediately magnified. ‘From other passages’ (than Isaiah xiv. 27, ‘The

* Lord of Hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannul it? and
 * His hand that is stretched out, and who shall turn it back?")
 * in which God is said to draw or bend Satan himself, and all
 * the reprobate to His will, a more difficult question arises. For
 * the carnal mind can scarcely comprehend how, when acting by
 * their means, He contracts no taint from their impurity, nay,
 * how in a common operation He is exempt from all guilt, and
 * can justly condemn His own ministers. Hence a distinction
 * has been invented between doing and permitting, because to
 * many it seemed altogether inexplicable how Satan and all the
 * wicked are so under the hand and authority of God, that He
 * directs their malice to whatever end He pleases, and employs
 * their iniquities to execute His judgments. The modesty of
 * those who are thus alarmed at the appearance of absurdity
 * might perhaps be excused, did they not endeavour to vindicate
 * the justice of God from every semblance of stigma, by defend-
 * ing an untruth. It seems absurd that man should be blinded
 * by the will and command of God, and yet be forthwith punished
 * for his blindness. Hence recourse is had to the evasion that
 * this is done only by the permission, and not also by the will, of
 * God. He, Himself, however, openly declaring that He *does*
 * this, repudiates the evasion. That men do *nothing* save at the
 * secret instigation of God, and do not discuss and deliberate on
 * anything but what He previously decreed with Himself, and
 * brings to pass by His secret direction, is proved by numberless
 * clear passages of Scripture.—Book I. chap. xviii. § 1.

We have heard how S. Augustine treats the rejection of
 Esau; let us now hear Calvin: 'We now come,' he says, 'to
 the reprobate, to whom the Apostle at the same time refers.
 * (Rom. ix. 13). For as Jacob, who, as yet, had merited nothing
 * by good works, is assumed into favour, so Esau, while as yet
 * unpolluted by any crime, is hated. If we turn our view to
 * works, we do injustice to the Apostle, as if he had failed to see
 * the very thing which is clear to us. Moreover, there is com-
 * plete proof of his not having seen it, since he expressly insists
 * that when as yet they had done neither good nor evil, the one
 * was elected, the other rejected, in order to prove that the founda-
 * tion of the Divine predestination is not in works. Then, after
 * stating the objection, is God unjust? instead of employing
 * what would have been the surest and plainest defence of His
 * justice, namely, that God had recompensed Esau according to
 * his wickedness, he is contented with a different solution,
 * namely, that the reprobate are expressly raised up *in order* that
 * the glory of God might thereby be displayed. At last he
 * concludes that "God hath mercy on whom He will have
 * mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth," Rom. ix. 18. 'You

‘see how he refers both to the same pleasure of God. Therefore ‘if we cannot assign any reason for His bestowing mercy ‘on this people, but just that it so pleases Him, neither can we ‘have any reason for His reprobating others but His will. ‘When God is said to visit in mercy, or to harden whom He ‘will, men are reminded that they are not to seek for any ‘cause beyond His will.’—Book III. chap. xxii. § 11.

S. Augustine then lays stress on the rejection of Esau from his birth, and so does Calvin. But the difference between them lies in this, that S. Augustine bases that rejection on the sin of Adam, whilst Calvin ascribes it to God’s will and pleasure merely, as if the other cause had no existence whatever. Esau is not, according to him, punished for the sin that is in him, but in order that God’s glory may be increased. Not as S. Augustine teaches, and as all men hold with him, that God overrules evil to the increase of His own glory, but that He directly causes it to that end. Few, we suppose, will be bound by the false and shallow sophistry with which the above extract concludes. Calvin’s system may indeed require, that its recipient ask no question, to which it is not convenient for its author to reply, but with which, if answered, the system itself falls utterly to the ground. We submit, not only that we may seek, but that we are bound to seek for ‘a cause beyond God’s ‘will in the condemnation of the wicked;’ for there is such a cause expressly revealed to us; God wills to harden the hearts of impenitent sinners for the same reason which caused Him to harden Pharaoh’s, namely, because he hardened his own heart; ‘grace for grace’ has its complement, and that is hardening for hardening.

But how, if God so wills that sin should be, and so caused Adam to sin, does not the guilt lie *not* on the creature who commits the sin, but on Him who irresistibly causes it to be committed? This Calvin must tell us. Accordingly, forgetful of the axiom, ‘Qui facit per alium facit per se,’ he says that the guilt rests with Satan or those evil men who actually do what God, however, causes them to do. ‘God often acts in the ‘reprobate by the agency of Satan, but in such a manner that ‘Satan himself performs his part, just as he is impelled, and ‘succeeds only in so far as he is permitted.’—Book I. chap. xviii. § 2. Again, he says still more strongly: ‘Instrumentum ‘cum sit (Satanas) iræ Dei pro Ejus nutu atque imperio huc ‘atque illuc se inflectere ad exequenda Ejus justa judicia.’—Book II. chap. iv. § 2; and he admits that the same act may be ascribed to God as to Satan and to evil men, the only difference being in the mode of it, which is to cause, (he does not say how,) on the one hand, the righteousness of God, and,

on the other, the wickedness of Satan and man, to be seen the clearer.

And here we cannot but ask, Is it the truth then, after all, that the only difference between God and Satan is not that the one is in Himself righteous, and the other is in himself wicked, but that they are merely in different positions? And does Satan not disobey and defy God, but merely act in obedience, though it be in forced obedience, to His will? Was it by God's 'nutus et imperium' that he first rebelled in heaven? And do evil men—murderers and adulterers—only cooperate with God? The idea, when stated in other language than Calvin's, is too shocking and repulsive to be entertained for a moment: nor can we easily see how those who have accused him of blasphemy, and termed his God not the God of Christians but of Manicheans, and the like, are at all guilty of essential exaggeration.

We will now pass on to some of the consequences of Calvin's scheme of predestination and absolute Divine decrees. We have seen how S. Augustine defines faith, and a greater than he has termed it 'The substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,' (Heb. xi. 1,) a description regarding equally the subject and the object. Calvin has utterly destroyed this harmony, for he makes faith wholly subjective. Having rightly protested against faith being considered as mere assent to Gospel history, he requires it to be explicit, yet is compelled to grant, from the nature of the case, that it must be in a measure implicit, 'not only because, as yet, many things 'are hidden from us, but because, involved in the mists of 'error, we attain not to all.' He places it in knowledge; that is, not merely knowledge of God, but of His will; yet, again, not in every kind of knowledge, but in a firm and sure knowledge of the Divine favour towards ourselves, founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, and revealed to our minds, and sealed on our hearts by the Holy Ghost, and its issue is a full assurance.—Book III. chap. ii. §§. 1—11.

The result, of course, must be that such faith is indefectible. 'As God regenerates the elect only, for ever, by an incorruptible 'seed, and as the seed of life once sown in their hearts never 'perishes, so He effectually seals in them the grace of His adoption, that it may be sure and steadfast. We must remember, 'that however feeble and slender the faith of the elect may be, 'yet as the spirit of God is, to them, a true earnest and seal of 'their adoption, the impression once engraven, can never be 'effaced from their hearts, whereas the light which glimmers in 'the reprobate is quenched.' 'Therefore as we have already 'said, we again maintain that faith remaining fixed in the

‘believer’s breast, can never be eradicated from it. However it may seem shaken and bent in this direction or that, its flame is never so completely quenched as not at least to lurk under the embers.’—Book III. chap. ii. §§ 12—21.

Of course, with such a faith, there cannot but be perfect assurance with it. ‘God only gives the reprobate a manifestation of His present mercy—in the elect alone He implants the living root of faith, so that they persevere even to the end.’—Book III. chap. ii. § 11. ‘In one word, he only is a true believer who, firmly persuaded that God is reconciled, and is a kind Father to him, hopes everything from His kindness, who, trusting to the promises of the Divine favour, with undoubting confidence anticipates salvation’—in support of this he cites Hebrews iii. 14, ‘We are made partakers of Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence—(*ὑποστάσεως*, substantiæ) unto the end,’—with the irrelevant comment, ‘He thus holds that none hope well in the Lord, save those who confidently glory in being the heirs of the Heavenly Kingdom.’—Book III. chap. ii. § 16.

‘The spirit of election is called the seal and earnest of the future election, because by His testimony He confirms and seals the certainty of future adoption in the hearts of the elect.’—Book III. chap. xxiv. § 1. ‘Moreover, it cannot be doubted that, since Christ prays for all the elect, He asks the same thing for them as He asked for Peter—namely, that their faith fail not. Hence we infer that there is no danger of their falling away, since the Son of God, who asks that their piety may prove constant, never meets with a refusal.’—Book III. chap. xxiv. § 6. The case of Judas he meets by assuming what he cannot, and by stating what he does not, know; that such never really adhered to Christ—with the confidence, that is, by which *he* lays it down that the certainty of election is secured.

S. Augustine, with S. Paul, teaches, as we have seen, the necessity of humility, lest we lose our grace—not so Calvin. ‘Meanwhile believers are taught to examine themselves carefully and humbly, lest carnal security creep in and take the place of assurance of faith.’ Calvin then held directly what S. Augustine did not, that grace is in the strictest sense indefectible, and cannot be otherwise.

It appears, then, that there are the following points of difference between S. Augustine and the so-called ‘Reformer’ of Geneva—S. Augustine, by laying down so strongly Adam’s freedom of will, and asserting that it was in his own power never to have seen death, teaches, with the Church at large, that there was no necessity laid on him to sin, and therefore that the words, ‘In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die,’ were spoken merely as a warning. According to Calvin, their

true sense must be 'when the day shall have arrived which I have predetermined and ordained, and arranged that thou shalt eat thereof,' &c.

S. Augustine holds the view,—presumptuously derided, but of course not disproved by Calvin,—that God permitted, indeed, but did not cause the sin of man; Calvin, that He caused and decreed it; that He compelled Adam to commit it, that He might thereby show His severity, His justice, and His power—for He, by an eternal and absolute decree, predestined the wicked to reprobation and to damnation, before He saw any stain of corruption in them, for the sake of which He had determined to punish them; and afterwards, that He might follow out his decree, He caused them to fall into sin, by which He might have cause of just hatred to, and punishment of them. This he said, not seeing that God cannot condemn, by an absolute decree, any who, having yet no sin, cannot be a just object of condemnation. They against whom He issues such a decree, must have given cause for it, and their sin must therefore have preceded and not followed that sentence. No man is a criminal, and no human judge punishes, before a crime has actually been committed. Nor is the cause of this the absence merely of prescience on the part of the judge, for if he could certainly foreknow that such a man would be a murderer before next year, that foreknowledge would still form no reason why he should now issue sentence of death against him; and is God less just than man?

Here then is the fatal flaw in the argument of Calvin. His doctrine would make God act not merely against reason, but against justice. S. Augustine and Calvin date predestination from a different period—S. Augustine puts the sin first and deduces the sentence of reprobation from it; Calvin makes the reprobation precede and cause the sin. S. Augustine, in teaching predestination, contemplates men as they *are*, namely, under sin, and not otherwise; he dates predestination from the fall, and not sooner. Calvin applies the same doctrine to man even when as yet there was no sin in him. S. Augustine taught, with S. Paul, that the first act of sin changed the previous counsels of God towards man; a fact which Calvin would never have acknowledged; and that when that act was committed, but not before; God, foreknowing indeed that it would be committed, *then* predetermined to separate some men for salvation, and to punish the rest. The cause of the former decree was purely His mercy, the cause of the latter was not merely His own will (as Calvin said), but the sin that was in the condemned. They in whom this sin is washed away by baptism, still not entering life unless God bestow on them not merely the Grace of Justifi-

cation but also the further Grace of Perseverance. The only cause of S. Augustine's reprobation, then, was sin; for according to him, reprobation, but for sin, could not be just.

We are anxious, indeed, to clear S. Augustine from all suspicion of holding a doctrine so monstrous and horrible as that God is in any manner, directly or indirectly, the author of sin itself and of Adam's sin. He fortunately speaks most decidedly on the subject, 'This rule,' he says to Prosper and Hilary, 'is to be held unshakenly; that sinners were foreknown in their sin, but not prepared for it—their punishment however *was* prepared.' Again, to Sixtus, 'God hardens not by imparting malice, but by not imparting grace, as they (who sin) are not worthy of it. For they to whom He imparts it not, are not worthy of, and do not deserve it, rather they are worthy, and do deserve, that it should not be imparted.' And to Simplician, 'We must not understand that God so hardens as if He compelled any one to sin, but those sinners on whom He does not bestow the mercy of His justification, He is therefore said to harden, because He does not take mercy on them, not because He impels them to sin.'

But it will be replied that Calvin repudiates the making God the author of sin; saying that, 'Between the willing and the commanding there is a very great difference.'—*Inst.* Book I. chap. xviii. § 4. Of course he is compelled to say this in words, for it would be simple Manicheism to hold the contrary; the question really is, whether his system bears out this denial. In that he makes Satan God's instrument of acting, and holds that he acts according to God's will, and not contrarily to it, he surely makes God the original cause of the act. If an irresponsible emperor were to issue a decree commanding the performance of some act of injustice, he himself, and not his minister, would be the person really accountable for it. The words of S. Augustine, '*Voluntas Dei rerum necessitas*,' (meant to apply to God's actions after the Fall,) being used of them, by Calvin, before it, make God the cause of the Fall—for the stain of nature, from which reprobation followed (we might say resulted) is posterior and not prior to reprobation, and if the will of God, determined to condemn some, and to elect others to salvation, and chose sin, as Calvin says, and made that the instrument and means of their condemnation, He is therefore the final cause both of the reprobation and of the will which caused it, and man is not to be blamed because it was a fatal necessity, or the will of God, which caused him to sin.¹ Beza taught this, as Petavius

¹ Calvin makes Satan act, as we have seen, '*Pro Dei nutu atque imperio*.' Wherein, then, lies the difference between Satan tempting Eve, and Gabriel visiting Mary? How could the action of the latter be described as done otherwise than by that '*nutus et imperium*'?

shows even more plainly than Calvin his master. 'In a decree of that kind by which God destined vessels of His wrath, whom He would, from eternity, we must distinguish the execution of the design itself, that is, the purpose of reprobation from condemnation. For we understand no other cause of the design than the will of God itself; but of its execution, that is, of the damnation, the voluntary corruption of Adam derived to us. The hatred of God then in reprobating men we affirm in the order of causes, not to precede the eternal counsel of God, inasmuch as we rightly place it in the last grade of all causes; but rather to follow it. Hence it is, that although those whom God in the beginning predestinates from eternity, He, in His own time, afterwards hates; yet in the beginning to predestinate them is not to have hated them, but to predestinate them to His hatred. But, at the same time, when God destines to His hatred those whom He will, He so supplies causes of His future hatred, as that the material of hatred may be inherent in those who are predestinated to their destruction, and also that His justice in following them with hatred, and at length condemning them, may stand forth.'

This Petavius calls a doctrine in opposition to itself: 'For how,' he asks, 'can God condemn any man by an absolute decree, but that He hates him? . . . Those, therefore, whom He wills to visit with so great a punishment, He, by that, hates and numbers among the cursed and execrated, so that the hatred of God precedes the condemnation of the reprobate, and does not follow it.' *De Prædest.*, Lib. X. cap. xi. §§ vii. viii.

Calvin, again, teaches, firstly, 'that faith and righteousness are never given to the reprobate; and secondly, that they can never fail in the elect even for a moment.' *Institutes*, Book III. chap. ii. § 11.

S. Augustine teaches that faith and righteousness are given to the reprobate and lost, from the case of the Devil and his angels, who had once had grace and faith, but lost them.—*De Correctione*, chap. vi.

Calvin also holds that those who are truly justified are sure of their election and predestination, and he places the test of faith in that certain and absolute persuasion of salvation which will allow no doubt of it.

S. Augustine most emphatically disallows any such security. 'What man can know that he will persevere in the performance and increase of righteousness to the end, unless he is made certain of it by some revelation, from Him, who, on this subject, by a just and hidden judgment, instructs not all, but deceives no one?'—*De Civitate Dei*, chap. xii., quoted by Petavius, *De Prædest.*, lib. X. chap. ix. § iv.

Lastly, it is the doctrine of Calvin, necessarily following those which he holds on predestination and grace, that God does not will *all* men to be saved, but only the elect; and, consequently, that Christ died not for all men, but only for these.

S. Augustine, on the other hand, says, 'God wills all mankind to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. Not so, however, as to take from them free-will, by using which well or ill they are most justly judged.'—*De Spiritu et Litt.* § xxxiii. On which Petavius says, 'By these words he shows not only that God has a secret will within Himself, by which He wishes all men to be saved, although in fact they be not made free by the fault of their own will, but also that outwardly by some sign and effect, He discloses that which is alluring and inviting grace. For if nothing were proposed to the reprobate, which they could either embrace or reject by free-will, they would not be able, in that, to use their free-will well or ill, nor, from repudiation and rejection of that which was offered, to be most justly judged.'—*De Prædest.*, lib. X. chap. iv. § vii.

Calvin's doctrine of an absolute decree evidently strikes at the root of the fact of redemption. God wills all men to be saved. Christ died for all men; not, indeed, as the Schoolmen say, 'actualiter,' that is, as far as the *result* of his death is concerned, but 'efficienter,' as far as regards the *virtue* of it.

S. Augustine says on S. John iii. 17, 'He came not to judge the world, but to save it: as much as is in a physician, He came to heal the sick. He who will not observe the directions of the physician kills himself.'

But how, in the system of Calvin, could Christ suffer for those whom God had predetermined to condemn by an absolute decree from the beginning? Thus, according to him, not merely is a Mediator not required, but there is no real place for one. There is no justice to be satisfied, for there is no original act of disobedience against the commands of God; but an act which He originally caused to be done, and which the agent had no power to refrain from doing. An absolute decree one way should be balanced by a counter decree the other way, as Limborch and the Arminians have actually argued. An absolute decree of condemnation is met not by the blood of a mediator, which has nothing to do with it, but by an absolute decree of salvation; and if the shedding of blood was not necessary to a decree of reprobation, why should it be required to one of election?

We affirm, then, that in one of its phases Calvin has wholly changed the Christian faith. As surely as the Church of Rome,

in the worship of saints, transubstantiation, the supremacy of S. Peter, and the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, has put an objective system of her own into the room of that of the saints of old; so surely, in his doctrines of predestination, reprobation, regeneration, (which, as we should have shown, had it belonged to our particular subject to do so, he has disconnected from, and made independent of, the sacrament of Baptism,) conversion, justification, indefectible grace, and assurance, has Calvin given a new subjective scheme for that of the Apostles. But there is another accusation, and one scarcely less grave, yet remaining against him. He has tampered with the qualities and gifts of God. The depth and freshness of the wonderful love of God has wholly perished from his scheme. His mercy is perverted to arbitrary will. The glorious liberty of Christ is turned into mere licentiousness, the wholesome fear and trembling of Christians into presumption, and that inexhaustible richness and exuberance of grace, which so abounds and overflows in the writings of the Apostles, is wholly lost in his. Who from the pages of Calvin could form the slightest idea that the Church had ever possessed a S. John? The 'frigid fiction,' of which he accuses his opponents, may well be retorted on himself. The great ruling principle of God's dealings with man is not, with him, as with S. John, love without measure, but arbitrary will; will merely to display His own attributes. There is no cry of 'Abba' with him, no interceding spirit 'making intercession with groanings which cannot be uttered,' no necessarily healing virtue in the most precious blood shed on the cross. His system is without comfort to make it alluring, and without truth to recommend it. There is no moral warmth, no heart, no life, no love in it; all is cold, hard, dry, heartless, unloving, intellectual exercise.

How different with the writings of S. Augustine! He may have his faults or deficiencies, indeed, as a teacher; he may speak more absolutely than he has authority for on some questions; his writings may not be wholly without hardness in parts; and on many points he may be no unerring nor satisfactory guide, leaving difficulties where he finds them, or only explaining them by others. From what is revealed in Holy Scripture on predestination he has drawn conclusions, and erected a scheme of his own, and in so doing, has, no doubt, by implication, trenched in some degree on the truth of sacramental grace; but still when he does approach the subject of grace itself, how intense and masterly do we feel his ideas and language to be! What a profound unmatched insight he is seen to possess into a subject in itself so deep and so mysterious! Where, out of inspiration, is anything to be compared to it?

One's feelings, on first making acquaintance with his writings on the question of grace and free-will, are of those which seize us once or twice in our life, and can never be repeated. It awes us to see the vast, almost superhuman, power he puts out. We hold our breath before words so wonderfully concentrated on the one point of the humiliation of the creature, and the exaltation of the Creator. What a lesson of humility, too, is to be learnt in the intensity of the abasement of that most mighty mind before a doctrine which declares that man, of himself alone, cannot even so much as form a wish, utter a sigh, move a finger, towards good; but that, if he do so, it is of God's grace alone, and not in any manner of his own power. There is more comfort in S. Augustine's doctrine of grace, duly considered and realized, than in any other in the range of subjective theology.

The doctrines of Calvin, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, had obtained great hold in Geneva, although even then receding from the supralapsarian form, in which they are found in his works, to the sublapsarian. From his dogma of an absolute decree followed as a necessary consequence the denial of the universality of the redemption by Christ's death. This urged Arminius, a native of Holland, but educated at Geneva, to leave the heterodox innovations of Calvin, and teach, in accordance with the ancient and true faith, that Christ, by His death on the cross, made atonement for the sins of all, though the faithful alone receive the fruits of it. This, after more than one preliminary meeting and debate, caused, in 1618, the holding of the Synod of Dort. The Arminians, or remonstrants, were headed by Episcopius, who had been a pupil of Arminius's, and there were present four English divines—Carleton, bishop of Llandaff, Hall, afterwards bishop of Exeter and Norwich, Davenant of Salisbury, and Dr. Ward. Dr. Hall was afterwards, through ill-health, succeeded by Dr. Goad, chaplain to Abbot, the Calvinistic archbishop of Canterbury, and Walter Balcanqual, another puritan divine of the times, was added to their number.¹

The five points, as they are called, formed the subject-matter of debate. They were as follows:—1. Predestination in its two parts of Election and Reprobation; 2. The Universality of Christ's death; 3. 4. The power of the Will and Divine Grace; 5. Perseverance.

It is impossible to give any thing like all the definitions,

¹ Our chief authority for the following account of the Synod is the Latin folio 'Acti Synodi Nationalis Dordrechtii habite.' Lugdun. MDCXX. Hales of Eton was present as a spectator, and has given an account of it. Dr. Heylin, also, has left a work on the five points.

voluminous and wordy as they are, of the different reformed bodies who were present, and took part in the debates. It must suffice to say, briefly, that on the first point the Arminians hold that predestination is 'God's decree to save those who believe 'and continue in faith and faithful obedience to their lives' end.' The cause of their election being 'Their foreseen faith and 'obedience.' Reprobation they declare to be 'A decree of God 'to leave the faithless, who persist in unbelief and disobedience, 'under His wrath and condemnation;' and its cause is 'Impenitence and unbelief, and perseverance in them.' The Calvinists define predestination to be 'God's voluntary decree to save 'certain chosen from the rest, efficaciously call them, justify 'them, preserve them in faith, and at last bring them to glory;' the cause being 'His own will and pleasure alone, without any 'consideration of man's future faith or obedience.' Reprobation, with them, is 'God's most free and just decree by which 'He has determined not to choose some nor call them by His 'Spirit to election, and justification, and future glory.'¹ Our own divines hold that election to life was 'Of God's mercy, by 'which He provided salvation for the elect, and such means as 'should efficaciously and infallibly lead them to it.'² Reprobation they term 'Non-election,' and define it to be 'An eternal Divine decree, by which God, of His most free-will, did 'not so far take pity on some of those who fell in Adam, as to 'snatch them out of a state of misery through Christ, and bring 'them infallibly to happiness.'³

On the second point, the Arminians affirm that Christ died for all alike, 'tam pereuntibus quam servandis.' The Calvinists only allow that He died for the elect.'⁴ The British divines side with the former, saying, 'Christ gave Himself for the sins 'of the whole world, so that the offer of salvation is made to 'all, and they who are lost perish through their own wilful 'fault.'⁵

On the third and fourth points, the Arminians admit the existence of free-will. They hold that 'God wills all men to 'have faith by the Gospel, and gives to all and each, sufficiently 'and efficaciously, the means of grace, if they themselves do 'not oppose it, the Holy Spirit being necessary to illuminate 'and regenerate the natural faculties, and enable them to do 'real good; yet the will can resist this grace if it choose, or 'can work with it.' The Calvinists hold the reverse of the first proposition, and on the second they declare 'Regeneration 'and grace of the Holy Ghost to be both infallible and irre-

¹ Fol. Pt. iii., p. 1, &c.² Fol. Pt. ii., p. 3, &c.³ Fol. Pt. ii., p. 11.⁴ Pt. iii., pp. 88, 103, &c.⁵ Pt. ii., pp. 78, 79.

'sistible.'¹ The British hold that in the Fall the will lost its power, and needs grace to its renewal; and they teach, with the Calvinists, against the Arminians, an indefectible grace; for although they admit that the elect can fall, they deny that they can fall finally and irrecoverably. Throughout their discussions on this article they also, like both Arminians and Calvinists, speak heretically on Baptism, and fully adopt the Calvinistic view of regeneration and conversion.²

On the fifth point, the Arminians hold that 'Perseverance is not the gift of God, properly so called, but a precept and moral condition of the New Testament, for men can fall from grace totally and finally, and none of the faithful can be assured of His salvation, in this life, without a special revelation:'³ a truth, we might say, a matter of common sense, which it has now been long out of the power of controversy to call in question, and which a man would scarcely be thought sane if he doubted, in these days. The Calvinists, however, entirely denied it, with whom our own countrymen agreed, asserting that 'every one of the elect can be certainly assured of his perseverance and final salvation, and placing it among what they call "*Theses heterodoxæ*" to hold otherwise.'⁴ Yet they admit that this assurance is sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker, and sometimes, as in very heavy temptations, does not exist at all.⁵ They place among the same '*Theses heterodoxæ*' that the faithful can sin mortally; that each deadly sin, so far, forfeits the state of justification and adoption; and that the (Calvinistic) doctrine of the certainty of perseverance and salvation is pernicious and deadly to religion.⁶

Yet, although holding doctrines so unscriptural and unwarrantable, the Calvinistic party was too numerous and too strong in political influence for their opponents, who were consequently defeated. The Arminians, in fact, had not a fair trial. 'Their accusers and adversaries were,' as Mosheim truly says, 'their judges;' and, utterly dissenting, as we must do, from much of their teaching, especially that on regeneration, and their statements on the third and fourth points, in which they do seem to come (as they have since been accused of doing) too near to Pelagianism, we may still heartily concur in the decision of the historian just mentioned, that 'the Calvinistic doctrines ruled by the Synod were utterly unknown in the first ages of the Christian Church.'

The Synod of Dort had a very brief popularity, if any at all, in England. Thanks to Archbishop Laud, the perverse

¹ Pt. iii., pp. 181, 186.
p. 223.

⁴ Fol. Pt. ii., p. 196.

² Fol. Pt. ii., pp. 127—136.

⁵ Ibid. p. 198.

³ Fol. Pt. iii.,

⁶ Ibid. pp. 200, 202.

heterodoxies of Calvin were not, in his primacy, to override the land. But, in the year 1643-4, a number of puritan divines, known as 'The Westminster Assembly,' met in Henry VII.'s chapel at Westminster, and composed, and in 1645-6 published, the body of doctrine which has since formed a main authority of that party. It consisted of a confession of faith, and a longer and shorter catechism, in which they assert the system of Calvin in all its most unsound and repulsive parts. In considering the questions of predestination and grace historically, they cannot be omitted, and as they had besides no slight effect on the religious questions of their own and subsequent times, we will venture to give a few extracts, confining ourselves, however, to the Confession, for the catechisms, of course, simply reproduce its matter in another form.

The Confession speaks thus on Predestination under the head of God's Eternal Decree, chapter III:—

'I. God, from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

'II. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet hath He not decreed anything because He foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.

'III. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His Glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death.'

The Confession endeavours to support its doctrine by citing texts of Scripture. In proof of the latter of the two assertions in the above paragraph, it refers to Proverbs xvi. 4, 'The Lord hath made all things for Himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil;' which, however, clearly does not assert what the framers of the Confession intend it should.

'IV. These angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

'V. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to His eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of His will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free-grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions or causes moving Him thereunto; and all to the praise of His glorious grace.

'VI. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath He, by the eternal and most free purpose of His will, foreordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ; are effectually called unto faith in Christ by His Spirit, working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by His power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed

by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.

* VII. The rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of His own will, whereby He extendeth or withholdeth mercy as He pleaseth, for the glory of His sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of His glorious justice.*

On freewill the Confession says, chapter IX:—

* I. God hath endured the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined, to good or evil.

* II. Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well pleasing to God; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it.

* III. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good, accompanying salvation; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto.

* IV. When God converts a sinner and translates him into the state of grace, He freeth him from his natural bondage under sin, and by His grace alone, enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good; yet so as that, by reason of his remaining corruption, he doth not perfectly not only will that which is good, but doth also will that which is evil.*

It teaches an absolute election, chapter X:—

* I. All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only he is pleased, in His appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by His word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds, spiritually and savingly, to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by His almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by His grace.

* II. This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it.

* III. Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ, through His Spirit, who worketh when, and where, and how He pleases. So also are all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word.

* IV. Others not elected, although they may be called by the ministry of the word, and may have some common operations of the Spirit, yet they never truly come unto Christ, and therefore cannot be saved; much less can men not professing the Christian religion be saved in any other way whatsoever, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature, and the law of that religion they do profess; and to assert and maintain that they may, is very pernicious, and to be detested.*

It holds grace to be strictly indefectible, and that perseverance in it is certain, chapter XVII:—

* I. They whom God hath accepted in His Beloved, effectually called and sanctified by His Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the

state of grace, but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved.

‘II. This perseverance of the saints depends not upon their own free-will, but upon the immutability of the decree of election, flowing from the free and unchangeable love of God the Father; upon the efficacy of the merit and intercession of Jesus Christ; the abiding of the Spirit, and of the seed of God within them; and the nature of the covenant of grace; from all which ariseth also the certainty and infallibility thereof.

‘III. Nevertheless they may, through the temptations of Satan and of the world, the prevalency of corruption remaining in them, and the neglect of the means of their preservation, fall into grievous sins, and for a time continue therein; whereby they incur God’s displeasure, and grieve His Holy Spirit; come to be deprived of some measure of their graces and comforts; have their hearts hardened, and their consciences wounded; hurt and scandalize others, and bring temporal judgments upon themselves.’

And affirms that there is an infallible assurance of salvation to the truly elect, chapter XVIII:—

‘I. As though hypocrites, and other unregenerate men, may vainly deceive themselves with false hopes and carnal presumptions of being in the favour of God and estate of salvation: which hope of theirs shall perish; yet such as truly believe in the Lord Jesus, and love Him in sincerity, endeavouring to walk in all good conscience before Him, may in this life be certainly assured that they are in the state of grace, and may rejoice in the hope of the glory of God; which hope shall never make them ashamed.

‘II. This certainty is not a bare conjectural and probable persuasion, grounded upon a fallible hope; but an infallible assurance of faith, founded upon the Divine truth of the promises of salvation, the inward evidence of those graces unto which these promises are made, the testimony of the Spirit of adoption, witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God; which Spirit is the earnest of our inheritance, whereby we are sealed to the day of redemption.

‘III. This infallible assurance doth not so belong to the essence of faith, but that a true believer may wait long and conflict with many difficulties, before he be partaker of it: yet being enabled by the Spirit to know the things which are freely given him of God, he may, without extraordinary revelation, in the right use of ordinary means, attain thereunto. And, therefore, it is the duty of every one to give all diligence to make his calling and election sure; that thereby his heart may be enlarged in peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, in love and thankfulness to God, and in strength and cheerfulness in the duties of obedience, the proper fruits of this assurance; so far is it from inclining men to looseness.

‘IV. True believers may have the assurance of their salvation divers ways shaken, diminished, and intermitted; as by negligence in preserving of it; by falling into some special sin, which woundeth the conscience and grieveth the spirit; by some sudden or vehement temptation; by God’s withdrawing the light of His countenance, and suffering even such as fear Him to walk in darkness, and to have no light; yet are they never utterly destitute of that seed of God, and life of faith, that love of Christ and the brethren, that sincerity of heart and conscience of duty, out of which, by the operation of the Spirit, this assurance may in due time be revived, and by the which, in the mean time, they are supported from despair.’

The reasoning in the last chapter is evidently false. If grace and faith are known to be strictly indefectible and unfailing, and

assurance, as is here taught, ever accompanies it, then, grace being present, assurance can never be absent. It either is present, or it is not. If present, it must be so fully and perfectly; for it is a mere contradiction in terms to speak of a 'shaken, diminished, or intermitted assurance.' If such, it is not assurance at all, it is doubt; and the Westminster Divines should, therefore, either have given up their position, or, to be consistent, they should have taught that sin, or affliction, or, if so be, the withdrawal of the light of God's countenance—though they should have shown how this is not the withdrawal of grace—may, indeed, wound the conscience or trouble the heart, but cannot take away the assurance of the result of that which itself can never be lost. Their conclusion, then, is baseless, because their premises are untrue assumptions.

The doctrines of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, however, cannot but recal to memory those of the Lambeth Articles, which also taught, 1. That God has from eternity predestinated some to life, and has reprobated others. 2. That the moving or efficient cause of predestination to life is not our faith or works, but only the good will and pleasure of God. 3. That there is a certain number of predestinate, which can neither be increased nor diminished. 4. That those who are not predestined to salvation shall infallibly be condemned for their sins. 5. That a true living and justifying faith, and the Spirit of God justifying, is not extinguished, falleth not away, vanisheth not in the elect, either finally or totally. 6. A man truly faithful—that is, such an one as is endued with a justifying faith—is certain, with a full assurance of faith, of the remission of his sins, and of his everlasting salvation by Christ. 7. Saving grace is not given, granted, or communicated to all men, by which they may be saved if they will. 8. No man can come unto Christ unless it shall be given to him, and the Father draw him: and all men are not drawn to Him. 9. It is not in the will and power of every man to be saved. It is well known that Elizabeth caused the suppression of these Articles as soon as they were published, and that Archbishop Whitgift narrowly escaped a præmunire for them. Collier is content to show, from their variance with the Homilies on the same points, that they are in utter opposition to the real doctrine of the Church.

There soon arose a division among the Calvinistic body into rigid and moderate Calvinists. The former held, and the latter—among whom were Usher, Davenant, Baxter, Howe, and others, with the Synod of Dort—rejected, the doctrine of absolute Divine decrees, on the ground that it must inevitably and necessarily make God the author of sin. Few we imagine, if any, in the

Church at least, could be found to accept the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, in all that they involve and imply, as well as directly assert.

The divisions which had been sown by Calvin, and had proved such a fruitful source of heart-burning among the Reformed Churches, were soon to find their way into the Church of Rome. The year 1640 is, indeed, a memorable one in her history, for it saw published the great work of Jansen, the Bishop of Ypres. Our readers would scarcely thank us for commencing at the end of our article a discussion on a folio volume of nearly 1,200 small and closely printed pages. It is recorded of Jansen, that he had read over the whole writings of S. Augustine, ten, and those in particular against the Pelagians thirty, times; and it was the labour of his life to compose, as it would almost be that of another thoroughly to master, his vast commentary on them. As condemning many of his own Church, and giving a certain authority to some of the doctrines of moderate Calvinism, his work has met with Papal and other condemnations; which, however, have proved unable to prevent numbers of his own Church, and some of the most learned writers among them, from becoming his followers. He is, however, deficient in that clearness of expression, the result of the deep and wonderful comprehension of his subject in all its branches, which marks the pages of S. Augustine. Many write to S. Augustine on the subject of predestination, grace, free-will, &c., who, from their confused and scarcely intelligible language, evidently have not fathomed their own thoughts, and therefore do not know, but require to be taught, their own meaning. Their ideas are vague, and their expressions, therefore, cannot be clear. S. Augustine, then, as by a touch of some magic wand, shows them what they mean; explains their thoughts to themselves; fills up what is imperfect in their ideas; and gives system to crudeness, method and lucidness to obscurity. This could never be said of Jansen. As a divine, he follows S. Augustine on all points, as thinking him by far the greatest of all expositors on predestination and grace. To say this is almost, at once, to state his own place as a writer on those subjects. He defines predestination as we have seen that S. Augustine does, and opposes Calvin's denial of free-will, and his doctrines of irresistible and indefectible grace; so that we may well remember his caution, '*Non propter Calvinum Augustino indignandum est.*'¹ He repudiates the idea of an absolute decree of reprobation from eternity, on which Calvin lays so much stress, not only as the first act of the Creator towards a large portion of

¹ Part III. book viii. chap. 21.

His living creatures, but even as an intention on His part so to act towards them before they yet had existence; and with S. Augustine, he dates Reprobation itself after, and not before, the Fall.¹ Pope Innocent X., in his Bull on the subject, and Petavius, indeed, accuse him by implication of supralapsarianism; but, if he do sometimes err in this direction, it does not seem to have been his systematic intention to do so. On the whole, and as far as we are acquainted with his prodigious work, we still think that he is one of the most close and faithful of all the exponents of the system of S. Augustine. But our space permits us to say but little more.

With a few forcible and thoughtful remarks upon the opposite systems of S. Augustine and Pelagius, Mr. Mozley concludes his volume. The doctrines of S. Augustine and his school, he says, came from ignorance of the limits of human reason and knowledge;

‘They commenced with an assumption, which no modern philosopher would allow, that the Divine Power must be an absolutely unlimited thing.’²

Unlimited that is from within—for of course no one would dispute that it is so from without. Hence they proceeded to assert that, if He pleased, He could have created a better Universe than He has; one without evil and sin: and by His simple power have removed sin or changed it to good. But here arises the question, Why did He not? and here it cannot be denied that the doctrine of Calvin, that God is to be considered not only as having permitted, but as having caused that sin should be committed, monstrous and unchristian as it is, is, in itself, more consistent than that of S. Augustine. The fact, indeed, that it is so, shows that the latter must contain in itself, the germ of error; as in fact it does, for it paved the way for the above perversion of Calvin.

S. Augustine, then, from the above view of the unlimited nature of the Divine Power, drew out his scheme of Predestination and Grace; whilst Pelagianism was based, on the other hand, on the opposite assumption of the human will. Whereas the truth lies between, or rather is with, both, and both should be held together; for, although opposite truths, they are only such accidentally, *i. e.* as to time and this life;

“And this is, in fact,” says Mr. Mozley, “the mode in which this question is settled by the practical common sense of mankind; for what do the common phrases employed in ordinary conversation and writing upon this question—the popular and received modes of deciding it, whenever it incidentally turns up—amount to but this solution? Such phrases, I mean, as

¹ Part III. book x. chap. 3.

² P. 325.

that we must hold man's free-will together with God's foreknowledge and Predestination, although we do not see *how* they agree, and other like formulæ? Such forms of language for deciding the question, evidently proceed upon the acknowledgment of two contradictory truths on this subject, which cannot be reconciled, but must be held together in inconsistency. They imply that the doctrine of Predestination and the doctrine of Free-will are both true, and that one who would hold the truth must hold both."—P. 327.

At the same time, Mr. Mozley clearly states the difference between the two systems. The Predestinarian, he says, mistakes from forgetting the fact of the originality of our will, and throws all therefore upon God's will, being unable, of course, when he has done so, to say how God is not the author of sin; whilst the sin of the Pelagian is that of presumption, in that he tampers with our innate sense of sin, and with the infirmity of our will and nature; added to which he wholly destroys the force of the great objective doctrines of Christianity. We would specify two points on which we think *S. Augustine's* teachings at fault. The former is perhaps only an inconsistency; the latter is an error. He condemns without hope all unbaptized infants to eternal punishment, yet he lays down a doctrine of Predestination which does in no way depend upon Baptism, but is prior to, and independent of it. Secondly, he distinguishes between 'calling' or 'choice' and 'election,' and says that the latter, if once given, can never be lost. But, according to Holy Scripture, they are the same grace, and, like every other, can be lost. The Apostle does not say 'Make, or pray God to make, your calling become election, and then it is sure,' but he says, 'Make your calling and election sure.' The Fall, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection, and Sacraments as the means and instruments of conveying grace. Consequently, the Church has allowed Predestination, but rejected Pelagianism.¹

Mr. Mozley ends with a caution to those who differ in religious teaching, lest they be found to differ, not in holding truth and error, but only in holding different sides of the same truth. Applied to abstract doctrines, such as that of Predestination, on which we have no full system of revealed truth, and its bearings on other truths, we heartily concur with his wise and temperate language; but when he extends his caution to the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, we confess that we can follow him no further.

"If the question of grace," he says, "is one which, depending on irreconcilable, but equally true tendencies of thought in man, cannot be settled absolutely either way, it seems to follow that a difference upon it should not occasion a distance or separation: and this remark will apply

¹ P. 328, and following.

to such further and more particular questions as are connected with this general question, and are necessarily affected by the view we take upon, and the mode in which we decide, the general question. Such, for example, is the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. A slight consideration will be enough to show how intimately this doctrine is connected with the general doctrine of grace; and that one who holds an extreme, and one who holds a modified doctrine of grace in general, cannot hold the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration in the same sense. If a latitude of opinion then may be allowed, on the general question, it seems to follow that an equal latitude may be allowed on this further and more particular one; and that if an extreme Predestinarian and a maintainer of free-will can maintain and teach their respective doctrines within the same communion, they need not exclude each other when they come to give to their respective doctrines their necessary and legitimate application in a particular case."—P. 347.

We trust that it is not to be thought that Mr. Mozley means, by these words, to recommend any lax hold or qualification, much less any actual abandonment of essential truth; or that it is our duty to act and speak as if differences *do* not, only because they *ought* not, to exist. He has, we think, been both praised and blamed for this part of his work wrongly. We stand by his own words. They recommend harmony and toleration to those who hold the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration in different senses; but do not inculcate, or even hint at, any union between those who hold and those who deny it, as if, like Predestination, it were a truth as yet imperfectly revealed, or which was to be counterbalanced by some other, as is God's foreknowledge by man's free-will.

The question of grace, in itself, may be connected with the intellectual difficulties he describes; but since Holy Scripture and the Church alike teach us that the Sacrament of Baptism is the instrument of its conveyance to us, we dare not tolerate any contradiction of, or departure from, their voice. We cannot, therefore, but wish that the words above-cited had not been written, or at least that their author had explained what degree of liberty of statement he would permit, and what amount of difference in holding the doctrine he is prepared to tolerate. Whether for instance, he would have those who hold, with the early Church, that Regeneration is the Grace given to the right administration of the Sacrament of Baptism in all cases, agree with others who hold that it is only given in some; and whether he would have those who think it a Divine act of the Holy Ghost involving an entire moral and spiritual change in the mind and heart of the subject, which is begun and perfected in Baptism, unite with such as think that it is only then begun, and perfected gradually throughout life—what license, in short, he would think consistent with an honest belief in the doctrine of Holy Scripture, and the plain and reiterated statements of our own, and every other branch of the Christian Church—that

Regeneration is the peculiar gift of God, bestowed by Him in all cases of proper administration (and in the case of adults of the right receipt) of Holy Baptism, never separated from it, and never given but through it? The absence of such a safeguard is a real want in Mr. Mozley's work. Had it been supplied he would have rendered it impossible for an opponent to say that he had even so much as tended to leave a moral question, for such in truth it is in its fulness, in any manner open. He seems, in more than one passage of his work, to promise something like an addition to, or continuation of it. We earnestly trust that he will, at some future time, turn that half-promise into a whole one. Should he do so, and should the question of Sacramental Grace again occur, he will, perhaps, bear in mind our suggestion; meantime, whilst first principles are being daily called into question, and first truths have to be maintained again and again, he, assuredly, is not one whom the Church can afford to have unoccupied and silent.

ART. V.—*Spicilegium Syriacum: containing Remains of Bar-desan, Meliton, Ambrose, and Mara Bar Serapion. Now first edited, with an English Translation and Notes. By the REV. WILLIAM CURETON, M.A., F.R.S., Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, Rector of St. Margaret's, and Canon of Westminster.* London: Rivingtons, Waterloo Place. 1855.

THIS is a thoroughly disappointing book, whether we look to the contents, or to the time that we have been waiting for it, or to the hopes that have been excited about it. Never were we more tempted to exclaim, 'Parturiunt montes,' than at the sight of these few—just fifty—pages of Syriac, swelled by a hundred pages of introduction, translation, notes, and other et ceteras, into a volume of one hundred and fifty pages. This book is, indeed, a poor little mouse, if we contrast it with the great expectations that have been raised of what was to be brought out of the treasures of the Nitrian Convents, now stored up in our Museum, and heralded so loudly. And the volume has been the fruit of a long period of gestation, itself exciting great expectations, kept alive by occasional intimations of what was to come, so that not we in England, but a foreigner thus speaks of the expected work, in part of a letter which Mr. Cureton prints in a note—'Spicilegio isto Syriaco, quod omnes Europæ viri eruditi tanta expectatione præstolantur.' But we do not refer only or chiefly to the long delay of Mr. Cureton's book. It is, indeed, we are told, *nine years* since the pages of the Syriac text were printed, and much of the translation, apparently, was done about that time, and yet the rest of the work, writing, printing and all, might have been easily done in a few months. Mr. Cureton cites, indeed, the rule: 'nonumque prematur in annum,' and tells us of his own observance of it. But Horace's rule referred not to works such as this; and it implied that the intended publication was to benefit by the delay. In this instance we see no benefit whatever that has accrued from the delay.

The fact is, and it must be matter of general regret among scholars, that the learned editor has been interrupted by other occupations; some of them, indeed, more important labours in the same field, the preparation and publication of Syriac texts. His time, in this respect, has been well spent; but still we can see no adequate reason for delaying the publication of these tracts, except there had been an intention of adding to their number, or editing them more eruditely, or gaining fresh evi-

dence for their genuineness; because Mr. Cureton has done nothing, in regard to them, which might not have been done quite as well nine years ago. And the nine years' delay has kept public expectation in suspense, deprived scholars of the opportunity of learning what the MSS. contained, or benefiting by anything of value which there might be in them. Gieseler and Neander have died in ignorance of their contents; and they have been spared the disappointment of seeing only this poor result of nine years' expectation.

But the delay of hope arising from Mr. Cureton's waiting so long was not uppermost in our minds. What we thought of was the warm and sanguine anticipation of what these Syriac treasures were to reveal to us. They were to bring to light all sorts of hidden truths; they were to restore the true text of the Fathers; they were to reveal what Greek ecclesiastics wished to hide; they were to place the facts of Ecclesiastical History in a new light; they were, as seemed to be fully expected, to overthrow the entire system of primitive doctrine, as hitherto received, and to establish a new one in its stead. We have had, and we do not forget it, the publication of the so-called genuine Ignatian Epistles, from an abridged and imperfect Syriac version. We have had works recovered in Syriac versions which were interesting and important, but which threw little light on the history of the Church or its doctrines,—the Festal Epistles of S. Athanasius, and the Theophania of Eusebius; and we have also had, and we gratefully acknowledge it, the Church History of John of Ephesus. But the learned men of Europe looked for greater and more valuable results. They anticipated much, and now they have the *Spicilegium Syriacum*, 'the Syriac Gleanings,' in which, excepting what was previously extant in Greek, and some extracts of most questionable genuineness, there is but very little of Christian doctrine, sentiment, or history. We must confess feeling grievously disappointed; and we feel this all the more, because we do not see why the book should not have been sent out eight or nine years ago, and then at least we should not have had our disappointment increased by the exaggerated excitement of hope and expectation. It is indeed matter of regret that there should not be a greater number of Syriac scholars capable of sharing the labours of transcription or translation. We should have thought that in nine years there might have been men trained up, if they could not have been found to do such work, to have shared the heavy burdens of the Editor, or to have acted under his guidance. But for much of what is needed in the satisfactory editing such a work as this is, not mere Syriac scholars, but Patristic Divines are wanted. It is to be regretted that Mr. Cureton should

attempt what he is not able to perform alone, and wait nine years to write an introduction, and a very few notes, when the associating with himself as editor a person well read in the Fathers and Church History, might have given us the treatises many years ago, with illustrative notes and an introduction really throwing more light on the subject, and, if possible, drawing out of it some instruction in the history of those early days, which might have given to the tract or tracts, if possible, a connexion with Patristic literature, and hence have let us see what their value is. Mr. Cureton has done his work alone, and it has consequently been delayed for nine years. It is extorted, we cannot but suppose, at last, by others taking the subject up, and seems, after all, to be an immature production. Mr. Cureton's own account of some who were likely to do the work, and to do it ill, will put the matter in the clearest light; it will show also his great readiness and kindness in communicating his discoveries:—

' In 1852 M. Ernest Renan, a young orientalist, from whose zeal and diligence we may hope for much hereafter, in a Letter addressed to M. Reinaud, inserted in the "*Journal Asiatique*" an account of some Syriac Manuscripts which he had seen in the British Museum the year before, and, amongst the rest, a notice of that in which are found the treatises comprised in this volume. Not having seen the announcement of my intended publication, he believed that he had been the first to discover the existence of these precious remains of antiquity. In writing to thank M. Renan for the copy of this Letter, which he had been good enough to send to me, I pointed out to him the fact that they had been already printed four years before. His reply, which is now in my hands, reflects far greater honour upon M. Renan, than the reputation of any such discovery could have done. He is most anxious to repair an injury, which, although in ignorance and unintentionally, he thought that he had done to me by assuming to himself a discovery which I had already made, and to restore to me the full credit—if indeed there be any in so small a matter—by taking the earliest opportunity of stating in the "*Journal Asiatique*" how the case really stood. Nor did this satisfy him. In a brief notice prefixed to a Latin Translation of this tract of Meliton, which came into my hands in time for me to refer to it in the notes of this volume, he again alludes to the same matter.

' Besides the Syriac text which I had communicated to M. Renan, for the purpose of being inserted in the "*Spicilegium Solesmense*," edited by my very learned friend, M. Pitra, I also placed in the hands of the Chevalier Bunsen the English translation in manuscript, as well as the printed text, with full permission to make any use of it that he might deem proper for the second edition of his work, "*Hippolytus and his Age*."

' In the course of the present year, a writer who seems to have been altogether unaware of these facts has inserted, in the "*Journal of Sacred Literature*," a translation of the pieces attributed to Meliton, published in this volume. It appears to be the attempt of some young man who at present has but a very imperfect acquaintance with the language, as well as with what has been done in Syriac literature of late, or he could hardly have been ignorant that my volume was in the press. It has been my duty, in the course of the Notes, to point out some of the errors into which he has fallen, although I could not undertake to notice them all. Whoever

he be, let him not take this amiss. He deserves encouragement for having applied himself at all to such studies; but he will certainly render a greater benefit to literature, and better consult his own reputation, if henceforth he will advisedly follow the caution of the Roman poet whose words I have quoted above.—Pp. i—iii.

That caution is to wait for nine years;—shall we add, doing nothing to improve the work you are going to send out?—only waiting nine years.

It is true, that the tracts printed in this volume are either the originals or translations of works of the second century of the Christian era, a period so distant, out of the wreck of whose once copious literature so few fragments can now by any chance be recovered, that we feel grateful for any, even the smallest, contribution. And we should not speak so slightly of this work, if it is to be regarded as an instalment only. But we are sorry to see that the Editor does not seem conscious of the scanty value of what he has sent out. To Lord John Russell, in his dedication, he says:—

‘The publication for the first time of remains of writers who have been among the most celebrated in the earliest ages of the Christian Church, cannot fail of securing for this volume an interest with the scholar, and a place in the libraries of our colleges and public institutions, in spite of any deficiencies on the part of the Editor.’

Yet what are these works? I. The work of the Syrian Gnostic Bardesanes, on Freewill, or, as it is here entitled, on the Laws of Countries, extending over twenty-one pages. II. What professes to be an Oration (or an Apology), addressed by Melito of Sardis to the Emperor Antoninus, ten pages in length, which we feel sure was not written by Melito, and is intrinsically of little value as a Christian document. III. A few fragments which are called Melito's, but which are (most probably) only called so. IV. An Attack on the Heathen Mythology, hitherto known to us under the title *Oratio ad Græcos*, and placed among the works of S. Justin Martyr, translated into Syriac, but with so much alteration as to be almost entirely a new treatise. V. A letter from one Mara, the son of Serapion, to his son Serapion, both father and son being alike unknown, but whom Mr. Cureton assumes, we think without sufficient ground, to have been certainly a Syrian Christian. Such are the contents of this volume. But we will try to extract, from a more detailed examination of them, something which may interest and inform our readers, and at the same time show the real value of the *Spicilegium*.

I. The first tract, then, in this collection, and in our judgment the most valuable, perhaps the only valuable one, is a dialogue, after the Platonic fashion, on the freedom of the will, by Bardesanes, whom we know better by the Græcised form of

his name, as Bardesanes. He is known as the teacher of a modified form of Gnosticism, and as the first composer of Hymns for the Syrian Christians; and probably as among the earliest composers of Metrical Hymns such as we now use. He was a person of widespread influence, of high reputation, of bland and winning address, adopting the language of Catholics, and pretending to agree with them—thus gaining for his errors an admission into hearts that would have repudiated them in their naked forms. With these moral qualities he combined a fine imagination, a graceful style, and a highly poetic genius. His Hymns won over the hearts of the Syrians, and for a hundred years or more Bardesanes and his views were dominant in Mesopotamia.

If any of our readers wish for an interesting account of Bardesanes and the Syriac Hymns, they will find it in a volume which we gladly take this opportunity of recommending,—Dr. Burgess' translation of 'Select Metrical Hymns and Homilies of Ephrem Syrus.' Beauty of poetry, the deepest Christian piety, and evidence of the Catholic faith of the great Syrian teacher of that day, will be found united there. The introduction to this volume contains in English the substance of what Hahn and others have collected about Bardesanes, in which the extracts from Ephrem Syrus about him are most interesting. We will take the liberty of making some extracts from Dr. Burgess.

'The name of Bardesanes, a Gnostic Christian, stands first in relation to this metrical literature. He was a native of Edessa, from whose river, Daison, he took his name. To this circumstance Ephraem alludes in his second homily against heresies (tom. v. p. 439):—

"Who first by the name of Daison
Surnamed Bardesanes?
He has more affinity with a son of Daison (a man)
Than with the river Daison;
For that stream never brought forth
Thistles and tares!"

'Neander attributes the reputation of Bardesanes for a kind of orthodoxy, to the cunning manner in which he concealed and modified his opinions in public. He says, "Bardesanes, like other Gnostics, was in the habit of accommodating himself, when he spoke publicly in the Church, to the prevailing opinions; he let himself down in this way to the level of *physical natures*." Yet Neander concedes that he was moderate in his errors, compared with some others. "He did in many points really agree, more than other Gnostics, with the orthodox doctrine. He could even write, from honest conviction, against many other Gnostic sects then spreading themselves in Syria."

'It is agreed on every hand, that Bardesanes acquired great influence in the second century in Syria, by the use of metrical compositions, in which he adapted his heresies to the public taste, and gained for them an extensive circulation. This we learn especially from Ephraem, who, from living and labouring in the scenes formerly occupied by his deceased opponent, and among his followers, is continually alluding to him in his writings. In his

fifty-third Homily against heretics, (tom. v. p. 553,) he gives the following explicit account of his musical genius, written in pentasyllabic metre :—

“For these things Bardesanes
Uttered in his writings,—
He composed odes,
And mingled them with music;
He harmonized Psalms,
And introduced measures,—
By measures and balances
He divided words.
He thus concealed for the simple
The bitter with the sweet,
For the sickly do not prefer
Food which is wholesome.
He sought to imitate David,
To adorn himself with his beauty
So that he might be praised by the likeness.
He therefore set in order,
Psalms one hundred and fifty.
But he deserted the truth of David,
And only imitated his numbers.”

‘Certainly Ephraem appears, in this passage, to give to Bardesanes the credit of inventing the Syriac hymnology. He expressly says that he introduced measures, although it may admit of a doubt whether this means that he invented them in the first instance, or brought into fashion some novel ones of his own, or even that he used existing machinery for the circulation of his opinions. However this may be, his testimony is clear as to the popularity which the productions of Bardesanes secured, for in the first homily of the same collection (tom. v. p. 439), he pays a compliment to his skill and influence, while he blames his use of them :—

“In the resorts of Bardesanes
There are songs and melodies.
For seeing that young persons
Loved sweet music,
By the harmony of his songs
He corrupted their minds.”

‘One more passage may be quoted, bearing the same testimony to the captivating power of this modulator of the rugged language of the Syrians. In the fifty-fifth homily against heresies (tom. v. p. 557), Ephraem gives some extracts from a work of Bardesanes in hexasyllabic metre, and, after a quotation of a very objectionable character, says :—

“Thus in his Odes he testifieth—
(This wizard by his blandishments,
And this lax one by his melodies),—
That he dishonours the fair name
Of the Holy Spirit.”

Metrical Hymns, pp. xxviii—xxxì.

‘In the life of Ephraem Syrus, by an anonymous Syrian author, a natural and graphic description is given, of the way in which he was first led to cultivate metrical composition, (*Opera Ephraemi*, tom. vi. p. 1). He is first introduced, saying in a heptasyllabic piece of autobiography :—

“I found the book of Bardesanes,
And was distressed by it continually;
For it defiled my ears and my whole nature,

With its offensive blasphemies.
 For I heard in his homilies profane things,
 And things execrable in his songs.
 For if the body rises not
 It will be equal with things accursed!
 If He created the body for corruption,
 And it shall not rise for ever,
 Behold he blasphemes the Just One,
 And contemns Divine Providence;
 Ascribing hatred to the Loving One,
 And repressing the hope of immortality.
 I have therefore read again, my brethren,
 The writings of the Holy Ghost:
 And my ears were quickly closed
 Against the impurity of that sinner!"'

Metrical Hymns, pp. xxxvii. xxxviii.

Such is the character of the distinguished Syrian, whose most celebrated tract is now brought to light.

To this, and the well-known notices in the Greek ecclesiastical writers, we have only to add the confirmations of these representations of him which Mr. Cureton has found in the Syriac of Philoxenus, and translated in his preface:—

'But thou hast not been mindful of thy instructor, Bardesan, whom his disciples celebrate in their books for his patience and polite answers to every man. Whoso confesseth that boy which was born of the Virgin, that her child is the Highest, he assents to Bardesan.

'Therefore this also, that "the Antient of Eternity was a boy," we have not taken this from Bardesan, but he has made use of it as a means of concealing his own error, and took it from the doctrine of the Church.

'There are some of them who say, that he sent down the Word a body from heaven, as thou saidest just now, and didest assent to thy teacher Bardesan Because thou hast not comprehended the mind of Bardesan, who assumeth the body of Christ to be from heaven.'

The doctrine here alluded to is Bardesanes' denial that our Lord's Body was of the substance of His mother. The first extract indicates his winning personal character, and way of writing.

It appears that this treatise is the earliest specimen of Syriac literature which we possess. (We except, of course, the Syriac Version of the Scriptures.) Hitherto the writings of S. Ephrem Syrus were the earliest Syriac known; we now go back a century or a century and a half earlier, and have in our hands, in its own original Syriac, the best-known work of one who may be regarded as the father of Syriac literature.

The tract was well known in the Christian Church, and often referred to. Two large portions of it, in a Greek translation, had been preserved in the *Preparatio Evangelica* of Eusebius. Of its identity with the Syriac now discovered there can be no doubt. To Eusebius, and those who followed him, the treatise was known by the title 'Of Fate' (*περὶ εἰμαρμένης*); in the Syriac MS. its title is, 'Of the Laws of Different

Countries.' This latter title, no doubt, arose from the circumstance that the portion of the treatise which was most frequently cited, and which appears to have been most generally known, was on the customs of different countries—as the author, in the course of his argument, alleges them. The bringing together these instances of the varying customs of different nations was naturally the most interesting portion of the work, and free from Gnosticism. It is that part which is most fully cited by Eusebius. It was used without acknowledgment by Cæsarius (the brother of S. Gregory Nazianzen) in his *Dialogues*; and in Rufinus' translation of the Pseudo-Clementine *Recognitions* it is given very fully in Latin.

It appears from a statement of Theodoret (*Hist. Eccl.* iv. 30) that the writings of Bardesanes were translated by his friends into Greek; and the circumstance that in this treatise he maintains the doctrine of freedom and responsibility, in opposition to the heretical teaching of necessity, with comparatively little of Gnostic views, probably led to its being generally known and read. In one respect the tract is most interesting—that it is the genuine, original, and, so far as we know, the ungarbled work of a Gnostic writer. We say Gnostic, although, as we have noticed above, the author was opposed to the extreme doctrines of Marcion and Valentinus, and wrote against them, yet he himself held the Gnostic doctrines in a less exaggerated form. Of the contents of the treatise, and the views of the author, we will speak presently. We must first notice the points in which the work illustrates the statements made respecting it by early writers.

The treatise itself is a dialogue, in which Avida (in Greek Abidas) is the person addressed; and so we find it described in Epiphanius. Speaking of Bardesanes, he says, *ὅς πολλά πρὸς Ἀβειδάν τὸν ἀστρονόμον κατὰ εἰμαρμένης λέγων συνελογήσατο*. But Eusebius, in his *Ecclesiastical History*, iv. 30, calls it, *δὲ πρὸς Ἀντωνίνον ἱκανώτατος αὐτοῦ περὶ εἰμαρμένης διάλογος*. This Jerome interprets, '*Clarissimus et fortissimus liber, quem Marco Antonino de fato tradidit.*' Mr. Cureton speaks of it as 'the celebrated Treatise of Bardesan on Fate, said to have been addressed to the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, commonly known as Marcus Aurelius; although, with the document now complete before us, we find no intimation of its having been so addressed.' We are surprised that Mr. Cureton has not noticed the further difficulty in such a supposition, which has been known to the readers of Eusebius, from Valesius' note on the passage—viz. the improbability that a treatise written in Syriac would have been addressed or presented to a Roman emperor. Indeed, we conceive that the simple words of Euse-

bius, ὁ πρὸς Ἀντωνῖνον διάλογος, are scarcely compatible with such an interpretation; certainly not with that adopted by Jerome, that it was presented to the Emperor. Ὁ πρὸς τινὰ διάλογος, would most naturally be understood to mean a dialogue addressed to the party in question, as one of the interlocutors, or as the party *against* whom it was composed; as it is rightly described by Epiphanius, ὁ πρὸς Ἀβειδὰν τὸν ἀστρονόμον διάλογος; and by Eusebius himself, in his *Præparatio Evangelica*, Βαρδησάνης, ὃς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐταίρους διαλόγοις. We should rather suspect an error in Eusebius, or in some very early transcript, of πρὸς Ἀντωνῖνον for πρὸς Ἀβειδὰν τὸν ἀστρονόμον, or some similar words. There is a difficulty in supposing that this treatise was addressed or presented to Marcus Aurelius, which is this:—the birth of Bardesanes is set down in the Chronicle of Edessa, as having taken place July 11, in the 465th year of the æra of the Seleucidæ, that is, A.D. 154; this would make the author only twenty-six in 180, when Marcus Aurelius died—an early age to present books to emperors; and Bardesanes, in his treatise, speaks of his own earlier writings, and of modifications of his opinions such as could scarcely have occurred at that age; nay, in the passage we are about to cite, he speaks of himself as much older than those he is conversing with. Mr. Cureton does not notice this circumstance; it is one of the many difficulties that hang around the history of this heretical teacher. Hahn places his birth much earlier; we must either do this or place this treatise much later; we incline to the latter course. Eusebius, it is to be observed, places him among those who flourished under Antoninus. Of course, if we were to take to conjectures, we might suppose that Bardesanes, who was a man of learning, both in Greek and Syriac, may have himself translated or re-written his treatise in Greek, and addressed it to the emperor; but this is mere conjecture; and the difficulty of the expression πρὸς Ἀντωνῖνον διάλογος remains.

The treatise itself opens thus:—

‘A few days ago we went up to visit Shemashgram, our brother. And Bardesan came and found us there; and when he had felt him, and seen that he was well, he asked us, “What were you talking about, for I heard your voice from without as I was coming in?” For he was accustomed, whenever he found us talking about anything before him, to ask us, “What were you saying?” that he might converse with us about it. We therefore said to him, “This Avida was saying to us: ‘That if God be one, as you say, and He created mankind, and willeth that you should do that which you are commanded, why did he not create men so that they should not be able to go wrong, but always should do what is good; for by this His will would be accomplished.’”

‘Bardesan saith to him, “Tell me, my son Avida, why dost thou think

that the God of all is not one, or that He is one, and doth not will that men should conduct themselves holily and uprightly?"

'Avida saith, "I, my Lord, asked these of my own age in order that they might give me a reply."

'Bardesan saith to him, "If thou desirest to learn, it would be advantageous for thee, that thou shouldest learn from one who is older than they: but if to teach, it is not requisite that thou shouldest question them, but that thou shouldest persuade them to ask thee what they desire. For teachers are usually asked, and do not themselves ask. And whenever they do put a question, it should be to direct the mind of the questioner so that he may ask properly, and they may know what his desire is. For it is a good thing that a man should know how to put questions."

'Avida saith, "I am desirous of learning, but I began first to question these my brethren, because I was ashamed of asking thee."

'Bardesan saith, "Thou speakest cleverly. Nevertheless know that he who putteth his inquiries properly, and is willing to be convinced, and draweth near to the way of truth without obstinacy, needeth not to be ashamed, because he will certainly give pleasure to him to whom the inquiry is directed, by those things which I have mentioned. If therefore, my son, thou hast anything in thy mind respecting this about which thou wast inquiring, tell it to us all; and if it please us also, we shall participate with thee; and if it please us not, necessity will compel us to show thee why it does not please us. And if thou wert only desiring to know this word, without having any thing in thy mind respecting it, as a man who has lately attached himself to the Disciples and is a recent inquirer, I will inform thee, in order that thou mayest not depart from us without profit; and if those things which I tell thee please thee, we have also for thee other things respecting this matter, but if they please thee not, we for our part shall have spoken without any ill feeling."

'Avida saith, "I even greatly desire to hear and to be convinced, because it is not from any other I have heard this word; but I have spoken it of my own mind to these my brethren, and they were not willing to convince me, but say, 'Believe really, and thou wilt be able to know every thing;' but I am not able to believe unless I be convinced."

'Bardesan saith, "Not Avida alone is unwilling to believe, but also many, because they have in them no faith, are not even able to be convinced, but always are pulling down and building up, and are found destitute of all knowledge of the truth. Nevertheless, because Avida is not willing to believe, lo! I will speak to you who do believe concerning this which he inquireth, and he will hear something more."

'And he began to say to us, "There are many men who have not faith, and have not received knowledge from the wisdom of the truth. And on this account they are not competent to speak and to instruct, and do not easily incline themselves to hear. For they have not the foundation of faith to build upon, and they have no confidence upon which they may hope."—Pp. 1—3.

We see the Gnostic 'Disciples,' and their view of faith. It will be observed also in the first words attributed to Avida, 'If God be one, &c.' that the existence of sin and evil was alleged as an argument for the dualistic theory of Marcion,—of a good and an evil God; a view which Bardesanes strongly opposes. This agrees with the statement of S. Ephrem Syrus; that he wished to appear to have rejected this doctrine, though he accuses him of really holding it. He says that Bardesanes really taught with Marcion the doctrine of two Gods, though

he wished to be thought to have rejected it. It seems as if the ground for the accusation was the power attributed by Bardesanes to inferior or ministering Æons, or to the Evil one.

Presently after we find the following statement of his views:

‘But as to what Avida was saying, “Why did not God create us so that we should not sin and be guilty?”—if man had been created so, he would not have been for himself, but would have been the instrument of him who moved him; and it is known that whoso moveth as he chuseth he moveth him either to good or to evil. And how then would a man differ from a harp, upon which another playeth, or from a ship, which another steereth: but the praise and the blame stand in the hand of the artist, and the harp itself knoweth not what is played upon it, nor the ship whether it be well steered and guided; but they are instruments which are made for the use of him who possesseth in himself the science. But God in his kindness did not will that he should create man so. But he exalted him by free-will above many things, and made him equal with the angels. For observe the sun and the moon and the sphere, and the rest of those creatures which are greater than we in some things, that there is not given to them free-will of themselves, but they are all fixed by ordinance that they should do that only which is ordained for them, and nothing else.’—P. 3.

The expression, ‘There is not given them freewill of themselves,’ and what follows in p. 4, ‘there hath been given to him ‘freewill *more than* to all those elements of which we have been ‘speaking;’ are explained by the following statement in p. 5, which indicates the strange notions which the philosophic views of the time sanctioned.

‘But nevertheless know ye, that even those things of which I have said that they stand by ordinance, are not entirely devoid of all freedom, and on this account at the last day they all shall be subject to judgment.

‘I say to him, “And how can those things which are fixed be judged?”

‘He saith to me, “Not in so far as they are fixed, oh, Philip, will the Elements be judged, but in so far as they have power; for Beings when they are set in order are not deprived of their natural property, but of their force of energy, being diminished by the mingling of one with another, and they are subdued by the power of their Creator; and in so far as they are subject they will not be judged, but in that which is their own.”’

To which Avida replies, ‘Those things which thou hast said are ‘very good.’ It would seem that the notion of the personality of the heavenly bodies was one generally received among the Syrian Gnostics; it was certainly the doctrine of Bardesanes, that the sun, moon, and stars being a lower order of Æons, or beings of that kind, were ‘set in order’ by the framer of the world, the Demiurgus.

Avida alleges as an objection the severity of the commandments given to men, and their inability to perform them. Bardesanes replies at length, asserting, in the course of his argument, that ‘men are not commanded to do anything but what they are able to do.’ That the avoiding of sinful acts is possible, for ‘all these things are subject to the mind of man, ‘and it is not in the power of the body they are, but in the

'will of the soul.' Here we notice, by the way, what bears upon the error attributed to Bardesanes, that while those things which concern the soul are not subject to fate, bodily and external things are. What follows is very beautiful:

'For even if a man be poor and sick and old, or impotent in his limbs, he is able to avoid doing all these things; and as he is able to avoid doing these things, so is he able to love, and to bless, and to speak the truth, and to pray for that which is good for every one whom he knoweth: and if he be in health and have the use of his hands, he is able too to give something of that which he hath; also to support by the strength of body him who is sick and broken down, this too he is able to do. Who, therefore, it is that is not able to do what those devoid of faith murmur about, I know not. For I think, that it is in these commandments more than in any thing man has power. For they are easy, and there is nothing that is able to hinder them.'—P. 5.

And again, 'there hath been given to us, according to the goodness of God, commandments without grudging, such as every man who possesseth a soul within him can do without grudging.' But presently we meet with an exception: 'nor is there any one who doth not delight within himself when he refraineth from evil things, with the exception of those who were not made for this grace, and are called Tares; for would not that judge be unjust who should blame a man for such a thing as he is not able to do?' And presently after, page 7, 'for the good is the man's own, and on this account he rejoiceth whenever he doeth good; but the evil is the operation of the enemy, and on this account when man is troubled, and not sound in his nature, he doeth wicked things.' Here we see peeping out probably the views which led S. Ephrem to accuse Bardesanes of really, though not professedly, holding with Marcion the doctrine of two principles—two Gods.

But at this place we must pause. We have to observe that, among the extant ecclesiastical writings of early times, there remain two especially which profess to give a representation of the opinions of Bardesanes: one, the fifty-six and other Homilies of S. Ephrem Syrus against Heresies, which are extant in the original Syriac, some of which were particularly intended to counteract the influence of his opinions, and which throughout contain numerous allusions to him; the other, the Dialogues or Dialogue against Marcion, or, *De recta Fide*, as it is called, bearing the name of Origen; in three of which Dialogues a Bardesianist is introduced as one of the parties in the discussion, and as representing, whether truly or not, the opinions of his master Bardesanes. Of these works the former, S. Ephrem's Homilies, are of the utmost importance in the illustration of the Syriac treatise now published, because the meaning of Syriac theological terms may be most decidedly ascertained

from that writer; those, for example, for *Æons* and the like. And in each case it would be important to illustrate the newly-recovered work of the Gnostic, by the statements of his views contained in these treatises: to explain those views so far as the representations seem to be true, and to show the incorrectness, if so be, in the picture of his system made by his opponents, or the distortions of it by his followers. The difficulty which there is in reconciling or accounting for the various statements respecting him makes this a very important work. It seems clear that the Bardesianist in the so-called Origen does not express the views of freewill contained in this tract; and the opinions attributed to Bardesanes in S. Augustin against Heresies, as they agree with those of Origen, are also different from these. It is possible that the followers of Bardesanes carried out notions, of which hints are found in this tract, about things external to the soul being fated, so as to contradict other opinions of their master. Or again, it is possible that the views of Bardesanes himself underwent a change. Or, what is most probable, it may be that it was the plausible, and, as S. Ephrem Syrus says, the crafty way in which he concealed his real views and passed himself off for orthodox, by assuming the language of catholics, and by the general piety of his tone, which deceived those writers. It is certain that the history of his opinions was either imperfectly known to ecclesiastical writers, or that mistakes were made about him; those writers seem to agree in the statement, that at one time or other he changed his notions, whether falling into deeper heresy as he went on, or cleansing himself, though imperfectly, from the heresies of Valentinus, whose follower he had been. Any how the subject of his opinions is very interesting in the history of Gnosticism, and the preciousness of this tract consists in the circumstance that we have so very few works of the early heretics. We know their opinions through the representations of their opponents; and, however faithful these representations may be, they give us no adequate idea of the same opinions as they were embodied in the earnest and eloquent writings of the men who propagated them. Take any bare analysis, however correct, of the views entertained and taught by misbelievers and philosophical Christians of our own day, and consider how very poorly it would shadow forth the actual living breathing system which they propagate. It would give no more idea of it than would the human skeleton suggest the fair and noble form of the perfection of God's work on earth. Add to this the horror felt by Catholic writers of the views they are depicting, and you have the account of the strange incongruity which exists between the pictures of Gnostic systems set

forth by S. Irenæus, and the fact that those systems were living, energetic, influential, that they spread like wildfire through the Church, were embraced, defended, enlarged, developed by men of high intellect and seemingly noble aspirations. S. Irenæus gives the skeleton, true and faithful in representing the real notions of heretical schools in their naked horrors; the heretics themselves kept back those notions, or put them forth in connexion with the philosophical opinions of their own time, of which they formed a phase, or combined them with noble and religious sentiments. One writing of Marcion is known to have been of such high esteem, that a theorist of our own day would identify it with the beautiful Epistle to Diognetus. A fragment of Valentinus on the Origin of Evil is still preserved; it is a monument of the fine sentiments and great ability of that once influential writer. The present treatise of Bardesanes is another instance of sentiments generally good, and a religious tone of writing. In these instances the heretics speak for themselves, and tell their own tale.

And the lessons that result from such facts as these are no unprofitable ones to ourselves. They show us what the ancient heretics really were. They solve the difficulty which must very often have presented itself strongly to a student of Ecclesiastical History, viz. how reasonable beings could ever have believed or taught the wild dreams of the Gnostic schools. But they do more. They enable us to put ourselves in the position of the Christians of those days. We can see the temptations to which they were exposed, and that their trials were not so unlike our own. The living heresy looks fair and winning; if we saw the same heresy that thus tempts us laid down in the noisomeness of death, we should draw back with horror. The attempt to reconcile those facts of Christianity, which scepticism cannot deny, with the philosophy of the day; and to frame from them a system of so-called Christian faith and practice, is a temptation to ourselves: but it is no strange thing that has happened to us; only the very same trial which beset the early Christians, which misled and deluded them when they were at rest in the intervals of persecution. To know Bardesanes or Valentinus by their own works, is to realize the position of the early Christians. The writings of the Catholic controversialists represent their views simply as they are in themselves, blasphemous and horrible; just as a bare analysis of the opinions of some winning plausible writer of our own time (we will not give any names) would horrify good Christians now. It is some comfort to look at other points of the analogy; most of the telling and influential talent of those days was on the side of the philosophizers; mere Christian honesty, simplicity, and common sense were opposed

to them. To all their fine-drawn arguments the answer was ready: We have received no such doctrine. And the ultimate success was complete. The philosophical Christians of those days flourished for their time. They did indeed desolate the Church and destroy souls: they were influential, like Bardesanes, for a time, but they passed away, and are only remembered as the follies of a bygone age.

Now such being the importance of this treatise of Bardesanes, the comparison of it with the earliest representations of his views, for illustration or correction, is manifest; and though it may lie out of the province of a translator and editor of the Syriac text to do this—yet when he takes nine years to think over the Syriac text already printed and translated we might have expected something of it. At all events, S. Ephrem Syrus ought to have been used abundantly for the mere purpose of determining and explaining the *very* obscure language of the English translation. Will our readers believe us? There are, as we have said, *two*, and only *two*, important sources of information on the doctrine of Bardesanes; these are the so-called Origen and S. Ephrem. *Now in Mr. Cureton's notes there is no extract, no reference, no allusion whatever to either of these writers.* Other writers are cited, sacred and profane; we are referred to Justin Martyr, to Origen against Celsus, and others, on divers subjects. The name of S. Ephraem Syrus is never once mentioned in these notes; when his work must have been the best possible means for illustrating the language of Bardesanes, being his countryman and his great opponent. Now this is one of the most unaccountable things we ever met with; unless we suppose that Mr. Cureton's notes were made accidentally and desultorily, without systematic study or research; for if the editor was wishing really to illustrate Bardesanes, why did he not read the writings which bear upon his works? To give an instance of what is done, thereby to show what might have been done; the Syriac word which M. Cureton translates 'Being' with a capital letter, he says, p. 77, 'is often used for *Æon*. See Hahn, Bardesanes Gnosticus, p. 58, *et seq.*' Now, except this one reference to Hahn, the only materials used for illustrating the Syriac seem to be the Greek and Latin Versions of some portions of the latter part of the treatise. In two places, indeed, we are told that the Greek word corresponding to Mr. Cureton's 'established,' or 'set in order,' is *δημιουργέω*, or 'set in order by the Demiurgus;' and again, of 'fortune,' 'the corresponding Greek is *γένεσις*,' but this is from Eusebius. These are the kinds of illustration which the treatise needs, had they only been systematically done. This would have been better than noticing M. Renan's blunders; as for instance:—

'M. Renan has mistaken this for the name of a place, and supposed the particle and verb which follow to be the name of a person. It is hardly possible to commit a greater number of errors in the same space than M. Renan has fallen into in translating the first lines of this treatise.'—P. 76.

But this we shall have to notice presently.

We left off our account of the tract of Bardesanes, when we felt, and when our readers would feel, the need of some illustrations and explanations.

We proceed. The general argument for man's free-will having been discussed, the first objection is that he is influenced by his nature:—

'I say to him, "After this manner again was this Avida saying, 'That it is from his Nature man acteth wrongly; for if he had not been formed naturally to do wrong, he would not do wrong.'"

'Bardesan saith, "If all men did one deed and acted with the one mind, it would then be known that it was their Nature governed them, and they would not have the Free-will of which I spake to you. Nevertheless, in order that ye may understand what is Nature and what is Free-will, I will proceed to inform you."

'The Nature of man is this: that he should be born, and grow up, and rise in stature, and beget children, and grow old, by eating and by drinking, and sleeping, and waking, and that he should die. These, because they are of Nature, belong to all men, and not to all men only, but also to all animals which have a soul in them; and some of them also to trees. For this is a physical operation which performeth and produceth and establisheth every thing as it has been ordained. But Nature also is found to be maintained by animals too in their actions. For the lion eateth flesh, by his Nature; and on this account all lions are eaters of flesh. And the sheep eateth grass; and for this reason all sheep are eaters of grass. And the bee maketh honey by which it sustains itself; for this reason all bees are honey-makers. And the ant layeth up for itself a store in summer, that it may sustain itself from it in the winter; and for this reason all ants do likewise. And the scorpion striketh with its sting him who hath not hurt it; and so likewise all scorpions strike. And all animals maintain their Nature; and those which feed upon grass do not eat flesh; nor do those that feed upon flesh eat grass. But men are not governed in this manner; but in the things belonging to their bodies they maintain their Nature like animals, and in the things which belong to their minds they do that which they wish, as being free and with power, and as the likeness of God.'—Pp. 8, 9.

We need not pursue the quotation. This is one of the passages which have been cited in Greek by Eusebius; but, in order that our readers may see how far the translations of the early centuries were intended to be exact representations of the originals, they must carefully notice those parts of the original which are not in the translation (or at least, to a great extent, differently represented); and that, by way of compensating for these omissions, Eusebius's Greek has a good deal which is not in the Syriac. To cite Mr. Cureton's words:—

'It will be seen, upon comparing the passages comprised in this and the following pages with that cited by Eusebius, *Præpar. Evan.* vi. c. 10, printed

below, that the Greek varies considerably from the Syriac: there are many interpolations which are not found in the original; and again several sentences of the Syriac have been omitted in the Greek.'—P. 79.

We will give a very mild instance from the passage we have just cited. The Greek is—'The lion eateth flesh [by his Nature] (and defends himself if he is injured); and on this account all lions are eaters of flesh (and defend themselves). And the sheep eat grass (and do not touch flesh, and if injured do not defend themselves); *and this is the way of all sheep.*' We insert the words in [] to show what is in the Syriac, and not in the Greek; the words in () are in the Greek, and not in the Syriac; the words in italics are substituted for the words of the Syriac. The next sentences are transposed in the Greek; the scorpion taking precedence of the bee and the ant.

To account for all this is not our concern. Our own opinion is, that the so-called translators wished to reproduce useful works for the Greek or Syriac speaking Christians, respectively, out of the literature of the other language, and did not think of giving more than a paraphrastic, abridged, or enlarged representation of the original, as the case might be. It was not material to reproduce Bardesanes exactly, but to remodel him for general use. But what becomes of the edifice of the *Corpus Ignatianum*? What standing ground is there left for those who would make a Syriac translation the absolute standard by which to decide on the integrity, the readings, the interpretation of the Greek?

When we consider how Mr. Cureton and his *ὑπερασπιστής*, Dr. Bunsen, fought every inch of ground in maintaining the authority of the text as represented in a Syriac translation, against the form in which it appears in the original language,—how the controversy ran into questions of this kind,—what is the character of Syriac translations? such facts as are now before us respecting Greek translations of that day (which will be exhibited in an infinitely higher degree in the Syriac translation or *rifacimento* of the *Oratio ad Græcos*), such facts, we repeat, were of the utmost importance. Witness Bunsen's eagerness to overthrow the evidence of an Armenian Version that was fuller than the Syriac; of which we shall have occasion to speak presently. This, then, was the very class of facts which were wanted, and on which the whole controversy hinged. Now here is a large amount of evidence, and that of the most important kind; but it was not produced. All we would say is, that if this *Spicilegium* had been published when it was printed, if it had come out in the time of the Ignatian controversy, the value of the Syriac texts would have been greatly depreciated by it. We shall, however, have occasion to revert to the subject in another part of this article.

We will refresh our readers with another extract from Bardesanes, soon after our last citation—

‘And if any one should say, they have each individually a Nature to do so, let him see that it is not so. For there are some who were fornicators and drunkards, and when the admonition of good counsels reached them, they became chaste and temperate, and abandoned the lust of their bodies. And there are some who conducted themselves with chastity and temperance; and when they became negligent of right admonition, and despised the commands of the Deity, and of their instructors, fell from the way of truth, and became fornicators and prodigals; and there are some who repented again after their fall; and fear came upon them, and they returned to the truth in which they stood. What, then, is man's Nature? for lo! all men differ one from another in their conduct, and in their desires; and those who stood in one will and in one counsel resemble one another: but those men whose lust is enticing them up to the present moment, and whose passion governs them, desire to attribute whatsoever they do wrong to their Creator; so that they themselves may be found without fault, and He who created them may be condemned by a vain plea; and they do not see that Nature has no law, for a man is not blamed because he is tall in his stature or little, or white or black; or because his eyes be large or small; or for any one of the defects of the body: but he is blamed if he steal, or lie, or practise deceit, or poisoneth, or curseth, or doeth such things as are like these; for lo! from hence it is evident, that as to those things which are not done by our hands, but which we have from Nature, we are not indeed condemned by these; neither by these are we justified; but those things which we do by our own Free-will, if they be good, by them we are justified and praised, and if they be wicked, by them we are condemned and blamed.’—P. 10.

Then follows the real objection of Fortune, or their Nativity; the Greek, as we noticed above, is Genesis.

‘Again we asked him, and said to him, “There are others who say, that by the decree of Fortune men are governed, at one time wickedly, and at another time well.”’—P. 11.

The answer of Bardesanes to this is important, as containing an acknowledgment of a change of opinion:—

‘He said to us, “I likewise, O Philip and Baryama, know that there are men who are called Chaldeans, and others who love this knowledge of the art, as I also once loved it; for it has been said by me, in another place, that the soul of man is capable of knowing that which many do not know, and the same men meditate to do; and all that they do wrong, and all that they do good, and all the things which happen to them in riches and in poverty, and in sickness and in health, and in defects of the body, it is from the influence of those Stars, which are called the Seven, they befall them, and they are governed by them. But there are others which say the opposite of these things, &c.”’—P. 11.

He states some differing opinions, and proceeds, in that spirit of accommodation of which S. Ephrem accuses him, to say:—

‘But as for myself, in my humble opinion, it appeareth to me that these three sects are partly true, and partly false. They are true, because men

speak after the fashion which they see, and because, also, men see how things happen to them, and mistake;—because the wisdom of God is richer than they, which has established the worlds and created man, and has ordained the Governors, and has given to all things the power which is suitable for each one of them. But I say that God and the Angels, and the Powers, and the Governors, and the Elements, and men and animals have this power: but all these orders of which I have spoken have not power given to them in every thing. For he that is powerful in every thing is One; but they have power in some things, and in some things they have no power, as I have said: that the goodness of God may be seen in that in which they have power, and in that in which they have no power they may know that they have a Lord. There is, therefore, Fortune, as the Chaldeans say: but that everything is not in our will is apparent from hence—that the majority of men have wished to be rich and to have power over their fellows, and to be healthy in their bodies, and that things should be subject to them as they desire: yet wealth is not found but with few; nor power, except with one here and there; nor health of body with all men; neither do those who are rich have entire possession of their riches; nor those who are in power have all things obedient to them as they wish: and sometimes they are disobedient in a manner which they do not wish.’—Pp. 11, 12.

He concludes: ‘We men are found to be governed by Nature equally, and by Fortune differently, and by our free-will each as he wishes.’

The ‘Heads,’ the ‘Governors,’ and the ‘Powers,’ and the ‘Elements,’ represented as possessed of freewill, are the *Æons* of the ancient philosophic or Gnostic systems,—*δυνάμεις, ἀρχαί, ἐξουσίαι*. Mr. Cureton leaves them unexplained, unillustrated.

Now for Bardesanes’ view of this ‘fortune,’ or our nativity:—

‘But let us speak now, and show with respect to Fortune, that it has not power over every thing; for this very thing itself which is called Fortune is an order of procession which is given to the Powers and the Elements by God; and according to this procession and order, intelligences are changed by their coming down to be with the soul, and souls are changed by their coming down to be with the body: and this alternation itself is called the Fortune, and the Nativity of this assemblage, which is being sifted and purified, for the assistance of that which by the favour of God and by grace has been assisted, and is being assisted, till the consummation of all. The body, therefore, is governed by Nature, the soul also suffering with it and perceiving; and the body is not constrained nor assisted by Fortune in all the things which it does individually.’—Pp. 13, 14.

Below he says what may illustrate his view: ‘From nature cometh the growth and perfection of the body; but apart from nature, and by fortune, come sicknesses and defects in the body.’

And again:—

‘And know ye distinctly that, whenever Nature is disturbed from its right course, its disturbance is from the cause of Fortune, because those Heads and Governors, upon whom that alternation is which is called Nativity, are in opposition one to the other. And those of them which are called Right, they assist Nature, and add to its excellency, whenever the procession helps them, and they stand in the high places, which are in the

sphere, in their own portions; and those which are called Left are evil; and whenever they, too, occupy the places of height, they are opposed to Nature, and not only injure men, but, at different times, also animals, and trees and fruit, and the produce of the year, and the fountains of water, and every thing that is in the Nature which is under their control. And on account of these divisions and sects which exist among the Powers, some men have supposed that the world is governed without any superintendence because they do not know that these sects and divisions and justification and condemnation proceed from that influence which is given in Free-will by God, that those actors also by the power of themselves may either be justified or condemned: as we see that Fortune crushes Nature, so we can also see the Free-will of man repelling and crushing Fortune itself; but not in every thing, as also Fortune itself doth not repel Nature in every thing; for it is proper that the three things, Nature and Fortune and Free-will, should be maintained in their lives until the procession be accomplished, and the measure and number be fulfilled, as it seemed good before Him who ordained how should be the life and perfection of all creatures, and the state of all Beings and Natures.'—Pp. 14, 15.

This is a pretty specimen of the Gnostic views, and enables us to see something of the truth of S. Irenæus's representations. And again:—

'Bardesan saith, "From this, that men are not equally governed, art thou persuaded that it is not from their Nature they act wrongly? Therefore the matter constrains thee to believe that neither also from their Fortune do they altogether act wrongly, if we be able to show thee that the decree of the Fortunes and the Powers does not move all men equally, but we have Free-will in ourselves to avoid serving Physical nature and being moved by the control of the Powers."—P. 15.

This leads to a discussion on the influences of the heavenly bodies:—

'Avida saith, "Prove me this, and I will be convinced by thee, and whatever thou shalt charge me I will do."

'Bardesan saith, "Have you read the books of the Chaldeans which are in Babylon, in which are written what the stars effect by their associations at the Nativities of men? And the books of the Egyptians, in which are written all the modes which happen to men?"

'Avida saith, "I have read the books of Chaldeans, but I do not know which belong to the Babylonians and which to the Egyptians."

'Bardesan saith, "The doctrine of both countries is the same."

'Avida saith, "It is known that it is so."

'Bardesan saith, "Hear now and understand, that it is not what the stars decree in their Fortune and in their portions, that all men equally do who are in all the earth; for men have established laws in different places, by that Free-will which has been given to them by God. Because the gift itself is opposed to that Fortune of the Powers, which assume for themselves that which has not been given to them. I will begin to speak so far as I remember from the east, the head of the whole world."—Pp. 15, 16.

We have now landed our readers on the second portion of the treatise which is cited by Eusebius. In this case, as in the former, the Greek of the *Præparatio Evangelica* is printed at the bottom of the page; and in this latter a Latin version also, as it appears in Rufinus's translation of the *Recognitions* of

Clement. With these translations at the foot of the page, the account of the customs of different countries, the conclusion, which we shall cite presently, runs on to the thirty-fourth page of the volume. We may repeat that this was the portion of the treatise best known and most valued, forming a sort of established storehouse from which to derive accounts of the manners and customs of different nations.

As an illustration of the doctrine attributed to Bardesanes by the early Christian writers, that he made man's soul free, but his outer man subject to fate, we cite the following:—

'In every country, and in every nation, all men use the Free-will of their Nature as they wish, and do service to Fortune and to Nature, on account of the body with which they are clad, at one time as they wish, at another as they do not wish; for in every country and in every nation there are rich and poor, and rulers and subjects, and healthy and sick, each of them, according as Fortune and Nativity has reached him.'—P. 27.

Now that our readers may have a little about Christianity—we cite the only passage that indicates any Christian belief in the writer; it is in the conclusion of the tract. Let it be observed that the *fact* of the promulgation and influence of Christianity is admitted; but we see no evidence in the whole treatise of almost any Christian *doctrine*; only going to church on Sundays, and keeping fast-days duly, were the marks by which Christians were known in the second century.

'What, then, shall we say respecting the new race of ourselves who are Christians, whom in every country and in every region the Messiah established at His coming; for, lo! wherever we be, all of us are called by the one name of the Messiah—Christians; and upon one day, which is the first of the week, we assemble ourselves together, and on the appointed days we abstain from food. Neither do the Brethren . . . which are in Parthia take two wives; nor those which are in Judea circumcise themselves; nor do our sisters which are amongst the Geli and amongst the Cashani have connexion with strangers; nor do those which are in Persia take their daughters for wives; nor those who are in Media fly from their dead, or bury them alive, or give them for food to the dogs; nor do those who are in Edessa kill their wives that commit fornication, or their sisters, but withdraw themselves from them, and commit them to the judgment of God. Nor do those who are in Hatra stone the thieves. But wherever they be, and in whatever place that they are, the laws of the countries do not separate them from the laws of their Messiah; neither does the Fortune of the Governors compel them to make use of things which are impure to them; but sickness and health, and riches and poverty—this which does not appertain to their Free-will, befalls them wherever they are. For as the Free-will of men is not governed by the necessity of the Seven, and whenever it is governed it is able to stand against its influences, so also is this visible man not able readily to deliver himself from the commands of his Governors, for he is a slave and a subject. For if we were able to do every thing we should be everything; and if nothing came within the reach of our hands to do, we should be the instruments of others. But whenever God pleaseth, all things are possible to be, without hindrance. For there is nothing which can hinder that great and holy will. For even such as think that they stand against Him, it is not in strength they stand, but in

evil and in error; and this may subsist a short time, because He is kind and permitteth all Natures that they should stand in what they are, and be governed by their own will, but being bound nevertheless by the deeds which are done, and by the plans which have been devised for their help. For this order and government which have been given, and association of one with another, softens down the force of the Natures, that they should not be altogether injurious, nor be altogether injured, as they were injuring and injured before the creation of the world. And there will be a time, when also this injury which remaineth in them shall be brought to an end by the instruction which shall be in another association. And at the establishment of that new world, all evil motions will cease, and all rebellions will be brought to an end, and the foolish will be persuaded, and deficiencies will be filled up, and there will be peace and safety, by the gift of Him who is the Lord of all Natures.'—Pp. 32—34.

This will not, we hope, be altogether uninteresting to our readers. They have before them specimens of a long-buried treasure, of what may well be likened to the fossil skeleton of some extinct species of animal, an instance and an illustration of the life, the Christian, or Pseudo-Christian, life of the second century.

We will not dwell longer on Bardesanes; but proceed to the next treatise, simply observing the value of the publication of such a work as this.

II. The second work in the collection, then, is a Syriac Version, or supposed Syriac Version, of a tract, which bears the name of Melito, and professes to be an Oration or Apology, addressed by Melito, the Bishop of Sardis, to the Emperor Antoninus. The date of it would be soon after the middle of the second century. It is an exhortation to relinquish the follies of idolatry, and to embrace the worship of the one true God.

We will presently give an account of the tract; but we must first premise some observations on what is really the point at issue, viz. whether it is indeed a work of Melito, Bishop of Sardis, or not. It is obvious how much the importance of the treatise would be enhanced, if this could be shown to be the fact.

We may first notice, incidentally, that it ought to be a translation from the Greek. We should have been glad to have evidence of this, which is an item of some importance in the investigation, because it might very easily have been a Syriac forgery; and the eliciting the Greek corresponding to the Syriac, is itself most useful.

And here we must observe, that to notice a point of this kind came naturally into the province of the translator. Mr. Cureton has simply translated the Syriac text very literally; the result is an obscure representation of the *original* author. No doubt it is right to give us an exact representation of the Syriac as it stands; but, inasmuch as the object of the publication of these

texts is to give us, in the only form in which we can have them, the hitherto lost works of the first ages, the *notes* ought to have supplied what is necessary for representing truly the original Greek—so far, that is, as sure-footed conjecture could do it. The translator ought to do this, because the knowledge of the Syriac language, and of the phrases by which the translators were accustomed to render particular Greek words, is necessary for doing it; and also because the same translator, who gives us what is occasionally almost unintelligible English, ought to do all he can to facilitate our understanding it.

Instead of this, which seems, as we have said, naturally to fall under his province, the Editor has written many pages of notes on this Oration, which are, we regret to say, almost wholly devoted to exhibiting the mistakes made by the unlucky wight, yclept B. H. C., who in an evil hour copied in the British Museum that very Syriac treasure which Mr. Cureton had printed nine years ago—but on which he was still in a state of incubation. The mistakes of B. H. C., that is, of a writer in the Quarterly Periodical called the 'Journal of Sacred Literature,' and of M. Renan, (the French scholar who made such ample amends for his mistake,) form the bulk of the notes. Now in the '*Spicilegium Syriacum*,' which is of a high order of literature, containing the very texts of writers of the early centuries, which is to be the subject of research, comment, and exposition; in such a book mere temporary and trivial matter, like the mistakes of a 'young Syriac scholar' in a periodical publication, are undeserving of notice; one general intimation, such as that in the preface, would have been sufficient. What does it concern the readers of the so-called Melito's Oration, in this or a future age, to know what mistakes B. H. C. made—which B. H. C., as he grows older, will himself very likely confess? Yet we have them recurring in almost every line. One conclusion we are forced to draw from it,—that to translate Syriac texts, as Mr. Cureton does, is not in everybody's power. Our readers ought to see a specimen of the young culprit's blunders: we select those given at the end of the preface, or rather the prefatory 'Notice:':—

B. H. C.'s TRANSLATION.

I say that rejection is denounced against those.

Now the understanding is free and a knower of the truth: whether it is in these things consider with thyself. And if they dress up for thee the figure of a woman.

Against this generation.

But perhaps thou wilt say, How

MY TRANSLATION.

I affirm that also the Sibyl has said respecting them.

But thou, a free intelligence and cognizant of the truth, enter into thyself, and if they clothe thee in the fashion of a woman.

Touching this matter.

But perchance thou mayest say,

is my work not the God whom thou worshippest, and not an image?

* And art thou not ashamed that blood should be required of the maker of it?

Wherein thou wallowest on the earth, and yet art favoured. For things which are destitute of consciousness are afraid of Him who maketh the earth tremble.

Was seized by the shearer.

Thou didst lie down against rectitude of mind.

Why did not God create me, so that I should then have served Him, and not idols?

And art thou not ashamed, perchance it should be deficient to demand of him who made it?

Why rollest thou thyself upon the earth, and offerest supplication to things which are without perception? Fear him who shaketh the earth.

Was taken from the flock.

Thou wast reclining on a soft bed.

Notice, p. iii.

General readers are not much interested in B. H. C.'s errors; but they do wish to know what the real meaning of the Syriac is, and, in obscure places, they wish to know what the words of the original Greek probably were, so far as this can be made out. But Mr. Cureton gives us no help here; and, except a very few parallel passages from early apologists, given very unevenly—sometimes full even to the citation of the words of several writers, sometimes most meagre—except these, the whole of the notes consist of exhibitions of the mistakes of this nameless young scholar. And in the case of a Syriac scholar of so high reputation as Mr. Cureton, it was not necessary for his own justification to explain the causes of the discrepancies between his translation and that in the 'Journal of Sacred Literature.'

Is this tract, then, a work of Melito, Bishop of Sardis? The opinion of Dr. Routh, to whom Mr. Cureton sent his translation, is not told us. M. Bunsen declares 'it bears the stamp of a late and confused composition;' but Mr. Cureton assures us that at first he thought it genuine, till he found allusions in it which clearly indicated an acquaintance with the third chapter of the Second Epistle of S. Peter: and then he changed his mind. So at least we understand Mr. Cureton's words; he says:—

'Meliton evidently alludes here to 2 Pet. iii. 10. 12. This may probably be one reason why my friend, the Chevalier Bunsen, to whom I lent the translation of this *Apology*, and who at first did not doubt its authenticity, might have been led afterwards to think that it "bears the stamp of a late and confused composition;" and "for that reason to abstain from giving it a place among the genuine texts;" *Hippolytus and his Age*, vol. i. p. xi. 185†. Mr. Bunsen does not admit the authenticity of the Second Epistle of St. Peter. It is, however, certainly alluded to here by one of the earliest and most learned writers of the Christian Church in the second century, and consequently appears to have been admitted by him as genuine.'—P. 95.

Mr. Cureton himself appears to have been convinced that it was genuine. In 1845, in the *Quarterly Review*, (vol. lxxvii. p. 65,) it was announced, indeed, as 'an Oration of Melito,

Bishop of Sardis, to the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, which, however, does not agree with that cited by Eusebius.' Mr. Cureton gave the translation of it as genuine to Dr. Routh and Bunsen. He evidently thought it genuine while writing the note we have just cited; and also, in the epistle dedicatory to Lord John Russell, for he says: 'The publication for the first time of remains of writers who have been amongst the most celebrated in the earliest ages of the Christian Church, cannot fail of securing for this volume,' &c.—which does not apply to any work in the volume except this, and that of Bardesanes. And he argues strenuously throughout for its genuineness, as we shall see.

M. Renan thought it genuine, apparently; with the simplicity which was too transparent in the first volume sent out by the Benedictine fraternity of Solesmes. B. H. C. argues strongly in its favour in the 'Journal of Sacred Literature' for April last; and Mr. Westcott, in his work on the Canon, having only seen the unfortunate translation of B. H. C., says: 'it contains several allusions to the Epistles, but no quotations from them . . . In this respect it agrees very well with other apologetic writings; and on other grounds I see no reason to doubt its authenticity.' We readily concur in part of this observation of Mr. Westcott's in evidence of the period at which the tract was written, as against Bunsen's assertion that it bears marks of a *late* composition; but we must say, not only that our verdict as to its being Melito's work is 'Not proven,' but further, that we cannot coincide in Mr. Westcott's opinion, or 'see no reason to doubt its authenticity.' We do not think it could possibly have been what it pretends to be, an address of the Bishop of Sardis to the Emperor Antoninus, or a writing of the Bishop of Sardis at all.

Our readers shall have a brief statement of the arguments:—

1. Eusebius enumerates those writings of Melito which he had met with, concluding his list with the words, 'and above all (or after all) *the* little work addressed to Antoninus;' and (iv. 13) speaks of '*the* apology which he made for our doctrine to the Emperor Verus.' Eusebius, then, knew of one such discourse only: and that, as is allowed, is not the discourse before us; for there are long passages extracted by Eusebius which are not in this discourse, nor is there anything at all like them. They could not have formed any part of this address.

2. But, it is alleged, there is evidence that Melito wrote two Apologies, though Eusebius had only met with one, (and we are fortunate enough to have recovered the other.) The evidence of this consists of a passage in the 'Paschal Chronicle,' which, besides mentioning the known Apology of Melito under the year

A.D. 169, has, in the year A.D. 165, mention of his presenting an Apology to the Emperors in that year.¹

Now the first observation we make is, that the 'Paschal Chronicle' is not to be depended on. There is so great a similarity in the entries in the two passages, that it is more probable that the repetition should be a mistake of the compiler of the Chronicle than not. He might easily have put down, under two different years, what he found noticed in his authorities as having occurred in each of those years, when the Apology was really but one; only placed in different years by different chronologers. For it is plain, from the words of Eusebius, that he not only did not himself know of any other Apology, but that no other was known (at least in the Church generally) in his time; as we infer from his marked manner of speaking of the work, and his use of the article: 'And, above all, *the* little work,' &c.—that is, the well-known Apology. If, then, another Apology of Melito's existed, it was not then known to the Greek-speaking Christian world. It had been early removed into the regions of Syria, and there translated; and was lying hid in those parts till it has now come back to claim its rightful place. It is plain that some decisive evidence is necessary to prove this claim. We believe there is none but the party's own assertion. The treatise is headed: 'An Oration of Meliton, the philosopher, 'who was in the presence of Antoninus Caesar, and bade the same 'Caesar know God, and showed him the way of truth. And 'he began speaking after this manner. Melito saith: It is not 'an easy matter readily to bring into the right way that man who 'has been a long time preoccupied by error.' There is no allusion whatever to the Emperor in the body of the tract: no semblance of its being a defence or argument addressed to any one. It is a hortatory treatise, but it ends with a few words addressed to Antoninus:—

'But when thou, O Antonius (Antoninus) Caesar shalt learn these things thyself, and thy children also with thee, thou wilt bequeath to them an eternal inheritance which fadeth not away; and thou wilt deliver thine own soul, and also the soul of thy children from that which is about to befall the whole earth in the judgment of truth and righteousness. Because, as thou hast acknowledged Him here, He will acknowledge thee there; and if thou esteem him great here, He esteemeth not thee more than those who have

¹ In the cxxxvii. Ol. A. C. 169: Μελίτων, Ἀσιανὸς τῆς Σάρδεων πόλεως ἐπίσκοπος, καὶ Ἀπολλινάριος Ἱερὰπόλεως ἐπίσκοπος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοῦ καθ' ἡμῶς λόγου βιβλίον ἀπολογίας Ἀνρηλίῳ Ἀντωνίνῳ ἐπέδωκαν, Ἰουστίνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, κ. τ. λ., p. 484. *ibid.*

Ἀλλὰ καὶ Μελίτων Ἀσιανὸς, Σαρδιανῶν ἐπίσκοπος, βιβλίον ἀπολογίας ἔδωκεν τοῖς λεγόμενοις βασιλεῦσιν (Μάρκῳ Ἀνρηλίῳ καὶ Ἀντωνίνῳ Βῆρῳ), καὶ ἕτεροι δὲ πολλοὶ, ὧν ὁ δηλωθεὶς Ἰουστίνος, κ. τ. λ., p. 482 in the cxxxvi. Olympiad. A. Mund. 5672: A.D. 164-65. edit. Dindorf. p. 482.

known Him and confessed Him. Sufficient be these for thy majesty; and if they be too many,—as thou wilt.

‘HERE ENDETH MELITON.’—P. 51.

But this is surely not sufficient. It is easy to add such heads and tails to treatises; and these additions have no connexion or correspondence whatever with the body of the treatise, in which, as we have said, there is no reference, even where it was most natural, to the Emperor: *e.g.* it contains frequent allusions to the deification of sovereigns, yet no turn of the subject to him who is supposed to be addressed. Again, it has these words:—

‘Perchance one who is a sovereign may say that I am not able to conduct myself well, because I am a sovereign. It behoveth me to do the will of the many. He who should plead thus, truly deserves to be laughed at. For why should not the sovereign be himself the leader in all good things, and persuade the people which is subject to him, that they should conduct themselves with purity, and know God in truth, and set them in himself examples of all good deeds? Because so it becometh him. For it is an absurd thing that a sovereign, while he conducts himself badly, should be the judge, and condemn those who go wrong.

‘But my opinion is this: that in this way a realm may be governed in peace, whenever the sovereign shall be acquainted with the God of truth, and through fear of Him shall be withheld from injuring those who are his subjects, but shall judge everything with equity, as one who knoweth that he himself also is about to be judged before God; while those also who are under his hand shall be withheld by the fear of God from acting wrongly towards their sovereign, and shall also be withheld by fear from doing what is wrong to each other. And by this knowledge and fear of God all wickedness may be removed from the realm. For if the sovereign abstain from injuring those who are under his hand, and they abstain from doing wrong against him, and against each other, it is evident that the whole country will dwell in peace. And many advantages will be there, because amongst them all the name of God will be glorified. For what advantage is greater than this, that a sovereign should deliver the people which is under his hand from error, and by this good deed obtain the favour of God? For from error all those evils arise. But the chief of error is this: that while a man is ignorant of God, he should worship in God’s stead that which is not God.’—Pp. 48, 49.

Now, if it had been an Apology, what would have been more natural, than in this place to have addressed some personal appeal to the Emperor, such as does actually occur in the portion still preserved of Melito’s known Apology.

But, unfortunately, the tract itself contains a contradiction to the heading thus prefixed. At p. 43, the author says: ‘But I, according as I know, will *write* and show how and for what cause images were made for kings and tyrants, and they became as gods;’ and p. 45, ‘of which I will not *write* farther;’ an inconsistency which Mr. Cureton would get over by supposing that Melito spoke first in the presence of the Emperor, and then wrote down his speech: it is much more likely that this

was a written treatise to which some one affixed the heading and the conclusion.

However, to turn to another point: the evidence of the 'Paschal Chronicle,' supposing it admitted, shows that Melito had written an Apology before that one which Eusebius and all the world knew as 'The Apology of Melito.' But what evidence is there that our tract is that earlier Apology? Why none: but rather there is evidence to the contrary. For the 'Paschal Chronicle' says that Melito presented a written Apology (*βιβλίον ἀπολογίας*) to the Emperor; whilst the work before us does not profess to be an Apology or defence of Christians: it is a work against paganism. Again: the 'Chronicle,' mentioning the Apology in the time of the two Emperors Antoninus and Verus, says it was made to them. The production before us, like that described by Eusebius, professes to be addressed to Antoninus only. But, lastly, the 'Paschal Chronicle' gives an extract from this very Apology, which, it says, was presented to Antoninus in this year 165, and neither the words of that extract themselves, nor any words at all equivalent to them, or really like them, are found in the address before us. Here, then, the question may be decisively settled. This is not the Apology of Melito known to Eusebius, for it does not contain any of the passages which he cites. True, say the advocates for the genuineness of this Syriac treatise, but Melito wrote an earlier Apology—the 'Paschal Chronicle' proves that he did—and our tract is that Apology. But the 'Paschal Chronicle' gives an extract from the Apology of which it is speaking: so that we have a means of testing our Apology. That test fails. The passage is not to be found in the Syriac tract. We say this decisively: and we consider that it settles the question, and that the little tract which is now published is not that address of Melito of which the 'Paschal Chronicle' is supposed to speak, and it is not the well-known Apology which Eusebius knew, and from which he cites largely. Therefore there is no evidence that it is Melito's at all.

But B. H. C. and Mr. Cureton do not give up their case so easily. They say, that the citation in the 'Paschal Chronicle' is made from their new-found Oration. We will give the passage as it is in the 'Paschal Chronicle':—'We are not worshippers of 'stones that have no sense, but of the only God, who is before 'all and over all; and also are worshippers of His Christ, who 'is indeed God the Word (in being) before the worlds.' The most important part of this passage is the latter clause, which declares that the Christians are not merely not idolaters, but followers of Christ. The first portion could not well be without something like it in any work against idolatry (nor, as

we think, could the latter be without something corresponding to it in any real Christian apology). It is the former portion only, to some words of which the editors of this address have found a few expressions similar; and to diminish the force of objections arising from the absence of sufficient similarity to identify them, they remind us that we have the Melito in a Syriac Version.

That we may do no injustice to Mr. Cureton, we cite his argument entire, though we have already replied to much of it:—

‘There is no reason why we must suppose that Meliton should not have written two Addresses to the Roman Emperor as well as Justin Martyr, or that one of them might not have escaped the knowledge of Eusebius, or at least we have had no mention of it made by him, as well as that of Athenagoras. The *Apology* cited by Eusebius was probably amongst the latest, or indeed the last of all the works which Meliton wrote; and internal evidence has led critics to conclude that it was presented to the Emperor Marcus Antoninus in the tenth year of his reign, after the death of his associate in the Empire, Lucius Aurelius Verus, about A.D. 169—70. External testimony by the author of the *Chronicon Paschale* attributes it to the same date, A.D. 169. But the same writer, five years before, A.D. 164—65, speaks also of an *Apology* presented by Meliton to the Emperor. Unless, therefore, we assume that he was not sufficiently well and clearly informed, and has therefore given a confused account—an assumption for which the silence of Eusebius cannot afford sufficient grounds—we can hardly draw any other conclusion from his words than that Meliton presented two Apologetical addresses to the Roman Emperors—the one before us, which contains rather a defence of the true religion against the Polytheism, idolatry, and incorrect ideas of the Deity entertained by Pagans; and the other, as the extract preserved by Eusebius would lead us to infer, against the persecution of the Christians on account of their faith. Indeed the passage which the author of the *Chronicon Paschale* cites as from Meliton's *Apology*, and which, from its having been given before he mentions the later date, would lead us, if there were two, to refer it to the former, seems to be sufficiently near to be almost identified with expressions found in the work before us, if we bear in mind, that it must necessarily have undergone some change in phraseology, by the translation out of Greek into Syriac, and also suppose it not to have been intended for an exact and verbatim quotation, but only as an allusion.’—Pp. viii. ix.

So we must suppose two things; one, that, in the address we have, the passage has been changed by translation into something utterly unlike itself; the other, that the very exact citation in the ‘Paschal Chronicle’ is not ‘intended for an exact and verbatim quotation, but only as an allusion;’ a supposition utterly contradictory to the manner and language of the citation. In his note to this extract, in which the agreement between the passage cited in the ‘Paschal Chronicle’ and our Syriac address is to be shown, Mr. Cureton very quietly suppresses the latter portion of the extract, and presents to us the former portion only. We will place the two in parallel columns, and our readers shall judge; only we give the context of the passages, supposed to be parallel, marking by inverted commas

the words taken out of them by Cureton, and retaining his italics, which indicate the 'almost identified expressions':—

Citation in the Paschal Chronicle.

'We are not worshippers of stones that have no sense; but of the only God, who is before all and over all, [and also adorers of His Christ, who is indeed God the Word (in being) before the worlds.]'

The words in brackets are omitted by Mr. Cureton.

Passages in the Syriac Tract.

'For what end, therefore, this world was created, and why it passeth away, and why the body exists, and why it falleth, and why it standeth, thou art not able to know until thou shalt have lifted up thy head from this sleep in which thou art sunken, and have opened thine eyes, and seen that "*There is one God, the Lord of all,*" and have served Him with all thy heart. Then will He grant thee to know His will; for every one who is far removed from the knowledge of the living God is dead and buried in his body. On this account thou rollest thyself upon the ground before demons and shadows, and asketh vain petitions from such as hath not what to give. But thou, stand thou up from amongst those who are lying on the earth and "*embracing stones,*" and giving their sustenance as food for the fire, and offering their clothes to idols, "*and are willing, while they themselves are endowed with senses, to serve that which is insensible.*"'—P. 47.

'But thou, feeble man, "*within whom He is, and without whom He is, and above whom He is,*" hast gone and bought for thyself wood from the carpenter's house, which is graven and made into an abomination of God.'—P. 49.

We hope our readers sufficiently admire the evidence which this extract affords of the identity of our Syriac Address with the (supposed) earlier Apology of Melito. We hope they admire sufficiently the skilful alembic of the Canon of Westminster, by which any words can be drawn from the passages before us and forced into a likeness to the real words of Melito. Only let them remember that, as Mr. Cureton puts the passages before us in his note, (Preface, p. ix,) we have only part of the extract in the 'Paschal Chronicle,' and, on the other hand, only occasional words, without a hint of their context, taken out of the passages which we have cited in full.

His words are: 'Compare "*οὐκ ἔσμεν κ.τ.λ.*" 'we are not worshippers of stones that have no sense, but of the only God 'who is before all and over all,' with '*There is one God the Lord*

'of all . . . embracing stones . . . and are willing, while they themselves are endowed with sense, to serve that which is 'insensible,' p. 47, 'and within whom He is, and above whom,' &c. p. 49.'

Here is a pretty case; eight words, then a long interval, then one word, then another interval, then four words, then, after nearly two pages, one word more; and these are words and thoughts which, or their like, must occur in all treatises against idolatry, often many times over. Take away half the extract which you are going to use as your test, you do not pretend to find anything like that; then suggest the change of phraseology which takes place in the process of translation. Why, even B. H. C. could not have translated in this way. The 'change of phraseology,' indeed, which could produce a noble, brief, and simple statement of the Christian worship, out of a diluted appeal to a heathen on the unreasonableness of idolatry; then consider that the words in the 'Paschal Chronicle' may only be intended for allusions. It is a process indeed worthy of a conjuror, thus to prove the identity of two passages utterly unlike; and quite fatal to the Editor's critical character.

And here we might stop the trial for want of sufficient evidence on the part of the claimant. But we wish to take advantage of this very citation to show why we do not think that the address now printed could have been an Apology of Melito at all. First from the matter, then from the manner, of the extract.

First from the matter. The extract is plainly Christian. It puts forward boldly and explicitly, as all the extant Apologies do, the name of Him whom the Christians adored—that Holy Name whereby they were called. They were not ashamed of the name or of the doctrine. They regarded explicitness in laying open their faith thus far as necessary. But in the whole of this Syriac address, the name of Christ is never found at all. The tract might in this respect have been written by an Alexandrian Jew before the birth of our Saviour, were it not for such a passage as this:—

'But I say nevertheless, that so long as a man not having heard, neither discerneth nor understands that there is a Lord over these creatures, perhaps he is not to be blamed, because no one blameth the blind when he walketh badly. For in the same manner also men, while they were seeking after God, stumbled against stones and stocks; and such of them as were rich, stumbled against gold and silver, and by their stumbling were kept back from that which they were seeking after. But now that a voice has been heard in all the earth that there is a God of truth, and an eye has been given to every man to see withal, they are without excuse who are influenced by a feeling of shame towards the many with whom they have been in error, but otherwise desire to walk in the right way. For those who are ashamed to be saved, necessity compels them to die. On this

account I counsel them that they open their eyes and see; for, lo! light without envy is given to all of us, that we may see thereby: and if, when light hath risen upon us, any one closeth his eyes that he may not see, his course is to the ditch. For why is a man influenced by feelings of shame towards those who have been in error together with himself?—P. 42.

Were it not for the words in italics, and the concluding passage, which we shall quote presently, on the destruction of the world by fire, we should have said it might be a composition of the date of the Book of Wisdom, as indeed it is not unlike some of the later chapters of that book. The true Melito openly professes himself a worshipper of Christ; the false one advocated only the worship of the one God, instead of idols, and not only calls this religion a 'philosophy,' as the real Melito does, but advocates it as a philosophy; not as revealed by God, but as commending itself to our own minds. A good consideration, in its place, and used by Christian apologists, in subordination to the Gospel; and really forming the argument of one class of treatises belonging to the second century, written with the view not of defending Christianity, but of drawing persons from Paganism.

Secondly, as to manner. The style of the short extract in the 'Paschal Chronicle' is simple, concise, compressed; and such is the style of the other extracts from Melito's known Apology in Eusebius. There is a plain business-like air about them, and a character of common sense. We know the peril of arguing on such a ground as the diversity of styles. We know that one who seems mystical, nay, almost dreamy, in devotional writings, can be as plain, concise, and business-like as any man, when his work calls him to be so. But yet the fact must be noted, that the style of this new address is quite unlike the plain simple style of the known fragments of Melito.

We cite those which are preserved by Eusebius:—

'... what never has happened yet, the whole family of the devout worshippers of God is now under persecution, harassed throughout all Asia by the new edicts. For informers, and they that are eager after the property of others, men without any sense of shame, having their handle from the injunctions, commit open robbery, both by night and by day, seizing on the goods of those who are doing no wrong. . . . And if it be so indeed that these things are done at thy command, be it so; for a righteous emperor would never determine unrighteously; and we bear cheerfully the meed of such a death: only we prefer to thee one request, that thou wouldest thyself first take cognizance of those that are the causes of such strife and contention' (Christians, *i.e.* who disturbed the peace of society); 'and that thou wouldest then decide with justice whether they are worthy of death and punishment, or of security and quiet. But if indeed it be so, that this plan and this new injunction is not from thyself,—an injunction which would not be fitting even against barbarian enemies,—so much the more do we entreat thee not negligently to leave us thus exposed as objects of general plunder. . . . For our philosophy first arose among

barbarians; but having sprung up among thy people in the glorious reign of thy ancestor Augustus, it became most especially a propitious blessing to thy Empire. For from that time the Roman power increased so as to be great and glorious: of which power thou hast become the desired possessor, and wilt be so, together with thy son, if thou guardest the philosophy which was nursed together with the Empire, and grew up with Augustus; which, moreover, thy ancestors honoured in addition to all other religions. And this is the strongest evidence that it was for good that our doctrine grew up together with the Empire, in its brilliant beginning—viz. that since the reign of Augustus nothing calamitous has occurred, but on the contrary everything glorious and honourable, according to the prayers of all. Only Nero and Domitian, persuaded by some malevolent persons, wished to make our doctrine the object of suspicion and ill-will; from whom the lying system of information originated, which has spread by an unreasonable custom against persons such as we are. But thy religious ancestors corrected the want of information of Nero and Domitian, and frequently by edicts rebuked many who presumed to take to new courses against us. Among these thy grandfather Adrian appears to have written to many, and especially to Fundanus the proconsul, in government of Asia; and thy father, at the time when thou thyself wast administering all things for him, wrote to the cities to take no new measure respecting us; and among them to the people of Larissa, Thessalonica, Athens, and to all the Greeks. And we are persuaded that thou thyself, even in a greater degree entertaining the same views with them on these subjects, and even views more humane and more worthy of a philosopher, wilt do all that we ask of thee.

Compare this with any part of the Syriac address. Pleasing as the thoughts and composition of the latter seem to be, even in the wretched condition of having undergone one or two processes of translation, they are quite different from the character of Melito's writings.

Of its general argument our readers shall judge for themselves.* It begins thus:—

* Melito saith: It is not an easy matter readily to bring into the right way that man who has been a long time preoccupied by error. But nevertheless it is possible to be done; for when a man has been turned from error a little, the mention of the truth is acceptable to him; for in the same manner as, when the cloud has been broken a little, there is fine weather, so also a man, too, when he is turned towards God, the thick cloud of error which hindered him from the true vision, is quickly removed from his face. For error, like passion and sleep, holdeth for a long time those who alight under it; but truth, using the word as a stimulus, and smiting such as are asleep, also awaketh them; and when they are awake, seeing the truth, they also understand, and hearing, they also distinguish that which exists from that which doth not exist. For there are men that call wickedness righteousness, and so then they suppose that this is righteousness when a man shall be in error together with the many. But I say that this is not a good excuse, that a man be in error with the many: for if one only act foolishly his folly is great; how much greater, then, must the folly be when the many are foolish together?—P. 41.

This seems like a mere literary composition, the work of

one who was studying to arrange his arguments according to the rules of art, and to write well.

The author then sets forth the simple attributes of the one Eternal God, and contrasts with devotion to Him, the worship of the elements, or heavenly bodies, or idols of wood and stone, of which we must cite the following:—

‘But the folly of which I speak is this, if a man should leave that which really exists, and serve that which really does not exist: but there is that which really exists, and is called God, and He really exists, and by His power every thing subsists; and this same was not made, nor yet brought into being, but exists from eternity, and will exist for ever and ever. He undergoes no change, while all things are changed. No sight is able to behold Him; nor understanding able to comprehend Him, nor words to describe Him; and those who love Him call him after this manner—Father and God of Truth.’—Pp. 41, 42.

After this follows the passage we cited before, ‘But I say this, &c.’; and then the writer proceeds to dwell on the origin of idolatry, and after opening his argument proceeds:—

‘But I affirm that also the Sybil has said respecting them, that it is the images of kings, who are dead, they worship. And this is easy to understand; for, lo! even now they worship and honour the images of those belonging to the Cæsars, more than those former Gods: for from those their former Gods, both tribute and produce are *paid* to Cæsar as to one, who is greater than they. And on this account those are slain who despise them, and diminish the revenue of Cæsar. For also to the treasury of other kings in various places it is appointed how much the worshippers supply, and how many sacks full of water from the sea. And this is the wickedness of the world, of such as worship and fear that which hath no perception; and many of those who are cunning, either for the sake of profit, or on account of vain-glory, or for the sake of swaying the many, both worship themselves, and instigate the deficient in understanding to worship that which hath no perception.’—P. 43.

‘Is not this a dainty dish to set before a king?’ Is it likely that this should be the Apology addressed by Melito to one of these same Cæsars?—that the most offensive things should be said, about that delicate subject of revenue, without one word of courtesy to him who is addressed? A pretty republican Melito must have been! an American citizen, or friend Bright telling his mind to the Emperor of All the Russias, is nothing to him! nay, setting aside the offensiveness of the matter, that such an argument should be addressed to an Emperor, without one single word in it to indicate that he who is addressed is the Cæsar. He is spoken of as a third party; by no means as a hearer. Contrast this with the respectful and beautifully deferential language of the genuine Melito, in Eusebius.

Then comes a list of instances of idolatrous worship being given to dead kings and tyrants, in which every reader must be struck by the oriental character of the instances adduced.

Greek and Roman history might have furnished mythical histories in abundant illustration; but even Hercules must be mentioned in connexion with 'Zuradi the Persian, his friend,' a person we never heard of before; and then, after slight mention of the Greeks, and the people of Attica, we have the Egyptians worshipping Joseph as Serapis, a common opinion among Christians at the end of the second century, then the Phœnicians, the Elamites, the Syrians, the people of Mesopotamia; and, finally:—

* But touching Nebo, which is in Mabug, why should I write to you; for, lo! all the priests which are in Mabug know that it is the image of Orpheus, a Thracian Magus. And Hadrian is the image of Zaradusht, a Persian Magus, because both of these Magi practised Magism to a well which is in a wood in Mabug, in which was an unclean spirit, and it committed violence and attacked the passage of every one who was passing by in all that place in which now the fortress of Mabug is located; and these same Magi charged Simi, the daughter of Hadad, that she should draw water from the sea, and cast it into the well, in order that the spirit should not come up and commit injury, according to that which was a mystery in their Magism. And in like manner, also, the rest of mankind made images of their kings, and worshipped them, of which I will not write further.—Pp. 44, 45.

All this looks as if the treatise was written among the Eastern people, even among the Syrians themselves.

But just before this we read:—

* The Syrians worshipped Athi, a Hadibite, who sent the daughter of Belat, who was skilled in medicine, and she cured Simi, daughter of Hadad, King of Syria; and after a time, when the leprosy attacked Hadad himself, Athi entreated Elisha, the Hebrew, and he came and cured him of his leprosy.—P. 44.

Is it likely that this should have been written by Melito, the accurate enquirer into the canon of the Hebrew Scriptures?

Afterwards we have one of the most beautiful passages in the tract:—

— 'But thou, a free intelligence and cognizant of the truth, if thou wilt consider these things, enter into thyself; and if they clothe thee in the fashion of a woman, remember that thou art a man, and be a believer in Him who really is God, and to Him open thy mind, and to Him commit thyself, and He is able to give thee everlasting life, which dieth not; for every thing cometh through His hands; and all other things so let them be esteemed by thee as they are, images as images, sculptures as sculptures; and let not any thing which has been made be put by thee in the place of Him who is not made. But let Him, the ever-living God, be always running in thy mind, for thy mind itself is His likeness, for it, too, is invisible and impalpable, and without form; and by its will the whole body is moved. Know thou, therefore, that if thou wilt always be serving Him that is immovable, as He exists for ever, so thou also, when thou halt have put off this which is visible and corruptible, shalt stand before Him for ever, living and endowed with knowledge; and thy works shall be

for thee riches which fail not, and possessions that do not lack. But know thou that the chief of all thy good works is this : that thou shouldest know God and serve Him. And know that He asketh not for any thing of thee : He needeth nothing.

'Who is that God? He who is himself truth, and his word truth. But what is truth? That which is not fashioned, and not made, and not formed; that is, that which, without having been brought into existence, does exist, and is called truth.'—P. 45.

Throughout this passage we may recognise Christian expressions, (*e.g.* 'and His Word (is) truth,') and the thoughts and arguments of other writers of that age.

So again in the following extract, which comes after some pleasing passages, containing arguments from the works of God :—

'Therefore I counsel thee that thou shouldest know thyself, and shouldest know God. For understand how there is within thee that which is called the soul : by it the eye seeth, by it the ear heareth, by it the mouth speaketh : and how it employeth the whole body. And whensoever He pleaseth to remove the soul from the body, it falleth and goeth to decay. From this, therefore, which exists within thyself and is invisible, understand how God also moveth the whole world by his power, like the body, and that whensoever it pleaseth Him to withdraw his power, the whole world also, like the body, will fall and go to decay.'—P. 47.

Then we have the passages we cited before in a parallel column, by the side of the real Melito of the 'Paschal Chronicle,' and that about the wisdom of a sovereign setting an example of true wisdom to his subjects, in which occurs the only real resemblance to Melito's known writings—we mean the calling Christianity a philosophy.

We will now give the conclusion. We only wish our readers to know, that, in the passage with which the extract opens, Mr. Cureton considers there is an allusion to the father, and to the son of the Emperor Antoninus, who, he supposes, is the person addressed. It would be a pity if they lost the perception of such an allusion. Mr. Cureton says :—

'Judging merely from what we read in the Address itself, I should have been disposed to fix the date about four years earlier than that in which mention is first made of Meliton by the *Chronicon Paschale*, either to the end of 160, or the beginning of 161, a short time before the death of Antoninus Pius, and probably when his health had sensibly begun to decline. Unless, indeed, the expression be intended as generally applicable to every one whose father is still alive, the words "Be solicitous respecting thy father—so long as thy solicitude may be of avail to help him," would imply that Antoninus Pius was still surviving, although perhaps in a state to cause anxiety. In the inscription, Marcus Antoninus is designated Cæsar, and not Autocrat, or Emperor. His being associated with Antoninus Pius, and taking a part in the administration of the empire, would be sufficient grounds for Meliton to address him; and in the words of the *Apology* cited by Eusebius, he alludes to the part which he took in the government : "During the times that thou also with him wast governing every thing." The prospect of his early succession to be the head of the state, might also

have prompted Meliton to offer his opinion as to the surest means of governing a realm in peace—by knowing the truth, and living conformably thereto. At the end of the Address he refers to the children of Antoninus. Of these he had several, both sons and daughters.'—Pp. ix. x.

The words of the Syriac Address are:—

'Wherefore, inquire if thy father walked well; *if so*, do thou also follow after him; but if thy father walked ill, walk thou well, and let thy children also follow after thee. Be solicitous too respecting thy father, because he walketh ill, so long as thy solicitude may be of avail to help him. But as for thy children, say to them thus, That there does exist a God, the Father of all, who never was brought into being, neither was He made, and everything subsisteth by his will; and He made the lights that *his* works may behold one another, and He concealeth himself in his might from all his works; for it is not possible for any mutable thing to see Him who is immutable. But such as have been admonished and admitted into that covenant which is immutable, they see God so far as it is possible for them to see him. These same will be able to escape from being consumed when the flood of fire shall come upon all the world. For there was once a flood and wind, and the chosen men were destroyed by a mighty north wind, and the just were left for demonstration of the truth; but again, at another time there was a flood of waters, and all men and living creatures were destroyed by the multitudes of water, and the just were preserved in an ark of wood, by the ordinance of God. So also it will be at the last time; there shall be a flood of fire, and the earth shall be burnt up together with its mountains, and men shall be burnt up together with the idols which they have made, and with the graven images which they have worshipped; and the sea, together with its isles, shall be burnt; and the just shall be delivered from the fury, like their fellows in the ark from the waters of the deluge. And then those who have not known God, and those who have made idols for themselves, shall lament, when they behold the same idols on fire together with themselves, and nothing shall be found to help them.'—Pp. 50, 51.

This is the passage on which Mr. Cureton lays the blame of leading his friend Bunsen to consider his Melito's Apology a late and confused composition, because it appears to allude to the second Epistle of S. Peter. We cited Mr. Cureton's words in p. 221. We shall not be suspected of doubting the authority of the Epistle; but we must remind Mr. Cureton, that the question is not merely as to the existence of that Epistle in the time of Melito, but of its authority and its genuineness, and that the 'consequently' of his last clause, in which he says, 'It is, however, certainly alluded to here by one of the earliest and most learned writers of the Christian Church in the second century, and *consequently* appears to have been admitted by him as genuine,' would scarcely be admitted by his friend. The confidence with which Mr. Cureton speaks of this passage, as if really written by Melito, is marvellous.

On the other hand, we conceive that Bunsen, in his eagerness to get rid of the fact that the Epistle is alluded to by a writer of the middle of the second century, has been unhappy in his selection of the epithets, 'a late and confused composition.' We see no signs of lateness; none of confusion. It is a regular,

well, and even neatly arranged treatise—the tone and notions of which correspond, as Mr. Cureton has pointed out in several instances, to those which prevailed in the second century.

In the course of our argument, we have not turned aside to refer to the article of B. H. C. in the 'Journal of Sacred Literature' for April last, in defence of the genuineness of the Treatise. The points adduced by him, which have not been noticed by implication in our argument, are these:—

1. That Verus is not joined in the address with Antoninus, because he was absent at the war in the East, and Antoninus alone at the seat of empire. We ask, why then should the 'Paschal Chronicle' mention both emperors?

2. B. H. C. is bolder than Cureton on the subject of the extract in the 'Paschal Chronicle.' He states the difficulty, and answers it thus: 'Either, *first*, we have not the entire document preserved; or *secondly*, it is not quoted with literal accuracy; or *thirdly*, the author quoted from the second instead of the first by mistake. We are disposed to think the second is the most probable reason, as we find the sentence substantially in the Syriac; and we know that quotations were not always exactly correct, being sometimes made from memory.' It seems to us that the third supposition would have been nearest to the truth; but it would have taken away the only support for the genuineness of the treatise. We have said enough of the second supposition, in which B. H. C. and Mr. Cureton only rival each other in absurdity. M. Renan, as we understand from Mr. Cureton's note, would adopt the first alternative, and calls the Syriac a fragment of the supposed earlier Apology. Of this there is absolutely no trace whatever.

3. B. H. C. argues in favour of the genuineness of the Syriac tract, from its likeness to the extracts given by Eusebius. He says (p. 123): 'The previous extracts contain nothing from the Apology in Eusebius which is inconsistent with the style and spirit of the Syrian document, but much which is, in a singular manner, coincident with it. 1. There is no such word as Christ or Christianity.' [We answer: i. We have only short extracts given in Eusebius; and yet the Christian religion and Church form the topic of the whole, though it so happens that the word does not occur. ii. In the few lines extracted in the 'Paschal Chronicle' Christ is plainly spoken of.] '2. There is no quotation from Scripture, and no direct mention of it.' [This arises from the nature of the treatise, whoever wrote it.] '3. There is the same manly and straightforward style of address.' [In this we do not agree with B. H. C.] '4. In the inscription to the Syriac document, Melito, a Christian teacher, is called a philosopher, and here (in the Eusebian

'extract) Christianity is more than once called philosophy.' [This is true, and let it have its full weight.] '5. Both are the productions of a man possessing varied and accurate knowledge, and great freedom of expression.' [We doubt of the accuracy of the Syrian's knowledge.]

In conclusion, it seems to us: I. That internal evidence is decidedly destructive of this supposition. This tract could not have been an address to a Roman emperor. II. That no trace of the extract given in the 'Paschal Chronicle' is to be found here; and therefore this is not the Apology mentioned there.

It seems to us quite clear, that what has happened in so very many other instances, has happened here; there was a good book without an author's name; and Melito's Apology was not known; and the addition of a beginning and end enabled a transcriber to pass this off as the genuine work of Melito. We regret that Mr. Cureton should have committed himself to defending it.

III. After this Oration come some fragments bearing the name of Melito, and extending over rather more than four pages. They appear as five separate fragments; but the fifth, which is only two and a half lines in length, is really a repetition of part of the fourth, word for word the same, but breaking off abruptly. It is found in a different MS. from the others. We do not observe that Mr. Cureton notices the circumstance of its being really a part of his fourth fragment, which is the more strange as it is from these very words in the fourth fragment, except two that are lost by the abrupt ending of the fifth, that he argues for its identity with a passage cited from Melito by Anastasius Sinaita. Neither does Mr. Cureton notice the fact that his third fragment here printed as Melito's, has already made its appearance out of the Syriac treasures of the Museum, nay, out of the very same MS., and that through the instrumentality of Mr. Cureton himself, under the name of S. Irenæus, so that it has now done double duty under different names, and that not for the first time, as we shall see presently.

In the headings of the last two fragments, Melito is called Bishop of the city of Attica, and Bishop of Ittica. Mr. Cureton seems to suppose that the error lay in the copyist inserting the words 'of the city;' and adduces the circumstance mentioned by Eusebius (E. H. vii. 32) of Meletius, Bishop of Sebastopolis, being called on account of the sweetness of his eloquence (and with an allusion we presume to his name), τὸ μέλι τῆς Ἀττικῆς; and this Meletius and our Melito may, he thinks, have been confounded, and the name of 'the honey of Attica' hence attached to the Bishop of Sardis. But he identifies the

extract as a part of the works of Melito of Sardis by the correspondence of one passage,

'He that supported the earth was supported upon a tree. The Lord was exposed to ignominy with a naked body. God put to death; the King of Israel slain by the Israelitish right hand.'

with the words cited by Anastasius from the discourse of Melito on the Passion (λόγος εἰς τὸ πάθος), 'God suffered by the Israelitish right hand.' (The fifth fragment is a repetition of this passage, only ending at the word 'slain.') So this seems to confirm the authority of the Syriac MS. which attributes them to Melito.

Mr. Cureton adds, 'No one who compares this (extract) with the preceding can fail, I think, to draw the conclusion that they are by the same hand, although perhaps by a different one from that of the Apologies.' On the point of similarity between the fourth and preceding extracts we quite differ from Mr. Cureton. The fourth seems to be by another, and more able, writer. From this it does not appear distinctly what Mr. Cureton thinks of the authorship of the extracts: they were all, he conceives, by the same author, and him the author cited as Melito by Anastasius; but not the same 'perhaps' as the author of the Apologies. But the author of the Apologies, Mr. C. clearly holds to be the Bishop of Sardis; therefore we infer that he doubts the genuineness of the fragments. And yet elsewhere he speaks as if they were certainly Melito's.

In such a state of the inquiry it becomes important to know the nature and value of the authority on which or by which the name of Melito is attached to them. The headings of the extracts are, 1. 'By Meliton, Bishop of Sardis, from the Discourse on the Soul and Body;' 2. 'By the same, from the Discourse on the Cross;' 3. 'From Meliton the Bishop on Faith;' 4. 'Of Meliton, Bishop of the city of Attica,' which last is identified with the extract in Anastasius from the discourse on the Passion. 5. 'Of the Holy Meliton, Bishop of Ittica.' Among the treatises of Melito of Sardis, enumerated by Eusebius, we have one 'On the Soul and Body;' one 'On the Obedience of Faith,' and one 'On the Faith' simply, if we follow the Syriac version of Eusebius, and read *περὶ πίστεως* for *περὶ κτίσεως (καὶ γενέσεως Χριστοῦ)*. The other extracts, 'On the Cross,' and 'On the Passion' might, as far as that goes, be from portions of the work *περὶ ἐνσωμάτου Θεοῦ*. Now by whom, or on whose authority, are the headings to these extracts attached? Mr. Cureton vouchsafes to tell us only that they are thus found in a Syriac MS. written in the year A.D. 562 at Edessa. For further information respecting that MS. he refers us to his *Corpus Ignatianum*. The information which the reader of the 'Spicilegium' wants would not have occupied many lines;

and so much of the account of the MS. as was necessary might have been repeated out of the *Corpus Ignatianum*, a work which is not universally accessible. But the 'Corpus' itself does not tell us what we want to know, and what Mr. Cureton ought to have told us. We are obliged to elicit this as well as we can with the aid of another work, the '*Spicilegium Solesmense*,' in which we happen to know that this same Syriac MS. makes a figure.

We will give what Mr. Cureton says in his own words. In the notes to the '*Spicilegium Syriacum*,' p. 95, we read: 'The four following extracts are taken from one of the Syriac manuscripts brought from Nitria, now in the British Museum, No. 12,156, f. 70, 76, 77, written A.D. 562. As I have already given a description of this manuscript in my *Corpus Ignatianum*, p. 352, it is needless for me to repeat it here.' Perhaps it may be; but it is not needless that we should be told whether these extracts are like Sybilline leaves, blown together into MS. No. 12,156, f. 70, 76, 77, or whether they form part of some other work. This Mr. Cureton could easily have told us; and he has not told it us either here or in the '*Corpus Ignatianum*.' There we read in a note on an extract from S. Ignatius:—

'This extract is taken from a work by Timotheus, Patriarch of Alexandria, against the Council of Chalcedon. The same volume contains also the Apology of Cyril of Alexandria for the twelve chapters against the Oriental Bishops; a treatise ascribed to Gregory Thaumaturgus, on the Passibility and Impassibility of our Lord; and a summary of heresies by Epiphanius. A note at the end, indicating the monastery to which the book belonged, has been partly erased; but what remains states that it was presented in the year of the Greeks 873 (A.D. 562), about which time it seems to have been written by a scribe of Edessa. One or two leaves have been lost from the beginning; and consequently the work of Timothy is imperfect. This volume is a large quarto, written in three columns, and is one of those obtained in 1839. Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 12,156, fol. 1, and fol. 69.

Now we are told, in the note before us, that the four extracts from Melito come from fol. 70, 76, 77 of this volume, but out of which of the treatises do they come? We should have known this if Mr. Cureton had given us an exact account of the contents of the volume and the folio at which each treatise began. But he has been so sparing of information, that he has not even told us all the treatises that are in this volume. For further light upon the subject we must go to the '*Spicilegium Solesmense*,' in which (Prolegomena, p. vii.) the contents of the volume are given, translated into Latin by M. Renan, from the last page of the MS. Here we read:

'Explicit liber iste (quo continentur)—

* I. Liber servi Dei Timothei, Episcopi Alexandrini, contra Synodum incedonensem.

'II. Capitula duodecim S. Cyrilli.

'III. Objectio quam fecerunt eis Andreas Samosatensis et Theodoretus Cyrensis.

'IV. Rursus Apologia quam fecit contra eos sanctus Cyrillus (condemnavit et detexit fraudem eorum argumentis manifestis e libris sanctis).

'V. Oratio servi Dei Gregorii Episcopi Neocæsariensis in Ponto ad Theopompum.

'VI. Descriptio hæresium servi Dei Epiphanii Episcopi Cypri.'

Here we come nearer to the point. It is out of some one of these treatises that these extracts come; and it would certainly have added to the value of the evidence for their genuineness, at all events have made clear what it really was, if the sponsors for their being Melito's had been said to be some one of the distinguished and exalted personages whose treatises are contained in this volume, rather than the nameless scribe at Edessa who wrote it out, A.D. 562. It would have thrown back the testimony at least a century earlier, and it would have been given by a Greek writer, addressing himself to Greeks, writing a work in the midst of a controversy, interesting to the whole Greek world and carried on in the broad daylight of the cognizance of the whole Christian Church. Such an one so putting forward a citation as from Melito, may be wrong, but he is more likely to be right than an Edessene monk.

Now we are left to draw our own inference as to the treatise in which these extracts from Melito at fol. 70, 76, 77 of the volume occur. We suppose they are out of that of Timothy, since the other treatises near the beginning of the volume are all extant, in whole or in part, and the extract from Ignatius in the '*Corpus Ignatianum*,' which is in Timothy's work, *seems to be* from fol. 69. So that we infer that the first treatise in the volume extends so far, at any rate; and as Cyril's twelve chapters come next, and our extracts at fol. 70, 76, 77, are certainly not in them, the work of Timothy must extend further than fol. 69, and reach over these folios. If we are wrong in this inference we are very sorry; it is not our fault. Mr. Cureton could have spared us the trouble of this investigation, and have said in a single line whether the person who cited these passages as Melito's was Timothy or Cyril, or Andrew of Samosata, or Theodoret. Anyhow they were thus cited between the years 430 and (we suppose we may safely say) 460, in a controversial work on the great subject which divided the Christian world at that time,—the Union of the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ. We suppose these passages, then, to have been cited by Timothy, who is distinguished as *Ælurus*, the Monophysite intruder into the See of Alexandria, which he occupied from A.D. 457 to 460. Whether Mr. Cureton was unwilling to acknowledge a Monophysite source for his extracts we know not. He certainly seemed very much grieved that any stain

of Monophysite heresy should attach to his MSS. of S. Ignatius. But we do not except against Timothy Ælurus' testimony on the ground of his heresy.

We observed before that Mr. Cureton alleges the few words cited by Anastasius from the work of Melito on the Passion, which are found in his fourth extract, as an evidence of that being rightly attributed to Melito. Would it not have been much better to have cited Timothy Ælurus himself, who lived two hundred years earlier than Anastasius, and who published these extracts as Melito's, when all the world was looking on; the more so, when it is well known that the Hodegus of Anastasius, in which those words occur, is very much made up of materials derived from the writers on the Incarnation in the fifth century; as indeed Mr. Cureton must have known that large portions of the Greek original of the treatise of Andreas Samosatensis, which stands third in the table of contents of this same Syriac volume, No. 12,156, are preserved in the Hodegus of Anastasius. So that, for anything that appears to the contrary, Anastasius may have derived this very extract of Melito from the work of Timothy Ælurus, or some of those who were engaged in the controversy with him.

But what, after all, is the value of the testimony by Timothy Ælurus to the authorship of these extracts? We have set it as high as we could, and, we think, have not been unfair in doing so. But if, as we inferred, Timothy's work be the source from which these extracts are derived, then it will appear that Timothy had himself, in this very same work, cited a portion of the third extract, which he here attributes to Melito, as the writing of S. Irenæus; and we know, from other sources, that the whole third extract itself passed in some portions of the Church for the work of S. Irenæus. So that if Timothy's work be the source of our extract, the value of his authority is reduced to very little indeed; and if it be not, still Melito's claim to be the author of this third extract is to be settled with another ancient and contemporary bishop, S. Irenæus. The case stands thus: In a work called the '*Spicilegium Solesmense*,' published in 1852, there is a Syriac fragment bearing the name of S. Irenæus, which was taken out of this same Syriac MS., No. 12,156, fol. 1, and out of this same work of Timothy's against the Council of Chalcedon. It has a different beginning from the one here attributed to Melito (this one having had the beginning cut away), and is much shorter. But in the same '*Spicilegium*' is a longer form of the same passage, in Armenian, beginning, indeed, as the Syriac does, but, except this and one or two slight variations, being identical with what Mr. Cureton has published in his present '*Spicilegium*' as Melito's. We will present the whole to our readers, and save them to judge.

Syriac, No. 1, in
Spic. Solesm.
IRENÆUS.

The Law and the Prophets, and the Evangelists have proclaimed of Christ, that He was born of a virgin; and that He suffered on the tree; and that He rose from the dead; and ascended into Heaven; and that He was glorified by the Father; and that He is King for ever; that He is, &c., as in Italics of No. 2.

In place of the words in parentheses; among men, man;

the Shepherd of the saved,

Syriac, No. 2, in
Spic. Syriacum.
MELITO.

We have made collections from the Law and the Prophets relative to those things which have been declared respecting our Lord Jesus Christ, that we may prove to your love;

that He is perfect reason, the Word of God; who was begotten before the light; who was Creator together with the Father; who was the fashioner of man; who was all in all; who among the Patriarchs was Patriarch; who in the law was the Law; among the priests Chief priest; amongst kings Governor, among prophets the Prophet; among the angels Archangel; (in the Voice the Word; among spirits Spirit; in the Father the Son; in God, God—the king for ever and ever. For this was He who was pilot to Noah; who conducted Abraham; who was bound with Isaac, who was exile with Jacob, who was sold with Joseph, who was captain with Moses, (who was the divider of the inheritance with Jesus the Son of Nun,) who in (David and) the prophets foretold (his own sufferings), who was incarnate in the Virgin, who was born at Bethlehem, (who was wrapped in swaddling clothes in the manger, who was seen of the shepherds, who was glorified of the angels, who was worshipped of the Magi,) who was pointed out by John,

who assembled the Apostles, who preached the kingdom, (who healed the maimed,) who gave light to the blind, who raised the dead, who appeared in the temple, who was not believed on by the people, (who was betrayed by Judas,) who was laid hold on by the priests, who was condemned by Pilate, who was transixed in the flesh, who was hanged upon the tree, (who was buried in the earth,) who rose from the dead, who appeared to the Apostles, who ascended to heaven, who sitteth on the right hand of the Father, (who is the rest of those that are departed,) the recoverer of those who were lost, the light of those who are in darkness, the deliverer of those who are captives, (the guide of those who have gone astray, the refuge of the afflicted,) the bridegroom of the Church, the charioteer of the Cherubim, the captain of the angels, God who is of God, the Son who is of the Father, Jesus Christ, the King for ever and ever. Amen.

NO. XCI.—N.S.

R

Armenian, in
Spic. Solesm.
IRENÆUS.

Same as Syriac, No. 1.

among men, man;

same as Syriac, No. 2, omitting words in parentheses, and adding what is in this column.

who was baptized in the Jordan, tempted in the wilderness, and found to be the Lord,

and is glorified by Him, as the resurrection of the dead,

the Shepherd of the saved,

Our readers will see, that the portions of the passage from Melito in Mr. Cureton's present publication, here printed in Italics, were published in Syriac in the '*Spicilegium Solesmense*,' 1852, as an extract from Irenæus, so given in Timothy's work (from this same MS. Syr., No. 12,156, fol 1); and that the whole of the passage, with only such variations as are indicated in our third column, was printed in the same volume in Armenian, as an extract from S. Irenæus on the Resurrection. (See *Spicileg. Solesm.* vol. i. pp. 3—6.)

Now, we think Mr. Cureton ought to have known all this, and knowing it, should have told his readers. He should have told us, on every ground: first, because what he now sends out is not absolutely new; secondly, because the question of authorship is materially affected by it; thirdly, because the authority of Timothy Ælurus, if it is to him we are indebted for these extracts, is considerably lessened by the fact that he alleges the same words first as Irenæus's, and then as Melito's; and Mr. Cureton ought to have known this, because he had much to do with it. This the sad consequence of his waiting nine years; keeping his work on hand so long that he forgets the passages he has transcribed, translated, revised, given away, which have even been the subject of a controversy in which his 'dear friend' Bunsen took up arms in defence of Mr. Cureton himself, who is ungrateful or inconsiderate enough to know nothing about the matter. All this is very strange; yet so it is.

If we understand Mr. Cureton rightly, the Syriac of this third extract, which we have given in English, was printed by him as Melito's, in 1846; in 1849 (we believe) the Benedictine Pitra was in the British Museum; he was received there with '*humanissima benevolentia*;' viewed its rich treasures with admiration; above all admired the Syriac MSS., above 500 in number, which Mr. Cureton told him were by far the most ancient in Europe: '*contestante cl. V. Curetono, eos esse facile omnium antiquissimos quos occidentæ bibliothecæ asservavere.*' (*Spic. Solesm. Proleg.* p. vi.) We must give the account of Mr. Cureton's further kindness, in the good Frenchman's own words: '*Quin, ea siquidem fuit eruditi viri prompta munificentia, optio data mihi est quem potissimum vellem ad usus meos exscribendi. Gallus ego quidem et e Lugduno oriundus, appello D. Irenæum. Nec mora: ipsius eruditi viri excipiente manu, unus et alter Irenæi locus, æque insignis ac plane novus, mihi præsto est.*' (*Ib.*)

Mr. Cureton gave Pitra the offer of transcribing a piece of any author he liked. Pitra, a Frenchman and Lyonnese, asked for a bit of Irenæus; no sooner asked than given. Mr. Cureton with his own hand showed him two pieces of Irenæus, out of this very book of Timothy Ælurus, and this unlucky volume, No. 12,156.

Now, when Mr. Cureton gave to Dom Pitra, or rather allowed him to transcribe, these extracts, one of which is what we have exhibited above, in col. 1, and the Italics of col. 2, did he know that it was a part of what he had himself printed as Melito's or not? We wonder how it came to pass that Mr. Cureton had not printed these extracts from Irenæus for his own '*Spicilegium*.' We cannot suppose that his 'prompt munificence,' which affected the Benedictine so much, consisted in giving away as Irenæus', what he himself was going to publish in a fuller form as Melito's. Surely by one preparing a '*Spicilegium Syriacum*' of the second century, the extracts from S. Irenæus ought to have been examined at least, if not included in it; and Mr. Cureton should have known that these extracts called Irenæus's and Melito's were the same. But this is not all. A Latin translation of the very fragment in question was made by Renan, and this translation was revised by Mr. Cureton; so the note on the extract informs us, (*Spicil. Solesm.* p. 3.)

'E. Cod. Syr. Britann. Musei inter codd. addit. no. 12,156, fol. 1. Interpretatus est E. RENAN; eadem recensuerunt clariss. et doctiss. viri W. CURETON et QUATREMERIE.'

Here is another way in which the fragment of Irenæus certainly came under his notice. Yet Mr. Cureton seems not to have recognised his Melito. Nay more, Dom Pitra, (shall we say ungratefully?) assailed Mr. Cureton's great Ignatian theory with the very weapon he had himself given him,—this very piece of Irenæus. It seems that contemporaneously with his obtaining this Syriac of Irenæus from Cureton he received an Armenian version of the same passage, only much more full (as in our col. 3), from the Mechitarists at Venice. This Armenian version also bore the name of S. Irenæus; from the circumstance, then, that the Syriac of Irenæus, given to Pitra by Cureton, was, as it appeared, a shorter form of the same passage as the Armenian, and from the fact that the Armenian version of S. Ignatius, just published by Peterman, gave the longer text, while Cureton's Syriac Ignatius was shorter, Pitra proceeded to argue that the Syrian translators were wont to abridge the authors whom they translated.—(*Spic. Solesm. Proleg.* pp. viii. ix.)

Of all this we suppose Mr. Cureton to have been ignorant. He had given up all further controversy about his Ignatius. But his 'learned and very dear friend Bunsen' had not; and accordingly, in the preface to the fourth volume of his '*Hypolytus*,' ed. 1, he replies to Pitra, and maintains that the Syriac (that in our first column) is the genuine text, and the Armenian (our third column) is interpolated. Of all this battling around and over the dead body of his Ignatius, Mr. Cureton may have been supremely ignorant. At all events, we are left to discover

as we can the curious fact, that at this very time Mr. Cureton had in print a fuller than this very fuller form itself in Syriac (our col. 2), only bearing the name of Melito, of which he said not a word at the time, nor does he say one word now. Yet he has printed, translated, written notes upon it. He found both extracts, one under the name of Irenæus, the other under that of Melito, in one and the same Syriac MS., and, we believe, in one and the same treatise in that MS., the one at fol. 1, the other at fol. 70, 76, or 77, we are not told which. The one he gave to Pitra, the other he has published himself, without a hint of there being any connexion between them. And now they who are interested in such investigations are left to decide whether the Bishop of Sardis or of Lyons is to have the fragment assigned to him; Mr. Cureton printing his as Melito's, and suppressing, or being ignorant of the fact, that the Armenian version and this very same Syriac volume assigned it to Irenæus. We noticed the question as between Pitra and Bunsen (as to which was the genuine text), and gave the passage at length in the 'Christian Remembrancer' for July, 1853, pp. 228, seq. We do not think it worth while to say more than what we then said, that we could 'have no hesitation in agreeing with 'the view that the Syriac is mutilated, from the abrupt transition from Jacob to the Church, and the recurrence of "King 'for ever and ever," in the space of a few lines: but whether 'the Armenian also may not be interpolated,' we said, 'is not 'so easy to determine.' The publication of this other Syriac form of the passage remarkably confirms our view.

We will only add the observation, that it is highly probable, if there were stray fragments, such as these we have cited, on the Divine and Human Natures of our Lord, going about in the world without owners, that Melito and Irenæus are the two persons to whom they would be attributed, on account of that remarkable testimony of S. Hippolytus or Caius of Rome, cited by Eusebius: 'Who is ignorant of the works 'of Irenæus, and Melito, and the rest, *which set forth the 'Christ as God and man?*' The variations in the three copies make us think that the passage has not been regarded as the allowed work of any great Father, or it would scarcely have been altered or abridged so freely.

Of Mr. Cureton's editorial negligence we leave the learned world to judge; as also of the value of Timothy Ælurus' authority for the authorship of the extracts which he gives.¹

¹ After these extracts Mr. Cureton prints the Syriac of that part of Eusebius which contains an account of Melito and a list of his works, which is interesting as suggesting variations of reading. We wish he had done the same in regard to Bardesanes.

We must now hasten to conclude this review. Two treatises remain, each of which requires some notice.

IV. The first (pp. 61-69) is a tract bearing this title:—

‘Hypomnemata, which Ambrose, a chief man of Greece, wrote: who became a Christian: and all his fellow-senators raised a clamour against him; and he fled from them, and wrote and showed them all their folly; and at the beginning of his discourse he answered and said.’

The publication of the Syriac text of this discourse is of no importance, except as showing the strange way in which our Christian early writings have been cut about and altered. The tract is that which, as we said at first, has long been known as the ‘*Oratio ad Græcos*,’ printed among the works of S. Justin Martyr, but placed by his latest editor, Otto, more properly, as we think, among the spurious works bearing his name. It will be seen that in the Syriac the tract has a different title, and bears the name of Ambrose, whom Mr. Cureton would identify with Ambrose of Alexandria, the convert and friend of Origen. This we think absurdly groundless, and highly improbable, from the absence of any philosophizing tone in it, or any reference to the mythicizing tendencies of the Alexandrians of that day, who saw in the fables of their religion representations of the truths of nature and of morality.

But though we have said that the address is the *Oratio ad Græcos*, we ought to add that it is an entire remodelling of it; the beginning and latter parts are to some extent the same; the middle, which sets forth the follies and wickednesses of the heathen mythology, goes indeed over the same ground, and takes the same line of argument, and every now and then agrees with the Greek; but on the whole is different, both in the instances alleged and the language in which they are expressed. This may easily be seen by a cursory view of Mr. Cureton’s book, as he has printed the Greek along the bottom of the page under his translation of the Syriac; but without indicating, as we think he might have done, what parts of the two are the same and what are different.

We cite the beginning of this address; what is printed across the page is common to the Greek and the Syriac; what is in the first column is only in the Syriac; what is in the second only in the Greek; we would remind our readers that this is a part of the tract in which the two are most alike.

* Do not suppose, Men and Greeks, that my separation from your customs has taken place without a befitting and just cause;

For I have investigated the whole of your wisdom of poetry, and rhetoric, and philosophy; and when I found not

For there is not in them

any thing right or worthy of the Deity,

I was desirous of investigating the wisdom of the Christians also, and of learning and seeing who *they are*, and when, and what is this its recent and strange production, or on what good things they rely who follow this wisdom, so as to speak the truth.

Men and Greeks, when I had made the inquiry I found not any folly, as in the famous Homer, who says respecting the wars of the two trials, "for the sake of Helen many of the Greeks perished at Troy, far from their beloved home."

For first they say respecting Agamemnon their king, that through the folly of Menelaus his brother, and the vehemence of his madness, and the incontinence of his lust;

He was desirous to go and

For the compositions of your poets are themselves monuments of insanity and incontinence.

For any one who goes to him who stands out most prominently in your education is of all men most foolish.

Cooperating with these, he was content to give his daughter for a sacrifice, and to throw all Greece into confusion that he might

rescue Helen from a leprous shepherd.'

This will be a sufficient specimen of the least marked variations of the two forms of the tract. We supposed it was a popular work, bearing no one's name and owned by none, which persons remodelled each as it suited him. The conclusion, however, is worthy of being cited:—

'Come, then, and be instructed by the Word of God, and by consoling wisdom: rejoice and partake of it: know too the King incorruptible, and become acquainted with his servants, which boast not in armour, neither make slaughter; because our Captain delighteth not in the multitude of an army, neither in the horsemen and in their beauty, nor in the illustriousness of family; but he delighteth in the pure soul, which a wall of justice surrounds. But the word of God is always instructing us, and the promises of our good King and the works of God. Oh the soul that is purchased by the power of the Word! oh the trumpet of peace without war! oh the doctrine quenching the natural fire of the soul, which maketh not poets, nor produceth philosophers, nor the crowd-followed orator; but goeth and maketh the dead pass over that he die not, and raiseth men from earth as Gods, to the region which is above the firmament. Come, be instructed, and be like me, for I also have been like you.'—Pp. 68, 69.

The Syriac ends here. The Greek continues a little further, with a pleasing testimony to the convert's own experience of his change. So much for Syriac translations.

V. The concluding tract (pp. 70—76) is an Epistle of one Mara, son of Serapion, to his son Serapion. Mr. Cureton tries to identify this Serapion with some one or other of the known persons of that name: and also to determine the time when the letter was written: being uncertain himself on both points, and unsuccessful, as it seems to us, in the whole subject.

The Epistle is from a father who had been removed from his house at Samosata, with others of his countrymen, by the Romans, and thrown into captivity. He writes kindly and morally to his son, to exhort him to good conduct. This seems to us from its length and prosiness to have much more the air of a fiction than a letter really written. But what is most remarkable in it is the absence of any such distinct and plain statements as would show the writer to be a Christian. It may at least be made matter of question whether he was one or not. If he was, he must have designedly suppressed explicit statements about it, in order, we may suppose, not to bring his little son into trouble. But the absence of all distinct Christian motives, or Christian doctrines, is very worthy of notice. We cite all the passages bearing that way, that our readers may judge for themselves:—

‘When thy master and tutor wrote to me a letter, and informed me that thou art very diligent in learning for a child of few years, I blessed God, that thou, being a little boy without one to guide thee, hast begun with a good intention; and as for me myself this has been a consolation to me, that respecting thee, a little boy, I have heard of this greatness of mind and good conscience, such as does not readily remain in many. On this account, lo! I have written to thee this memorial of what I have experienced in the world; for the manner of men's living has been experienced by me, and I have walked in instruction, and all those things of the instruction of the Greeks I have found them wrecked together with the birth of life. Be careful, therefore, my son, of those things which are suitable for such as be free, to meditate upon learning, and to pursue after wisdom: and in this manner reckon to be confirmed in that with which thou hast begun; and remember my injunctions with diligence, as a quiet man, who loveth discipline: and although it appear to thee to be very bitter, when thou shalt experience it for a little while, it will be very pleasant to thee, because so also it hath happened to me. But a man when he shall be departed from among his family, and shall be able to retain his own habit, and shall do with justice whatsoever is proper for him, he is that chosen man who is called the Blessing of God, and with whose liberty nothing else can be compared. For such men as are called to discipline, seek to disentangle themselves from the struggle of the time; and such as lay hold upon wisdom are elevated by the hope of righteousness; and those that stand in the truth exhibit the standard of their virtue; and those that devote themselves to philosophy look to escape from the miseries of the world. But thou, too, my son, conduct thyself so wisely in these things, as a wise man who endeavoureth to spend a pure life: and beware lest the acquisition of wealth, which the many thirst after, subdue thee, and thy mind be turned to desire riches which are not real; for neither when *men* obtain their desire do they abide, nor even while they continue in righteousness: and all these things which are seen by thee in the world, as of one who is for a short time, are to be dissolved like a dream; for they are the ups and downs of the times.’—Pp. 70, 71.

The words, ‘I have found them wrecked together with the birth of life,’ Mr. Cureton conceives may mean that the Greek learning became worthless to him on his becoming a Christian.

by a new birth. He says further, 'There are several very 'obscure passages in this letter. Although I have endeavoured 'to give the meaning of them as accurately as I could, I cannot 'confidently assert that I have in no instance failed.'

The next extract we shall make shows that the companions of Mara at least were heathens:—

'For I have heard respecting our companions, that when they were departing from Samosata it grieved them; and like those who blame the time, they also spake after this manner: "Henceforth we are driven far away from the habitation of men, and we are not allowed to return to our city, and to behold our men, and to embrace our *gods* with praise." It is meet that that should be called a day of lamentation, because one heavy grief laid hold upon them all equally.'—P. 71.

The tone of the following is as like that of a Greek rhetorist as it is of a Christian:

'But as for thee, my beloved, let it not grieve thee that thy loneliness has been driven from place to place; because men are born for this end, to receive the accidents of the time. But thus reckon thou, that for wise men every place is equally the same; and for the virtuous, fathers and mothers abound in every city. Even indeed from thine own self take the trial. How many men, who know thee not, love thee as their own children, and a multitude of women receive thee like their own beloved ones. Verily as a stranger thou hast been successful, verily for thy little love many men have desired thee.'—P. 72.

So the following:—

'But thou, my little son, choose for thyself that which fadeth not away because they that occupy themselves in such things are called modest and beloved, and lovers of a good name: but whenever any evil thing opposeth thee, blame not man, nor be angry against God, neither murmur against thy time. If thou continue in this mind, thy gift is not a small one which thou hast received from God, which standeth not in need of riches, nor is brought near to poverty, because thou wilt perform thy part in the world without fear, and with rejoicing; for fear and excuse of that which cometh naturally is not for the sake of the wise, but for the sake of those who walk without law.'—Pp. 72, 73.

And this:—

'If, therefore, thou art wise, and diligently keepest watch, God will not cease from helping thee, nor man from loving thee. Whatsoever thou art able to acquire, let that be sufficient for thee; and if indeed thou be able to do without possessions, then shalt thou be called blessed because no one will even envy thee.'—P. 73.

The next passage we shall give is that which Cureton cites as alone referring expressly to Christianity:

'For what else have we to say, when wise men are forcibly dragged by the hands of tyrants, and their wisdom is taken captive by calumny, and they are oppressed in their intelligence without defence? For what advantage did the Athenians gain by the murder of Socrates, the recompense of which they received in famine and pestilence? Or the people of Samos by the burning of Pythagoras, because in one hour their country 'as entirely covered with sand? Or the Jews *by the death* of their wise king,

because from that same time their kingdom was taken away? For with justice did God make recompense to the wisdom of these three: for the Athenians died of famine; and the Samians were overwhelmed by the sea without remedy; and the Jews, desolate and driven from their own kingdom, are scattered through every country. Socrates is not dead, because of Plato; neither Pythagoras, because of the statue of Juno; nor the Wise King, because of the laws which he promulgated.'—Pp. 73, 74.

Whether this is the way in which a Christian would speak of his Lord and Saviour, who had risen, and liveth for ever and ever, is another question. It shows a recognition of the fact of Christianity, not a belief in Christ.

The following should be cited also:

'And here, too, in prison we give thanks to God that we have obtained the love of many; for we essayed our soul to continue in wisdom and in rejoicing. But if any drive us by force, he will proclaim the witness against himself, that he is far removed from all good things, and will receive disgrace and shame from the vile object of shame. For we have shown our truth, that we have no vice in an empire. But if the Romans will permit us to return to our country in justice and righteousness, let them act like humane men, and they will be called good and righteous, and the country in which they abide will also be in tranquillity. For let them show their own greatness by leaving us free. Let us be obedient to that dominion which the times has assigned to us, and let them not, like tyrants, treat us as slaves; and whatever may be decreed to take place, we shall not receive any thing more than the tranquil death which is reserved for us.'—Pp. 75, 76.

Another paragraph concludes the letter. The following is an evident addition, though put as part of the letter:—

'One of his friends asked Mara, the son of Serapion, when he was in bonds by his side; "On my life, Mara, I pray thee tell me what laughable thing has appeared to thee that thou laughedst?" Mara said to him, "I was laughing at the Time, because without having borrowed any evil from me, it repays me."—P. 76.

This seems to us a very ordinary production, which was probably circulated as good reading for little boys, which the bulk of it is. It may certainly afford ample materials for essays, and we may have many little monographs by German scholars on Mara Ben-Serapion, whether he were a heathen, or a Jew, or an Ebionite, or a Gnostic of any kind.

And now, to conclude. We wish much for the publication of the Syriac MSS., *i. e.* of all of them that are of any value. What we have written is put out with real gratitude to Mr. Cureton for the great service he has rendered to theological literature in this way, and we should be sorry if anything said or written by any one should discourage Mr. Cureton in proceeding with his labours. But we must express a hope that the critical part of the work, *if attempted at all*, may be more carefully done. The work of reading and translating the Syriac,

for which Mr. Cureton is so preeminently qualified, is quite distinct from that of illustrating the works from Patristic sources, and indeed from determining their genuineness. For this purpose, it is true, the Syriac and its relation to the Greek might contribute much material evidence, but that must be subordinated to the general critical judgment. In his critical attempts in this volume Mr. Cureton, we feel bound to say, appears to us singularly unfortunate. And so also in his notes.

He was not called on to write notes at all, except such as belong to the explanation of the Syriac; though any good notes would have been gratefully received. As it is, almost all the notes might have been altogether omitted, with little or no disadvantage to the volume: most of them with a positive advantage. They tell us, what we do not want to know, about other men's blunders. And they do not tell us, what we do want to know; about the sources of the passages published, the language, the corresponding Greek, or the theological and Gnostic terms represented by the Syriac.

We can only suppose that Mr. Cureton printed these few tracts nine years ago, intending to add more to them, and hoping to edit them with learned notes; that he has been hindered from doing so by a multiplicity of other occupations, and that he has now been forced on premature publication by the fact that other persons would bring out these treasures, with errors of translation in almost every line, if he did not anticipate and correct them by publishing his own. We quite sympathise with the difficulty of his position.

Indeed it must be a regret to all who are interested in the subject, that when we have acquired treasures of so great value as these were supposed to be, our busy life, our money-making propensities, or our theological controversies, should draw away those who might have devoted themselves to such literary works, and that there is not any source of a public or national kind from which persons could be enabled to edit and publish such works, except at a ruinous loss to themselves. The Rector of S. Margaret's, Westminster, is otherwise engaged, as much or more than was the Librarian of the Museum; as a Canon of Westminster only, he might have had leisure, which he too evidently has not had for finishing his work. So much for one feature of 'Cathedral Reform.'

ART. VI.—*The Judgment of the Right Hon. Stephen Lushington, D.C.L., delivered in the Consistory Court of the Bishop of London, in the cases of Westerton against Liddell, &c., Beal against Liddell, &c. on the 5th of December, 1855.* Edited by A. F. BAYFORD, D.C.L. London: Butterworth.

THE voluntary organization of Churchmen for self-defence, which was so active as well as so useful, a few years back, has in more recent times receded into a less conspicuous, though not less really healthy or vigorous position. Prudence and principle alike dictated this reticence. Convocation had made its first great step towards life and usefulness; and any large contemporaneous movement which was open, however unfairly, to the charge of playing at business, would, in the interests of Convocation, have been alike indecorous and imprudent. That such a condition of quiet would, however, be chronic, was an expectation which no one moderately endowed with reflection ought to have embraced. The opponents of Church principles, within and without the Church, were not only vigilant and strong, but were provoked to attempting something by observing the steady daily advance of the system which they hated and dreaded. A blow from some quarter or other was inevitable, and when it came, Churchmen could but fall back upon the attitude which they had assumed in 1848 and in 1850. Convocation, still struggling for its own existence, would be powerless to help them; potentially to appeal to it would be but to endanger its making that existence good. To wait till it had made it good, and to hope that then it would turn back the course of months, and perhaps of years, at the disadvantage which that so long inaction had created, would be to forfeit the first requisite of help from elsewhere—self-assistance.

These are axioms the truth of which, no one, we trust, will dispute. The practical question of to-day is, Has this crisis arrived in the recent judgment of Dr. Lushington in the case of the Belgravian Churches? We have no hesitation in saying that Churchmen are at this moment called upon to combine in opposition to the judgment, and to take every step, which the laws of the Church and the land allow them, to have it arrested and reversed. We are aware that in assuming this position we open ourselves and the Church's cause to the whole artillery of set phrases which has so often been levelled at us by enemies and half-hearted friends; and, of course, we shall be told that we

want to break up the peace of the Church for non-essentials—to set society at strife for things external and indifferent—that we have enough left of majesty and beauty in our ritual to convince all reasonable persons that we ought to obey the constituted tribunal, &c. &c. The answer to all this talking is very simple. Were we all of us living in a supersubstantial state of existence, these theories might be exceedingly practical; but as such is not the case, they fall into the limbus of impossibilities. The blow is not aimed at the material altar—so many hundred weight of stone; the material altar-cloth—so many yards of silk; the material cross—so much bulk of brass or wood, arranged so as to present four right-angles. But at that great fact which all these particulars indicate—that ceremonial worship of God, which has ever been the correlative of the sacramental system in the Catholic, as previously in the Jewish, Church. To ignore this, and to let the enemy make its lodgment on the vantage ground, would be to act as if the Western Powers had overlooked the Russian occupation of the Danubian principalities, or Russia acquiesced in the English and French seizing the Crimea. ‘It is only Wallachia and Moldavia,’ the English or French optimist might have said. ‘What matters the Crimea?’ the Russian might have asked, ‘when we have all Russia in Europe besides, and all Siberia, not to mention the Aleutic islands.’

Such language sounds not a little ridiculous when applied to an international crisis; and that its ridicule is not equally patent when it is made use of in regard to the Church’s interest is because Churchmen, as a body, have not adequately educated themselves in that most necessary branch of study, the politics of their position. They may take a useful warning even from the sharp practice of the party of which Lord Shaftesbury is the head, and Mr. Westerton the other extremity. This party was for years determined, if the opportunity rose, to pull down the restored propriety of Anglican worship. The Church of S. Barnabas was selected, not only because it was a very perfect exemplar of that propriety, but because it was situated in an accessible part of London. The happy moment of the Papal Aggression was seized, and some of the most disgraceful scenes of a foreign revolution were put into rehearsal within the consecrated walls. The public was, it was thought, lashed into a sufficient excess of rabies, and that memorable meeting was called, in which the now Lord Shaftesbury heroically announced his preference for worshipping ‘with Lydia by the banks of the river-side;’ and the now Sir John Dean Paul piously ejaculated the assertion, that the Church ought to be named after the robber, and not after the saint—S. Barabbas and not S. Barnabas.

Still, brutality did not succeed, and the Church stood its ground. The repulsed party had too much tact to recommence prematurely the campaign. A few years were allowed to elapse, and the decorous form of a lawsuit was substituted for the indecencies of violence and slander, which formed the apparatus of the former attack. Accordingly, although this time unable to find a more eloquent or learned spokesman than a jovial Irish Colonel of Militia, strong in the assertion that the Church of England only recognises one Sacrament, they have for all that gained the temporary success of a favourable decision in the lowest Court of resort. To leave that decision where it is would be to yield obedience, not to the Consistory Court, but to Mr. Drummond's butler and Sir John Dean Paul.

So much for general considerations of policy, supposing that the evil of Dr. Lushington's judgment was limited to the actual prohibitions which it contains, and that he had confined his speech to its three last minutes, which recapitulated the effect of his intended decree. But the reasons for that decree are so infinitely worse than even the results, that we must be allowed to dwell a little upon some of their more conspicuous features. These being viewed as they are, the duty of resistance becomes inevitable, in proportion as the principles set up by the judge are antagonistic to the essence of the Church of England, in its character of a portion of the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. We do not say that the judgment affects any point of faith or doctrine, but it does lay down rules which, if applied to the decision of faith and doctrine, would be fatal to an orthodox result; and it is therefore a sacred obligation to repudiate them, while the repudiation can still be made upon non-vital questions.

We do not pretend to analyze the judgment, however incompletely. This will be most amply done, we doubt not, in court and out of court, before the question is settled. But assuming that our readers have read it, or have it before them to refer to, we will indicate some of its worst principles, and more monstrous conclusions.

The proposition underlying the whole judgment—the judgment of one who sits in a pre-reformational court, as the holder of a pre-reformational office, in virtue of which he has continually to deal with, and to pronounce sentence according to pre-reformational canons and constitutions—is, that the reformed Church of England is a new thing, the creation of the Reformation, without continuity or dependence, descent, or affinity to any thing before or beyond the England of three centuries. Faintly deny it as he may, admit as he may incidentally in one passage that the Church of England is not the mere negative of the Church of Rome, yet in the length and breadth, the common

sense of his whole judgment, Dr. Lushington goes to the utmost extent of this suicidal position in his illustrations of 'the principles and intentions of the Reformation,' as assumed, and as expounded by *himself*, which, as he mildly phrases it, he is bound to 'bear in mind.' We need not pause to show the monstrous stretch of authority which a judge assumes when he thus, by one stroke of his pen, constructs a vague and fluctuating common law, of which he is at once the author and the expositor, and puts it in the place of that painstaking investigation of antecedent and contemporaneous evidence, which is the duty of the judicial office. But to come to our proofs. First, the learned Chancellor starts with the statement, that 'our Church did not adopt by its silence every use and custom 'of the ancient Church which it did not expressly prohibit.' Loose and vague as this dictum is, it might pass muster in an innocent sense. But what is its immediate sequel? The assertion, that 'Our Church has set forth what it did adopt, though not perhaps in the most perspicuous manner, that what the Church has prescribed is a virtual prohibition of every thing else, *ejusdem generis*; that the provision *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius* does apply.' These words are so sweeping in their signification that you almost lose their sting in their extent. Adopt them, and your claim to continuity with the antecedent Church has gone for ever. All things depend upon the express prescription of the [post-reformational] Church, and this so absolutely, that parity and tradition are not allowed to exist as explanatory even in case of doubt—where, according to Dr. Lushington's assertion, the normal imperspicuity of the Church of England shows itself—for '*Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*,' and so, in a doubtful matter, the light that is to guide our path, is not the innocent practice of the primitive Church—not the traditional common-law—the ancient use of the English Church, before, up to, and during the second year of Edward VI., for all these are not expressed, and so they are concluded. There remains behind, the choice either of chaos or of the arbitrary interpretations of a living individual judge, one who, by his own confession, is little 'accustomed to antiquarian questions, as to that accurate historical understanding of the Reformation, which is the peculiar province of theologians.' In 1848, M. Carnot, in the name of the French Provisional Government, issued a circular, advising the election of 'ignorantine' representatives to the National Assembly. Till now we thought the deliberate preference of ignorance over knowledge, in the solution of knotty questions, had been limited to that memorable instance.

Dr. Lushington, indeed, absolutely revels in the repudiation of

the primitive Church. 'If all the usages in indifferent matters in the ancient and primitive Church were to be sanctioned, our Reformers would have so declared. Had such been the intention, words might have easily made it clear. They have done the contrary.' 'The contrary,' means grammatically, and Dr. Lushington intends it to mean, that they sanctioned nothing,—prohibited everything. Again, at the risk of tautology, we ask Churchmen to consider and to say whether they are willing to sanction by their acquiescence the admission into ecclesiastic jurisprudence of these principles, which, if allowed to pass into precedents, will, of course, be held to rule questions no less of doctrine than of ritual. Briefly stated, the judge's grounds of decision amount to this: 'There are, I assert, principles and intentions of the Reformation,'—these to me are 'not, perhaps, set forth in the most perspicuous manner; therefore I will assume them for myself, and apply them according to my own assumption, and so *make* perspicuous law for the Church, as I should like it to be, for all time to come.'

We have only space to indicate here most briefly the pregnant silence with which throughout the entire judgment Dr. Lushington contrives to glide on, without the slightest allusion to the rubric,—'the chancels shall remain as they have done in times past.' Whatever may be the scope as to particular fittings, of this rubric, its rank contrariety to the whole principle of the judgment is glaring and self-evident. It is accordingly slurred over by that judge, who says, 'I hold in great contempt a judgment apparently strong; but only made so to appear by concealing difficulties which ought to be encountered.'

To proceed to those details of the judgment which further help to illustrate its spirit, we shall confine ourselves to two instances. And first, we shall deal with that which is of the least importance,—the vituperative prohibition of ornamented altar-cloths, varying according to the Christian seasons. This, we are told, is a 'servile imitation of the Church of Rome'—and a 'meretricious display of fanciful and unnecessary ornament.' These abusive asseverations (made by one who commenced his judgment with the strongest protestations of his determination to adhere to the dry law of the case) refute themselves by their own flaunting injustice; and whether altar-cloths may be handsome or the contrary, whether they may seem 'meretricious,' 'fanciful,' and 'unnecessary' to Dr. Lushington, to repeat his staid and cool phraseology; yet, unless the Prayerbook itself is nothing but a servile imitation of the Missal and the Breviary, the accusation rests on record among the melancholy instances, which here and there occur in modern history, of the judge forgetting his appropriate duties, to enact the advocate and par-

tisan. The Missal and Breviary observe distinctions of days—so does the Prayerbook. Among those days we find Christmas, Easter, Ascension-day, Whitsunday, sundry Saints-days, Lent, Advent, in the Missal and the Breviary; we find the same likewise in the Prayerbook. We find, on the one hand, an *Altare* and coverings prescribed; on the other, the Lord's-table occurs, and that is also directed to be covered with silk or some other decent stuff. If the matter rested here, there might arise the question, whether it was right to cover our 'Lord's-table' in at all the same way in which the 'altare' was covered upon the days of like observance. But when we see that our reformed Prayerbook actually preserves, generally speaking, the Collect, Epistle, and Gospel of the older Missal for the holy-days and seasons retained in its pages, together with, to some extent, the prefaces, including the artificial plan of octaves, no candid mind can doubt as to the allowableness (this is all we plead for) of the Church of England indicating those days and times of sacred observances, derived from the older traditions, by varieties of colour in the 'carpet,' not more like the analogous Roman varieties than the Collect of the Church of England resembles that of the Missal.

The servile imitation would exist if we used Roman changes of frontals, on days which Rome observes and we do not. So long as we specially avoid such an abuse, and specially commemorate our own holy and fast days—and those alone—then, in contradiction to Dr. Lushington, we assert, and challenge him to deny if, that the practice, so far from being a servile imitation of the Church of Rome, is the clear and bold proclamation to the whole world of the independence and the authority of the Reformed Church of these lands. Enter S. Paul's or S. Barnabas on the 15th of August, and you will find displayed the simple green frontal of an ordinary day. The Roman Catholic churches are all putting forth their most gorgeous white—for that day is the Festival of the Assumption, which ranks so supremely high in their calendar, while with us it is not even named. Again, on the 8th of December, we have nothing more gaudy to show than the sombre violet of Advent; for although our own calendar retains the commemoration of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, yet our own Church—wisely, we think—has no form or circumstance to celebrate the event; and so the course of Advent runs unbroken;—Rome, on the other hand, neglecting the penitential associations of the season, breaks out into the most festal display; for then she feasts her newest and most daring aggression of papal infallibility.

These are distinctions obvious to the perception of a school-child or a Westerton. That the judge should have overlooked

them is nearly incredible—that not overlooking them, he should have suppressed them, is still more perplexing.

We do not dwell upon the pitiful and petty obliquity of perception which tries to torture the order to have continually a carpet of silk or other decent stuff, into a prohibition to have any stated change of these cloths, and blandly constructs an autocratic power for the Ordinary, in that same breath which limits the discretion given by the Canon to judging of materials other than silk. We refrain, because we feel that we might be tempted into phrases not consistent with the respect which we desire to maintain for Dr. Lushington's office.

A graver prohibition stamps the judgment—that of the great symbol of salvation. Two altar-crosses, and one chancel-screen cross were debated. Dr. Bayford delivered an elaborate and ingenious argument to prove that they came under the prohibition levelled against images by an Act revived in the time of James I. Dr. Lushington throws this argument over. It is too little that the cross should be condemned as it were by a side-wind. Its fall is ordered on its own merits—not as an image, but as the cross; not because it is an altar-cross, and therefore a piece of furniture misplaced where it is; not because it is a chancel-screen cross, and so an unnecessary element in the barely-acquitted screen; but wholly, simply, roundly, absolutely, universally, without evasion, equivocation, or limitation, as the cross. The judge has at last been found, in the English Church, to say that the Cross of Christ should not occur in a place of Christian worship—and why? because the '*Crucifix*,' the cross bearing the moulded image of the Son of God 'had been abused'!

Queen Elizabeth had a 'crucifix' in her chapel—Mr. Liddell claimed to keep his 'cross.' The judge, in aiming his blow at the living incumbent through the dead monarch, parades the opposition which certain Bishops made to Elizabeth's crucifix; 'who,' says he, 'desired to retain the use of crucifixes and 'crosses' in her own chapel.' When we say that this assertion is inaccurate, we do not use language stronger than our feelings. Queen Elizabeth did not desire to retain a cross, but a crucifix. Mr. Liddell does not desire to retain a crucifix, but a cross. On either side, what reciprocally becomes of Dr. Lushington's own guiding maxim, *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*? This dictum would be fatal to the use he himself makes of Queen Elizabeth's case; and so that case is coaxed, by her being made to desire what she *did not*, but what Mr. Liddell *does* care for.

But Queen Elizabeth, who adhered to the crucifix, is gently handled compared with Bishop Butler, who was contented in his chapel to use the plain cross. He is 'a beacon on high, to warn us all from the dangers of so perilous a course.'

Bishop Butler was what is called a High-Churchman, and so he meets with this treatment. Archbishop Tenison was a Low-Churchman. And yet, as Dr. Phillimore urged in his argument, this Primate, in his 'Discourse of Idolatry,' brands the 'breaking down of crosses,' in the great rebellion; 'which authority' (i.e. of the Bishops of Laud's and Juxon's school, whom Dr. Lushington treats so cheaply) 'had suffered to remain entire,' as being '*high superstition*.' Mr. Liddell's advocate urged this passage on the judge, and yet no notice was taken of it in the judgment.

Let us give up the principle of our crosses, and we shall prove an object of contempt, not only to the unreformed Churches of the East and West, but to the Lutheran communities. In Sweden (be that a true Episcopal Church or not) not the cross but the crucifix stands over the altar; before it the Priest celebrates the Swedish Communion Service or 'high mass,' as it is still called. In the new Prussian Liturgy the crucifix and lighted candles are ordered. In the church recently built by the King of Prussia at Potsdam, the cross of marble rises six feet sheer from the ground, behind an immoveable marble altar, on which the candles are figured burning. Archbishop Secker, whom Dr. Lushington uses to knock Bishop Butler down with, asked more than a century ago, 'Most of our churches have crosses upon them; are they therefore Popish? The Lutherans have more than crosses in theirs; are the Lutherans therefore Papists?' We think we hear the comment—Well, but what is Swedish life or German orthodoxy? Better the life and the orthodoxy of the English Church, with an 'oyster-board' for the Lord's Table, than the gorgeous altars of Sweden and Prussia, with the deadness of the one, and the neology and defective ministry of the other. This is most true. But what has it to do with our conduct, when the case for us to consider, the evil for us to ward off, is being reduced to the oyster-board, as a step to bring about that deadness, that neology, that loss of valid ministrations? If we allow this to be done, we shall indeed be 'of all men most miserable.'

Of the offence to the growing art-culture, to the general perception of beauty in form and colour, to the improvement of manufactures keeping pace with that perception, which this judgment will be, we need hardly speak. True it seems aimed at a few particulars only, but its spirit is that of Dowsing and Barebones, and strikes to the root of all artistic feeling, and the dedication of all beauty to the house of God. Everything rare and costly is as equally liable, at the caprice of the judge, to be set down as '*meretricious*,' '*corrupt*,' and '*unnecessary*,' as op-

posed to the 'principles and intentions of the Reformation,' as any of the innocent details which have just raised the bile of the Chancellor of London. Every artist, every man of taste, every person of common sense, every one, in short, who has not placed himself under the heavy yoke of puritan superstition, must be the natural opponent of this most bigoted decision.

We have sufficiently indicated the leading principle of Dr. Lushington's judgment; we have illustrated this by his way of handling two of the details. The more elaborate work of testing his law, and sifting his facts, and of investigating by history, what was the Church-apparatus in the second year of Edward VI., still remains untouched; and we do not purpose to handle it, confident that it is, and will be, amply cared for. We have but to draw our practical conclusion, and tender our advice upon the crisis which the judgment creates.

A few words will dispose of the reasons which have been urged in favour of acquiescing in the judgment: among these, the one which has been most insisted on is that the judgment at present only *binds* one Diocese—that of London. If affirmed by the Court above, it will be law for all the English Church. This argument, strong as it looks nakedly put, is really marrowless and shadowy. Granted that in form Dr. Lushington's judgment does not bind more than the Diocese of which he is Chancellor, yet, if acquiesced in, it will become a precedent; and one that will be all the more binding from the fact of that acquiescence. The natural inference will be, that it was not appealed against because it was irrefragable; and so it will, to all intents and purposes, become, for a perpetual hereafter, the law of all England, without the advantage to its opponents (whatever be the ultimate result) of that further and more complete dissection which the case will receive during subsequent arguments. In truth, the pages of the judgment itself contain two pregnant instances of the evils of non-appeal, in the authority which Dr. Lushington gives, on the one hand, to Sir Herbert Jenner Fust's decision in the *S. Sepulchre's* case—a case which demanded, if any ever did, an appeal; and, on the other, to the Bishop of Exeter's too trenchant condemnation of Mr. Park Smith's flowers and cross, acquiesced in after the mere preliminary form of a *prima facie* inquiry—a condemnation, let us add, which can be, and we trust will be, effectually distinguished from the present decision.

It will be observed that the Appeal which we have been all along contemplating is not to stop at the Arches' Court, but, if necessary, to be carried before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. No Churchman will, we trust, be startled by his concurrence being claimed in a resort to a tribunal connected

in his eyes with very laic associations, and with a memorable case. The looming Appeal is not one directly of doctrine, but of law and fact, to which the class of mind, and a very high class unquestionably, sitting on that Committee, is peculiarly fitted to do justice. But, again, are the so-called Church Courts sitting in London, as at present constituted, really so *very* ecclesiastical as to make the distinction between them and the high tribunal of Whitehall broadly perceptible, except in the greater weight which, from or against our own inclinations, we are compelled to render to the wisdom and the learning of the latter? Desiring, as we all do, some real measure of Church reform, which shall restore to the Church of England genuine discipline, administered by a *bond fide* ecclesiastical machinery, it is something very like pretence to assume any extreme reverence for the actual Doctors' Commons, on the ground of its antiquated assumptions of possessing legitimate Church mission.

We have reasons for supposing that some persons, whose opinion is entitled to the highest consideration, are, if not averse, at least to some extent indifferent, to the prosecution of the Appeal in the present instance, from their anxieties being centered in the grave debate in which the Archdeacon of Taunton's precipitancy threatens to involve the Church. In answer to them we have but to refer to the considerations with which we commenced this Article. In proportion as they feel anxious, (and they cannot be more so than we are,) to avoid a direct doctrinal conflict, or, if inevitably plunged into it, to come out again with success, so they must avoid affording the enemy the coveted vantage-ground of a success in a contest in which the mere inventory of articles nominally in dispute is but the mask to conceal aggressions on our faith, and to cripple us before the batteries open the fire upon abstract doctrine itself.

To accept the recent judgment is to admit the principle that the worship of the Established Church of England is a new thing, invented by the Reformers upon the principle of 'prohibiting and 'discouraging all things, indifferent in themselves, and even, 'perhaps, laudable in themselves, which had been abused to superstitious purposes,'—the proof of such abuse being rested by the judge on the basis of the non-existence of a specific ideal Act of Parliament of the *one* second year of Edward VI. which is considered by him in order to create innocence and admissibility. To resist the judgment is to refuse to accept, at Dr. Lushington's hands, this monstrous proposition—a proposition involving the utmost extent of what we may call ritual antinomianism, and which Dr. Lushington had himself to violate when he allowed the candlesticks, the screen, and the gates, to pass.

NOTICES.

We have heard a good deal lately of the dishonesty of the inferior clergy preaching sermons of other than their own composition; and strictures, not altogether undeserved, have been passed on the practice of advertising a regular supply of clerical pseudo-manuscripts. But we were not aware how high in the hierarchy this practice of strutting in borrowed plumes had soared, until we met with 'A Charge delivered to the Clergy of the 'United Dioceses of Killala and Achonry at the Annual Visitation, 29th Sept., '1854. By the Right Hon. and Right Rev. Thomas Lord Plunket, D.D. Bishop 'of Tuam, Killala, and Achonry.' (Dublin: J. B. Oldham, 1855). This Charge, consisting of fifteen printed pages, is, with the exception of about thirty lines, taken verbatim, and without the slightest acknowledgment, from two Charges delivered by the present Archbishop of Canterbury, when Bishop of Chester—the one in 1838, and the other in 1841. This latter Charge of Dr. Sumner is the somewhat famous or notorious composition of which the Bishop of Exeter remarked, that he 'could not name 'any one work of any one minister in our Church which, though of double the 'bulk, contains half so many heretical statements.' Of these Chester Charges most of our readers will remember some of the more virulent passages. 'Under the specious pretence of deference to antiquity, and respect for 'primitive models, the foundations of our Protestant Church are undermined by men who dwell within her walls;' 'And here it is impossible 'not to remark on the subtle wiles of that adversary,' &c. &c. All this cold cabbage of seventeen years' staleness the Right Rev. Baron and Bishop dishes up for the indiscriminating Irish palate; and, with a careless defiance both of the Copyright Act and of common decency, prints as an original work under his own name. We say nothing of the literary piracy, unparalleled in our whole experience of the world of letters, but the insult to the clergy addressed, we trust that there are some of them who will have the spirit to resent. Such little self-reliance does his lordship possess, that he cannot even trust himself to compose the opening words of his pastoral, but boldly copies, word for word, from the Archbishop's Charge of 1838, this important exordium, 'We meet together, Rev. Brethren, once again to take council respecting the things in which we are mutually concerned,'—one of which was probably not the eighth commandment. We observe but two paragraphs, amounting, as we have said, to thirty lines, which we have not traced to the Archbishop's Charges; doubtless these two passages are cribbed from somebody. But in transcribing the last (p. 14), it would be curious to inquire whether Bishop Plunket felt any twinge of conscience. Speaking of the Irish clergy, his lordship is unwilling to forecast the day, 'when the people would be justly warranted in refusing to acknowledge 'in the ministers of the Church an authority which was found rather to 'cover indolence and inefficiency, than to secure ability and exertion.' Certainly his lordship is skilled in the rare art of painting his own portrait.

Charity would of course suggest that the incapable Bishop has been imposed upon by some idle and unprincipled hack whom he employed to get up the document to order: for incredible as the whole matter is, it is still more incredible that one who had committed a conscious larceny should invite detection by printing and publishing the fatal evidence of his own 'indolence and inefficiency.'

It requires something of an apology to the Bishop of Salisbury to mention in such immediate connexion with this Irish production his lordship's 'Primary Charge,' (Rivingtons,) delivered during the autumn. If we are bold to denounce fraud even in the highest places of the Church, we are not called upon to treat, in the ordinary terms of discriminating praise, even such an affecting and solemn document as the present. Did we reserve to ourselves such a right, we should find it difficult to express adequately our admiration and respect for the deep piety and simple, honest, earnest dignity, the affectionate and brotherly spirit, and the working character of this Pastoral Address, which in its way is almost as much an innovation in the English, as we should like to hope that Bishop Plunket's is an exception in the Irish, Church.

We have also to acknowledge the Bishop of Lincoln's 'Primary Charge,' (Skeffington,) which is of a practical and level character, and favourably expresses his lordship's cautious and moderate temper.

J. H. Parker's 'Church Calendar' seems to be a great improvement on last year's publication. It is fuller in matter, neater in form, and as cheap in price. It comprises that great clerical necessity—a blank-paged diary.—Masters' very useful 'Churchman's Diary,' which is more strictly of an ecclesiastical character, continues its useful course. If we are to distinguish between these publications, we should say that the former is more fitted for the writing-table, and the latter for the reading-desk.—Cleaver's 'Companion for Churchmen' is comprehensive and cheap.—And a penny publication by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge is rather cheap than comprehensive. The *cruz* for all these almanacs consists in settling, as in 1845, the calendar lessons for the twenty-seventh Sunday after Trinity.

An able and remarkable work, the 'Internal History of German Protestantism,' by Dr. Kahnis, has been translated by Mr. Theodore Meyer, and published by the well-known house of Clark of Edinburgh. It is the work of a Lutheran of a high type; and exhibits more than any work with which we are acquainted the sacramental and better tendencies of this communion. It is a history of literature as well as of opinion; and with the usual characteristics of German writing, displays a depth but seldom plunging into obscurity; but at the same time it is written in a kind and sympathising spirit. We observe that the translator takes credit for 'faithfully' translating whatever Dr. Kahnis has written, only now and then recording 'his protest by an interspersed (!)'. The respectable publishers would have done well to have forbidden this impertinence in Mr. Theodore Meyer.

'Christ and other Masters,' (Macmillan,)—a title with which we are not particularly pleased—is a work by the Christian Advocate, Mr. C. Hardwick, designed to fulfil the especial obligation of his office to combat the prevailing assault upon the Gospel of the day. Consequently, this intel-

ligent and painstaking writer has read with great diligence the works of Messrs. F. Newman, Mackay, Fox, Parker, and other exponents of 'the Absolute Religion,' and we must say that he has produced in an available form a valuable body of criticism, especially in treating that most important question, the characteristics of Religion under the Old Testament Dispensation. We look for valuable productions from Mr. Hardwick.

'The Promises of Christianity' is a republication of certain Essays published in India by Mr. Kay, the Principal of Bishop's College, Calcutta, (J. H. Parker). We find here not only an interesting specimen of the cast of thought which is forced upon an earnest and reflective mind engaged in the higher department of Missionary work; but Mr. Kay's work grapples, and for its compass successfully, with the great problem of reconciling the unquestionably ascetic character and high acquirements of the Gospel precepts with duties towards the world as it now is. Whether entirely realized or not, the latent suspicion in minds nominally Christian, as well as heathen, is that Christianity does not suit the actual work of life. Mr. Kay meets this.

We have received a handsomely printed volume, 'The Gospel on Ezekiel,' (A. & C. Black,) a collection of Sermons by Dr. Guthrie, one, we believe, of the most popular preachers in the Scotch Establishment. The title is a misnomer, or misleader: only the texts are taken from Ezekiel, and not an attempt is made to draw out the instructive and interesting subject promised in the title-page. (We may remark, in passing, that Mr. Fairbairn, a Scotch writer, has published a volume on Ezekiel, of remarkable depth and completeness.) Dr. Guthrie's line is the rhetorical, and he exhibits 'pulpit qualifications'—we should call them tricks—which it is a standing wonder to us why they should be so much admired in the very prosaic atmosphere of the Scotch metropolis. Here is one of Dr. Guthrie's ordinary periods. 'Near by a stone—a mass of rock that had fallen from the overhanging crag—which had some wild flowers growing in its fissures, and on its top the foxglove, with its spike of beautiful but deadly flowers, we once came upon an adder as it lay in ribbon coil, basking on the sunny ground. At our approach the reptile stirred, uncoiled itself, and raising its venomous head, with eyes like burning coals, it shook its cloven tongue, and, hissing, gave signs of battle, &c. &c. . . . And in looking on that shattered rock . . . it seemed to us an emblem of that heart described in the text as a stone,' &c. &c. What we should like to know is the fact, whether this anecdote and image really do detail an actual event? If so, the circumstance that Dr. Guthrie's interview with the adder really did suggest the parallel of an unconverted heart is a remarkable psychological fact: if it were not so, we do greater honour to Dr. Guthrie's imagination than to his sense of propriety in inventing his events.

'Everley, a Tale,' (Masters,) is an imitation of Miss Young's manner and matter. Like most imitations, it exaggerates; and the style of the authoress of the 'Heir of Redclyffe,' with its close and accurate reproduction of really brilliant dialogue, and its minute analysis of character, will not bear repetition in the shape of common-place talk and unmarked

varieties of interlocutor and incident. The writer—and intimate knowledge of the mysteries of dress and some curious innovations in syntax betray the gentle female pen—exhibits very good intentions, and an occasional specimen of bad grammar. Her glimpses of English social life are not very accurate: *ex grat.* It is not the custom, nor would it be desirable even in, or rather still less in, the case of a brilliant marriage, 'for every one in the neighbourhood of Eaton Square to call on the bride.' There is a spirit and a right mind in the tale which is creditable to the writer; but our objections to religious tales are not removed by the perusal of 'Everley.'

A superior volume of 'Sermons,' (J.H. Parker,) many of them academical, reaches us from Mr. Eden, formerly of St. Mary's, Oxford. They seem to combine characteristics which seldom meet, warmth, with sound, business-like precision.

'The Sampler; a System of teaching Plain Needlework,' (Rivingtons,) written by Lady E. Finch, and dedicated to Lady Guernsey, looks as though Mr. Maurice had, in some quarters of society at least, been anticipated. His 'Practical Lectures to Ladies' are hardly needed, where high blood and titled dames in person superintend in our village schools the mysteries of 'seam, and gusset, and band.'

We have not hitherto expressed great admiration for Mr. Archer Gurney's poetical achievements; but in two recent publications, 'Iphigenia in Delphi,' and an 'Ode of Peace,' (Longmans,) he has exhibited high powers. The former is a correct, and because correct, cold, yet elaborate and learned reproduction of Greek Tragedy; the latter deals with a subject as trying to the political sympathies of the day as it seems unpromising to the Pindaric lyre. Mr. Gurney turns into an ode the argument, not of the peace societies, but of all rational and Christian men, that enough has been spent both of blood and treasure in the unprofitable Russian war: and he pursues his thesis into all the arguments which we usually meet with in newspapers. The result is a laureate's leading article. Here is the trite argument, that anyhow we have thrown back Russia twenty years, done into Mr. Gurney's sonorous lines:—

' Full twenty times this orb must round the vast,
Circling around the parent sun,
Ere she could play the part she now hath done.'

There is in the whole poem a great deal of vigorous language and a nice sense of harmony.

Mr. Wright, of Dalston, has delivered a very agreeable and useful 'Lecture on the Choral Service,' which is published by Rivingtons.

We can seriously recommend as a little gift-book suitable for the season, and at once amusing, indeed extremely comic, and at the same time instructive, 'Mrs. Boss's Niece,' (Mozleys.) It is by the author of 'Stories on Proverbs,' and, if we remember right, 'The Conceited Pig,'—an especial weakness of ours.

Our excellent friend and monitor, Mr. Paget, is almost reconciling us to the ecclesiastical tale, and this chiefly because his recent stories are by no means Church novels; that is to say, they are not designed to teach 'Church

principles' by improbable dialogue and impossible fiction. We are not sure that we have kept up with Mr. J. H. Parker's amusing and instructive series: but a recent instalment, 'The Tenants of Tinker's End,' struck us as unusually good.

But 'The Owlet of Owlstone Edge' (Masters) is this ingenious author's last and, we must add, most elaborate work. It is a disquisition on Parsons' Wives, who are presented in a series of sketches, after the manner of Theophrastus or Bishop Earle. There is not a little wit and satire, occasionally running into sarcasm, in this volume, of which the title, a frigid conceit, is its least recommendation.

'The Beauty of Holiness Illustrated,' (W. White,) is a collection of detached passages of Holy Scripture, arranged according to a classification which we are unable to comprehend. We confess to a distaste for 'Beauties of the Bible.'

We are disposed to place far above the average of such collections a set of 'Parish Sermons,' by Mr. C. A. West, (Deighton & Bell.) The volume is a posthumous publication; and Mr. West's style is a very good model for a village preacher.—A volume which comprises some thoughtful and careful discourses 'On the Lord's Day,' by Mr. Gowing, of Banbury, (J. H. Parker,) is also to be unhesitatingly commended.

The two books of the year, Dean Milman's 'Latin Christianity,' vols. iv. v. vi., concluding the work, (Murray,) and Macaulay's 'History,' vols. iii. and iv. (Longmans,) reach us only in time to acknowledge. They will, of course, receive other than the present notice at our hands.

Dr. Pusey, always alive to the immediate duties of the Church in raising its solemn protest against every heretical statement as it rises, has just published two weighty 'Sermons on Faith,' (J. H. Parker.) They are remarkable, even among their author's profusion of ancient lore, for richness of Patristic learning, and still richer with that devout and earnest love which ranks their author first among our religious as among our doctrinal teachers. The second sermon deals with the subjective unbelief of Mr. F. Newman, and the sentimental school of misbelief in the Gospel. Incidentally, Dr. Pusey criticizes Professor Jowett's denial of the doctrine of the Atonement, and accepts as the starting-point of his objections, that they would involve human passions in God. Is it not rather,—or, more correctly, is it not as well,—that Professor Jowett has no real belief in the Divinity of the Saviour? By the way, we used to hear a good deal of non-natural interpretations some years ago: we should much like to hear Professor Jowett's explanation of the sense in which, within the last week or two, he renewed his subscription to the Articles.

Two handsome reprints, from Mr. J. H. Parker's beautiful press, Laud's 'Devotions' and Spinkes' 'Devotions,' are satisfactory and sufficient proofs that, amidst heavy clouds and difficulties, the practical and essential Church principles are still gaining on society.

Among Christmas Books, and among competing editions of the particular author, we can specify Routledge's Edition of 'Longfellow's Poems,'

profusely illustrated, as having attained a high, if not the first, place. The wood-cuts are beautifully executed, and 'worked' with a truth and precision which is highly creditable. The 'Golden Legend' is not included, which, considering the character of the edition as a gift-book, is perhaps as well; for with all the beauty of this poem, it is certainly unreadable for the young.—We may here mention that an article on *Hiawatha*, and other Poems of the Year, is unavoidably excluded from the present number.

Mr. Gresley has added to the many claims which he has upon the regard and respect of Churchmen, 'Three Sermons on the present State of the Controversy with Rome,' (Masters,) which are characterized by his well-known earnest spirit and sound practical sense.

'The Life of Alderman Kelly,' by Mr. Fell, (Groombridge,) is a tedious narrative of the life of a respectable but very common-place person.

'The Suffering Saviour,' (Clark: Edinburgh,) translated from Krummacher, is a series of Meditations on the Passion, conceived in much of the realizing devotional spirit of the best ages and writers of the Church; and exhibits a very favourable, and we fear exceptional, specimen of the communion to which the warm-hearted author belongs.

First in the sleet of pamphlets which is destined to assail Dr. Lushington's judgment, and not likely to be the last in the way of argument, is a careful brochure by 'a Parish Priest, who has not in use the Articles complained of,' under the title of 'Dr. Lushington's Judgment, &c. considered.' (Masters.)

The authoress of the 'Heir of Redclyffe' has presented children with a noble Christmas book—'The History of Sir Thomas Thumb,' (Constable,) illustrated with some first-rate wood-cuts of animal life, by J. B., an artist equal to, and praised by, Landseer, and already favourably known by some noble illustrations of Scripture. In the notes there is a great deal of curious literature.

Mr. Blatch's 'Memoir of Bishop Low,' (Rivingtons,) is a valuable monograph of a character now extinct, the Highland Jacobite clergyman. The good Bishop was almost a great man: great from the solidity and simplicity of his character, and quite recalling the primitive life. The indigenous Episcopate of the non-established Scotch Church is a bright page in ecclesiastical history.

Mr. John Hewitt's noble work on 'Ancient Armour,' is one of those important works, profusely and accurately illustrated, and full of archaeological research, which it is a labour of love to Mr. J. H. Parker to publish. This gentleman's services to Christian and monumental art it would be difficult to exaggerate.

THE
CHRISTIAN REMEMBRANCER.

APRIL, 1856.

- ART. I.¹—1. *The Song of Hiawatha.* By HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW. London: David Bogue, Fleet Street.
2. *Maud.* By ALFRED TENNYSON. London: Moxon.
3. *Men and Women.* By ROBERT BROWNING. London: Chapman and Hall.
4. *The Mystic, and other Poems.* By JAMES PHILIP BAILEY. London: Chapman and Hall.
5. *The Poetry of Creation.* By NICHOLAS MICHELL. London: Chapman and Hall.
6. *The Battle-Day, and other Poems.* By ERNEST JONES. London: G. Routledge and Co.

OUR poets would seem this year to have entered into a compact—or some subtle influence spreading amongst them has acted with all the force of mutual agreement and design—to surprise the world with something new and unexpected. Actual originality comes of itself, and no man can successfully lay snares for it; but the public may be made to wonder and look about them at an easier cost of powers. Startling effects, what the mercantile world calls ‘novelties,’ are oftener produced by recklessness than study; and it needs only for a man of genius to resolve by a deliberate act of the will to tread in no man’s steps, to be guided by no canons of criticism, to submit to no exclusions, to break down the barriers between prose and poetry, to constitute nothing too mean to compose a verse, nothing too grotesque to point a thought, nothing too barbarous or grating to be forced into the fetters of rhythm, to raise a more general curiosity and excitement than he has ever raised before, to be more in the world’s eye and on the world’s tongue, and probably for his book to find a readier sale.

We are not disposed to be severe upon this impulse. Surprise

¹ The following pages were in type for the January Number of this year.

is an agreeable sensation; often something really effective is hit off in this mood, and the reading public are so far gainers on the whole, that they enjoy the great desideratum of a luxurious age—a new sensation: their feelings go through a series of vicissitudes more *piquante* than a matter-of-course approval. They indulge in a sort of lovers' quarrel with their favourite, and experience the delights of a reconciliation when their judgment is subdued to a charmed acquiescence in his vagaries. What poem, for example, was ever received with a louder outcry than 'Maud'—with such regret, despair, even contempt? Enemies triumphant—closest friends confounded, and hanging their heads for shame. 'The Times' reviewer exulted in a lost reputation. Tennyson was supposed to have done for himself. We doubt not the poet all the while had no fears; he must have intentionally and deliberately inflicted the shock, and would now wait calmly for the reaction. The 'new sensation' had been produced—curiosity had been excited. Was it indeed a deliberate insult to the public understanding? or might not deep meaning lie underneath? Was there any sense, after all, lying perdue under the 'blush from West to East, the blush from East to West'? Was there any poetry in the domestic arrangement so naïvely confided to us—'I keep but a man and a maid'? What about 'burial fees,' 'pestles and mortars,' 'forging wine-companies,' 'yard-wands,' 'snubnoses'? The very audacity of the assault on their prejudices made men pause in their first indignation. A man could not have written such things without knowing what he was about—a poet, too, whom they had loved and honoured so long—the very master of melody, who had added new strings to our harp, and struck out music our language never gave utterance to before. Men began to lower their tone. Poets are teachers: what though we do not understand their message? does it therefore become learners to clamour against it at the first hearing? May there not be harmony to tutored ears in those apparent discords? or may not their harshness of tone, and coarse, snarling misanthropy of thought—this seeming defiance of all rule, both in the choice of subject for verse and mode of treatment—be in themselves so many proofs of the artist's skill; by their contrast adding sweetness and grace to the very intelligible beauty of certain passages? or, again, are not the worst passages, as we had profanely designated them in our presumptuous exercise of private judgment, really the best, as showing the deepest dramatic power, the keenest insight into that mystery, the distracted human intellect?—which sees all things distorted and astray, and yet is guided by influences as certain in their action as those of reason—influences which genius alone can trace and follow out. We

recoiled, it is true, on first reading, at the thought of that shallow grave under the highway—those ‘horse-hoofs beat, beat, beating into the scalp and brain.’ We thought no one had a right to inflict it upon our nerves; it was too horribly matter-of-fact, too disgusting. But when we find it gives rise to philosophic controversy, our nerves strengthen—we begin to see power; and what will not people excuse to this idol, power. Then the Peace party cry ‘Maud’ down, as though they regarded the poet as a dangerous antagonist: counter-poems are addressed to him in reproof. The case is thus removed, so to say, to a court far more favourable to the poet; for we see at once it is unreasonable ever to expect poets to be in their inmost hearts on the side of peace. Where would their vocation be, if all the world lived comfortably by their own firesides? Human suffering is indispensable to their art, as developing magnanimity and heroism; and perhaps in this case our poet may even be conscious that, had he lived in the stir of war and battle, great deeds and mighty sufferings passing under his eyes, his verse might have been inspired by greater unity of purpose, and might have achieved greater things. Noble *action* might have been reflected there, and it might have been given him to conceive a hero, and to compose a great work.

In the meanwhile ‘Maud’ enjoys all the vulgar signs of success. After all the initiatory clamour, Mr. Moxon is able, a very few months after the first publication, to advertise a ninth thousand—a vast number, when we consider how very small a part of the world reads poetry, and how few of those buy it. We believe that the extravagancies and eccentricities of ‘Maud’ have materially assisted its circulation; they have brought it into more general notice. For ourselves, we can in all sincerity congratulate each purchaser: he has, if not a fine poem, some most exquisite fragments. The opening and the close he may never look at again—some pages he may even turn over in nervous haste; but, rejecting the rough rind, there remains a sweet kernel. ‘I have led her home,’ is a little elysium of sweet sounds and thoughts while it lasts: those beautiful mellifluous lines alike haunt heart and ear; we turn to them again and again, always to be more alive to their sweetness and truth: and sweetness and truth to nature on the purest Tennysonian model; so that we may take comfort in the conviction that his more characteristic powers have lost none of their excellence and felicity. But the world has had ‘Maud’ before it so long, that it is no part of our intention to enter on an elaborate criticism. We adduce this strange poem only as a leading example of the passion for eccentricity, or novelty, or change our modern poets, and would-be poets, are showing. No two poets could

present more marked points of contrast than Alfred Tennyson and the topmost bard of the Western hemisphere, Mr. Longfellow; but they have pretty simultaneously produced poems in bold defiance of all preconceived standards. 'The Song of Hiawatha' and 'Maud' have not another feature in common; but in an utter indifference to the laws and customs of verse-making they agree. We consider that Mr. Longfellow's subject justifies any departure from usage he may be pleased to make: we think his poem original, interesting, and, on the whole, attaining the end aimed at; but candour obliges us at the same time to say, that his unprecedented metre is too often a jingling sing-song, and his language not seldom a jargon. The poem is a step towards barbarism. If the style became popular, the consequences might be fatal to literature; but Mr. Longfellow is not answerable for consequences. Having set himself to portray savage life, his business has been to *invent* an appropriate language; good English and established classical verse having notoriously failed in awakening any interest in that subject. In spite of this failure, the subject has a claim on the American poet. So wonderful a thing as savage life ought to have its epic. The aborigines seem to demand this from their conquerors: and the American poet's love of Nature and acknowledged skill at portraying her minutest features must lead him to dwell much on the wild humanity which haunted, as an integral part, her fairest and grandest scenes. As parts of a scene, these wild men have a picturesque charm and value: as America's only early history and antiquities, they must not be forgotten; even for some fine qualities in themselves, they deserve to be remembered. On the other hand, there is between cultivated and savage life a natural repugnance and alienation. Try as we will, reason as we may, the idea of savages soon wearies and disgusts us. Our curiosity may be laboriously raised, but presently subsides again: the separation between them and us is too wide; we turn to more congenial thoughts. All this, no doubt, Mr. Longfellow has reflected upon, and discovered that if he is to make his readers care for wigwams, war-paint, wampum belts, feathers, and their wearers, they must steal into his regard through the aid of appropriate scenery and accessories. A cultivated measure, for example, with its artful cadences and recurring rhymes, its intricacies and linked harmonies, was too far removed from the subject to hope for success. It was regarding the poor savage too much *de haut en bas*. It was bringing him into the midst of our façades and colonnades, and shaming his bareness by our wealth. In fact, no familiar structure of verse, ancient or modern, can either transport us to his haunts or keep us there. They all ring of cultivation; they wake echoes more

congenial to our taste. Romance, chivalry, art, science, philosophy, devotion, our measures all tell of one or other of these; and if we are to care at all for Mr. Longfellow's hero, upon all of these we must turn our backs for the time being, and suffer a temporary oblivion that such matters ever engaged our attention. For we are to be transported to another world altogether. Man is to show his superiority over the animals mainly by his keener instincts. He conquers them, but he also learns from them. Instincts he has, and feelings and passions; but the faculty of reason may be said to sleep within him. Progress is an idea unknown. Human life is from age to age the same struggle with animal life and with the elements, partially and feebly redeemed by certain moral perceptions, and some innate or traditional ideas of a Divine Providence, miserably obscured by superstition. We are to sympathise with a life that lives only in the present, without hope, and almost without forethought, alternating between sloth and excitement, satiety and famine, where the affections alone,—lasting longer and more generous than in the animal tribes, but blindly obeyed as in their case,—raise the life of man above the life of the brute; whose language, too, partaking of this distinction and this similarity, is based on *sound*, and takes nature, animate and inanimate, for its source and guide: meagre, scanty, and barren,—an echo of wind and wave, of song and whirring wings, of roar, growl, and scream; but apparently no vehicle of abstract thought.

Such is, or was, the Red Indian, and being what he is, his poet and chronicler has at least the stimulus of knowing him the crowning barbarian of our age, the only respectable savage. In him he can exhibit savage life in its heroic and most divine aspect. God's image is least obliterated; he is still man stalking erect, brave, tall, active, king of his own domain, supreme over the brutes; and such the poet of the soil is minded to portray him before the last Ojibway disappears, and vanishes into a fading legend, leaving no material trace behind. But language framed in the service of reason, poetry, and art being ill adapted, as we have said, to sustain our sympathies in his life and achievements, the poet, as a preliminary measure, has felt himself obliged to *invent* a new language appropriate to the theme, and removing it from all other themes as wide as may be. Sounding it must be, as befits a land of forests and cataracts—monotonous, for life there has no variety—simple, for few are the ideas to be enunciated—often harsh, as imitative of animal sounds, associated as these are with all human habits and interests,—repeating itself, because this is the inevitable action of the mind debarred from new impressions. A few lines from the Preface show the poet's view of his task:—

'Should you ask me whence these stories?

Whence these legends and traditions,
With the odours of the forest,
With the dew and damp of meadows,
With the curling smoke of wigwams,
With the rushing of great rivers,
With their frequent repetitions,
And their wild reverberations,
As of thunder in the mountains?

I should answer, I should tell you,
"From the forests and the prairies,
From the great lakes of the Northland,
From the land of the Ojibways,
From the land of the Dakotahs,
From the mountains, moors, and fenlands,
Where the heron, the Shuh-shuh-gah,
Feeds among the reeds and rushes,
I repeat them as I heard them
From the lips of Nawadaha,
The musician, the sweet singer."—P. 1.

We believe that Mr. Longfellow, adopting the tom-tom beat of the Indian drum for his lyre, has fulfilled all our requirements with a skill which none but a real poet could show. His is a sort of creation, though people may reasonably differ as to its value. Of his courage at least there can be no doubt. Where ever before were barbarous sounds so profusely used for mere sound's sake? where was the system of parallelism ever carried to such an extreme? where was simplicity ever more nakedly simple? where was mere repetition—to enforce without amplifying an idea or a fact—so persisted in? The unrhymed verse, too, four trochees, without break or change throughout a long poem, supports admirably the monotony of the design, and is to our ears as new, as much an invention, as the language. We are told that this is the old national metre of Finland, and as Mr. Longfellow is great in Scandinavian lore, the idea was no doubt thus suggested to him. The measure of some Spanish ballads is also the same. In one of his earlier poems we learn that in these it had charmed his ear—

'Like the long wave on a sea-beach,
Where the sand as silver shines,
With a soft monotonous cadence
Flow its unrhymed lyric lines.'

But Finnish and Spanish are not precedents for English. We believe the large infusion of Indian words, barbarous as they sound, are *necessary* to the effect: that they tell wonderfully on the ear, and preserve this long poem from a monotony which would without them grow insufferably tedious. As it is, though managed with skill, we soon perceive a kind of knack acquired, a mechanical process arrived at, and see no

reason why the poet should not maintain an average success, while an Indian tradition remains to be told, or a word in Indian nomenclature (the accent generally lying so conveniently on the penultimate) to refresh the sated ear, and bring up the line with a new effect of sound.

Before entering upon the matter of the poem, an instance or two will be appropriate of its savage characteristics: and first of barbarous sounds. Here is a passage from Hiawatha's fight with his father, the West Wind:—

'And as Mudjekeewis, rising,
Stretched his hand to pluck the bulrush,
Hiawatha cried in terror,
Cried in well-dissembled terror,
"Kago! kago! do not touch it!"
"Ah, kaween!" said Mudjekeewis,
"No, indeed, I will not touch it!"
Then they talked of other matters;
First of Hiawatha's brothers,
First of Wabun, of the East-Wind,
Of the South-Wind, Shawondasee,
Of the North, Kabibonokka;
Then of Hiawatha's mother,
Of the beautiful Wenonah,
Of her birth upon the meadow,
Of her death, as old Nokomis
Had remembered and related.'—P. 30.

and such lines as these, which abound—

"Pishnekuh!" cried Pau-Puk-Keewis,
"Pishnekuh! my brothers!" said he.—P. 129.
"Hi-au-ha!" replied the chorus,
"Way-ha-way!" the mystic chorus.—P. 112.

and where Hiawatha, fishing, is on such familiar terms with the denizens of the deep, and desiring to catch the Sturgeon, king of fishes, is expected to put up with the Pike instead—

'Full of scorn was Hiawatha
When he saw the fish rise upward,
Saw the pike, the Maskenozha,
Coming nearer, nearer to him,
And he shouted through the water,
"Esa! esa! Shame upon you!
You are but the pike, Kenozha,
You are not the fish I wanted,
You are not the King of Fishes!"
Reeling downward to the bottom
Sank the pike in great confusion,
And the mighty sturgeon, Nahma,
Said to Ugudwash, the sun-fish,
"Take the bait of this great boaster,
Break the line of Hiawatha."—P. 55.

As a specimen of parallelisms and repetitions, this is the

picture of Hiawatha's home, where each idea is reiterated three or four times—

'By the shores of Gitche Gumece,
By the shining Big-Sea-Water,
Stood the wigwam of Nokomis,
Daughter of the Moon, Nokomis.
Dark behind it rose the forest,
Rose the black and gloomy pine-trees,
Rose the firs with cones upon them;
Bright before it beat the water,
Beat the clear and sunny water,
Beat the shining Big-Sea-Water.'—P. 21.

and in the description of the strong man (the Indian Samson it might seem) and the fairy conspiracy against him—

"If this hateful Kwasind," said they,
"If this great, outrageous fellow
Goes on thus a little longer,
Tearing everything he touches,
Rending everything to pieces,
Filling all the world with wonder,
What becomes of the Puk-Wudjies?
Who will care for the Puk-Wudjies?
He will tread us down like mushrooms,
Drive us all into the water,
Give our bodies to be eaten
By the wicked Nee-ba-naw-baigs,
By the Spirits of the water!"

So the angry Little People
All conspired against the Strong Man,
All conspired to murder Kwasind,
Yes, to rid the world of Kwasind,
The audacious, overbearing,
Heartless, haughty, dangerous Kwasind!

Now this wondrous strength of Kwasind
In his crown alone was seated;
In his crown too was his weakness;
There alone could he be wounded,
Nowhere else could weapon pierce him,
Nowhere else could weapon harm him.'—P. 135.

Of the simplicity which arises from fewness of ideas, and which yet is redeemed from absolute inanity by the fixedness and reality of those ideas, the following translation of an Indian song is a very curious instance; it is a maiden's lamentation for her lover:—

"When I think of my beloved,
Ah me! think of my beloved,
When my heart is thinking of him,
O my sweetheart, my Algonquin!
"Ah me! when I parted from him,
Round my neck he hung the wam-
pum,
As a pledge, the snow-white wam-
pum,
O my sweetheart, my Algonquin!

"I will go with you, he whispered,
Ah me! to your native country;
Let me go with you, he whispered,
O my sweetheart, my Algonquin!
"Far away, away, I answered,
Very far away, I answered,
Ah me! is my native country,
O my sweetheart, my Algonquin!
"When I looked back to behold
him,

Where we parted, to behold him,
 After me he still was gazing,
 O my sweetheart, my Algonquin!
 "By the tree he still was stand-
 ing,
 By the fallen tree was standing,

That had dropped into the water,
 O my sweetheart, my Algonquin!
 "When I think of my beloved,
 Ah me! think of my beloved,
 When my heart is thinking of him,
 O my sweetheart, my Algonquin!"

—Pp. 95, 96.

These all remove us far enough from civilized life, and as such do their work well, though our readers may not be disposed to think these examples in themselves very valuable additions to our literature. But the poem has many passages of real beauty. The author calls it an Indian Edda. It is founded upon a tradition prevalent amongst the North American Indians, of a personage of miraculous birth, who in past ages was sent to teach them the arts of peace, to clear rivers, forests, &c., to make the land habitable, and to introduce some ideas of agriculture. This person goes under various names, of which Mr. Longfellow has chosen the most euphonous—Hiawatha. He is endowed with certain magic powers, and the supernatural largely enters into the narrative, but both influence his course very little. The effect produced is that of an heroic savage endued with the virtues, feelings, antipathies, and prejudices of his class, and with the strength, fortitude, and spirit which our previous notions deem necessary to the character. He loves his friends with tenderness, hates his enemies (our friend Pau-Puk-Keewis) with unswerving tenacity, and is a more sentimentally attached husband than our previous ideas of that relation amongst Indians led us to expect. Not that we would at all wish to alter the very pretty passages which tell us of Minnehaha, Laughing Water. Some of the legends bear a curious analogy with those of Scripture. We find Hiawatha naming the animals according to their natures; at another time he wrestles with a spirit all the night, indeed several successive nights, and gains a blessing:—the spirit Mondamin, of whom it is beautifully said that he

'Came as silent as the dew comes,
 From the empty air appearing,
 Into empty air returning,
 Taking shape when earth it touches,
 But invisible to all men
 In its coming and its going.'—P. 38.

Again, our hero is swallowed, canoe and all, by the Sturgeon, who, from the quantity of oil he yields, must be the Indian fresh-water whale, and emerges from his dark prison on to the pebbly beach unharmed and conqueror. Lastly, we have the strong man Kwasind, with his Samsonian feats. The notes, however, make no comment on these singular coincidences, if they are not, rather, genuine though distorted traditions.

We like the history of the construction of the first canoe.

The authority of man over the powers of Nature, and her ineffectual resistance, are we think gracefully symbolised in the process of building:—

“Give me of your bark, O Birch-Tree!

Of your yellow bark, O Birch-Tree!
Growing by the rushing river,
Tall and stately in the valley!
I a light canoe will build me,
Build a swift Cheemaun for sailing,
That shall float upon the river,
Like a yellow leaf in Autumn,
Like a yellow water-lily!

“Lay aside your cloak, O Birch-Tree?

Lay aside your white-skin wrapper,
For the Summer-time is coming,
And the sun is warm in heaven,
And you need no white-skin wrapper!”

* * * *

And the tree with all its branches
Rustled in the breeze of morning,
Saying, with a sigh of patience,
“Take my cloak, O Hiawatha!”

With his knife the tree he girded;
Just beneath its lowest branches,
Till above the roots, he cut it,
Till the sap came oozing outward;
Down the trunk, from top to bottom,
Sheer he cleft the bark asunder,
With a wooden wedge he raised it,
Stripped it from the trunk unbroken.

“Give me of your boughs, O Cedar!

Of your strong and pliant branches,
My canoe to make more steady,
Make more strong and firm beneath me!”

Through the summit of the Cedar
Went a sound, a cry of horror,
Went a murmur of resistance;
But it whispered, bending downward,
“Take my boughs, O Hiawatha!”

Down he hewed the boughs of cedar,

Shaped them straightway to a framework,

Like two bows he formed and shaped them,

Like two bended bows together.

“Give me of your roots, O Tammarack!

Of your fibrous roots, O Larch-Tree!

My canoe to bind together,
So to bind the ends together
That the water may not enter,
That the river may not wet me!”

And the Larch, with all its fibres,
Shivered in the air of morning,
Touched his forehead with its tassels,

Said, with one long sigh of sorrow,
“Take them all, O Hiawatha!”

From the earth he tore the fibres,

Tore the tough roots of the Larch-Tree,

Closely sewed the bark together,
Bound it closely to the framework.

“Give me of your balm, O Fir-Tree!

Of your balsam and your resin,
So to close the seams together
That the water may not enter,
That the river may not wet me!”

And the Fir-Tree, tall and sombre,
Sobbed through all its robes of darkness,

Rattled like a shore with pebbles,
Answered wailing, answered weeping,

“Take my balm, O Hiawatha!”

* * * *

Thus the Birch-Canoe was builded

In the valley, by the river,
In the bosom of the forest;

And the forest's life was in it,
All its mystery and its magic,

All the lightness of the birch-tree,

All the toughness of the cedar,

All the larch's supple sinews;

And it floated on the river

Like a yellow leaf in Autumn,

Like a yellow water-lily.

Paddles none had Hiawatha,

Paddles none he had or needed,

For his thoughts as paddles served him,

And his wishes served to guide him.

Pp. 49—52.

Minnehaha is a very poetical squaw; a word by the bye which Mr. Longfellow wisely does not think fit to make use of.

Hiawatha is an Ojibway; but in one of his journeys he had stayed to purchase arrows of the ancient arrow-maker of the Dacotahs, whose wigwam was by the Falls of Minnehaha.

'With him dwelt his dark-eyed daughter,
Wayward as the Minnehaha,
With her moods of shade and sunshine,
Eyes that smiled and frowned alternate,
Feet as rapid as the river,
Tresses flowing like the water,
And as musical a laughter;
And he named her from the river,
From the water-fall he named her,
Minnehaha, Laughing Water.'—Pp. 33, 34.

The remembrance of the fair damsel haunts him, and at length he announces to his old grandmother Nokomis that he will seek her for his wife. She argues against a stranger:—

"Wed a maiden of your people,"
Warning, said the old Nokomis;
"Go not eastward, go not westward,
For a stranger, whom we know not!
Like a fire upon the hearthstone
Is a neighbour's homely daughter,
Like the starlight or the moonlight
Is the handsomest of strangers!"

Thus dissuading spake Nokomis,
And my Hiawatha answered
Only this: "Dear old Nokomis,
Very pleasant is the fire-light,
But I like the starlight better,
Better do I like the moonlight!"—P. 70.

Hiawatha sets out on his wooing, shoots a red deer by the way, which he bears on his shoulders as an offering, and approaches with magic strides the land of the Dacotahs.

'At the doorway of his wigwam
Sat the ancient Arrow-maker,
In the land of the Dacotahs,
Making arrow-heads of jasper,
Arrow-heads of chalcedony.
At his side, in all her beauty,
Sat the lovely Minnehaha,
Sat his daughter, Laughing Water,
Plaiting mats of flags and rushes;
Of the past the old man's thoughts
were,

And the maiden's of the future.

* * * * *
She was thinking of a hunter,
From another tribe and country,
Young and tall and very handsome,
Who one morning, in the Spring-
time,

Came to buy her father's arrows,
Sat and rested in the wigwam,

Lingered long about the doorway,
Looking back as he departed.
She had heard her father praise him,
Praise his courage and his wisdom;
Would he come again for arrows
To the Falls of Minnehaha?
On the mat her hands lay idle,
And her eyes were very dreamy.

Through their thoughts they heard
a footstep,
Heard a rustling in the branches,
And with glowing cheek and fore-
head,

With the deer upon his shoulders,
Suddenly from out the woodlands
Hiawatha stood before them.

Straight the ancient Arrow-maker
Looked up gravely from his labour,
Laid aside the unfinished arrow,
Bade him enter at the doorway,

Saying, as he rose to meet him,
 "Hiawatha, you are welcome!"
 At the feet of Laughing Water
 Hiawatha laid his burden,
 Threw the red deer from his shoulders;

And the maiden looked up at him,
 Looked up from her mat of rushes,
 Said with gentle look and accent,
 "You are welcome, Hiawatha!"

Pp. 72, 73.

He enters the wigwam, and is hospitably entertained, Minnehaha waiting on him and her father, listening to all that was said, but, like Milton's Eve, taking no part in the conversation. Soon the lovers' discourse takes a practical turn:—

"After many years of warfare,
 Many years of strife and bloodshed,
 There is peace between the Ojibways
 And the tribe of the Dacotahs."
 Thus continued Hiawatha,
 And then added, speaking slowly,
 "That this peace may last for ever,
 And our hands be clasped more closely,
 And our hearts be more united,
 Give me as my wife this maiden,
 Minnehaha, Laughing Water,
 Loveliest of Dacotah women!"

And the ancient Arrow-maker
 Paused a moment ere he answered,
 Smoked a little while in silence,
 Looked at Hiawatha proudly,
 Fondly looked at Laughing Water,
 And made answer very gravely:
 "Yes, if Minnehaha wishes;
 Let your heart speak, Minnehaha!"

And the lovely Laughing Water
 Seemed more lovely as she stood there,

Neither willing nor reluctant,
 As she went to Hiawatha
 Softly took the seat beside him,
 While she said, and blushed to say it,
 "I will follow you, my husband!"

This was Hiawatha's wooing!
 Thus it was he won the daughter
 Of the ancient Arrow-maker,
 In the land of the Dacotahs!

From the wigwam he departed,
 Leading with him Laughing Water;
 Hand in hand they went together,

Through the woodland and the meadow,
 Left the old man standing lonely
 At the doorway of his wigwam,
 Heard the Falls of Minnehaha
 Calling to them from the distance,
 Crying to them from afar off,
 "Fare thee well, O Minnehaha!"

And the ancient Arrow-maker
 Turned again unto his labour,
 Sat down by his sunny doorway,
 Murmuring to himself, and saying:
 "Thus it is our daughters leave us,
 Those we love, and those who love us!"

Just when they have learned to help us,
 When we are old and lean upon them,

Comes a youth with flaunting feathers,
 With his flute of reeds, a stranger
 Wanders piping through the village,
 Beckons to the fairest maiden,
 And she follows where he leads her,
 Leaving all things for the stranger!"

Pleasant was the journey homeward,
 Through interminable forests,
 Over meadow, over mountain,
 Over river, hill, and hollow.
 Short it seemed to Hiawatha,
 Though they journeyed very slowly,
 Though his pace he checked and slackened

To the steps of Laughing Water.

Pp. 74—76.

Like all heroes, Hiawatha has to be perfected by affliction. The saying that 'misfortunes never come single,' has this very happy illustration:—

'Never stoops the soaring vulture
 On his quarry in the desert,
 On the sick or wounded bison,

But another vulture, watching
From his high aerial look-out,
Sees the downward plunge, and follows;
And a third pursues the second,
Coming from the invisible ether,
First a speck, and then a vulture,
Till the air is dark with pinions.
So disasters come not singly;
But as if they watched and waited,
Scanning one another's motions,
When the first descends, the others
Fellow, follow, gathering flock-wise
Round their victim, sick and wounded,
First a shadow, then a sorrow,
Till the air is dark with anguish.'—Pp. 138, 139.

Troubles come upon him, ushered in by a visit of ghosts in a female shape, who seem a more material sort of personages, in Indian belief, than we esteem them, and very expensive as well as troublesome guests. For weeks they sat crouching in the corner of the wigwam, undisturbed, as became the laws of Indian hospitality.

'And whenever Hiawatha
Came from fishing or from hunting,
When the evening meal was ready,
And the food had been divided,
Gliding from their darksome corner,
Came the pallid guests, the strangers,
Seized upon the choicest portions
Set aside for Laughing Water,
And without rebuke or question
Flitted back among the shadows.
Never once had Hiawatha
By a word or look reproved them;
Never once had old Nokomis
Made a gesture of impatience:
Never once had Laughing Water,
Shown resentment at the outrage.
All had they endured in silence,
That the rights of guest and stranger,
That the virtue of free-giving,
By a look might not be lessened,
By a word might not be broken.'—P. 142.

The object of their visit at length transpires; it is to forbid the living to mourn too keenly for the dead, or to wish them back again:—

'“Cries of grief and lamentation
Reach us in the Blessed Islands;
Cries of anguish from the living,
Calling back their friends departed,
Sadden us with useless sorrow.
Therefore have we come to try you;
No one knows us, no one heeds us.
We are but a burden to you,
And we see that the departed
Have no place among the living.”'—P. 143.

The famine consequent upon a long frost, of which these dreary guests are the precursors, is amongst the most striking parts of the poem. The death of Minnehaha is full of pathos and human interest; the peculiar measure suits the mournful theme, and no ornament or minuteness of detail disturbs the wild simplicity of the scene:—

'O the famine and the fever!
O the wasting of the famine!
O the blasting of the fever!
O the wailing of the children!
O the anguish of the women!
All the earth was sick and famished;

Hungry was the air around them,
Hungry was the sky above them,
And the hungry stars in heaven
Like the eyes of wolves glared at them!

Into Hiawatha's wigwam
Came two other guests, as silent
As the ghosts were, and as gloomy,
Waited not to be invited,
Did not parley at the doorway,
Sat there without word of welcome
In the seat of Laughing Water;
Looked with haggard eyes and hollow

At the face of Laughing Water.
And the foremost said: "Behold me!

I am Famine, Buckadawin!"
And the other said: "Behold me!
I am Fever, Abkosewin!"

And the lovely Minnehaha
Shuddered as they looked upon her,
Shuddered at the words they uttered,
Lay down on her bed in silence,
Hid her face, but made no answer;
Lay there trembling, freezing, burning

At the looks they cast upon her,
At the fearful words they uttered.

Forth into the empty forest
Rushed the maddened Hiawatha,
In his heart was deadly sorrow,
In his face a stony firmness;
On his brow the sweat of anguish
Started, but it froze and fell not.—

* * * *

'In the wigwam with Nokomis,
With those gloomy guests, that
watched her,
With the Famine and the Fever,
She was lying, the Beloved,
She the dying Minnehaha.

"Hark!" she said; "I hear a rushing,

Hear a roaring and a rushing,
Hear the Falls of Minnehaha
Calling to me from a distance!"
"No, my child!" said old Nokomis,
"'Tis the night-wind in the pine-trees!"

"Look!" she said; "I see my father

Standing lonely at his doorway,
Beckoning to me from his wigwam
In the land of the Dacotahs!"
"No, my child!" said old Nokomis,
"'Tis the smoke, that waves and beckons!"

"Ah!" she said, "the eyes of Pauguk

Glare upon me in the darkness,
I can feel his icy fingers
Clasping mine amid the darkness!
Hiawatha! Hiawatha!"

And the desolate Hiawatha,
Far away amid the forest,
Miles away among the mountains,
Heard that sudden cry of anguish,
Heard the voice of Minnehaha
Calling to him in the darkness,
"Hiawatha! Hiawatha!"

Over snow-fields waste and pathless,

Under snow-encumbered branches,
Homeward hurried Hiawatha,
Empty-handed, heavy-hearted,
Heard Nokomis moaning, wailing:
"Wahonomin! Wahonomin!
Would that I had perished for you,
Would that I were dead as you are!
Wahonomin! Wahonomin!"

And he rushed into the wigwam,
Saw the old Nokomis slowly
Rocking to and fro and moaning,
Saw his lovely Minnehaha
Laying dead and cold before him,
And his bursting heart within him
Uttered such a cry of anguish,
That the forest moaned and shuddered,

That the very stars in heaven

Shook and trembled with his anguish.

Then he sat down, still and speechless,

On the bed of Minnehaha,

At the feet of Laughing Water,

At those willing feet that never

More would lightly run to meet him,

Never more would lightly follow.

With both hands his face he covered,

Seven long days and nights he sat there,

As if in a swoon he sat there,

Speechless, motionless, unconscious

Of the daylight or the darkness.'

Pp. 145—149.

Certainly 'Hiawatha' is the most interesting Indian legend that has yet been produced. We feel it an act of justice to those hapless tribes; there is a satisfaction in it beyond the intrinsic value of the performance, and therefore we have dwelt on it longer than some of our readers may thank us for. But it is something in these days to understand a poem, and more to be able to read it; and we linger by the smooth flow of intelligible verse, however singular and capricious the structure, when we know that the next step brings us to Mr. Browning's spasmodic whirls and eddies—that beyond yawns the black gulf of Mr. Bailey's 'Mystic.'

Such of our readers as are acquainted with Mr. Browning's poetry, if only through the medium of these pages, will know that affected singularity can be no new feature; nevertheless, the influence which we have attributed to the year has not been without its effect. And his last volume, 'Men and Women,' is by many degrees more eccentric, affected, resolutely strange, and in parts deliberately unintelligible than its predecessors. Nor are these by any means the book's worst characteristics. No doubt other poets have more grossly transgressed the bounds of propriety, more unscrupulously outraged decorum; but we doubt if any writer of verse amongst such as have a place at all in the literary world, and have their little circle of admirers, ever represented 'Men and Women' under a more uniformly offensive aspect, or more utterly without moral elevation. We presume Mr. Browning's design is to represent human nature as he sees it. But our nature is twofold. It may have low propensities, but it has also high instincts and aspirations. Such he either despises or ignores. To him, it cannot be doubted, the only interesting part of humanity is its fallen earthly elements. These he fastens upon, gloats over, and depicts with curious minuteness and evident relish; and undoubtedly with some ingenuity, but in our estimation with scarce a spark of genuine poetry either in matter or execution. Mr. Browning, conscious of certain coarse powers of emphasis and realization, thinks and calls himself a poet, and he has followers who claim the rank for him, and use very grand language indeed concerning his reach of thought, and fine ear for all the intricacies of harmony.

But *no* man can turn such themes as he constantly chooses for his verse into poetry, nor could a man endowed with anything so divine as the real poetic faculty ever apply his thoughts to such revolting subjects as are many in this volume. The muse is avenged for the attempt; for anything so crabbed, harsh, grotesque, as many of these so-called poems, we never encountered before. The weary and exasperated reader perpetually pauses in search of epithets to express the ungrateful toil of perusal: all images of obstruction and little-ease crowd into his fancy; stitches, cramps, and spasms, grinding cart-wheels, clanking chains, Charivaris, shrieks, insane utterances, all suggest themselves by turns. This is where the sense *is* to be learnt by a steady unrelaxed attention, which he feels the subject is not worth; but there are various passages, and whole poems, where a conscientious desire to get at the meaning can only be compared to a search in the dark. We grope and stumble along, encountering unexpected obstructions at every turn, now hitting a shin, now fraying an elbow, and emerging at length unsuccessful, irritated, humbled, and with resolutions against such expeditions for the future.

The subjects are various, but the mode of treating them tolerably uniform—themes of small interest, acted on by men and women of low ideas, and resulting in some grovelling end. A sort of chemical process may be observed throughout, by which the dregs of each feeling and passion remain, the purer emotions having vanished we know not whither. His pictures of love are coarse passion, or at best a subjugation of conscience and reason to passion; his idea of beauty is sensual, his religion bigotry or hypocrisy, his patriotism selfishness, his philosophy scepticism. His respect is given not to purity but strength of purpose; his moral is a deliberate preference of the present over the future. These are hard charges; but what can we think of such poems as ‘The Statue and the Bust,’ the point of which is to hold up to our contempt a man and woman who had not courage enough to act out a wicked intention? of another (Fra Lippo Lippi),—where we are called upon to sympathise with a licentious monk artist, compelled to paint saints against the grain, and apologising with unctuous minuteness for his shameless course of life?—of another (The Heretic’s Tragedy; a middle age interlude), where a bigot exults in roasting a heretic over a slow fire, and malignantly gloats over the process of torture, indulging his fancy the while in certain pious conceits?—of another (Holy-Cross Day), where we are made to hear the hissing, croaking spite of certain Jews, compelled to the obsolete discipline of listening to a Christian sermon for their conversion; the malignity, the insinuations, the self-contempt,

all venting themselves in scarcely human language—squeaking, groaning, barking? Even where these heights of impropriety are not reached, the tone is almost as bad. One of the most elaborate poems, so to call it, is an apology for infidelity, (Bishop Blougram's Apology) by a cardinal bishop of the Roman Catholic Church; unjustifiable, as pointing unmistakeably to a living person much in the world's eyes and thoughts, and also as a really clever defence of a life-long course of conscious deliberate hypocrisy; so ingeniously done, that it is difficult to believe the author is representing another's supposed feelings, without in a measure justifying them. Even where we cannot bring any moral charge, the moral impression is often very painful; as where a husband (Andrea del Sarto), is pouring his feelings into the ears of his wife, bribing her, heartless and faithless as he knows her to be, for a little sympathy by the promise of money and fine clothes; or, again, where the mesmerist is represented as having absolute mastery by the mystic power of his art over the woman he loves, compelling her presence, and constraining her will, by the simple fixing of his thoughts upon her. Or where the woman, in 'A Woman's Last Word,' a poem with more claim to beauty than most in the volume, lays herself, soul as well as body, in abject subservience at the feet of the man she loves—we suppose her husband—in these words, and others like them:—

' Be a god, and hold me
With a charm:
Be a man, and fold me
With thine arm!
Teach me, only teach, Love!
As I ought
I will speak thy speech, Love—
Think thy thought—
Meet, if thou require it,
Both demands,
Laying flesh and spirit
In thy hands!'—*Browning*, vol. i. p. 33.

These are all unwholesome, unpleasant ideas, to say the least of it; and these curious, creeping, morbid fancies, this imagination too often let loose upon low pleasures, low sins, low revenges, take the place of the true poet's frank, generous, world-wide sympathies.

In themes absolutely blameless, the grotesque mode of treatment is perhaps most conspicuous of all. It is as though the writer's aim were simply to baffle the reader and tire out his patience. We must suppose, however, that he designs us to see humour and point in such rhymes and comparisons as we will adduce. There is a very long poem, descriptive of a fugue in music,

(‘Master Hugue of Saxe Gotha,’) of which we may say that, granting it ingenuity, and some cleverness—for Mr. Browning has the knack of Hudibrastic rhyming—we know no more tormenting task than its perusal. These are some of its twenty-nine stanzas; the rest are all as affected and discordant. We should premise that the numerals one, two, three, four, five, are the several strands, so to say, of the harmony—

‘One disertates, he is candid—
Two must discept,—has distinguished!
Three helps the couple, if ever yet man did:
Four protests, Five makes a dart at the thing wished—
Back to One, goes the case banded!
One says his say with a difference—
More of expounding, explaining!
All now is wrangle, abuse, and vociferance—
Now there’s a truce, all’s subdued, self-restraining—
Five, though, stands out all the stiffer hence.
One is incisive, corrosive—
Two retorts, nettled, curt, crepitant—
Three makes rejoinder, expansive, explosive—
Four overbears them all, strident and strepitant—
Five . . . O Danaides, O Sieve!’—Vol. i. pp. 198, 199.

And in the poem ‘the Grammarian’s Funeral’—the only person, by the way, who has an aim to which the *present* is sacrificed—the student’s aspirations are thus described:—

‘Did not he magnify the mind, shew clear
Just what it all meant?
He would not discount life, as fools do here,
Paid by instalment!
He ventured neck or nothing—heaven’s success
Found, or earth’s failure:
“Wilt thou trust death or not?” he answered “Yes.
“Hence with life’s pale lure!”
That low man seeks a little thing to do,
Sees it and does it:
This high man, with a great thing to pursue,
Dies ere he knows it.
That low man goes on adding one to one,
His hundred’s soon hit:
This high man, aiming at a million,
Misses an unit.
That, has the world here—should he need the next,
Let the world mind him!
This, throws himself on God, and unperplext
Seeking shall find Him.
So, with the throttling hands of Death at strife,
Ground he at grammar;
Still, thro’ the rattle, parts of speech were rife.
While he could stammer
He settled *Holi’s* business—let it be!—
Properly based *Oun*—
Gave us the doctrine of the enclitic *De*,
Dead from the waist down.’—Vol. ii. pp. 215—217.

In such lines does he win us to honour 'a man decided not to love but know.' There is no better passage to be found in eight pages of the same convulsed and galvanized measure. All this discordance is deliberate on Mr. Browning's part. He cannot, it is true, write really harmonious verse, but finding this gift denied him he makes a merit of his deficiencies, depreciates what he does not possess, and announces that he does not write for boys, but men; as though there were manly force and virtue in harsh sounds, violent rhymes, halting accents, and meaning involved beyond hope of disentanglement. A friend thus addresses him:—

'But here's your fault; grown men want thought, you think;
Thought's what they mean by verse, and seek in verse:
Boys seek for images and melody,
Men must have reason—so you aim at men.'—Vol. ii, p. 224.

Again, giving a story of Luther's:—

'Grand rough old Martin Luther
Bloomed fables—flowers on furze,
The better the uncouth:
Do roses stick like burrs?'—Vol. ii, p. 190.

He is splenetic on 'Popularity,' to which he devotes a poem, where he likens true poetry to the old Tyrian purple. The poet *par excellence* finds the shell, the popular man makes the extract and gets the reward. We cannot see that the simile holds: our great minstrels have left us abundant evidence that they could apply their discoveries better than any one else. However, Mr. Browning leaves us to infer that *he* finds the shell and others profit by it. Our readers may judge how much divine purple lies hid in the following stanzas:—

Mere conchs! not fit for warp or woof!
Till art comes,—comes to pound and squeeze
And clarify,—refines to proof
The liquor filtered by degrees,
While the world stands aloof.
And there's the extract, flasked and fine,
And priced, and saleable at last!
And Hobbs, Nobbs, Stokes and Nokes combine
To paint the future from the past,
Put blue into their line.
Hobbs hints blue,—straight he turtle eats.
Nobbs prints blue,—claret crowns his cup.
Nokes outdares Stokes in azure feats,—
Both gorge. Who fished the murex up?
What porridge had John Keats?'—Vol. ii. 196, 197.

Mr. Browning has clearly a morbid horror of common-place sweetness; he, therefore, is always refreshing his style and startling his readers by revolting or monstrous allusions. An

Arab physician writes his adventures to a friend, or, in other words, 'voids the stuffing of his travel-scrip.' It is thus he measures distances.

' But at the end, I reach Jerusalem,
Since this poor covert where I pass the night,
This Bethany, lies scarce the distance thence
A man with plague-sores at the third degree
Runs till he drops down dead. Thou laughest here!'

—Vol. i. p. 92.

As an instance of obscurity, we should like to give the poem entitled "Before," which would abundantly prove our charge; but to extract a whole poem only because it is unintelligible, would be imposing on the forbearance of our readers. We owe apologies to them for some of the extracts we shall adduce; but having said strong things, we must support them by evidence. If Mr. Browning were simply a writer of doggerel verses, or simply a man naturally predisposed to low and vulgar ideas, or simply a person of prurient imaginations, we should pass his works by altogether. But we believe these sins both of thought and execution are not so much *natural* as the results of deliberate choice. He was meant for better things. He has real powers; not perhaps such as he supposes himself to possess, but such as would have won him estimation with men of taste and judgment, had not the canker of scepticism blighted his whole view of things. Every moral, every religious question is tinged by it; even matters of mere taste show signs of the infection. Men and women are viewed under a totally different aspect by a man who *doubts*; who will not see this world as a probation. If this world were really all, the maxim, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,' would be a wise one; but on its adoption would follow a total change, not only in our avowedly religious and moral creed, but in our universal estimate of things. Our *respect* would be destroyed. From a human being to a flower, we should see all things differently. We believe it is this failure of respect for humanity, arising from a doubt as to our future destiny and an uncertainty as to any eternal consequences accruing to men from their actions, which produces much of the *bad taste* of this volume. The following lines are more than vulgar; they are an insult to humanity; they represent the feelings of the Jews, setting forth on compulsion, to hear the sermon preached for their conversion. Of course, Mr. Browning sides with them, but no bigot while he persecuted ever estimated a Jew's feelings and nature so low.—

"Fee, faw, fum! bubble and squeak!
Blessedest Thursday's the fat of the week.

Rumble and tumble, sleek and rough,
Stinking and savoury, smug and gruff,
Take the church-road, for the bell's due chime
Gives us the summons—'tis sermon-time.

Boh, here's Barnabas! Job, that's you?
Up stumps Solomon—bustling too?
Shame, man! greedy beyond your years
To hansom the bishop's shaving-shears?
Fair play's a jewel! leave friends in the lurch?
Stand on a line ere you start for the church.

Higgledy piggedly, packed we lie,
Rats in a hamper, swine in a sty,
Wasps in a bottle, frogs in a sieve,
Worms in a carcase, fleas in a sleeve.
Hist! square shoulders, settle your thumbs
And buzz for the bishop—here he comes.

Bow, wow, wow—a bone for the dog!
I liken his Grace to an acorned hog.—Vol. ii. pp. 158—160.

with much more to the same effect.

We cannot extract from the 'Heretic's Tragedy,' to which we have before alluded, from the ghastly horror of the subject, and the mode of treatment, which is really atrocious. No man who can blush for mortal error could have written it. We presume he affects the subject as exhibiting the workings of a blind unreasoning faith, for which he elsewhere expresses contempt. In the workings of the affections we may trace the same evil influence. Whether Mr. Browning would deliberately recommend to his readers a disregard of the old-fashioned code of morals we do not know, but he represents such disregard as natural, and he does not blame it. In the dramatic sketch called 'In a Balcony,' the actors in which are two passionate lovers and a poor old queen, shamefully duped between them; we find the lady oppose, against a public avowal of their attachment, to which there was no rational objection, the following argument:—

'Had I not loved you from the very first,
Were I not yours, could we not steal out thus
So wickedly, so wildly, and so well,
You might be thus impatient. What's conceived
Of us without here, by the folks within?
Where are you now? immersed in cares of state—
Where am I now?—intent on festal robes—
We two, embracing under death's spread hand!
What was this thought for, what this scruple of yours
Which broke the council up, to bring about
One minute's meeting in the corridor?
And then the sudden sleights, long secresies,
The plots inscrutable, deep telegraphs,
Long-planned chance-meetings, hazards of a look,
"Does she know? does she not know? saved or lost?"

A year of this compression's ecstasy
 All goes for nothing? you would give this up
 For the old way, the open way, the world's,
 His way who beats, and his who sells his wife?
 What tempts you? their notorious happiness,
 That you're ashamed of ours? The best you'll get
 Will be, the Queen grants all that you require,
 Concedes the cousin, and gets rid of you
 And her at once, and gives us ample leave
 To live as our five hundred happy friends.'—Vol. ii. pp. 60, 61.

It is hardly a less injury to women to suppose such reasoning natural than to think it right. Mr. Browning is a contemner of prejudice. No doubt he feels it his mission to dispel illusions; if his book has an apparent aim, it is this. It is pretty clear that love of country is in Mr. Browning's eyes an old-fashioned notion. His native land has no hold either on his taste or his principles; Italy is the land of his adoption. Italy, no doubt, is a very beautiful and interesting country, but we are, nevertheless, fastidious as to the motives of all who give it exclusive preference. All men, whose manhood is connected with their youth and childhood by natural and vigorous ties, whose education has been what it ought, who have learnt what nature in those plastic early years was designed to teach, admire and love their own country most and best. Wherever this is not the case, the mind has received some injury; early faith and trust have been trampled on, and some violent wrench has disjoined the man from the boy. Not seldom a so-called conversion is this wrench; but more frequently it is a breaking from old restraints rather than the adoption of new ones. From whatever cause Italy has Mr. Browning's heart, its climate, its women, its pictures, its music, its cities, its history, its careless easy life—all are reviewed as though there was no moral bearing in any of them, none, at least, with which the stranger amongst them has anything to do.

'Italy, my Italy!
 Queen Mary's saying serves for me—
 (When fortune's malice
 Lost her, Calais.)
 Open my heart and you will see
 Graved inside of it, "Italy."
 Such lovers old are I and she;
 So it always was, so it still shall be.'—Vol. ii. 49.

'Bishop Blougram's Apology,' in conversational blank verse, a very stiff piece of reading indeed, is yet useful and curious, as furnishing the key to a great deal that has apparently no connexion with its subject. We know not whether to call it an apology for hypocrisy, or an argument for scepticism. The author evidently desires to show that he can sympathise with

both states, and is much too enlightened a person to recoil with contempt from a man who professes himself, and imposes upon others, an implicit unreasoning faith, while he has no real belief whatever. So long as the thing is done effectually, so long as the world is imposed upon, and the hypocrite gets what he aims at, he can see something almost to respect in the position. Fortunately for us, our Church awakes no sympathy in Mr. Browning; Romanism is much more to his taste. Mindful therefore of his Italian predilections, he chooses a Roman Catholic Bishop as the actor in this anomalous position; one born in Italy and impregnated with foreign tastes, though bearing an English name, and naturalized amongst us. The higher he estimates a man's intellect, the less, evidently, can he believe in the sincerity of any dogmatic creed he may profess. We do not deny, that to many others it may be a standing difficulty how some men, with the intellects we know them to have, can believe the extravagancies they do apparently believe. Mr. Browning cuts the difficulty at once by assuming that they do not believe them. His respect evidently would suffer least diminution by supposing such an one a hypocrite; it is, indeed, the only assumption by which his interest can be sustained. In 'Bishop Blougram' he shows us how it may be done. This ecclesiastic is represented in a fit of after-dinner confidence explaining and defending his position to an avowed sceptic, a clever sort of fellow in his way, but too far beneath his companion in the world's estimation for any risk to be run by a betrayal of these singular admissions. The Bishop begins by assuming that his more honest friend *despises* him. He is enjoying himself over a good cool glass of wine after 'some hot long ceremonies of our Church,' which had occupied the morning; and after pluming himself on certain worldly advantages, in which he has the better of the avowed sceptic, concludes with the question,—

'Why won't you be a bishop too?'

Why, first, you don't believe, you don't and can't,
 (Not statedly, that is, and fixedly
 And absolutely and exclusively)
 In any revelation called divine.
 No dogmas nail your faith—and what remains
 But say so, like the honest man you are?
 First, therefore, overhaul theology!
 Nay, I too, not a fool, you please to think,
 Must find believing every whit as hard,
 And if I do not frankly say as much,
 The ugly consequence is clear enough.

Now, wait, my friend: well, I do not believe—
 If you'll accept no faith that is not fixed,
 Absolute and exclusive, as you say.
 (You're wrong—I mean to prove it in due time)

Meanwhile, I know where difficulties lie
 I could not, cannot solve, nor ever shall,
 So give up hope accordingly to solve—
 (To you, and over the wine). Our dogmas then
 With both of us, tho' in unlike degree,
 Missing full credence—overboard with them!
 I mean to meet you on your own premise—
 Good, there go mine in company with yours!

And now what are we? unbelievers both,
 Calm and complete, determinately fixed
 To-day, to-morrow, and for ever, pray?
 You'll guarantee me that? Not so, I think.
 In no-wise! all we've gained is, that belief,
 As unbelief before, shakes us by fits,
 Confounds us like its predecessor. Where's
 The gain? how can we guard our unbelief,
 Make it bear fruit to us?—the problem here.
 Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-touch,
 A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
 A chorus-ending from Euripides,—
 And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears
 As old and new at once as Nature's self,
 To rap and knock and enter in our soul,
 Take hands and dance there, a fantastic ring,
 Round the ancient idol, on his base again,—
 The grand Perhaps!—Vol. i. pp. 213—215.

He next candidly states his grounds for his choice of line.

'I know the special kind of life I like,
 What suits the most my idiosyncrasy,
 Brings out the best of me and bears me fruit
 In power, peace, pleasantness, and length of days.
 I find that positive belief does this
 For me, and unbelief, no whit of this.'—Vol. i. pp. 217, 218.

* * * * *

'Well now—there's one great form of Christian faith
 I happened to be born in—which to teach
 Was given me as I grew up, on all hands,
 As best and readiest means of living by;
 The same on examination being proved
 The most pronounced moreover, fixed, precise
 And absolute form of faith in the whole world—
 Accordingly, most potent of all forms
 For working on the world. Observe, my friend,
 Such as you know me, I am free to say,
 In these hard latter days which hamper one,
 Myself, by no immoderate exercise
 Of intellect and learning, and the tact
 To let external forces work for me,
 Bid the street's stones be bread and they are bread,
 Bid Peter's creed, or, rather, Hildebrand's,
 Exalt me o'er my fellows in the world
 And make my life an ease and joy and pride,
 It does so,—which for me is a great point gained,
 Who have a soul and body that exact
 A comfortable care in many ways.

There's power in me and will to dominate
Which I must exercise, they hurt me else :
In many ways I need mankind's respect,
Obedience, and the love that's born of fear :
While at the same time, there's a taste I have,
A toy of soul, a titillating thing,
Refuses to digest these dainties crude.'—Vol. i. pp. 221, 222.

Here he supposes his antagonist to object that, though he succeeds in carrying the million imbeciles with him, yet some dozen men of sense eye him apart, and their suffrages he loses. These will say, either he believes in the last winking Virgin, in which case he is a fool, or he disbelieves and is a knave.

—' approve in neither case,
Withhold their voices though I look their way :
Like Verdi when, at his worst opera's end
(The thing they gave at Florence,—what's its name ?)
While the mad houseful's plaudits near out-bang
His orchestra of salt-box, tongs and bones,
He looks through all the roaring and the wreaths
Where sits Rossini patient in his stall.'—Vol. i. p. 225.

But this he disputes altogether, and proves ingeniously that there is distinction in his questionable position. He likens himself to a boy perched on a stack of chimneys; sixty boys a minute may pass along the street, and you take no note of them; but this one, all eyes are fixed on him. 'Our interest's on the dangerous edge of things.'

' Your picked Twelve, you'll find,
Profess themselves indignant, scandalized
At thus being held unable to explain
How a superior man who disbelieves
May not believe as well: that's Schelling's way!
It's through my coming in the tail of time,
Nicking the minute with a happy tact.
Had I been born three hundred years ago
They'd say, "What's strange? Blougram of course believes;"
And, seventy years since, "disbelieves of course."
But now, "He may believe; and yet, and yet
How can he?"—All eyes turn with interest.
Whereas, step off the line on either side—
You, for example, clever to a fault,
The rough and ready man that write apace,
Read somewhat seldomer, think perhaps even less—
You disbelieve! Who wonders and who cares?
Lord So-and-So—his coat bedropt with wax,
All Peter's chains about his waist, his back
Brave with the needlework of Noddledom,
Believes! Again, who wonders and who cares?
But I, the man of sense and learning too,
The able to think yet act, the this, the that,
I, to believe at this late time of day!
Enough; you see, I need not fear contempt. —

Vol. i. pp. 226—228

The man's argument is the simply worldly one, he will have this world and let the next take its chance. And we take leave to say, that this is the moral of Mr. Browning's two volumes: nor can we see that his own mind ever takes a step beyond this Bishop's, in the whole train of his reasoning. He supposes the unworldly sceptic opposing to this life of his the nobler existences of power and genius. Napoleon he reviews and dismisses, showing how chimerical the conqueror's gains. The poet's; it would be all very well to be Shakspeare, but not having it in him to write Hamlet and Othello, he prefers remaining his poor self; or Luther's.

'Why to be Luther—that's a life to lead,
Incomparably better than my own,
He comes, reclaims God's earth for God, he says,
Sets up God's rule again by simple means,
Re-opens a shut book, and all is done.
He flared out in the flaring of mankind;
Such Luther's luck was—how shall such be mine?'—Vol. i. p. 235.

and *why*? because Luther

'secured
A real heaven in his heart throughout his life,
Supposing death a little altered things!'—Vol. i. p. 236.

One more extract we give from this poem, esteeming it more in character with the author than his puppet the Cardinal Bishop. It might indeed stand for the motto of his whole book.

'Pure faith indeed—you know not what you ask!
Naked belief in God the Omnipotent,
Omniscient, Omnipresent, sears too much
The sense of conscious creatures to be borne.
It were the seeing him, no flesh shall dare.
Some think, Creation's meant to show him forth:
I say, it's meant to hide him all it can:
And that's what all the blessed Evil's for.'—Vol. i. 239.

This 'blessed Evil,' as he calls it, forms pretty nearly the subject-matter of these volumes. A very spasmodic poem called 'Saul,' enlarged from Mr. Browning's previous works, puts the same in a semi-theological mystical form. David is the prophet of Saul's ultimate glorification, Saul being probably chosen as a kind of type of *power*—power, which is the *summum bonum* of such thinkers as Mr. Browning. But the measure is so insufferable, and the thoughts so obscure, and the task of reading a poem of forty pages, from these combined causes, so irksome, that we pass it over with just a specimen of the verse.

'I say then,—my song
While I sang thus, assuring the monarch, and ever more strong
Made a proffer of good to console him—he slowly resumed
His old motions and habitudes kingly.'—Vol. ii. p. 133.

The little dedicatory poem at the end 'to E. B. B.' the poet's poetess-wife, is at once the most amiable and most intelligible effusion of the whole two volumes. The metre is a sort of amplification of Mr. Longfellow's; five pure unrhymed trochees instead of four; but it runs flowingly and costs the reader no effort. It betrays, together with a just sense of good fortune in being connected with so congenial mind, a full appreciation of the author's own position amongst poets. He has clearly no doubt whatever about his mission, and considers anything like a pretty fancy, any departure from his ordinary style, as a condescension from his high path which needs accounting for, which he does by the following high examples of a very natural and amiable impulse of affection.

'Rafael made a century of sonnets,
Made and wrote them in a certain volume
Dinted with the silver-pointed pencil
Else he only used to draw Madonnas:
These, the world might view—but One, the volume.
Who that one, you ask? Your heart instructs you.
Did she live and love it all her life-time?
Did she drop, his lady of the sonnets,
Die, and let it drop beside her pillow
Where it lay in place of Rafael's glory,
Rafael's cheek so duteous and so loving—
Cheek, the world was wont to hail a painter's,
Rafael's cheek, her love had turned a poet's?
You and I would rather read that volume,
(Taken to his beating bosom by it)
Lean and list the bosom-beats of Rafael,
Would we not? than wonder at Madonnas—
Her, San Sisto names, and Her, Foligno,
Her, that visits Florence in a vision,
Her, that's left with lilies in the Louvre—
Seen by us and all the world in circle.
You and I will never read that volume.
Guido Reni, like his own eye's apple
Guarded long the treasure-book and loved it.
Guido Reni dying, all Bologna
Cried, and the world with it, "Ours—the treasure!"
Suddenly, as rare things will, it vanished.

Dante once prepared to paint an angel:
Whom to please? You whisper "Beatrice."
While he mused and traced it and retraced it,

* * * * *

Dante, who loved well because he hated,
Hated wickedness that hinders loving,
Dante standing, studying his angel,—
In there broke the folk of his Inferno.
Says he—"Certain people of importance"
(Such he gave his daily, dreadful line to)
Entered and would seize, forsooth, the poet.
Says the poet—"Then I stopped my painting."

You and I would rather see that angel,
 Painted by the tenderness of Dante,
 Would we not?—than read a fresh *Inferno*.
 You and I will never see that picture.
 While he mused on love and Beatrice,
 While he softened o'er his outlined angel,
 In they broke, those "people of importance;"
 We and Bice bear the loss for ever.

What of Rafael's sonnets, Dante's picture?

This: no artist lives and loves that longs not
 Once, and only once, and for One only,
 (Ah, the prize!) to find his love a language
 Fit and fair and simple and sufficient—
 Using nature that's an art to others,
 Not, this one time, art that's turned his nature.
 Ay, of all the artists living, loving,
 None but would forego his proper dowry,—
 Does he paint? he fain would write a poem,—
 Does he write? he fain would paint a picture,
 Put to proof art alien to the artist's,
 Once, and only once, and for One only,
 So to be the man and leave the artist,
 Save the man's joy, miss the artist's sorrow.'—Pp. 229—233.

Here follows a long parallel between Moses' ungrateful task in the desert and the poet's in the world, when they strike the rock of human ignorance; and some very gratuitous assumptions concerning Moses himself, which we need not enter into. But passing this, the poet has to find an analogy between his present offering of affection and those he first adduced as his examples.

'I shall never, in the years remaining,
 Paint you pictures, no, nor carve you statues,
 Make you music that should all-express me;
 So it seems: I stand on my attainment.
 This of verse alone, one life allows me;
 Verse and nothing else have I to give you.
 Other heights in other lives, God willing—
 All the gifts from all the heights, your own, Love!
 Yet a semblance of resource avails us—
 Shade so finely touched, love's sense must seize it.
 Take these lines, look lovingly and nearly,
 Lines I write the first time and the last time.
 He who works in fresco, steals a hair-brush,
 Curbs the liberal hand, subservient proudly,
 Cramps his spirit, crowds its all in little,
 Makes a strange art of an art familiar,
 Fills his lady's missal-marge with flowerets.
 He who blows thro' bronze, may breathe thro' silver,
 Fitly serenade a slumbrous princess.
 He who writes, may write for once, as I do.'—Pp. 236, 237."

And so we part from Mr. Browning's 'Fifty Men and Women,' which he could hardly have dedicated in the quarter he has done without something in the likeness of a propitiatory offering.

Next on our list stands 'The Mystic,' which perhaps more than any book we know defies criticism; indeed, anything like a lengthened notice we believe to be a moral impossibility. The writer charged with the task of conveying to others an idea of this singular work finds himself baffled; he cannot rest on it for a single moment, it offers no point of contact. As in all mysterious subjects, he is driven back in search of comparisons, but he finds nothing to which it can be compared. Thus, instead of boldly facing 'the Mystic,' we find ourselves reviewing what has gone before. Are there any points of resemblance or marked opposition to the poets previously discussed? They have all their eccentricities, and 'the Mystic' is strange. It comes out in the same year with them; the impulse to produce something new has evidently been at work; but here all analogy ends. We could discuss and analyse them, but 'the Mystic' has no parts. We may speculate whether Mr. Tennyson's splenetic denunciations are fit subjects for poetry, but 'the Mystic' has no subjects. We seem for a moment to find something in common with 'Hiawatha's' new vocabulary, but 'the Mystic's' new words have no assignable purpose. We have questioned the moral of Mr. Browning's narrative and situations, but 'the Mystic' has no moral, and no story, and no place; we have quarrelled with the caprices of his verse, but any variety would be welcome in 'the Mystic'; we have had to grope for his meaning, but 'the Mystic' defies search, and has no meaning. The reviewer finds his occupation gone, the critic has nothing for his occupation to work upon; 'the Mystic' is in fact *the* millstone into which one man can see as far and no further than another.

Some of our readers have probably read Mr. Bailey's 'great work, Festus;' if not the poem itself, a notice of it in these pages, with grand display of high literary names, who were not ashamed to usher that flippant farrago of profaneness into the world with an absolute extravagance of commendation. 'Festus' is remarkable for an utter insensibility to the nature of all great ideas. Heaven and eternity, the Godhead itself, make no impression on the conceited and inflated mind of the poet. He discusses them all as easily, and with the same choice of words, as he would the news of the day. We have no doubt 'the Mystic' is a natural sequence of 'Festus.' The author really did not then know what he was talking of; he gave high sounding names to his ideas and conceptions, but the ideas had all the while no true connexion with the names. 'Space,' and 'heaven,' and 'hell,' and 'angels,' and 'demons,' never really lifted Mr. Bailey an inch above the lecture-hall, or the drawing-room, or the market-place, or his fellow-townsmen; he never

actually conceived of anything beyond his experience and what his eyes had seen. It was a delusion to suppose the imagination exercised in those masquerade flights. But he found his experiment successful, his daring was wonderfully commended, his counterfeit coin was received as current. He has reason from the former reception of his muse, to expect great results from the simple act of getting out of his depth. This has been the one mental action of 'the Mystic.' A bold resolute fling at the outset from the shores of common sense and reason, and no inch of ground to stand upon, nothing but plunging and floundering, no distance gained, no progress made ever after. 'The Mystic' goes through many births and transmigrations,—this is all that we can tell our readers. There never appears any advance or purpose in his changes of existence, which seem to be uniformly spent in company with the sun and moon, and all the signs of the zodiac. The following passage represents the state of things all through; there really is no room for choice.

'He at his birth the starry stamps received,
For every limb held commune with its god,
And planetary gifts plenipotent;
The moon dispensed him riches, and the sun
Mind-wealth, that so before his dazed eyne
The splendid spectrum of immortal fame
Perpetual danced; soul-compulsory power,
The god of psychopompous function, round
Circling the sun with fourfold force; love's star
The joys that come with beauteous shapes and eyes
Dewy and blue; courage the god-star red;
Supremacy and justice they who held
Successive, if usurped sway, o'er the skies.'—P. 8.

At another time the 'Mystic' is

'Dear to the bearded serpent, spirit supreme,
Whose omnipresent eye approves the world—
Eye of the world of life, and nature's soul,
Who lapped him in his cold blue coils, and flew
Where live the stars: there, mid nocturnal day
Where Death's grim orb illumines the restless ghosts,
And with his scourge on their own hearts inscribes
The tortures of the evils they have done,
He, weighed 'gainst Truth, down-dipped the skiey scale.'—P. 12.

At another,

'Initiate, mystic, perfected, epopt,
Illuminate, adept, transcendent, he
Ivy-like, lived, and died, and again lived,
Resuscitant.'—P. 53.

Again,

'He, arrow-like, launched forth—heaven is a bow
The chord whereof is earth—and charmed his way
Led by prismatic clue through spheres and skies,

Fire, ice, and scalding venom-floods of hell,
To prove all sacred truth within himself.'—P. 54.

Now we read of golden flocks lamb-headed, (we are not told whether they are lamb-bodied as well;) then of a 'skiff of grisly marble,' of 'nebulous thoughts grouping in fundamental unities,' of ghosts of maddening beauty, of things being præeternal; a monstrous word, which we lay stress upon as affording a key to the true value of all Mr. Bailey's so-called flights of imagination. The 'Mystic' at one time dwells

'Upon the royal rock four-faced, he dwelled,
The tripod mountain, with its jewelled feet
Long while.'—P. 20.

While upon another occasion,

'His soul,
One and compatiënt with the life of time,
Rose kosmical with all God's great designs;
And so on earth their luminous life enjoyed,
The unapparent and essential fates.'—P. 56.

But why particularize nonsense, as though it had an organization, as though one part were more especial nonsense than another. In fact, the fragments gain a sort of purpose by being detached from the main mass. We cannot help the idea, that the context would throw some light upon them. Nothing but the whole poem can give an adequate idea of the fatuity of the whole poem, of that resolute rejection of meaning, of anything that can be understood. Even if a simple idea is stumbled upon, we see at once that the author instinctively objects to it, feels it altogether out of place and character, that it strikes upon his eye like a word of our mother-tongue in a page of unknown characters—he at once passes the pen through it, and coins a word in its place. Thus, a twisted leaf is a 'writhen frond,' and drink is 'bever.' Indeed, the coinage of new words throughout, carried on in such wholesale fashion, has the one sole object of making the whole more pompously unintelligible. Yet there are, it must be granted, innocent and offensive forms of nonsense; some that excite suspicion, some that we trust implicitly, that ebb and flow upon the verse without awaking a single misgiving. Our readers may think us hypercritical, but we fancy we can detect mischief in solution, in the following stage of mystic existence.

'Though pure in aspiration, pure as is
The pearl-rose halo round a star, so, proof
Of the divine within us and the strain
Of the celestial heavenward, yet he sinned,
In virtue of his nature, and sought earth;
For sin is nature; and through all life's gates,
Like to the perishing flowery arches reared

Before some fane, he willed to pass, for he
 The ultimate sanctity and æternal joy
 Foreknew that they led up to ; and, perchance,
 By his own consciousness of final bliss,
 He might the hearts of millions fortify.—P. 22.

There is another poem in the same volume, so like in aspect and sound (the reader's only guides), that if the opening page and title are passed over, it will be confounded with 'the Mystic.' Such passages as the following spring from precisely the same condition of mind,—

'Till one soul,
 Tuneful and luminous as a singing star,
 Stepped into light, and in the immarbled ear
 Of the convergent infinite, sang of God
 Larklike his lone lay.'—P. 104.

There is no advance towards sense in luminous bodies stepping into light, &c. However, though not less absurd, 'the Spiritual Legend' is less unintelligible. The puzzle is, how a man could have undertaken the enormous labour of its composition for such a result. It professes to be a history of the creation of the world by angels, taken from a Gnostic legend ; but it is really seventy pages of geography in blank verse—not modern, useful geography, but pages full of hard words without any connexion, which it must have been an incredible toil only to transcribe, to say nothing of the reading up it must have demanded. For example : the angels make the mountains. Then follow three pages such as—

'Andes and Himalaya's heavenly heights ;
 Dhawalaghi's pinnacle supreme,
 And Chuquibamba's cone of roseate snow ;
 The hill Altäic named the almighty god,
 By Tchudic tribelets of the age of mounds.'—P. 69.

Next, 'the angels trenched the rivers ;' and we have three pages of 'the holy Boug,' 'Chandra-bagha, holy to the moon,' 'Nuorra, Gyndes, Rhaiadwr, Shoshonee,' &c. &c. Next the islands, steppes, plains ; herbs, plants, and trees ; capes, caves, minerals ; fishes, birds, animals, and last, man.

'The sea-born seed, too, earth-born, mountain-born,
 Titians and Cyclops, Gog and Magog, sons
 So called of gods, Corineus, Corcoran,
 And those, Hrimthursar hight, who norwards held
 Frore Jotunheim, contemning gods and men ;
 The Anakim and Æmim of old writ.'—P. 106.

The angels dig the sites of cities, Louqsor, Medina, Thabou, 'Tchelminar,' &c. They establish races of gods with awful long names ; and Symbolism, and Kabalistic lore.

'Aheieh, Matzpatz, Cemeth, On, Elhai,
 Aishi, and Baali, Netzah, Agla, Tzour.'—P. 121.

Now, it is perfectly impossible that any man or woman born can have sixty pages of such words as these¹ on the tip of his tongue, or at his finger's ends. We know that they must be painfully hunted up from all kinds of sources; they cannot, we should say, ring in a man's ears when he *has* found them. Two or three long sounding words taken into the memory do this, though not of every-day application; such would Milton's memory supply him with when his line needed some high mystic sounds to swell the verse; but pages of mere mouthing, like this catalogue of unpronounceable names and words, prove that the writer has not only no imagination now, but that he never can have had any, or he could never have sunk into such slavery; the faculty divine could never so utterly desert the spot it once haunted. But this we will leave Mr. Bailey's old admirers to settle amongst themselves, only trusting that a blush of ingenuous shame has suffused the cheek of some of them, as their conscience tells them that their extravagant flattery has contributed something to this finale. An old Fairy Tale, versified in a very ordinary fashion, completes what we must call a very worthless volume—worthless, that is, in any other light than as a literary curiosity.

It is really painful to have to turn from this audacious publication, this conscious and deliberate perpetration, this bold defiance of sense and reason, which invites attack, and which would prefer any degree of vituperation to neglect, to a little book of a very innocent, harmless character,—more than harmless, written with intentions positively good,—and not be able to refresh ourselves with some hearty commendation. But good intentions do not make good poetry, and no one does good by writing mere common-place. Mr. Michell's '*Poetry of Creation*' is composed in a devout spirit, with a most praise-worthy aim to reconcile scripture with modern science, after a careful study of Chalmers, and Whewell, and Brewster, and astronomers and geologists in general, and with much general feeling for the beauty of nature, and the goodness of the Creator. But it is not poetry; it never approaches to being poetry; it is only familiar ideas put into creditable verse. We wish that some parts had been worse, so that others had been better, that we might have singled out points for praise and blame. But it is not so; page after page, till we reach nearly two hundred, are characterised by a strict uniformity of merit. We may find fault with the metre, and say that the eight-syllable Iambic is not suited to lofty themes, but we cannot conscien-

¹ This versé catalogue of cacophonous names, by the way, is plagiarized from a dreary and forgotten volume of blank verse, Mr. Hawkins' "*Wars of Jehovah*," published ten or twelve years ago.

tiously say that the poem would have materially gained by the addition of two syllables to every line; there would perhaps have been one mistake the less, but after all, if we talk of change, it would have been better to change the theme than the metre, for what could Mr. Michell do with heroics. Nor have we cause here to complain of an affected singularity, an attempt by unfair means at originality. No temporary influence has been at work; the book would not have been better written last year or next. The truth is, the subject is wholly above Mr. Michell's powers. A man cannot write on the Creation to any purpose, either with a mere long string of hard words like Mr. Bailey, or a stock of common-place descriptions, which has been Mr. Mitchell's sole material for the task. The mysteries and glories of creation have nothing at all to do with a geographical survey, or a treatise on natural history; but unless a man has imagination to rise to an apprehension of the one, he must sink to the other. Imagination glorifies what it sees or has seen; but the writer without this faculty, being more dazzled by what others describe to him than by what his own eyes tell him, always supposes that unknown lands have wonders which nature does not put on in his own, and when he would make a grand impression, reproduces what he has read of distant countries, instead of painting a home landscape; so Mr. Michell wanders from Mount Athos and Mount Ararat to Arabia and America—the volcanoes, the rivers, the plains, the birds and beasts there—but never with a touch of truth or nature to show them in a new light as *he* sees them in distinction from books and travellers. Like Mr. Bailey, he betrays a reading-up for his subject. The discoveries of science haunt the reader; and the wonders of the microscope, revealing animalculæ and such small deer, occupy an undue space, and show a very indifferent power of choice or grouping; but nothing is merely indicated, all is described in full. The author thus measures distances of the stars, and flights of angels:—

‘And yet between the nearest spheres,
Seeming close knit, the gulf that spread,
The tube-shot ball, that ceaseless sped,
Would cross not in ten thousand years;
While a swift angel, whose bold flight
Should match the speed of thought-winged light,
His task from orb to orb to wend,
One second on its zone to spend—
Task that commenced when Adam rose—
Might till this hour through space have run,
Nor brought his journey to a close,
But found it only just begun!’—P. 14.

And thus he describes ‘those great nations,’ the insects in a drop of water—

'A scene of wonder ; myriads live,
 Disporting in the solar rays,
 And to that globule splendour give.
 In armies they career and gleam,
 Some with rich plumes, and helmets that beam ;
 Some with the purple glittering scale,
 Leaf upon leaf, like shirt of mail.
 And here, as on vast crystal plains,
 They march or skirmish, feast or bound,
 Nor ask, nor need more wide domains,
 Travelling their spacious world around.
 In this small drop, gay millions see !
 And each a perfect form shall be,
 With nice-adapted organs made,
 Feeling bestowed, and sense conveyed ;
 With heart and vein, and ear and eye,
 And all life's quickening energy.'—Pp. 126, 127.

The subject is pursued at length, concluding with more propriety of intention than diction, to praise the Maker of all things :—

'How doubly powerful, grand he seems,
 Too awful for our loftiest dreams !'—P. 127.

At one time 'trees *dignified* made rich the scene,' at another the Rhine is complimented as 'a river *Taste* will ever prize.' These are slips, however, from the ordinary prize-poem decorum of the verse, which flows on with a smoothness and a facility in the adaptation of poetical phrases and imagery, which may well mislead the author into the idea that he actually invents what he writes. We would adduce the birthplace of the stream (P. 93) as amongst the prettiest passages we have met with, but it is too long for insertion, where there is really not a new thought, only a fuller realization of the scene described, and also of the force and meaning of the language employed.

The name of Mr. Ernest Jones will sound oddly in some ears amongst a bevy of poets. When we see the delicate blue and gold volume which bears his name, we are tempted to inquire, Is it *the* Ernest Jones, the Chartist mob-orator whose name at monster meetings we see attached to long speeches, which quiet people never dream of reading? But so it is—he has found time from his peculiar mission of agitation to compose a volume of verse, not without popular qualities, and which may win him credit with such of his party as do not condemn poetry as unreal trifling. Though we should not hazard a conjecture before-hand as to what sort of poetry a Chartist orator would write, we perceive, after its perusal, that this is precisely what might have been looked for. There is a good deal of rather envious appreciation of the rank and social elevation it is his business to pull down ; there is flow, and spirit *sometimes*, plenty of rant, and now and then pretty and pleasing ideas, which *all* who win their

way into any kind of popular estimation must have their share of. And with this a singular looseness of thought, and want of consecutiveness. Witness a general failure in holding together the parts of a metaphor, or seeing quite clearly to the end of a thought, so that what begins with almost fierce energy, as though stamped indelibly on the poet's brain, loses its identity in course of expression; we find ourselves suddenly at fault, and finally the illustration turns up something quite different from what was designed at starting. This is simply a picture of most oratorical flowers of speech, and matters not the least in an oration to excited thousands, who probably prefer this style to a dogged closeness of reasoning and comparison. They like a genial dash of eloquence, and never stop to check off accurately the exact progress of a metaphor. When ideas are set down, however, and we have to read them for ourselves, the case is different, and the value of accuracy and precision rise, so to say, in the market.

Now we doubt not that Mr. Jones has frequently denounced the steam engine to his hearers with great effect, in much such terms as the following, regarding it, as he does, as *the* weapon of the aristocracy of wealth, the upholder of the present system of employers and employed which he would break down. His book is full of anathemas against it. We believe steam to be as much a creature of God as the river that supplies its water, but other and wiser men than Mr. Ernest Jones, according to the world's esteem, think with him. His *listening* admirers would not be perplexed, as we are, to make out the absolute exact meaning of the terrible image or images employed. *We* ask, what is '*it*?' what is '*he*?' Is the 'steel-corse' the 'giant,' or is it the 'rack?' Why, if the corse is the giant, is it at one time supposed to be dead, and at another breathing? Why, if the 'rack' is after all the 'corse,' should it be performing so many acts of life, tearing, 'squeezing through its fangs,' and the like; and what is that about foaming with humanity's pangs?

'For a giant had risen, all grisly and grim,
 With his huge limbs loud-clattering and vast!
 And he breathed his steam-breath through long channels of death,
 Till the soul itself died on the blast.
 And fibre and flesh he bound down on a rack,
 Flame-girt on a factory-floor;
 And the ghastly steel-corse plied its horrible force,
 Still tearing the hearts of the poor.
 Like a wine-press for mammon to form a gold draught,
 It squeezed their best blood through its fangs;
 And he quaffed at a breath the quick vintage of death,
 While it foamed with humanity's pangs.'—Pp. 119, 120.

In like manner we must demur to the opening of 'The Poet's Invitation.'

'When the sea is still as glass,
And the whispering breezes pass
On messages from zone to zone.'—P. 128.

How can the sea be 'still as glass,' with breezes passing over it? But to pass from metaphors to subjects. There is one long history at the end of the book, 'Percy Vere's Story,'—the name designed as a play upon the word *persevere*,—where the narrator's pompous introduction of himself to the readers, full of such words as 'factories, chains, priestcraft, fetters, future, past,' &c. &c., ends in an ill-told love story, with no connexion whatever with the exordium, and where we find such lines as these—

'None question asked, none spoke a word,
All read at once what had occurred.'

This uncertainty of meaning, this break between beginning and end, characterises most of the volume, with rants interspersed about '*the free, the free, the free.*' The poem, however, that gives its name to the book, 'The Battle Day, or the Lost Army,' is very superior to the rest; it is dissociated from all the author's ordinary themes of declamation, has more purpose, and keeps to that purpose more closely and steadily. A definite aim is expressed with some feeling and reality. The moral of the story is, the fatal consequences of doubt and irresolution. Lindsey, its subject, has great powers, but fails in all the objects of life from this infirmity. First he alienates his wife, and when, on the loss of domestic happiness, he becomes a soldier, and shows the highest talents for command, he loses all a second time, by want of generous trust. Success has hitherto attended all his schemes. The crisis of his own and a nation's fate is now at hand. It is the night before the battle-day:—

'But deem not that his eye was bright
With glorious calm of wonted light:
Or steady throbs each rising vein;
There was too much to lose and gain!
The goal of all his stormy life
Is centered in the morrow's strife:
The guerdon he had toiled for long,
The hope, that made the weary strong,
The moment, that should years outweigh,
Beyond whose loss 'twere vain to stay,
When time, on-pointing to the dead,
Forbade afresh his path to tread;
Past man's control—past thought's command—
The life—the death—'twas all at hand,
And he was sitting on the brink
With nought to do but think—and think!
Few—few upon his musing break,
An augur from their chief to take.

There was but one—and this a friend—
 Who questioned of the morrow's end.
He would not the word betray,
 The word, that lost the coming day!
 'Twas but one friend! he bent his ear,
 And then could scarce the answer hear;
 The gusty winds were loud without,
 'Twas scarcely breathed: "*I doubt! I doubt!*"
 There was none else who could have heard
 The scarce articulated word!
 Yet through the curtain's silken fold,
 Coldly on the midnight cold
 It crept like messenger of ill,
 From heart to heart with footstep chill.
 Spoken lowly and alone,
 Whence did echo win the tone?
 From lip and eye, and brow and hand,
 And deadness of the dull command.
 O'er hearts, that every thought can hear,
 Untold of tongue, unheard of ear,
 In blighting circles widened out
 The palsyng spell—" *I doubt! I doubt!* "—Pp. 57—59.

Since the previous sheets had already gone to press, two little volumes have reached us, which deserve notice, if only as being suggested by the great and stirring events of the year whose poetry has been under review. It has been matter of surprise that all the features of the war—its heroism, its successes, its unspeakable trials and miseries—have been so little suggestive to our poets of name. 'Maud' is in favour of war in the abstract; but, with the signal exception of its author's dashing 'Charge of the Light Brigade,'—the first rough copy of which went home to the universal heart, though taste would have its qualms,—our accepted and acknowledged poets have done little to immortalize deeds of daring and self-devotion, which yield to none that poetry sings or history chronicles. Not that there have been wanting songs and poems on the war, proving an ardent sympathy in their several writers; but the stimulus which impels a young or inexperienced fancy to expression is a very different thing from that thorough realization of a great action or stirring incident, which alone enables one mind to imprint its own impressions in sharp and vigorous outline on another. 'La Nation Boutiquière, and other Poems,' by Henry Lushington, (Macmillan, Cambridge,) are specimens and evidences of the first-mentioned stimulus. The long opening preface is a philippic against the Peace party, and the poems—'the result, so far as the composition is concerned, of a few days'—are the fruit of the same spirit. But this rapidity of composition, though it speaks well for the poet's zeal, experience teaches us to mistrust. People may hit off a short poem at

a sitting, and produce something terse and to the point; but the same mental effort kept up for days together, always issues in too many words by half. It is excitement, not inspiration. 'La Nation Boutiquière,' which embodies an acknowledgment and boast of the title given us by the first Napoleon; and 'Inkerman,' as told by a Serjeant who had been engaged in that battle; both bear traces of hurry rather than genuine impetus, and are decidedly *long* to the reader. We have read, however, with pleasure the concluding poem; for its genuine feeling rather than for any particular poetical merit. The opening lines, indeed, are uncouth in their abruptness; but the right impression is given, and the reader is made to feel for the nameless hero:—

'THE ROAD TO THE TRENCHES.

"Leave me, comrades—here I drop—

"No, sir, take them on—

"All are wanted—none should stop—

"Duty must be done.

"Those whose guard you take will find me

"As they pass below."

So the soldier spoke, and staggering,

Fell amid the snow.

And ever on the dreary heights
Down came the snow.

"Men, it must be as he asks;

"Duty must be done:

"Far too few for half our tasks,

"We can spare not one.

"Wrap him in this: I need it less:

"Fear not—they shall know.

"Mark the place—yon stunted larch.

"Forward!" On they go,
And silent, on their silent march,
Down sank the snow.

O'er his features, as he lies,
Calms the wrench of pain:

Close, faint eyes; pass, cruel
skies,

Freezing mountain plain.

With far soft sounds the stillness
teems;

Church-bells,—voices low,
Passing into English dreams

There amid the snow.

And darkening, thickening o'er
the heights,

Down fell the snow.

Looking, looking for the mark,

Down the others came,

Struggling through the snow rifts
stark,

Calling out his name:

"Here or there? the drifts are
deep.

"Have we passed him?" No—

Look, a little growing heap,

Snow above the snow,

Where heavy on his heavy sleep

Down fell the snow.

Strong hands raised him, voices
strong

Spoke within his ears:

Ah, his dreams had softer tongue,
Neither now he hears.

One more gone for England's sake,
Where so many go,

Lying down without complaint,

Dying in the snow;

Starving, striving, for her sake,

Dying in the snow.

Simply done his soldier's part,

Through long months of woe,

All endured with soldier heart

Battle, famine, snow:

Noble nameless English heart,

Snow-cold in the snow.'

—*Poems by Henry Lushington*, p. 62.

The volume contains beside, some poems entitled 'Points of War,' by (we presume, a brother) Franklin Lushington; these

are adapted to martial airs, and are written with considerable freedom and some spirit, but with so little aim at rigid truth and nature, that 'The Muster of the Guards' (whose departure in February, 1854, newspaper readers will remember to have seen recorded in very graphic prose) commences with the following gratuitous and startling anachronism—

' Lying here awake, I hear the watchman's warning,
" Past four o'clock," on this February morning.'

A cry which may have often mingled with the departure of regiments in the Peninsular war, but which certainly can have struck on no London ears in 1854.

'Peace in War, In Memoriam L. R.,' (Macmillan, Cambridge,) another fruit of the war, is a little series of poems, with a wholly different aim, and in altogether another spirit, from the foregoing. They embody a little history of private sorrow and suffering, of which all wars must furnish examples innumerable. The subject is a loving, tender, heroic wife, who sinks under the trial of her husband's exposure to all the horrors and dangers of last winter's campaign, but who allows no murmur of her own to reach him or disturb him in his post of duty. The author's own spirit of religious resignation fits him well for the task he has chosen. There is throughout a tenderness of feeling and cultivated purity of taste which makes every line pleasing, though we can point out no passage as evidence of marked poetical power; and though the style often bears traces of unconscious imitation. The concluding lines of tranquil hope, realizing that peace which no war can take away, fall pleasantly both on heart and ear:—

' When Christmas bells shall ring
Across the lifeless snow,
We, too, will gladly sing
The joy above the woe;
No storm of earth shall keep afar
The peace that cannot turn to war.

And when through budding trees,
Blithe Easter chimes shall bound,
Toss'd on the quickening breeze,
In waves of throbbing sound,
We will not scorn the bliss of spring,
For all our autumn murmuring;

But cherish as we may
The living fire that burns,
In growth and in decay,
In light and shade by turns;
And greet through veils of sunlit tears
The perfect sum of deathless years.'

—*Peace in War*, p. 31.

Our remarks on the subjects before us have come to an end, and general reflections follow upon our completed task. When will poetry be again popular? will the world ever again be imbued with it as it has been?—not the literary world, which knows that it does not *do* to neglect poetry, nor the critical world, whose business it is to discuss it; but the world of high and low, rich and poor, young and old. When will they again find pleasure in it? We see little chance of it. It is not all that there are no poets now addressing the feelings and instincts common to all mankind, though that is true; it is that the general habits of thought and action are against it—that, in fact, the world does not want poets, and would hardly know how to treat one of the sort that people clamour for in articles and crude verses, if he appeared amongst them, which he certainly will not do just at present. Poets must have an audience, and will always write for such an audience as they have. Now this audience, in any literal sense, there is not; the universal habit of hasty perusal, the rapidity of glance with which whole sentences are embraced by the eye at once, and which is essential, if persons are to do anything else but read serials and newspapers, is a habit wholly opposed to a love for, or any attainment in, poetry. The simplest poetry needs some deliberation and concentration of thought to take it in. All poetry is addressed to the ear as well as the understanding. Now the eye supersedes the ear, and does its work in one-third the time. But poetry has no place in an age where time is so very precious that we cannot dwell upon what we read. The modes by which poetry has been issued to the world have been various; first it was chanted, then recited, then spoken with pomp of action, then read; now it is perused, never *heard*. Who ever hears poetry read or repeated now? the man who attempts to quote it is a bore. Of course there are persons of such ready taste and penetration as to be arrested, when the eye is at a hand-gallop, by an exquisite turn of thought or expression; but this is not common, and we are convinced that the great majority of those quite capable of enjoying and appreciating poetry, when presented to them with all the honours of attention, and a clear and happy delivery, could detect nothing in many of our finest poems, if perused as they are in the habit of perusing prose. The consequence is, that the world of readers does not care for poetry now; they secretly think it an old-fashioned tedious mode of composition, which we have outgrown—something that we can do without now—or an illusion altogether. The truth being that the popular taste has gone back in this respect, and that the illiterate first hearers of ‘Chevy-chase’ were better judges of that ballad’s merits as a poem, and a fitter audience, than any promiscuous reading and

writing assemblage would be now : their ears and their attention were in better training.

All this sounds a very shallow explanation for the 'great want of the age—a popular poet.' But if we find that the world is not fit for him—would, in fact, be interrupted and embarrassed, and put out of its way by him—we may at least wait with more patience for his appearance, and apply ourselves to a correction of those habits of idle business and unprofitable occupation, and fussy, unthinking energy, into which so much of the seeming work and activity of a bustling age may be resolved.

ART. II. *Introduction to the Book of Genesis, with a Commentary on the Opening Portion.* From the German of Dr. Peter Von Bohlen, late Professor of Oriental Languages and Literature in the University of Königsberg. Edited by James Heywood, M.P., F.R.S. 2 vols. 8vo. London, John Chapman. 1855.

THE fortunes of infidelity have been very various. At some periods in the world's history, and in some countries, it has ventured to throw off all disguise, and exhibit itself in its native shape to the gaze of all mankind. But these are in general exceptions to its normal condition, which demands a certain deference to the religious opinions of the age, and, as a natural consequence of this necessity, it has assumed a variety of strange aspects, and appeared under a very considerable number of disguises. Sometimes it is discovered, without much difficulty, under a very thin veil of Unitarianism, sometimes scarcely concealed by the garb of the philosopher; it professes a great regard for the enlightenment of mankind, and its emancipation from narrow prejudices. But it often takes the form of a commentary on Scripture, and by rationalizing explanations reduces Revelation to a mere *caput mortuum*; it takes away all that the Christian loves and venerates, and deprives even the little which it leaves of all its value. Many of the Deistical writers of England, as Collins and Tindal, professed a sort of regard for Christianity, but subverted its authority by their writings; and among the rationalists of Germany the greater number pretend to do no more than clear away from Revelation the narrow-minded views, with which an adherence to the literal interpretation has obscured the brightness of the great moral truths delivered in the Bible. It is true, that some speak out; and the views entertained on this subject appear to have had their regular progress from the mere hint and suspicion to an open declaration, so that Rationalism itself in Germany has undergone a great variety of phases. But it is not with any view of exhibiting a phantasmagoria of 'horrid shapes and sights unholy' that we allude to the different modes in which Christianity has been assailed at different times, but simply to recal the fact to the recollection of our readers, that they may learn to estimate the lucubrations which now proceed in considerable numbers from the manufactory of Mr. Chapman at their right value, and assign them, not a conspicuous position in the Temple of Philosophy, but only a common-place niche in the narrow school of simple infidelity. The authors, indeed,

try every form of approach to gain access to the public mind from the duodecimo tale to the ponderous octavo history, and still more heavy Commentary or Essay. The volumes before us, on which we are about to offer a few comments, appear to come forth with unusual claims to our attention. They are the offspring of the learned labours of a celebrated scholar of Germany, introduced to the English public by the translation of two English gentlemen, and ushered into the world under the editorship of another, Mr. Heywood. We are indebted to the latter gentleman for a Preface, which contains a biographical sketch of the author, and for a number of notes scattered through the volumes, and distinguished from the text and the notes of the author himself by square brackets. As the author himself is no longer amenable to any human tribunal, we are unwilling to speak with any unnecessary harshness concerning his works, or to make any unkind remarks on that portraiture of his life which his editor has thought proper to prefix to the translation of his lucubrations on Genesis. But the cause of truth demands that his arguments should be disposed of without ceremony, and if a circumstance or two in his life calls for animadversion, the fault must rest not with us, but with those who choose to drag him before the English public. Professor von Bohlen, it appears from the memoir before us, was born at Wüppel, in the lordship of Jever and the duchy of Oldenburg, on the 13th March, 1796, of poor parents. After the death of his father the expense of his education at the village school was defrayed by voluntary contributions, collected chiefly by Drost, the worthy clergyman of the parish. He desired to become a schoolmaster, but his poverty having prevented the realization of this wish, he was sent, in 1810, with other orphan boys to the Military Dépôt of the district. His stature being below the regulation-height, he could not enter the army, and he became domestic servant to Baron Guiton, the General of the French cavalry in that part of Germany. His master was a kind-hearted man, who taught him French and amused himself in listening to young Von Bohlen's 'readings in dramatic authors.' He was afterwards in the employment of Admiral L'Hermite, but, on the restoration of peace in 1814, he preferred service in his own country, and obtained an engagement in a mercantile house in Hamburg, one of the partners of which was an Englishman. Here Bohlen learned English, and at the age of twenty he took lessons in Latin, and was shortly afterwards admitted as a free scholar into the Hamburg Grammar School, where he pursued a regular course of study for three years, under the care of the master, named Gurlitt, whom he described in after years as having been not only his preceptor, but his 'friend and

fatherly benefactor.' The English Consul at Hamburg presented Bohlen with a copy of Sir W. Jones's Works, and some of the principal merchants of that city invited him to their homes, and intrusted him with the education of their children. Bohlen now 'devoted much of his time,' according to his biographers, 'to theology,' (?) 'studying Hebrew and Arabic, 'to which, with his natural taste for Oriental languages, he 'soon added Persian.' He became 'Assistant Librarian of the City Library,' an office which he held six months; and his Hamburg friends assisted in 'defraying the expenses of his 'University education under Gesenius and other Oriental and 'theological professors at Halle.' Through the representations of Dr. Gurlitt and Gesenius a small stipend was allotted in 1822 to Bohlen from the treasury by Baron von Altestein, the Prussian Minister of Education, and continued to him during his subsequent career at Halle, Bonn, Berlin, and Königsberg. It was also intimated to him that Königsberg presented the only suitable sphere of activity for him, as the other Universities were well provided with teachers in the Oriental department.

At Bonn he studied Arabic under Freytag, and Sanscrit with Schlegel; and in the latter language his progress was so marked, that he was engaged by Sir Alexander Johnstone and the celebrated Orientalist, Colebrooke, to teach Sanscrit to their sons. From Bonn he proceeded to Berlin for the benefit of the instruction of Bopp and other eminent scholars. In the year 1825 Von Bohlen was removed to Königsberg, first as a private teacher under Government, with a salary of 60*l.* per annum; and then, in 1826, as an extraordinary professor. In 1828 he became an ordinary professor of Oriental languages and literature, with an addition of 15*l.* a year to his salary.

It appears that the cold and variable climate of Königsberg did not suit his health, or that of his wife, and he obtained leave of absence for a journey. How long this leave of absence lasted we are not informed, nor whither he travelled; his desire was to visit India, but this desire was never gratified. In 1836 we are informed that Von Bohlen's prosperity was at its height; he had forty-seven pupils in his class on archæology, nineteen scholars for his exposition of Job, and some students in Oriental languages. He had, besides, as a private pupil, the Earl of Shelburne, son of the Marquis of Lansdowne, and now Member for Calne. In 1837 a serious illness at Hamburg impaired his constitution, and, on leaving that city, he visited England, and spent some time at Bowood, which he described to his friend Voigt as a terrestrial Eden. A visit to the Isle of Wight was of some service to his health, but he was never able to resume

his professional labours, and the winter was passed at Hyères in Provence. Leave of absence from Königsberg was granted till Easter 1839, and was subsequently extended for another year; and the last months of his life were passed at Halle, where he died on the 5th February, 1840. His biographer informs us that sacred songs were sung by students of Halle at his funeral, but the exact nature of these sacred songs is not indicated; and Professor Franke delivered an address to the mourners, describing the life and struggles of their departed friend. In his last requests to his friends, he expressed a desire to be buried simply; and stated that, if his friend Professor Wilda wished it, there might be a stone over his grave, but he particularly requested that there might be no cross upon his coffin. His opinions on religion render the latter direction a matter of no astonishment.

We have omitted one episode in this history of a poor scholar's struggles in Germany, but it relates to rather an important event in his life—his marriage. The editor of these volumes is well known to entertain a desire to tamper, according to the best of his ability or non-ability, with the existing laws relating to marriage in this country, and thus to loosen the ties of Holy Matrimony; and the author whose work he has chosen to edit appears, as far as we can gather from the meagre account given in this sketch, to have acted in a manner quite consonant to the notions of Mr. Heywood. The statement is as follows:—

‘Babette, the daughter of Von Bohlen's landlord, Von Martial, at Bonn, had married an unfeeling husband, who deserted her; her sorrows and noble conduct excited the pity and admiration of the enthusiastic Oriental scholar. A divorce was subsequently obtained, and in 1827 Babette became the wife of Von Bohlen.’—P. xvii.

We are very old fashioned in our notions on such subjects, as we derive our opinions from Scripture; but if it is meant that under these circumstances Von Bohlen lived with the wife of another man, we can give the transaction no other name than that of adultery. Mr. Heywood may possibly think otherwise; but all the sentimentality in the world about Babette and her unfeeling husband can make no difference in the affair.

We have thus minutely traced the career of Professor Von Bohlen for two reasons—first, because the history of a poor scholar winning his way to eminence in any walk of literature is always full of interest; and secondly, because we think it calculated to assist our judgment in estimating the value of his opinions on many very important subjects. That he was gifted with very considerable powers of acquisition, especially in the department of languages, cannot be doubted, and his career is highly creditable to his diligence, his perseverance, and his talent as a linguistic student. But we cannot help feeling that

the extremely limited education which he received up to the twentieth year of his age, when he appears to have taken his first lessons in Latin, was likely to exert a very unfavourable influence on his mind in regard to many subjects of historical inquiry. If there is any subject to which it is desirable that the inquirer should bring a well trained mind, familiar from youth with the chief depositories of human knowledge and thought, and with the best models of reasoning, it is that whole class of inquiries which are directed to the elucidation of the early history of the world. The most careful inductive habits, the most severe caution in avoiding rash conclusions, find here room for constant exercise, and a large accumulated store of historical information, laid up in the mind and deeply pondered over, is almost an indispensable qualification. We are quite ready to admit the cleverness, and the remarkable powers of acquisition possessed by Von Bohlen, but does not the simple history of his life necessarily lead to the inference that some of the qualifications requisite for the satisfactory discussion of such a question, must have been wanting in his case? With his sagacity one would expect a mixture of rashness; in his historical inductions, we should expect to find those hasty views which acquisitions made late in life often bring with them. Above all we should expect the influences which were continually working upon him from the commencement of his literary career, to have an overwhelming effect upon his mind, and it would have been astonishing indeed to see the scholar thus taken up and pushed forward by men like Gesenius and his associates, rise superior to the prejudices of this new and arrogant school of philosophy. We are not therefore surprised to find him following in the wake of Vater, De Wette, Gesenius, Gramberg, Hartmann, and the rest of the Biblical critics of that class of opinions, though occasionally we seem to gain a faint glimpse of some better notions in his mind, which a happier education and mature reflection might have ripened into valuable fruits. We do not wish to make any illiberal reflections, but we think that these conclusions are almost inevitable, and that they are of some importance towards guiding us in forming a judgment on this author's views. Linguistic acquirements are not so common in England as in Germany; but the English Church not long ago possessed two men whose range of knowledge in this respect was scarcely surpassed by that of any European scholars, with the exception perhaps of Mezzofanti: we mean Dr. Mill and Dr. Lee. The career of Dr. Lee had not been very dissimilar to that of Von Bohlen as far as his education was concerned, except that his struggles were far more severe, and that

the fostering hand was not held out to him, until his extraordinary powers of acquisition and his victory over obstacles, which would have seemed to a less ardent spirit utterly insuperable, had won for him a name of high celebrity. We would not willingly say a single word in disparagement of his vast acquirements, and of his undoubted talents—we had a very sincere regard for him, but we cannot help feeling that the value of these acquirements and talents would have been greatly enhanced had he been blessed with the means of obtaining in early life an education to train him for the honourable position he attained in later years. With regard to Dr. Mill, his knowledge of Eastern languages was probably very much more extensive and accurate than that of Von Bohlen. As an instance of his great knowledge in one language we may remark, that while other men were contented to translate from Sanscrit, he translated English works into Sanscrit, that he might assist in the evangelization of India. Indeed, with the exception of Professor Wilson, his successful opponent for the Boden Professorship, we believe that a few years ago, there was no person in Europe whose knowledge of that language could be compared with his. Our readers well know also, that besides his remarkable knowledge of Oriental languages, he had powers of mind which gave a sterling character to all his writings. One might not agree with all he advanced, but it was impossible to read a few pages of his writing without perceiving that they proceeded from one whose powers of reasoning were of no common order, and whose mind had been trained so as to grasp great questions in their full extent. The power of mind, and the reasoning powers displayed in the treasures he has bequeathed to the Church, are fully as conspicuous as the gigantic learning and research for which some of them are remarkable. Now in this case there was exactly that which in Von Bohlen was wanting—a thorough training in early youth. Dr. Mill obtained distinction at the University of Cambridge, being high on the Mathematical Tripos, and a Fellow of Trinity College; and among his contemporaries at College he was held in high estimation both for learning and original powers. His residence in Calcutta, as Principal of Bishop's College, enabled him to add a profound acquaintance with Oriental literature and history to his large store of classical and general knowledge; and the practical knowledge he thus acquired of Eastern life was also of infinite value to his mind. We confess, that to the judgment of a mind thus formed, we should have listened with that deference, which mere linguistic attainments, acquired like those of Von Bohlen, would never command. But his opinions were utterly and diametrically

opposed to the views of German Rationalism, and were quite in unison with what a juvenile theologian' (as we should suppose) in the Quarterly Review, somewhat sneeringly designates, as mere 'Patristic and Anglican theology!' We must apologize for this digression—if to compare one of the giants of our own day with the author on whom we are occupied be really a digression—but as nothing illustrates any statement so well as an example, we have thought it only fair, while we object to Von Bohlen's qualifications, to point out some well-known instance where the deficiencies under which he laboured are supplied.

We shall not occupy ourselves further with the personal history of the author of this work and his claims to our attention. His history is interesting, and, if rightly read, very instructive, and we have therefore dwelt upon it at some length. A very few words will suffice for disposing of the qualifications of his editor, J. Heywood, Esq., M.P. Having achieved a three years' course at Cambridge, without, we believe, achieving anything else at that seat of learning, in due time Mr. Heywood was elected a Member of Parliament. It doubtless appeared to the reflecting mind of the heir of the house of Heywood, that an University which had allowed so distinguished an individual to leave its walls unhonoured, and undecorated with the laurels he doubtless deserved, must be in a sadly corrupt condition. The idea haunted him day and night, and day and night he worried the House of Commons, till at last he thought it needful to worry no longer, because a Commission was issued to overhaul both the Universities. We believe that Mr. Heywood's position in the House of Commons is very analogous to that which he held in the University, except that when a man possesses a considerable faculty of boring a large assembly, it is clear that he will become remarkable for something. He has joined the Marriage-Law movement, in order that if he is inefficient for good, he may at least have the satisfaction of

¹ We do not profess to know by whom the rhapsodic panegyric of Archdeacon Hare, in the Quarterly Review, No. 193, was composed. The following passage leads us to suppose that it proceeds from a juvenile theologian.—'The Hebrew Professor' (Dr. Pusey) 'has since drifted away so far from the position which he then maintained, that he has long since ceased to be identified with the country [Germany] to which he owes so much; and though his lectures still, it is believed, breathe the atmosphere of his original studies at Bonn and Halle, his published writings, for the most part, point only to the more ordinary sphere of *Patristic and Anglican* theology. Not so the Archdeacon of Lewes. Whatever he wrote or thought was coloured through and through with German research and German speculation. Schleiermacher and Nitzsch, Daub and Lücke, were as familiar in his mouth as *Tillotson or Secker, Mant or D'Oyley*!' If a sneer is intended, we have only to regret that our influential contemporary, the organ as it once was of the safe old-fashioned Church of Englandism, has drifted from the dry mooring places of Tillotson and Secker to swamps and quicksands of a very different character.

joining abler men than himself in passing bad measures. His little escapade in the literary line also appears something of the same kind; not possessing either the talent or the learning to make an assault on the Bible himself, Mr. Heywood is still not content to give up the hope of connecting his name with some assault of the sort, and rather than remain quiet, he finds a miserable German performance, which he does not translate himself, but publishes with a few additions of his own, being content, as to the body of the work, merely to edit the translation of some more diligent friend. He has not been happy in his selection of an author. Von Bohlen was indeed a man of considerable acquirement, and his work exhibits some mind; but what can we think of the mere editor of a mere translation of his already obsolete assaults on Revelation? We look upon him as performing very much the part of Mallet in the publication of Lord Bolingbroke's posthumous works. But mean as the employment is, if Mr. Heywood likes it, he is welcome to his taste. He should remember, however, that Von Bohlen has been answered in Germany,¹ and we believe, if he will inquire of any German of competent knowledge, he will learn that Von Bohlen's work is now almost forgotten in the land of its birth. A few weeks ago a German, of high literary reputation, was on a visit at Oxford, and there expressed his unfeigned surprise that the English should have thought it worth while to translate a work now so lightly esteemed in Germany. But such is Mr. Heywood's taste, and the English public are indebted to him for disseminating a work in England which may perhaps make shipwreck of the faith of some, who are unable to cope with its fallacies, and who do not know the slender regard which is entertained for it in the land from which it proceeds.

We now proceed to give some account of the work which is ushered into the world under such distinguished patronage. It consists of two parts, each occupying a volume. The first volume contains the Prolegomena of Von Bohlen to Genesis; the second contains a Commentary on the first eleven chapters of that book. Our chief business lies with the first. It has unfortunately been our fate 'to spend long days that better might be spent' in reading and examining many of the theological writings of German authors on the subject of the Old Testament. We are quite willing to admit the amount of research which is found in these writers, and to acknowledge the assistance which the results of that research often afford towards the establishment of an enlightened criticism and interpretation of the original text of Scripture. But our praise

¹ By Hengstenberg and by Drechsler.

can only be given with very large deductions, and our gratitude for the assistance rendered is mingled with serious regret for the needless trouble which the extreme inaccuracy of these works inflicts on all who examine their statements. They can at best be considered only as contributions to our stores, and contributions, too, which require continual sifting and filtering before they can be considered fit for use. The faculty of judgment is sadly wanting in the authors, so that while their collections are very large, their conclusions are often most uncritical and unsound. But there is another feature in these works, which causes far more trouble and perplexity than the unsoundness of judgment exhibited by the authors; we mean their inaccuracy in matters of fact. We shall have occasion in the course of this article to give proofs of the truth of this assertion. We speak from bitter experience, and from personal examination of the writings of many of the most eminent critics and philologers of Germany, when we state, as a general rule, that it is impossible to trust any assertions which we find in them as to the use of particular phrases in certain parts of Scripture, until one has tested every assertion by the help of a Concordance. We will mention an amusing instance of this class of inaccuracy, which is to be found in Moses Stuart's 'Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews.' Dr. Stuart takes notice, in the first volume of that work, of the numerous attempts of German critics to prove that S. Paul was not the author of this Epistle. Among the arguments which he combats is one drawn from the ἅπαξ λεγόμενα found in this Epistle. This argument appears to have been very prominently put forward by Seyffarth, who gives a list of these ἅπαξ λεγόμενα amounting to 118 in number. Now a simple reference to Schmidt's 'Concordance' (the edition by Bruder), will show that many of these words are not only not ἅπαξ λεγόμενα in the common acceptance of that phrase, but they occur in other portions of the New Testament. Such, for instance, are the words μέτοχος πατριάρχης, &c. It would have been sufficient to point this out to show the unsoundness of the argument. But the American Professor thought it necessary to go much further, and show the futility of this argument by a *reductio ad absurdum*! He accordingly produced a much longer list of ἅπαξ λεγόμενα from the first Epistle to the Corinthians, which is an acknowledged work of S. Paul. The curious part of this history is, that the American list is still more ridiculous than the German, which will easily be conceived when we mention that out of seven words in the first line of the list ἀγνοσία and ἀγοράζω form two! Our business lies with the Old Testament at present, but this illustration of

extreme recklessness with which such lists are concocted is so valuable as a warning, that we feel sure our readers will be indebted to us for bringing it under their notice. But to return to Von Bohlen.

It will easily be understood that the object of the present volumes is to represent the Pentateuch as the composition of an age considerably posterior to Moses, and to dispute not only its genuineness, but also the faithfulness of the narrative which it has transmitted to us. These are, it will be seen, two distinct questions. The narrative might be true, even though it did not proceed from the pen of Moses; and therefore, with neological writers, it is not sufficient to dispute the authorship of the work, but its facts must also be discredited. The Pentateuch in general, and Genesis in particular, have been the favourite points for the assaults of the writers of this school of criticism. And in this they show their tact, because as long as they can persuade the defenders of the Bible to argue with them on these books alone, they are on a vantage-ground, which is won from them when the history and the criticism of other books of the Bible, and other portions of the argument for the authenticity of the Bible, are taken into the account. They argue the question as if the Pentateuch were an isolated book, to be considered by itself, except when by some legerdemain they can bring some proof of its late composition by comparing its language with that of the other books of the Bible. Every argument which can be tortured into a witness against the antiquity of the Pentateuch, or any part of it, is gathered up with such eagerness, that you are tolerably sure that in reading two neological works you will have the same fact urged to prove contradictory conclusions; and you are by no means sure that the same thing may not happen in two different parts of the same essay. So eager are the neologists for support, that they call in the aid of those who have already abjured the views they once maintained.¹ Thus, Von Bohlen, whose 'Genesis' was published in 1835, cites the sketch of the history of the Jews by Leo, published in 1829, as the first attempt to give a philosophical history of that people, without the slightest intimation that Professor Leo had already published a formal recantation of the opinions maintained in that work. The work of Professor Leo was animadverted upon, and certain statements with regard to the book of Joshua were combated in the Hulsean Lectures for 1833; and a short time afterwards, when one of the Cambridge professors was in Germany, and introduced to Professor

¹ Mr. Heywood has not entirely escaped these tendencies. He quotes such authorities as Prof. Owen and Sir C. Lyell, as vouchers for *some* of his views, but, we apprehend, they would rather object to the company into which he drags them.

Leo, he stated this, and said that he supposed the author of those Lectures was not aware that he had changed his sentiments, &c. Nay, so hardly are they pressed for a little support to their views, that they actually quote Tom Paine as a respectable authority! (Von Bohlen. Translation, vol. i. p. 25.)

We must also, before we begin to remark on Von Bohlen's own remarks on the Pentateuch, state a fact of which the neological writers themselves are hardly aware. We mean, that while they consider themselves entirely free from prejudice, they are really the slaves of some of the most preposterous prejudices which ever signalized a body of literary men. They begin with a very narrow circle of maxims, which are handed down from generation to generation, and they can no more emancipate themselves from their thralldom than the unfortunate victims of the old man of the sea. Indeed, if it were merely a matter of taste, one would far prefer to be a believer in the substantial truth of Revelation, than one might have a chance of interpreting the most ancient book in the world with some degree of freedom and originality, instead of being obliged to draw one's maxims from so limited a range of view, and being obliged to content oneself with such very inferior company, such very crude arguments, and such meagre information, as fall to the lot of the ordinary run of neologists. However, it is not a matter in which taste has to be consulted; it is a strictly dry question of historical truth, and we are concerned to see in the opponents of revelation so little regard for truth and honesty in their arguments. But the very limited range of their ideas is shown by the maxims which seem to guide them. A simple assertion that all priests are ambitious, and an application of this maxim to the history of the Jews, is quite sufficient to outweigh all the evidence of Scripture, and by a slight process of necromantic art, we find that the Pentateuch was entirely a forgery of later days to assist the priests in getting the better of the kings, and in subjecting the consciences of the people. We really meet with the reiteration of this sentiment in the common run of neological writers so very frequently that it becomes ridiculous. As soon as we meet with 'the intrigues of the priests,' 'the Hebrew theocracy,' &c., we should be very glad, if it were consistent with our duty, to omit the next few pages. The sentence is kept in stereotypes.

But there is another feature in the neological writings which is almost as remarkable as the narrow range of ideas which pervades them—the extreme arrogance of the assertions with which they abound. As a specimen of this characteristic of the style of these critics, we shall just quote the following modest remark from Von Bohlen:—

'Although, therefore, we can hazard no further conjecture as to the internal arrangement of the four first books of the Pentateuch, than that Jeremiah *may* have been possibly concerned in revising them for the public eye, our principal position, that *these four books, as well as Deuteronomy, were never made public before the reign of Josiah*, remains an incontrovertible result of criticism, which has already acquired fresh force and consistency, both from external and internal evidence, that neither plausible arguments nor sophisms can have any power to shake it.'—*Translation*, vol. i. p. 277.

This is commonly the extravagant language, mixed with most irreverent and offensive sneers against the authors of the Divine Volume, in which critics of this school delight to express themselves. We cannot, unhappily, recognise in these volumes traces of a spirit and grasp of mind superior to the vulgar herd of neological writers, and in irreverence he is in advance of many of them. We shall now attempt to give some account of the contents of the first volume.

Von Bohlen begins by asserting, that 'Among all the civilized nations of antiquity, the dawn of genuine history (whether more or less authentic) is preceded by a series of myths and legends, whose patriotic object it uniformly is to trace the origin and to exalt the early glories of the people.'

Now it is quite true that, as literature has arisen among nations, the earliest authors who have descended to us have only been able to record the history of ages long past by some dark traditional reminiscences, and that a philosophic spirit of inquiry is the production of a later age. Thus in Greece, the earliest historian whose works we possess in any degree of completeness is Herodotus. His annals of ages very remote from his own, rest chiefly on mythical tales and legends, but the major part of his history is devoted to times by no means removed by a great distance from his own. The line in Grecian history, properly so called, is tolerably clear and distinct between myth and statements of historical authority. An earlier fragment of blended myth and history is preserved in epic poetry, but it is impossible there to separate the history from the myth. Greece is indeed the country in which the materials are more abundant than in other lands; their earliest books being of a far greater antiquity than in other nations. We do not here mean to include the ancient Sanscrit writings, but we speak of historical documents, and as far as the history of the world is concerned, we have no profane authorities to which we can appeal, which can compare with those of Greece. And the statement of Von Bohlen is quite applicable to the early history of Greece, *e.g.* to the story of the Heracleids, and to all the mass of legends with which the later literature of Greece is saturated. But the earliest *authentic* history of Greece only rises up to the point at which the Biblical authorities are beginning to disappear. The

proper history of the Bible terminates not very long after the reign of Cyrus, the Persian king, the restoration of the temple being almost the only important portion of the national history of the Jews (except the Book of Esther) posterior to his reign, which is included in the Canonical Scriptures. It would seem to us that this is, *in limine*, an objection to the system which places these two sources of information on a level. The earliest Greek history, of which we have any substantial remains, was written after the battle of Salamis, which took place in the year B.C. 480, a season at which the history and the literature of Judæa was on the wane, and one-half of the Captivity had nearly passed away. But probably we shall here be met with the observation: 'This is exactly what we assert; all Grecian history anterior to the time of Cyrus is mythical and legendary, and the Hebrew annals must stand upon the same footing.' So indeed they would, if we knew that they were composed after the year B.C. 450. But, unfortunately for the neological argument, the simple fact is, that not only they were not composed after that period, but the larger portion of them must necessarily have been written at periods very long anterior to that time! And certainly, if internal evidence be worth anything, the man who would believe that the whole of the books of the Bible *could* have been written within a short space of time, will swallow, as the neologists do, a very large camel, while he is carefully straining out a gnat. Indeed the downright tomfoolery one meets with in neological writers on other subjects is very amusing. They will believe anything, however improbable, provided it be not found in Sacred Scripture. To give a notable instance of this propensity among them, Hartmann (a sort of Coryphæus of the tribe, and a great authority with Von Bohlen) who will not believe that the Hebrew language could remain as little altered as it appears to have been from the time of Moses to the Captivity, fully believes in the authenticity of the Poems of Ossian, and finds no stumbling-block in the notion that they were orally transmitted for fourteen centuries. And the controversy about the Amber Witch must be fresh in the memory of our readers, in which one of the adherents of Strauss maintained that internal evidence proved that tale to be genuine, till the author avowed himself and undeceived the world. One can scarcely place in any other category than that of Hartmann's defence of Ossian, the strange belief which Niebuhr avows, that 'genuine oral tradition has kept the story of Tarpeia for five-and-twenty hundred years in the mouth of the common people' of the Capitoline hill of Rome. So credulous is incredulity.

¹ Niebuhr, Hist. of Rome, vol. i. p. 230. Hare and Thirlwall's translation.

Again, in discussing the truth of Sacred History, the neological writers arrange a scheme which suits the book they happen to be considering, without looking in the face the consequences of that scheme, when viewed in combination with other portions of Scripture. Thus, a writer may place Genesis, while he argues on Genesis alone, in any century he pleases, but after all, there are certain fixed epochs in Jewish history which cannot be altered, and neological writers seldom trouble themselves to show that there is even a possibility that the other books of the Bible, which imply the existence of some of the earlier books, could have been written within so limited a period as their scheme would leave for them. We shall mention one or two facts in regard to this matter, which we deem of some importance towards a right judgment of these theories. It must be remembered that we are here combating these arguments only on grounds of human probability, and only by a class of reasoning which our opponents must admit. Gesenius¹ allows, as a matter of fact, that the prophecies of Jeremiah are a genuine production of the time to which they profess to belong. The same philologist assigns also the prophecies of Isaiah (at least the earlier chapters) and those of Hosea, Amos, and Micah, to the period of their recognised authors. Now at the beginning of the Captivity a new period of the Hebrew language began, when it took a Chaldaizing phase; and from that time the ancient language of the Jews began to die out as a living and spoken language, (§§ 9, 10). This then is an epoch from which we may begin to date our arguments. The two periods into which Gesenius divides the Biblical Hebrew are separated at the Captivity. His words are as follows:—

‘As the language appears to us at present in the Writings of the Old Testament, only two periods of it distinctly characterised by a marked difference can be distinguished: of which the first comprehends the Writings before the Captivity; the second the Writings during the Captivity and after it. The former has been not unaptly called its Golden Age, the second, its Silver.’¹—*Gesenius: Geschichte, &c. Erst. Abschn. § 9.*²

From this extract it is clear that the Hebrew language, in the opinion of Gesenius, who is a great authority with Von

¹ *Geschichte der Hebräischen Sprache und Schrift. Erster Abschnitt.* The reader, to understand the view of Gesenius, must read the whole of this first division of his work, so that we deem it useless to refer to each section separately in all cases.

² We subjoin the original for the satisfaction of those who read German:—“1. Wie die Sprache uns gegenwärtig in den Schriften des A. T. erscheint, lassen sich nur zwey durch ihren Charakter merklich geschiedene Zeitalter derselben unterscheiden, wovon das eine die Schriften vor dem Exil, das zweite die Schriften während und nach demselben umfasst. Nicht unpassend hat man jenes das goldene, dieses das silberne Zeitalter derselben genannt.”—P. 21.

Bohlen, has two distinct periods—the one before the Captivity, and the other during the Captivity and afterwards; and all the books of the Pentateuch (except Deuteronomy, in regard to which Gesenius has a different view) belong, according to the same authority, to the earlier period of the language. We shall say a few words on the arguments of Gesenius against Deuteronomy hereafter. But we now ask, if there be any truth in the views of Gesenius, how can we account for the phenomena offered by the existence of a book like the Pentateuch, which according to Von Bohlen was not known till about twenty years before the Captivity began? (B.C. 624, Von Bohlen, vol. i. p. 256). It is true that the expression here used by Von Bohlen is, '*the appearance of the Levitical code,*' but the course of the argument clearly determines the meaning of the phrase to be the Pentateuch in general. Either Gesenius is entirely mistaken in supposing the language to be so distinct, or Von Bohlen is mistaken in assigning the Pentateuch to a time so close to the Captivity. But then again, another question arises, Does the Pentateuch itself in any way agree with such a supposition? The everlasting story of the neologists, that Josiah was a priest-ridden monarch, of course accounts for the regulations which give power to the priests, that is to say, if we admit that Josiah was ready to give up all his power into the hands of priests, who were also ready to forge any documents whatever, some portions of the Pentateuch will agree tolerably well with such a supposition. And this is the utmost which can be conceded to such a barefaced assumption. The next question which arises in the mind of a philosophical inquirer, in such a matter, would be, Are there tendencies in the Pentateuch, are there portions of it, which are utterly at variance with the notion of its being the forgery of that period? And the whole character of the Book rises up in indignant refutation of so unworthy an origin. Its unconscious simplicity of style in its narrative, its admission of the faults of the patriarchs, the utter absence of unconscious slips by which such a designed forgery would be betrayed, are very strong *primâ facie* evidence against such a monstrous supposition. Such slips, indeed, are said by Von Bohlen and his companions in infidelity (for it is useless to disguise the fact that these are *infidel* works) to be found in the volume, but we deny the truth of their assertions. It is, of course, impossible in a general review of this book, to argue these points separately, but we shall give some specimens of the unfairness which is exhibited in this matter. They even go so far as to make the mention of Mount Moriah as the scene of the intended sacrifice of Isaac, a deliberate designation of the spot on which the temple of Solomon was built as the Holy

Place for the house of God. One is only inclined to say to those who can see thus much in the simplicity of this passage; What next? Again, with regard to the premonition against kingly form of government, which, according to Von Bohlen and Co., must have been written during the existence of the regal form of government, what possible motive can we suppose that Josiah could have for sanctioning such a passage? And if the Pentateuch had been written at this period, should we have been able to detect no allusion to the partition of the kingdom? It will be remembered also, that this warning against desiring a king is presupposed in the first book of Samuel. But this, of course, is easily dealt with. Just as Mr. Shepherd determines every passage in an ancient author which mentions Cyprian to be an interpolation or a forgery, so Von Bohlen and other infidels consider that the passage in Samuel is a manifest interpolation. We would, however, earnestly request any impartial person to read the Pentateuch and the historical books together, and then declare whether he can possibly believe either that the Pentateuch was a forgery of any epoch during the time in which the kingdoms of Judah and Israel were flourishing together, or of the interval between the captivity of Israel and that of Judah.

The theory of Von Bohlen is simply this, that the people gradually emerged from barbarism and became a civilized nation; that their institutions were of gradual growth, and that the Pentateuch was a sort of epic poem, which was written to adorn and beautify the story of their humble origin, and to maintain the arrogant power of the priesthood. Another object was to cast a stigma on other nations, to separate 'two accursed tribes [descendants of Cain and Canaan] from the mass of the 'surrounding people, and placing them on the east and west.' We are anxious to know who the descendants of Cain might be? We mean, what descendants of his, after the flood, and about the year B.C. 624 could disturb the equanimity of a patriotic Jew and inspire him with the desire of writing a libel on their origin in the history of Cain? Truly, if this be philosophical history, if these are the discoveries of Mr. Chapman's chosen writers, the world must enter into its dotage before it listens to them. Our readers will remember that we are at present reasoning upon the probability, or rather discussing the possibility, of assigning the date of the year B.C. 624 for the publication, *i. e.* the composition of the Pentateuch. While, therefore, we are on this branch of the subject we will take an extract from the twenty-fifth chapter of this notable work. We must beg our readers to pardon our sullying these pages with trash at once so arrogant, so senseless, and so blas-

phemous, but it will serve as a specimen of the work we are examining.

‘Nothing can be more certain than that the Hebrew author borrowed from some foreign source the introductory myths of a physical or philosophical character, (which form, as we have already shown, the true mythology of every primæval history,) in order, as it would seem, to supply a solid foundation for the commencement of his national epic. He adopts these myths with all their peculiarities of style and colouring, but introduces, nevertheless, his own peculiar views of the creation and origin of man (Gen. ii. & iii.), and betrays from the first the patriotic object which directs him, by separating (Gen. iv. & ix.) two accursed tribes (descendants of Cain and Canaan), from the mass of the surrounding people and placing them on the east and west, that they may not further interfere with the growing influence of the Hebrew family. After widening the range of his narrative, and passing in review before the reader all the nations of the earth with whom he was acquainted, according to their language and position, he again reduces the narration (by the selection of the Semitic race) within the narrowest limits, and hence is enabled, from this central point, to follow with a steady hand the early fortunes of his people. The calling of Abraham is related, the land of Canaan is promised as an eternal inheritance, and the blessings of Jehovah are made to descend on all the succeeding patriarchs; the kindred tribes show themselves unworthy of their possessions, and receive a recompense elsewhere, or they voluntarily resign their claims and consent to leave the country; everything is here foretold by prophecy, in order to confirm the result; and the narrator can safely represent his ancestors as removing for a season to Egypt, can dwell with pleasure on the services which were rendered by Joseph to the Egyptian state, without a fear lest this desertion of Palestine should annul the promise of Jehovah; for the Deity himself “goes down” with his chosen people, and deigns to lead them back to their own paternal possessions. This leading idea, which pervades the whole of the plan, and which has been further developed by the master-hand of Ewald, had been thus correctly stated by Friedrich. “From the history of Abraham downwards, the book of Genesis appears to present a kind of historical apology for the just rights of the Hebrews to assume the possession of Palestine. These claims were founded on the possessions which had belonged to the individuals called the three patriarchs in that country. The Hebrews very possibly may have found it necessary on more than one occasion to defend their conquests by word and pen as well as by the sword.” In the execution of this plan, genealogy forms the epic thread on which events are strung together, and by which they are continued downwards. Poverty of invention is however strikingly visible in most cases, and especially where the hostile feeling of the writer towards national enemies or neighbouring tribes suggested to his fancy the adoption of the most invidious means of displaying his enmity. Cain must murder his brother in order that he may draw down the curse of the Almighty; Canaan must uncover the nakedness of his drunken father, that he may become accursed; the Moabites and Ammonites are represented as the offspring of incest; the Arabs are described as the bastard children of the patriarchs; and Esau is made the butt of their unfeeling mockery—inventions, all of which would do little honour to the character of their author, if they were not to be regarded from a national point of view, and were not to a great extent redeemed by higher and nobler features. The remainder of the narratives will be mostly found to turn on famines, on the barrenness of women, the blessings bestowed by blind fathers on their children, the substitution of

wives for sisters, and similar expedients, which are repeatedly employed.'—Vol. i. p. 317—319.

It would certainly be somewhat curious to ascertain the particular motives which induced this fiery patriot to vindicate the claim of his countrymen to the land in which they were living at the epoch fixed upon by Von Bohlen, or at any period during the existence of the kingdoms of Judah and Israel, by arguments drawn from the pages of Genesis, or, as he chooses to call it, this national epic. Their right to that country could only be disputed by the earlier inhabitants of the land, who had long been dispossessed of the soil, and were almost exterminated. But Von Bohlen seems to hint that the national epic was intended to bar the claims of the Ishmaelites and Edomites. It is really scarcely possible to treat arguments such as these as worthy of serious consideration. They tally neither with the history of the people, with common sense, nor with the general state of mankind.

We cannot, indeed, imagine a much more untenable assertion than that which assigns the Pentateuch to so late a date. The motive for such a forgery it is difficult to divine. The very imputations cast upon the neighbouring nations rebounded on the Jews. If Moab was sprung from so hateful an origin, the very circumstance that David, and through David, all the kings of Judah, were implicated in the taint thus transmitted, would have stayed the pen of a forger. The unprejudiced reader of the Sacred Volume can scarcely fail to see a progress—not in the language of the writers, but in the condition of the people—throughout the different books of the Old Testament. Gesenius assigns Proverbs, in its main portions, to the earlier period of the Hebrew language, and we simply ask whether it is possible to suppose, (excluding all notions of inspiration in the conduct of our argument,) that Genesis and Proverbs could be the product of the same age? The whole range of ideas is enlarged in the latter, while the former contains the annals of men of simple lives and pastoral habits. Can we believe that the Pentateuch, the Books of Joshua and Judges, the Books of Samuel and Kings, all of which exhibit such distinct phases of society, could be the product of any short period of time? Yet this is the camel which neology requires us to swallow.

But it would weary our readers to follow out all the absurdities which result from almost every scheme which is advocated by each neological writer. We have not yet drawn attention to the innumerable contradictions which are found in the different writers of the new school of criticism. There is scarcely an opinion offered by any one of the party which is not flatly contradicted by another; and yet, while they assail the Bible from

the most contradictory principles, they expect the world to believe that the books of the Bible are forgeries, and their authors shameful impostors. Because A is B, therefore Genesis is a late work, is the assertion of one; because A is not B, Genesis could not be written early, is the argument of another. We shall illustrate this statement by a few examples of what we mean. De Wette and Gramberg are quite sure that Judges is a far older book than Joshua. Bertholdt, on the contrary, maintains that Joshua is older than Judges. A third writer tells us they were probably written about the same time. And Ewald, who is very confidently appealed to by Von Bohlen, is wholly at variance with him as to the date of the Pentateuch. He asserts, without hesitation (or did assert about twenty years ago), that 'the first four books of the Pentateuch must have been in existence, in their present state, by the tenth century before Christ.' What becomes then of Von Bohlen's assertion that the Pentateuch was not known till B.C. 624? Again, Gesenius discovers a marked difference between the language before and after the Captivity, which began B.C. 606. Notwithstanding this marked difference, many of the neologists consider that Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy, were written during or after the Captivity. These instances will, perhaps, be sufficient to indicate to our readers the nature of the contradictions, relative to the age of the different books of the Old Testament, found in the new school of criticism. They are taken from the appendix to the Hulsean Lectures for 1833, where more will be found collected together.

We think it really needless to pursue this train of argument any further. But we may, however, add a few words on the arguments drawn from the use of particular words. As the induction can be made only from the writers in the Bible, it is clear that the instances ought to be of the most striking character and free from all manner of doubt. If there were contemporary writers in each period, and a rich uninspired literature in the same language, there might be some tolerable grounds for forming an opinion; but in so narrow a range as the Old Testament, it requires considerable boldness to attempt to form any very marked distinctions, and establish by inductive reasoning the age of any particular book. From this, however, neither Gesenius nor Von Bohlen appears to shrink; with what success one or two examples of this species of reasoning from Von Bohlen will show.

In p. 46 Von Bohlen makes the following remark:—'In many cases we meet for the first time in the Pentateuch with modes of expression belonging to a later period; thus, in Joel, for instance, and the older writers, *tsum* is used for "to fast;"

'whereas the Pentateuch, and other books after the Captivity, conform with the more ascetic spirit of the time, and employ the phrase *'inah nephesh* (to afflict the soul), in order to point out its merit.'

A foot-note is subjoined to this observation, which is as follows:—'Lev. xvi. 29, 31; xxiii. 27, 32. Numb. xxix. 7; xxx. 14. Deut. viii. 3.—See Credner, on Joel, p. 149.'¹

Now if this were true, or rather, if the observation had any force, we ought to find that *'inah nephesh* (we quote Von Bohlen, but are not answerable for this pronunciation ourselves) was used commonly by later writers, and *tsum* by the earlier. The fact we believe to be, that *'inah nephesh* only occurs four times in any other part of the Bible,—*i. e.* in Ps. xxxv. 13, and three times in Isaiah lviii., whereas *tsum* is used about forty-one times; of which eighteen are found in Zechariah, Jeremiah, Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and Chronicles. In these books the phrase *'inah nephesh* is not once found, although they are among the very latest of the sacred writings. These books comprise indeed the chief writings of the period posterior to the Captivity; and therefore the assertion that the Pentateuch, and other books after the Captivity, commonly use this phrase *'inah nephesh*, stands in very suspicious proximity to a deliberate falsehood, unless we acquit the author of wilful deception on the plea of reckless assertion.²

We find in a note to p. 45 a list of words adduced to prove that 'from Genesis alone a considerable number of words and forms may be adduced, which either follow the inflexions of the later dialects, or are only to be found in the books written after the Captivity.' We rather suspect, from two or three little indications we have observed, that Von Bohlen was by no means a profound Hebrew scholar;³ and if the knowledge of Hebrew should ever become a capital offence in our country, we feel quite sure that we need be under no anxiety about the valuable lives of his two translators, and their parliamentary Editor. We observe among the verbs in this list '*nabelah, to confound,*' with the reference, Gen. xi. 7. The translators (and

¹ We think we are correct in this statement; but, as we are obliged to rely on Buxtorf's Concordance, it is possible that one or two instances may have escaped us, from the circumstance that this very useful volume is badly printed, and the arrangement, not being according to the books of the Bible, but according to the parts of the verb, the search is laborious. In Calasio's or Fürst's Concordance the same operation would only take one-tenth of the time.

² We are fully aware that Gesenius assigns the latter portion of Isaiah from chap. xl.—lxvi. to the period of the Captivity; but this is entirely an arbitrary assertion; and the fact that the *later* writers do not commonly use *'inah nephesh* stands untouched.

³ See, for instance, his absurd derivation of Noah from the Greek word '*naus*, a ship' vol. ii. p. 106, &c.

perhaps Von Bohlen himself) appear to be perfectly innocent of any particular knowledge of the word about which they are writing. They do not seem to be aware that there is no such verb as *nabelah*, which is nothing more than the first person plural of the so-called future tense of the verb *balal*, to confound. The verb itself in its radical form occurs in verse 9 of the same chapter. We certainly should find it difficult to carry on any controversy about the inflexions of later dialects with gentlemen who seem to be ignorant of the Hebrew accidence. With regard to the word *balal*, it is true that it is the parent of many forms found in later dialects, as *balbel*, and other kindred forms; but how this can prove the lateness of Genesis, it would puzzle a wiser man than Mr. Heywood to declare. The derived forms, or rather the participial forms, are the recognised words for the *mixing* of various ingredients in offerings, and occur repeatedly in Leviticus and Numbers; but the verb and its derivatives are seldom found beyond the Pentateuch: but the five instances of their occurrence are found in those books which most neologists allow to be the most ancient, viz. Judges, Job, Isaiah (chap. xxx.), Hosea, and the Psalms.

Again, the word '*tsachak*, to laugh,' is one of the instances. Why this should be noted as a late word, we know not; it only occurs twice beyond the Pentateuch; and that in Judges and Ezekiel.

We think that our readers will not require a more detailed examination of this list of words. We are not in the least surprised to find the carelessness with which it is compiled. The lists of Gesenius and Hartmann are made up in exactly the same manner. Out of a list of ten words which Hartmann asserts to prove the late composition of Deuteronomy, as being used only by the later writers, the simple use of a Concordance places six *hors de combat* at once.¹

We confess that this employment of guarding against the most nefarious injustice to the Sacred Volume is very uncongenial. It is always unpleasant to find carelessness and dishonesty in matters of such vital importance; but as long as there are dishonest writers, it is requisite that they should be tracked. We think that we have now indicated sufficiently the proper mode of dealing with some portion of the arguments adduced in these volumes. Before we take leave of them, we shall only point out one more glaring absurdity. In pp. 246 and 247 von Bohlen quotes passages from Samuel, Joel, Isaiah, &c. which resemble certain verses in some parts of the Pentateuch. It does not seem very unnatural that the prophets should occa-

² See an analysis of these words in the Hulsean Lectures for 1833.

sionally give a glance towards the great prophet, through whom God had given his Law to the Israelites, and occasionally use his language. But no! this simple explanation is not sufficient for neological incredulity; and Von Bohlen actually has the unparalleled impudence to parade these passages as proofs that the Pentateuch was composed after the epoch of these prophets and imitated them! Can the perversity of man's mind go much further than this?

It is indeed not needful to pursue the analysis of these lists any further. Neology has done its worst in this line of argument against Revelation, and proved nothing but its own imbecility or dishonesty. Before, however, we conclude our remarks, we must state that Von Bohlen refuses to attribute any weight to the argument for the antiquity of the Pentateuch, drawn from the three archaic forms peculiar¹ to that part of the Holy Scripture. The cogency of this argument has generally been admitted, and even Gesenius admits its importance; nay, he goes so far as to affirm, because these three archaic forms are met with in Deuteronomy (to which he assigns a later origin) that a revising hand must have brought it into conformity with the four more ancient books! (Gesenius, *Gesch. der Heb. Sprache*, &c. p. 32.) We are quite aware that Gesenius, who compares these forms to the Latin '*terraï*,' &c. will not allow such an antiquity to the four books of the Pentateuch as would bring them to the age of Moses; but we only quote his opinion to prove that Von Bohlen out-herods Herod, when he attributes these archaisms to the affectation of the author!

We must now close our observations on this worthless book. We take no notice of the arguments by which the contents of the Book of Genesis are controverted,—by which the author and editor endeavour to show the impossibility of the Flood, and of the antediluvian history. All this is evidently beside the question. If there be internal and convincing evidence that the work is a late imposture, then the whole Christian Church must veil its head, and bow before the wisdom of these new lights of the world. But if the book be a revelation from God, the subject-matter demands our faith, and admits of no questioning. This is the great question between the neologists, or rather the infidels, and the Christians,—Whether God has really made a revelation of Himself in the Bible or not? and the neologists assume a negative answer to the question, and argue from that assumption as one of their premises. A clearer case of a *petitio principii* can scarcely be adduced. But when we observe the rashness and the ignorance with which the charges against the

¹ They are scarcely found elsewhere.

Sacred Scriptures are commonly brought in this volume, and the vulgar spitefulness¹ by which in some instances they are accompanied, one can only wonder that any gentlemen of tolerable education in this country should translate such trash; and still more, that they would find a member of the British Senate ready to indorse it. After having shown the utter futility of these attempts to prove a late origin for Genesis, we do not consider it requisite to condescend to argue the truth of the message, which we believe that book to contain from God. We have pointed out the absurdities committed by the author, and the inconclusiveness of his reasoning on this main point, taking up the question, as if there were nothing but bare historical evidence in our favour—arguing the question on his grounds, and answering, in short, ‘a fool according to his folly.’ But we have, in arguing the matter on these grounds, done a manifest injustice to the cause of Revelation. We have argued as if the books of the Bible had nothing to distinguish them from the common mass of profane literature. But let it be observed that the Bible has nothing whatever in common with the myths of profane authors; the books are far more ancient, and the matter entirely different. There are phenomena to be accounted for, which infidelity never can account for, and which it is either obliged impudently to deny, or to explain with a mixture of ignorance and imbecility which would provoke a smile, if it did not excite more serious thoughts. How came a barbarous people, inferior in arts to the nations of the world, to surpass all mankind in the purity and rationality of their faith, and the earnestness of their religious impressions? How comes it that even now, every elevated sentiment concerning the Supreme God, the Creator of heaven and earth, which is found in the world, is to be traced to the Hebrew Scriptures, or to the Christian Volume, which is their natural completion? How comes it that this Hebrew people, placed in contiguity to the greatest nations of antiquity, to Tyre, to Sidon, to Babylon, to Assyria, and to Egypt, has recorded in its Scriptures, written undoubtedly at the epoch of the prosperity of those kingdoms, the definite prophecies of their later destinies? How comes it that these prophecies should have been fulfilled to the letter? How comes it that, in writings separated from each other by so long an interval of time, threads of concurrent prophecy should be found converging to one point, and that these prophecies should all have been fulfilled in our blessed Saviour Jesus Christ? How comes it that this people should have dwelt alone among the nations, for so many centuries, fulfilling the very

¹ See, for instance, his remarks on the word *kédeshah*, vol. i. p. 46.

destiny predicted of them in the Pentateuch itself? Their whole history is in diametrical contradiction to the history of every other nation with which we are acquainted; and yet every argument of these modern critics proceeds on the assumption that their nation is one out of a crowd of other nations, similarly situated with the Jews. It is, unhappily, necessary occasionally to argue for the historical truth of the Scriptures and for their genuineness and authenticity, lest it should be supposed that works like Von Bohlen's are not answered, because of the cogency of their arguments. But as Christians, persuaded of the truth of our religion, we have arguments which carry conviction home to our bosoms with a force which a thousand such volumes as these could not affect. The Christian Church, receiving these ancient documents as the word of God, has stamped upon them the approbation of our Saviour, of Him whose word shall remain, when heaven and earth shall pass away; and we have no fear that even the gates of hell can finally prevail against the Church of Christ, and the Scriptures, on which its faith is founded. These attempts of modern criticism may shake the faith of some weak brethren, and impose for a time on the ignorant and unwary, but their futility will soon be discovered, and men will be ashamed to appeal to them. They will pass away, but the Scriptures will remain, at once the source of comfort, of hope, and of instruction to man!

With these observations we should be inclined to leave this work to the consideration of our readers; but we think it a duty to state that the charges of incompetence and ignorance, which we have brought against Von Bohlen, are by no means unsupported by accusations of a similar character from his own countrymen. Professor Hengstenberg, in his 'Egypt and the Books of Moses,' has made the gravest charges of ignorance and incompetence against this author; and the English reader may estimate the value of Von Bohlen's remarks on Egyptian history by reading this work in the American translation by Mr. Robbins, which was published, with some additional notes by Dr. Taylor, as the third volume of the New Series of the Biblical Cabinet at Edinburgh, in 1845. (Clark, Edinburgh.) We quote a specimen or two.

Von Bohlen having argued that, as the buildings of Egypt were of hewn stone, the notion of bricks was derived from Babylon, &c., Professor Hengstenberg comments on the passage in these words:—

'We can scarcely trust our eyes when we read such things. Is it possible that one who undertakes to comment upon the Pentateuch, and even ventures to accuse its author of ignorance in relation to Egyptian affairs, should show himself grossly uninformed in these same things, and make asser-

tions whose incorrectness is conclusively proved by the first good compendium?"

He then proceeds to prove that we 'are literally overwhelmed with proofs of the abundant use of bricks' in Egypt in very early times. (Hengstenberg, p. 2 of the Translation.)

We quote one more instance, but only as a specimen.

Hengstenberg quotes the following remark from Von Bohlen, together with several similar observations: 'The author [of the Pentateuch] represents Joseph, Gen. xliii. 16, in most manifest opposition to the sacredness of beasts to prepare flesh for food.'

Hengstenberg then remarks:—

'Our astonishment at the condition of our great critic's knowledge of Egypt is here again not a little increased, and the credulity with which so many use such an author's work on India as good authority, becomes, after the successive developments of his ignorance, unaccountable to us.'—*Translation*, p. 8.

For Professor Hengstenberg's views, on some points, we do not profess to be answerable; but he is a man of very high acquirements, and his authority may serve to show that the estimate of the value of Von Bohlen's works which we have given is by no means confined to English ground, but will find considerable sympathy in Germany.¹

Our notice of this author is now ended. We could say much more, but we have devoted to him a larger share of this volume than he deserves; and we only wish we could have heard that he had recanted his follies and his blasphemies, before he was called to 'go hence, and be no more seen.' We trust that his Editor may, in some future period of his life, see reason to repent of having dragged from its obscurity such a worthless assault on Revelation; that he may, before he passes away from earth, become a wiser and a better man. But as he has shown such irreverence for the Holy Scriptures, and such ignorance respecting all the critical questions connected with them, we sincerely hope that the eyes of the nation may be opened to his obliquities with regard to Holy Writ; and that a motion, which he has had the audacity to put upon the Journals of the House of Commons for the purpose of tampering with the Authorized Translation of the Scriptures, will be met with one universal cry of indignation. The hands of the ignorant and the profane must, at least, be removed from the Ark of God.

¹ Much valuable matter in answer to Von Bohlen will also be found in Prof. Hengstenberg's '*Die Authentie des Pentateuches erwiesen*,' &c. 2 vols. 8vo. Berlin, 1836.

ART. III.—1. *Life of Thomas Young, M.D., F.R.S., &c., and one of the Eight Foreign Associates of the National Institute of France.* By GEORGE PEACOCK, D.D., F.R.S., &c., *Dean of Ely.* London: Murray. 1855.

2.—*Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton.* By Sir DAVID BREWSTER, K.H., A.M., D.C.L., F.R.S., &c. &c. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co. 1855.

THE lives of men of science present few points of attraction to an unscientific public. It is otherwise with political or literary characters, with whom the great majority of readers have some points in common, and in whose mode of life their trials and successes, their pursuits and views, their virtues and their failings, their foibles and their greatness, they can feel an interest and sympathy. All readers of books have some love of literature, and a still larger class of people are, or at least profess themselves to be, interested in political matters. Hence the memoirs of statesmen, and those who have attained celebrity in any department of literature and art, are written for a larger and more miscellaneous class of readers than can be calculated on for the biography of even the most eminent men in science. In fact, the interest felt in the biography of scientific men is proportional to that which is felt for the subject or subjects on which they were employed. Some of the most successful attempts at this species of composition have been made by Lord Brougham in his *Sketches*; yet, though equal ability was employed in both works, and though the writer was probably quite as much interested in science as in statesmanship, the '*Sketches of Statesmen*' has been a far more popular work than his '*Lives of Philosophers*.' Biography, indeed, at the first hearing, conveys the idea of a popular mode of instruction; and hence arises the difficulty of the task which he imposes upon himself, who undertakes to present to the world an account of the life and writings of the man of science. And thus, to use a mathematical illustration, the successful composition of such a work is a problem which can only be solved approximately. The writer has to accommodate himself to two classes of readers quite heterogeneous; and when he addresses himself, especially to the one, he is almost necessarily excluding the other. The ordinary reader will, as a matter of course, skip all the scientific part, and the learned are in danger of being bored by explanations of things which to them are perfectly familiar. It is, we

repeat, a difficult task, for an author to steer clear of these opposite tendencies, and so to adjust the materials on which he has to work, as to unite the greatest possible number of readers with the smallest probable amount of omission in the course of reading—to secure some readers whose attention will not flag from the beginning to the end—and to provide for the entertainment of those who at best must be content to forego some portions of the work.

That the task of combining, into one biography, matter which should at once secure the interest of scientific readers, and afford information and amusement to the ordinary reader, was not impossible, is abundantly proved, not merely by the ‘*Lives of Philosophers of the Time of George III.*,’ but by the *Notices Biographiques* of M. Arago, recently published in France. To this author is due the credit of having changed the character of the *éloges*, which for nearly two centuries it has been the custom to pronounce over recently deceased members of the French Institute. Instead of adopting the merely laudatory tone which mostly characterises these memoirs, and which is the besetting sin of biographers in general, he has endeavoured to render his volumes subservient to the purposes of science, by interspersing much valuable matter both philosophical and historical. It is true that in doing so he imagined himself writing for an increased and increasing number of persons either devoted to, or at least interested in, the subject of natural philosophy; and to such, accordingly, these parts of his volumes must be considered to be especially addressed; and yet it is easy to foresee that these Memoirs, notwithstanding their *hard parts*, will be extremely popular.

Of the two works which we have placed at the head of this article, one has been eminently successful in avoiding the difficulty to which we have been alluding; whilst the other has, from various causes, which we shall notice in the sequel, proved as remarkable a failure. This is the more to be regretted, because the subject of Sir David Brewster’s memoir is one of whom all Englishmen, whether scientific or not, naturally feel proud; and undoubtedly eminent as Dr. Young was, and entitled to our admiration for his grand discovery of the undulatory theory, we suppose we shall be within the mark if we say that, where one reader will be found to take any interest in the memoirs of his life and discoveries, a hundred will be found anxious to learn something of the mode in which Newton prosecuted his inquiries. We do not mean that the Dean of Ely has entirely succeeded in his attempt to explain to popular readers the undulatory theory of light; we believe it to be next to impossible to render the subject clear to those who have

neither seen the experiments by which it is illustrated, nor are able to follow the mathematical investigations which connect its various phenomena. But to write a Life of Dr. Young, without attempting to give some account of his principal discovery in science, would have been a simple absurdity. If, therefore, unscientific readers have to omit the whole or the greater part of the sixth and the twelfth chapters, to which the optical discoveries have been judiciously consigned, they must lay the blame not on the writer, who has done the best that could be done under the circumstances, but on their own want of acquaintance with physical science, or, if they please, on the intrinsic difficulties of the subject. With the exception of these two chapters, there is little or nothing in this volume but what will be intelligible and interesting to one who has the ordinary education of a gentleman.

The Life of Dr. Young owes much of its interest to the fact, that he attained far greater eminence in science than his education and desultory habits of reading would have led us to suppose, *à priori*, probable. Few persons living would feel a stronger appreciation of this than the accomplished mathematician who has undertaken the task of editing his works and life; yet, though allusion has been more than once made to this subject, it has not been brought out as prominently as we could have wished. It is desirable in these days, when there seems great danger of the old system of our public schools and universities being superseded by the superficial acquaintance engendered by professorial teaching, to enter one's protest, wherever it may be done, against anything that may encourage this view. And it is not without grave alarm that we have seen an establishment of a school of natural science at Oxford, in which mechanics is admitted as a subject, and candidates are allowed to pass and take honours who are entirely ignorant of mathematics, and consequently of the first principles of the science itself. That the University should recognise, if indeed it does recognise, such text-books as those sent out by the Professor of Experimental Philosophy, is indeed disgraceful.

The want of a regular and systematic mathematical education, which would have been, in almost any supposable case, fatal to any great distinction in physical science, was compensated in Young's case by most unusual sagacity and power of intuition, united with very great industry in following up the subject which for the time being occupied his attention, and, we may add, a deep interest in the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake. The habit of completely mastering what he once took in hand, will account for his considerable attainments in various branches of learning. It shows itself in his scholarship, which,

however, his biographer is inclined to overrate, as well as in his hieroglyphical researches and optical investigations; and his very deficiencies, as, for instance, his want of appreciation of natural beauty and his indifference to high art, as well as his carelessness of historical and political subjects of the day, and want of sympathy with his fellow-men, all contributed to the same result. He had less to distract him in his pursuit of experimental science and abstract investigation than those who are more highly gifted than himself with these endowments of nature. But for this singular combination of positive qualities, with the absence of disturbing affections, we should have been inclined to pronounce the opinion that he was, but that he ought not to have been, a distinguished character.

Apart from his literary and scientific career, there are but few incidents of his life which possess much interest. He was born of Quaker parents, and brought up in the strictest principles of that sect. He picked up his various information from a great variety of independent sources; but the most valuable part of it appears to have been due to his own insatiable thirst for knowledge, which enabled him to turn to good account the resources of those with whom he was accidentally thrown, or under whose care he was placed. Probably few boys at the age of thirteen have ever read so much, or profited to so great an extent by their reading, as he had. Before he was nine years old he had mastered the whole of his book in arithmetic, which the master who was teaching him the subject was dull enough not to find out; and during long intervals of many months, in which he seems to have had no systematic instruction, he learned from a neighbour who was a land surveyor the use of his mathematical instruments, and from another neighbour borrowed a quadrant, which was the constant companion of his walks, and with which he endeavoured to measure the height of the principal eminences in the neighbourhood. To these pursuits, if we add some knowledge of botany, of the microscope, of the art of turning, together with a tolerable acquaintance with French, Italian, and Hebrew, all attained by his own unassisted efforts, and remember that all this was but an addition to the ordinary amount of Greek and Latin learned by boys at school, we may well wonder that the precocious boy grew up into the discoverer of the undulatory theory, and of the true method of reading the Egyptian hieroglyphics.

His education during the remaining years of his boyhood and youth was even more desultory. He read a good deal of classical literature, and attained a good and even accurate knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages. The Greek iambs, which are exhibited as a specimen of his style of composition,

were not worth printing. They are neither much better nor much worse than other exercises of that time, and certainly will bear no comparison with the productions of our public schools and universities at this day. The accentuation too, if it is his own, is not very scholarlike. The little epigram printed at p. 57 gives a more favourable impression of his scholarship, and breathes a good deal of the spirit of the Greek epigrammatists. We reprint it for the benefit of such of our readers as do not remember it in Dalzel's Collectanea:—

ΦΙΛΗΜΑ.

‘Χθές μέλι μοι προφέρεσκε Καλήδονος ἡ χαρίεσσα,
 Τοῦ δὲ μελισσογενοῦς οὐδὲν ἔφην ἐθέλω.
 ‘ΑΛΛ’ ἀπὸ σου στόματος δὺς μοι μέλι, κατ’ ἐφίλησα,
 Κῆν γλυκίον τὸ φίλημ’ εἰκοσάκις μελιτος.’—P. 57.

It is scarcely possible to conceive so desultory an education being so successful as his after-life proves it to have been: but there was one correction to it. Young finished one thing at a time. Capable as he was of attending to so many different subjects of thought, he must have imposed upon himself great restraint when he determined not to leave one subject for another till he had mastered it; and but for this one rule, which he resolutely adhered to, he never would have attained eminence in any department of literature or science. The remarks made by the author upon this subject are too important to be omitted:—

‘This self-education, however, eminent as was its success, was not without very serious disadvantages. He had no sufficient opportunity of freely reciprocating his thoughts with other minds than his own, at that period of life when such interchanges are most cordial and spontaneous; when every impulse of feeling, every creation of the fancy, every dream of the imagination, every hope that we cherish, every apprehension that we entertain, is thrown open to our equals in age and in fortune; when the experience of life, its trials and its disappointments, have not chilled the ardour of our affections, or clouded the brightness of those visions of happiness or distinction in which youth so much delights to indulge. If he had to regret no loss of time or opportunities in the pursuit of knowledge, to deplore no sacrifices to the seductive influences of boyish sports or idle companions, he had, on the other hand, no means of observing the difficulties which they experience in the progress of their studies, or of fixing upon those points in the communication of knowledge which, though clear and obvious to himself, were likely to be obscure or unintelligible to others: he was throughout life destitute of that intellectual fellow-feeling (if the phrase may be used), which is so essential to form a successful teacher or lecturer, or a luminous and interesting writer.

‘His mathematical was, if possible, still more unassisted than his classical education, and we can only form an estimate of the correctness and soundness of his knowledge, by his philosophical writings in after-life, which, though always obscure and generally deficient in elegance and conciseness of form, yet touch upon many of the most abstruse applications of

mathematics to natural philosophy, and are often remarkable for the simple means by which the most difficult problems are solved. There is, in fact, no department of his very various researches and labours, in which the resources of his genius (for a less forcible term would be inappropriate) are more remarkable than in this. We fear, however, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to point out the causes of his success. A desultory mathematical education rarely leads to sound or accurate knowledge. One or more fundamental principles imperfectly understood, or altogether misconceived, are generally found to affect the stability of the whole structure which is raised upon it. The very basis of demonstration is unsound, and there is an end of all certain distinction between truth and error. If, therefore, in the remarkable instance before us it produced a different result, it is rather referable to the peculiar character of his mind than to the discipline to which it was subjected.'—Pp. 29—31.

He had scarcely commenced his medical education when his attention was directed to the subject of the structure of the eye; and an essay which he wrote on the power which the eye possesses of adapting itself to see clearly objects at different distances, procured him the honour of election at the age of twenty-one as a Fellow of the Royal Society. He afterwards went through the usual professional course at Edinburgh and Göttingen, after which he was admitted a Fellow Commoner of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, where he took his degrees in medicine, chiefly, it may be supposed, in order to qualify for admission to the privilege of a Fellow of the College of Physicians in London. In the year 1800, he established himself in Welbeck Street, with the view of practising as a physician, but though he remained in the same residence for twenty-five years, he never was in extensive practice; and thus adds one to the list of names which might be produced in evidence of the incompatibility of devotion to literary and scientific pursuits with success in the medical profession. It was fortunate for his literary fame that it was so, for it was during this period that all the discoveries for which his name will ever be distinguished were made. The first of these was the principle of the interference of light, and the establishment of the propagation of light by undulations. The next discovery, which will immortalise his name, was the deciphering of Egyptian hieroglyphics, a task which he did not enter upon till fourteen years later. The intervening time was occupied with preparing and delivering, and subsequently publishing, a course of lectures on natural philosophy and the mechanical arts, with writing a considerable number of articles in the '*Quarterly Review*,' and some medical works.

The chapter on '*Hieroglyphical Researches*' is much the most interesting in the work, partly on account of the subject itself, and partly because it exhibits in favourable colours Young's frankness of disposition, and freedom from that jea-

lousy of priority which characterises most great discoverers, and amongst them, as we shall presently have occasion to notice, Newton himself. We have no space for even a brief account of the ingenious mode in which he succeeded in recognising the connexion between the hieroglyphic and the enchorial characters, both of which he had to make out from the single inscription on the Rosetta stone, written in both characters, and followed by a Greek translation in a mutilated state. Suffice it to say, that being, quite contrary to his sanguine expectations, baffled in interpreting the enchorial text, excepting in connecting the distinct words with those of the Greek version, he devoted himself to a comparison of the enchorial and the hieroglyphic texts; and his biographer has successfully shown, that though his principle of regarding as phonetic the proper names, which could not be represented by characters addressed to the eye only, was not strictly correct, yet it was this brilliant conjecture that has led the way to all the subsequent discoveries of M. Champollion. The latter was disingenuous enough to claim the whole merit of this discovery, and only speaks of the acknowledged faults in Young's hypothesis, without giving him any credit for the hypothesis itself, which too nearly resembles M. Champollion's, to allow of their being conceived of as independent discoveries. We have referred to this controversy principally with the view of exhibiting Young's modesty and forbearance. Though he had been very shabbily treated by M. Champollion, he vindicates himself in the gentlest language, and makes no insinuations against his rival's good faith, which, however, can scarcely be maintained; and it is interesting to find these two great discoverers meeting a few years afterwards, apparently on the most cordial terms.

This is almost the only event in his life which gives us any information as to his moral character. His conscientiousness appears on two occasions; once when, in early life, the abhorrence of the principle of slavery in which he had been brought up inclined him to abstain from the use of slave-grown sugar; and again, in later life, his proposing to accept a smaller salary than had been allowed him as medical referee and inspector of calculations to an insurance company. His biographer speaks of him as not being altogether free from the affectation of the manners of a man of the world; and there are sufficient indications in expressions of his own, that he had no very deep sense of religious obligations. We are told that he threw off the outward garb and manners of a Quaker before he arrived at manhood; but it is nowhere implied that he formally joined any religious body, excepting, in the account of his last illness and death, when Mr. Gurney speaks of his 'having taken the

sacraments of the Church,' and says of his religious sentiments that they were by himself stated to be liberal, though orthodox. This is a disappointing omission. Probably his biographer had no materials from which to describe him more minutely, or he may have preferred being silent from motives of delicacy.

From Young, let us pass to the Life of Newton. We have already implied that this is a work of very inferior execution: it is indeed singularly wanting in that continuity of narrative which is essential to the interest of a biography, and will hardly regain for its writer the credit which he lost by his trumpery and ill-tempered volume against the Essay on the Plurality of Worlds. We had thought that it was pretty generally agreed upon, both amongst learned and unlearned readers, that the writer of the essay entitled 'More Worlds than One,' had been entirely overthrown by his accomplished adversary, that even his best friends had lamented the want of logic and of temper with which he had attempted to defend opinions which, in common with himself, they had cherished from their infancy. But Sir David Brewster belongs to the class represented by the schoolmaster in the 'Deserted Village,' whose skill consisted in the fact, that 'E'en though vanquished he could argue still.' We really must express our unfeigned astonishment at his venturing to refer to that controversy as he has done two or three times in the course of these volumes. We can entirely sympathise with our author in his glowing and enthusiastic description of the *Principia*, as a work of human genius, but he certainly does not imitate the caution for which that work is so conspicuous, when he definitely asserts that it will ever be regarded as the brightest page in the records of human reason; and we are strongly reminded of that short step which is said to unite the sublime and the ridiculous, when we find it spoken of as 'a work, may we not add, which would be read 'with delight in every planet of our system, in every system of 'the universe.' (Vol. i. p. 319.) In another place he attempts to represent Newton himself as an advocate of the same views which he has 'ventured to state and illustrate in the last 'chapter, "On the Future of the Universe," of a little volume 'entitled "More Worlds than One, 1854."' The concluding paragraph of a quotation from a MS. of Sir Isaac's, which is in many respects remarkable, has been printed in italics, and we will transcribe it in order that our readers may judge for themselves how wide is the interval between Sir Isaac Newton's caution and Sir David Brewster's dogmatism:—

'For in God's house (which is the universe) are many mansions, and He governs them by agents which can pass through the heavens from one mansion to another. For if all places to which we have access are filled

with living creatures, why should all these immense spaces of the heavens above the clouds be incapable of inhabitants?'—Vol. ii. p. 354.

The truth is, there are a great many things contained in these ponderous tomes which in reading the *Life of Newton* we do not want, whilst the description of the state of mechanical and astronomical science previous to his time, and the account of his chief discovery of the law of universal gravitation, are meagre in the extreme. We are continually asking ourselves while reading these volumes, what principle of selection guided their author in the information he volunteers, and what class of readers his scientific explanations are intended for? In one place we have an account of the reason why the tides are high at the time of opposition as well as conjunction, the theory of which is given in every popular book of astronomy; whilst in another we have dissertations on the most recent discoveries in physical optics, it being taken for granted that the reader is as perfectly acquainted with this abstruse science as an attentive perusal of all Sir David Brewster's works would perhaps have rendered him.

Indeed, the biography appears to have been intended to act as a vehicle for advertising the author's miscellaneous works. Thus the reader is every here and there reminded of what the author has written and discovered, and constant reference is made to what I or we (for Sir David Brewster sometimes adopts the singular, sometimes the plural form) have found out and printed in the treatise on *New Philosophical Instruments*, or that on *Optics*, and of views which have been put forth by the author in his '*Martyrs of Science*,' or contributions to the '*Edinburgh Review*,' '*Encyclopædia*,' and '*Transactions*.' In this respect, the two writers of the two *Lives* appear in marked contrast. Dr. Peacock scarcely ever appears in his *Memoir of Young*, whilst Sir David Brewster, not content with alluding to his former works, extracts whole passages from them.

The publication itself professes to be an enlargement of the small and popular *Life of Newton*, published by the same author in Mr. Murray's *Family Library*, in the year 1831, and the composition of the present volumes appears to have been in hand for nearly twenty years. The additional sources of information, to which the author had not had access previous to his former edition, are the manuscripts and correspondence which came into the possession of the Portsmouth family through Newton's grandniece, Miss Conduitt, afterwards Lady Lymington. John Conduitt, the nephew of Sir Isaac, had conceived, shortly after his death, the idea of writing his *Life*; and though, judging from the mass of manuscript which he left behind him, it does not appear that the world has lost much by his abandon-

ment of his design, yet the materials which he collected from Mrs. Conduitt and from the surviving friends of Newton are of great value; and from abstracts taken of these papers, during a week's visit at Hurstbourne Park, the first volume of the work has been furnished with some important matter. During the interval between the composition of the first and second volumes, all the papers which had been examined and arranged by Mr. Fellowes were put into the hands of the author; and thus the second volume has been enriched at the expense of the first, the new information respecting the history of the *Principia* being introduced where mention is made of the editions of the work which were published after 1687. We presume it is owing to the same want of earlier access to these MSS. that we have consigned to the Appendix the very interesting account of the time at which the different parts of the *Principia* were composed. From it we learn that it was begun in December, 1684, and finished before May, 1686, with the exception that the first and eleventh propositions were written in December, 1679, from the sixth to the fifteenth inclusive with the seventeenth, and the first four of the second book in June and July, 1684. The volume has also had the advantage of having been read during its passing through the press by Mr. Edleston, whose name is known to the public as editor of the Correspondence of Newton with Cotes and other mathematicians, the originals of which were in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. It is unfortunate that the first volume did not possess the same advantages, as it would probably not have appeared without a correction of some of the mistakes which we shall subsequently have to refer to.

The appearance of Baily's *Life of Flamsteed*, in 1835, had tended to give a different impression of Newton's character and temper from the prevailing opinion about him, and the same collection of manuscripts has enabled the author to vindicate his illustrious subject from what he denounces as 'a system of calumny and misrepresentation, unexampled in the history of science.' On this subject, as well as on many other subjects connected with the life and works of Newton, these volumes have thrown considerable light. We shall at the conclusion of this article recur to the subject of his religious opinions. But first we propose to give some intelligible account, which Sir David Brewster has not done, of the state of science prior to Newton's great discovery, as well as of the discovery itself, and in the latter part shall confine ourselves, as our space is limited, to the demonstration of that which is the turning-point of the whole theory — the truth enunciated in the third and fourth propositions of the third book of the *Principia*; viz. first that

the moon gravitates towards the earth, and by the force of gravity is continually drawn off from a rectilinear motion and retained in its orbit, and secondly, that this force is reciprocally as the square of the distance of its place from the earth's centre.

In estimating the difficulty of any new discovery in science after its truth has been satisfactorily proved, and when it has become established in the belief of the unlearned as well as the learned, we are very apt to be misled by forgetting the different position in which we are placed from that of those who lived before or at the time of the discovery. The difference is that of persons attempting to read what is written in cypher with or without the key; when we have been put in possession of the key, we wonder most unreasonably that we were so foolish as not to find it for ourselves. The student who can read Newton's first three sections sees it proved that in the case of elliptic orbits, the force, if it be directed to one of the foci, must necessarily vary inversely as the square of the distance; and understands the converse case of argument from the law having this variation to the conic section which must be described. He knows Kepler's wonderful discovery, that the squares of the periodic times are as the cubes of the distances of the planets from the sun, and the mathematical deduction from this that the centripetal force in circular orbits varies inversely as the square of the distance. He finds no difficulty in following the argument that granting this law of force, and supposing the particular conic sections described to be ellipses, the squares of the periodic times must vary as the cubes of the major axes of the orbits. He is lost in wonder at Kepler's empirical sagacity; and instead of seeing anything to admire in Newton's discovery, he is only surprised that Kepler did not find out so evident a deduction from his own observations. He is accustomed to regard the first two laws of motion, which are necessary to establish this inference, as axiomatic truths. We have no hesitation, in fact, in speaking of them as *à priori* truths. Yet self-evident as they are to any one who rightly understands the terms in which they are laid down, these laws in the earlier part of the seventeenth century were neither understood nor believed. And not only was this so, but there were prevailing misconceptions which would have acted as a prejudice against their reception. We may observe here, by the way, that the fact that they were not recognised earlier is no more conclusive against their *à priori* nature, than the non-recognition of certain parts of the moral law in certain classes of people is a proof against immutable distinctions in morality. Truths may be *à priori*, though they do not at once commend themselves as such to the mind of the hearer.

Thus it was once commonly believed that there was some natural tendency in velocity to diminish—and sense, which it seems is not always to be trusted implicitly, seemed to favour this notion; whereas now that the terms force and velocity have fallen into their proper place, and are strictly defined, we at once recognise this as involving a contradiction in terms, or as being equivalent to the assertion that there can be an effect without a cause.

Much might be said on this interesting subject, and we are aware that many whose opinions are entitled to great weight would consider that Newton's first two laws of motion are not in the number of *à priori* truths, but are established or rendered probable by experiment; however, they are at least universally regarded as axiomatic, and no one thinks of withholding his assent to them; and, whichever view be taken, none will deny that they put a key into our hands for the interpretation of the phenomena of the universe, which was wanting before they were so clearly enunciated as they now are.

The three philosophers who preceded Newton's grand discovery, and may be considered to have prepared the way for it, are Galileo, Kepler, and Huyghens. A grand step had been made by the publication of the Copernican system, which placed the sun at the centre of the system, and made the planets to revolve round him; Mercury and Venus in orbits interior to the earth's orbit. The fact that these latter planets must on this hypothesis exhibit phases like those of the moon, was as yet unobserved—the grand instrument of modern astronomical discovery, the telescope, not having yet been invented; neither did Copernicus live long enough to see the verification of his own prediction that Venus would be seen in a crescent shape. Tycho Brahe, who followed him, possessed considerable skill in observing phenomena, and enriched astronomical science with important discoveries; yet, strange to say, he returned to the old hypothesis, that the earth was stationary, and imagined even that the sun with its attendant planets performed a daily revolution round her. We cannot, therefore, regard him as contributing anything directly towards the establishment of the Newtonian theory of gravitation. But the three illustrious men we have named above, each supplied something which facilitated the conjecture or assisted in the establishment of its truth. Galileo's part was the invention of the telescope with the concave eye-glass, which is now commonly used as an opera-glass. This immediately led to the discovery of the four satellites of Jupiter and the phases of Venus; a discovery the direct bearing of which upon the Newtonian theory was, that it set the minds of investigators free from the distraction necessarily attendant

upon the nearly equally balanced claims of two conflicting theories. The absence of all sensible parallax in the fixed stars was, it must be admitted, a strong and almost unanswerable argument against the Copernican theory. Philosophers of that day had formed no adequate conception of the enormous distances by which it is now well known that the stars are separated from each other; and Tycho fairly argued that if these distances were anything short of infinity, the angle subtended by a line equal to the length of the axis of the earth's supposed orbit round the sun must be of some magnitude. The only answer that could be given was, that the magnitude might be too small to be appreciable to sense. The difficulty, of course, remained just as it was before Galileo's discoveries, with this exception, that as they gave an immense weight of additional probability to the truth of the Copernican system, men's minds were thus forced into inventing arguments for doing away with this objection; and the result was, that long before Newton's name began to be known in the scientific world, the theory which best accounts for the phenomena of nature may be regarded as recognised by all who had any pretensions to philosophy. Let it not be forgotten, however, that neither Copernicus nor Galileo had formed any idea whatever of the physical cause of these phenomena.

The invention of the telescope, and the consequent revelations as to the revolution of the planets and their satellites, were not the only contributions made by Galileo towards Newton's grand discovery. Strange as it may seem to a reader unacquainted with mechanical science, it is no less strange than true that the discovery of the law of acceleration of falling bodies had more influence on the progress of astronomy than his discoveries amongst the heavenly bodies,—and for this reason, that in his investigations on the subject of falling bodies, he was much nearer to the physical cause of their motion than when his attention was directed to the revolutions either of primaries or their satellites. The value of these discoveries has been much underrated by most English writers on the history of astronomy; and we wish that Sir David Brewster had given us a fuller account of them, instead of repeating the often-told story of his disgraceful recantation. It is but fair, however, to mention that this writer is almost alone amongst physical philosophers in denouncing the hypocritical recantation of Galileo, whilst he is inveighing against the tyranny of the Inquisition.

The true law of acceleration of a body acted on by a uniform force is so simple, that it is difficult to conceive how Galileo could have missed it. Yet we have his own testimony that he was for a long time under the impression, that the velocity of a

falling body varies as the space fallen through from the beginning of the motion—an idea that, it is scarcely necessary to say, is absurd because self-contradictory, and which he afterwards himself discovered to be so. It appears that he afterwards hit upon the true law of the descent of falling bodies by experiment alone; but it is very difficult to understand how, with the immense number of experiments which he made, he should have estimated the space fallen through from rest in the first second of time at about half what it really is.¹ In his dialogues on motion he gives an account of his experiments, which were made with an inclined plane twelve yards long, placed at different inclinations to the horizon; and the invariable result was, that as far as he could accurately estimate small divisions of time, the spaces described from the beginning of the motion were in equal times, as the odd numbers 1, 3, 5, &c., or, which amounts to the same thing, the whole space from the commencement of the motion varied as the square of the time. Again, we have to remind the reader of our different position in making such an experiment, with our accurate measures of time, from that of Galileo, who describes his own method thus:—
 ‘As to the estimation of the time, we hung up a great bucket full of water, which, by a very small hole pierced in the bottom, squirted out a fine thread of water, which we caught in a small glass during the whole time of the different descents: then weighing from time to time, in an exact pair of scales, the quantity of water caught in this way, the differences and proportions of their weights gave the differences and proportions of the times; and this with such exactness, that, as I said before, although the experiments were repeated again and again, they never differed in any degree worth noticing.’
 —*Drinkwater Bethune's Life of Galileo*, p. 86.

Had Galileo possessed any conception of what is now called the first law of motion, he must have been able to disentangle the increment of velocity from the remainder; and then, by assigning the latter to the inertia of matter, or its inability to alter its own state, whether of rest or of uniform motion, have attributed the regularity of the former to its true cause, viz. the uniform nature of the force which acted upon it. But this was a point he had not yet reached, though, whilst acknowledging his inability to explain the cause of this regular

¹ This statement is made on the authority of Mr. Drinkwater Bethune's ‘Life of Galileo,’ p. 86, but it is scarcely credible; we suspect there is some error in Mersenne's estimate of the length of the *braccia*. It seems more likely that this term would represent a length of about three feet than two; even on this supposition, Galileo would have made the space fallen through to be only twelve feet in the first second.

increment of velocity in falling bodies, he enunciates a principle which is one of the earliest anticipations of the doctrine of gravitation. He says,—‘A heavy body has by nature an intrinsic principle of moving towards the common centre of heavy things, that is to say, to the centre of our terrestrial globe, with a motion continually accelerated in such manner, that in equal times there are always equal additions of velocity. This is to be understood as holding true only where all accidental and external impediments are removed, amongst which is one that we cannot obviate, namely, the resistance of the medium. This opposes itself less or more accordingly as it is to open more slowly or hastily to make way for the moveable, which being by its own nature, as I have said, continually accelerated, consequently encounters a continually increasing resistance in the medium, until at last the velocity reaches that degree, and the resistance that power, that they balance each other; all further acceleration is prevented, and the moveable continues ever after with an uniform and equable motion.’—*Ibid.*, p. 88.

There is one other doctrine of Galileo’s which may be noticed as preparing the way for Newton. Ignorant as he was of the real nature of accelerating force, yet he was acquainted with the theory of the composition of forces, as given in Newton’s Second Corollary to the Axioms or Laws of Motion. It was impossible that this principle could have remained long unknown, when once the revolution of the earth round the sun, and its diurnal rotation on its axis, were recognised as established truths. The objections which would be urged against this theory would at once elicit the true answer; and Galileo not only knew this law of the independence of forces, but illustrated it in a much happier manner than most modern books of mechanics, in which the illustrations are not so clear, and in some instances are absolutely false, *e.g.* that of dropping a stone from the window of a carriage in motion. The illustration given in the second dialogue is that of a painter, who, during a voyage from Venice to Alexandria, should draw a picture which he says would accurately represent the objects intended, though the point of his pencil has really travelled, though imperceptibly, over the same distance which the ship has gone. By the help of this principle, which is in fact the second law of motion, combined with a law which is in effect the same with the first law, Galileo proved the parabolic path of a projectile; and Newton has observed that it was by the help of these two laws and the deduced corollaries that Galileo discovered (he should have said demonstrated) ‘that the descent of bodies observed the duplicate ratio of the time, and that the motion of projectiles

'was in the curve of a parabola.' This is not the place to discuss how far Galileo understood his own principles. If he understood them, he certainly expressed himself very clumsily, as is evidenced by so acute a philosopher as Descartes objecting to them. We have here referred to them partly with the view of exhibiting how near approach had been made before Newton's time to his great discovery, and partly to remind our readers of the caution given above, to warn them against underrating the genius of men, who were employed on these subjects when in their infancy, for not admitting at once propositions which seem to them self-evident, or acquiescing in deductions which now appear unavoidable.

What prevented Galileo from making further advances in mechanical science, was his want of skill in pure mathematics, and his too great confidence in the accuracy of his experiments. It seems scarcely credible, yet is a well-attested fact, that he attempted to convince himself of the truth of the proposition that the area of the cycloid is equal to three times that of its generating circle, by cutting out three such circles of the same material and thickness as the cycloid, and weighing them against it; and his assertion of the exact isochronism of a common pendulum shows that he had not tried the experiment in vibrations through large arcs. If he had, even with his imperfect measures of time, he must have discovered a variation. Thus he would have detected a variation of one beat in fifty, if he had made an ordinary pendulum oscillate through an arc of 30° . Yet he expresses himself on this subject in the following words:—'The precision of my time-measurer is so great that it will give the exact quantity of hours, minutes, seconds, and even thirds, if their recurrence could be counted; and its constancy is such that two, four, or six such instruments will go on together so exactly, that one will not differ from another so much as the beat of a pulse, not only in an hour, but even in a day or month.'

The next great pioneer who immediately prepared the way for Newton was Kepler, a man remarkably sagacious in invention, and singularly fortunate in discovery. He was exactly contemporary with Galileo, though their discoveries scarcely clashed at all. The one supplied the laws of motion, the other the empirical classification of its facts. Amidst a multitude of guesses which he perseveringly endeavoured, one after another, to accommodate to the motions of the solar system, he was successful in exhibiting the accordance of the three laws, which are now known by his name, with the phenomena of planetary motion.

These laws, which every tyro in mathematics can prove, as being the simplest deductions from the theory of the variation of

centripetal force according to the inverse square of the distance, are as follows:—1. That the planets move in ellipses round the sun, which is placed in one of the foci. 2. That the areas included between two radii vectores are as the times of describing the arcs. 3. That the squares of the periodic times are proportional to the cubes of the distances.

It must not be supposed that it was mere chance that led to these discoveries. His previous suppositions as to the relative distances and the paths of the planets were of the most fantastic nature, and were supported by no grounds of probability, and he was speedily obliged to abandon them when he found they could not be reconciled with facts. But in the discovery of these three laws, fortunate as we must admit him to have been, he cannot be denied the praise of a very penetrating sagacity and most unwearied perseverance. That such laws as these should be empirically established, seems at first sight to imply a sort of inspiration in the maker of the hypothesis; but this idea disappears upon a further acquaintance with the mode in which they were discovered. As to the third and least remarkable of them, he was determined to find out the relation, for he took it for granted that some relation existed, and after trying various other conjectures hit upon the true one. This was his last discovery, and was made in the summer of 1618, about a quarter of a century before the birth of Newton. His attempts to account for this law are more like the lucubrations of a madman than the sober reasoning of a philosopher. The establishment of the elliptic orbit of Mars was made twelve years earlier. After ascertaining clearly from Tycho Brahe's observations that the orbit was not circular, he tried an oval, and afterwards an ellipse, which proved to be the correct supposition. But in the discovery of the equable description of areas he was favoured by fortune, much in the same way as we said above Dr. Young was in his discovery of the phonetic character of some of the Egyptian hieroglyphics. It was the hasty and erroneous inference that, because the times of describing equal spaces are nearly as the distances from the sun, when the planet is at the apsides, this must be true at other parts of its orbit, which led him in his attempt to calculate the time of arriving at any point to the happy invention of representing it by means of the area swept out by the radius vector. We cannot explain this further here, nor is it necessary, for it has been admirably done in Mr. Drinkwater Bethune's '*Life of Kepler*,' published by the *Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge*: but we have thought it worth while to allude to the subject, as it throws light upon the intellectual character of a mind which, though engaged on the same subjects as Newton,

pursued so very different a method of investigation. It should be observed here, that if it had not been for the accurate observations of Tycho Brahe, Kepler would never have discovered his first two laws. Nevertheless, we have preferred omitting Tycho Brahe from our list of the pioneers of Newton, first, because his labours have no direct reference to physical astronomy, of which Newton must be considered the founder; and secondly, because his adoption of a counter theory may perhaps have contributed in some degree to retard the progress of this science. That his observations and discoveries contributed to the perfecting that theory is obvious to any reader of the *Principia*; but they did nothing towards suggesting it, excepting so far as they enabled Kepler to detect his laws. Sir David Brewster says, 'We have not learned that the intellectual monarchs of the age enjoyed any opportunity for mutual congratulation.' We confess our utter indifference to the privilege which he says 'it would have been to have contrasted the aristocratic dignity of Tycho with the reckless ease of Kepler and the manly and impetuous mien of the Italian sage.' But we think a discussion of the respective claims to our admiration of the intellectual qualities of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, might have led to interesting and profitable speculations.

Before we quit the subject of Kepler's discoveries we may make mention of some of our author's mistaken and confused statements, which are most abundant at this portion of his work. We are quite at a loss to comprehend how any one not entirely ignorant of mathematics could have expressed himself as Sir David Brewster has done on the subject of gravitation. In speaking of the variation of this force he almost always describes it as if the word reciprocally or inversely were of no consequence whatever. Again, it is really too much to expect us to believe that Kepler 'compared the squares and the cubes of the distances with the same powers of the periodic times.'—Vol. i. p. 267. Kepler was no doubt indefatigable in his calculations, but would scarcely, we think, give himself the additional trouble of raising numbers to the square or the cube in order to compare them with each other. 'He even made the comparison between the squares of the periodic times and the cubes of the distances.'—*Ibid.* But for this unfortunate conclusion we might have charitably supposed that the comparison of the square of one with the cube of the other was what the author meant in his first statement, but the concluding part of the sentence unfortunately precludes the supposition. Again, we protest against such slipshod expressions as that 'the earth's eccentricity will diminish during the

period of twenty-four thousand years.' Such inaccuracies of statement and of spelling would not be tolerated in a school-boy's exercise. We must not occupy our space with referring to other instances of carelessness. Had the writer been a man of less eminence than Sir David Brewster, we should have pronounced him almost entirely ignorant of mathematics.

Huyghens' contributions remain to be noticed. Sir David Brewster has classed him with Bouillard, Borelli, Hooke, Wren, and Halley—unjustly, we think; because, though perhaps in some respects inferior as a philosopher to some of them, his invention of the application of the pendulum to the regulating the rate of the clock, was, as we shall see, of the last importance in estimating the exact value of the force of gravitation. Moreover, Huyghens calculated the central force in terms of the velocity in cases of circular motion. He very soon improved upon Galileo's construction of the telescope, by substituting a double convex for a double concave eye-glass, and his skill was rewarded by the speedy discovery of Saturn's ring and sixth satellite. The existence of another satellite moving round another planet, no doubt tended to familiarize men's minds with the idea of smaller bodies revolving round greater, and thus prepared the way for the idea of the mutual influence of these bodies on each other, or at least for the influence exerted by the greater over the smaller. But his chief value as a precursor of Newton consists in his improvement of Galileo's theory of the pendulum. It was necessary, as we shall see presently, for the testing of Newton's conjecture as to the force of gravity, that he should have an exact measurer of time; that is, that he should be in possession of a pendulum beating seconds exactly, as well as that he should know the exact length of the seconds' pendulum. We have seen above how Galileo employed a water-clock to determine the relative times of the descent down portions of an inclined plane. It is strange that he did not use his favourite pendulum, whose property of isochronism he had noticed at the age of twenty. Still more strange is it, that fifty years later he should have been in entire ignorance of the cause of its near approach to isochronism, as well as of the fact, which repeated observations might have assured him of, of its deviation from exact isochronism.

It was Huyghens' superior mathematical powers that enabled him to show that the circular pendulum was not isochronous, and thus prove the error which Galileo's practice of fifty years failed to discover in his conjecture of isochronism. It is a remarkable instance in which theory had not to bend to fact, but where observation was obliged to increase its accuracy to bear testimony to the triumphs of deductive science. It has been

said that Huyghens was born to improve upon the inventions of Galileo, and the history of the telescope and the pendulum certainly bears out the remark. Huyghens first proved that the circle was not the tautochron, though it was nearly twenty years before he discovered that the cycloid was the curve which possessed this property.

But the importance of Huyghens' pendulum discoveries was not so much in their application to the clock as a measure of time, as in his being enabled thereby to compute the actual value of the force of gravity at the surface of the earth. It requires very little knowledge of mechanics to understand the formula which connects the length of the pendulum with the time of its vibration and the force by which it is actuated; and the value of this discovery may be estimated by referring to the attempts which had been previously made to ascertain how far a body would descend by the action of gravity in the first second of its fall. Galileo's estimate was very wide of the mark. Mersenne, who followed him, after repeated trials produced the result of about thirteen feet in a second, a tolerably near approximation to the truth, after making allowance for the retardation of motion caused by the resistance of the air, but entirely useless as a means of estimating the real value of the force by which bodies are attracted to the centre of the earth. This value can be accurately ascertained by a rule which Huyghens demonstrated; and, accordingly, both his observation of the length of the seconds' pendulum, and the rule for deducing from it the space which a heavy body describes by falling in one second of time, have been referred to for the facts which establish the celebrated fourth proposition of the Third Book of the *Principia*.

It would be out of place here to refer to his elegant theory of the centre of oscillation, which has been the means of enabling us to calculate with extreme precision the exact length of the seconds' pendulum—for such accuracy was not at that time needed, as any one may easily convince himself by trying the experiment of making a heavy ball suspended by a fine string oscillate, and comparing its rate and length. Rude as this experiment may seem, if repeated often enough to secure the maker against errors of observation, it will bring out the length of the seconds' pendulum to a considerable degree of accuracy. Thus far Galileo might have reached; but though he was apparently aware of the true relation that subsists between the length and the time of vibration, it was reserved for the Dutch mathematician to investigate and demonstrate the law which accounts for this fact, and to apply it to the calculation of the value of the force of gravity.

The reader who is acquainted with mathematical science, will at once recognise the formula—

$$t = \pi \sqrt{\frac{l}{g}}$$

which connects the time of oscillation with the length of the pendulum and the force of gravity. The time of course can be chosen by the observer for himself and the length measured, and the only remaining unknown quantity in the equation computed. Any one who will take the trouble to make the experiment for himself, may easily satisfy himself that g is very nearly equal to thirty-two feet. It would be out of place here to give the proof of this simple formula, for which we may refer the reader to Mr. Goodwin's '*Elementary Course of Mathematics*.'

We may then regard Kepler, Galileo, and Huyghens, as the immediate precursors of Newton. It has been the custom to depreciate Huyghens, whose name is probably far less familiar to our readers than those of either of the other two. The writer of the *Lives of Galileo and Kepler*, to which we have referred, has done justice to his memory in vindicating his claims to the invention of the pendulum clock; and the important contribution made by him to Newton's investigations, demanded that he should be placed amongst the first class of his pioneers, rather than that he should be classed, as Sir David Brewster has classed him, with men of inferior stamp, such as Bouillard, Borelli, Hooke, and Wren. Certainly Newton had no mean opinion of him, as appears from the reference made to him in the passage already quoted as well as in the Scholium to the Fourth Proposition of the First Book, as also in the Scholium which follows the Corollaries to the Three Laws of Motion, where he is classed with Wren and Wallis, and the three are quoted as 'the greatest geometers of our times.'

It would be tedious here, and fortunately it is unnecessary, to discuss the claims of other mathematicians and physical philosophers to having prepared the way for Newton. It has been the fate of his as of all other grand discoveries, that there have been anticipations of them more or less clearly expressed previous to their announcement to the world, and many such passages might be produced, if it were worth while, which point towards Universal Gravitation. Such expressions are frequently the result of pure accident, and convey an impression to a modern reader very different from the idea that was in the writer's mind; still more often are they vague surmises of the truth which their originator wants the knowledge or the skill to develop, and which are consequently put aside before they have attained any consistency or definiteness. Of this latter

class are the hints supplied by Bouillard, Borelli, Wren, and Halley.

The first of these, as early as the middle of the seventeenth century, had maintained that the force of attraction must vary reciprocally as the square of the distance. A few years later Borelli ascribes, with tolerable accuracy, the motion of the planets to an original impulse, united with a deflection, produced by some virtue residing in the central body, which he illustrates by the whirling of a sling. The speculations of Hooke are so curious that we extract them, and that the rather because his name is much less known than it deserves to be in the history of Science.

"I shall hereafter," he says, "explain a system of the world differing in many particulars from any yet known, but answering in all things to the common rules of mechanical motions. This depends upon three suppositions: *First*, That all celestial bodies whatsoever have an attraction or gravitating power towards their own centres, whereby they attract not only their own parts, and keep them from flying from them, as we may observe the Earth to do, but that they also do attract all the other celestial bodies that are within the sphere of their activity; and consequently that not only the Sun and Moon have an influence upon the body and motion of the Earth, and the Earth upon them, but that Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn also, by their attractive powers, have a considerable influence upon its motion, as in the same manner the corresponding attractive power of the Earth hath a considerable influence upon every one of their motions also. The *second* supposition is this, that all bodies whatsoever that are put into a direct and simple motion, will so continue to move forward in a straight line till they are, by some other effectual powers, deflected, and sent into a motion describing a circle, ellipsis, or some other more compounded curve line. The *third* supposition is, that these attractive powers are so much the more powerful in operating by how much the nearer the body wrought upon is to their own centres. Now, what these several degrees are, I have not yet experimentally verified, but it is a notion which, if fully prosecuted, as it ought to be, will mightily assist the astronomers to reduce all the celestial motions to a certain rule, which I doubt will never be done without it. He that understands the nature of the circular pendulum, and of circular motion, will easily understand the whole of this principle, and will know where to find directions in nature for the true stating thereof. This I only hint at present to such as have ability and opportunity of prosecuting this inquiry, and are not wanting of industry for observing and calculating, wishing heartily such may be found, having myself many other things in hand which I would first complete, and therefore cannot so well attend it. But this I durst promise the undertaker, that he will find all the great motions of the world to be influenced by this principle, and that the true understanding thereof will be the true perfection of astronomy."—*Brewster's Newton*, vol. i. pp. 286, 287.

¹ In quoting this passage, which Delambre admits to be very curious, we think he scarcely does justice to Hooke, when he says that what it contains is found expressly in Kepler. It is quite true that Kepler mentioned as probable the law of the squares of the distances, but he afterwards, as Delambre admits, rejected it for that of the simple distances. Hooke, on the contrary, announces it as a truth.—See *Astronomie du 18me Siècle*, pp. 9, 10.—Clairaut has justly remarked, that the example of Hooke and Kepler shows how great is the difference between a truth conjectured or asserted, and a truth demonstrated.

To this remarkable passage, which appeared in 1674, and which only wants the addition of the law of variation, by which the attractive powers and the distances are connected, to be a complete exposition of the doctrine of Universal Gravitation, Hooke added, in a letter to Newton, written five years later, that if the force of gravity decreased as the square of the distance, the curve described by a projectile would be an ellipse, whose focus was the centre of the earth.

Sir Christopher Wren and Halley had each of them endeavoured to make out the motions of the planets from the consideration of the law of force varying in this way, and Halley goes so far as to say that he had concluded this law of variation from 'Kepler's sesqui-alterate proportion of the periodic times.' Halley declares the ill-success of his attempts; but Hooke asserted in January, 1684, that he could bring a convincing demonstration of the planets' paths. This it is certain Hooke never did; his assertion that he could do it is, therefore, not worth much.

We can imagine an unscientific reader here asking the question, What then, if so much was done ready to his hand, was the great discovery of Newton? The answer to this is, that he supplied the connecting link which tied all these phenomena together, and proved that the heavenly bodies must move as they do, upon the supposition of the variation of force inversely as the square of the distance. The effort of genius was the conception of the identity of that force by which bodies fall to the ground with that by which the moon is retained in her orbit; or by which, if she were to lose her projectile motion, she would fall towards the centre of the earth. After establishing this fact, he has the merit of proving that his law both accounts for all the phenomena of the universe that were then known, and enables modern astronomers to calculate the elements of the orbits of all the heavenly bodies that have since been discovered. The establishment of this identity was the turning-point of the whole theory; and as it admits of being explained to readers but slightly acquainted with mathematical science, we will endeavour to state the method by which it was proved.

The story, with which we are all familiar, of the accidental falling of an apple from a tree suggesting the first idea of the true theory of gravitation to Newton's mind, belongs, according to our author, to the autumn of 1665. It is said, that whilst speculating on the power of gravity, it occurred to him that there was sensible diminution of it at the greatest distance from the earth which we can reach; and the question suggested itself, why not the same power extend itself as far as the moon? and if

it does, why may it not be the actual force by which she is retained in her orbit? He was at the time residing at Woolsthorpe, to which place he had retired, his College having been dismissed on account of the plague which was then raging at Cambridge. He was therefore deprived of books of reference, as well as the conversation of other scientific men, who might, if consulted on the subject, have saved him from the error which he is said to have committed, by adopting an erroneous measure of the earth's semi-diameter. In order to complete the demonstration, it was necessary for him to know, to some degree of accuracy, the distance from the surface of the earth to its centre, the distance of the moon from the earth, the velocity with which she moves in her orbit, and the value of the force of gravity at the surface of the earth. Now, taking for granted the identity of the force of gravity with that by which the moon is deflected from her rectilinear path, and assuming also that it varied inversely as the square of the distance from the centre of the earth; and knowing the value of this force at one distance, it was easy, by solving a common rule-of-three sum, to ascertain what was its value at any other given distance, *e.g.* the place of the moon in her orbit. These *constants* were supplied from different sources. The distance of the moon was easily determined in terms of the earth's radius by means of her observed parallax, and had been approximated to as early as the time of Ptolemy, who made it fifty-nine times the radius, and had been ascertained more exactly by Huyghens and Copernicus at about sixty times that distance. The value of the force of gravity was pretty exactly ascertained by Huyghens' rule, that the space which a heavy body describes by falling in one second of time is to half the length of the pendulum which oscillates in a second, (which length was also ascertained by Huyghens for the latitude of Paris,) in the duplicate ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. It had thus been shown that a body descends by the action of gravity in the first second of its fall through a little more than sixteen feet. The only *constant* remaining to be accurately ascertained was the length of the earth's semi-diameter, and Newton, by taking a wrong estimate of this, when he might have had a correct one, spoiled his calculations. The only method by which it was possible to arrive at the measure of the earth's diameter, was by actual measurement of a degree of its circumference. This had been done both by Snellius and Norwood. The measurement of the latter, though very roughly performed, was by a singular combination of accidents very nearly correct, and even Snell's would have exhibited too near an approach to accuracy for Newton summarily to have

dismissed the case as he did. Instead of using either of these measurements, 'he adopted the measure of sixty miles for a 'degree of latitude, which had been employed by the old geographers and seamen, and in which, as Mr. Rigaud conjectures, 'he may have placed the more confidence, as it agreed with the 'result of the observations which Edward Wright, a Cambridge 'mathematician, had published in 1610.' The independent calculation of the distance through which the moon would, if deprived of all motion, descend towards the earth, was easily made from her observed periodic time, which, in respect of the fixed stars, was estimated at $27^{\circ} 7' 43''$, and her velocity, which depended upon the space passed over in that time, which again depended on her distance from the earth. This mode of calculation gave rise to a result so much greater than the other, owing to the cause we have stated, that he abandoned the subject, and was led to the impression, that the power which retained the moon in her orbit might be partly that of gravity, and partly that of the vortices of Descartes. That Newton did not resume his labours on this subject till the year 1684, has always appeared to us a most inexplicable phenomenon, neither does Sir David Brewster throw any light upon the matter. In a note he quotes a remark of Mr. Rigaud's, that 'we do not know when Norwood's determination became 'known to Newton, but we are certain that he was well aware 'of Snellius's measures quite as soon as he was of Picard's,—probably much sooner, since the specific mention of them is made 'in Varenus's *Geography*, of which he edited a new edition 'at Cambridge, in 1672.' A new and more accurate measurement had been executed by Picard in 1670, which five years afterwards was made known to English men of science, by its appearing in the *Philosophical Transactions*; and yet fourteen years elapsed from this time before Newton resumed this subject, and discovered that the moon's deflection was exactly what it ought to be on his hypothesis, of her being attracted towards the earth by the same force which governs the motion of falling bodies near the surface, this force being supposed to vary inversely as the square of a distance. The story of his recurrence to the subject is an interesting one, and, like the other anecdotes of Newton with which we have been familiar from our infancy, seems to rest upon slender evidence. We will give it as it appears in Professor Powell's 'Historical View of the Physical and Mathematical Sciences.' He says, 'The recent result,' *i. e.* of Picard's measurement, 'became the 'subject of discussion at a meeting of the Royal Society, in 'June, 1682. Newton being present, felt of course a degree of interest in the discussion, totally unsuspected by the by-

standers. Noting down Picard's value of the earth's radius, he hurried home; and having substituted this number in his former proportion, and proceeded a little way in the calculation, he was utterly unable to carry it on, from the overpowering excitement of its anticipated termination. He requested a friend to finish it for him, and the result was, a perfect accordance of the force which acts upon the moon, with the force of gravity at the earth's surface, diminished in the exact ratio of the squares of the distances.' (P. 324.)

This anecdote, which this writer has considerably embellished, rests only on tradition, and, as Sir D. Brewster observes, 'is not supported by what is known of Newton's character.' However, whatever judgment we may pronounce upon it, the difficulty still remains that nearly twenty years elapsed between the first conception and the final recognition of this truth in Newton's mind; that in the interval he had become acquainted with a fact which, if he had ever thought of it in that relation, must have reminded him of the mistake he had made, yet that he, during all that time, never repeated a calculation, which, when made, enabled him to solve the problem of the universe. Neither does it remove the difficulty in the slightest degree, to say that Newton's attention was absorbed in his Optical Investigations. It is clear that he had leisure for other pursuits of a very different kind. In 1676 we find him discussing the kind of apple-trees that produced the best cider, and, what is more to the present purpose, during the three preceding years he had been investigating the cause of the moon's libration, which he had 'sometimes thought might depend upon her *conatus* from the sun and earth compared together,' till he discovered its true cause, viz. the uniformity of her motion round her axis, combined with the inequality of motion in her elliptic orbit. It appears that, during part of this time, he was harassed by pecuniary difficulties, and that he had had serious thoughts of directing his mind to the study of the law. The expression which occurs in one of his letters to Collins, written in 1674, 'that mathematical speculations were at least dry, if not somewhat barren,' is worth recording, if only to show how little expectation he had at that time entertained of achieving the great work, the publication of which, thirteen years afterwards, has rendered his name immortal.

The readers of a 'Life of Sir Isaac Newton,' which extends through two large octavo volumes, and occupying above a thousand pages, would naturally expect a tolerably full description of this, his greatest work. Such an expectation would be grievously disappointed. The 'endeavour to convey to the reader some idea of the revelations which he made,' consists of exactly

ten pages; and even these few pages contain matter which would only tend to embarrass and confuse the reader, as, for instance, where it is stated that, in a circular orbit with the force in the circumference, the force must vary as the fifth power of the distance; and that if the orbit be the proportional spiral, the force will be reciprocally as the cube of the distance. There was no occasion whatever to allude, in so brief a description of the *Principia*, to other laws than that of the inverse square of the distance, which, after all, are purely imaginary; and we certainly would advise Sir David Brewster, if his book should ever reach a second edition, to alter his erroneous statement with regard to circular motion, by inserting the word *inversely*, and in the latter to designate the spiral which he calls *proportional* by the term *equiangular* or *logarithmic*. Again, it is really unpardonable that ordinary readers, for whom alone this part of the work can have been intended, should be misled by such mistakes as the following, 'that the intensity of gravity 'at any point of the earth's surface is in the inverse ratio of the 'distance of that point from the centre, and, *consequently*, that it 'diminishes from the equator to the poles.' (Vol. i. p. 324.) We have no space here to supply the omissions of this work in pointing out the method adopted by Newton in establishing the theory that every particle of matter in the universe gravitates to every other particle of matter with a force inversely proportional to the square of the distance; neither is it possible to follow him in his mode of exhibiting how this supposition accounts for the phenomena of the tides, the precession of the equinoxes, calculates the eclipses of the sun and planets, and indeed solves every other phenomenon to which it has been applied. But again, we have to regret the absence of any account of the calculus employed in his demonstrations. It would have been a very interesting inquiry to point out how far Newton used the analytic method, and how far the synthetic, to which he has for the most part confined his demonstrations as they now appear in the *Principia*. No one, we think, can have read any portion of this great work without having the question suggested to him, 'How did Newton find out this?' and the general conclusion arrived at is, that he must have used analytic processes, and afterwards converted them into geometrical demonstrations. The correspondence between Newton and Cotes, which has been published by Mr. Edleston, shows that the analytic method was used by them in discussing points which required explanation; but this affords no evidence as to the mode in which they were originally discovered. We might, we think, reasonably have expected a discussion of this point to have occupied the concluding chapter of the first

volume instead of the foolish attempt to 'gather fresh laurels for the author of the *Principia*,' by following his discovery through its numerous developments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

We have to express our regret for a similar omission in the history of the 'Discovery of the Fluxional or Differential Calculus.' It is, of course, difficult to trace the intellectual processes of any mind, when we have little more than results to judge from; and this difficulty is greatly increased in the case of discoveries like Newton's, which frequently were not made public for many years after they were made, and in many instances bear the appearance of supernatural inspirations. But we have often suspected that this theory was in the mind at least of its English inventor, though probably not in that of Leibnitz, much more nearly connected with dynamical than geometrical or algebraic investigations; and it would be an interesting task if we were supplied with sufficient data to go upon to trace the simultaneous development of the same idea in the minds of the two great mathematicians, as suggested from two different sources. In truth, this method must have been on the eve of discovery, after Galileo's attempt to separate the increment of the velocity from the velocity itself. The necessities of mechanical science, even though there had not been problems concerning areas, and lengths, and volumes, which required it for their solution, must have brought this branch of science into existence. The attempt to estimate and compare the continually varying velocity which is the necessary result of a constant force being applied to a moving body, and still more to measure a force itself variable as the force of gravity had been tolerably well ascertained to be, could not but have originated the Differential Calculus. Even in Leibnitz's mind the idea was not wholly unconnected with dynamics, as may be judged from his '*Theoria Motus Abstracti*,' dedicated to the Academy of Sciences in Paris in 1671, though it is not likely that he himself viewed his new calculus in connexion with the subject of motion; and we may perhaps trace the different workings out of the idea in the two minds, in the very language used in explaining the two systems, and perhaps in the notation adopted by their respective authors.

The history of the famous controversy between Leibnitz and Newton was not likely, even at the distance of a century and a half, to be written so as to satisfy all parties. And perhaps it is impossible exactly to adjust the claims of two independent discoverers of a truth of which not only themselves, but other contemporary mathematicians, may perhaps have had some occasional glimpses. The aphorism that 'coming events cast

their shadows before them' is nowhere so conspicuous as in the history of philosophical discovery in general, and perhaps in particular in that of physical science. Few of his readers will be found to follow the author through his elaborate discussion of the question of priority and independence of the discovery of the Fluxional or Differential Method. Most will content themselves with acquiescing without inquiry in the results at which he has arrived. We are bound, however, to say that the discussion has been conducted both carefully and temperately, and that the subject, whatever be its merits, has been exhausted. The intellectual claims of both must be admitted; but the moral character of each, as well as that of Leibnitz's friend, Bernoulli, is terribly damaged by the revelations made in the course of the investigation. Such histories, like all other histories, are of course instructive, and we are continually reminded by biographers and writers of Compendiums of the History of Physical and Mathematical Science, and sometimes with an air of triumph, that distinguished philosophers are not exempt from the frailties of temper and other failings common to their fellow-men. To ourselves we must own such controversies are bitterly disappointing; and whilst we refrain from further comment on the characters and conduct of individuals, we may at least learn the important lesson of endeavouring to find out how far our own love of truth is mixed up with personal motives of vanity or ambition.

The two conclusions arrived at are expressed as follows (vol. ii. p. 78):—'1. That Newton was the first inventor of the *Method of Fluxions*; that the method was incomplete in its notation; and that the fundamental principle of it was not published to the world till 1687, twenty years after he had invented it. '2. That Leibnitz communicated to Newton, in 1677, his *Differential Calculus*, with a complete system of notation, and that he published it in 1684, three years before the publication of 'Newton's Method.' The author observes that upon the principle enunciated by Newton, that '*second* inventors have little or no honour, and no rights,' the whole merit of the new calculus must be given to Newton; whereas on the principle which transfers all the merit of an invention or discovery to the person who first gives it to the world, the merit of the new calculus must be adjudged to Leibnitz. The author, whilst demurring to the first of these two principles, does not give in his entire adherence to the latter. We need not enter into the question here, but shall content ourselves with quoting the temperate remark of Dr. Young (Life, p. 286) with reference to Champollion's discovery of the derivation of the hieratic from the hieroglyphical characters:—'Whether he made this discovery before I had

‘printed my letters in the Museum Criticum, in 1816, I have no means of ascertaining. I have never asked him the question, nor is it of much importance either to the world at large or to ourselves. It may not be strictly just to say that a man has no right to claim any discovery as his own till he has printed and published it, but the rule is at least a very useful one.’

The same conclusions had been arrived at by M. Montmort, and are expressed in two letters addressed by him to Brook Taylor, the well-known author of ‘Taylor’s Theorem.’ One of these has been printed at length in the Appendix to vol. ii. p. 511, where there is also an extract from the other. The views expressed in both these letters are very interesting, conveying, as they do, the opinions of a mathematician quite competent to judge of the case—and, as far as appears, very far from prejudices, either personal or national. He expresses, in very exact language, the view that Newton was in possession of this key to science many years before the publication of the first edition of the *Principia*; and his opinion to this effect, as expressed in the first extract, is the more valuable, because in the second letter, which is now for the first time printed from the manuscript copy amongst Newton’s papers, he strenuously argues in favour of the sole claims of Leibnitz and Bernoulli to the invention and the perfecting of the Differential Calculus. We will only express our cordial concurrence in the author’s view, that Newton can quite afford, intellectually speaking, to lose the credit of the invention; and premising that the same carelessness that characterises the rest of the book is apparent in the bad stopping and spelling of this letter, which contains at least a dozen mistakes, will present the reader with the passages that are of most importance. He says,—

‘Pour moi je soutiens icy et je l’ai toujours soutenu hautement que M. Newton a été maître du Calcul différentiel et intégral avant tout autre géomètre, et que dès l’année 1677 il sçavoit tout ce que les travaux de M. Leibnitz et M. Bernoulli ont découvert depuis.’

Afterwards, in the second letter, after giving his opinion as to several other recent discoveries, and those who could lay claim to them, he continues,—

‘J’ay été fort surpris de trouver ce qui suit dans votre lettre. “As to the owning of any one as inventor or improver of the method, besides Sir Isaac Newton, I knew of none. I saw nothing anywhere that seemed to me an improvement upon what Sir Isaac had published. I was sensible that several had applied the method with good success, and understood pretty much of it; but I always took Sir Isaac Newton not only for the inventor, but also for the greatest master of it.” Je pense comme vous Mr. sur le mérite de M. Newton. Je parle toujours comme d’un homme au dessus des autres, et qu’on ne peut trop admirer. Mais je ne puis m’empêcher de combattre l’opinion où vous estes que le Public a reçu de M. Newton, et non de M. Leibnitz et Bernoulli les nouveaux calculs, et l’art

de les faire servir à toutes les recherches qu'on peut faire en Géométrie. C'est une erreur de fait. Il vaut mieux que moi qui n'ay là dessus aucune prévention, ni rien qui me porte à en avoir, qui fais profession d'estre votre ami, et qui le suis plus sans comparaison que des Géomètres Allemands que je n'ai jamais vu; il vaut mieux, dis je, que je vous fasse remarquer la fausseté qu'un adversaire à qui vous donneriez avantage sur vous et qui vous reprocheroit avec apparence de vérité que votre zèle pour la gloire de votre nation vous rend partiel et vous fait oublier toutes les règles de l'équité. Je n'examinerai point ici les droits de M^r. Newton et Leibnitz à la première invention du calcul différentiel et intégral. Je vous rapporterai quand vous voudriez le détail des réflexions qu'un long et sérieux examen m'a fourni, et j'espère que vous n'en serez pas mécontent. Je veux seulement vous faire remarquer qu'il est insoutenable de dire que M^r. Leibnitz et Bernoulli ne sont pas les vrais et presque uniques promoteurs de ces calculs.

After giving the facts on which his conclusion is founded, he finishes his letter as follows:—

' Il est vray M^r. que les Principes Math. de M. Newton ont paru en 1686 [1687]; ce sçavant ouvrage peut donner lieu de croire que M. Newton sçavoit dès-lors de ces calculs tout ce qu'on sçait aujourd'hui, M. Bernoulli même. Je ne veux pas disconvenir, et c'est une question à part. Mais il est sûr au moins que ce livre n'apprend rien de ces calculs, si ce n'est le lemme, 2^d page 250, 1^{re} édit., mais vous sçavez qu'il ne contient que la 1^{re} et plus simple règle de prendre les différences, ce que M. Leibnitz avoit fait avec plus d'étendue en 1684. Je dois ajouter que dans le 2^d volume de M. Wallis imprimé en 1693 on trouve plus au long les règles de ces calculs, mais quoyque ce morceau soit propre à nous donner une grande idée de ce qu'en sçavoit alors, Mr. Newton, il n'en apprend pas plus que l'on en trouvoit dans les journaux de Leipsic. On trouve en 1697 une solution de Mr. Newton du problème de la plus viste descente mais comme il n'y a point d'analyse, et qu'on ne sçait point la route qu'il a suivie, cela ne touche point à ma proposition qui est que depuis 1684, 1^{re} date publique de la naissance du calcul différentiel et intégral, jusqu'en 1700 ou environ, où je suppose qu'il avoit acquis presque toute la perfection qu'il a aujourd'hui, personne n'a contribué à le perfectionner que M^r. Leibnitz et Bernoulli, à moins qu'on n'y veuille joindre pour quelque part M. le M. l'Hospital à qui ils avoient de bonne heure révélé leurs secrets. Qui apparemment en seroient encore pour tous les Géomètres d'aujourd'hui s'ils avoient voulu les tenir cachés à l'imitation de M. Newton, qui à mon avis a du avoir la clef de ceux là ou des pareils dès le temps qu'il a donné son fameux ouvrage, *Ph. Nat. Ppia Math.* On ne peut rien de plus beau ni de meilleur en son genre que le traité de M. Newton *De Quadratura Curvarum*, mais il est venu bien tard. La date de l'impression de cet ouvrage est fâcheuse, non pour M. Newton, qui a acquis tant de gloire que l'homme le plus ambitieux n'en pourroit désirer davantage, mais pour quelques Anglois qui semblent porter envie à ceux qui ont découvert et publié les 1^{res} ces nouvelles méthodes qui ont portés si long la Géométrie.'

We come now to the least pleasing part of the task which we have set ourselves—the estimate of the moral character and religious opinions of the illustrious philosopher. Neither his quarrel with Flamsteed, nor his controversy with Leibnitz, fall in exactly with the view of Sir Isaac Newton which we somehow or other form from reading the popular accounts of his

life, or the often-repeated anecdotes of his actions. The publication of the correspondence with Flamsteed exhibited him in a somewhat different light from that in which from our childhood we had rejoiced to view him. The perfect equanimity and almost childish simplicity, which we gazed on with so much reverence, quite disappears in the accounts which we have here given us, of his desire for promotion in the world, and his interference in political matters. Some readers will, perhaps, be disappointed at learning that one whom they had thought of only as a recluse, who forgot the ordinary occupations of life when absorbed in philosophical speculations, but whose acquaintance with the works of God only served to deepen his love and reverence to their Creator,—that such a man should have been subject to infirmities of temper; that he should have entertained any ideas of rising in the world; that he should have lived much as other men of the world did, after he had gained a seat in Parliament, and was promoted to the Wardenship of the Mint; and that at the mature age of sixty he should have entertained thoughts of marriage, and made proposals to a widow. Much, however, of the extravagant opinion we are led to form of Sir Isaac Newton's greatness and goodness is due to erroneous inferences made from a partial examination of what was related of him. Enough had been recorded before the publication of these volumes to enable us to form a more accurate estimate of his character. But the three interesting letters printed in chapter xvi. furnish particulars of his life during his residence at Cambridge, which, we are sorry to say, represent his devotional habits and practice as no better than that of others of his day—and, truth compels us to add, probably not much worse.

The first letter is one written by Mr. Nicolas Wickins, son of a Fellow of Trinity, who was exactly contemporary with Newton, whose chamber-fellow he was for some years. The accidental circumstance of their both finding their chamber-fellows disagreeable and noisy companions, induced them to 'chum together,' as the letter quaintly expresses it—and thus commenced an intimacy which enabled Mr. Wickins to give a trustworthy account of his friend's mode of life. This letter, in a very graphic way, describes 'Sir Isaac's forgetfulness of his food when intent upon his studies,' and 'his rising in a 'pleasant manner with the satisfaction of having found out 'some proposition without any concern for a seeming want of 'his night's sleep, which he was sensible he had lost thereby.' The letter also gives an account of a charitable benefaction of Newton, by which the writer and his father had been the means of dispensing many dozens of Bibles to poor people. The other two letters are addressed to Newton by Mr. Hum-

phrey, who was living with him during the period when the *Principia* was composed and published. These letters contain no evidence to show how far Newton's thoughts were directed to sacred and solemn subjects; but, from the very absence of allusion to them, seem to imply very strongly that he was no exception to the general rule of the bad effect on the mind when the attention is wholly absorbed by one class of pursuits. But over and above this, we have the distinct assertion in the second letter that 'he very seldom went to chapel, that being 'the time he chiefly took his repose; and as for the afternoon, 'his earnest and indefatigable studies retained him so, that he 'scarcely knew the house¹ of prayer.' The only counterpoise to this statement is in the following sentence, that very frequently on Sundays he went to S. Mary's Church' to hear the sermon, especially in the forenoon. To this account we have the addition in the following letter: 'As for his private prayers, I can 'say nothing of them. I am apt to believe his intense studies 'deprived him of the better part.' Yet with regard to the ordinary duties of life, and his intercourse with his fellow-men, it cannot be denied that Newton is entitled to the praise due to strict integrity and honesty. His apology to Locke for a mistake into which he was inadvertently drawn, exhibits great candour, and even meekness. This latter virtue, with that of general equanimity and an unruffled temper, is uniformly ascribed to him, and at no time of his life does he appear in any other light than as a man of perfectly upright and pure life, *i. e.* speaking as the world would speak. That his virtues, such as they were, had no foundation in any deep sense of religion, must be evident from what we have said above. The writer of the letters quoted above alludes to an illness which confined him for some days to his bed, which he bore, he says, with a great deal of patience and magnanimity, seemingly indifferent either to live or die. Of resignation and hope we hear nothing; nor is there on so solemn an occasion any allusion to religion at all. 'He, seeing me,' he continues, 'very much concerned at his illness, bid me not trouble myself. For if, said he, I die, I shall 'leave you an estate, which he then mentioned.' (Vol. ii. p. 95.)

He seems to have been endowed by nature with a kind and gentle heart, neither does he appear to have been wanting in offices of generosity to his relations or to the poor; nor, again, does there appear any instance of stinginess or illiberality worth mentioning—the poverty of one particular entertainment which is alluded to, being probably a mere accident.

¹ We have little doubt that in the original this word is 'hour,' but we have printed it as it stands in the author's text. In the French letter printed above, we have only altered evident mistakes of grammar.

With such views, we shall not be surprised to hear that Newton, though requested by several dignitaries of the Church, refused to take holy orders, partly on the ground that he did not hold with the Thirty-nine Articles, partly on the alleged reason that he should do religion more service as a layman. What service religion would do him, does not seem to have been the question. And here we desire to enter our most earnest protest against the mode of speaking which Sir David Brewster, in common with many other writers of the lives of men eminent in any particular branch of science, adopts in speaking of the bearing of their opinions on the truth of Christianity or revelation. If the truth of Christianity were to depend upon the number of scientific believers, we are afraid the evidence would be much more evenly balanced than some of these pretended champions of revelation would altogether like to acquiesce in. For ourselves, we are not in the habit of regarding it 'as a proud triumph of the Christian faith, that the 'greatest philosopher of which any age can boast was a sincere 'and humble believer in the leading doctrines of our religion, 'and lived conformably to its precepts;' and, accordingly, it is a matter perfectly indifferent to us, regarded in the light of evidence, how many of the 'wise of this world' have or have not been enrolled amongst the professors of Christianity, and lived a life conformable to its precepts. Certainly the Church could well afford to lose the support of those amongst her children who do not live up to her teaching. We therefore have no reluctance, on this ground at least, to admit that Sir Isaac Newton's belief scarcely rises to a level with Arianism. Our author is very indignant against the supposition that Newton took up religious investigations late in life, when he was either tired of or unfitted for philosophical speculation; and he has certainly proved that Newton's thoughts were turned this way before he was fifty years old, and that the religious turn, if so it can in any sense be called, was quite unconnected with any supposed mental aberration. We must be careful to distinguish between Newton's religious opinions and those of his biographer. The writer in his preface speaks of Sir Isaac's religious opinions as being adverse to his own; nor was he, perhaps, called upon to do more than what he professes to do, viz. 'submit them to the judgment of the reader.' We are sorry that he almost contradicts himself in the following assertion, that 'what the 'gifted mind of Newton believed to be truth, I dare not pronounce to be error.' With regard, however, to Sir Isaac's views of toleration and comprehension, his aversion to creeds and dogmatic teaching, he evidently entirely sympathises with him—a toleration which, excluding only the opinions of Roman

Catholics, and those who in the author's view have tendencies towards Romanism, must obviously be extended to take in all shades of Arianism, and perhaps Socinianism itself.

In fact, Sir David Brewster sometimes speaks as if science and religion were almost convertible terms. There is no appearance of his having ever entertained the notion that religious views have any connexion with the state of the heart, the affections, and the will. It is as if it were a mere matter of understanding. Our readers will not be surprised, therefore, to find him designating Sir Isaac Newton as the High Priest of Science, or at his thinking that it is a sufficient answer to the objection that men of intellect are found in opposition to the faith, to allege the instances of men capable of judging of its merits who resist the evidence from the Copernican system (vol. ii. p. 358): 'If men of high powers, then, are still found, who are insensible to the evidence which has established the system of the universe, need we wonder that there are others who resist the effulgent evidence which sustains the strongholds of our faith?'

In spite of these men of straw, raised up and invented to object to the Copernican system, Newton is spoken of by our author (vol. ii. p. 359) as having 'united philosophy with religion, and so dissolving the league which genius had formed with scepticism, and adding to the cloud of witnesses the brightest name of ancient or of modern times.' In another place (p. 314) we find the author delighting in the thought that Newton never entered the Church, and therefore had 'no beacons to dread, and no false lights to mislead him. He was free to range through the volume of inspiration, and to gather from the Sibylline pages of its prophets and apostles, its historians and its poets, the insulated truths which they reveal, and to combine them into a broader faith, and embalm them in a higher toleration.'

It was the attempt of James II. to force upon the Universities members of the Roman Church which probably first drew Newton's attention to political and ecclesiastical questions. He was one of the deputation appointed by the senate to appear at Westminster before the High Commission, to show cause why they had refused to admit Father Alban Francis, a Benedictine monk, to the degree of Master of Arts, without taking the usual oaths of supremacy and allegiance. The Chancellor of Ely, who was one of the deputation, proposed that in this case the degree should be granted on condition that it should not be drawn into a precedent. Newton's habitual reserve, perhaps, prevented him from speaking openly on the subject; but he was unwilling to acquiesce in so dishonest an evasion, and

expressed to the University Bedell his opinion that this was equivalent to giving up the question. 'So it is,' was the reply; 'why didn't you go and speak to it?' However, he only ventured to propose that the suggestion should be submitted to counsel, which it accordingly was, and was withdrawn.

We are sorry that we cannot read many pages in any part of these volumes without being compelled to notice the impertinences of their author. The introduction of the name of Newton amongst the members of this deputation may perhaps plead his justification for indulging in some remarks upon the conduct of the King and of the University; but the irrelevant comparison of the case with what Sir David Brewster is pleased to call 'the attempts recently made in Oxford to tamper with the national faith,' and the reflection on the late governing body at Oxford, implied in the expression of the hope that the new Government which Parliament has provided will protect her youth against religious innovation, only betray his ignorance of the constitution of the University, as well as of the class of men who sat upon the Hebdomadal Board, or are likely to become members of the new Council.

Newton afterwards sat in the Convention Parliament of 1689; and though he appears to have taken no active part in political measures, yet his sympathies were entirely with the Revolution, and he seems to have felt no difficulty in transferring his allegiance from the one sovereign to the other, alleging, in his letter to the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, that 'when King William began to protect us, we began to owe him allegiance.'

It was not unnatural that his religious as well as his political sympathies should have been with the Latitudinarian divines who supplanted the Nonjurors in their bishoprics and other preferments. The Church of England was, humanly speaking, in great danger of surrendering some of the essential articles of the faith, when Tillotson and Burnet were amongst her leading and most influential governors, on the popular ground of a broader basis of toleration. The Archbishop was himself little better than a Socinian; and such was the want of learning amongst the clergy, and so widely spread the indifference to religious truth, that any proposal for enlarging the sphere of comprehension so as to include foreign Protestants, by acknowledging their orders, or admitting them to communion with the Church of England, would have met with general sympathy. We need not, therefore, be surprised at the following document, which, a few years later, was drawn up by Sir Isaac Newton as the draft for an Act of Parliament:—

'Whereas of late years, some opinions have been propagated by superstitious men among the Christians of the Church of England, to break all communion and friendship with the Protestant churches abroad, and to return into the communion of the Church of Rome; such as are the opinions, that the Church of Rome is a true church, without allowing her to be a false church in any respect, and that the Protestant churches abroad are false churches, and that they have no baptism, and by consequence are no Christians, and that the Church of England is in danger, meaning, by the succession of the House of Hanover. For preventing the mischiefs which may ensue upon such dangerous, uncharitable, and unchristian principles, be it enacted,—

'That the following declaration shall be made and subscribed in open court in the Quarter Sessions next after by all persons.

'We, whose names are underwritten, do solemnly, and without all equivocation or mental reservation, acknowledge and declare that we do sincerely believe that the Church of Rome is, in doctrine and worship, a false, uncharitable, and idolatrous church, with whom it is not lawful to communicate; and that the churches of the Lutherans and Calvinists abroad are true churches, with whom we may lawfully communicate, and that their baptism is valid and authentic; and that the Church of England is in no danger by the succession of the House of Hanover in the throne of the kingdom of Great Britain.'—*Brewster's Newton*, vol. ii. p. 351.

It is evident that Newton's ideas of toleration and comprehension went far beyond those of the Government, and he seems to have been careful how he expressed his opinions on religious subjects. The Toleration Act of 1688 excepted from its benefit all who wrote against the doctrine of the Trinity; and in the Act of 1698, for the Suppression of Blasphemy and Profaneness, persons who by printing, teaching, or advisedly speaking, denied any one of the Persons of the Holy Trinity to be God, were for the first offence disabled to have any office or employment, or any profit appertaining thereunto.

His biographer says that it does not appear that Newton was charged with being an Arian during his lifetime. He admits that a traditionary belief has long prevailed that Newton was an Arian, and says that he has no doubt that Newton was influenced by motives of this kind (fear, that is, of the consequences of avowing his belief) when he desired Locke to stop the translation and impression of his papers, and mentioned his design to suppress them. The papers alluded to are the 'Historical Account of Two Notable Corruptions of Scripture;' and the author again expresses his opinion (p. 337) that 'although 'it is obvious that in allowing his Dissertation to be published 'in Holland, Sir Isaac did not consider himself as supporting the 'Socinians or the Arians, yet it cannot be doubted that he was 'afraid of being known as the author of the work, and of holding 'the opinions which it advocates.' What is the meaning of the note at p. 339 we are at a loss to conceive, in which it is asserted that 'in suppressing these papers, Sir Isaac certainly 'did not "deliberately suppress his opinions," as Dr. Burgess has

‘stated.—There is abundance of evidence that he never abandoned the opinions maintained in these papers.’ The author apparently has it very much at heart to justify himself for having written, in 1830, his belief that Newton was a believer in the Trinity. We regret to say that the MSS. Sir David Brewster has since had access to, throw a good deal of light upon these opinions. The most remarkable amongst them are the ‘Paradoxical Questions concerning Athanasius,’ which are given, with an epitome of their answers, by the author in the text (pp. 342—6). These have been written out so legibly, and there are so many copies of them, that it can scarcely be doubted that they were thus repeatedly corrected for publication. ‘The fact, indeed,’ continues our author, ‘of Sir Isaac having, previous to his death, burned many of his letters and papers, and left these theological writings behind him, makes it more than probable that he had no desire to suppress his opinions.’ We think the natural conclusion at which the reader will arrive is, that Sir Isaac thought it wisest to suppress his opinions during his lifetime, but was indifferent how extensively they might be made known after his death.

With regard to the other MSS. on theological subjects, which have been placed in the Appendix, one consists of twenty theses, and is entitled ‘Irenicum, or Ecclesiastical Polity tending to Peace;’ the other of twenty-two queries regarding the word *ὁμοούσιος*. The former appears to have been copied out four times, and was probably, therefore, intended for publication. The latter, we may charitably suppose, would have undergone some corrections before it was finally transcribed for the press. We shall have occasion to notice this document presently, referring such readers as are curious about Newton’s opinions on religious and ecclesiastical questions, to the Appendix, No. 30, where they will find these queries printed at length. We doubt the expediency, and even the fairness, of bringing to the light the notes and scattered thoughts, which perhaps were never intended for publication, after an author’s death, when he is helplessly in the hands of an editor who perhaps is unable to comprehend his meaning, or even to read his handwriting; and, in the present instance, we have reason to suspect his editor of gross carelessness in transcribing his MSS., as well as of profound ignorance of the subject of ecclesiastical antiquity. The name of Ischyra is not so obscure a name as to offer any excuse for its occurrence twice in the same page with a wrong spelling. The slight mistake of Meletus for Meletius would scarcely have been worth notice, had it not occurred in the same sentence.

Whilst we are on the subject of verbal mistakes, it may be worth while to notice the quotation of *Ziphilina apud Dionam*,

and *Gregory Nystra*; in a letter of Newton to Locke, on the subject of miracles. The latter name is the substitute for that of *S. Gregory Nyssen*, and the former, we take for granted, should have been *Xiphilinus apud Dionem*. The letter contains at least one other mistake, which we may charitably ascribe to the corrector of the press.

We will conclude this article with a brief notice of Sir Isaac Newton's opinions on historical subjects of the times of S. Athanasius, premising that, as we have access only to the epitome of the answers to the sixteen questions given by their editor, we can only be responsible for the correctness of our account of them as they appear at pp. 342—6. We shall make no variations from the text, excepting that we shall transpose the alleged facts so as to exhibit them in historical order.

In the first place, then, it appears that Athanasius was ordained Bishop at twenty-five years of age by sedition and violence; the Bishops who ordained him, after resisting his importunities for many days together, and having been kept prisoners in a church by a mob of his party, at last consenting.

That Athanasius and his party were persecuted, not for religion, but sedition, by Constantius, who treated them with the greatest moderation, and that the Emperor is not surpassed by any other, of whom knowledge has come to the writer, in clemency, temperance, chastity, contempt of popular fame, affection to Christianity, justice, prudence, princely carriage, and good government.

That Athanasius was justly deposed by the Council of Tyre, for which seven different arguments are adduced. Whether these arguments are distinct from or identical with the assertions contained in the questions from the fourth to the twelfth inclusive, we know not. But, if so, the argument and the facts on which it rests stand as follows:—

That his deprivation was just, because, though he attempted by an ingenious artifice to explain away the charge of breaking the communion cup of Ischyrras (*sic*), he failed in doing so. Secondly, because the letter of Ischyrras to Athanasius is suspected to be a forgery, and that of Arsenius to the same is also concluded to be a forgery, got up before the convening of the Council. Thirdly, because he falsely accused Eusebius of adultery before the Council of Tyre, in hope of raising such a tumult as might enable him to escape being tried; and that the Athanasians afterwards invented this story, and pretended that the woman had been hired by the Eusebians to accuse Athanasius. Fourthly, that the dead body of Arsenius was, after being disinterred, produced before the Council of Tyre; that Athanasius was there found guilty of the murder, and accord-

ingly banished; and that the current story is a mere invention on the part of Athanasius about twenty-five years after—viz., that it was a dead man's hand that was produced before the Council, and that the charge was refuted by the production of Arsenius alive—and that the letter of Pinnes proving Arsenius to be alive was a forgery of the same date: in conformity with which view the writer endeavours to show the incorrectness of the story of the monk's confession, that Arsenius had been concealed at Hypseles (*sic*), and been sent out of the way to the lower parts of Egypt. The recantations of Valens and Ursatius, though supposed with good reason to be forgeries, are not charged directly upon Athanasius, but on his partisans.

In like manner, it appears that the charges against the Meletians are only fictions got up by Athanasius in retaliation for his having been brought to trial at the instance of Ischyra, a Meletian Presbyter; and that the ignominious death of Arius was feigned, and put about above twenty years after his death. Athanasius pretended to have received it from Macarius, but, in reality, invented it himself, and circulated it, 'that the miracle of his death being known, it will no longer be doubted whether the Arian heresy be odious to God or not.'

Lastly, amongst these remarkable paradoxes we find the Council of Jerusalem and Tyre—which, for the occasion, are treated as a single council—was not an Arian council, but was a full council, and 'as authentic as any Greek council ever was or could be since the Apostles' days, they being in communion with the Church Catholic, and legally convened by the letters of Constantine the Great;' and that this council received Arius into communion, and excommunicated Athanasius. We have neither inclination nor space to give the refutation of all this nonsense, nor do we care to adjust the respective portions which belong to the author and the illustrious subject of his memoir. For the facts of the case, we must refer to the 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.' Enough has been said to convict both of the grossest ignorance, and, we fear we must add, one of them of wilful perversion of historical facts. We doubt not that many of our readers, in common with ourselves, will experience a grave disappointment that the genius which could with so unrivalled a sagacity penetrate the recesses of physical science, should have exhibited a spectacle almost unique of failure in the attempt to examine the facts of history and the testimony of antiquity.

The influence of mathematical and physical studies upon the religious belief, is both an interesting and important inquiry, and admits of being treated as a purely abstract question, as well as of being illustrated from an immense induction of parti-

cular instances. It is commonly thought that the tendency of men wholly devoted to pure mathematical science, is to infidelity; and we believe the view may be maintained by an appeal to facts. We not only willingly admit the fact, but wish to make it prominent, because, if it is true, it is very desirable in these days, when systems of education are so much discussed, that it should be as widely known as possible. What is there, we would ask, unreasonable in the supposition, that men whose minds are cramped and narrowed by exclusive attention to deductive processes, should become insensible to evidence of a totally different kind? Viewing the case as a mere matter of intellect, such persons actually become insensible to subjects which do not admit of being treated by the same rigid processes of argument. We do not wish here to enter upon the wide question, how far these pursuits, when carried too far, disincubate men for the more ordinary duties of life, or to what extent they interfere with the development of the imaginative faculty, or stunt the growth of the affections. Probably none would be found to advocate any such system, though, in point of fact, the Cambridge course of education was, till of late years, very much of this kind, or at least showed considerably too much favour to mathematics, as it was possible to obtain a degree at the final examination without any other knowledge whatever. We are, however, apprehensive of undue weight being assigned in a course of education to subjects connected with physical science. The tide has set very strongly in that direction. We trust we have no tendency to disparage the importance of mathematical and physical science combined, or to underrate its value as an integral part of education; but they will not do for the basis of an education. It may be said, and truly, that whatever evils may result from the respective processes of induction and deduction will be counterbalanced and eliminated by the judicious combination of the two. But there are other truths which it is of more importance to know than either the abstractions of mathematics or the facts of natural science, strictly so called; and there are qualities of mind which it is the business of education to develop, which the cultivation of these studies does not touch. The study of physical science no doubt has a natural tendency to correct the inclination which purely deductive science has, to deify its own first principles and axioms. It takes an opposite course, ascending to generalizations, which do but point towards others still higher and of still wider comprehension than themselves; yet unity of law and of design does not always, as it did to Newton's mind, suggest the idea of the One Almighty Being, of whose mind that Unity is a true reflection, much less does it of itself convey any knowledge of

His nature and attributes. We do not, of course, doubt that nature is replete with evidences of its great Creator. All we say is, that its phenomena and its laws are *φωνάντα συνέτοιμα*. The deepest mysteries of the faith may possibly be read in the secrets of nature; but they will only be read by those who have the faculty of reading them.

The General Scholium with which the *Principia* concludes, proves Newton's belief in the Unity of the Godhead, and the Almighty power, Omnipresence, and Omniscience of God. It shows also that he thought his System of the Universe proved as much as this. Perchance he thought his principles did not allow him to go further, for of strictly moral attributes he is entirely silent. We do not blame him for this; we should not be surprised at finding readers who could follow his demonstrations up to this point, who should still demur to his conclusion.

There was another philosopher of the previous generation whose mind was far more evenly balanced than Newton's. We mean Blaise Pascal; and as our opinion on this subject exactly coincides with his, we prefer giving it in his own language:—

'Si le monde subsistoit pour instruire l'homme de l'existence de Dieu, sa divinité y reluiroit de toutes parts d'une manière incontestable; mais comme il ne subsiste que par Jésus-Christ et pour Jésus-Christ, et pour instruire les hommes, et de leur corruption et de la rédemption, tout y éclate de ces deux vérités. Ce qui y paroît ni marque, ni une exclusion totale, ni une présence manifeste de divinité, mais la présence d'un Dieu qui se cache: tout porte ce caractère.'

The Unity of God was by no means the whole of Newton's creed, but only so much of it as he thought could be proved from Nature; alleging, as he does, that to discourse of Him from the appearances of things does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy. It is certain that he received the Bible as containing the revealed will of God, and considered it as the ultimate standard of appeal; but his standard of doctrine was widely different from that of the Church.

In Horsley's edition of his works, we have notice of a paper of twelve short paragraphs, which, the editor thinks, were the beginning of a treatise on the divinity of our Saviour, noticing that in the fourth paragraph the Arian interpretation of the word *Logos*, in S. John's Gospel, is maintained, but the Socinian denied. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the manuscript which is printed at pp. 349—50, and which also contains twelve articles, all of which would, we think, be adopted by many Socinians, though they contain an expression which they are not in the habit of using. However, their general bearing is rather towards Arianism than Socinianism. His 'Short Scheme of the true Religion' does not apparently contain any evidence either way; neither does another manuscript to which we have referred before,

which is entitled 'Irenicum, or Ecclesiastical Polity tending to Peace,' the chief characteristic of which is its Erastianism. The last document connected with this subject, is given in the Appendix, No. 30. It is in the form of twenty-two queries; these queries are not what their name imports—questions thrown out for solution of difficulties, but are merely a disguised form of expressing strong opinions, the reader being meant to supply the answer of 'certainly' or 'certainly not,' as the case may be. They are so ridiculous and childish that we shall content ourselves with giving the first and last as a specimen of their tone:—

'1. Whether Christ sent his Apostles to preach metaphysics to the unlearned common people, and to their wives, and children?'

'22. Whether Hosius, S. Athanasius, S. Hilary, S. Ambrose, S. Hierome, S. Austin, were not Papists?'

The question of Newton's Arianism or Socinianism is scarcely worth the attempt at a solution; and, indeed, there is little evidence either way. It seems most probable that he had no very definite creed as regards these points. It is clear that he had a strong prejudice against dogmatic statements, and likely therefore that, being without this safeguard, he would veer, according to circumstances, from one point to another. And here we part from Sir David Brewster, protesting against this being considered a question of words, and not hesitating, as he does, to pronounce that 'to be error which the gifted mind of Newton believed to be truth,' because we submit to that interpretation of Scripture which the Church Catholic has always held, as it was defined at the Nicene Council.

ART. IV.—*The History of England, from the Accession of James the Second.* By THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY. Vols. III. and IV. London: Longman. 1855.

AMONG the circumstances attending the appearance of Mr. Macaulay's new volumes, there is one better worth noticing and remembering, than the number of cartloads of which the copies of the first edition consisted, or the number of miles over which its sheets, spread out, would stretch. The book was at once reviewed in the daily and weekly journals. Most of these reviews were written in a spirit of hearty sympathy with Mr. Macaulay's political principles. They were also written with no grudging admiration of Mr. Macaulay's powers. He had produced a great book; a book of singular and enduring interest. The spirit and eloquence of the first two volumes were more than kept up in the last two. It was indeed to be regretted that the scale on which he had resolved to construct his noble edifice forbade the hope of ever seeing it even half achieved. Yet who would be without a page of that rich and magnificent fragment, even for the sake of a wider and more comprehensive plan? But there was one opinion in which the ablest of the Whig critics of the favourite Whig historian were agreed.¹ The praise of a truthful and unexaggerated estimate of the chief characters of his story, they could not give him. The distance of the past, the spirit of the present, the natural disposition of a widely informed and practised mind to be impartial, the deliberate meditations of eight quiet years, had not been able to secure his elaborate judgments from the taint of prepossessions and antipathies. The lofty and accomplished historian had yielded to the vulgar temptations of over painting and under painting; he could not portray those whom he approved without sinking all their real faults, nor those whom he condemned without overloading them with crimes and abuse. Thus the great scene of English history, which was to have been filled with the men and women of our experience, the men and women of real life, the men and women of real letters and memoirs and actions, is filled with virtue as perfect, and with vice as untempered as a romance or a play. Thus a great task still remains for accomplishment. Whigs date the greatness of England from the deliverance of 1688; but they hesitate to accept Mr. Macaulay's William for the William of history, and

¹ See the *Athenæum*, and the just and forcible review in the *Times*.

wisely scruple, in such days as ours, at burdening their faith with an idol. Equitable and impartial men know that Marlborough's glory was barred by great turpitude; but the coarse rancour of his modern accuser displeases them, and they are not prepared, on such evidence as he lays before them, to paint-out the accustomed portrait, with its mingled greatness and deformity, in order to substitute the savage caricature which Mr. Macaulay has sketched instead of it.

Such is the remarkable coincidence of opinion in the preliminary judgment, passed at first view, on Mr. Macaulay's volumes by representatives, for the most part, of his own principles: principles that owe their strong hold on the English mind at this day, as much to the opportunities which he has had of expounding them, and to the art and eloquence with which he has recommended them, as to any other single cause. The *præjudicium* of favourable judges is against him. He has sacrificed everything and everybody to William's glory; and even his admirers resent the extravagant and unfair attempt, and, feeling that their cause does not need it, exclaim against the new confusion gratuitously introduced into history, by arbitrary violations of probability, and neglect of much evidence, in favour of a view vigorous and consistent indeed, but resting for its main support on Mr. Macaulay's powerful imagination, and strong personal feelings.

A second and more careful reading is not likely to reverse or even to qualify the impressions produced by the first. The feeling which the book leaves on our own mind is,—how a great and remarkable subject has been spoiled by a licentious abuse of those remarkable powers by which Mr. Macaulay seeks to bring back the image of the past; spoilt by want of a larger and more comprehensive, and in some cases more generous survey of the whole scene; spoilt by coarse touches, where the subject eminently required very careful and discriminating ones; spoilt by a vulgar straining after violent effects and strong contrasts; spoilt by an equally vulgar fear of dealing boldly and frankly with the good and the evil which seem out of keeping with what he represents. He has made the great, the fatal mistake, of pitching his tone too high for his subject. That subject is indeed one of high and eventful interest; but it is not heroic; nor can even Mr. Macaulay make either its incidents or its men heroic. For all that, it presents inexhaustible materials for a great history. But the historian must not *force* his materials. Draw William of Orange truly, his ambition, his perseverance, his long-headed foresight, his subtle, silent, crafty, resolute nature; draw him with the keenness, and, if you can, the fellow-feeling of Davila and Guicciardini—add a few more traits than they

would have cared to add, of human feeling; and you have a curious and striking, and probably a true picture of one of the most remarkable actors of his time; not a man to admire or to love, or to place very high in the scale of men, yet a great politician: but make him the man of lofty and generous ideas, of fine sensibilities elicited by the ties and realities of home, though continually suppressed under a stoical exterior, the devoted, much-enduring, and ever suffering hero—and we can only say that you will be hard put to it to find anything, in the monuments which remain of him, to correspond to your picture. The struggles of English parties and factions are a strange and instructive scene; the traces of them are remaining to this day: in them were laid, in deep unconsciousness of the future, the awkward and ungainly foundations of some of the greatest institutions of modern England; in them were established, in very unpromising forms, and for reasons often of a very equivocal nature, some of the chief principles of modern English polity and law; in them were given some of the most important warnings to posterity, which English history supplies. In their results, they have proved as important as those of the Reformation or the Rebellion. But when you come to bring to light and track home the men and their doings, you must be content to measure them, for the most part, by the measure which they took of themselves. They were a shrewd, cool, clear-headed, plausible, self-interested race, to whom high principles and high obligations were almost confessedly a matter of words. They played a keen game very often; but it was not with the terrible enthusiasm of their fathers and grandfathers. To do them justice, to put in a clear light the peculiar character of their doublings and twistings, their bargains and their perfidies, their low-mindedness and impudence, a historian does not want the dark colours of Tacitus, or the solemnity of Clarendon; he wants rather the keenness, the humour, the sense of the absurd, the hard dry irony of their own satirists and pamphleteers. Those smooth faces, and huge perukes, and affectations of Roman armour and Roman togas, which we see in their portraits, tell of an age of masks: it is affectation to impute to them the virtues, it is unfair to judge them by the standard of better times: and where all are so far distant from what we ourselves account the ordinary measures of honesty, and good faith, and public spirit, it is absurd to magnify the distance which separated the more from the less scrupulous among them; and while we are perfectly alive to the atmosphere of trick and intrigue in which they all lived and schemed, to single out for the indignation which attends extraordinary villany some particular instances of it, in men or parties, whom we do not like.

And this is the great vice which counterbalances the rare, and in some points unrivalled, excellences of Mr. Macaulay's history ; and it is one for which they cannot make amends, as regards the purpose for which history is written. This want of moral perspective gives an artificial and factitious air to all the composition ; and nothing can compensate for the appearance of want of reality and truthfulness in history. It is indeed a long time since there have been brought together on such a subject such manifold and various and consummate gifts, as in this book. The broad and accurate view of the statesman, the closer analysis and balancing of the philosopher, the terse and nervous argument of the debater—bold and stirring declamation—an eye which nothing escapes, a grasp which collects and adjusts and holds together every trait, and a touch, of the nicest and most delicate, in painting manners—a power of telling a story in plain and racy English which Defoe might have envied—an art in the arranging and marshalling of intricate materials not inferior to Gibbon's—the keen, genial, yet only half disclosed sensibility of a great humourist, to all that rises before him of grotesque or touching, ridiculous, noble, or pathetic, in their least obvious forms—ability to group together the gravest and the lightest parts of a subject without incongruity, and a flexible versatility which turns from one to the other without breaking the continuity of a line of thought or feeling—remarkable skill in seizing and representing the local character and colour of scenes where great events happened—great learning, great accuracy, great memory—all these are here, each in a degree which would singly make a considerable name for another man ;—exhibited under the harmonizing and controlling influence of a judgment perfectly master of itself and its purpose, and brought to ripe perfection by the leisure and meditation of many quiet years ; and their results are woven together in a style of singular animation, clearness, and force. Such a history, diffuse as it is, unfinished as it must be, will not soon be seen again in England. But when the regret rises to our minds of having to forego the hope of seeing the great undertaking accomplished, the thought comes with it, how signally that part which has been done, has fallen short ! Few can be proof against the charms of its brilliant, exciting, persuasive narrative. The view that it presents of men and events is clear, vivid, consistent, instructive. But when you have done, you do not feel that it has left you with an impression to which you can surrender yourself ; or that the historian has really taken in, and given their due weight to all the facts, which all ought to be taken into account and allowed for, whatever opposite ones there may be, in gathering up the result. You feel that the historian has not told you all. You feel that

he has not been willing or able to disengage his mind from evidence which bore him in one direction, in order to allow it to be fairly acted on by evidence which would have borne him in another. And when you have said that, of a historian writing in the name of learning, candour, and justice, writing of the quarrels and mistakes of parties, now old and dead—writing when we are learning to acknowledge on all sides, that great truths and great causes do not hang on the perfection of those who have represented them—writing with the declared purpose of giving to Englishmen a specimen of their own history, worthy of their times, their light, their fearless love of truth,—if you have said it truly, you have pronounced a condemnation, which no splendour of writing, no fulness of information, no partial fairness can countervail.

The English Revolution of 1688 has been viewed with feelings borrowed from later history. It succeeded; and success carries its own title to admiration and applause. But, besides that, it really was the beginning, though a somewhat unpromising one, of good government in this country; and those unpromising beginnings have, in the course of a century and a half, borne fruits, which have been in reality quite out of proportion with the character of the stock from which they sprung. But they were naturally, and with something of pious reverence, ascribed to the wisdom and patriotism of the Revolution and its statesmen. The last result of a series of convulsions, the Bill of Rights, has proved a settlement which has not needed alteration; and public men feeling the incalculable benefits depending on a settlement, and in fact due to that one, have long vied with each other in extolling the policy out of which it arose; and it has shone with glory reflected upon it, from a long period of constitutional liberty and progress. But in these panegyrics it was the work more than the motives, the legal text of documents rather than the character of their framers, which was in view; those motives and characters were favourably construed, as would be natural with judges in good humour with the work, but with much the same looseness as we eulogise the feudal Barons who gave us *Magna Charta*. But to the historian there was, from a very early date, something very suspicious about the political morality of even the most venerable among these fathers of the constitution. Their wisdom, their gravity, their moderation, as evinced in their cautious and weighty acts of State, have stood the test of time and trial; not so the springs and reasons which moved these deep and wise statesmen to their great work. There it appeared more and more, that in most of the men of the Revolution there was nothing to be proud of. Their heads were much harder than those of their rivals, but

their hearts were as callous and cold. Their triumph was the victory, the natural, and in its results, the salutary victory, of wider views and truer judgments, of cooler tempers and stronger sense, over extravagant claims and dogged blindness, over flighty cleverness and unthinking enthusiasm. But though there was so much difference in intellectual force, there was but little in moral and political principle. Those powerful and commanding spirits, against whom the court of James played such a hopeless game, held generally no higher standard of virtue or honour than the poor intriguers who struggled impotently against their heavy hand. As the secrets of that day have been unfolded, as the lapse of time has unsealed confidential letters, and opened private diaries, and decyphered dark messages, the character of one after another of these great men has sunk lower and lower. We know them now. Cold-blooded selfishness, falsehood, double-dealing and perfidy equally cold-blooded and deliberate, the meanest vanity and revenge, the basest and most venal avarice, ruled the souls of many of those who in that trying day spoke so well, and acted with such dignity, and resolved so wisely and so warily. We may think as highly as we please of the Revolution; we can hardly any longer think very highly of its great men.

No one has done more to confirm this judgment than Mr. Macaulay. No one has painted that time in more powerful colours; and they are as dark as they are powerful. A reader must be very insensible who can rise from the perusal of his pages without feeling humiliated at the picture there given of the English people of that day, and the leaders of their parties. The chiefs of the Revolution hardly fare better than any one else. Mr. Macaulay discriminates, indeed, between them; not always, as it appears to us, with fairness. He is singularly gentle in his treatment of some, who seem to deserve no such privilege; he is unmeasured in his abuse and scorn of others, who do not seem to have risen or sunk very much beyond their fellows in their contempt of principle. Yet whatever individual differences may be marked, the general look of that crowd of great men is singularly repulsive. In Mr. Macaulay's narrative, one only stands out from among them fully and strongly; with no taint of their lowness of soul, if they are bad; with no fellowship in their weakness or narrow-mindedness, if they are honest. That one is William of Orange.

William appears, in these pages, from first to last, to use Mr. Macaulay's favourite word, as the Deliverer—the Deliverer of the English people, not only at the moment of the Revolution, but ever afterwards, at the various turning points of his reign; their Deliverer first from bitter bondage and foreign

vassalage, afterwards from the imminent chastisement of their own faults and follies, their mad intestine quarrels, their hasty outbreaks of revenge or disappointment; their Deliverer from those plagues which are the scourge of faction, of unreasoning prejudice and caprice. He alone saw and valued their true interests, and secured those interests in spite of themselves. He accepted and bore their ill-will and ingratitude, that he might save them. It was a heroic work. It added to his sorrows, his dangers and his cares, and it brought no compensation. For he toiled and fought for people whom he did not love; whom it was impossible that he could ever respect and trust. For he was lofty-minded and large-hearted; and the best of them were cross-grained and hide-bound islanders, full of conceit and ignorance—the average of them were a selfish, unscrupulous, and revengeful herd—the worst of them were some of the most accomplished and abandoned traitors of that age of treason. Yet he bore with them; he used them; he passed over the villany on which he, almost with his own eyes, saw them busy; he bore in suffering, he bore in silence, he could not help bearing with contempt. Though a warrior, he revolted from the violence and judicial bloodshed, for which they were so ready. Though caring and understanding little about our institutions, his natural good sense and temper made him work them far better than those who did. With all those kingly virtues, he was also something less, and something more, than a king. He was a man of stern and saturnine temper, but who under that unattractive mask hid the noblest of souls; a soul which would not win even a kingdom by dishonour or double-dealing, a soul to which the splendour of the magnificent crown which he had won, and which he had made more splendid, was not in itself worth the delights of the austere and simple home of his childhood; a soul, full of the deepest friendship, and the tenderest affection, made all the more touching, from the jealous reserve with which it was locked up. Such was William as a man: such was he as king of England. But over and above all this, he was the chief actor in a scene of which England was but a subordinate part. He was the head and soul of a confederacy of European kings. He filled without a rival the first place, where the Emperor of Germany and the King of Spain were second. He alone stood in the path of the French monarchy to European conquest, and obliged French ambition to wait for Napoleon. He was not only the Deliverer to England, he was the Deliverer also to Christendom and the civilised world.

Mr. Macaulay, whose nature is not to venerate, feels for William a passionate veneration. He claims a place for him in

the Pantheon of Heroes; the silent unpretending ones who made no show, and whose greatness and goodness has had to be interpreted in distant days, from the harsh, crabbed hieroglyphics in which they lay enshrined. He has formed a conception of him, new, indeed, but striking, and he has added this on, with exquisite art, and interwoven it with what is certain and indisputable, of William's wisdom and capacity. The representation pleads hard to be admitted. There are the old well-remembered features, but painted by the hand of genius; not in the rude plainness of the first limners, but though unchanged and stern, with new grace and nobility infused into them. We admire the master; but does he leave us with the conviction that he has painted true, in those delicate but all-important matters of expression and living character? We think few of Mr. Macaulay's readers, few of those, at least, who have even cursorily gone through the documents of the times, will say so. In his estimate of William there is much that is true, and much that is original; but what is true, is what has been long acknowledged, and of what is original, there is, as far as we can see, no evidence.¹

William, as Mr. Macaulay very justly keeps continually before us, filled two great positions. He was chief of a great continental alliance, and he was king of these islands. They were not necessarily incompatible positions, but they might easily become opposed, or entirely subordinated one to the other. Were they both filled with equal heart, with equal care and interest, by William? Mr. Macaulay is obliged to admit fully that he cannot say so:—

'He had, in the course of his eventful life, to sustain some high parts for which he was not eminently qualified; and, in those parts, his success was imperfect. As sovereign of England, he showed abilities and virtues which entitle him to honourable mention in history; but his deficiencies were great. He was to the last a stranger among us, cold, reserved, never in good spirits, never at his ease. His kingdom was a place of exile. His finest palaces were prisons. He was always counting the days which must elapse before he should again see the land of his birth, the clipped trees, the wings of the innumerable windmills, the nests of the storks on the tall gables, and the long lines of painted villas reflected in the sleeping canals. He took no pains to hide the preference which he felt for his native soil and for his early friends; and therefore, though he

¹ He refers very often to William's letters, but does not often quote them. It is greatly to be regretted that Mr. Macaulay has not given larger extracts from these letters. 'King William's letters,' says Dalrymple, 'are the best written of the age in which he lived.' But after such a work as this, we ought no longer to be at the mercy of privileged consulters of great historical documents. It would be a worthy act if the Portland papers were edited for the public; and if the Government took steps for the editing and publication of that foreign correspondence which Lord Palmerston has collected at the British Museum. (Macaulay, 417.) In France they would not be slow at such a work.

rendered great services to our country, he did not reign in our hearts.'—Vol. iv. pp. 256, 257.¹

It is plain, that in William's eyes that noble crown for which he had played such a clever game, was of value only because it gave a vast increase of strength to his position on the continent. It gave him a new and most important piece on the board. But his English government was a by-work, necessary, yet only subsidiary to the great dream and object of his soul,—marshalling the nations of the continent against Louis. It gave him trouble, and he submitted to that trouble. It required his rare talents of keeping in order discordant elements and minds, and he kept them in order. It was in the highest degree necessary that England should be weaned from the agitation and violence which had alternated there with intervals of inglorious stupor, for more than half a century. In doing so, he displayed the coolness and address, the temperate and sober counsels which, perhaps, would have been unattainable in any Englishman who had been a witness, a sharer, and probably a sufferer, in the hot and fierce struggles of the day. With all the weight of his character, with all the subtlety of his crafty nature, he tried to keep the peace between interests and factions for whose objects he cared nothing and did not disguise his contempt, but whose quarrels threatened ruin to the island strength which he required so much on the continent. He needed English fleets in the Channel and the Mediterranean, English battalions in the fields of Flanders; above all, that abounding English exchequer, which was never dry, and seemed never to suffer by what it gave. He did not grudge some portion of his thoughts and care to nurse and improve these great sources of supply, and he was well repaid. England gained, doubtless, by having vigour, instead of dulness and incapacity, at the head of her counsels; by having some one to govern her who, from temper and interest, was disposed to accustom her parties to a less sanguinary and reckless warfare; some one who saw and felt his advantage in multiplying her power and perfecting her resources. But whatever obligations she incurred were amply

¹ Mr. Macaulay had stated this even more strongly before:—'Those who commit the error of considering him as an English statesman, must necessarily see his whole life in a false light, and will be unable to discover any principle, good or bad, Whig or Tory, to which his most important acts can be referred. But, when we consider him as a man whose especial task was to join a crowd of feeble, divided, and dispirited states in firm and energetic union against a common enemy; when we consider him as a man in whose eyes England was important, chiefly because, without her, the great coalition which he projected must be incomplete, we shall be forced to admit that no long career recorded in history has been more uniform from the beginning to the close, than that of this great prince.'—Vol. ii. p. 185. But he has not kept in view his own admission when he comes to treat William's character and policy in detail. Then, his English administration finds as full a justification as his foreign policy.

discharged to William of Orange. She gave him, what he wanted, her fleets, her armies, her treasure; she gave him, what he wanted, the second throne of the West: she gave him to appear in the camps and congresses where his heart was always, with the pomp and strength and credit which was not his by inheritance. She never gave him her love, says his panegyrist. Did he ever want it? Did he ever give his real interest for anything that was merely English, and not European? England was great enough to be worth the concentrated energies of a great statesman; and if he wore her crown, to have the first place in his thoughts, his heart, his pride. But what English institution ever attracted the notice of William, ever escaped his scorn and expressed dislike, except it might serve him in war or diplomacy? What branch of English policy, or law, or administration, shows that it had come under the care of his vigilant and energetic mind? In truth, his sense of his duty as King of England was not strong. He ruled in England, he cared for England, as a general rules in an army or cares for an army, with which his credit is identified, but which is composed of men who do not speak his tongue, and who speak different tongues and have different religions among themselves. And then he resented, he who in England was ever the haughtiest and the coldest of men, the unpopularity which came upon him. There is something exquisitely ludicrous in the way in which William all through, with the utmost gravity, made a favour of being King of England—dwelt on the great sacrifices which he was making on her behalf, and on the unrequited and disproportionate labour which it cost him to keep her quiet. These islands gave so much trouble to their deliverer—to him who had left his home, and risked so much to rescue them. He could not govern these English; he would go back to Holland, and leave them to cut one another's throats. And Mr. Macaulay thinks that he spoke it in sad and disappointed earnest,—Mr. Macaulay, who has been all his life conversant with the words and purposes of kings and statesmen,—he thinks that so wise and shrewd a man as King William meant what he said, and had good reason to complain. Really it was rather too bad for William, after having grasped at the English crown when it was not his own, and while he was reaping for his own objects and ambition the advantages of wearing it, to give vent to peevish and unmanly grumbling, because it gave him trouble. It was but natural for Burnet to echo it;¹ but the

¹ 'At the opening of the Session of Parliament, 1697, the king told them, that in his opinion a standing land force was necessary: the House of Commons carried the jealousy of a standing army so high, that they would not hear the motion, nor did they like the way the king took of offering them his opinion on the point:

comedy becomes rather extravagant, when Mr. Macaulay deliberately invests it with the dignity of an involuntary outburst of heroic sadness and indignation.¹

The truth is, that with all his knowledge, and we must add, with all his assurance, Mr. Macaulay feels himself very much embarrassed, in trying to keep up the impression that he is bent on producing—that this able and ambitious foreign statesman was also, if not a successful, at least a patriotic and constitutional English king. For instance, William, as he distinctly and repeatedly points out, was his own foreign minister.² His English ministers were allowed to know no more of his dealings with his confederates at the Hague and at Ryswick than he chose to tell them, and that was very little. But this, of course, is highly unconstitutional, and Mr. Macaulay thinks it incumbent on him to give reasons for William's broad departure from constitutional principles.³ One reason is, that constitutional rights and limits were not yet settled and adjusted; and that is a good reason, though not always remembered by him on other occasions. Another, and one that he even more relies on, is, that if William might without censure be his own general and fight the battle of the Boyne, he might equally be his own Foreign Minister; and that is a bad one, first, because on the same ground he might have been anything else, Chancellor, Chief Justice, or Archbishop; and next, because the two cases are not parallel, nor is the amount of responsibility the same, in the cabinet minister, who decides upon the course which his country is to pursue and the engagements she is to contract abroad, and

this seemed a prescription to them, and might bias in some the counsels they were to offer to the king, and bar the freedom of debate: the managers of the court had no orders to name any number; so the house came to the resolution of paying off and disbanding all the forces which had been raised since 1680. This vote brought the army to be less than 8,000. The court were struck with this, and then they tried by an after-game to raise the number to 15,000. *If this had been proposed in time, it would probably have been carried without any difficulty; but the king was so long on the reserve, that now, when he came to speak out his mind, he found it was too late: so a force not exceeding 10,000 was all that the house could be brought to.*

On this Burnet remarks.—the difference, it will be observed, being between 15,000 and 10,000 men, and the defeat of the court having taken place solely by William's own fault—

This gave the king the greatest distaste of anything that had befallen him in his whole reign. He thought it would derogate much from him, and render his alliance so inconsiderable, that he doubted whether he could carry on the government, after it should have been reduced to so weak and so contemptible a state. He said, that if he could have imagined, that after all the service he should have done the nation, he should have met with such returns, he would never have meddled in our affairs; and that he was weary of governing a nation that was so jealous, as to lay itself open to an enemy, rather than trust him, who had acted so faithfully during his whole life, that he had never once deceived those who trusted him. He said this, with a great deal more to the same purpose, to myself; but he saw the necessity of submitting to that which could not be helped.—Burnet, ii. 207.

¹ Vol. iii. 528—531.

² iii. 14, 67; iv. 9.

³ iv. 10, 11.

in the general who fights a battle, even if that battle chance to be a critical one. No one will say that William's responsibility was the same, when he secretly pledged England to the Partition Treaty¹ without asking the advice of his own ministers or the consent of Spain, and when he resolved to take the chance of fighting at Landen, or of besieging Namur. But in reality the argument is quite superfluous, and neither Mr. Macaulay's reasons, nor those of his opponents, ever entered William's mind. One thing is quite certain, that he came to England to be his own foreign minister. He came to England to carry on more effectually a great European plan of policy, which was the work and object of his life, and to which he intended the foreign policy of England to contribute. To have given up that foreign policy to an English minister, would have been to give up that for which alone he cared to be King of England. Whether the constitution was violated or not, the author of the League of Augsburg would never have left in any hands but his own the direction of an influence, on whose weight, far more than on his campaigns or sieges, the result of his great undertaking depended.

The constitutional feature which, as strongly as any other, marks William's connexion with England, is the beginning in his reign of that organized and acknowledged system of corruption in Parliament which was for more than a century the shame and almost the condemnation of parliamentary government.² It began under William, and William himself practised

¹ Burnet, ii. 232.

² 1689. 'From him' (Sir John Trevor) 'began the practice of buying off men, in which hitherto the king had kept to stricter rules. I took the liberty once to complain to the king of this method; he said, he hated it as much as any man could; but he saw it was not possible, considering the corruption of the age, to avoid it, unless he would endanger the whole.'—*Burnet*, ii. 42. Compare Mr. Macaulay's paraphrase, iv. 547.

1691. 'The taking off Parliament men, who complained of grievances, by places and pensions, was believed now to be very generally practised.'—*Burnet*, ii. 86.

1693. 'The truth was, it came to be observed, that some got credit by opposing the government. . . This gave a specious colour to those who charged the court with designs of corrupting members, or at least of stopping their mouths by places and pensions.'—*Burnet*, ii. 105.

Sir Christopher Musgrave, 'on many critical occasions, gave up some important points, for which the king found it necessary to pay him very liberally.' *Burnet* ii. 109; and the notes of Dartmouth, Onslow, and Hardwicke. Sir C. Musgrave was the 'unsuspected old patriot' of Pope's lines ('Moral Essays,' iii. 35)—

'Once, we confess, beneath the patriot's cloak,
From the crack'd bag, the dropping guinea spoke;
And gingling down the back-stairs, told the crew,
"Old Cato is as great a rogue as you."'

1694. 'The strength and reputation' of our constitution 'was very much sunk; for corruption was so generally spread, that it was believed that everything was carried that way.'—*Burnet*, ii. 133.

Mr. Macaulay's remarks on the history and peculiarities of Parliamentary corruption (iii. 541—547) are a curious mixture of truth and sophistry.

it broadly and frankly. Mr. Macaulay tells us that it was so; but he adds, William declared that he did not like it—that he did it against his will, because he could not help himself. Probably Sir Robert Walpole sometimes said the same. But what we look for, on the part of a high-souled and honest ruler, at the first appearance of a great mischief, debasing and mining the character of a nation, is some signs of appreciation of its evil, and some attempt to check it. Even Mr. Macaulay can find nothing of this kind to record of William. With a passing verbal protest, that he could not avoid it and gain his ends, William, with quiet unconcern, left it to gather and gain head, and used it. It was cunning policy in the foreign statesman, who wanted English resources as readily and with as little trouble as possible; it was base and unkingly policy, as much so as that of any of the Stuarts, in an English sovereign.

Mr. Macaulay lays the blame on the people who were willing to be corrupted. And he enlarges in strong and terrible language on the utter want of principle and honour among William's English servants. But if it was so, what reason have we for setting William himself so much higher in the scale, as regards public spirit and nobility of soul, than his own generation? We see in him one of those men, not so rare in history, to whom power was the chiefest of earthly goods, and whom nature had endowed with a marvellous aptitude for winning and retaining power. William's aptitude consisted, not in impressing his own will and character on everything around him, like Louis or Napoleon, but in managing that other men in pursuing their own ends should forward his own. It would have been a new and curious study to Macchiavelli, and he best could have done it justice—that passionate yet disciplined nature, from childhood, in spite of the impediments and blight of a life-long sickness, burning and panting after power, yet never misled by passion or chance as to the conditions under which power was within its reach—doggedly battling against the load and fret of weakness and asthma, yet master at every moment of a judgment as undisturbed, as sure, as profound, as unclouded as the spirit which it served was restless and troubled; with fierce and desperate energy making the most of the doubtful chances of life, and peevish always and sullen, and often tempestuous in his rage at contradiction, as if he felt that his time was short, and he could less afford to be hindered than healthier men; yet of all men the most convinced that hurry was useless—of all men the most patient to bide his opportunity and resigned to its inevitable lingering—of all men the most patient to put up with failure and repair a mistake: prompt and hot and venturous at the nick of the enterprise, yet retiring unmortified and undismayed, if it

missed, to contrive it afresh : a man whom all witness to have been imperious, resentful, contemptuous, yet broken in to be so cool, so yielding, so craftily considerate, so wary, so studious of temperaments and compromise, so averse to violent expedients, in the moment of calculation and counsel : unbending in purpose, irresistible in will, impetuous when resolved to act; yet it was in the subtle combinations of policy that he found his keenest enjoyment; the more the game admitted of skill and play, the more indirect the road by which he moved round to his object, the greater the zest he felt; and even louder than his glee in the hunting-field, when some stag with sixteen antlers had fallen, was his boisterous laugh of triumph when he had outwitted his opponent.¹ He was the silent and crafty weaver of a network of opposing interests, which with unwearied patience and clear-sightedness he maintained unbroken. He measured with cold and keen judgment the passions, the aims, the dangers, the antipathies of other men, and so worked on them and so balanced them, that they should do his purpose, and he seem necessary to fulfil their own. No statesman had yet arisen in modern Europe who had been able to survey so exactly and with such dispassionate impartiality the forces of the fierce jarring elements round him, or to calculate so truly the precise point, up to which they might be, beyond which they could not be, harmonized. Undaunted and inflexible, he had yet comprehended, from the spectacles of that bloody age, that before the sure reaction from violent extremes and ferocious retribution, even courage and resolution are in vain. Wary and keen-sighted, his very keen-sightedness showed him that the fashionable suspiciousness of the politicians of his day, instead of being a mark of deep sagacity, was mere stupidity and blindness; that it was powerless to prevent what was really dangerous, while it made what was safe, intolerable; and having seen through his instruments, their clashing temptations and master passions, he rested secure in his estimate of their game. But what is there in all this to place William, except in intellect and force of character, above his fellows? and what is there *more*? We are told about many other things,—his high feelings of friendship, his noble simplicity of taste, his piety, his conjugal love. It is easy to imagine it; it is easy to add those insinuating epithets, which have almost the power of fact, and against which it is so difficult to guard our feelings from being imposed upon. But where is the proof? That William had a hearty and obsequious² servant in Bentinck and was attached to him; that he liked the ditches of Holland and the hedges of Loo better than Windsor; that at solemn and critical times he spoke of Providence; that

¹ Lord Dartmouth in Burnet, ii. 304.

² Burnet's word, ii. 5.

latterly he learned to treat the wife, who brought him his crown, less offensively, and was deeply moved by her untimely death,—is really but very small warrant for all that Mr. Macaulay has embroidered on these very commonplace and ordinary facts. It is not enough to prove that he was either a high-souled or a good man. And when Mr. Macaulay makes such a merit of the Act of Grace, and of the indisposition of William's government to shed the blood of political opponents, it simply proves, what no one has questioned, that William had thought more coolly and profoundly than the angry men around him about what would best secure his throne in England. But we must pause before we admire the humanity of the man who gave with such indifference—to take Burnet's exculpation—the order for the extirpation of the Macdonalds, and deliberately refused to punish the miscreant who had so terribly interpreted his words: before we extol the magnanimity of the man, who, from personal vindictiveness,¹ insisted on extra-legal means being found to compass the destruction of so insignificant an offender as Sir John Fenwick: before we can think highly of the feelings of honour of a king, who out of all England chose to take to his bosom, and to treat with greater confidence than any other Englishman, the abandoned Sunderland: before we can think very highly of the conjugal feelings of him who, when he became king of England by Mary's title, made Elizabeth Villiers the richly endowed Countess of Orkney. It is an unhappy distinction of William that he was the last English Sovereign whose assent was given to a sentence of death by act of attainder;² the last whose name is signed to a warrant for an indiscriminate massacre on grounds of State; the last whose name is signed to a warrant for the use of the torture.³ We spoke of the grim satisfaction with which a politician of the old Italian school would have contemplated such a specimen of state-craft, exquisitely and temperately adjusted to its times: if anything could add to that grim satisfaction, it would be to see how easy it is to portray such a character in the colours of unswerving honour, and of noble and self-denying goodness.

The effect of this primary false conception is obvious throughout the history. This one false patch of leading colour throws

¹ Mr. Macaulay suggests that William's 'intense personal aversion' to Sir John Fenwick arose from his impertinence to Mary, after the fall of Mons (iv. 34). He gives no proof; and other reasons were assigned at the time, not very probable ones, perhaps, but at least as probable, as that William should have so resented impertinence to a lady, even if that lady was Mary.

² Macaulay, iv. 769.

³ In Nevil Payne's case. 'This is the last instance of the use of the torture in Scotland. An account of it is to be found in the record of the Scottish Privy Council, 10 Dec., 1690. There was a special warrant for it, signed by the king and Melville.'—Dalrymple's 'Memoirs' (second edition, 1771), p. 426, note.

all the rest of the picture into confusion. The central point being wrong, the other parts of the construction are distorted or dragged out of their place. In proportion as William rises, all who belonged to him rise too; all who were in collision with him suffer. And as William rises much higher than he ought, a good deal of force and a good deal of artifice are needed to keep his friends in their places; and a good deal of uncandid and unfair severity is exercised towards those who opposed him. In proportion as his rule is assumed to be beneficent and righteous, insensibility to its benefits appears more inexcusable, and opposition to it a darker crime. In proportion as it is assumed that it ought to have appeared to all men the plain and manifest settlement of great distractions—that its title was without a flaw, and the means of its establishment pure and blameless—in the same proportion will attempts to overturn it appear to deserve the stigma of treason, and unfaithfulness to it to be inexplicable except on the supposition of stupidity or wickedness. But these judgments depend on that which we form of the qualifications of William's government to command attachment and confidence; and few will agree with Mr. Macaulay's estimate of these qualifications, even from a perusal of his own history.

Mr. Macaulay writes as if it were a subject of astonishment, that when William seized the crown, England was not at once quiet and submissive under his rule. He seems to think that on all sides the Revolution ought to have been accepted as final. He treats it as unpardonable crime,—and when Mr. Macaulay does not pardon, his vigilant dislike never slumbers,—that friends and enemies should not at once have surceased from all looking forward to the contingencies of the future, and resigned themselves with unreserved confidence to the guidance of the Deliverer. He is beyond measure indignant that there should have been any Non-jurors, any Jacobites, any adherents to the old-fashioned yet widely received Cavalier doctrines of hereditary right. He overflows with scorn and sarcasm at the restlessness and pertinacity of the party of the defeated House; their acts are always baser and more crooked than those of any other plotters of those days; Jacobite libels and lampoons are continually alluded to, as if they were more bitter and more mendacious than those of any other party; he sneers at Jacobite secret presses, as if none but Jacobites had ever printed in garrets, under the fear of spies and messengers and the danger of a Council warrant; he laughs at Jacobite parsons busily running about the streets with the news, just as if Dissenting preachers or Whig informers had never run about as busily in their time. And it is not Jacobites only whom he treats so severely. He seems to find it difficult to understand how any Englishman

could have balanced, after William was on the throne, between an old line of kings and an untried and scarcely known foreigner. He writes as if it was a disgrace to them that they did not at first glance discern the wisdom of the Convention's choice, and the singular fitness for the English throne of the great Continental statesman whom they had chosen. He is disgusted with the Whigs for checking and distrusting William; he is disgusted with the Tories for not preferring him to any one else. The ties of years had been broken all over the country; the course of government abruptly turned aside by a most eventful and unforeseen experiment; not the wisest of those who dared it could predict its issue: yet Mr. Macaulay writes as if it is surprising that William's accession should not at once have silenced all regrets, all doubtings, all anxieties, and won the hearty allegiance of every class of the English people.

But Mr. Macaulay's fundamental apprehension of the state of things in those days is unfair and narrow. He tries a state of disturbance by the rules of a state of rest. It is obvious that you must make very different allowances for the behaviour of a whole nation, and of its parties and factions, where a government is an acknowledged and settled one, and where a title is new and contested, where possession is precarious and uncertain, where authority is but of yesterday and has itself arisen out of violence and intrigue, and where the minds of all men are still vexed and harassed by the sense of insecurity and the probability of change. Even conspiracy and insurrection, even the dissimulations and stratagems of defeated partizans will have a different aspect in the eyes of fair lookers-on, according to their times. Bad and wrong, and ultimately mischievous, such measures almost always are; yet it is to be remembered that they have almost always been but the too ready and natural weapons of all defeated parties in troublous times, in carrying on a dispute which was yet unsettled, and in which they hoped still for a turn of fortune. But Mr. Macaulay would have us deal with the times and government of William as we might with those of Queen Victoria, and invokes the same detestation on the Jacobites, that he might justly invoke now against conspirators with Russia. This is false history, and false art too, in a writer of history. Mr. Macaulay knows quite well, and has no business to forget, when he fixes some name of infamy on a Jacobite partizan, or brands the whole body with his passing scorn, that William's government sprang out of conspiracy; that its success was not brought about by the clear undoubting call of the whole nation, but had hung balanced on a fleeting moment of exasperation and doubt; that it had rested in the first instance on foreign arms; and that if, as Whigs hold,

patriotic wisdom had one great part in its establishment, unscrupulous violation of law, undisguised selfishness, and the basest betrayal of allegiance and trust, confessedly had the other. It is too much to expect that such an example should be lost on those whom it had so terribly injured and so strongly provoked, or to affect indignation, because those crooked and questionable expedients which had not been spared at the Revolution, and which too many good men of all parties in those evil days thought unavoidable, were turned against itself. Mr. Macaulay has no business to forget, when he is so angry with the fickleness, the mistrust, the restlessness of English society, that during the years of which he treats, William's government was, both to those who hoped, and those who feared from it, the most uncertain one in Europe. It is too much to expect that the feelings which had been strangely shaken in the convulsion of the Revolution, should at once fall to their level, and be laid to rest. It is too much to expect, even after the government began to give proofs of its stability, that the public mind should not still for a long while show traces of disquietude and uneasiness—that men should not, long afterwards, dwell on the chances of change—that those who wished for it, should at once relinquish the well-known and well-used arts in which all the statesmen of the day had at one time or another dabbled:—

— ‘*Ceu murmurat alti
Impacata quies pelagi, cum flamine fracto
Durat adhuc sævitque tumor, dubiumque per æstum
Lassa recedentis fluitant vestigia venti.*’¹

Such was England in the years after the Revolution: ‘a working sea remaining from the storm;’ it was seen in due time that the strength of the tempest was broken; but on that heaving and rolling surface the flaws and blasts of the departing gale long swept, and left it doubtful whether it were indeed tired out or again arising to its work.

Even where Mr. Macaulay condemns justly, his sentence is too often either extreme, or partial; and that which affects it, is invariably seen to be, his extravagant and unhistorical estimate of William. In judging offences against William, he loses sight of the temperate and large-minded measures of a judge; in discriminating between these very offences, in palliating or darkening them, his judgment seems to be mainly swayed by the relation in which the offender stood to William, whether he was favoured or disliked by William—whether he did service to William, or opposed him. The determining motive of his judgment of men and things is, for a writer of so much art and

¹ Claudian in Ruf. i. 70.

of such high pretensions to philosophy and candour, surprisingly transparent. The general tone of speaking, the passing sympathy or sarcasm, the epithet of softer or darker shade, the extenuating or aggravating touch in a final summing up, are as uniformly and rigorously governed by the impression which he labours to convey of William, as they would be, if he were writing a novel, or arguing the case of a client.

Take the case of the intrigues which are now proved to have been carried on with S. Germain, by some of the chief men of the Revolution and of William's court—Shrewsbury, Marlborough, Godolphin, Russell, Halifax, Sunderland, and we must add, Danby. The Revolution had hardly been accomplished, before these men began to make professions of loyalty and promises of service to James. It is at once ludicrous and humiliating, after reading the record of their bargainings, their repentances, their bland and impudent hypocrisies, which James kept locked up in his desk to be produced for the edification of posterity, to turn back and see how they looked to the eye of their contemporaries, dazzled by the 'constellation' that presided over the glories of Blenheim and Malplaquet; to read Isaac Bickerstaff's enthusiasm about the league of great characters, 'the ablest and best men of the nation' who governed 'Felicia'; about Martio's administrative integrity, and the 'severe honesty of Horatio,' 'living in a court unsullied by its arts;' and with what pleasure the Whig Essayist reflected on the dispensations of Providence in the forty years of Marlborough's life, and on the noble arts by which his elevation had been won and was sustained. A thorough-going admirer and defender of the Revolution may be pardoned for a natural irritation at having to make the avowal that such great names are so deeply stained: his feelings have been represented by the great poet, when he figures himself as discovering with astonishment and horror, how terribly the popular estimate of so many of the famous men of Florence had been reversed in Hell:

Farinata, e' l Tegghiaio che fur si degni,
Jacopo Rusticucci, Arrigo, e' l Mosca,
E gli altri che a ben far poser gl' ingegni,
Dimmi ove sono, e fa ch' io li conosca.
E quegli: *ei son tra l' anime più nere.*

A common-place partizan might still perhaps attempt to defend them. That is not Mr. Macaulay's plan. He gives them up, and lavishes his scorn and abuse on their perfidy and baseness. That such double-dealing as theirs was perfidious and base, there cannot be a question. But there are degrees even

¹ Tatler, No. 4, 5, and 130. Spectator, Dedic. to vol. iv. Martio is Russell, Horatio is Godolphin.

in perfidy. There is a perfidy so great and dangerous and unnatural, that we shrink from it with abhorrence and hatred. But there is a perfidy also which we are disgusted at and despise, but which is not big enough or serious enough to be angry with or make much of. Mr. Macaulay seems to us to have exaggerated the character and drift, and even the guilt of their intrigues, and to have been led into this exaggeration, by his erroneous estimate of William and his position in England. Suppose him to be a great patriot king; suppose his authority consecrated by a title which none disputed, by use, and time, and undisturbed allegiance; suppose him, even though an intruder, to have won that general allegiance by a rule which all confessed to make amends for a doubtful title; suppose that no evil arts had surrounded and helped on his accession, or at any rate that the time of evil arts was confessedly long over, and its memory overlaid by greater and happier days; suppose him to have set the example of high disinterestedness, pure honour, and genuine love of his people: then, indeed, we might be indignant at those who harboured the thought of disturbing such a settlement, and declaim against the duplicity and false dealings of Marlborough and his associates as the blackest of treasons, and a 'mystery of iniquity.' But Mr. Macaulay's tone is too tragic, and his indignation too intense for a king like William, and for the ideas which prevailed about public honour and integrity in England and Europe in his time. William had played with them at the game of selfishness, and had played as deep and as unscrupulously as any of them: he had served himself of them, and served himself well: but when he had gained his ends, they were not inclined to let the game drop. They felt that they had helped to set him up; they felt also that the question of success was far from settled between him and the old king; they felt that the public opinion on which his throne rested was far from being as clear in his favour as it needed to be, to make him secure; besides all this, each had his own private discontents, legitimate grounds, according to the morality of that day, for extreme public measures. Cautious, yet deeply pledged gamesters, they had no notion of

¹ Macaulay, iv. 52. It is amusing to find him falling on the favourite word, which all parties in those days used to describe the practices of their opponents. The Edinburgh preachers applied it to 'liberty of conscience,' (iii. 707,) Melfort, to the Revolution, (Macpherson's Orig. Papers, i. 349.) It is one of Mr. Macaulay's mannerisms, to affect the use of Scripture phrases. He is particularly fond of the phrases,—*'but none of these things moved him;'* and *'extreme to mark what is done amiss.'* See e.g. iii. 578, 656; iv. 227, 274, 359, 462, 517, 522, 523, 617. In this fashion he follows a great Whig model. It is remarkable to observe how Algernon Sidney, though a deist, seems almost naturally to have fallen into Scripture phraseology, in some of his last striking protests. Dalrymple Memoirs, 81, 96, 98.

playing for their heads on behalf of a brother gamester, and one who had carried off the largest stake, without, as Mr. Macaulay says, 'hedging' them. In that day of confusion, when all political ties were so lightly felt and so loosely worn, there is not much to wonder at in this. Nor is there much to be said about the aggravation to be found in the obligations of most of them to William. For after all, they gave him ample service; they obviously meant to support him as long as he could be supported. It was, as indeed Mr. Macaulay admits, James, not William, who had most reason to complain that they were playing him false; but he understood their game, and he accepted it for what it was worth. He accepted Russell's professions before La Hogue; Russell sent them, and James accepted them as readily, just as if nothing had happened, after La Hogue. William understood their game too: and in nothing, certainly, is his patient sagacity more shown than in his estimate of their intrigues. Mr. Macaulay praises his lenity and forbearance; the truth is, that it would have been folly to have made much of the danger, and to have shown severity would have cost him his crown. William measured truly his position and their own; he knew that he must deal with these magnates of English parties, just as he dealt with the members of his continental confederacy, that he must allow for their ends, and make what he could out of them for himself. He was a man who never kicked against what could not be helped; and it could not be helped that his friends in England should feel their necks in some danger, and should feel a natural wish to make them as safe as they could. Very slippery and dirty work is all this; but there is an interval, which an historian has no right to slur over, between it, and what we understand and mean by the great crime of treason. It is perfectly true that an offence smaller than the least perfidy of the least criminal of these offenders would, in our days, disqualify a man, not only for public office, but even for decent society; but it is also true, that politicians in those days thought less of deserting a king, or intriguing with a pretender, than politicians do, in our days, of deserting a party or trafficking about a place. In that age the law punished such doings with death, but opinion was very tolerant towards them. The law branded them as the most heinous of human crimes: opinion regarded them as the natural expedients of political malcontents, in carrying out their designs. Those statesmen who corresponded with James under William, had corresponded with William under James: and had James come back, would probably have corresponded with William again, as soon as they thought that things were going wrong, and public evils or their own affronts required a remedy.

Algernon Sidney has become a household instance, when men speak of heroic patriotism; yet Mr. Macaulay has had to tell us that Algernon Sidney was a pensioner of France.¹ A purer and worthier name is that of Lord William Russell; yet Lord William Russell was leagued with Shaftesbury, belonged to the great conspiracy of which the Rye House Plot was the adjunct and interior mystery, backed the perjuries of Titus Oates, clamoured for the innocent blood of Stafford and complained that the extremity of shame and torture was spared to his dying moments;² and, in order to thwart an unconstitutional English king, was willing to lend himself, or pretend to lend himself, to the designs of the French king against England. Those who would not have done like them, under the provocation of personal disputes or political defeat, were not many. Familiarity with change, and the spectacle and anticipation of great vicissitudes, tried men's habits of consistency and integrity, and long years were to elapse before their minds calmed down, and a higher standard of good faith and honesty became general. In the political history of modern Spain, we may see something like an image of what men proposed to themselves and dared, of what they thought justifiable or necessary in England, in those years of uncertainty and trouble, from the civil wars to the establishment of the house of Hanover. We justly condemn the Spanish standard of what is lawful and honourable in

¹ 'These jealousies were studiously fomented by the French king. He had long kept England passive by promising to support the throne against the Parliament. He now, alarmed by the patriotic counsels of Danby, began to inflame the Parliament against the throne. . . . The unsteadiness and faithlessness of Charles were such that the French Government and the English opposition, agreeing in nothing else, agreed in disbelieving his protestations, and were equally desirous to keep him poor and without an army. Communications were opened between Barillon, the Ambassador of Lewis, and those English politicians, who had always professed, and who indeed sincerely felt, the greatest dread and dislike of French ascendancy. The most upright member of the country party, William Lord Russell, did not scruple to concert with a foreign mission, schemes for embarrassing his own sovereign. This was the whole extent of Russell's offence. His principles and his fortune alike raised him above all temptations of a more sordid kind; but there is too much reason to believe that some of his associates were less scrupulous. It would be unjust to impute to them the extreme wickedness of taking bribes, to injure their country; on the contrary, they meant to serve her: but it is impossible to deny that they were mean and indelicate enough to let a foreign prince pay them for serving her.' [Was that what they professed to Louis, and Louis meant?] 'Among those who cannot be acquitted of this degrading charge, was one man who is popularly considered as the personification of public spirit, and who, in spite of some great moral and intellectual faults, has a just claim to be called a hero, a philosopher, and a patriot. It is impossible to see without pain such a name in the list of the pensioners of France. Yet it is some consolation to reflect, that in our time, a public man would be thought lost to all sense of duty and shame, who should not spurn from him a temptation which conquered the virtue and the pride of Algernon Sidney.'—*Macaulay*, i. 228, 229.

² Dalrymple Memoirs, 93. Cf. *Macaulay*, iii. 525.

party strife; the faithlessness and fickleness of Spanish factions and their leaders, the reckless and violent courses which they engage in so lightly; but there would be no justice in affixing the same amount of turpitude to the ill-conduct of this or that Spanish politician, which we should be justified in doing, if he were an English one of our day.

If these things had been done against James, instead of against William, Mr. Macaulay would, probably, without disguising or denying the immorality of such double-dealing, have taken care to put us in mind of the circumstances of the time, and the difficulties under which statesmen acted. The writer who has contrived with such exquisite ingenuity to do full justice to the faults of Clive and Warren Hastings, and yet to efface the effect of them, and leave their authors with the halo of their glory not dimmed but heightened—the writer who, in this History, in describing the part of the Master of Stair in the greatest political atrocity of the age, has found no difficulty in throwing on him the whole burden of the guilt, and yet so overlaying it with favourable suppositions and extenuating circumstances, that we are left, at the end, with the feeling that, after all, it was but a mistake of judgment—that the Master had been misled by excessive public spirit, and excessive historical research—by his zeal against Highland caterans, and by having read how a Pope of Rome had cunningly poisoned a whole band of robbers,—such a writer would have found something to say even for Marlborough, if Marlborough had intrigued for William instead of for himself, and if Marlborough had not been, by his ties with William's successor, placed in greater opposition to William than any other courtier. It would better have become the historian who can find some excuse for the massacre of Glencoe, to have restrained the severity of his judgment and the strength of his epithets against the miserable yet extremely usual devices of courtiers to make themselves more important persons, or to provide against the day of change. And he is not only excessive, but partial, in his condemnation. Marlborough, as every one knows, is the object of his bitter scorn and dislike. Marlborough he brands, whenever he has a chance, with some insult, expressive at once of the criminal's ability and his baseness. Marlborough's name provokes him as a red flag does a wild bull. Against Marlborough he gives himself a licence of broad and frank abuse which would not have done discredit to the most virulent of the lampooners of that age of lampoons. When Marlborough professes his sorrow for having betrayed James, Mr. Macaulay suggests that 'the loss of half-a-guinea would have done more to spoil his appetite and disturb his slumbers than all the terrors of an evil

'conscience.'¹ If some crime of Marlborough is to be described, it is set before us as but one of the 'hundred villanies of Marlborough.'² Two distinct charges are elaborately constructed against him. The grounds of them are not very ample:—a few dark and meagre lines among James's papers, proving nothing clearly but correspondence and negotiations; but they are enough for Mr. Macaulay to work on, and through three or four pages he supplies motives, intentions, designs, circumstantial details, with a clearness, and copiousness, and positiveness, which an ordinary reader thinks it too bold to ascribe to Mr. Macaulay's intuitive and confident knowledge of Marlborough's secret soul, and refers, naturally enough, to some unquoted sources of information. We close the book with the impression that of all the villains spoken of in English history, Marlborough was the basest, and of all the traitors the blackest.

Certainly the turn of the wheel has come round in a very remarkable manner for the reputation of the conqueror of Louis XIV., and the idol of the Augustan age of England; since Addison sung his glories, and declared of his great deeds, that 'those who paint them truest praise them most.' A great novelist,³ and a great historian, have in our days agreed to

¹ Vol. iv. p. 62.

² Vol. iv. p. 512.

³ 'Our chief, whom England and all Europe, saving only the Frenchmen, worshipped almost, had this of the godlike in him, that he was impassible before victory, before danger, before defeat. Before the greatest obstacle or the most trivial ceremony—before a hundred thousand men drawn in battalia, or a peasant slaughtered at the door of his burning hovel—before a carouse of drunken German lords, or a monarch's court, or a cottage-table where his plans were laid, or an enemy's battery vomiting flame and death and strewing corpses round about him—he was always cold, calm, resolute, like Fate. He performed a treason or a court-bow, he told a falsehood as black as Styx, as easily as he paid a compliment or spoke about the weather. He took a mistress and left her; he betrayed his benefactor and supported him, or would have murdered him, with the same calmness always and having no more remorse than Clotho when she weaves the thread, or Lachesis when she cuts it. In the hour of battle, I have heard the Prince of Savoy's officers say, The Prince became possessed with a sort of warlike fury; his eyes lighted up; he rushed hither and thither, raging; he shrieked curses and encouragement, yelling and harking his bloody war-dogs on, and himself always at the first of the hunt. Our Duke was as calm at the mouth of the cannon as at the door of a drawing-room. Perhaps he could not have been the great man he was, had he had a heart either for love or hatred, or pity or fear, or regret or remorse. He achieved the highest deed of daring, or deepest calculation of thought, as he performed the very meanest action of which a man is capable; told a lie, or cheated a fond woman, or robbed a poor beggar of a halfpenny, with a like awful serenity, and equal capacity of the highest and lowest acts of our nature. His qualities were pretty well known in the army, where there were parties of all politics, and of plenty of shrewdness and wit; but there existed such a perfect confidence in him as the first captain of the world, and such a faith and admiration in his prodigious genius and fortune, that the very men whom he notoriously cheated of their pay, the chiefs whom he used and injured,—(for he used all men, great and small, that came near him, as his instruments alike, and took something of theirs, either some quality or some property,—the blood of a soldier, it might be, or a jewelled hat, or a hundred thousand crowns from a king, or a por-

describe him as the most despicable and odious of his contemporaries—intrepidly serene, and the master of fortune, in the meanest crimes and humiliations, and the highest trials of man. That he was a bad man, none can doubt; that he was so pre-eminent in badness above the rest of his fellows, is a view which may probably be fairly disputed, and which seems to have recommended itself less from positive proof than from the tempting and striking contrast which it offers to his unquestioned fortune, genius, and glory. At any rate, for the preeminence in guilt among the intriguers with S. Germain, which Mr. Macaulay assigns him, we see no reason whatever. We can see no good reason for the excuses and softenings which Mr. Macaulay suggests for all the rest, at Marlborough's expense. The evidence against them all is contained in the fragmentary remains of the secret archives of James's closet and cabinet which have survived to our time, the notes which James took of the information sent him by his agents, and the reports of these agents themselves. It is evidence which provokes, much more than it satisfies, curiosity; for neither it is, for the most part, first hand, nor does it enter much into details, nor is it continuous. It implicates a number of persons; but the degree of complicity of each, even the designs of each, it is impossible to extract from it with any certainty. The names which occur most frequently are those of Churchill, Russell, and Godolphin; but where other names are mentioned, as much is implied about their overtures, as in the fuller accounts of the words and behaviour of the former, and perhaps more reliance disclosed on their intentions and promises. But all who appear in those papers, must equally share the imputations which arise from them. The evidence is incomplete, and often excites suspicion; but whatever its force is against one, the same is its force against another, though one be oftener mentioned than the other; for the only thing which we can be sure of, from its notices, is the fact of communication; and that is as clear

tion out of a starving sentinel's three farthings; or, when he was young, a kiss from a woman, and a gold chain off her neck, taking all he could from woman or man, and having, as I have said, this of the godlike in him, that he could see a hero perish or a sparrow fall with the same amount of sympathy for either. Not that he had no tears: he could always order up his reserve at the proper moment to battle; he could draw upon tears or smiles alike, and whenever need was for using this cheap coin. He would cringe to a shoeblick, as he would flatter a minister or a monarch; be haughty, be humble, threaten, repent, weep, grasp your hand, or stab you, whenever he saw the occasion.)—But yet those of the army who knew him best and had suffered most from him admired him most of all; and as he rode along the lines to battle, or galloped up in the nick of time to a battalion reeling from before the enemy's charge or shot, the fainting men and officers got new courage as they saw the splendid calm of his face and felt that his will made them irresistible.—*Thackeray's Esmond.*]

against Halifax, and Danby,¹ and Sunderland,² as against Churchill and Russell. It is true that Halifax is only mentioned

¹ Mr. Macaulay singularly underrates the weight of a single good witness. Speaking of Danby, he expresses great surprise that he should have been considered at S. Germain's as a favourer of James. 'How he came to be so considered is a most perplexing question.' The information about his dealings is 'contained in a single short paper written by Melfort, 16th Oct., 1693.' If the 'single short paper' is authentic and conclusive, there need be no perplexity, though it be short and single. The single short paper is a paper of instructions, in James's name, to the 'Earl of Danby, Lord Godolphin, and Churchill, by the Countess of Shrewsbury'—in which he, in conjunction with the other lords, and Shrewsbury and Russell, is told, both in general and in particular, what he is to do. It is a letter which implies perfect understanding, and it is one of a batch of despatches of the same date to a number of persons in England, in contemplation, apparently, of an early movement. There cannot be a clearer proof that James had reason for thinking that he might expect Danby's services as much as those of Churchill or Russell. He is also mentioned in another paper—anonymous, but not, as Mr. Macaulay says, undated—for it has Nairne's endorsement, and approximate date about the same time, from Oct. to Dec., 1693—which Mr. Macaulay tosses aside as not worth notice. What is certain is, that the writer knew a good deal about England, and had minute information; and further, that Mr. Macaulay exaggerates grossly when he charges him with 'blundering grossly about Marlborough, Godolphin, Shrewsbury, and the Beaufort family,' and says that he 'knew nothing of the situation or character of any of the public men mentioned.' Mr. Macaulay finds fault with Mr. Hallam for saying that Caermarthen's name is perpetually mentioned among those whom James thought his friends. Mr. Hallam may speak too strongly; but Caermarthen is mentioned oftener than Mr. Macaulay tells us of. Churchill, at the first, spoke of him as a possible convert: 'he doubted not but that he could bring over many great men to the King's party; and desired to know whether he should endeavour that in reference to my lord Danby, who, he said, was the main stay to the present government, or join with the party in Parliament in contriving his ruin.'* He is distinctly mentioned by James himself after La Hogue: 'Shrewsbury, Danby, Godolphin, Russell, and others, seemed desirous that the king should be restored.'† In Lloyd's report of May, 1694, in which Shrewsbury is represented as the leader of James's friends, the Countess of Shrewsbury informs Lloyd that William was soon going to Holland; 'that he would leave the government in the hands of the princess; but that she would entirely follow the advices of Danby and Shrewsbury.'‡ Mr. Macaulay's argument from probabilities,—from Caermarthen's cunning, and from what he would lose if James came back,—too plainly cuts both ways to be worth anything.

² Mr. Macaulay unaccountably omits Sunderland among the intriguers with S. Germain's. Has he forgotten, in favour of one to whom William took so strongly—his host at Althorpe, his guide in forming the first Whig ministry—the mass of information in Macpherson's papers against Sunderland? 'He made, in profound secrecy, some timid overtures,' but 'they were ungraciously received;' and he was, 'in the main, true to government.' From Macpherson's documents we learn that Sunderland, who in the winter of 1693-4 had been deeper in William's confidence than any Englishman, was in January, 1694, writing to James, among other men of quality, that 'a descent is the only means to finish the misfortunes of the King and the nation, and that if his majesty comes now with an army he cannot fail to carry his point:' and at the same time, the Earl of Arran 'assures his majesty of the sincerity of Lord Sunderland, and that he may do good service.'§ From this time, Sunderland appears keeping up a correspondence with James and Arran. What seems to have suggested Mr. Macaulay's 'profound secrecy,' was his wish not to be talked about—which, under the circumstances, was natural; but there is not much 'timidity' in his overtures. In March, 1695, Sunderland professes to give

* Macpherson, 1692; i. 237.

† Ibid. i. 483.

‡ Ibid. 1692; i. 243.

§ Ibid. 1694, Jan.; i. 475.

once or twice; but when it appears that he was one of the earliest to retract his allegiance to the Convention Sovereign, to whom he had with his own hands offered the crown; that he is described as receiving the Jacobite agent with open arms; that he promised to do anything in his power to serve the King; that the cause of this change is said to have been the incompatible tempers of the statesman and his new master; that his frank assurances encouraged others, and that they particularly encouraged Godolphin,¹—it is manifest that such a statement, if worth anything, loses nothing of its weight by being the only one in a collection of fragments. It is as much a broad, damning proof against Halifax, as if it were mentioned twenty times besides. The charge does not become extenuated by being thrust away to the end, and alluded to in passing, at the summing up of Halifax's character and career. If personal neglect and wounded pride were, as Mr. Macaulay suggests, excuses for him, his colleagues in double-dealing could hardly have had worse themselves; and if, as his eulogist adds, he 'soon repented,' it only makes the case more complete against him; it is but in more perfect keeping with the popular, as contrasted with Mr. Macaulay's estimate, of the Accomplished Trimmer, who said that 'men must be saved in this world by want of faith.'²

Marlborough was undoubtedly bad enough, though the great scheme of ambition which Mr. Macaulay has elicited for him from James's few words be but a questionable surmise, and though the notice which he gave of the attack on Brest be a less serious matter than Mr. Macaulay would make it.³ If he

information of an intended attack on Toulon, but adds that he does not think it likely. In Nov., 1695, Middleton, speaking of the advantages of attacking England, mentions 'above all, the great credit of Lord Sunderland, who has always been the first to deceive himself, and the first to betray. But all these advantages will become useless, on account of our being unprepared to profit by them.'

¹ 'Buckley asked Godolphin what he would do to serve the cause. He rose suddenly from his chair, and said he would quit his office. This was a coy beginning. Buckley went to Halifax. He received him with open arms. He promised to do everything in his power to serve the King. Halifax was never to be satisfied, if controlled in anything. This had alienated him formerly from the King. The Prince of Orange finding his politics, though nice and subtle in speculation, yet seldom good in practice, they two did not hit it long. This free assurance of Halifax encouraged others. Godolphin was particularly encouraged, and made open assurances to the King.'—*Macpherson*; (*Extracts from James's Memoirs*, 1691.) i. 236.

² Quoted in the *Athenæum*, Dec. 29, 1855.

³ The objections to Mr. Macaulay's view are stated in the *Athenæum* of Dec. 29, 1855. They show how much he has assumed; but they are not conclusive against him. It is urged,—1. That Marlborough could not have meant the French to profit by his information, because he only wrote the day before the fleet was to sail, and the fleet, but for unforeseen hindrances, would have been at Brest nearly as soon as his letter at Versailles. And 2. That he could not in fact have helped

* *Macpherson*, March, 1695; i. 514. Nov. 1695; i. 528.

did not intend the overthrow of William, at least he amused James by pretending to do so, in case James should ever come back. But, bad as he is, if a difference is to be made between these unprincipled men, the chief place in shame and guilt belongs much more truly to one for whom Mr. Macaulay is singularly tender, even while he condemns him. Against Shrewsbury, the Whig idol, the proofs are not merely as conclusive, but nearly as multiplied as against Marlborough. His intrigues began as early, and were carried on without interruption, till Sir John Fenwick's confession effectually frightened him. His professed change of allegiance was no hasty outbreak of temper, no mere words over his wine; it was proved by deliberate, well-weighed acts, resolutely persisted in. His understanding with S. Germain was not an isolated act, it was a system persevered in for four years.¹ There are two transactions in the course of this time which throw much light on the dealings of Shrewsbury. When in May, 1690, a new and stringent Abjuration Bill against James was brought into the Lords, 'Shrewsbury,' writes Burnet, 'was at the head of those who pressed it most;' yet at this very moment Shrewsbury had made his peace with James, and convinced him that he was among his most blameless servants.¹ After the Abjuration Bill failed, Shrewsbury insisted, in spite of the remonstrances of Burnet, of Tillotson, of William, in spite of distress of mind that threw him into a fever, on resigning his office of Secretary of State. All the world thought it was because he and his Whig friends had been defeated in their hot advocacy of the Abjuration Bill; James understood that it was in obedience to his commands, and in order to give him a proof of Shrewsbury's sincerity.² The other transaction was, if possible, baser still.

them, because, though the fleet unexpectedly took a month getting to Brest, even a month was not enough, in those days, to admit of Marlborough's intelligence from London being acted on to any purpose at Brest. But, 1. Marlborough wrote, at least he says he wrote, the moment he had heard:—so much for his design that the news should reach as early as possible. 2. The *Athenæum* seems to over-estimate the length of time, which a letter sent *by express* would take to reach Louis—which it would take Vauban to reach Brest—and which it would require to make Brest formidable. James himself gives the date, *May 4*, as that on which 'Churchill informed him' of the design on Brest: and this could not be the date of Churchill's letter, for Sackville's letter enclosing it is dated *May 3*. *Macpherson*, i. 245, 486.

¹ 'It should be remarked,' writes James, 'that all who are of this party are not traitors.' After mentioning the Earl of Middleton, and General Sackville, he classes him with them: 'The Earl of Shrewsbury, who was Secretary of State to the Prince of Orange, laid down his employment by my orders. These men are too clear-sighted to allow themselves to be duped, and they have too much interest in my restoration, to allow themselves to be corrupted.'—*Macpherson*, i. 433. (1692, Nov.) James is speaking of what happened in the spring of 1690.—*Macaulay*, iii. 554, 596. *Burnet*, ii. 45.

² *Macaulay*, iii. 596.

In the end of 1693, and the beginning of 1694, Shrewsbury was earnestly pressed by William's friends, among others by Elizabeth Villiers, to take again the office he had laid down. He resisted for some time; and he had good reason; for during these months he was assuring James of his zeal for his service. 'Lord Shrewsbury,' wrote Churchill to James, 'was so pressed to receive his former office of Secretary, that he was afraid that he could not resist; but though he altered his condition, he assured him that he would not alter his inclinations.'¹ At length he was frightened into receiving them; William let him see that he knew that he had talked with a Jacobite agent, and intimated 'that Shrewsbury could only remove suspicion from himself by accepting the seals.' 'That,' said William, 'will put me quite at ease. I know that you are a man of honour, and that if you undertake to serve me, you will serve me faithfully. So pressed,' continues Mr. Macaulay, 'he complied, to the great joy of his whole party, and was immediately rewarded for his compliance with a dukedom and a garter.'² At the same time that he received his dukedom and his garter for consenting to be William's Secretary of State, he sent a message to S. Germain. He had waited, he said, in hopes that James would have come over. 'But that having failed,' writes the Jacobite Lloyd, after an interview with Shrewsbury's mother, 'to his great regret, he was obliged, on his return, to accept of the seals; which, she told me, from him, he did, only in order to serve your Majesty more effectually hereafter.'³

Yet for this man Mr. Macaulay is not ashamed to invoke our commiseration. Whenever Shrewsbury's conduct comes up, the historian has invariably something to say, to soften our heart towards him. The case is a bad one; the guilt is undeniable; Shrewsbury must be called a traitor; yet something may be said about it—*sunt verba et voces*—put it in the right light, and though the guilt cannot be denied, it may, by due skill, be made not to affect us like guilt. 'It was in an evil hour,' that this brilliant, accomplished, high-spirited, promising young man 'suffered himself to be seduced.'⁴ The 'evil,' or 'fatal,' or

¹ In a letter dated Feb. 28, 1694.—*Macpherson*, i, 245.

² *Macaulay*, iv. 505.

³ Lloyd's or Floyd's report, carried to Versailles, May 1, 1694. *Macpherson*, i. 480. Mr. Macaulay mentions these facts, (except the last message to James, mentioned in Lloyd's paper, to which he only gives a reference,) but he does not notice the coincidences of time, which give their real character to the transactions.

⁴ 'At what moment, and by what influence the unhappy man was induced to commit a treason . . . is not accurately known. It is highly probable that his mother . . . took fatal advantage of some unguarded hour, when he was irritated by finding his advice slighted, and that of Danby and Nottingham preferred.' iii. 596. 'Shrewsbury, irritated by finding his counsels rejected and those of his Tory rival followed, suffered himself in a fatal hour to be drawn into a correspon-

'unguarded hour' is repeated every time that the subject recurs, and with it the suggestion of some irresistible temptation, some overwhelming allurements taking its victim at advantage. We are not to think that Shrewsbury, like the rest, was a traitor of his own inclination; he was over-persuaded into it, 'induced to do it by some bad influence without him;' he 'suffered himself to be drawn into a correspondence,' from which he could not free himself. 'Marlborough and the rest had no scruple about corresponding with one king while corresponding with another; but Shrewsbury had, what they had not, a conscience;' and that explains how it was that 'while he was under engagements to James, he was unwilling to enter into the service of William.' And then he was so penitent—he suffered so deeply from remorse and self-torture. 'It is probable that he had scarcely committed his fault before he began to repent of it. But he had not strength to stop. Loathing his own baseness, dreading a detection which must be fatal to his honour, afraid to go forward, afraid to go back, he underwent tortures of which it is impossible to think without commiseration.' 'We have seen by what cruel sufferings of body and mind he expiated his fault. Tortured by remorse, and by disease the effect of remorse, he had quitted the court, but he had left behind him men whose principles were not less lax than his, and whose hearts were far harder and colder.' So Mr. Macaulay writes of him in 1690; yet in 1694 we again find this agonized penitent spoken of as the acknowledged leader and chief of these very men, consulted in all their plans, referred to as the judge of their actions and the proof of their sincerity, looked upon as the chief stay of the Jacobite cause in William's court.¹ In four years, it might be thought, such a penitent

dence with the banished family,' iv. 52. 'Had Shrewsbury spoken the whole truth he would have said that he had, in an evil hour, been false to the cause of the Revolution—that he had entered into engagements of which he repented, but from which he knew not how to extricate himself, and that while he remained under those engagements he was unwilling to enter into the service of the existing Government. . . . Shrewsbury had, what was wanting to Marlborough, Godolphin, and Russell, a conscience; a conscience, which indeed too often failed to restrain him from doing wrong, but which never failed to punish him,' iv. 472. 'Shrewsbury might in a moment of resentment or of weakness have trafficked with Jacobite agents,' iv. 720.

¹ See Lloyd's paper.—*Macpherson*, i. 481—3. Lloyd could not get Russell to be explicit. 'At last being unwilling to determine on any plan, he pretended to me in general that he would undertake the affair, and that Lord Shrewsbury and Lord Churchill should be judges of his actions.' 'Godolphin then explained his sentiments to your Majesty in the most affectionate manner imaginable;' thought that Russell had 'said all that could be expected of him, provided one could be sure that Lord Shrewsbury, whom he (Godolphin) believed to be sincerely in his Majesty's interest, had an entire influence over him.' Lady Shrewsbury told Lloyd that the Government, during William's absence, will be left in the hands of Mary; 'but that she would entirely follow the advices of Danby and Shrewsbury.'

might have retraced a step into which sudden temptation had led him. 'He could not free himself from his engagements,' says the historian. But why could he not? He had merely to give up corresponding; he had merely to refuse to receive visits; and there was not much fear that any one would turn round and inform against him. Mr. Macaulay has made a good story of the feigned penitence of Marlborough; at least as good a story might be made out of his compassionate suggestions about Shrewsbury. If it is ludicrous to hear Marlborough protesting that his heart is ready to break, and that he is longing to lay down his life to prove his penitence, it is just as ludicrous for Mr. Macaulay to dignify with the name of remorse for having been faithless to the right side, Shrewsbury's tormenting doubts, which would be the winning one; to bespeak our sympathy for him because he was thrown into a fever by not being able to make up his mind which King to serve, or rather, how far to carry his services to each, when he had deeply committed himself to both, and both were claiming from him proofs of sincerity; to dwell upon the sensitive conscience of a man who at the very moment that he was returning to his allegiance to James, was ostentatiously leading a hot faction in Parliament to impose a new oath to renounce him, and throwing up office because Parliament would not impose the oath; to exhibit as an imperfect yet real penitent, a man who carried on his double part with secret and wary caution year after year, and wound it up at last by accepting from one King, as the price to buy him off from his vacillation, the highest of titles, and that which is higher than the highest title, while in accepting he assured the other King that he had done so solely to serve him better. And Shrewsbury was what Marlborough was not, one of the few Englishmen whom William liked. He was the idol of James's enemies, and the favourite of James's rival. He was courted, caressed, and as Mr. Macaulay well expresses it, 'petted,' not only by 'nature and fortune,'¹ but as the first man of the Revolution. After all this we are edified by the consummate patience and self-command, with which Mr. Macaulay trusts himself to describe the deep and abject meanness with which this man excused himself to William, when his name had been mentioned by Sir J. Fenwick. Is it tenderness for a great Whig chief, or the halo of William surrounding even his unfaithful yet favoured servant, that blinds the historian? or is he speaking in irony?

'But Shrewsbury, who of all the four was the least to blame, was utterly overwhelmed. He wrote in extreme distress to William, acknowledged with warm expressions of gratitude the King's rare generosity, and

¹ Vol. iii. p. 596.

protested that Fenwick had malignantly exaggerated and distorted mere trifles into enormous crimes. "My Lord Middleton,"—such was the substance of the letter,—“was certainly in communication with me about the time of the battle of La Hogue. We are relations; we frequently met; we supped together just before he returned to France; I promised to take care of his interests here: he in return offered to do me good offices there; but I told him that I had offended too deeply to be forgiven, and that I would not stoop to ask forgiveness.” This, Shrewsbury averred, was the whole extent of his offence. It is but too fully proved that this confession was by no means ingenuous; nor is it likely that William was deceived. But he was determined to spare the repentant traitor the humiliation of owning a fault and accepting a pardon. “I can see,” the King wrote, “no crime at all in what you have acknowledged. Be assured that these calumnies have made no unfavourable impression on me. Nay, you shall find that they have strengthened my confidence in you.” A man hardened in depravity would have been perfectly contented with an acquittal so complete, announced in language so gracious. But Shrewsbury was quite unnerved by a tenderness which he was conscious that he had not merited. He shrank from the thought of meeting the master whom he had wronged, and by whom he had been forgiven, and of sustaining the gaze of the peers, among whom his birth and his abilities had gained for him a station of which he felt that he was unworthy.—Vol. iv. pp. 722, 723.

This connivance at the treasons of his great men, Mr. Macaulay thinks one of William's chief titles to glory. Speaking of Fenwick's confession, he says,—

‘It contained little more than what he had long known, and had long, with politic and generous dissimulation, affected not to know. If he spared, employed, and promoted men who had been false to him, it was not because he was their dupe. His observation was quick and just; his intelligence was good; and he had, during some years, had in his hands proofs of much that Fenwick had only gathered from wandering reports. It has seemed strange to many that a Prince of high spirit and acrimonious temper should have treated servants, who had so deeply wronged him, with a kindness hardly to be expected from the meekest of human beings. But William was emphatically a statesman. Ill humour, the natural and pardonable effect of much bodily and much mental suffering, might sometimes impel him to give a tart answer. But never did he on any important occasion indulge his angry passions at the expense of the great interests of which he was the guardian. For the sake of those interests, proud and imperious as he was by nature, he submitted patiently to galling restraints, bore cruel indignities and disappointments with the outward show of serenity, and not only forgave, but often pretended not to see, offences which might well have moved him to bitter resentment. He knew that he must work with such tools as he had. If he was to govern England, he must employ the public men of England, and in his age the public men of England, with much of a peculiar kind of ability, were, as a class, low-minded and immoral. There were, doubtless, exceptions. Such was Nottingham among the Tories, and Somers among the Whigs. But the majority, both of the Tory and of the Whig ministers of William, were men whose characters had taken the ply in the days of the Anti-puritan reaction. They had been formed in two evil schools, in the most unprincipled of courts, and the most unprincipled of oppositions, a court which took its character from Charles, an opposition headed by Shaftesbury. From men so trained it would have been unreasonable to

expect disinterested and steadfast fidelity to any cause. But though they could not be trusted, they might be used, and they might be useful. No reliance could be placed on their principles; but much reliance might be placed on their hopes and on their fears; and of the two kings who laid claim to the English crown, the King from whom there was most to hope and most to fear was the King in possession. If, therefore, William had little reason to esteem these politicians his hearty friends, he had still less reason to number them among his hearty foes. Their conduct towards him, reprehensible as it was, might be called upright when compared with their conduct towards James. To the reigning Sovereign they had given valuable service; to the banished Sovereign little more than promises and professions. Shrewsbury might, in a moment of resentment or of weakness, have trafficked with Jacobite agents; but his general conduct had proved that he was as far as ever from being a Jacobite. Godolphin had been lavish of fair words to the dynasty which was out; but he had thriftily and skilfully managed the revenues of the dynasty which was in. Russell had sworn that he would desert with the English fleet; but he had burned the French fleet. Even Marlborough's known treasons,—for his share in the disaster of Brest and the death of Talmash was unsuspected,—had not done so much harm as his exertions at Walcourt, at Cork, and at Kinsale had done good. William had therefore wisely resolved to shut his eyes to perfidy, which, however disgraceful it might be, had not injured him, and still to avail himself, with proper precautions, of the eminent talent which some of his unfaithful counsellors possessed.'—Vol. iv. pp. 719—721.

There might have been some reason for saying so, if, when William spared the great men, he had also spared the small ones. The great ones he dared not touch. No one can doubt what a perilous thing it would have been, in the sore and jealous state of English parties, for an unpopular foreigner to have threatened the heads of Shrewsbury or Marlborough. But the King who was so merciful to their misdeeds—who would not probe too deeply into their treasons—who with politic forbearance stopped the mouths of their accusers—who confined himself in one case to dismissal, in another to gentle reproof—who so kindly encouraged the conscience-stricken Shrewsbury, and comforted him with a dukedom and a garter, hunted to death with characteristic pertinacity, in company with those whom he knew to be worse traitors, a poor Jacobite baronet. The intrigues, of which so much is said in Mr. Macaulay's volumes, between William's great men and S. Germain's, were abruptly put an end to¹ by what very nearly tore the veil from off them, the business of Sir John Fenwick. It is impossible to read without loathing, and, we must add, without indignation at the historian, who so fully, yet so very coolly recounts it, the history of this shameful transaction; William screening the great nobles, whose guilt he knew, but whom he durst not punish, and at the same time throwing the whole course of justice into confusion to compass the death of a helpless prisoner who had too

¹ James's Papers, Macpherson, i. 257.

truly accused them; a King of England acting in person, and in his royal closet, the part of an Inquisitor of State; the 'strong body of honest gentlemen' of the Whig party shaming even the shameless Wharton by their attempt to use Fenwick's confession to ruin the Tory Godolphin, while they laughed it to scorn as evidence against Shrewsbury, Russell, and the neutral Marlborough; the King sanctioning the profligate injustice of party, and scheming with Sunderland to entrap and disgrace Godolphin; Russell, the great Whig admiral, who had sworn the deepest oaths to James, convening the Whig members at his house, to take vengeance on the man who had breathed suspicion on Whig honesty and patriotism; Russell, again, the foremost to rise in his place in Parliament to demand justice on the traitor; the Whig leaders, who were always declaiming about the judicial murders of Russell and Sidney, stimulating their followers, as they became ashamed of the work, with the oldest sophistries of tyranny, and propping up the falling majorities for the Bill of Attainder with all the arts of parliamentary corruption and parliamentary intimidation; 'the great muster of lawn sleeves,' contrary to precedent and repulsive to feeling, when the cause of blood came before the Peers; Burnet, signalizing himself, in company with three of the worst and basest men who ever wore coronet and ermine,¹ in urging the Lords to an extraordinary act of vengeance on Fenwick; Monmouth, afterwards the great Lord Peterborough, trying to use Fenwick against his own rivals, and becoming the most implacable of his destroyers when he refused; the spectacle of the august Court of Parliament, their imposing dignity, their irresistible power, their claims on an Englishman's confidence,² their power to intercede and to save,—all used, by the most honourable and most merciful of the Whig Peers,³ to work with a prolonged moral torture on a doomed and hopeless victim, to extort from him the names of a few disaffected men, and tempt him to turn king's evidence; and, finally, William going down in state to the houses of Parliament, as to a great act of public policy or justice, to pass the Bill of Attainder. How Mr. Macaulay, after telling us all that he has done, can write with such composed coolness, and singularly flat irony, the following account of Russell's position in the great Whig movement, it is difficult for those who are not Whigs to comprehend:—

'One of the methods employed by the Whig junto, for the purpose of instituting and maintaining through all the ranks of the Whig party a discipline never before known, was the frequent holdings of meetings of mem-

¹ Wharton, Monmouth, and Grey of Wark, then Lord Tankerville, vol. iv. pp. 753, 758: ² vol. iv. pp. 739, 760. ³ vol. iv. p. 759.

bers of the House of Commons. Some of those meetings were numerous; others were select. The larger were held at the Rose, a tavern frequently mentioned in the political pasquinades of that time, the smaller at Russell's in Covent Garden, or at Somers's in Lincoln's-inn-fields.

'On the day on which Godolphin resigned his great office two select meetings were called. In the morning the place of assembly was Russell's house. In the afternoon there was a fuller muster at the Lord Keeper's. Fenwick's confession, which, till that time, had probably been known only by rumour to most of those who were present, was read. The indignation of the hearers was strongly excited, particularly by one passage, of which the sense seemed to be, that not only Russell, not only Shrewsbury but the great body of the Whig party was, and had long been, at heart Jacobite. "The fellow insinuates," it was said, "that the Assassination Plot itself was a Whig scheme." The general opinion was that such a charge could not be lightly passed over. There must be a solemn debate and decision in Parliament. The best course would be that the King should himself see and examine the prisoner, and that Russell should then request the royal permission to bring the subject before the House of Commons. As Fenwick did not pretend that he had any authority for the stories which he had told except mere hearsay, there could be no difficulty in carrying a resolution branding him as a slanderer, and an address to the throne requesting that he might be forthwith brought to trial for high treason.'—Vol. iv. pp. 734, 735.

'Soon after the Commons had met, on the morning of the sixth of November, Russell rose in his place, and requested to be heard. The task which he had undertaken required courage not of the most respectable kind; but to him no kind of courage was wanting. "Sir John Fenwick," he said, "had sent to the King a paper, in which grave accusations were brought against some of his Majesty's servants, and his Majesty had, at the request of his accused servants, graciously given orders that this paper should be laid before the House. The confession was produced and read. The Admiral then, with spirit and dignity worthy of a better man, demanded justice for himself and Shrewsbury. "If we are innocent, clear us. If we are guilty, punish us as we deserve. I put myself on you as on my country. I am ready to stand or fall by your verdict."—Vol. iv. p. 738.

We must do Mr. Macaulay the justice to say, that, of the turns and vicissitudes of this terrible trial, he has given a narrative almost unrivalled for its deep and painful interest. But who will say that justice would not have been but fairly done on William, on the great nobles whom he screened, and on the government and the party, which showed a baseness and an implacable bloodthirstiness worthy of the worst days of Jeffreys, if Monmouth's plot had succeeded?—

'By the instrumentality of the Duchess, Monmouth conveyed to the prisoner several papers, containing suggestions framed with much art. Let Sir John, such was the substance of these suggestions, boldly affirm that his confession is true; that he has brought accusations on hearsay indeed, but not on common hearsay; that he has derived his knowledge of the facts which he has asserted from the highest quarters; and let him point out a mode in which his veracity may be easily brought to the test. Let him pray that the Earls of Portland and Romney, who are well known to enjoy the royal confidence, may be called upon to declare whether they are not in possession of information agreeing with what he has related. Let him pray that the King may be requested to lay before Parliament the

evidence which caused the sudden disgrace of Lord Marlborough, and any letters which may have been intercepted while passing between St. Germain and Lord Godolphin. "Unless," said Monmouth to his female agents, "Sir John is under a fate; unless he is out of his mind, he will take my counsel. If he does, his life and honour are safe. If he does not, he is a dead man."

"The papers written by Monmouth were delivered by Lady Mary to her husband. If the advice which they contained had been followed, there can be little doubt that the object of the adviser would have been attained. The King would have been bitterly mortified; there would have been a general panic among public men of every party; even Marlborough's serene fortitude would have been severely tried; and Shrewsbury would probably have shot himself. But that Fenwick would have put himself in a better situation is by no means clear. Such was his own opinion. He saw that the step which he was urged to take was hazardous. He knew that he was urged to take that step, not because it was likely to save himself, but because it was certain to annoy others; and he was resolved not to be Monmouth's tool."—Vol. iv. pp. 755, 756.

And who will say that Monmouth spoke very wide of the truth, when he exclaimed—

"He is the worst of men. He has acted basely. He pretends not to believe these charges against Shrewsbury, Russell, Marlborough, and Godolphin, and yet he knows," and Monmouth confirmed the assertion with a tremendous oath, "he knows that every word of these charges is true."—Vol. iv. pp. 755, 756.

To this scene of falsehood and perfidy and unbridled selfishness,—to the duplicity of the great men, and the corruption of the little men in the state,—there was at this time one striking contrast. There was one body of men in England who, in spite of the low tone of public honesty, did through evil report, through scorn and ridicule, through the loss of their daily bread, stick to their principles. There was one body of men possessed of reputation and competence, and some of them of high station and wealth, who might have kept all—have been caressed and flattered, at least feared or treated with respect—might at least have kept their freeholds and their influence, their peerages and palaces, or their quiet country parsonages, merely by saying a few words against their convictions, and who would not. It was nothing very fearful or profligate that they were called to do. It was then, and is still, even among those who sympathise with them, a great question whether they ought not to have done it. It was something for which, if they had wanted a pretext, they could have found not pretexts but good reasons, in the example, and opinion, and authority of numbers of their brethren—good and conscientious and pure-minded men. It was something which Beveridge and Bishop Wilson could do with a clear conscience. But their consciences would not allow them to do it; and they did it not. Call them over-scrupulous, call them narrow-minded, say that they were

entangled and misled by a false theory of government, still the fact remains; their duty seemed to them clear and plain, and their duty they followed at all costs. They lost everything by it; they were cast out of the Church, they were cast out of the State; too few to have any influence, too unpopular to hope for converts, they found themselves cut off from the body of their countrymen, cut off from all the chief walks of life, homeless and living on alms, pitied by friends, suspected by all in power, ridiculed by the world, plunged into the miseries and perplexities of a new and difficult course of action and of a small isolated clique, with small comfort for the present, and small hope for the future. Granting all that their critics or their enemies said of them—and they have had keen critics and rancorous enemies,—that they were fretful and cross-grained, that they were peevish and could not reason—that they were censorious and ill-natured to their opponents—that their theories were absurd, their heads hot, their intestine quarrels about small points very petty—granting that Sancroft was sour and self-opiniated, Turner a busy plotter, Collier indiscreet and a proud priest, that Dodwell had odd notions on the immortality of the soul, and that Hickes was as tiresome as Mr. Macaulay himself¹ about the Theban legion—still there is no denying the fact, that while the great men of the day, who were having their will, and riding on the high places of the earth, were, most of them, men whom we should shun as we do sharpers and swindlers—the mocked and ruined Non-jurors were honest men.

Such a spectacle, in such times, might at least have appealed to the generosity, if it could not move the sympathy, of a writer who held them greatly and mischievously in the wrong. It was not to be expected that Mr. Macaulay should feel favourably to them. A Whig could not like the extreme partizans of hereditary right—a Latitudinarian could not like the most uncompromising of High Churchmen. Those, indeed, who think that reverence is due to the ancient ideas, the immemorial belief, the traditional stream of doctrine and usage and law running on for centuries in the Christian Church, will remember how manfully and how ably the Non-jurors bore witness to the stricter and deeper faith of Christian antiquity, in a self-wise and supercilious age, amid lukewarm brethren and infidel enemies, perfectly unbridled in their scorn and malignity. They will not think it a proof of morbid pride in Collier, that in days when *priestcraft* was the common word of mockery, with which every flippant witling insulted religion, he had the courage to magnify his office: they will not think it absurd that Christian divines should study with interest and attention the monuments

¹ Vol. iii. pp. 458, 459; vol. iv. p. 386.

in which the history of the Church is found, the writings of her great teachers, and the acts of her great assemblies. Those who read old books with some worthier purpose than to pick out their absurdities know very well that the industry and learning of Hickes, Dodwell, Jeremy Collier, and Brett, still remains as useful, and deserves as respectful mention as those of any of their contemporaries; and Christians of any school, whose hearts sympathise with depth, and fervour, and zeal in the exercises of religious feeling and the discipline of the soul, will be thankful that in the days when Tillotson and Tenison set the standard of devotion, there were higher masters of the spiritual life and more evangelical preachers of holiness, among the disciples of Kettlewell and Ken. But honesty is a title to respect even with Mr. Macaulay, and here was certainly honesty. That men should decide on a mistaken course, yet with the purest and worthiest motives, is no new axiom in the philosophy of our days; and Mr. Macaulay, as well as any one, must be familiar with instances like that of Ken, where the error of the judgment, if so it was, has even enhanced the moral height of the character:—

‘*Si non errâsset, fecerat ille minus.*’

But because the Non-jurors, in his view, adhered too rigidly to a wrong theory of government, and by so adhering gave trouble and even brought odium on the measures of the Revolution, they are to have neither mercy nor justice. Other honest sufferers for conscience, though mistaken, would be entitled to respectful mention, even while they were blamed. Not so the Non-jurors. The rare and exemplary goodness of some of them cannot be denied. To Ken, to Kettlewell and Fitzwilliam, the friends of Lord William Russell, Mr. Macaulay gives, if not very warm, yet fair and just praise. He confesses the abilities of Leslie; and he prefaces a paragraph on the absurdities of Collier with a few lines of strong testimony to his goodness, and more qualified eulogy of his parts. But for the Non-jurors as a body, it is as much as they deserve even to admit that, though they voluntarily lost everything, they were honest. And that admission is soon lost sight of in the contempt, which Mr. Macaulay misses no opportunity of expressing, for all qualities in them of head and of heart. Their infirmities of temper are maliciously dwelt upon, as if no one had infirmities of temper but Non-jurors: their theology is laughed at, as if it was some new invention of their own, and the questions involved in it had never shaken the world: the extravagances of their learned men are diligently hunted up, as if it was something unheard of for the learned of those days, even the countrymen of Spanheim and Grævius,

to be pedantic and solemnly absurd. The faults and follies which all depressed and ill-treated minorities fall into, are with malignant pleasure made the characteristics of the Non-jurors. Let a miserable playwright, plagiarizing from Molière, indulge his spite by making a Non-juror do duty for Tartuffe, Mr. Macaulay grasps at the evidence that they were popularly viewed as the vilest of hypocrites. And even in Gibbon, when Gibbon was in his most unscrupulous and ill-natured mood, we know nothing more ungenerous than Mr. Macaulay's attempt to point the sting of his malice against the Non-jurors by a passing word of a great talker, who more than once showed his dislike to what he called their 'perverseness of integrity,' and who did not always weigh even more serious words.¹ Admitting that among them there were some good men, 'it is certain,' says Mr. Macaulay, 'that the character of the Non-jurors as a class did not stand high,—the public voice loudly accused many Non-jurors of 'requiting the hospitality of their benefactors with villainy as black as that of the hypocrite depicted in the masterpiece of Molière:' his proof is, first, that most of them were reduced to beggary, and therefore must have become scoundrels; an argument (borrowed, it may be observed, from Dr. Johnson) that it is immoral to suffer poverty for conscience sake; and, secondly, Cibber's comedy of the Non-juror, and Dr. Johnson's remark, when Boswell was asking him questions about it, and whether the Non-jurors really did as they were there represented as doing,—'I am afraid that many of them did so.' Even taking the words as evidence against the Non-jurors, they were spoken nearly a century after the time when Mr. Macaulay deals with the Non-jurors. They can be no proof whatever against the fellow-sufferers of Ken and Sancroft, even if they proved more than they do against their successors, when Johnson knew them, many years later.

But the truth is, that in all these matters, and on all subjects connected with the Church of England, Mr. Macaulay shows himself, to adopt the epithets applied by Dr. Johnson to Collier,² 'a fierce and implacable' partizan. An ill-natured critic might be tempted to surmise that, having to confess that his own friends were so bad, he was resolved that his opponents should suffer for it. There is no pleasing him; if one set of Churchmen, through dishonour and ruin, stick to what they think right, they are not only idiots and traitors, but every evil suggestion, every wanton slander, every hasty and ill-natured word, is carefully brought together, and elaborately put in array, to disparage and vilify them. If another set submit to a political revolution which they dislike and distrust, and amid difficulties which perplexed the

¹ Vol. iii. p. 467.

² Life of Congreve,

wisest heads in England, think it their duty to remain at their posts, and be taunted with inconsistency, Mr. Macaulay—whose leading principle is compromise—the eulogist of Halifax, its great master, and of the Convention, its great exemplification,—can find nothing better than to exult over their difficulties, and to point out, in a laboured and diffuse argument, how their conduct contradicted their principles. There is nothing that tries a historian's fairness and largeness of mind more than his treatment of the arguments and abstract theories of past times; and there is no instance, that we can call to mind, among writers of weight of our own day, where these qualities are so totally wanting, as in Mr. Macaulay's treatment of the theories about Government common among English divines of the seventeenth century. No one can know better than he, how long it takes for the highest truths and clearest principles to shape themselves into their fit and genuine forms: through what strange perversions, through what monstrous extremes, through what temporary masks, through what inconsistencies and imperfections, through what alloys of folly and error they have had to pass in stormy or unhappy times, before there was leisure, or light, or disinterestedness enough to think them out comprehensively and accurately. He himself has told us, that Locke would not grant toleration to Roman Catholics.¹ He has told us, how not one of the authors of the Declaration of Right dreamt of the liberty of the press,² and how this great mark of modern civilization arose in England by a chance accident; not from the enlarged foresight of her statesmen, but from the spiteful trick of a ribald scribbler.³ The English Clergy of the seventeenth century may have held the principle of the Royal authority in a harsh, extreme, inconsistent, untenable form; they

¹ Vol. ii. p. 9. In 1699, the rival factions in Parliament proposed penal laws against the Roman Catholics, which each party made as bad as they could, to make the other bear the odium of opposing anything against Roman Catholics. But the game failed, and the bill passed with the united restrictions of both parties, who each thought their own restrictions separately too intolerable to be passed. On this Burnet, who tells the story, remarks: 'I was for the bill, notwithstanding my principles of toleration, and against all persecution for conscience sake; I had always thought that if a Government found any sect in religion incompatible with its quiet and safety, it might, and sometimes ought, to send away all of that sect, with as little hardship as possible.' But he was not satisfied even with this, and goes on to complain 'that the Act wanted several clauses to enforce the due execution of it;' but he consoles himself with reflecting that 'here is a scheme laid, though not fully digested, which on some great provocation, given by those of that religion, may dispose a Parliament to put such clauses in a new Act as may make this effectual.' (ii. 229.) The Act made it perpetual imprisonment to say mass, or for a Roman Catholic to teach, even in a private family; and gave the estates of all Papists who should succeed to an inheritance to their Protestant kin, till they took the tests against Popery. The Act was not repealed till 1778, and Burke's vote for the repeal of it was one of those which cost him his seat at Bristol. (See his Speech to the Electors of Bristol, 1780.)

² Vol. ii. p. 649.

³ Vol. iv. p. 348.

may have exaggerated its relative importance; but that is no reason why we should forget that the principle itself¹ had ever been acknowledged as one of the most solemn and sacred in the polity of England, the foundation of English law, felt through every fibre of English society; that if Churchmen had defended it by wrong argument, they did no more than the defenders of all truths have done some time or another,—that if Churchmen over-stated it, and pushed it to extremes in controversy, there was quite enough in the circumstances and debates of the time to explain their very natural error. When Mr. Macaulay was exposing with so much glee the failure of Overall's theory, it would have been wiser, and it would have won him a higher place as a historian, though it might have interfered with his irony, and spoilt the flow of a triumphant page, if he had remembered how argument in all ages runs in a groove, and how all theories of Government are liable to fail. One theory was devised against the tyranny of the many; it let in the tyranny of one, and common sense and the strong feeling of wrong threw it overboard. The other theory was devised against the tyranny of one; and it has let in, to an extent to which the former never did, the tyranny of the many, and has had to be cured with sharper and far more illogical remedies. When Mr. Macaulay dwells on the figments and subterfuges to which the Anglican divines were forced to have recourse, either in defending a Regency or in submitting to William, it would have been as well for him to have remembered how the Convention made havoc of theories; how very like a solemn farce his own account of the Convention reads,—how those keen and determined men, who knew well enough what they were doing, were casting about on all sides for verbal figments and pretences of ancient law, to make the great change seem not a great change; how their great 'Resolution' is a disjointed shift to satisfy all theories while it evades them all, and is pronounced by himself the most illogical of all sentences;² and how all this care to cover up things with words and names has been celebrated by the profoundest and most eloquent of English statesmen, as the happiest effort of even English statesmanship.³ Why should the liberty of re-examining and modifying their theories, when a new and perplexing case arose, which was so freely used by statesmen and lawyers, both Whig and Tory, in the Convention, be refused, except with sneers and taunts, to country Clergymen, or even Bishops? Mr. Macaulay calls the doctrine of Divine Right and Passive Obedience an abject and servile superstition, invented by Anglican priests of the seven-

¹ See Burke's Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, and his extracts from Sir J. Jekyl at Sacheverell's trial.

² Vol. ii. p. 623.

³ Burke's Reflections.

teenth century. Can Mr. Macaulay doubt that these same doctrines were held, if not in the same terms yet rigorously in substance, by the clergy and the majority of the laity of every Church in Europe of the time where there was a king, except by the Ultra-montanes and Jesuits, who lowered kings that they might exalt Popes? Can he doubt that what he treats as a peculiar growth of English soil, was carried at least as high by Bossuet and Fenelon in France? Can he make it a reproach to Sancroft or Sherlock that they held the doctrine of Non-resistance in 1688, when Tillotson, and probably Burnet also, had declared it in 1683 a most certain Gospel and Protestant truth, and had urged its acceptance with the most solemn earnestness, in the last hours of Lord William Russell, on the conscience of their penitent? Mr. Macaulay calls it 'abject and servile:' its defenders might just as fairly have called it 'lofty and ennobling.' It was both, according to the tempers it acted

¹ 'During his previous visits to him in the Tower, Tillotson found that Lord Russell, in his love of truth, preferred to die a martyr to his principles of liberty, rather than acknowledge the doctrine of Non-resistance, which he did not hold. It was thought, if he yielded this point, Charles would grant him a pardon; but Russell was immovable. The Dean, on the other hand, held that the Christian religion plainly forbids the resistance of authority: as one of Lord Russell's spiritual comforters, he thought it essential to his true repentance, before death, to acknowledge this. Russell had received the Holy Communion in a calm and devout temper; but Tillotson, under the apprehension that his peace of mind was not well grounded, wrote him a letter, as more calculated to influence his deliberate thoughts than a transient discourse: 'The law,' he says, 'which establishes our religion declares that it is not lawful upon any pretence whatsoever to take up arms,' &c.: 'the law of nature and the general rules of Scripture, tie the hands of subjects: because the government and peace of society could not well subsist if they were left at liberty: this is the declared doctrine of all Protestant Churches. And I beg your Lordship to consider how it will agree with an avowed asserting of the Protestant religion, to go contrary to the general doctrine of the Protestants. My end in this is to convince your Lordship that you are in a very great and dangerous mistake, and being so convinced, that which before was a sin of ignorance will appear of a much more heinous nature, as in truth it is, and call for a very particular and deep repentance; which if your Lordship sincerely exercise upon the sight of your error, by a penitent acknowledgment of it to God and man, you will not only obtain forgiveness of God, but prevent a mighty scandal to the reformed religion.'—Life of Ken, by a Layman. Second edition, pp. 526, 527.

The following note is added:—'Among the Rawlinson MSS., in the Bodleian, there is a letter from Burnet to Compton, of London, dated 30th July, 1683, and enclosing Lord Russell's declaration in the Tower on the point of Non-resistance. This paper is clear evidence of the arguments which Tillotson and Burnet had used to persuade him to the acknowledgment of the doctrine of Passive-obedience:—

'For my part I cannot deny but that I have been of opinion that a free nation like this might defend their religion and liberties, when invaded, and taken from them, tho' under pretence and colour of law. But some worthy and eminent Divines, who have had the charity to be often with me, and whom I value and esteem to a very great degree, have offered me weighty reasons to persuade me, that faith and conscience are the proper waies for the preservation of religion, and that the method of the Gospel is rather to suffer persecution, than to use resistance. But if I have erred in this, I hope God will not lay it to my charge; since He knows 'twas only of ignorance.'

on; it made one man a fawning sycophant, it made another nobly and unselfishly loyal. It did as much as Windsor Castle does among ourselves; it did no more. When Mr. Macaulay talks about servility, it is difficult to avoid thinking of that 'great muster of lawn sleeves,'¹ in defiance of the usages and decencies of their profession, at one of the worst trials of blood that ever disgraced the House of Lords; and of Burnet and Tenison, when some of the stoutest of Whig laymen held back, 'being among the chief orators,'² in asking for the death of Fenwick by Act of Attainder; and our thoughts are involuntarily carried forward from Ken shutting his doors against Nell Gwynn, and from Sancroft in the Tower, to the courtly deans and smooth-tongued bishops who crowded the levees and smiled in the drawing-rooms of the Georges. Beside these polite and well-behaved personages it is hard to accuse the rough and plain-dealing Caroline Churchmen as the ringleaders in teaching servility to kings.

These great blemishes—and it would be easy to enlarge the list—are heavy abatements from the merit of Mr. Macaulay's brilliant attempt to revive our interest in a famous, though uninviting period of our history. It is to be regretted that a man who has lived in those days more than any one of his contemporaries, should have come back to us from them more than ever a partizan, inclined to colour what it would have been more profitable to criticise, and where it was natural to weigh and balance, only thinking of throwing into one scale a new weight of learning, eloquence, and feeling. Of the strength of his convictions no one has a right to complain. The effect of great and varied powers has been defeated, not by this, but by the narrowness of his sympathies. Desirous to be comprehensive, he yet could see no interest except in what appealed to the pride or the antipathies of a Whig. Willing to be candid, he could only give a grudging and artificial candour, out of which all the frankness and grace were taken. Anxious to sound and measure the many feelings and convictions with which the hearts of Englishmen were full, he was at fault whenever the feelings and convictions of a Whig stopped short or met opposition. The worst construction is never too forced and precarious to be assumed against those he hates; and where he admires, he can see nothing weak in gratuitous praise, or unpersuasive in a forced and overdone apology. He shows us England, swayed by selfish and dishonest leaders, by profligate and greedy factions, impudent and unscrupulous in their pursuit of power, money, or revenge; of the two parties, the Whigs were

¹ Vol. iv. p. 753.² Vol. iv. p. 758. Burnet, ii. 181.

at least not behind their rivals in all the evil arts and daring plans of factions: but instead of letting the history of wickedness produce its proper effect of warning and instruction, he leaves its impressions undisturbed, when they tell against the Tories, or else deepens and sharpens them; but carefully throws in some compensation or softening, wakens some sympathy and recalls us to good humour and indulgence, and covers all by some stirring principle or great recollection, when they tell against the Whigs. The intolerance of Tories or Churchmen, or the severities of Stuart kings, are left without set-off or explanation to produce their full shock, as naked instances of senseless or heartless inhumanity, on minds accustomed to assume, as first principles, that all bigotry is contemptible, and all cruelty hateful: when things, surprisingly similar, have to be told of a Whig king, or a Whig majority,—if a Whig king seems to order an indiscriminate massacre, or with indecent pertinacity to require blood and to play with his victim's feelings, or a Whig majority proscribes Papists and obstinately clings to a cruel law of treason, there is always a reason for it. And the same with his praise and blame of individuals. Nottingham and Somers were both honest men and faultless in their service to William; but compare the stiff unsympathising praise, which Mr. Macaulay bestows on Nottingham, the sneer with which he points to his narrow-minded conscientiousness,¹ and reminds us that though above corruption he retired rich,² with the free, hearty, zealous admiration which he bestows on Somers, unchecked by Somers' looseness both of religious principles and of life. Marlborough and Wharton were both bad men; but Marlborough he classes with the Tories: and compare the savage and immitigable hatred with which he calls for our abhorrence of the baseness and wickedness of Marlborough, and the jaunty, amused, half-indulgent way³ with which he describes the vices of Wharton, who had but one virtue, that of being 'true as steel' to his party. It is really quite amusing, how down to trifles Mr. Macaulay loves to load Jacobites and Tories with the whole weight of the absurdities which were common to the age and characteristic of it. He sneers at Thomas Wagstaffe the Jacobite, noticing the coincidences between the hours of James's flight in December 1688, and his daughter's death in December 1694: 'such was the profundity, and such the ingenuity of one whom the Jacobite schismatics justly regarded 'as one of the ablest of their chiefs.'⁴ He has nothing to say about the 'curious observation' for which Burnet, not less than among the Whigs than Wagstaffe among the Jacobites,

Vol. iv. 682, 683. ² Vol. iv. 470, 471. ³ Vol. iv. 456—9. ⁴ Vol. iv. 534.

interrupts the course of his history, and 'which, considering his profession, he hopes will be forgiven;'—the circumstance that 'Dr. Lloyd, the most learned Bishop of Worcester, who for above twenty years had been studying the Revelations with amazing diligence and exactness,' had predicted, from his scheme of the book, and predicted with success, the peace of Carlowitz in 1697, and had announced with positive certainty, which Burnet was inclined to think well grounded, that the Turks would never engage in a fresh war with the Papists.¹ Mr. Macaulay reminds us in a note, to show the ill-natured and pertinacious credulity of Jacobites, that sixty years after Tillotson's consecration, Dr. Johnson 'described a sturdy Jacobite as firmly convinced that Tillotson died an Atheist.'² he omits to notice that Tom Tempest's Whig friend, Jack Sneaker, was equally firmly persuaded of the story of the warming-pan, and believed as devoutly that Charles the First was a Papist.

Much, therefore, still remains to be told of those days, much awaits a calmer and more judicial examination than his. That strange time, when Englishmen were so great and so little, so shrewd and so purblind, so far-seeing and so prejudiced, so broad and so narrow in their views, so firm in mind and so lightly moved, so full of great half-seen truths and so stained with meanness and vice,—has been too much even for Mr. Macaulay's great powers. Some part or other of the complicated subject is ever slipping from his hold, or baffling his labour, or contradicting his philosophy. Characters which he wishes to clothe with body and life, remain still shadowy and doubtful; principles and purposes which he wishes to disentangle, remain still confused and perplexed; and after many an exposition, full, luminous, and abounding in common sense, of the play of ideas and influences on the public mind, we remain convinced that there were other ideas and other influences at work, with equal or superior force, which have been left out of the account, untraced, perhaps unsuspected. The quarrels of those days act on us, and divide us still; yet there is no indisposition to look dispassionately on the difficult questions of the Revolution, and to judge fairly and considerably of those who solved them so differently. There are many Liberals who condemn the policy of James, and dislike the man, without thinking it necessary to believe that he was a hypocrite in his devotion and repentance, or that he authorized the assassination of William; who think that Halifax and Somers were right, and that William's accession was a great advantage to England, without thinking that the minority which opposed it was a band of

¹ Burnet, ii. 204, 205.² Vol. iv. 37, referring to the Idler, No. 10.

traitors. There are many High Churchmen who can see nothing to admire in the manner in which the Revolution was brought about, and much to lament in the religious spirit to which it gave a triumph; but who can also see in it a just retribution on the house of Stuart for neglected warnings and for the orgies and lawlessness of the Restoration; who can admit that there was much to provoke and to justify it, and that though it brought much evil, it brought much good. Such persons will not wonder at Mr. Macaulay for upholding the Revolution. What they will wonder at, is his inability to see that at the time itself there might be two opinions about it; what they will demur to, is the assumption that dislike and distrust of it, and the feeling in favour of the old line, were decisive against the honesty or common sense of men and parties of that day. What they will except to is, not merely a want of fairness, but apparently an *inability* to be fair, to the opponents of the Revolution—a want of the historian's gift of accurately measuring the peculiar conditions of a distant time, and comprehending and discriminating the circumstances under which men who lived in it thought and acted. They will hardly accept the verdict of a historian who so manifestly places his moral judgment in subordination to his prepossessions for the Whigs, except when he places his prepossessions for the Whigs in subordination to his enthusiasm for William. They find it too late to sympathise with a party victory, such as he has claimed—claimed so sweepingly, claimed with such insulting triumph. They will rise dissatisfied and disappointed from the perusal of a narrative which, under the disguise of the ripe wisdom of our own day, exhibited with the most finished skill, repeats the prejudices of Burnet, with the acrimony, and too often, the coarseness of Swift.

Yet the fault is so broad and plain, that it carries its own correction with it; he gives ample warning, and to judge of Jacobites and Non-jurors from his estimate, would be as sensible as to judge of Christians and Christianity from Gibbon's. Making this allowance, the interest which he has thrown on the period succeeding the Revolution, is as varied and vivid as it has all the appearance of substantial truth. Of the warlike operations of those years, which take up so much of his third volume, and a considerable portion of the fourth, it is much to say that he has given a clear and readable narrative; but the truth is, that Englishmen will never care much for the wars of King William. For however much England was interested in them, we hardly feel them to have been our own wars. We were fought for by aliens at the Boyne. We feel no national humiliation for the defeat of Landen, and the loss of Namur; we feel no national

pride in the brilliant siege by which Namur was retaken. We have forgotten the disgrace of Beechy Head, and the name of the conqueror of La Hogue does not live among our great admirals. The composition of the armies, the cause and the alliances were the same in those years, as they were in the days of Ramilies, Blenheim, and Fontenoy; but we had not yet learned to feel ourselves more than auxiliaries, and our share in the failure or the triumph, made no lasting impression on the national memory. But there were other things, which had their beginnings in those years, and which will be identified with the civil and political state of England, as long as the remembrance of England shall last. These beginnings Mr. Macaulay has traced, with the care, the fulness, and the feeling of one who is anxious to recover the minutest feature, in its earliest form, of that which has since proved to have been pregnant with so much greatness and so much power. Men will long turn back to his pages with satisfaction and gratitude, for the lights which he has collected and combined, on the early appearance and working in their modern shape, of what are now some of the most familiar and the most prominent elements of our social life. Those days saw the development of the House of Commons, with its present attributes and peculiarities. Then first, its place in the commonwealth was finally ascertained. Then first, its debates came to have, not an occasional and fitful importance, but a continual and uniform one. Then first the art of managing it was studied. Then first its characteristic eloquence had its birth, and Somers and Montague were the genuine predecessors of that illustrious line of debaters,—Pulteney and Windham, the Pitts and Burke, Canning and Peel,—which we have seen continued with unabated force, and unaltered traditions, down to the latest session of Parliament. Those days first saw the organization of party, and the establishment of the unwritten law which regulates administrations. Those days saw the first modest and hesitating steps to that which has now become as fated and indissoluble a part of modern England as her mountains and streams—the National Debt. Those days first saw the vast change in commercial transactions, occasioned by the transference of the trade in money, from being an irregular by-work of pawnbrokers and goldsmiths, to great mercantile companies, whose business was nothing else. Those days saw, after many perplexities and doubts, amid the confusions of puzzle-headed projectors and old-fashioned men of business, the Bank of England set up, as the only expedient within reach for raising an indispensable supply of money;—to begin those operations on which the credit of England has, from that time forth, uninterruptedly hung. Those days saw the standard of the English

coinage fixed, and the great and anxious change carried out with boldness and skill, through unavoidable distress, and in the face of a great hazard, by which a debased currency was got rid of for ever. Lastly, those days saw, not indeed strictly the beginnings, but the first indications of the spirit and policy of that imperial association, whose colossal influence was to overshadow Asia, and enrich while it convulsed England,—the East India Company. It is remarkable that during those eight or nine eventful years, so full of the germs of the future, Mr. Macaulay has scarcely once occasion to name the Plantations in America.¹

Of these memorable beginnings, he has given sketches of great interest. Perhaps the most interesting is his account of the terrible crisis which attended the restoration of the currency. It is too long to extract, and Mr. Macaulay's narratives do not bear abridgment. The following is his account of the great change in the circumstances of the country which made it ripe for the beginning of the National Debt, and of the quiet unassuming fashion in which that portentous phenomenon first showed itself:—

'During the interval between the Restoration and the Revolution the riches of the nation had been rapidly increasing. Thousands of busy men found every Christmas that, after the expenses of the year's housekeeping had been defrayed out of the year's income, a surplus remained; and how that surplus was to be employed was a question of some difficulty. In our time, to invest such a surplus at something more than three per cent. on the best security that has ever been known in the world, is the work of a few minutes. But in the seventeenth century, a lawyer, a physician, a retired merchant, who had saved some thousands, and who wished to place them safely and profitably, was often greatly embarrassed. Three generations earlier, a man who had accumulated wealth in a profession generally purchased real property, or lent his savings on mortgage. But the number of acres in the kingdom had remained the same; and the value of those acres, though it had greatly increased, had by no means increased so fast as the quantity of capital which was seeking for employment. Many too wished to put their money where they could find it at an hour's notice, and looked about for some species of property which could be more readily transferred than a house or a field. A capitalist might lend on bottomry or on personal security; but, if he did so, he ran great risk of losing interest and principal. There were a few joint-stock companies, among which the East India Company held the foremost place; but the demand for stock of such companies was far greater than the supply. Indeed the cry for a new East India Company was chiefly raised by persons who had found difficulty in placing their savings at interest on good security. So great was the difficulty that the practice of hoarding was common. We are told that the father of Pope the poet, who retired from business in the City about

¹ Emigration seems to have been brisk in these years. In James's Memorial to Lewis of Nov. 1692, he says that his friends will argue in Parliament against the Continental war, and one of their reasons for giving up the army in Flanders is to be, that 'an infinite number of men will be saved, of which England stands much in need, being greatly depopulated by the number of inhabitants who go to the colonies.'—*Macpherson*, i. 438.

the time of the Revolution, carried to a retreat in the country a strong box containing nearly 20,000 pounds, and took out from time to time what was required for household expenses; and it is highly probable that this was not a solitary case. At present the quantity of coin which is hoarded by private persons is so small that it would, if brought forth, make no perceptible addition to the circulation. But in the earlier part of the reign of William III., all the greatest writers on currency were of opinion that a very considerable mass of gold and silver was hidden in secret drawers and behind wainscots.

The natural effect of this state of things was that a crowd of projectors, ingenious and absurd, honest and knavish, employed themselves in devising schemes for the employment of redundant capital. It was about the year 1688, that the word stock-jobber was first heard in London. In the short space of four years a crowd of companies, every one of which confidently held out to subscribers the hope of immense gains, sprang into existence; the Insurance Company, the Paper Company, the Lutestring Company, the Pearl Fishery Company, the Glass Bottle Company, the Alum Company, the Blythe Coal Company, the Sword-blade Company. There was a Tapestry Company which would soon furnish pretty hangings for all the parlours of the middle class, and all the bedchambers of the high. There was a Diving Company, which undertook to bring up precious effects from shipwrecked vessels, and which announced that it had laid in a stock of wonderful machines, resembling complete suits of armour. In front of the helmet was a huge glass eye, like that of a cyclop; and out of the crest went a pipe through which the air was to be admitted. The whole process was exhibited on the Thames. Fine gentlemen and fine ladies were invited to the show, were hospitably regaled, and were delighted by seeing the divers in their panoply descend into the river, and return laden with old iron and ship's tackle. There was a Greenland Fishing Company which could not fail to drive the Dutch whalers and herring vessels out of the Northern ocean. There was a Tanning Company which promised to furnish leather superior to the best that was brought from Turkey or Russia. There was a society which undertook the office of giving gentlemen a liberal education on low terms, and which assumed the sounding name of the Royal Academies Company. In a pompous advertisement it was announced that the directors of the Royal Academies Company had engaged the best masters in every branch of knowledge, and were about to issue twenty thousand tickets at twenty shillings each. There was to be a lottery; two thousand prizes were to be drawn; and the fortunate holders of the prizes were to be taught, at the charge of the company, Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, Spanish, conic sections, trigonometry, heraldry, jappanning, fortification, book-keeping, and the art of playing the theorbo. Some of these companies took large mansions and printed their advertisements in gilded letters. Others, less ostentatious, were content with ink, and met at coffee-houses in the neighbourhood of the Royal Exchange. Jonathan's and Garraway's were in a constant ferment with brokers, buyers, sellers, meetings of directors, meetings of proprietors. Time bargains soon came into fashion. Extensive combinations were formed, and monstrous fables were circulated, for the purpose of raising or depressing the price of shares. Our country witnessed for the first time those phenomena with which a long experience has made us familiar. A mania of which the symptoms were essentially the same with those of the mania of 1720, of the mania of 1825, of the mania of 1845, seized the public mind. An impatience to be rich, a contempt for those slow but sure gains which are the proper reward of industry, patience, and thrift, spread through society. The spirit of the cogging dicers of Whitefriars took possession of the grave Senators of the City, Wardens of Trades, Deputies, Aldermen. It was much easier and much more lucrative to put forth a lying

prospectus announcing a new stock, to persuade ignorant people that the dividends could not fall short of twenty per cent., and to part with five thousand pounds of this imaginary wealth for ten thousand solid guineas, than to load a ship with a well chosen cargo for Virginia or the Levant. Every day some new bubble was puffed into existence, rose buoyant, shone bright, burst, and was forgotten.

'The new form which covetousness had taken, furnished the comic poets and satirists with an excellent subject; nor was that subject the less welcome to them because some of the most unscrupulous and most successful of the new race of gamblers were men in sad coloured clothes and lank hair, men who called cards the devil's books, men who thought it a sin and a scandal to win or lose twopence over a backgammon board. It was in the last drama of Shadwell that the hypocrisy and knavery of these speculators was, for the first time, exposed to public ridicule. He died in November 1692, just before his Stock-jobbers came on the stage; and the epilogue was spoken by an actor dressed in deep mourning. The best scene is that in which four or five stern Nonconformists, clad in the full Puritan costume, after discussing the prospects of the Mousetrap Company, and the Flea-killing Company, examine the question whether the godly may lawfully hold stock in a company for bringing over Chinese rope-dancers. "Considerable men have shares," says one austere person, in cropped hair and bands; "but, verily, I question if it be lawful or not." These doubts are removed by a stout old roundhead colonel, who had fought at Marston Moor, and who reminds his weaker brother that the saints need not themselves see the rope-dancing, and that, in all probability, there will be no rope-dancing to see. "The thing," he says, "is like to take; the shares will sell well; and then we shall not care whether the dancers come over or no." It is important to observe that this scene was exhibited and applauded before one farthing of the national debt had been contracted. So ill-informed were the numerous writers, who, at a later period, ascribed to the national debt the existence of stock-jobbing, and of all the immoralities connected with stock-jobbing. The truth is that society had, in the natural course of its growth, reached a point at which it was inevitable that there should be stock-jobbing whether there were a national debt or not, and inevitable also that, if there were a long and costly war, there should be a national debt.

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'On the fifteenth of December, 1692, the House of Commons resolved itself into a Committee of Ways and Means. Somers took the chair. Montague proposed to raise a million by way of loan: the proposition was approved; and it was ordered that a bill should be brought in. The details of the scheme were much discussed and modified; but the principle appears to have been popular with all parties. The monied men were glad to have an opportunity of investing what they had hoarded. The landed men, hard pressed by the load of taxation, were ready to consent to anything for the sake of present ease. No member ventured to divide the House. On the twentieth of January the bill was read a third time, carried up to the Lords by Somers, and passed by them without any amendment.

'By this memorable law new duties were imposed on beer and other liquors. These duties were to be kept in the Exchequer separate from all other receipts, and were to form a fund on the credit of which a million was to be raised by life annuities. As the annuitants dropped off their annuities were to be divided among the survivors, till the number of survivors was reduced to seven. After that time whatever fell in was to go to the public. It was therefore certain that the eighteenth century would be far advanced before the debt would be finally extinguished. The rate of interest was to be ten per cent. till the year 1700, and after that year seven per cent. The advantages offered to the public creditor by this scheme may seem great,

but were not more than sufficient to compensate him for the risk which he ran. It was not impossible that there might be a counter-revolution; and it was certain that if there were a counter-revolution, those who had lent money to William would lose both interest and principal.'

Such was its beginning; the summary¹ which he subjoins of the history of its growth, of the cold fear which from time to time it has struck into the hearts of statesmen and philosophers, of the way in which, in spite of those alarms, it has steadily swelled, as if by a natural necessity, and yet none of what seemed its inevitable evils have as yet happened, is striking, and would be more consolatory if it did not itself show how the coolest and shrewdest heads may be utterly at fault, in probing the causes and grounds of national strength and prosperity:—

'Such was the origin of that debt which has since become the greatest prodigy that ever perplexed the sagacity and confounded the pride of statesmen and philosophers. At every stage in the growth of that debt the nation has set up the same cry of anguish and despair. At every stage in the growth of that debt it has been seriously asserted by wise men that bankruptcy and ruin were at hand. Yet, still the debt went on growing, and still bankruptcy and ruin were as remote as ever. When the great contest with Louis the Fourteenth was finally terminated by the peace of Utrecht, the nation owed about fifty millions; and that debt was considered, not merely by the rude multitude, not merely by fox-hunting squires and coffee-house orators, but by acute and profound thinkers, as an incumbrance which would permanently cripple the body politic. Nevertheless trade flourished, wealth increased; the nation became richer and richer. Then came the war of the Austrian Succession, and the debt rose to eighty millions. Pamphleteers, historians, and orators pronounced that now, at all events, our case was desperate. Yet the signs of increasing prosperity, signs which could neither be counterfeited nor concealed, ought to have satisfied observant and reflecting men that a debt of eighty millions was less to the England, which was governed by Pelham, than a debt of fifty millions had been to the England which was governed by Oxford. Soon war again broke forth; and, under the energetic and prodigal administration of the first William Pitt, the debt rapidly swelled to a hundred and forty millions. As soon as the first intoxication of victory was over, men of theory and men of business almost unanimously pronounced that the fatal day had now really arrived. The only statesman indeed, active or speculative, who did not share in the general delusion was Edmund Burke. David Hume, undoubtedly one of the most profound political economists of his time, declared that our madness had exceeded the madness of the Crusaders. Richard Cœur de Lion and Saint Lewis had not gone in the face of arithmetical demonstration. It was impossible to prove by figures that the road to Paradise did not lie through the Holy Land; but it was possible to prove by figures that the road to national ruin was

¹ It is the expansion of a sentence of Burke's.—'Public credit, that great but ambiguous principle, which has so often been predicted as the cause of our certain ruin, but which for a century has been the constant companion, and often the means, of our prosperity and greatness, had its origin, and was cradled, as I may say, in bankruptcy and beggary.'—*First Letter on a Regicide Peace*, 1796. Works, vol. v. 290. In an allusion, but without a reference, to Burke's appeal to Montague's famous Resolutions, in this letter, we notice a misprint in Mr. Macaulay's text:—'In 1798, Burke held up the proceedings of that day,' &c. (iv. 726.) Burke died in 1797. It should be 1796.

through the national debt. It was idle, however, now to talk about the road; we had reached the goal; all was over; all the revenues of the island north of Trent and west of Reading were mortgaged. Better for us to have been conquered by Prussia or Austria than to be saddled with the interest of a hundred and forty millions. And yet this great philosopher—for such he was—had only to open his eyes and see improvement all around him, cities increasing, cultivation extending, marts too small for the crowd of buyers and sellers, harbours insufficient to contain the shipping, artificial rivers joining the chief inland seats of industry to the chief seaports, streets better lighted, houses better furnished, richer wares exposed to sale in statelier shops, swifter carriages rolling along smoother roads. He had, indeed, only to compare the Edinburgh of his boyhood with the Edinburgh of his old age. His prediction remains to posterity, a memorable instance of the weakness from which the strongest minds are not exempt. Adam Smith saw a little, and but a little further. He admitted that, immense as the burden was, the nation did actually sustain it and thrive under it in a way which nobody could have foreseen. But he warned his countrymen not to repeat so hazardous an experiment. The limit had been reached. Even a small increase might be fatal. Not less gloomy was the view that George Grenville, a minister eminently diligent and practical, took of our financial situation. The nation must, he conceived, sink under a debt of a hundred and forty millions, unless a portion of the load were borne by the American colonies. The attempt to lay a portion of the load on the American colonies produced another war. That war left us with an additional hundred millions of debt, and without the colonies, whose help had been represented as indispensable. Again England was given over; and again the strange patient persisted in becoming stronger and more blooming in spite of all the diagnostics and prognostics of state physicians. As she had been visibly more prosperous with a debt of a hundred and forty millions than with a debt of fifty millions, so she was visibly more prosperous with a debt of two hundred and forty millions than with a debt of a hundred and forty millions. Soon, however, the wars which sprang from the French Revolution, and which far exceeded in cost any that the world had ever seen, tasked the powers of public credit to the utmost. When the world was again at rest, the funded debt of England amounted to eight hundred millions. If the most enlightened man had been told in 1792, that, in 1815, the interest on eight hundred millions would be duly paid to the day at the bank, he would have been as hard of belief as if he had been told that the government would be in possession of the lamp of Aladdin or the purse of Fortunatus. It was in truth a gigantic, a fabulous debt; and we can hardly wonder that the cry of despair should have been louder than ever. But again that cry was found to have been as unreasonable as ever. After a few years of exhaustion, England recovered herself. Yet, like Addison's valetudinarian, who continued to whimper that he was dying of consumption, till he became so fat that he was shamed into silence, she went on complaining that she was sunk in poverty, till her wealth showed itself by tokens which made her complaints ridiculous. The beggared, the bankrupt society not only proved able to meet all its obligations, but, while meeting those obligations, grew richer and richer so fast that the growth could almost be discerned by the eye. In every county we saw wastes recently turned into gardens: in every city we saw new streets, and squares, and markets, more brilliant lamps, more abundant supplies of water: in the suburbs of every great seat of industry we saw villas multiplying fast, each embosomed in its gay little paradise of lilacs and roses. While shallow politicians were repeating that the energies of the people were borne down by the weight of the public burdens, the first journey was performed by steam on a rail-

way. Soon the island was intersected by railways. A sum exceeding the whole amount of the national debt at the end of the American war, was, in a few years, voluntarily expended by this ruined people in viaducts, tunnels, embankments, bridges, stations, engines. Meanwhile taxation was almost constantly becoming lighter and lighter; yet still the exchequer was full. It may be now affirmed without fear of contradiction that we find it as easy to pay the interest of eight hundred millions as our ancestors found it a century ago to pay the interest of eighty millions. It can hardly be doubted that there must have been some great fallacy in the notions of those who uttered and those who believed that long succession of confident predictions, so signally falsified by a long succession of indisputable facts. To point out that fallacy is the office rather of the political economist than of the historian. Here it is sufficient to say that the prophets of evil were under a double delusion. They erroneously imagined that there was an exact analogy between the case of an individual who is in debt, and the case of a society which is in debt to a part of itself; and this analogy led them into endless mistakes about the effect of the system of funding. They were under an error not less serious, touching the resources of the country. They made no allowance for the effect produced by the incessant progress of every experimental science, and by the incessant efforts of every man to get on in life. They saw that the debt grew, and they forgot that other things grew as well as the debt.¹

When we laid down Mr. Macaulay's first two volumes eight years ago, we laid them down with the feelings with which persons look forward to the solution of an enigma, or the establishment of a paradox. What will he make of the most repulsive reign of English history? We have now seen how the paradox is maintained, and the riddle solved. We are not satisfied. We have much to complain of, much to condemn. But the task is accomplished with singular power and skill. We part now from him a second time, and with different feelings. There is no such curiosity at work to know what line he will take, or how he will acquit himself. We can tell exactly the view that he will adopt; and we know also how ably he will maintain it, and what new stores of interest he will be able to open out as he goes along. We part from him now, hardly venturing to look forward; we part from him with the feeling of regret at the interruption and failure of a great design. Something more indeed, we may yet, we trust, expect from him;¹ but this will be but an addition to a fragment. That great work, so proudly planned, which with all its faults would have been one of the most magnificent ornaments of English literature, will never be now. The regret is the stronger because the great writer is living to resign his hopes, and to feel that he must leave the story of which his mind is full, untold.

¹ We notice the promise given in vol. iv. p. 780.

ART. V.—1. *Polynesian Mythology and Ancient Traditional History of the New Zealand Race.* By SIR GEORGE GREY. London: Murray. 1855.

2. *Te Tka a Maui, or New Zealand and its Inhabitants.* By REV. RICHARD TAYLOR, M.A. Many years a Missionary in New Zealand. London: Wertheim and Macintosh. 1855.

THE publication of these two works, almost at the same time, is itself an evident proof that a very strong interest has been excited among the colonists of New Zealand in favour of the native population. It has too generally been the result of European immigration either to destroy altogether, or to subjugate with an iron hand, the indigenous races which it found in possession. The majority of such races have been utterly intractable, and have brought their fate on themselves. It would seem that many tribes are so utterly wild, and so lost to all powers of civilization, that an entire separation between themselves and the natives of Europe must last for many generations, if not to the end of time. In North America this want of sympathy has ended in the retirement of the native altogether from the struggle, and generally in his extinction; while the nations of Asia, though able to mingle with us for the secular purposes of life, show almost an equal want of sympathy, and the same obstinacy of race, in forbidding all real community of feeling. Much of this of course depends on climate. But generally it follows that lengthened acquaintance with native races has had the effect of diminishing our interest in them. The future has held out small prospects of real sympathy, or amalgamation, and therefore the past has been forgotten except as revealing some curious specimens of the varied ideas that have characterized the human family. Yet the greater interest, which is now felt for the Maori race, is not the result of any peculiar gentleness or fascination on first acquaintance. The most striking part of the subject is the contrast which is afforded between the first pictures of New Zealand life and the present state of things; between the former barbarities, and the present good understanding that exists. The death of a devoted Missionary, stationed in one of the Polynesian islands, was recently announced in the newspapers, with an accompanying remark, that he 'had experienced many touching proofs of grateful Christian love from the simple natives.' How different are such tender recollections from the savage and fearful narratives which, but very lately, were the too common histories of those adventurous Europeans, whether missionaries or otherwise, who

invaded the homes of this island race? Two New Zealand chiefs were exhibited in this country about twenty-five years ago, who were made to inspire all beholders with horror and disgust, by the daily performance of their most savage actions. They were known to be cannibals, and they were seen, though happily under a powerful escort, in the wildest attitudes of rage and frenzy; showing all their war dances, and shouting their cries of victory. Even then it was observed that, under all this painful and repulsive exhibition of savage manners, their existed a far gentler vein of thought than their actions betrayed; that they were not destitute of feelings which might form the groundwork of civilized life. They were rescued from their degrading position, were trained to mingle in social life, were warranted harmless, and eventually shipped off home, leaving behind them a very different notion of their capabilities and dispositions from that which existed on their first arrival.

This capacity of improvement, illustrated in the case of these two, has been since most strikingly confirmed in the whole race. Known at one time for little else but their cannibalistic habits, they are now chiefly notorious for being the most successful people among whom the preachers of the gospel have travelled in modern times. They seem to possess more of that stuff from which civilised beings are eventually constructed, than most of the heathen which have been brought to our notice; they are far more accessible to the Christian religion than the Indians of the west, or the Hindoos of the east.

If we trace in past ages the first origin of those who have been the chief people of the earth for their respective periods, we shall find a strange mixture of facts and fables, of plain and most probable statements of history, and of confused dreamy recollections, corresponding in the life of nations, with those visionary, indefinite, yet often pleasing fancies, which remain in the mature life of each individual as the memorial of childish days. It thus happens that our knowledge of classic ages is much connected with their mythology. It would seem most natural that, in looking back on ancient Greece or Rome, the developed periods of their civilization should, far more than in this case, have eclipsed the vague dreams of their early traditions. Through ages of struggling energy, of common-place worldly advancement, of refinement in art and luxury, of improved physical science, and of warlike operations conducted on the simplest principles of human courage and endurance; through even the periods of decline and fall which have marked the great empires and republics of antiquity; through all the mature and decaying life of the great nations of the world, we are still able to trace their most childish dreams of remote

fabulous histories. Is it not strange that the sturdy Lacedæmonian, or accomplished Athenian, should still be connected in our minds with the inhabitants of Olympus? and that the construction of Roman viaducts, or the general who so ably, yet, by ordinary laws of military science, conducted the campaign of the Gallican war, should still be associated in our minds with the loves of Anchises and Venus, or the eccentricities of a she-wolf? The book itself of Revelation, however true and exact it is in the narration of facts, yet bears upon its surface a highly mythological character. Nor is it to be imagined that we undervalue the truths of inspiration by calling them mythological: some myths are true, and some false; those handed down by revelation are the one, and those held by the heathen are the other; though some traditional glimpses of the truth may often be found, even in the wildest fancies of the remotest savage.

Such being the prevalent interest attached to the mythology of all civilized nations, it was a wise impression, conceived by Sir George Grey, that the duties of Governor-in-chief of New Zealand might be carried on with greater success, and that his influence over the natives might be more complete, as well as the dignity of the people enhanced, by a careful noting down, at the mouth of their priests, of the principal traditions yet remaining as to their origin, and their connexion with other countries, or even superhuman beings. In a few years it seemed probable that all such traditions would have vanished, since the rising generation know but little of them. Even as a matter of curiosity, it was thus very desirable that the scattered fragments should be at once collected. But Sir George Grey was influenced by higher motives than mere curiosity to prosecute this inquiry. He was led to it by all those previous efforts to conciliate the natives for which his governorship has been so pleasantly notorious. He found himself, on his arrival in New Zealand, in the midst of much angry feeling; and, to his credit be it spoken, he left the island in a state, not only of unexampled tranquillity, but far advanced in civilization.

His first instincts were a proof that he was anxious to adopt a superior mode of dealing with the wild people under his charge than has too generally been the case on the first contact of the white man with the savage:—

‘I soon perceived that I could neither successfully govern, nor hope to conciliate, a numerous and turbulent people, with whose language, manners, customs, religion, and modes of thought I was quite unacquainted. In order to redress their grievances, and apply remedies, which would neither wound their feelings nor militate against their prejudices, it was necessary that I should be able thoroughly to understand their complaints; and to win their confidence and regard, it was also requisite that I should be able at all times, and in all places, patiently to listen to the tales of their wrongs

or sufferings, and, even if I could not assist them, to give them a kind reply, couched in such terms as should leave no doubt on their minds that I clearly understood and felt for them, and was really well disposed towards them.'—P. iv.

The intervention of interpreters he found a very imperfect and a very cold method of communicating with the natives. Even when they were available, the case was not much better. Many difficulties were in the way which made it an arduous task to acquire any sufficient knowledge of an unwritten language during the many distracting engagements which occupied both his mind and his time; but, together with the toil which filled up every spare moment, came also the satisfaction of discovering more clearly than ever how extremely useful the acquisition of such knowledge would be.

'Only one thing could, under such circumstances, be done, and that was to acquaint myself with the ancient language of the country, to collect its traditional poems and legends, to induce their priests to impart to me their mythology, and to study their proverbs.'—P. viii.

For eight years Sir George Grey applied himself heartily and earnestly to this task; and even after this laborious task, one fruit of his researches was destroyed by fire.

Confused and indistinct was the result of all his labour till it underwent a further process of arrangement. With care, however, and method, he at last succeeded in harmonizing these scattered fragments of tradition into something like consistent and definite stories that might constitute a system of mythology. The translation is close and literal, which, of course, is necessary to give the work any real value as an authentic compilation. The rambling visionary characters of its histories may, indeed, be a trial to the patience of one whose only thought is to find an evening's amusement in their perusal, but the great interest of the book must be apparent if we consider the following picture of the origin from which it springs:—

'For the first time, I believe, a European reader will find it in his power to place himself in the position of one who listens to a heathen and savage high-priest, explaining to him, in his own words, and in his own energetic manner, the traditions in which he earnestly believes, and unfolding the religious opinions upon which the faith and hopes of his race rest.'—P. xi.

The mythology of Polynesia may seem puerile; but Sir George Grey very shrewdly remarks, that whenever other systems of mythology appear more grand, it is to be attributed to our greater ignorance of their details. Childish, however, as they are, there is much truth in the following considerations:—

'But the puerility of these traditions and barbarous mythological systems by no means diminishes their importance as regards their influence upon the human race. Those contained in the present volumes have, with slight modifications, prevailed perhaps considerably more than two thousand years throughout the great mass of the islands of the Pacific Ocean; and, indeed,

the religious system of ancient Mexico was, probably, to some extent connected with them. They have been believed in and obeyed by many millions of the human race; and it is still more melancholy to reflect that they were based upon a system of human sacrifices to the gods; so that if we allow them to have existed for two thousand years, and that, in accordance with the rites which are based upon them, at least two thousand human victims were annually sacrificed throughout the whole extent of the numerous islands in which they prevailed.—P. xiii.

From the thought of such horrors and barbarities of the past, it is indeed refreshing to hear the testimony of our author to the wonderful change which has come over them, and the capacity for improvement which, as a people, they have exhibited.

For any complete knowledge of those wild stories which constitute Polynesian mythology, we must refer the reader to our authors. We cannot attempt even any abstract or explanation of them. It might happen that occasional analogies could be discovered between these stories of the ocean, and European, or Scriptural mythology; but, as a general rule, all such analogies are most vague and incoherent, for the fables now under our notice contain little that is instructive or moral, though occasionally there are pleasant touches of the softer and gentler feelings of the human mind. The legends may be classed under two heads:—those that relate to the origin of the human race generally; and those which are connected with the first colonization of New Zealand. With regard to the former subject, we extract the following—called ‘The Children of Heaven and Earth’—both for its special subject-matter, and as a specimen of the dreamy conceptions which are the only Polynesian links between the past and the present:—

‘Men had but one pair of primitive ancestors; they sprang from the vast heaven that exists above us, and from the earth which lies beneath us. According to the traditions of our race, Rangi and Papa, or Heaven and Earth, were the source from which, in the beginning, all things originated. Darkness then rested upon the heaven and upon the earth, and they still both clave together, for they had not yet been rent apart; and the children they had begotten were ever thinking amongst themselves what might be the difference between darkness and light; they knew that beings had multiplied and increased, and yet light had never broken upon them, but it ever continued dark. Hence these sayings are found in our ancient religious services: “There was darkness from the first division of time, unto the tenth, to the hundredth, to the thousandth,” that is, for a vast space of time; and these divisions of times were considered as beings, and were each termed a Po; and on their account there was as yet no world with its bright light, but darkness only for the beings which existed.

‘At last the beings who had been begotten by Heaven and Earth, worn out by the continued darkness, consulted amongst themselves, saying, “Let us now determine what we should do with Rangi and Papa, whether it would be better to slay them or to rend them apart. Then spoke Tuma-tuenga, the fiercest of the children of Heaven and Earth, “It is well, let us slay them.”

‘Then spake Tane-mahuta, the father of forests and of all things that

inhabit them, or that are constructed from trees, "Nay, not so. It is better to rend them apart, and to let the heaven stand far above us, and the earth lie under our feet. Let the sky become as a stranger to us, but the earth remain close to us as our nursing mother."—Pp. 1, 2.

All consented to this unkind proposal except one brother, who was the father of winds and storms, by name Tawhiri-ma-tea, who was afraid that his own kingdom might suffer. At length, however, came the day when this important effort was to be made:—

'Their plans have been agreed on, lo, Rongo-ma-tane, the god and father of the cultivated food of man, rises up, that he may rend apart the heavens and the earth; he struggles, but he rends them not apart. Lo, next, Tangaroa, the god and father of fish and reptiles, rises up, that he may rend apart the heavens and the earth; he also struggles, but he rends them not apart. Lo, next, Haumia-tikitiki, the god and father of the food of man which springs without cultivation, rises up and struggles, but ineffectually. Lo, then, Tu-matauenga, the god and father of fierce human beings, rises up and struggles, but he, too, fails in his efforts. Then, at last, slowly uprises Tane-mahuta, the god and father of forests, of birds, and of insects, and he struggles with his parents; in vain he strives to rend them apart with his hands and arms. Lo, he pauses; his head is now firmly planted on his mother the earth, his feet he raises up and rests against his father the skies, he strains his back and limbs with mighty effort. Now are rent apart Rangi and Papa, and with cries and groans of wo they shriek aloud, "Wherefore slay you thus your parents? Why commit you so dreadful a crime as to slay us, as to rend your parents apart?" But Tane-mahuta pauses not, he regards not their shrieks and cries; far, far beneath him he presses down the earth; far, far above him he thrusts up the sky.'—Pp. 3, 4.

The one dissentient brother is full of dire revenge for this deed of the others, and dreading that the world should become too fair and beautiful, he rises up to his father in the skies, and forms awful plans for the disturbance of the earth. He sends his numerous progeny in all directions, and hence occasioned the four quarters of the wind:—

'He next sends forth fierce squalls, whirlwinds, dense clouds, massy clouds, dark clouds, gloomy thick clouds, fiery clouds, clouds which precede hurricanes, clouds of fiery black, clouds reflecting glowing red light, clouds wildly drifting from all quarters and wildly bursting, clouds of thunder storms, and clouds hurriedly flying. In the midst of these Tawhiri-ma-tea himself sweeps wildly on.'—Pp. 5, 6.

From the land this wrathful brother betakes himself to water, and there upraises all manner of waves, storms, and cliffs, eddies and whirlpools. Tangaroa, the god of the ocean, flies discomfited before him, and his offspring hid themselves, in two great divisions, some in the water, who continued there as fish, and some on land, who became reptiles. These separate parties thus addressed each other in the confusion of flight. The fish said to the reptiles:—

'Fly inland, then; and the fate of you and your race will be, that when they catch you, before you are cooked, they will singe off your scales over a lighted wisp of dry fern.'—P. 7.

While the reptiles answered:—

'Seek safety, then, in the sea; and the future fate of your race will be, that when they serve out little baskets of cooked vegetable food to each person, you will be laid upon the top of the food to give a relish to it.'—P. 8.

Tangaroa, enraged at the desertion of his children, who have gone, in the form of reptiles, to seek shelter on the land, wages war with the god of forests, who has become their protector. By way of retaliation, the god of forests is able to supply the enemies of Tangaroa with the wood from which canoes are made, also with spears, fish-hooks, and fibrous nets, to the great destruction of fish. Nor is Tangaroa unable, on his part, to carry on very active hostilities against the god of forests. He overwhelms canoes with the surges of the sea; swallows up lands, trees, and houses in his devastating floods, and destroys no small number of the insects, birds, and other animals which inhabit the dry land.

The god of the ocean being thus vanquished, and his progeny thrown into unceasing quarrels by the fury of Tawhiri-matea, this revengeful brother next turned his anger against those of his family who protected *food* in its various shapes. Happily for our race, these were enabled to hide themselves from the wind, and thus to escape harm, while their assailant next turned his attention toward another brother, possessing a most formidable name, which represents Man, or 'the fierce man.' Here he met with a rebuff, for Man stood erect and unshaken upon his mother earth, and caused the god of storms at length to become tranquil. Man being thus victorious, commenced a warfare against his brethren, who had failed to support him in the struggle he had waged against the common enemy, and eventually succeeded in devouring them all; an event illustrative of the power of man to make use of all the produce of the earth for his support. It was about this time, in some mysterious way, that man became subject to death, from the time that some goddess, whose name we need not repeat, was deceived by a demigod of equally difficult nomenclature. The position, however, of the world's inhabitants being thus relatively established,—the one brother to the other, and the children towards their parents,—then commenced the ordinary processes of nature as now we experience them. Every phenomenon that now comes within our observation, may in some way or other be traced to the conquests or the reverses of these primitive brethren. Man, of course, is preeminent, and all those things which are eaten by are the descendants of his original victims; and the sternness which the devouring instinct is carried out in all these ancient acts, is plainly connected with the comparatively recent habits, looking to our refined senses, of converting the bodies of those

slain in battle into cooked meat for food. The earth now multiplied and prospered under the enforced system of Rangi and Papa. The story, however, concludes with a very pleasing and poetical relation of the sentimental recollections which still exist between these long separated and loving partners:—

‘Up to this time the vast Heaven has still ever remained separated from his spouse the Earth. Yet their mutual love still continues—the soft warm sighs of her loving bosom still ever rise up to him, ascending from the woody mountains and valleys, and men call these mists; and the vast Heaven, as he mourns through the long nights his separation from his beloved, drops frequent tears upon her bosom, and men seeing these, term them dew-drops.’—P. 15.

In parts of this fabulous history we may perhaps trace some analogy with the first chapter of Genesis. The separation of the firmament from the earth, and the land from the water, with the preeminence of man over all nature, form the substance of each tale; but still the similarity of the two stories is not sufficiently exact to make us at all sure that the one is the tradition of the other. A contemplative observation of nature might itself have prompted all that we hear of Polynesian mythology.

The following passage from the adventures of a somewhat bold demigod into the region of the tenth heaven, is a rather curious illustration that purity and cleanliness is not in all minds associated with the more blessed abode of the universe:—

‘When they had each ended their lamentation, Rehua called to his servants, “Light a fire, and get everything ready for cooking food.” The slaves soon made the fire burn up brightly, and brought hollow calabashes, all ready to have food placed in them, and laid them down before Rehua. All this time Rupe was wondering whence the food was to come from with which the calabashes, which the slaves had brought, were to be filled; but presently he observed that Rehua was slowly loosening the thick bands which enveloped his locks around and upon the top of his head; and when his long locks all floated loosely, he shook the dense masses of his hair, and forth from them came flying flocks of the Tui birds, which had been nestling there, feeding upon insects; and as they flew forth, the slaves caught and killed them, and filled the calabashes with them, and took them to the fire, and put them on to cook, and when they were done, they carried them and laid them before Rupe as a present, and then placed them beside him that he might eat, and Rehua requested him to eat food, but Rupe answered him, “Nay, but I cannot eat this food; I saw these birds loosened and take wing from thy locks; who would dare to eat birds that had fed upon insects in thy sacred head?”—Pp. 84, 85.

From Sir George Grey we would now turn to the more general work of Mr. Taylor. Many years’ experience as a Missionary in the Island would seem to have implanted a very great respect in his mind for the Maori race, and to have also prompted a very industrious research into their history, both fabulous and real, past and present. We are, indeed, surprised at the vast amount of interesting matter which he has collected together and arranged with considerable art, for the instruction

of the public. He divides his subject into native traditions, previous to the arrival of Europeans, and the subsequent history of the Island.

The traditions mentioned by Mr. Taylor correspond very much (as of course they must do, if both are correct,) with those already discussed in connexion with Sir G. Grey. We will not, therefore, go over the same ground, and will only refer to Mr. Taylor, on points not already introduced to our readers.

Mr. Taylor is one of those religionists who takes special delight in tracing the history of the children of Israel, no matter where or when. We are not about to quarrel with him on this score, but simply to state his opinion, expressed in several parts of his work, that the Polynesian races are descended from the ten tribes. We confess that his evidence is anything but conclusive, and amounts to little more than a seeming probability of New Zealand having been originally peopled by nomad tribes from Asia, which, having traversed the continent, embarked on the sea, and, one by one, colonized the many islands which form a belt across the Southern ocean.

Taking this view of the origin of the New Zealand races, he imagines many of their traditions, especially on the law of Tapu, —those who in their childhood with ourselves have pondered with delight over Cook's Voyages, will identify this word in the more familiar *taboo*, —to have been founded in the Mosaic law. He does not, however, convey the idea that he twists events to suit his preconceived theory. There is an air of truth and nature in all that he says, which is entirely uninfluenced by the destination of the ten tribes. Of Tapu he thus says:—

'This singular Institution, which pervades the entire extent of Polynesia, may perhaps be most correctly defined as *A religious observance, established for political purposes*. It consisted in making any person, place, or thing sacred for a longer or shorter period; if it were a person, during the time of the Tapu he could not be touched by any one, or even put his own hand to his head himself; but he was either fed by another who was appointed for the purpose, or took up his food with his mouth from a small stage, with his hands behind him, or by a fern stalk, and thus conveyed it to his mouth; in drinking, the water was poured in a very expert manner from a calabash into his mouth, or on his hands, when he needed it for washing, so that he should not touch the vessel, which otherwise could not have been used again for ordinary purposes.¹ Places were tapu for certain periods; rivers until the fishing was ended; cultivations until the planting or reaping was completed; districts until either the hunting of the rat or catching of birds was done; woods until the fruit of the kie-kie was gathered.'—Pp. 56, 57.

The consequences of Tapu (which Mr. Taylor thinks bears a strong resemblance to the Mosaic law relating to uncleanness) were often very inconvenient, and occasionally serious:—

'The garments of an ariki, or high chief, were tapu, as well as everything relating to him; they could not be worn by any one else, lest they should kill him. An old chief in my company threw away a very good mat,

¹ A similar custom prevailed in Israel: see 2 Kings iii. 11.

because it was too heavy to carry; he cast it down a precipice, when I inquired why he did not leave it suspended on a tree, that any future traveller wanting a garment might take it? He gravely told me that it was the fear of its being worn by another, which had caused him to throw it where he did, for if it were worn, his tapu would kill the person. In the same way, Taunui's tinder-box killed several persons who were so unfortunate as to find it, and light their pipes from it, without knowing it belonged to so sacred an owner; they actually died from fright.'—P. 58.

Chiefs had a wonderful power of making things tapu or sacred; the means of doing it partake of the ludicrous. To render a place tapu, a chief had only to tie an old garment to a pole, and call the spot on which he placed it by some part of his own body, as his back bone, and no one then dare to infringe upon it without risking endless war in revenge for the injury committed. Everything connected with chiefs was held sacred, and even the rain from the roof of a chief's house, falling into an iron pot, was supposed on one occasion to render all food cooked in it to be fatal, until by a charm the tapu was taken off it. This power has been made use of in many ways, even where contending Christian sects have been influenced by it. A certain chief, who was a Roman Catholic, was guilty, it seems, of too great liberality in admitting a Protestant teacher within the limits of his country. For this he received a rebuke from his priest, which enraged the chief's wife, who had strong Protestant tendencies, and sympathized with the heretic. For the purpose, then, of putting the priest to inconvenience in his journey, this party-spirited lady made the river tapu, so that not a boat was to be had, which compelled the emissary of Rome to walk back by the way he came.

The Maories appear to have had no distinct places of religious worship, or even set prayers of any kind; but a tradition exists of some great temple in former days called Whare-kura. The sacred groves which had survived the more ancient glories of the temple, had degenerated into mere store-houses for old rags and cut hair, which had belonged to chiefs and were thus stowed away, on account of the tapu attached to them. The former temple was a place of gathering among the chiefs, whose pedigrees were there kept and solemnly read on stated occasions.

'Its extreme antiquity is seen from the circumstance of all those who are recorded as having met there, being now regarded as their most ancient gods. The temple had a porch or verandah to it, such as they still make to their houses; this was placed at the gable end by which they entered; and at the other extremity was a small building in which the high priest resided, and seventy other priests had their houses ranged around, each building bearing the name of one of the heavens.'—P. 66.

No food was eaten in the temple on pain of death; it was also made the grand centre of a kind of holy union among all orders of creation, for even reptiles were represented in its assemblies. Discord, however, at length clouded its fortunes, the staff of

Mai-i-rangi was broken; anarchy succeeded, and eventually it was destroyed by fire, a whole multitude perishing in its ruins. On this subject Mr. Taylor remarks:—

‘Such are the disjointed parts of traditions relative to this remarkable temple. They are interesting, and excite our conjectures as to their origin, since they must have been founded on something which once existed; and they are the more singular from referring to a building erected for worship, when they have never since had anything at all corresponding to it amongst them. The Christian natives compare it to Babel; and say it caused their dispersion, and the confusion of tongues, as well as the subsequent state of enmity they have lived in with each other; that at first it resembled Solomon’s temple, where all the tribes met together. It does indeed seem to remind us of the separation of the ten from the other two, in the reign of Rehoboam, who, like Kauika, broke the staff of peace and unity, by his folly: and, supposing this people to be descended from any of those tribes, this is just such a tradition as they might hand down from so distant a period; without letters, we could not expect them to preserve a fuller account. When Israel forsook the temple, which no longer continued to be a bond of union, then it worshipped in high places and groves.’—P. 68.

The ceremonies relating to burial are sufficiently unpleasant, but they strongly mark out a belief in the future state. The Maori has no idea of the silent grief that symbolizes annihilation; on the contrary, he howls and cries with his utmost force, and brings in the aid of gunpowder to make the dead hear from their graves the extent of the mourning which their departure has occasioned. Bodies were not always placed in a grave, but a strange substitute adopted.

‘In other places, the body was put into a kind of frame, formed by two pieces of an old canoe, standing about six feet high, and forming a hollow place, in which the corpse was seated on a grating, to allow the flesh, as it decomposed, to fall through. After a certain time, the skeleton was removed and the bones were scraped; this was the Ngapuhi custom.’—P. 99.

After two years, the unfortunate deceased was again visited. His bones, scraped white and then painted red, after which they were deposited in any place which the relations might fancy.

Space will not allow us to go through the chapters of Mr. Taylor’s book that relate of Maori proverbs, fables, and song; our readers would not probably understand them in the original, and such things lose much in translation. There is, however, a vein of good sense discernible in the proverbs, and of poetry in the songs. They are less exclusively on war than might have been expected from a people of so savage a reputation; and the sentiment of love is evidently well known in the Maori breast, as witnessed in the following song:—

‘O set, thou sun! sink into thy cavern,
Thou causest to gush like water the tears from my eyes.
I am a deserted one through the stepping out of the feet
Of thee, Taratiu, long hidden from my sight.
Thy distant hills, Waiohipara, and the flowing surface of the water,
appear bright like a fire.

My idol, whom I love, is below.
 Let thy spirit cease from visiting me;
 If, perchance, I may forget my sorrowing.'—P. 143.

On the subject of marriage, it is curious to trace the familiar notion that a man ought to take possession of his bride by an act of force and violence. A sham resistance was generally made, which, in the case of there being many competitors, did not always go off very smoothly for the unfortunate bride. In the struggle for her, she was often much hurt, or even killed; nor were her own inclinations allowed to enter into the question. She was handed over to the victorious combatant in whatever state she happened to be, either in body or mind, to share his lot for better or for worse.

The origin of the Maori races is a subject of considerable speculation. Mr. Taylor, as we have already seen, argues for their descent from the ten tribes. He traces a similarity of language between the Polynesian islands and Asiatic races, and many words which he quotes are certainly very like, not only Asiatic but European languages. One instance we quote:—

'Another remarkable word for its travels is *Paradise*. Every nation has pictured to itself some place of bliss, some abode of rest for the soul. Men vary in their idea of the character of that happy spot, but still the idea exists, and all of them are included between the extremes of the sensual paradise of Mahomet, and the spiritual and holy one of the Christian. The word *paradise* itself conveys the idea of a garden enclosed, a garden of delight; it is the place of repose, it is protected from every foe; no enemy can enter, or disturb the rest of the soul. The Hebrew word is *pardés*; the Arabic *firdaus*, plural *faradisa*; Syriac and Armenian *partes*; and Sanscrit *pradisa*, or *paradisa*, a circuit or district; *firdusi*, Persian, a pleasure garden; *Παράδεισος*, an enclosed garden, *paradise*; it is seen in the English words *park* and *pale*, and is preserved in *parae*. New Zealand, a small plain enclosed with forest. The simple root of all these words appear to be *Pa*, to obstruct, hence *Taie-pa* or *Pa-korokoro*, are fences for farms; *Rai he-pa* and *Parepare* are fortifications for towns; and the same root is found in the New Zealand word *pare*, to ward off, and in the English *parry*.'—P. 182.

All the traditions that relate to the first arrival of the Maories at New Zealand, are naturally connected with canoes; and it is remarkable, that the canoes now in use are evidently smaller than those first brought. It is supposed that New Zealand was colonized from the Sandwich Islands, not above 500 years ago. This may seem a long voyage for canoes, even of the size that were then in use, but experience has proved that these small craft, under the management of the natives, can live through very rough weather. It is curious also that, as navigated by them, they do not take quite the same course through the waves that a European sailor would suppose. Taking into account the prevailing winds and currents of the South Sea, it is calculated that the track from the Sandwich Islands to New Zealand is just the one that native canoes would naturally take, though with English navigation it would be different.

Small canoes take a different angle in the trough of each wave, which tells very materially in the general direction of a long voyage.

The population, however, of these islands are undoubtedly a mixed race, descended from emigrants who have come from different places, and at many different times. There are traces of the Malay race, and also of the Chinese, but the supposed fate of the ten tribes shall be told by Mr. Taylor himself:—

‘When the King of Assyria carried away the ten tribes, though he placed them primarily on the shores of the Caspian, that would not long suit their habits of traffic. They would doubtless seek the grand marts of commerce; no longer possessing fixed homes, they became merchants, as a matter of course, and those who still continued to love war and independence, or a pastoral life, would retire before their enemies, and thus, should it be proved that the Afghans are Jews, we see how they would reach that country. Whilst some, perhaps those from Babylon, remained in India, as the black Jews state they have done, some would pass on thence and people the Indian Isles, as the Malays. From the Caspian, many may have followed the caravans across Central Asia, Thibet, and Tartary, until they reached the Eastern Coast, and thence, from island to island, this race, doomed to wander, may have done so, either intentionally or otherwise, as ships are constantly picking up large canoes, which have drifted away from their island homes. Doubtless this has ever been the case, and whilst numbers have thus miserably perished, some few have escaped, and become the inhabitants of many a lone island of the Pacific Ocean. There is no saying where they may not have gone. The first and most civilized settlers of the Americas seemed to have passed by the Aleutian Isles to the continent; others, drifted by the course of currents, have reached the Sandwich Isles, and thence gone even to Easter Isle. The natives, in their traditions, preserve the name of the island they came from, which is *Hawaiki*.’—Pp. 191, 192.

This is more than sufficiently absurd.

Tasman was the first discoverer of New Zealand in 1642, and he supposed that the whole of this country formed part of the Australian continent. A long interval then occurs in our knowledge of the island, which brings down its history to a generation of men, of whom some yet remain alive.

Whaling ships, after this, paid frequent visits to the island; and in 1814, Mr. Marsden, the senior chaplain of New South Wales, claims the honour of having first preached the gospel.

‘Of all the persons connected with the civilization of New Zealand, no one stands higher than Samuel Marsden. Cook took possession of the country in the name of his Sovereign, but it was Marsden who first unfurled the banner of the Prince of Peace, and claimed those fair realms, then laid in heathen darkness, on behalf of the King of kings. It was Marsden who first introduced their savage inhabitants to Christian philanthropy, and enlisted the sympathy of the Church in their behalf; and having obtained aid, he brought it himself, and was the first to proclaim the message of mercy on their shores. He was the honoured instrument who laid the first stone of the Church, and thus commenced a work which has increased in magnitude with increasing years, and has now added those wide-spread realms to the kingdom of the Lord our righteousness.’—Pp. 181, 182.

The success of Mr. Marsden was great, and in common with

the present Bishop of New Zealand, he owed much of it to personal courage in boldly throwing himself among the Maori chiefs as if not at all apprehending that fate which in reality was in the highest degree probable; viz. that of being killed and eaten. The native mind was thus softened and made capable of true sympathy, though in some instances the wild passions of their race broke out with terrible force, even after many years of professed conversion. A change like that which has taken place in the Maori race cannot be expected to avoid occasional reactions. The evil spirit will now and then burst forth with the last effort of despairing energy, will again assert its dominion after being apparently driven out. A frightful instance of this occurred in the history of a chief, named Hongi. His first introduction is described as follows:—

‘Mr. Marsden met with him during his first visit to the Bay of Islands, in 1814; he described him then as a warrior, but of a very mild disposition, and with very little appearance of the savage about him. He was the Chief of seventeen places, but chiefly residing at the Keri Keri. He was of an ingenious turn of mind, extremely anxious to learn European arts, and, at Mr. Marsden’s request, made a bust of himself, with a piece of an old iron hoop, his only implement; on this he delineated his own *moko* (tattoo), and this was sent to the Church Mission-house, where it is still preserved, and is, indeed, a very creditable performance.’—P. 309.

After this he was the uniform protector of the missionaries, and so promising a disciple of civilisation was he, that in 1820 he visited England with a relation, and resided at Cambridge to assist Professor Lée in drawing up his New Zealand Grammar. Hongi’s wish was to see the king, and then to carry back with him a hundred men of various mechanical pursuits, together with missionaries, who might teach the arts and religion to the Maories at home. He also wished for twenty soldiers, and three officers. George the Fourth had an interview with him, and presented him with several suits of armour, and double-barrelled guns, and an ill-omened sword.

The unfortunate instinct of his English friends to foster, by their presents, his warlike tastes was the means of inspiring within him a most fatal ambition. He desired on his return to be king of New Zealand, as George the Fourth was of England, and accordingly sought for a quarrel with his neighbours. His first war was productive of fearful and cruel results.

‘Hongi had twenty prisoners on board his canoe, whom he intended to retain as slaves; but his daughter, who had lost her husband in the fight, with dishevelled locks, rushed down to the water’s edge, as the canoe touched the shore, and seizing the sword presented to her father by the King’s own hand, jumped on board, and smote off sixteen heads of the poor captives, who, without a murmur, placed their necks over the side-board of the canoe.¹ Twenty more were also killed and eaten; and yet the frantic

¹ ‘An eye-witness related this horrid butchery to me,—Mr. Puckey, of Kaitara, one of our Catechists.’

woman, not thinking that the shade of her husband was sufficiently appeased with this sacrifice, went into the bush with a loaded musket, and there shot herself; the ball, however, only passing through her arm, instead of her head, she was still alive when found, but determined to accompany her husband to the Reinga, she afterwards strangled herself.'—P. 313.

His name spread terror wherever he went, till he became a kind of Napoleon of New Zealand. At length, however, he received a wound, and after lingering for a whole year terminated his existence in the awful manner here related—

'In his last hours, so far from attending to the words of the Missionaries, he urged his followers to prosecute the war, and exterminate his enemies. When Patuone visited him, a day or two before his death, and was told he was dying, he said, "No, I am not dying: my heart is quite light. I am not dying." The next day he fainted, and was supposed to be dead; when he revived, he said, he should die, but not until the morrow. He ordered his powder to be brought to him, and when he saw it, he said to his children, *Ka ora koutou*,—you will be safe; intimating, the powder would be their protection. He then summoned his sons, and gave the coat of mail he had received from the King of England to one of them, and then divided his battle-axes and fire-arms amongst them, sternly demanding, "Who will dare to attack my followers after I am gone?"

'Early next morning, though evidently sinking fast, he continued to rally his friends, and said, "No matter from what quarter your enemies come, let their numbers be ever so great, should they come here hungry for you, *kia toa, kia toa*, be brave, be brave! Thus will you revenge my death, and thus only do I wish to be revenged." He continued repeating these words until he expired.'—P. 315.

The history of many other chiefs is given by Mr. Taylor, but we have no more space for extracts, and must refer to the work itself for the very graphic descriptions there contained of the strange horrors that accompany now, as formerly, the casting out of evil spirits.

Mr. Taylor's comments on Church government are beyond our present object to discuss. He obviously takes a different view of things from Bishop Selwyn, of whom nevertheless he speaks with a deference that comes all the more gracefully from a man of very insufficient grasp of Church principles, but of sufficiently long experience, (for Mr. Taylor was in those parts twenty years,) to give him full right, without any charge of presumption, to speak his own mind freely. His sneering language about the Canterbury Settlement deserves exceptional rebuke. On one, and that the main point; viz., one of fact, we have the united testimony of both Mr. Taylor and the Bishop. A change has come over the Maori race, more corresponding with primitive conversions, than has been witnessed for many centuries. They were blind, whereas now they see; and in this fact we may rest satisfied, that even though some differences of opinion have been at work, the One Great Agent has been truly at work, preparing an acceptable people to be added to His Church.

ART. VI. 1.—*The Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians: with Critical Notes and Dissertations.* By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, M.A., Canon of Canterbury; late Fellow and Tutor of University College, Oxford; and Author of the 'Life of Dr. Arnold,' and 'Bishop Stanley.' In Two Volumes. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street. 1855.

2. *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans: with Critical Notes and Dissertations.* By BENJAMIN JOWETT, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford. In Two Volumes. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street. 1855.

THE two works which we have here set down cannot be viewed aright, except in connexion with each other. They are portions of one plan, written indeed by men of very different powers, and of gifts remarkably contrasted, but undertaken in concert, one referring to the other as parts of one whole, agreeing in many of their general features, and tending towards the same end.

It is quite true that one writer is not by any means to be regarded as endorsing all the views of the other: occasionally, indeed, their interpretations differ, and they are at variance in matters of detail. But it would seem that they sympathise in their general sentiments and practically aid each other. Mr. Stanley's work is a kind of introduction to Mr. Jowett's; it is much more attractive to the general reader, much less startling in the opinions it expresses, but facilitating the reception of Mr. Jowett's theories, by breaking down old feelings of reverence and religious association, by accustoming us to regard the Apostle and his works as merely human, and to act on this principle in interpreting his writings.

The volumes before us contain the Greek of these several Epistles according to Lachmann's text, as being that which approaches most nearly to what was received in the first three centuries. All the important variations from the received readings are inserted at the foot of the text. In the Commentary these variations are only noticed 'where the authority is nearly equal, or where they suggest some general remark.' The English version is printed in Mr. Jowett's volumes on the page opposite the Greek, in Mr. Stanley's at the end of the second volume, revised in accordance with Lachmann's readings of the Greek text, and with the commentator's view of the right renderings; these alterations are made with a sparing hand. The notes of each work contain very rare references to the interpretations of other commentators; though, as the writers state, their works have been read and carefully considered. What these commentaries aim at is to give the result flowing fresh

from the mind of the writer, without troubling the reader with diversified interpretations. The notes, in consequence, are very easy to read, and require little exertion of mind. The Epistles are divided into sections, according to the divisions of the argument, and introductions are prefixed to each, sketching the argument, and saying what seems needed for appreciating it; and in Mr. Stanley's work a paraphrase is appended to each section, and wherever the case admits of such a distribution, each is followed by a statement of the results, 'either in Christian history or Christian truth, which that section has contributed to establish.' In some instances, these have assumed the form of distinct essays. In Mr. Jowett's volumes there are no paraphrases, and dissertations of great length grow up out of slight occasions furnished by the Epistles.

It will be found that each writer has undertaken those Epistles which appeared to be most suited to his peculiar turn of mind. Mr. Stanley comments on the most historical and personal of the Epistles, Mr. Jowett on those which connect themselves most with doctrinal and philosophical subjects; and throughout their works, we see the intellectual qualities of the writers remarkably contrasted. Mr. Stanley dwells on the visible and external; Mr. Jowett ever passes on into the 'spiritual' and transcendental. Mr. Stanley presents pictures, and dwells on local associations; Mr. Jowett throws these aside as vain and unprofitable. He says:—

'To fill the mind with historical pictures or descriptions of scenery, will not in any degree help us to feel as the Apostles felt, or think as they thought, any more than the history of the reign of George the Third, or a description of the scenery of Somersetshire or Cornwall, would enable us to understand the life and character of Wesley or Whitfield. Interesting as such pictures may be, they tend to withdraw us from a higher interest, which is to be found only in the private character of the Gospel narrative itself.'—Vol. i. p. 28.

Mr. Stanley is slight and superficial, almost gossiping. Mr. Jowett is grave and philosophical, addressing himself to our deepest and most serious feelings. There is throughout great part of Mr. Jowett's writings a tone of thoughtfulness, and the language of deep religious sentiment, whilst Mr. Stanley is almost frivolous. Indeed, his work might be designated as 'Commentaries made Easy' or as 'Amusing Annotations.' The notes are printed in an excellent large type, which is but a pattern of the ease with which they may be read. Nay, what is an advantage to both commentators, the notes may be read without a reader being troubled to read the text.

These volumes had indeed excited considerable interest, from the known ability and high character of the writers, as well as from their being understood to be thoroughly acquainted with the *theological literature of Germany*, and accordingly being

so well qualified to give the English readers the results of the much-boasted advances made by the critical writers of that country, in the illustration and interpretation of the writings of S. Paul. Mr. Stanley is indeed, in his own line, one of the most able and popular writers of the day. The author of the *Life of Arnold*, of the *Memorials of Canterbury*, and, above all, of the recent topographical work on Sinai and Palestine, may well be regarded as a master in the exhibition of the personal, historical, and local features of the writings of the great Apostle. But these qualities hold a very subordinate place in a commentary on S. Paul. A few essays would have supplied all that is really valuable in these volumes. Mr. Jowett possesses intellectual qualities of another and higher order; but he is devoid of, or lays aside, that accuracy of thought and soundness of judgment, which are necessary to make a faithful expositor. We speak now only of literary qualifications, choosing at present to say nothing of the perversion of view which turns each of these writers from simply trying to ascertain S. Paul's meaning, to a continued endeavour to explain it away.

We have heard much of the progress of theological criticism. We have been told that the theologians of the English Church are behind the age; that new light has been poured on the whole subject of Christian doctrine, and the understanding of Holy Scripture, and in these volumes we expected to see the fruits of it. We apprehend that scholars and theologians alike will regard the result as anything but favourable in the way of improving upon the interpretation of Holy Scripture; whilst, as exhibiting to English Christians in a fearful way the dark and dismal region of doubts and errors into which a false philosophy would lead them, they may prove an instructive warning.

We must here speak of Mr. Stanley's work as distinct from that of Mr. Jowett; and with all respect for his intellectual gifts, and still more for his amiable and earnest character, must do our duty as critics in considering what he has now sent out as a theological and critical work. We can have no hesitation in saying, that Mr. Stanley has mistaken his vocation; and giving all credit to him for the contributions these volumes incidentally contain towards the illustration of S. Paul, we must lay open their great defects, in criticism, in doctrine, in the apprehension of the Apostle's meaning, and, above all, in the tone of levity which pervades them, and the tendency throughout to bring the Apostle and his work not only to a mere human level, but that one of the most common and ordinary description.

Mr. Stanley's notes do, indeed, often put portions of Scripture in a new or stronger light. They bring together useful illustrations. They present animated portraits of the Apostle and his

times. The vividness of Mr. Stanley's pictures, the clearness of his style, the lively and often happy way in which he brings familiar ideas and expressions to illustrate the Epistles, are engaging and of use. In whatever is merely external they assist when they do not mislead. The annotations are interesting—they are even amusing—but they go no further than the external; not only do they not help us in entering into that which is really important—the truths which underlie the words of the writer, the deep thoughts which he labours to express—the divine and eternal realities which he was commissioned to teach—but rather they draw our attention from them. The writer dwells on the human till we almost forget there is anything divine. We could not wish for a more suitable illustration of the meaning of the words, to which Mr. Jowett's statements have drawn attention—the 'knowing Christ after the flesh'—than Mr. Stanley's way of viewing these subjects. We are placed at Corinth: the Apostle and his brother Christians are exhibited to us in their outward circumstances; then their assemblies, their contentions, their zeal, their love. But they are set before us as they might be seen by unbelievers. We will give a specimen of Mr. Stanley's writing when on his own ground:—

'It is not necessary to describe at length the outward aspect which the city of Corinth presented at the time of S. Paul. Its natural features are well known. From the summit of the Acrocorinthus, or huge rocky hill, at the foot of which the town was situated, and on the top of which was the ancient as now the modern citadel, the eye takes in at a glance, what is slowly conveyed by books, the whole secret of its importance as in classical, so also in sacred history. To the right and to the left extend the winding shores of the "double sea," whose blue waters, threading their way through islands and promontories innumerable, open to east and west the communication which made it once and again the natural resting-place in the Apostle's journeys. From that little bay at Cenchreæ he was to take his departure for Ephesus and Jerusalem; up the course of that western gulf lay the direct route to Rome and to the far West, which even now he hoped to follow, and along which, at his second visit, he sent his Epistle to the Romans. In front lie the hills of northern Greece, and, on the coast of Attica, discerned by the glitter of its crown of temples, the Acropolis of Athens, the last scene of S. Paul's preaching before he crossed the Saronic gulf. Behind rise the mountains of Peloponnesus, the highlands of Greece; into their remote fastnesses there was no call for the Apostle to enter; and accordingly, in the city which guards their entrance, we see, in all probability, the southernmost point of his future travels. What was the appearance of the city itself we know to a certain extent from the detailed description of it by Pausanias one hundred years later. At present one Doric temple alone remains of all the splendid edifices then standing; but the immediate vicinity presents various features to which the Apostle's allusions have given an immortal interest. The level plain, and the broken gullies of the isthmus, are still clothed with the low pine, which can still be identified by its modern name (*πενκη*), from whose branches of emerald green were woven the garlands for the Isthmian games, contrasted by the Apostle with the unfading crown of the Christian combatant. In its western declivities are to be seen the vestiges of that

"stadium," in which all ran with such energy as to be taken as the example of Christian self-denial and exertion; and of that "theatre" or "amphitheatre" which conveyed to the Corinthians a lively image of what those sufferings were which are compared to "the fighting with beasts" or to "the spectacle to the world, to angels and to men," the Apostles "being set forth as the last in the file of combatants appointed unto death." We have but to restore those now desolate spots with the long avenues of statues and the white marble seats on the grassy slope of the hill and the temples, whose beauty made the name of Corinthian buildings (*Ephyreæ ædes*) proverbial for magnificence, and which, standing as they did in their ancient glory amidst the new streets erected by Cæsar on the ruins left by Mummus, may well have suggested the comparison of the "gold, silver, and precious marbles," surviving the conflagration in which all meaner edifices of wood and thatch had perished,—and we shall have a sufficient conception of the outward objects which caught the Apostle's eye in his arrival and residence at Corinth.—Vol. i. pp. 5—7.

And:—

'With the confluence of strangers and of commerce, which entitled it to the appellation of the Venice of antiquity, was associated the luxury and licentiousness which gave the name of Corinth an infamous notoriety; and which, connected as they were in the case of the Temple of Aphrodite with religious rites, sufficiently explains the denunciations of sensuality to which the Apostle gives utterance in these Epistles more frequently and elaborately than elsewhere. On the other hand, it was celebrated for maintaining the character of a highly polished and literary society, such as (even without taking into account its connexion with Greek civilization generally) furnishes a natural basis for much both of the praise and blame, with which the first Epistle abounds in regard to intellectual gifts. "At Corinth, you would learn and hear even from inanimate objects," so said a Greek teacher within a century from this time; "so great are the treasures of literature in every direction, wherever you do but glance, both in the streets themselves and in the colonnades; not to speak of the gymnasia and schools, and the general spirit of instruction and inquiry."—Vol. i. pp. 8, 9.

Again:—

"This, then, is the group which we must conceive as present, if not throughout, at least at the opening, of the Epistle. There is Paul himself, now about sixty years of age, but with his powers of body and mind still unbroken, although bearing traces of his constant and recent hardships; his eyes at times streaming with tears of grief and indignation; the scribe, catching the words from his lips and recording them on the parchment scroll which lay unrolled before him. Possibly Sosthenes was himself the scribe, and, if so, we may conceive him not only transcribing, but also bearing his part in the Epistle, at times with signs of acquiescence and approbation, at times, it may be, interposing to remind the Apostle of some forgotten fact, as of the baptism of the household of Stephanas, or of some possible misapprehension of what he had dictated."—Vol. i. p. 24.

The last words exhibit an instance of the character which pervades this commentary: we mean the tendency throughout to dwell simply on what is human; and of the external uninterested attitude of Mr. Stanley towards the Sacred Writings and History.

In an introduction in which the peculiar characteristics of S. Paul are drawn out, as it would seem with the intention of giving a complete picture of what was specially to be kept in mind in studying his writings, the two features which most

strongly mark his epistles are omitted by the present writer : 1. That he was, or at least believed himself to be, an authoritative teacher of divine truth ; 2. That he was, or believed himself to be, guided by the Holy Spirit in the discernment and expression of such truth. And what is it to study S. Paul without having these considerations ever present, than to wander in the labyrinth without the clue—to omit those points which exercise the greatest influence on his writings, and are most essential to the right understanding of them? To approach the study of S. Paul's Epistles without a vivid impression of these truths must lead to error. They were addressed to those who so believed, and we must place ourselves in a corresponding mental position as believers. We must not stand on Mars' Hill among the criticising philosophers, but sit at the feet of the great Apostle and receive his words, as he himself says, 'not as the words of man, but as they are in truth the words of God.'

But this is not all. It is not merely in distinct passages such as this that we observed this defect, but in the tone which pervades the work. Let any one consider in what spirit a man ought to approach a writing which he believes to be in any sense the word of God, and in what manner he ought to interpret it. Surely the Divine words to Moses are but a slight hint of what our reverence ought to be. 'Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground.' 'Tread not here in the bold and fearless way in which thou walkest over common ground. Remember the object for which these letters were written, the source from which their thoughts and teaching were derived. Let that chasten thy imagination, and subdue thy boldness.' Unhappily, we see little of such a temper as this in the present volumes. Mr. Stanley's light way of treating the Apostle's words, even more than any formal statement, seems to say, or at least to lead his readers to feel, that they are not divine. In part this arises in him from an exaggeration of his own peculiarities.

Mr. Stanley's special gift is vividness of description; his favourite pursuit, historical analogy. Both are here largely used, apparently undesignedly, from the force of habit, in such a way as tends to bring down the Apostle, nay, the whole of Christianity, to a human level. Both are overdone to an extent that is satiating, nay, even ridiculous. We are obliged to exhibit some almost casual instances of what will be found in nearly every page. When S. Paul's thorn in the flesh is under consideration we read:—

'Instances in later history readily occur to illustrate both the severity of such a trial and of perseverance under it: Alfred, with his cancer—Luther, with the stone—William of Orange, with his fragile frame—contending against the constant demands of active life.'—Vol. ii. p. 247.

When marriage is discussed:—

“An sapienti ducenda sit uxor?” was an established question to be discussed, and the answer was usually in the negative.—Vol. i. p. 121.

When the Apostle's style is considered (Vol. i. p. iv.), it is compared to that of ‘Thucydides and Oliver Cromwell.’ There is a *βάθος* about such references the effect of which could only have been avoided by a tone of reverence in the writer which would show that he was not putting S. Paul on a level with these ‘heroes.’

But the work is not free from faults of a merely literary character. From the stores of Smith's ‘Biographical Dictionary,’ and Mr. Stanley's wide-spread historical information, there is a perpetual introduction of far-fetched and irrelevant allusions. These literary anecdotes fill up the book, and are highly amusing; but meanwhile they draw our minds off from the serious study of the Apostle's writings, and seem to proceed on the view that the object of our reading them is to trace historical illustrations, not to learn divine truth either of faith or practice. Thus when Aquila is mentioned, we are told, ‘Aquila was (like his famous namesake, the translator of the Old Testament) a Jew.’ (Vol. i. p. 412.) If the name ‘Achaicus’ occurs; ‘Achaicus was the surname of Mummius, as the conqueror of Greece, and was also the name of a writer on ethics, whose date and country are alike unknown.’ (*Ib.* p. 410.) If Apollos, we are told that this name is abridged from Apollonius, and then from Smith's Dictionary that the number of ‘Apolloniuses in Egypt was so great that, unless some distinguishing epithet is added, it is impossible to say who they were.’ Then the chief Apolloniuses are enumerated.

To show that we are not giving an unfair account of the literary aspect of this work, we cite the following, which occur in the notes on a few consecutive verses at the beginning of 1 Cor. xiii.:—

1. ‘Though I speak,’ &c.

‘It is said that Göthe always thought of this passage in reading the poems of Byron.’—Vol. i. p. 276.

On 2, ‘Though I have all faith so that I could remove mountains:’—

‘The phrase, to “remove mountains,” was common amongst the Rabbis, for victory over difficulties, and hence the most distinguished teachers were called “uprooters of mountains.” Compare the well-known story of Mahomet, where the removal of the mountain is put to him as the test of his miraculous power. There is an Eastern proverb, “Man may go to man, but not mountain to man.”’—*Ibid.*

3. ‘If I give all my goods in food (to feed the poor) *ἐὰν φωμίσω*.’ The only sense of *φωμίσω* elsewhere is, to feed, simply. It properly means, to feed as a nurse does a child,

by putting 'morsels into its mouth;' but the notion of the morsels themselves quite passes out of sight. Mr. Stanley drags them back for the sake of the following extract:—

'But it may also be, according to the etymology, "If I divide all my goods into morsels." Coleridge in a MS. note on this passage says, "The true and most significant sense is, 'Though I dole away in mouthfuls all my property or estates.' Who that has witnessed the alms-giving in a Catholic monastery or the court of a Spanish or Sicilian bishop's or archbishop's palace, where immense revenues are syringed away in farthings to herds of beggars, but must feel the force of the Apostle's half satirical ψωμίω?"'—Vol. i. p. 277.

In the latter part of this verse there is a disputed reading, 'to be burnt,'—'that I may glory.' Mr. Stanley dwells on this, though he prefers the other reading, and tells us:—

'There is a story of Sapricius, a Christian of Antioch, who was condemned to death for his profession of Christianity, and yet on his way to execution refused to forgive his enemy Nicephorus; and then, at the last moment, his faith gave way, and he recanted (see Heydenreich ad I.). Nor even without the case of Christian martyrs, were instances of such self-immolation inconceivable; Calanus burnt himself before the army of Alexander, and Peregrinus, the Stoic philosopher, did the same at the Olympic games, in the time of the Antonines, and in the presence of Lucian, who describes it.'—Vol. i. pp. 277, 278.

By way of further relieving our severer studies, and showing Mr. Stanley's appreciation of what is good and beautiful in every school of thought, we have, *apropos* to celibacy, 1 Cor. vii. half a page out of the 'Christian Year'—

'— There are souls that seem to dwell
Above this earth,' &c.

'There are in this loud stunning tide,' &c.

Vol. i. pp. 147, 148.

On the old leaven and new lump, 1 Cor. v. a verse of 'the well-known hymn of Thomas Aquinas, *Lauda Zion Salvatorem*:—

'Nova mensa, novi Regis,' &c.—Ibid. p. 99.

On 1 Cor. i. 20, the cessation of Rabbinical wisdom as one of the signs of the Messiah's coming suggests the analogy of the cessation of oracles in the heathen world; and this cannot be mentioned without adding those noble, yet to confess the truth rather familiar, lines:—

'The oracles are dumb,
Nor voice, nor the hideous hum

Runs thro' the arched roof in words deceiving.'

Ibid. p. 50.

We must, however, pass on to other points; only, by the way, we may well ask, if all this gossip is the pattern commentary of the intellectual and philosophical school of modern divines?

Of the poverty of the interpretations we will give one specimen:—

'This is the last and crowning glory of Love, that it is imperishable; everything else may be changed in the great change of death, but the *fections* may still be regarded as surviving.'—Vol. i. p. 281.

But of this the paraphrases appended to the section afford, even to the most casual reader, the fullest proof. It is scarcely possible to conceive how 'the fine gold' is made 'dim,' and 'the wine mingled with water.'

Of this meagre and unsubstantial fare we will give a single instance, on 1 Cor. xv. 30, seq. :—

'What would be the meaning, in our own case, of our hourly exposure to danger and death? It is no exaggeration. I protest to you by that which is dearest to me in the world,—my pride in you my converts which I have in Him in whose name I suffer,—I protest to you, that I am daily on the verge of the grave. And, to take the most recent instance, if it had only been with human hopes and fears that I fought the other day at Ephesus as if with wild beasts in the amphitheatre, what would have been my gain? No: if there be no resurrection, we must speak in the language, not of those high spirits who, even in the heathen world, despised all danger in the hope of immortality, but rather of those Epicurean sensualists, whose very words have been anticipated by the prophet Isaiah: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Be not deceived by the sensual arguments, which really prompt this denial of the resurrection. Even the heathen proverb warns you that good characters are not proof against the contamination of evil words. Wake from your drunken revelry to a sense of duty; for there are those among you who know nothing of God and His power. To your shame be it spoken.'—Vol. i. pp. 381, 382.

One instance more of comment on this noble argument of the Apostle, a melancholy specimen of what is, to say the least, a condescension to those who do not believe:—

'As logical or rhetorical arguments, his reasonings may be such as were already in existence, or such as may appear to us inconclusive; but as consequences from the acknowledgment of the grandeur (if one may so say) of the event which had transfixed and absorbed his whole imagination and being, they are irresistible. They may fail of themselves in persuading us of a future state, but they cannot fail in persuading us of his intense conviction of the reality of Christ's resurrection; and not only of its reality, but of its supreme importance as a turning point in the destinies of the human race. And in proportion as this is impressed upon ourselves, in that proportion will our belief in a future state be as unshaken as his, and this chapter be used as it always has been used, for the consolation and hope of all mourners.'—Vol. i. p. 384.

What consolation is likely to be left, when the solid grounds of Christian hope are thus tampered with, and the Apostle's human conviction is substituted for his authority as a teacher specially sent by God.

We might indeed have expected some critical excellence in these volumes, but we do not find it. In mere Greek scholarship, for instance, we meet with the following: On 2 Cor. v. 21. 'He made Him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him.' The verbs are *ἐποίησεν*, and *ἵνα γενώμεθα*. Mr. Stanley's note is:—

'*γενώμεθα* (as distinct from *γινώμεθα*, a later correction groundless) refers back to his conversion: not "That we might at some future time become," but "That we might become, as *we have become*."—Vol. ii. p. 113.

What Mr. Stanley imagines to be the force of this aorist

as distinguished from the present, appears more distinctly a few verses after, on chap. vi. 1, 'We beseech you,' &c. :

'μή εἰς κενόν τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ δεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς. "That you should not have received [this seems the force of the aorist tense] the goodness of God in your conversion to no purpose."—Vol. ii. pp. 113, 114.

The annotator seems to suppose that the aorist conjunctive and infinitive has the force of past time; when it is simply abstract, 'in order to our becoming,' 'not to receive.'

On 1 Cor. i. 22. 'The Jews seek a sign,' &c. 'Ἰουδαῖοι. "Ελληνες. "characters like the Jews—like the Greeks" (implied in the omission of the article).—Vol. i. p. 51.

But we must turn to a much more grave topic: we mean Mr. Stanley's views of doctrine, and the most extraordinary perversion of grammar in order to establish them. In 2 Cor. viii. 9, are the well-known words, 'Who when He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor;' indicating the personal preexistence and Divinity of Him who for our sakes became man. Mr. Stanley, in defiance of the plain meaning of the words, 'who being rich,' πλούσιος ὢν, interprets them in this audacious way, 'who when He might have been rich;' and when we expect authorities for such an interpretation, we find two well-known passages, 'who being in the form of God,' interpreted, 'who when He might have been in the form of God;' and 'even the Son of man who is in heaven,' which the commentator seems to suppose is to be understood, 'when He might have been in heaven.' No other authority is given for this extraordinary disregard for the plain meaning of words. We give the passage in full; and we naturally inquire whether Mr. Stanley believes in the personal preexistence and Divinity of our Lord.

'9. This parenthesis explains the reference to their love (ἀγάπη). "If your love is genuine, you will make yourselves poor for the sake of others, after Christ's example; for you know the favour that He gave to us (χάρις) is used for the sake of allusion to χάρις in verses 6, 7); for He, when He might have been rich, became subject to poverty for you, that you, through His poverty, might become rich in goodness."

'It is difficult to determine in what sense the Apostle used the words πλούσιος and ἐπώχευσε, as applied to Our Lord, whether of his surrendering the glory which He had with the Father (John xvii. 5; and probably Phil. ii. 6, the passage which most resembles this), or of the poverty of His actual condition in life. The probability is, that whilst ἐπώχευσε is taken entirely in the literal sense, πλούσιος ὢν, though taken in the literal sense to a certain extent, yet has also the more general meaning implied in πλουτήσητε in the next clause, as is so often the case in S. Paul's metaphorical use of the word "riches" (πλούτος). The words πλούσιος ὢν, "being rich," must, when taken with the context, mean, "when it was in His power to be rich," "when riches were in his grasp." For a similar of the present participle in exactly similar passages, compare John iii.

"He that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is (ὁ ὢν) heaven." Phil. ii. 6, 7: "Who being (ὤν) in the form of God,

made Himself of no reputation;" in which latter passage, however, the sense is more clearly brought out by the sense of the word *ὑπάρχω*.

'Whether *ἐπώχευσε* signifies "He was poor," or "He became poor," is doubtful. The classical usage is in favour of the first. The context, and perhaps the passages in the LXX., Jud. vi. 6; Ps. lxxviii. (lxxix.) 8, xxxiii. 11, (*πλούσιοι ἐπώχευσαν*) are rather in favour of the second. The general sense will thus be, "When all power, and wealth, and greatness, earthly and Divine, were His, He yet led a life of poverty, not merely for the world in general, but for *you*, that you might gain in spiritual wealth (compare 1 Cor. i. 5, *ἐπλουτίσθητε*, iv. 8, *πλουτεῖτε*) by His human poverty." *δὲ ὑμᾶς* is emphatic by position."—Vol. ii. pp. 151, 152.

We give full weight to the introduction of the words, 'the glory which He had with the Father,' as a possible meaning, and, 'when all power, and wealth, and greatness, earthly and Divine, were His;' but we ask, what are these expressions when set against the misinterpretations of three texts so plain as these?

The word *χάρις*, of course, is interpreted 'favour;' and it is always construed with this meaning, even when it passes into our sense of grace.

On the words, 2 Cor. v. 21, 'Who made Him to be sin for us,' &c., Mr. Stanley refers, we must suppose, to Mr. Jowett's commentary. He says, (vol. ii. p. 112,) 'The general truth, 'involved in this passage, can only be fully stated in connexion 'with the two passages where it is most systematically treated.' Rom. viii. 3, and Gal. iii. 13. He interprets the words thus: 'He was enveloped, lost, overwhelmed in sin, and its consequences, so far as He could be without Himself being sinful,' and adds: 'This qualification is necessarily involved in the preceding words, "who knew no sin."'

'Which may be compared with Heb. vii. 26, "Separate from sinners:" Heb. iv. 15, "Without sin;" 1 Pet. ii. 22, "Who did no sin," and expresses the perfect conviction which the Apostle age entertained of the sinless excellence of Christ.'—Vol. ii. p. 113.

There is, we suppose, a misprint here, but how lowering is this statement of the 'conviction of the Apostolic age,' instead of frankly and piously admitting the authority of an inspired teacher, on such a subject as the sinlessness of Christ.

Some other of Mr. Stanley's doctrinal interpretations must be taken in connexion with those of Mr. Jowett.

We proceed to give some instances of his deficiency in that chief quality of a commentator—at least of a critical commentator—a common-sense perception of the meaning of the writer whose words he is explaining.

And first we would refer to the well-known words about the woman having a veil upon her head. In this instance, the most natural interpretation of the words 'because of the angels,' is rejected on the grounds—1. that there is no allusion to the 'especial presence of angels at public worship in the New Testament;

(though there is in early Christian writers;) 2. that it would be introducing an argument into the passage wholly irrelevant to the context; the oft-repeated observation on S. Paul's style being full of apparent irrelevancies, on which Mr. Stanley elsewhere enlarges, is now lost sight of. Mr. Stanley suggests the following interpretation:—

'The Apostle had dwelt on the necessity of the subordination of the woman to man, as shown in all the passages in the early chapters of Genesis, where the relation of the sexes is described, viz. Gen. i. 26; ii. 18, 23; iii. 16. It is not impossible that the mention of these passages may have carried on his thoughts to the next and only kindred passage in Gen. vi. 4, in which those relations are described as subverted by the union of the daughters of men with the sons of God, and to the belief, founded on those words, which represented the use of the veil or covering as necessary to ward off the glances of angelic eyes that had then proved so fatal. In this case the sense would be, "In this subordination of the woman to man, we find the reason of the custom, which, in consequence of the sin of the angels, enjoins that the woman ought not to part with the sign that she is subject, not to them, but to her husband. The authority of the husband is, as it were, enthroned visibly upon her head, in token that she belongs to him alone, and that she owes no allegiance to any one besides, no, not even to the angels who stand before the throne of God."—Vol. i. p. 225.

This is illustrated by the following extract:—

'The feeling of the Eastern world on the subject is well illustrated by the story related of Khadijah in the two most authentic biographies of Mahomet. It is thus given in Weil's *Mohamed der Prophet*, p. 43: "Khadijah said to Mohamed after his first vision, 'If the Angel appears, let me know.' Gabriel again appeared, and he said to her, 'I see him.' She placed him first on her left, then on her right shoulder, and asked, 'Seest thou him still?' He answered, 'Yes.' Then she said, 'Turn, and lie on my bosom.' When he had so done, she asked again, 'Seest thou him?' He answered, 'Yes.' Then she took her veil from her head, and asked, 'Seest thou him still?' This time he answered, 'No.' Then she said, 'By God, it is true, it is true it was an angel, and not a devil.'"

'On this story the Arabian biographer remarks: "Khadijah knew from Waraka that a good angel must fly from before the face of an unveiled woman, whilst a devil would bear it well."—Vol. i. p. 226.

The introduction of this story is an instance of the light character of the commentary; the remark cited from the Arabian biographer we may, however, notice as a valuable evidence of the correctness of the common interpretation, which Mr. Stanley rejects.

Again, the meaning of the Apostle is quite misapprehended, and his words overlooked or distorted, when they are inconsistent with a favourite theory, as one instance will show.

Mr. Stanley appears to have a special dread of our feeling too much reverence for the Holy Eucharist; and would have us believe that in the Apostolic age the Lord's Supper (or Eucharist, for he identifies them) was the usual evening banquet, for which thanks were given to God; after which, a cup of *wine*, for which thanks were previously given, was drunk. He

speaks of it (p. 238) as a 'social meal to which the hungry looked forward to satisfying their wants, and when some even indulged in excess;' ... and 'a supper, ... the regular substantial meal of the day;' attended by 'festive accompaniments.' He says there was no 'administration,' and that the people divided the bread amongst them, helping themselves;¹ because it is said 'the bread which *we* break!' the *we* being understood to mean all the people.

In taking this view, Mr. Stanley wholly ignores the fact that the Eucharist was celebrated after the pattern of our Lord's action at the last Supper. That, accordingly, one person would take, bless, and break and divide the loaf, one would bless the cup. And of this a plain indication is given in the use of the first person, the bread which *we* break; the cup which *we* bless; i. e. the Apostle, and those Presbyters who presided, (*οἱ προεστῶτες*), as opposed to the second person, ('as often as "ye" eat,' &c.) which is uniformly adopted throughout the passage where the people are spoken of.

The *δεῖπνον* is confounded by Mr. Stanley with 'the bread and the cup.' He holds that the 'eating this bread, and drinking this cup,' means only 'partaking of this feast' (p. 244); though it is evident that the two were distinct, from what Mr. Stanley himself observes, viz. that it was *one* loaf which was specially broken and eaten as *the* bread, 'the sacred loaf, representing, in its compact unity, the harmony of the whole society,' (p. 248;) a quantity manifestly insufficient for a *banquet* for the whole body of Corinthian Christians. And it is plain that the *δεῖπνον* was a separate thing from the one loaf divided among them, because the latter implies their being together and sharing it, whereas each ate his own *δεῖπνον* without waiting for others, and so one was hungry, and another ate and drank to excess. That the bread and cup were not, in S. Paul's view, such an ordinary meal, is demonstrated by his saying, 'What, have ye not houses to eat and to drink in?' And again, 'If any is hungry, let him eat at home.' It seems quite clear that the one broken loaf was distinct from the meal, from the supper, that is, which each could eat by himself out of his own store; and the blessed cup was also distinct from what they drank at that meal; for, otherwise, how could there be the contrast, 'one is hungry, and another is drunken,' out of that which might have been shared alike? Mr. Stanley illustrates his view from the passage in Acts ii. 46, but passes by the proper meaning of *κατ' οἶκον*, 'at home,' as opposed to 'in the

¹ 'The phrase "takes before another," evidently implies that each man helped himself; that there was nothing corresponding to what in later times is called "an administration of the supper." Compare the expressions "*we break the bread*," in x. 18.—Vol. i. p. 240.

Temple;' and in alleging the instance of S. Paul at Troas and the Christian assembly there, he imagines that their meeting in the evening 'to break bread' has all the accompaniments of an 'ordinary family meal,' although, owing to the Apostle's lengthened preaching, the 'breaking of bread' was delayed from evening all through the night till morning, which is scarcely compatible with the people having looked forward to it, to satisfy their wants by a substantial meal. We leave Mr. Stanley's picturesque description of the banquet and the tapestried room as a mere imagination. The natural exposition of this passage which distinguishes the broken loaf and blessed cup from the Supper, and makes that supper the frugal meal which was eaten rather as a sign of mutual love and unity, than 'as the regular substantial meal of the day,' fits in exactly with the earliest accounts we have of its actual celebration in Pliny, in S. Justin Martyr, and in Tertullian.

Mr. Stanley chooses to say that in the words, 'the bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?' 'the communion of the body of Christ' means communion with His mystical body the Church. We cannot call this anything else than a wanton misunderstanding, since it is inconsistent with the very next clause, 'the communion of the blood of Christ,' as well as our Lord's own words, 'My body which is (broken) for you.' It is through our communion in His broken Body that we have communion one with another. But the whole of this portion of Mr. Stanley's work is valueless in the way of criticism or exposition; it is a vain attempt to destroy the Christian's faith in the most sacred institution of our Lord, and calls for the strongest reprobation. Let the following exposition of a few simple and nowise obscure words be taken as a specimen of Mr. Stanley's criticism. S. Paul says, 'Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup; for he that eateth and drinketh (unworthily), eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, not discerning the (Lord's) body.' Mr. Stanley explains the words thus:—

"Let every one examine the state of his heart and mind, *i. e.* to see whether he is likely to be guilty of the profanation here condemned; for, if he does not so examine himself, if he does not discern *that the body of the Lord is in himself, and in the Christian society*, and that it is *as the body of the Lord, or as a member of that body, that he partakes of the bread*, then heavy judgments will follow." This is harsh, but not more so than other explanations.—Vol. i. p. 245.

What mockery it is, to call this an explanation of S. Paul!

We pass on now to Mr. Jowett's volumes: and we come at once into a widely different sphere of thought and reflection. We pass out of the light reading, the varied pictures, the ornate and *wearing* beauties of Mr. Stanley's style, into the outpourings

of deep and serious thought, in the workings of a refined, highly-gifted, but unsettled mind, which would investigate every mystery and raise questions on every subject moral and religious.

In these volumes the Dissertations annexed to the Commentary form the most important part of the work, in matter, as well as extent. The work is published as a Commentary on certain epistles, but it is in reality a collection of essays on religious subjects, more or less connected with S. Paul's writings, but put together without system.

To each Epistle is prefixed an introduction and dissertation on its subject, and the time and place of its composition; to the Epistles to the Thessalonians and Galatians essays on the city and people addressed and on the genuineness of the letters, and discussions on Paley's chapters on these Epistles in his *Horæ Paulinæ*. These dissertations are, generally speaking, instructive, but distorted by the writer's fancies and prejudices against the truth of the History of the Acts, and against the clear and conclusive reasonings of Paley.

Each Epistle, again, gives occasion for dissertations, which, however, extend very far beyond what the exposition of the Epistle itself requires, and run out into topics very remote from the immediate questions which occasion them. The first Epistle to the Thessalonians suggests dissertations on the 'Evils in the Church of the Apostolical Age,' and on the 'Belief in the Coming of Christ in the Apostolical Age;' both of which exaggerate what is in itself true to such an extent as to make the representations put forth quite inconsistent with other portions of the Epistles. The second Epistle gives rise to an Essay on the 'Man of Sin,' what we consider a prophecy being in Mr. Jowett's view merely an expression of S. Paul's own anticipations of what was likely shortly to happen, couched in the phraseology of the Old Testament.

The Epistle to the Galatians gives occasion to an important dissertation on the 'Conversion of S. Paul,' a very beautiful Fragment on the Apostle's character, which is the more sad to read because its beauty is poisoned by error; a dissertation on 'S. Paul and the Twelve,' exhibiting the dreams—for it deserves no better name—of German critics, about the contentions of the Apostles and their followers; and two of a general character on the 'Quotations from the Old Testament in the New,' and on 'S. Paul and Philo:' the latter containing a very full account of Philo, his writings, and his phraseology, considered especially as exhibiting the language and modes of thought into which the first preachers of the Gospel, when they passed beyond the borders of the promised land, naturally fell.

Each chapter almost of the Epistle to the Romans suggests

a Dissertation; the first, two short essays on the 'Connexion of Immorality and Idolatry,' and on the 'State of the Heathen World;' and another, placed after the second Chapter, on the 'Abstract Ideas of the New Testament;' while to the second is annexed a dissertation on the 'Modes of Time and Place in the New Testament,' the design of which is to show, in a fanciful and exaggerated way, that the first Christians, including the writers of the Epistles, had not distinct ideas of time or place; that is to say, Mr. Jowett chooses to understand or misunderstand their expressions on this principle. The fourth Chapter suggests a few words on the 'Old Testament,' in which we will only notice that designedly, or with a forgetfulness of which we shall have to notice other instances, Mr. Jowett transfers the interpretation of the Old Testament by the light of the Gospel, which was 'reading the Old Testament after the manner of their age,' from our Lord Himself, to the Apostles. He says, "'Did not their hearts burn within them?'" as the *Apostles* expounded to them the Psalms and 'the Prophets.' (Vol. ii. p. 143.) This whole essay, as also that on the quotations from the Old Testament in the New, ignores the fact that our Lord Himself (at least according to our Gospels) taught His disciples thus to understand the Scriptures.

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With such a body of varied matter before us, it is obviously impossible to do more than offer general remarks on the character of the work, and illustrate its main features by some instances. There are but few pages of the Dissertation which do not call for a discussion extending to the length of an ordinary review, in order to analyse them thoroughly, to examine the grounds on which they rest, and to sift their nicely intermingled elements of truth and error.

One consequence of the writer's plan is, that the Dissertations are irregular, when viewed in their relations to each other or as a whole: so that we look in vain for any exact statement of the views and principles of the writer. It is indeed difficult at all times to determine what the writer's own views are. He

seems sometimes to put out statements of difficulties, like the *ἀπορίαι* of Aristotle or Plato, and to dwell on them and draw them out; at others, to express the views of opponents, as if they were speaking; at others, to represent what is matter of fact, as the experiences of the religious life; at others, to put forward possible views, or the views that would result under certain contingencies; while vagueness appears to be his delight, and he seems to consider that it is the only form under which the mind of man can receive Divine truth.

The tone of these Dissertations is indeed often most attractive and beautiful, and the informal and almost meditative method adopted is calculated to win over the heart of the reader. Mr. Jowett shows in this respect, whether designedly or not, the greatest art. Obnoxious propositions are not stated at first: the readers are led on to them through considerations of difficulties which arise in the examination of other views, in language which 'religious persons' are accustomed to use, nay, which seems to express all they themselves have felt. In truth, Mr. Jowett, considered as addressing the young, the high-principled, the intellectual and religiously disposed Englishmen of this day, writes with consummate skill; he could scarcely have adopted any method more effectual than that of these Dissertations for the purpose of inculcating opinions from which, if they were barely stated, religious Englishmen would revolt. There is throughout an air of candour, sincerity, and of honest seeking for truth. We seem to be admitted to the very inmost thoughts of a sincere and anxious inquirer, whose difficulties are stated in simplicity, and whose most fearful propositions are, as it were, forced out by the investigation of the subject. These are expressed as the natural workings of the meditative mind, as the 'confessions of an inquiring spirit.' The sad result to which we come at last is kept from our sight, and even when arrived at, its presence is generally hinted, rather than formally enunciated; the conclusion is suggested as a possibility, or stated with so much of vagueness, that an ingenuous mind would hope the words do not mean so much as they seem to mean. All appears simple and artless, as if the writer were only expressing the thoughts suggested to a religious mind by the apparent inconsistency of what Christians believe, with the facts of nature, with the suggestions of reason, with the voice of our hearts. They who have felt, as so many doubtless have felt, difficulties in the doctrines of the faith, or in the structure and words of Scripture, or in the Divine government, seem here to find a sympathizing mind, and are told that they may retain their Christianity, freed from those doctrines and views, which now appear as a load to sink it. If, we repeat, it were desired to draw aside the young, the generous, the religiously disposed,

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The tone of these Dissertations is indeed often most attractive and beautiful, and the informal and almost meditative method adopted is calculated to win over the heart of the reader. Mr. Jowett shows in this respect, whether designedly or not, the greatest art. Obnoxious propositions are not stated at first: the readers are led on to them through considerations of difficulties which arise in the examination of other views, in language which 'religious persons' are accustomed to use, nay, which seems to express all they themselves have felt. In truth, Mr. Jowett, considered as addressing the young, the high-principled, the intellectual and religiously disposed Englishmen of this day, writes with consummate skill; he could scarcely have adopted any method more effectual than that of these Dissertations for the purpose of inculcating opinions from which, if they were barely stated, religious Englishmen would revolt. There is throughout an air of candour, sincerity, and of honest seeking for truth. We seem to be admitted to the very inmost thoughts of a sincere and anxious inquirer, whose difficulties are stated in simplicity, and whose most fearful propositions are, as it were, forced out by the investigation of the subject. These are expressed as the natural workings of the meditative mind, as the 'confessions of an inquiring spirit.' The sad result to which we come at last is kept from our sight, and even when arrived at, its presence is generally hinted, rather than formally enunciated; the conclusion is suggested as a possibility, or stated with so much of vagueness, that an ingenuous mind would hope the words do not mean so much as they seem to mean. All appears simple and artless, as if the writer were only expressing the thoughts suggested to a religious mind by the apparent inconsistency of what Christians believe, with the facts of nature, with the suggestions of reason, with the voice of our hearts. They who have felt, as so many doubtless have felt, difficulties in the doctrines of the faith, or in the structure and words of Scripture, or in the Divine government, seem here to find a sympathizing mind, and are told that they may retain their Christianity, freed from those doctrines and views, which now appear as a load to sink it. If, we repeat, it were desired to draw aside the young, the generous, the religiously disposed,

to cheat them into the relinquishment of that belief which is now the stay and support of their souls, no more effectual means could have been devised. Again, there is nothing in the language to offend, but much to attract. A tone of piety pervades the work. The writer seems fully to appreciate the good that is in others, and to understand the workings of the religious mind, so that the reader says: Here is one who has felt what I feel; he can sympathize with me; he seems to have known the love of Christ, and felt the power of prayer, and to have had experience of the deep workings of the soul in its conversion from sin to holiness, and admits such religious influences as facts.

Again, difficulties, as we have said, are insinuated rather than boldly stated, they are made almost to arise out of the reader's own thoughts, and are expressed with a semblance of fairness and truthfulness which appears to proceed from a pure love of truth. Then the ability and the interest of the Dissertations are both very great. There is throughout them a body of most just views and true observations mixed up with and verging on what is most untrue. The thoughts on nature and human life commend themselves to our experience, and show deep reflection and keenful observation of character. There are beautiful touches of feeling in Mr. Jowett's volumes. The pleasing style, the varied topics that are introduced—the new lights in which old subjects are placed, and the pervading freshness of thought, give continual interest to the reader. History and poetry, the old religions of Heathendom, the classic writers, and the most recent theories of physical and ethnological science, are subordinated to the writer's use. We are presented with novel and striking views on almost every subject. Some passages there are of singular beauty; and all have the charm of seeming to come straight from the heart. But a poisonous atmosphere pervades the whole, and the result of the work seems to be to leave no sure resting place for religious faith. It appears designed to unsettle all existing convictions, and instead of them to give a vague, undefined, and dreamy view of a sort of natural religion to which Christianity is to be subordinated. Its very beauty and interest are deceptive. The *mirage* and haze of style and illustration and speculation and suggestion keep out of sight the false reasonings, the ignoring and misrepresentations of facts, the one-sidedness which pervades throughout.

Accordingly, when the immediate influence of the style is over, and we begin to reflect on the substance of what we have read, we perceive that the unsystematic and illogical style of the composition not only hinders us from having a clear view of our author's meaning, but also leads him to leave out of sight the most weighty considerations that are opposed to his own

views, and to contemplate one portion of a fact without apparently being at all conscious of that which is immediately connected with it. This onesidedness of view and this principle of ignoring of important facts would be regarded as dishonest in a systematic writer; and much harder measure than Mr. Jowett has dealt out to Paley would be deservedly given him. But when a writer seems to be so confidential with us as to let us see the very inmost workings of his mind—to think aloud as it were in our presence—he disarms us. We cannot suspect treason in one who invites us into the innermost chambers of the soul; we cannot suspect intentional dishonesty, and we set it down to his having overlooked the facts. At the same time, there is really not only the greatest unfairness, as we shall show, in this ignoring of facts, or balancing of arguments, but we find in Mr. Jowett's statement of the views of others a caricaturing of them which is inconsistent with real candour. In proof of this, we need only allude to Mr. Jowett's description of the Catholic faith on the Atonement, or on Original Sin.

Of the vagueness of the statements in these volumes we can give no better proof than this: that if an inquirer asks what is his view on almost any subject, even the most essential, it would be impossible to answer. In his Commentaries, for instance, we read:—

‘We must go back to the predoctrinal age of the Apostle himself, ere such distinctions existed. The whole Christian life flows with him from union with Christ. Whether this union is conscious or unconscious, whether it gives or merely imputes the righteousness of Christ, is a question which he does not analyse. But in thinking of it, he perceives a sort of balance and contrast between the humiliation of Christ and the exaltation of the Christian. The believer seems to gain what his master has lost. He throws on Christ the worse half of self, that the better half may be endued with the spirit of life.’—Vol. ii. p. 223.

‘What is meant by being crucified to the world? Not certainly being despised by the world, still less despising the world in return, or any mere figure of speech; but whatever is meant by being dead or buried with Christ, by the old man being crucified, by the life hidden with Christ in God.’—Vol. i. p. 323.

So when this writer has treated almost with derision the ordinary belief of pious Christians in our Lord's Atonement, he leaves us absolutely in the dark as to what he does himself believe.

But one of the most marked faults in this work is that to which we have referred, the overlooking and ignoring of important facts; of which we shall give some instances. There are strange contrasts in Mr. Jowett's mind, ‘antitheses’ equal to any that he has dwelt on: such is the contrast between acuteness and nice observation of facts at one time, and dreaminess and apparent blindness to them at another. We could scarcely give a finer instance of the former than the argument for the genuineness of the Epistle to the Thessalonians, which is marked by the

greatest acuteness and good sense: the facts are sagaciously laid hold of, and distinctly brought out. We are impressed the more by these characteristics, because this Dissertation comes almost immediately after the Introduction to that Epistle, which is marked by instances of those grave faults of which we are speaking—one-sidedness, and that disregard or carelessness about facts which most of all affect the point at issue.

The object of Mr. Jowett in this Dissertation is to show that S. Paul progressed from a defective and half-Judaized view of Christianity into a clearer and fuller appreciation of it: and that the Epistles to the Thessalonians were written when he was in this half-dark state. The grounds for supposing this, as derived from the Epistles themselves, are their tone and topics. These Mr. Jowett attributes to the writer having as yet a carnal view of Christianity. Without going further into the subject, we would observe that Mr. Jowett says nothing of what is quite as probable and complete an account of the facts, namely, the little progress which the Thessalonians had made in Christian knowledge, and the Apostle's practice of adapting his teaching to the progress of his hearers. The Thessalonians, on Mr. Jowett's own showing, had only been taught by S. Paul during three Sabbath days, and an hour a day on each other day during three weeks; they had then been left by the Apostle, and were now addressed by him 'a few weeks, or at most a few months after.'

This is Mr. Jowett's own account of the matter: but here let us pause a moment, and consider the wildness of this notion that S. Paul, during his residence at Thessalonica, Corinth, and Ephesus, only devoted one day in the week, 'the Sabbath,' and an hour on other days, to the work of the Christian ministry. In his note on 1 Thess. ii. 9:—

'Of the twelve hours of the day, perhaps not more than one, of the seven days of the week, perhaps only the Sabbath, was devoted to the exercise of his spiritual calling.'—Vol. i. p. 51.

We would ask, Is this a specimen of the new light of criticism? Can anything be more monstrous than this view? To how little purpose has Mr. Jowett read the writings of S. Paul, and how utterly has he failed in acquiring an understanding of his ways. When he was at Ephesus 'he taught daily in the school of one Tyrannus' (Acts xix. 9); but beside this, he was with them 'at all seasons,' teaching them 'publicly and at home,' (*δημοσίᾳ καὶ κατ' οἶκον*) and 'by the space of three years ceased not to warn every one night and day with tears.' (Acts xx. 20, 31.) Yet it is owing to this strange notion of S. Paul doing nothing but work night and day, that Mr. Jowett says, in a miserable criticism of Paley:—

'Paley should not have omitted the verse following (Phil. iv. 16), which implies that S. Paul received support from the Philippianians when at Thessalonica, and is therefore partly inconsistent with his working with his own

hands. "For even in Thessalonica ye sent once and again unto my necessities."—Vol. i. p. 129.

So far from one statement being 'partly inconsistent' with the other, it is altogether confirmatory of it, as showing that the Apostle needed support, which compelled him to work with his own hands, and only inconsistent with the notion, which is entirely Mr. Jowett's own, that S. Paul worked so hard and so profitably as to render any further assistance superfluous. Mr. Jowett has to learn that S. Paul's doing anything 'night and day' does not mean that he did nothing else. But further, how is this notion consistent with the views elsewhere maintained by Mr. Jowett, that S. Paul spent *three weeks only* in Thessalonica, *i. e.* he converted these persons, and instructed them so far in Christian knowledge, as that in a few weeks or months after he could write the first Epistle to them, by three Sabbath days' preaching, and one hour a day's instruction? Surely this betrays a want of the most ordinary common sense, unless we suppose a miracle. Now well nigh the whole of Mr. Jowett's discoveries of inconsistencies between the Acts and the Epistles, and in the narrative of the Acts itself, and his objection to the arguments of Paley, are grounded on some such misapprehensions; *e. g.* 'he (Paley) alters the natural and *prima facie* meaning of the Acts and the Epistles.' Why, of course he does, by showing, in confirmation of other arguments, that the *prima facie* meaning is not the real meaning. Paley's argument is that the coincidences between the letters and the history are undesigned, and this is proved by the very fact that the *prima facie* meaning is not the true one.

But to return to the Introduction to the Epistle to the Thessalonians, and this notion that S. Paul was still in a half-Judaized condition. In the progress of his argument Mr. Jowett says, 'Not only have we *à priori* reason to suppose that S. Paul's Christian knowledge must thus have grown, or evidence from the Epistles that it did so, it is implied in his own statements.' He adduces two places, 'the knowing Christ after the flesh,' mentioned in 2 Cor. v. 16, and the words, 'If I yet preach circumcision,' in Gal. v. 11. Now we do not deny that S. Paul the longer he lived and prayed and meditated, advanced to deeper and fuller appreciation of Divine truth, and came nearer and nearer to the beatific vision; but what we do deny is that there is the least evidence that his teaching after he was called to be an Apostle, was in any sense carnal, Judaical, or defective: according to Mr. Jowett's views, indeed, it was tinged with these faults to the last, and it remained for our later centuries to eliminate these heterogeneous elements from Christianity. But we are not concerned now with anything more than Mr.

Jowett's own deficiencies as an expositor. And what we wish our readers to observe is, that, in each of the verses cited, the clause on which Mr. Jowett argues is but a portion of a sentence, and in ascertaining its meaning the rest of the sentence must be considered. But it is not. It is absolutely ignored. The young and those who are not familiar with Holy Scripture, or who are not on their guard, might read this Dissertation and be persuaded by it. But when they came to see the words *in situ*, they would perceive how much they had been misled. The first words argued on are these: 'Wherefore henceforth know we no man after the flesh:—yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet henceforth know we him no more.' To pass by all the other objections to Mr. Jowett's interpretation, we simply note that he has not attempted to show what the first half of the verse would mean according to his explanation of the second half—he has simply declined to see it.

So in Gal. v. 11, Mr. Jowett says the words 'can have no other meaning than that S. Paul had once' (after he became an apostle) 'preached what his opponents declared to be the doctrine of the Circumcision' (*i.e.*, as the whole argument requires, proclaimed the duty of being circumcised, though Mr. Jowett vainly endeavours to give some other vague no-meaning to the expression,) he then argues from the words 'If I *yet* (ἐτι, still) preach circumcision,' as if they meant, 'if I still continue to proclaim the Judaizing view.' But a consideration of the whole verse will show that this is impossible: for the apostle's argument is, 'If I do this' (whatever it be) 'why am I *yet* (still) persecuted?' S. Paul says, 'If I *now* am preaching circumcision,' as may have been alleged, 'why do not the persecutions against me *cease*?' Surely the objection to my preaching would have been done away. The stumbling-block of the Cross would have been removed.' The force of ἐτι in the first clause must be determined by the unequivocal meaning of the whole verse—which is, not that S. Paul had formerly or hitherto been preaching circumcision, but that, as some seem to have reported, he had *begun* to preach circumcision, having hitherto taught in such a way as to excite the hatred of the Jews, he now, they said, had adopted their views—in which case he asks, Why am I still persecuted? surely in this case, the stumbling-block of the Cross would have ceased.

We should not have dwelt on the subject had not the point been one which in Mr. Jowett's view is very important, and consequently we find the argument elaborated with great care, and grounded upon the words of these two places, interpreted according to his own fancy without any regard to their contexts.

We are disposed to think that Mr. Jowett does not study the

Scriptures carefully, but remembers certain phrases, and develops large theories out of them, forgetting to test these by an examination of the connexion in which the words occur.

We can now appreciate the justice of Mr. Jowett's remarks :

'Biblical criticism is, from the very nature of its subject-matter, peculiarly liable to the error of stating as a certainty that which is no more than a probable conjecture.'—Vol. i. p. 14.

And also,

'There is a difficulty in meeting such objections as these, because, whatever real weight they may have, they ultimately resolve themselves in the impression of an individual critic.'—Vol. i. p. 16.

His own work is the best evidence of the truth of these observations.

We will now take another passage, on which it is impossible not to impute to the writer either very great carelessness, or ignorance of his subject, or unfairness arising from dwelling on one side only of an argument. And we would premise that Mr. Jowett is so unconscious of this fault in himself, that he is most severe, and, we must add, most unfair, in imputing the same faults to Paley. He objects to the *Horæ Paulinæ* on the ground of—

'their being written in the spirit of the advocate rather than in that of the judge, and consequently making no attempt to consider as a whole the objections of antagonists.'—Vol. i. p. 108.

And again he says,

'The omission of many of the discrepancies in the Epistles, and the absence of effort to regard the subject as a whole, and estimate the collective force of objections, place him' (Paley) 'in the rank of apologists, and not of impartial writers.'—Vol. i. p. 109.

Mr. Jowett seems not to class himself among apologists, but among impartial writers; but he does not 'consider the objections' to his own notions, either collectively or singly. He wishes to have the spirit of the judge rather than the advocate. But one important function of a judge is to sum up evidence; and surely in doing this no judge would omit wholly the points of evidence which either of the parties considered the strongest, and simply ignore them.

Yet Mr. Jowett does this. We give an instance from his discussion on the punctuation of the well-known words in Rom. ix. 5, 'Of whom as concerning the flesh Christ (came), who is over all, God blessed for ever.' The words in the Greek are thus pointed by Lachmann, whom Mr. Jowett follows; *καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα. ὁ ὧν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. Ἀμήν.* making the last words an interjectional ascription of glory to God the Father; thus; 'Of whom as 'concerning the flesh Christ came. God who is over all be 'blessed for ever.' Mr. Jowett, in a calm and innocent tone, prefaces an observation that 'we can hardly expect to get an

answer' on this question 'unbiassed by the interests of controversy;' and then, as if he were in a pure atmosphere, high above the mists of theological disputations, undertakes to state reasons for and against the pointing commonly received.

Now, there is one most weighty consideration, nay, we may say, one mode by which the question might be settled irrespectively of such bias; that is, by ascertaining, if possible, how the early Christians read it. And as this is the principle on which Lachmann professed to settle the text of Scripture, whom Mr. Jowett herein follows, we should have expected it to have been applied in this case. Lachmann 'aims,' Mr. Jowett says, (*Introd.* vol. i. p. vi.) 'at reproducing the text not as it ought to be, but as it was; that is, not as it may be supposed to come 'from the autograph of the authors themselves, but as it actually 'existed in copies of the fourth century.' The means used for ascertaining this are, *a*, the most ancient MSS.; *β*, citations in Origen; *γ*, the ancient Latin versions; *δ*, citations by ancient Latin fathers. In this instance, through the want of punctuation, the earliest Greek MSS. determine nothing; but the citations and the versions are decisive in favour of the pointing, 'Christ who is over all,' &c. The words are quoted very often, and always in the same way. Heretics alleged the verse to prove that it was the Father that became man; the orthodox replied to them, showing that such was not its sense: but no party seemed to imagine it could be understood in any other way than by referring 'who is over all,' &c. to Christ. The verse is thus often quoted before the fourth century, very often in it; but though its meaning was thus the subject of much controversy, there is not a trace of any other way of reading it than ours. This fact alone ought to have settled the point on Lachmann's principles. Here is the text of the fourth century. But Lachmann did not like this, and pointed it in his own way. Mr. Jowett follows his pointing, and, what is more, absolutely omits all notice whatever of the ancient mode of reading it. He does not seem to be aware of the fact, or, if he was, he disposes of it in these words,—

'Neither can tradition be of any real value, except so far as it preserves to us some fact or meaning of a word which we should not otherwise have known. Where it is repugnant to the style and phraseology of an author, it is in error; where it agrees with them, it hardly affords any additional confirmation.'—Vol. ii. p. 244.

If these words refer to the 'tradition' of the text of Scripture, they are simply contradictory to the very principles on which the text professes to be based. Lachmann is commended (*Introd.* vol. i. p. viii.) because he 'based the text on the most ancient authorities, solely on grounds of evidence, without regard to doctrinal considerations, or claims of authority, and

‘irrespective even of the meaning of the words.’ That is, he was guided by ‘tradition.’ And if there be any fact morally certain, it is that the text of the first four centuries and onward connected ‘who is God over all,’ &c. with Christ. But our impartial critic simply suppresses all mention of this fact.

Next, in considering the construction of the passage, Mr. Jowett mentions indeed some arguments of little weight; but he wholly omits one which ought to be regarded as decisive, namely, that if the Apostle had wished to express, ‘God, who is over all, be blessed for ever,’ he must, according to the unvarying usage of the New Testament and the LXX. have placed *εὐλογητός* first, and said, *εὐλογητός ὁ ὦν κ. τ. λ.* There are about forty places in the Old Testament and five in the New in which this formula of doxology occurs, and in every case the arrangement is the same, ‘Blessed be the God who is over all, for ever.’ This ought to be conclusive, but Mr. Jowett *does not allude to it*. He dwells on less important points; nay, in giving reasons against the old pointing, says:—

‘It may be added: . . . That nearly the same expression, *ὁ ὦν εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας* occurs also in 2 Cor. xi. 31.; but that it is applied, not to Christ himself, but to “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.”’

What we observe here is, that Mr. Jowett has before him a construction exactly parallel to that of the text, which, of itself, would go far to show that the words *ὁ ὦν*, &c. should be referred to Christ. He cites it for another purpose, but is quite blind to the fact that it is an exactly parallel construction, and decisive in favour of the received reading. Surely this is anything but candid.

We must now go on to the great question raised by this work, intimating by the way that we have brought forward these instances, not merely for their own sake, as showing the extreme unfairness of critics, who claim for themselves exclusively the credit of veracity and love of truth, but also because they afford a miniature specimen of the unfairness of the work as a whole; for a similar ignoring of the facts most important in their bearing on the gravest questions prevails throughout; we mean, an ignoring of the idea of revelation and of the truths on which it rests, viz. that the first preachers of the Gospel were divinely instructed and sanctioned by the exercise of miraculous powers, and, accordingly, that what they teach is the word of God, not of man.

Judging from Mr. Jowett’s silence, we might imagine that no such view was entertained—whereas it has been the common faith of Christians from the first, and is the promise of Christ and the distinct teaching of the Apostles themselves. ‘Ye received it,’ (our preaching,) ‘not as the word of man, but as it is in truth, the word of God.’ The idea of authoritative revela-

tion is simply and contemptuously passed over, as though it had never existed, as is also that of inspiration such as to secure an Apostle from error. The passage in 1 Cor. ii., in which the Apostle speaks of himself as having truths revealed to him by the Spirit, which he expresses in words taught by the Spirit, is most incorrectly explained by Mr. Stanley to refer to all Christians, simply because it speaks of 'we' and 'us,' though it appears clearly to be describing the Apostles. The authority which S. Paul claims is explained away: and all the evidence for the Apostles being authorized exponents of Divine truth, whose teaching was to be received simply, as being a message from God, is quietly neglected. S. Paul is criticised as a mere human writer would be. He and the twelve are considered to have differed. 'His own converts,' we are told, 'and his Jewish opponents were all the world to him; and through them, as it were in a glass, *he appeared to himself* to see the 'workings of human nature generally.' (Vol. i. p. 178.)

The appearance of our Lord to S. Paul is by both these writers regarded as probably a vision—an inward, not an outward fact, and, accordingly, not an evidence; although the Apostle himself asserts that the Lord had appeared to him, as He had done to the other Apostles, and although he claims to be of the same standing with them, as having seen the Lord Jesus Christ; an assertion which is merely delusive, if what he had seen was but a vision. Mr. Jowett says,—

'If we submit the narrative in the Acts to the ordinary rules of evidence, we shall scarcely find ourselves able to determine whether any outward fact was intended by it, or not. Such' (namely, that it was an outward fact) 'is, indeed, the impression at first sight conveyed; but we must remember that this impression is gathered from an author to whom the distinction of the spiritual and supernatural, which is so familiar to ourselves, had scarcely an existence; who, if he had been asked the question which we are now considering, would probably have replied:—"Whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell."—Vol. i. p. 232.

So that S. Paul is set aside, as one whose testimony about the greatest event of his whole life is not worth listening to. And by way of still further destroying the value of his attestation of miraculous facts, we are told:—

'Often the apostle S. Paul has been described as a person the furthest removed from enthusiasm; incapable of spiritual illusion; by his natural temperament averse to credulity or superstition. By such considerations as these a celebrated author confesses himself to have been converted to the belief in Christianity. And yet, if it is intended to reduce S. Paul to the type of what is termed "good sense" in the present day, it must be admitted, that the view which thus describes him is but partially true. Far nearer the truth is that other quaint notion of a modern writer, "that S. Paul was the finest gentleman that ever lived;" for no man had nobler forms of courtesy or a deeper regard for the feelings of others. But "*good sense*" is a term not well adapted to express either the individual, or the age and country in which he lived. He who wrought miracles, who had handkerchiefs

carried to him from the sick, who spake with tongues more than they all, who lived amid visions and revelations of the Lord, who did not appeal to the Gospel as a thing long settled, but himself saw the process of revelation actually going on before his eyes, and communicated it to his fellow-men, could never have been *such an one as ourselves*. Nor can we pretend to estimate whether, in the modern sense of the term, he was capable of weighing evidence; or how far he would have attempted to sever between the workings of his own mind and the Spirit which was imparted to him.—Vol. i. pp. 299, 300.

We are not therefore surprised to find that what Mr. Jowett says of miracles is simply directed to underrating their value as grounds of conviction. For instance:—

‘It is not upon the testimony of any single person, even were it far more distinct than in the present instance, we can venture to peril the truth of the Christian religion. Weak defences of comparatively unimportant points undermine more than they support. He who has the Spirit of Christ and his Apostles, has the witness in himself: he who leads the life of Paul, has already set his seal that his words are true. Were the other view supported by the most irrefragable historical evidence, had the sign in the clouds been beheld by whole multitudes of Jews and Gentiles, believers and unbelievers, it is to the internal aspect of the event we should be more inclined to turn, both as the more religious one, and the which more closely links the Apostle with ourselves.’—Vol. i. pp. 322, 323.

So Mr. Stanley:—

‘The more ample we suppose the evidence for the Gospel miracles, or the more portentous their nature, so much the more striking is the testimony of Christ and the Apostle to the truth that it is not on them that the main structure of Christian faith is to be built up. The tendency in human nature, especially in Oriental nature, is acknowledged, and, to a certain extent, satisfied. But it is discountenanced as unworthy of the highest and best form of Christian Revelation.’—Vol. i. p. 58.

What miserable trifling is this; what hypocritical evasion of the question, Was a miracle wrought or not? On the other branch of external evidence, prophecy, his view, as it is shown in the instance of the prediction of the Man of Sin, seems to be, that there is nothing in it but what is human. The whole interpretation of the passage in 2 Thess. ii. goes on the supposition that S. Paul repeated the imagery of the Old Testament without attaching any definite meaning to it; and that, in speaking of ‘that which letteth,’ and ‘the Man of Sin,’ he was only expressing his own merely human anticipations produced by his observing the tendencies of the times.

Then as to revelation itself; it is most difficult to ascertain what Mr. Jowett holds respecting it. There is a divine work; there are divine communications: but they come to us through human channels, and are coloured by the means through which they are communicated. The divine truth is distinguished from the human expression of it, the matter from the form, the essence from the accidents, the spirit from the letter. The writings of the Apostle are no longer to be regarded as teaching us what the revealed truth is. The whole of the Epistles pre-

suppose some previous teaching, and it is manifest that S. Paul did teach certain doctrines, which are alluded to, enforced, made the grounds of practical exhortations, or put forward as motives of conduct. It is manifest that, on the whole, to put the facts at the very lowest, he and the other Apostles taught substantially the same truths: to ascertain what these truths were has hitherto been the object of Christian theologians, and they supposed that they could discover something of them from the allusions and direct statements in S. Paul's Epistles. But now Mr. Jowett says (speaking of the Epistle to the Thessalonians):—

‘Unmeaning they can only appear when we judge them by a modern standard, and when, losing sight of him and his converts, we attempt to elicit from them notions of philosophy, or revelations of the unseen world.’—Vol. i. p. 34.

It would seem, then, that S. Paul is no longer to be regarded as teaching us anything when he speaks of our whole body, soul, and spirit; or when he describes to us the coming again of our Lord, or our being raised to meet Him. Are they only occasional letters of which the object alike, and meaning, and use have passed away? It is, indeed, difficult to determine what Mr. Jowett means by statements such as this. We would not willingly misjudge him. It will be best, before we proceed further with this topic, to show in some particular instance how he deals with the statements of the Apostle.

Mr. Jowett's method of setting aside the doctrine of the Atonement has been frequently referred to. We will only cite one passage which may illustrate our meaning.

‘To be told that Christ performed the greatest act that was ever done in this world, does not seem so much as to be told that He was the sacrifice for the sins of men. All history combines to strengthen the illusion; the institution of sacrifice is regarded as part of a Divine design in the education of the world. We cease any more to inquire how far the blood of bulls or of goats can be a real or adequate representation of the relation in which Christ stood to His Father and mankind. We delight to think of the religions of all nations bearing witness “to Him that was to come.”’

‘It must be remembered that the Apostles were Jews; they were so before their conversion; they remained so afterwards in their thoughts and language; they could not lay aside their first nature, or divest themselves at once of Jewish modes of expression. Sacrifice and atonement were leading ideas of the Jewish dispensation; without shedding of blood there was no remission. In thinking of the death of Christ and the fulfilment of which He spoke, it was natural to them to think of Him as a “sacrifice” and “atonement” for sin. To Him bear all the prophets witness, as well as the types of the law and the history of the Jewish people. All their life long they had been sacrificing and living in the commandments of the law blameless. What a striking view must it have been to their minds that their rites and ceremonies were not in vain, but only done in ignorance of their true design and import; not that they were nothing, but that there was more in them than the chief priests and Pharisees could even conceive! And the very deadness of them as practised by the Jews in general, and the entire passing away of

their original meaning, would greatly assist their new application. *There was something in the sacrifices that they could not comprehend, as they truly felt that there was in the death of Christ also far more than they could understand, and they interpreted the one by the other.* And when once the thought was suggested to men's minds, at every opening of the book of the Old Testament a new light fell upon the page: the history of Abraham, the settlement in the promised land, the least details of the Temple and the Tabernacle, were written for their instruction.'—Vol. ii. pp. 475, 476.

In writing this, Mr. Jowett seems to forget that One higher than the Apostle thus spake of His death. But the gist of the whole is, that we are in advance of the Apostles, and can discriminate where they could not, and can divest ourselves of Jewish 'thoughts' and modes of expression, and discern where the Jewish element trenches on the Christian.

We will next consider the way in which this writer treats the doctrine of Original Sin, as an instance of the mode in which his views on this subject, the weight to be attached to the words of the Apostle, are applied to a particular case.

In two places of his Epistles (Rom. v. and 1 Cor. xv.) S. Paul connects our sinfulness and liability to death with the sin of Adam, and the death which was its consequence. Mr. Jowett's view is, that our nature is sinful, 'that we are one in a common sinful nature, which, even if it were not derived from the sin of Adam, exists as really as if it were,' (vol. ii. p. 167;) nay, he says, (ibid. p. 154,) 'Human nature is sinful: this we know as a fact, *nor can we imagine how it could be otherwise;*' but he repudiates the notion that this sinfulness is in anywise connected with the sin of our (supposed) first parents.

In his notes he says (vol. ii. p. 155), 'The Apostle is about to speak of Adam *the type of sin*, as Christ is *the type of righteousness*. The sin of Adam is the sin of man, as the righteousness of Christ is the righteousness of man.' On verse 19 of this fifth chapter Mr. Jowett has no note, the words being 'as by one man's disobedience many *were made* sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many *be made* righteous.'

We must here first observe the want of fairness and candour shown in treating this subject. Mr. Jowett's sympathies are all exhausted on doubters; believers are treated with no more consideration in this case than in that of the Atonement and others; their opinions are simply caricatured. Here, for instance, the consequences of the fall are stated in the most repulsive form, as an *imputation* of the sin of Adam. This doctrine, he says, is 'at variance with our first notions of the moral nature of God,' (vol. ii. p. 137;) and therefore the words of the Apostle which seem to teach it must be otherwise explained.

But surely Mr. Jowett must have known that there is a view of the effects of the Fall, most generally held by Catholic Chris-

to cheat them into the relinquishment of that belief which is now the stay and support of their souls, no more effectual means could have been devised. Again, there is nothing in the language to offend, but much to attract. A tone of piety pervades the work. The writer seems fully to appreciate the good that is in others, and to understand the workings of the religious mind, so that the reader says: Here is one who has felt what I feel; he can sympathize with me; he seems to have known the love of Christ, and felt the power of prayer, and to have had experience of the deep workings of the soul in its conversion from sin to holiness, and admits such religious influences as facts.

Again, difficulties, as we have said, are insinuated rather than boldly stated, they are made almost to arise out of the reader's own thoughts, and are expressed with a semblance of fairness and truthfulness which appears to proceed from a pure love of truth. Then the ability and the interest of the Dissertations are both very great. There is throughout them a body of most just views and true observations mixed up with and verging on what is most untrue. The thoughts on nature and human life commend themselves to our experience, and show deep reflection and keenful observation of character. There are beautiful touches of feeling in Mr. Jowett's volumes. The pleasing style, the varied topics that are introduced—the new lights in which old subjects are placed, and the pervading freshness of thought, give continual interest to the reader. History and poetry, the old religions of Heathendom, the classic writers, and the most recent theories of physical and ethnological science, are subordinated to the writer's use. We are presented with novel and striking views on almost every subject. Some passages there are of singular beauty; and all have the charm of seeming to come straight from the heart. But a poisonous atmosphere pervades the whole, and the result of the work seems to be to leave no sure resting place for religious faith. It appears designed to unsettle all existing convictions, and instead of them to give a vague, undefined, and dreamy view of a sort of natural religion to which Christianity is to be subordinated. Its very beauty and interest are deceptive. The *mirage* and haze of style and illustration and speculation and suggestion keep out of sight the false reasonings, the ignoring and misrepresentations of facts, the one-sidedness which pervades throughout.

Accordingly, when the immediate influence of the style is over, and we begin to reflect on the substance of what we have read, we perceive that the unsystematic and illogical style of the composition not only hinders us from having a clear view of our author's meaning, but also leads him to leave out of sight *the most weighty considerations* that are opposed to his own

views, and to contemplate one portion of a fact without apparently being at all conscious of that which is immediately connected with it. This onesidedness of view and this principle of ignoring of important facts would be regarded as dishonest in a systematic writer; and much harder measure than Mr. Jowett has dealt out to Paley would be deservedly given him. But when a writer seems to be so confidential with us as to let us see the very inmost workings of his mind—to think aloud as it were in our presence—he disarms us. We cannot suspect treason in one who invites us into the innermost chambers of the soul; we cannot suspect intentional dishonesty, and we set it down to his having overlooked the facts. At the same time, there is really not only the greatest unfairness, as we shall show, in this ignoring of facts, or balancing of arguments, but we find in Mr. Jowett's statement of the views of others a caricaturing of them which is inconsistent with real candour. In proof of this, we need only allude to Mr. Jowett's description of the Catholic faith on the Atonement, or on Original Sin.

Of the vagueness of the statements in these volumes we can give no better proof than this: that if an inquirer asks what is his view on almost any subject, even the most essential, it would be impossible to answer. In his Commentaries, for instance, we read:—

‘We must go back to the predoctrinal age of the Apostle himself, ere such distinctions existed. The whole Christian life flows with him from union with Christ. Whether this union is conscious or unconscious, whether it gives or merely imputes the righteousness of Christ, is a question which he does not analyse. But in thinking of it, he perceives a sort of balance and contrast between the humiliation of Christ and the exaltation of the Christian. The believer seems to gain what his master has lost. He throws on Christ the worse half of self, that the better half may be endued with the spirit of life.’—Vol. ii. p. 223.

‘What is meant by being crucified to the world? Not certainly being despised by the world, still less despising the world in return, or any mere figure of speech; but whatever is meant by being dead or buried with Christ, by the old man being crucified, by the life hidden with Christ in God.’—Vol. i. p. 323.

So when this writer has treated almost with derision the ordinary belief of pious Christians in our Lord's Atonement, he leaves us absolutely in the dark as to what he does himself believe.

But one of the most marked faults in this work is that to which we have referred, the overlooking and ignoring of important facts; of which we shall give some instances. There are strange contrasts in Mr. Jowett's mind, ‘antitheses’ equal to any that he has dwelt on: such is the contrast between acuteness and nice observation of facts at one time, and dreaminess and apparent blindness to them at another. We could scarcely give a finer instance of the former than the argument for the genuineness of the Epistle to the Thessalonians, which is marked by the

—‘There is no resting-place until we admit freely that the laws ‘of nature, and the will of the God of nature, are absolutely ‘identical.’ So that, if a contradiction to our notions of justice and mercy—to the suggestions of our ‘moral sense,’—be allowed to hold against what we have good reason to believe to be divine appointments, it is plain that we must deny that the author and governor of the world is a just and merciful God.

If it be said: True; but it is only when viewed piecemeal that these things seem thus contradictory to the Divine goodness, and they ought to be viewed as parts of a whole: we reply, that those doctrines which the Apostles teach respecting God, must also be viewed as parts of a great system, the whole of which is unknown to us; and that it is only by isolating them, and then caricaturing them, that Mr. Jowett endeavours to show that they are inconsistent with the attributes of God.

Besides, there is another very important consideration bearing on the whole of Mr. Jowett’s work which this instance will illustrate. The statement which we have cited from Mr. Mozley’s work expresses simply and clearly a fact which is most important in its relation to this subject—namely, that the whole Christian Church, from the earliest point of history which we can ascertain, has held the doctrine that the sin of Adam affected his posterity. The same must be said, in even a stronger degree, of the doctrine of the Atonement, which from the first was believed by Christians, in that they regarded the death of our Lord as the procuring cause of our forgiveness and salvation, as a sacrifice, and as a ransom. It comes, then, to this—the conclusion seems inevitable—that the Apostles taught this doctrine: that they not only alluded to our Saviour’s death in the metaphorical language of the Law, or mentioned it by the way in their Epistles, but taught it as the Christian doctrine to their converts. So that if there could have been any doubt as to the teaching implied in the Epistles, the belief of the Christians would have decided the point; unless we suppose that S. Paul, who is so anxious in guarding his disciples against error—so jealous for the honour of God—who takes so great pains to remove misapprehensions and to clear up difficulties—would have permitted his converts to be misled into believing something which is inconsistent, as it is alleged, with the purer attributes of God, and more degrading beneath the errors of the heathen. It is surely, then, important to ascertain, if we can, what the Apostles did teach. Because it is certain that S. Paul laboured much in the personal instruction of his converts; still more in that of his constant companions, as Timothy and S. Luke,—that in that teaching he might have removed erroneous views which they had imbibed from the metaphors he adopted. While the Epistle took but a

short time to write or to read, the Apostle's daily conversation and frequent teaching must have afforded ample opportunity for exact and unmetaphorical instruction. Yet, we repeat, we find only one doctrine of the effect of our Lord's death, that of atonement, sacrifice, ransom, and, involved in ransom, satisfaction.

And yet, in relation to the doctrine of the Atonement, Mr. Jowett quietly overlooks one important fact—the institution of the Eucharist as a commemoration of our Lord's death; and that not as a great moral fact, but as an atonement—'the Body given or broken for you'—'the Blood of the New Covenant'—'the Blood shed for you and for many *for the remission of sins.*' Just as the coeval institution of the Lord's-day is a standing memorial of the fact of our blessed Lord's Resurrection, so is the institution of the Holy Eucharist a standing monument of the doctrine of His Atonement. His own words, attested by S. Paul as well as by the Evangelists, stamp this character upon it, and throw us on to Himself as being, in this as well as His other teaching, the Revealer of the Atonement; whilst the absence of all reference in the Eucharistic rite to the idea of a great moral fact, and the exclusive view of the death as an atonement, is decisive, if proof were needed, that this doctrine was taught as the most essential truth of our religion, bound up and interwoven into the very innermost life of Christians.

But to return. Not in these instances only, but throughout his work, Mr. Jowett endeavours to lessen the authority of S. Paul. He is spoken of as one whose notions were limited to his own day and to those with whom he held relations. His views and statements are supposed to be applicable only to them, and to be influenced by their language and mode of thought. Whatever there was divine in the Apostle's mind was struggling against these restraints and hindrances. The result is, not that we are to subject ourselves to the teaching of the Apostle, but to submit his teaching to our judgment. His authority is destroyed. Miracles are slighted, prophecy seemingly regarded as impossible. The passages of the Old Testament which seem to testify of Christ, are only accommodated by S. Paul to this meaning. Plato and the Alexandrian school are considered, in order to suggest to us a human element which entered into the form and expression of revelation. All this tends towards lowering and making human what we have hitherto held to be divine; *e.g.*—

'Except from the Gospel history and the writings of Josephus and Philo, we know but little of the tendencies of the Jewish mind in the time of our Lord. Yet we cannot doubt that the entrance of Christianity into the

world was not sudden and abrupt; that is an illusion which arises in the mind from our slender acquaintance with contemporary opinions. Better and higher and holier as it was, *it was not absolutely distinct from the teaching of the doctors of the law either in form or substance; it was not unconnected with, but gave life and truth to, the mystic fancies of Alexandrian philosophy.* Even in the counsels of perfection of the Sermon on the Mount, there is probably nothing which might not be found either in letter or spirit, in Philo or some other Jewish or Eastern writer. The peculiarity of the Gospel is, not that it teaches what is wholly new, but that it draws out of the treasure-house of the human heart things new and old, gathering together in one the dispersed fragments of the truth. The common people would not have "heard Him gladly," but for the truth of what He said. The heart was its own witness to it. The better nature of man, though but for a moment, responded to it, spoken as it was with authority, and not as the Scribes; with simplicity, and not as the great teachers of the law; and sanctified by the life and actions of Him from whose lips it came, and "Who spake as never man spake."

'And yet, after reviewing the circumstances of the first preaching of the Gospel, there remains something which cannot be resolved into causes or antecedents; which eludes criticism, and can no more be explained in the world than the sudden changes of character in the individual.'—Vol. ii. p. 204.

Some of this language seems to recognise the true view of the relation of the Gospel to existing opinions. But we are left quite uncertain what the 'dispersed fragments of the truth' are. The Apostles, it seems, gathered fragments of error as well as of truth.

Thus again:—

'The best and holiest persons among the poor and ignorant are not entirely free from superstition, according to the notions of the educated; at best they are apt to speak of religion in a manner not quite suited to our taste; they sing with a loud and excited voice; they imagine themselves to receive Divine oracles, even about the humblest cares of life. Is not this, in externals at least, very like the appearance which the first disciples must have presented, who obeyed the Apostle's injunction, "Is any sad? let him pray; is any merry? let him sing psalms?" Could our nerves have borne to witness "the speaking with tongues," or "the administration of Baptism," or the love feasts as they probably existed in the early Church?'—Vol. ii. p. 204.

The evident direction of these exaggerated remarks is to lower the authority of the Apostles. Accordingly not only the doctrines, but the moral teaching of the Apostle, is subjected to Mr. Jowett's judgment. S. Paul's character is considered on this principle: he lived in twilight. His language is the language of ecstasy. The world against which he warns us is only the Jewish or heathen world of his own day. His rules of conduct are grounded on the mistaken notion that the world would soon come to an end. This error modified all his practical views.

The result of all this is, that the authority of the Christian Scriptures being impaired, if not destroyed, it is open to the

writer to sit in judgment on each doctrine or precept, and to accept or reject it according as it agrees or not with his canons. These seem to be two:—i. The laws of nature as discovered by experiment and research. ii. The moral sense of mankind. We apprehend we must so understand Mr. Jowett. It is not his own moral sense, but that of men generally. Whatever there be in Scripture or the doctrines received by Christians that is in Mr. Jowett's judgment opposed to these, that must be set aside as not Divine. It is of the accidents, not the essence of the truth.

Now the former of these principles may be admitted in the general, but what the truths discovered are remains to be shown, and then that the doctrines of our religion are inconsistent with them. We cannot give up what God has even probably told us, for the passing philosophies of the day, which will ere long be superseded.

As to the second, we demur to the use made of this test, the moral sense of mankind:—First, in the mode of applying the test, which is to Mr. Jowett's representation of the Christian doctrine,—as in the cases of Original Sin and of the Atonement; secondly, to the assumption that he truly represents the expressions of this moral sense—for example, when the writer makes the moral sense of mankind repudiate the doctrine of the Atonement, which is the one doctrine of the Gospel which, more than any other, has drawn men to accept the true religion, and won them by its correspondence with their nature's needs;—and, thirdly, to the possibility of the moral sense judging on such subjects, until reason had stated the whole case and presented a just view of it to that sense. For the moral sense, as is clear, is even now continually misjudging actions, characters, questions of conduct, as Mr. Jowett has shown in his *Essay on Casuistry*: the cause of which is, that every character and action has its varying sides and aspects, the more so as each is in itself more complicated, and it is the office of another faculty to state the case, and set it in a right point of view before the moral sense. And of the Divine dealings and dispensations reason cannot judge as a whole, because they are imperfectly known. The moral sense, therefore, must be an insufficient critic of a supposed revealed doctrine, if it be beyond reason to judge of it in all its bearings. This may be easily illustrated. The teaching of the Apostles must have presented many aspects opposed to the moral sense of the Jews as well as to the reason, and, as they would have said, the well-grounded convictions of the Gentiles. But these gave way before the authority of teaching, which on the whole so commended itself to the consciences and moral sense of the hearers, as that

they were convinced it must be from God, and which they saw or heard was sanctioned by miracles.

Indeed, the idea of Revelation, as it appears in Holy Scripture, seems to be set aside by Mr. Jowett, and to be superseded by the philosophy of the age. What the Apostles believed was, that they were divinely taught certain truths concerning the unseen world, as well as concerning the duties and destinies of men. That these truths were absolutely certain. That they must be received implicitly by faith as being the words of God. That God had given assurance of their truth by the resurrection of His Son, and that He sanctioned themselves as the messengers and exponents of these truths by enabling them to work miracles. This is the teaching of the Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles. And the words of Christ, as well as of His Apostles, are decisive as to the permanent and abiding character of the Revelation and its institutions,—that they were to continue to the end of the world.

The fact of the Divine original of Christianity, which is involved in the documents themselves, ought to determine the laws of their interpretation. To interpret them as merely human documents, is to prejudice the question. That Christianity is of Divine original, is indeed certain if anything can be certain. If so, our submission to it, our reverent way of viewing its documents, our abstaining from judging of the Divine counsels on partial knowledge, result as duties immediately consequent upon this truth.

Before concluding the subject, we must take up a very painful part of our duty, an examination of Mr. Jowett's trustworthiness as a guide in the understanding, in the simplest way, of Holy Scripture, or in the facts on which his reasonings are built. It is necessary to do this, because his views are generally stated in so magisterial a tone, that one feels as if they must be well grounded; and the severity with which he has dealt with Paley for some alleged errors, makes one suppose that he himself must be free from them. But, in his writings, we continually come across evidences that Mr. Jowett is not well acquainted with the Scriptures he is criticising, nor by any means accurate in his statements.

We read, for instance, (vol. i. p. 24,) that 'the favourite word *καυχᾶσθαι* nowhere occurs in the First Epistle to the Thessalonians.' But *καύχησης* does, (ii. 19,) which in this argument comes to the same thing.

'They' (the Epistles to the Thessalonians) 'say nothing of justification by faith and not by the works of the law, but no more does the earliest narrative of the primitive Church,' *i.e.*

the Acts of the Apostles (i. 11). Yes, it does, in Acts xiii. S. Paul, at the very beginning of his Apostolical preaching, declared respecting Christ, 'by whom all that believe are justified 'from all things from which they could not be justified by the 'law;' a passage which (by the way) also shows that this doctrine was part of the Apostles' earliest teaching; and, therefore, that its absence from the Epistles to the Thessalonians is not to be accounted for by supposing that S. Paul grew into such views.

In vol. i. p. 334, among many questions this is raised: 'Were 'the teachers who came from Jerusalem to Antioch, saying, '“ Except ye be circumcised, ye cannot be saved,” commis- 'sioned by the Twelve?' This blasphemous supposition might have been anticipated by remembering the words of the Apostles in their letter from the Council at Jerusalem: 'Forasmuch as 'we have heard that certain which went out from us have 'troubled you with words subverting your souls, saying, Ye 'must be circumcised, and keep the law; *to whom we gave no 'such commandment.*'

On the previous page: 'Nor is it without significance that 'in the discussion of this question of the admission of the 'Gentiles, no reference is made . . . to the intercourse of Peter 'with Cornelius.' Why S. Peter's speech at the Council is wholly on this subject, and most decisive, how God 'made 'choice among us, that the Gentiles by my mouth should hear 'the word of the gospel and believe,' and 'put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith;' and that of S. James begins: 'Simeon hath declared how God at 'the first did visit the Gentiles, to take out of them a people 'for His name.' (Acts xv. 1—11. 14.)

Indeed, this whole account of the relation to the Twelve, of S. Paul, and of the Judaizers of the Apostolic Church, is a dream, which a simple attention to facts, rather than imaginary deductions and *à priori* reasonings, would have dispelled. But, unhappily, Mr. Jowett would rather sacrifice the authenticity of the History of the Acts than his own theories. He says:—

'Nor, again, in No. 10, is it quite satisfactory to omit to notice the different character in which James is exhibited in the Acts, as the supporter of S. Paul on two great occasions of dispute (Acts xv. 13; xxi. 18), between Jew and Gentile, compared with the light in which he is incidentally alluded to in Gal. ii. 12. (comp. ver. 9), or the inconsistency in Peter's conduct at Antioch, when compared not merely with the decree of the council which is alluded to by Paley, but with the vision at Joppa, which is omitted by him, though more to the point.

'But the great instance, not of unfairness in the writer, but of want of perception of what is due to the reader, occurs in the comparison of the visit of Gal. ii. with the council in Acts xv. The true result of such a comparison is to show the identity of the two occasions (see note at the end of

chap. ii), amid the diversity of the accounts of them. Paley, while half admitting this identity, overlooks the extreme difficulty of supposing that S. Paul should have referred to this visit and yet have concealed precisely that circumstance in it which was most to the purpose.'

'The narrative of the Acts of the Apostles, when compared with the Epistle to the Galatians, does not show equal historical accuracy. It differs in details, and also in the point of view in which its author regards the question of Jew and Gentile. Was it that years had passed away, and the breaches between the Apostles were no longer seen in the distance, or forgotten in their common sufferings? Whatever may have been the reason, the amount of discrepancy between the earlier chapters of the Acts and the Epistle to the Galatians affords a striking contrast with the precise agreement of the later chapters with the Romans and Corinthians.'—Vol. i. pp. 351, 352.

Mr. Jowett remarks:—'It is obvious that such a belief' (in the immediate coming of Christ) 'was inconsistent with an established ecclesiastical order. A succession of bishops could have had no meaning in a world that was to vanish away.' (Vol. i. p. 104.) Yet S. Paul appointed Timothy and Titus, and commissioned and directed them to provide for a succession of bishops.

Incidentally we may observe that Mr. Jowett's views on the belief of S. Paul and the early Christians, as to the immediate return of Christ, are altogether exaggerated. He overlooks what they themselves say; and the fact that the time of Christ's coming being left quite uncertain, they only believed (and that rightly) that it might be at any time, and would most probably be in their own time.

Again:—'We naturally ask, why a future life, as distinct from this, was not made a part of the first preaching of the Gospel?' Surely it was so made. Part of the foundation doctrines of the faith, was the resurrection of the dead, and eternal judgment; and the contrast of things temporal and things eternal, and the earthly house of this tabernacle and the future house, are contrasted as much as they could be by us now.

It is perhaps of slight importance in Mr. Jowett's view, what the actual words of Scripture are. His theory of preferring the spirit to the letter, the matter to the form, the essence to the accidents, makes it immaterial. But his mistakes and apparent want of acquaintance with Scripture, is what we should not have expected. They remind us of the witty canon of S. Paul's concluding his sermon, 'in the words of *the Psalmist*, Lord, now lettest Thou Thy servant depart in peace;' and would even do to be related among the blunders of Oxford examiners.

Thus in vol. ii. p. 456, we read, 'When in the *Gospel* it is said, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved," &c.' and this is not a misprint, or slip of the pen, because the context requires that the Gospel should be meant, for it is contrasting the teaching of the Gospels and Epistles. One would have

thought that the words of the jailor of Philippi would have been remembered.

A few lines after, (p. 457) we read, 'as our Saviour to the disciple who affirms his belief, says, Thy sins be forgiven thee;' it was a paralytic, not a disciple, one whose friends had by their deeds shown great faith in Christ's power, but who had not affirmed any belief at all, to whom these words were spoken.

In vol. i. p. 300, of S. Paul: 'He who wrought miracles, who had handkerchiefs carried to him from the sick:' they were carried from him to the sick.

This want of acquaintance with Scripture, or carelessness about it, is, we presume, not material on Mr. Jowett's view. He has a theory which overrides the words of Scripture. If S. Paul differed from him, S. Paul would be mistaken. *Tant pis pour les faits.*

But there are questions which must be settled by facts, and history is one of them. Now the history of the Church throws but little light on the favourite theory of the Judaizers and the imaginary divisions between S. Paul and the Twelve. Accordingly, Mr. Jowett despises it, as he does the Acts of the Apostles. He calls it 'the twilight of Ecclesiastical history.' (Vol. i. p. 344.) He says elsewhere, that when the fathers of the second century speak of the first ages, 'they do but display their own ignorance;' of no one could this be said with more truth than of Mr. Jowett. He rarely indeed refers to the early times of the Church. But rarely as he does refer to them, each reference shows his ignorance, e.g. (vol. i. p. 112) in criticising Paley's words: 'I question whether any ancient forgeries were executed in the lifetime of the persons whose name they bear:' he says, 'That forgeries came into existence soon after the death of the person whose name they bear, is certainly proved by the example of the Shepherd of Hermas, the Clementine Homilies, and some of the Apocryphal Gospels. Neither the interval of a hundred years, nor a distance of a hundred miles, needs to be interposed.' These words lead us to suppose that Mr. Jowett understood these forgeries to have been made in or near the lifetime of their supposed authors: but the Hermas whose name the Shepherd is supposed wrongly to bear was contemporary with S. Paul. The book is supposed to have been written circ. A.D. 136. The Clementine Homilies are dated by Mr. Jowett himself A.D. 160, by Mr. Stanley circ. A.D. 212—230; but S. Clement died A.D. 100. And how many of the Apocryphal Gospels were written much less than a hundred years after the death of those whose names they bear, we should wish Mr. Jowett to show.

Again, in speaking of the history of heresy, in connexion with

the Judaizers, he says, 'We should have to begin by forming a criterion of the credibility of Irenæus, Clement, Tertullian, Origen, and Eusebius.' Mr. Jowett omits Justin, and apparently is not aware that it is he who is the chief authority on this point, as he gives a very precise and explicit contemporary account of the parties then in (or out of) the Church, relative to the Judaizing questions.

But the most remarkable instance is the following; and that on a subject of no less importance than the extent to which the Epistles of S. Paul were known in the middle of the second century. Mr. Jowett has been speaking of S. Paul's supposed opposition to the Twelve, when he makes the following observations:—

'Bearing in mind these two general facts, the tendency of which is to throw a degree of doubt on the early ecclesiastical tradition, and so to lead us to seek for indications out of the regular course of history, we have to consider, in reference to our present subject, the following statements:—

'1. That Justin, and probably Hegesippus and Papias, living at a time when the Epistles of S. Paul must have been widely spread, were unacquainted with them or their author.

'2. That Marcion, who was their contemporary, appealed exclusively to the authority of S. Paul in opposition to the Twelve.—Vol. i. p. 345.

'4. That in the Clementine Homilies, A. 160, *although a work otherwise orthodox*, S. Paul is covertly introduced under the name of Simon Magus, as the enemy who had pretended visions and revelations, and who withstood and blamed Peter.—Vol. i. p. 346.

The calm and quiet manner in which these statements are made, gives them all the character of unquestioned and well-known facts: whereas Mr. Jowett ought to have known that they (Nos. 1 and 4) are simply false.

'Justin, and probably Hegesippus and Papias, were unacquainted with the Epistles of S. Paul, or their author.' Why, it must require the very strongest evidence to prove what is so utterly improbable. And what evidence is there that Justin, Hegesippus, or Papias, were unacquainted with S. Paul or his Epistles? *Absolutely none.*

It does not at all follow that they were unacquainted with them because we do not find them cited in the few fragments of Papias and Hegesippus now remaining. The extant remains would not fill more than five or six pages such as are now before our readers: and the book Papias wrote led him quite away from S. Paul; it was on the words of our Lord, and traditions respecting Him and the Apostles who had known Him and lived with Him. Surely then, even if he had never mentioned S. Paul and his writings, it would have been no evidence whatever that he was unacquainted with them. On the other hand, Papias was the intimate acquaintance of Polycarp (*ἐταῖρος τοῦ Πολυκάρπου*) and Polycarp's letter shows his knowledge and

esteem of S. Paul and his Epistles, so that Papias could scarcely avoid being acquainted with them.

Why does Mr. Jowett say 'that Justin, and probably Hegesippus and Papias,' were unacquainted with S. Paul's Epistles? Why not, Hegesippus, Papias, and probably Justin . . . for that is the order we should have expected, unless the 'probably' refers to Hegesippus only. We are glad that Mr. Jowett thinks that Hegesippus was *probably* unacquainted with the Epistles—because it shows that he does not agree with the notion that Hegesippus cited S. Paul's words and directly condemned him of false teaching, as in a passage referred to by Mr. Stanley, found in a fragment in Photius. We are, however, inclined to think that Mr. Jowett did not know even so much as this about Hegesippus. But was Hegesippus really unacquainted with S. Paul's writings?—he who travelled through the churches, gathering up all the information he could, who stayed at Corinth and at Rome with the bishops of those Churches, to whom it is that we are indebted for our information about the Epistle of S. Clement which was read in the Church at Corinth—an Epistle which is so intimately connected with S. Paul.

The boldness of this assertion is only exceeded by that of S. Justin *not being acquainted* with S. Paul or his writings, immediately followed as it is by the statement 'that Marcion, 'who was their contemporary, appealed exclusively to the 'authority of S. Paul in opposition to the Twelve.' Did Mr. Jowett know that Justin (as he himself states) wrote a work 'against all heresies,' and that he wrote one specially against Marcion himself, of which we have an extract in Irenæus. How can it be supposed then that he was unacquainted with the Apostle to whom exclusively Marcion *appealed*? He must have been a very indifferent controversialist indeed not to have read the writings of the person whom he opposed, or have been 'unacquainted with' those Epistles from which exclusively Marcion's authorities were taken. And, though Justin does not cite S. Paul formally or by name, as there was no reason that he should in apologies to Roman emperors or a controversy with a Jew, yet it is plain enough that he was so well acquainted with his writings as to express himself in the Apostle's peculiar phraseology, *e.g.* about the man of sin. The passages may be seen in Mr. Westcott's work on the Canon.

But the statement that 'the Clementine Homilies, A.D. 160,' was 'a work *otherwise orthodox*,' except in its attack on S. Paul, shows the most profound ignorance of the whole subject. The Clementine Homilies are anything but orthodox; they are replete with heresy; they are the work of Ebionites, 'the Judaizers' run to seed, who united the belief in the permanent obligation of the Law with that of the mere humanity of our Lord. And

in the Clementine Homilies, S. Peter is represented as strongly maintaining that Christ was a mere man, adducing arguments which would interest Mr. Jowett, while Simon Magus, representing S. Paul, maintains the Catholic doctrine. Indeed, if Mr. Jowett's date, (A.D. 160,) were right, we should have in these heretical books earlier indications than are extant any where else of the Catholic arguments for the Divinity of the Son from His being the Son, and *therefore* God, and of the same *οὐσία* as the Father. The Clementines also maintain that Christians who die impenitent cease to exist, and are not punished eternally, with divers other errors. So much for Mr. Jowett's quiet assertion that they are 'otherwise orthodox,' and so much for the value to be attached to this writer's historical statements.

On Mr. Jowett's errors as an interpreter or expositor of S. Paul, we have not time to dwell. They are trifles in comparison of the general views which he puts out, which make the interpreting S. Paul a very unimportant matter, seeing that when we have ascertained what S. Paul meant, we may be told that he was under a mistake.

In Mr. Jowett's view, the ideas and expressions of the Apostles belong to their own age and circumstances. If so much be shadow—be the outward garb—the question arises then: What is the substance? What is there that we may rest upon as true? It would seem, alas! as if there was but little, and that little is likely to grow less: and the prospects of those who do not accept any part of the revelation—whose lives are good according to the ordinary measure of men's goodness, are still the objects of God's love and mercy—exercised not in order to convert them, but to save them as they are—they are a law to themselves. Faith, indeed, in his view, is the spirit of liberty: and freedom from anxiety and scruples, with love, is his idea of religion. 'Faith, in the language of the Apostle, is almost synonymous with freedom,' (vol. ii. p. 457), or it is 'the spiritual principle whereby we go out of ourselves to hold communion with God and Christ.' How small a remnant of our religion would content Mr. Jowett, the following words may show:—

'In inquiries of this sort it is often supposed that, if the evidence of the genuineness of a single book of Scripture be weakened, or the credit of a single chapter shaken, a deep and irreparable injury is inflicted on Christian truth. It may afford a rest to the mind to consider that, if but one discourse of Christ, one Epistle of Paul, had come down to us, still more than half would have been preserved. Coleridge has remarked, that out of a single play of Shakspeare the whole of English literature might be restored. Much more true is it that, in short portions or single verses of Scripture the whole spirit of Christianity is contained.'—Vol. i. p. 352.

The objects of faith are not simply the things which God has revealed. With his usual inaccuracy, Mr. Jowett says, 'Faith may be spoken of, in the language of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as the substance of things unseen. But what are the "things unseen?"'

'Not merely an invisible world ready to flash through the thralldom of the material at the appearance of Christ; not angels, or powers of darkness, or even God Himself seated, as the Old Testament described, on the circle of the heavens; but the kingdom of truth and justice, the things that are within, of which God is the centre, and with which men everywhere by faith hold communion. Faith is the belief in the existence of this kingdom; that is, in the truth and justice and mercy of God, who disposes all things—not perhaps in our judgment for the greatest happiness of His creatures, but absolutely in accordance with our moral notions. And that this is not seen to be the case here, makes it a matter of faith and not of sight, that it will be so in some future world, or is so in some ways that we are unable to comprehend. He that believes on God, believes, first, that He is; and, secondly, that He is the Rewarder of them that seek Him.'—Vol. ii. p. 463.

In other words, simple natural religion. In his careless citation of this text, Mr. Jowett forgot that the words of the Apostle are inconsistent with his interpretation: those words are, 'Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.' The things hoped for must be something more definite than what he has put out, and the whole chapter from which they are taken shows that faith is relative to the promises and revelations of God.

Mr. Jowett continues,—and we cite his words to show where he places faith in Christ:—

'Now, if we go on to ask what is it that gives us this absolute and present assurance of the truth and justice of God, the answer is, the life and death of Christ, who is the image of God and man alike, the Son of God; the First-born of the redeemed. We know what He Himself has told us of God, and we cannot conceive perfect goodness separate from perfect truth; nay, *this goodness itself is the only and the highest conception we can form of God*, if we confess and comprehend what the mere immensity of the material world tends to suggest, that God is a Being different in kind from any physical power; a Being of whom the reason of man, however feeble, forms a far truer (though most inadequate) conception than imagination in its highest flights. Admit the statements of the Gospel respecting Christ; it is not so much a matter to be proved by dubious inference from texts, as manifest on the surface that *He is Divine in all that truly constitutes divinity except this outward garb of flesh*.

'That is the only image of God which we are capable of conceiving; an image not of physical, nor even of spiritual power, *seen in the sufferings rather than in the miracles of Christ our Saviour*; the image of *perfect goodness and peace and truth and love*.

'We are on the edge of a theological difficulty; for *who can deny, that the image of that goodness may fade from the mind's eye after so many centuries, or that there are those who recognise the idea and may be unable to admit the fact?* Can we say that this error of the head is also an error of the heart? The lives of such unbelievers in the facts of Christianity would sometimes

refute our explanation. And yet it is true that *Providence has made our spiritual life dependent on the belief in certain truths, and those truths run up into matters of fact, with the belief in which they have ever been associated*; it is true, also, that the most important moral consequences flow from unbelief. We grant the difficulty: no complete answer can be given to it on this side the grave. Doubtless God has provided a way that the sceptic no less than the believer shall receive his due; He does not need our timid counsels for the protection of the truth. If among those who have rejected the facts of the Gospel history some have been rash, hypercritical, inflated with the pride of intellect, or secretly alienated by sensuality from the faith of Christ,—there have been others, also, upon whom we may believe to rest a portion of that blessing which comes to such as “have not seen and yet have believed.”—Vol. ii. pp. 463, 464.

This is indeed a strange passage. In what sense Mr. Jowett holds the divinity of Christ it is hard to say: it would seem, from the words cited here, as if he only held it in the sense of His perfect goodness: but it may be that he here speaks not of his own convictions, but of what may be held by others. Yet it would seem that this small remains of Christianity may die out, when the image of that Goodness dies away, and ‘Providence,’ not God, has connected our spiritual life with the belief of truths, and those truths run up into matters of fact with which *they have always been associated*:—

‘No one who, instead of “hanging to the past,” will look forward to the future, can expect that natural science should stand in the same attitude towards revelation fifty years hence as at present. The faith of mankind varies from age to age; it may be hereafter weaker than it is now; it may be stronger also. But that which never varies or turns aside, which is always going on, and is quite independent of faith, is knowledge based on the sure ground of observation and experiment, the very progress of which is itself matter of experience. When the results even of our present knowledge are familiar to us, when they become the possession not of the few but of the many, can the wisest foresee the effect on religious and social life? Doubtless God has provided a way that the thought of Him should not be banished from the hearts of men. And habit, and opinion, and prescription may “last our time,” as men say; and many motives may conspire to keep our minds off the coming struggle. But if there ever be a day when our present knowledge of geology, of languages, of the races and religions of mankind, of the human frame itself, shall be regarded as the starting-point of a goal which has been almost reached, we can hardly anticipate, from what we already see, the nature of the conflict that will then arise between reason and faith. The cry of the soul to God, “Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” may be the entrance to a new life.’—Vol. ii. p. 445.

It would seem from this that Christianity may give way to pure natural religion; nay, all that the writer seems to expect is, that God will provide a way ‘that the thought of Him should not be banished from the hearts of men.’

We continue the quotation; and the distress and misery expressed by it, if it really be a picture of the writer’s own state, must excite sympathy and compassion:—

* Such are a few of the trials which, in proportion as we reflect either on ourselves or on the world, meet us in the course of our pilgrimage, as the law did the Apostle S. Paul. Like him we must overcome them not by earthly warfare, nor by human wisdom, but 'by humility, by patience, by resignation to the will of God, by taking up the cross, and following Christ. There is a circle within which we can still live; a spirit of truth, which in the deepest night and lowest abyss of scepticism may yet save us, "so as by fire."—Vol. ii. p. 445.

Of the misery of such restlessness, and the difficulties of conduct that it involves, read the following:—

'Inquiry is not an easy task; hard to all, impossible to most; seeming in its very nature to have no resting-place until all is disclosed. Behind every reason another reason seems to be concealed; each cause points to a further cause; the solution of every difficulty brings into view new difficulties yet unsolved. The mind, true to itself, naturally asks, what is the use of a little inquiry, if the first principles of truth and right are to remain uninvestigated? if inquiry commences at the end of the scale of knowledge, what need of inquiry at all? As we pursue the never-ending track of investigation, our days are told. Life has passed away ere we have learned how to live. We hang between the opposing tendencies of reason and faith, our theory at variance with practice; the head contradicting the heart. And then, if, pursuing our doubts, we wage war against established opinions, we ourselves become isolated, and deny our social nature. We have no meeting point with others, no communion of souls, no church in which to worship in the same sense and with the same feelings as other men. For the sake of truth we place ourselves in the position least favourable to the practice of virtue, or of religion, almost to the investigation of truth itself. No one can say that we have done wrong; hardly that we could have done otherwise without doing wrong. And yet it is scarcely possible to overrate the ill effect on the character, of isolation in opinions from the rest of mankind. Alone we move in a world of shadows; there arises in us a feeling of suspicion respecting the human faculties themselves; a vain consciousness of superiority, though it be in knowing that we know nothing; an utter apathy about all aims of human good or schemes of earthly ambition. Our sense of differences of opinion will probably lead to an habitual concealment of opinion. To that class of men who are the most devoted to the good of their fellows we shall become peculiarly the objects of enmity and of aversion. Better not to have been than to live in doubt and alienation from mankind.'—Vol. ii. pp. 443, 444.

How melancholy a failure, but how true. What, then, shall we say of one who puts forth all these doubts and uncertainties—who does not wait till he can see his own way, or suggest any helps, or offer any safe resting-place for others, but publishes his own difficulties, and with all the skill, and ability, and genius that he possesses, writes in such a way as is peculiarly calculated to unsettle the belief of others, and to destroy their faith in Holy Scripture, and the doctrines of the Church:—who stimulates them to this very inquiry, 'which is hard to all, impossible to most;' and which consequently it must be wrong for most men to attempt? How is it that he does not see that it is to be expected from the mercy and goodness of God, that some guidance and sufficient support would be provided to give that assured knowledge which investigation cannot attain to?

And this, we are told, is taking an enlarged view of revelation, of which we have another phase in the Dissertation on Natural Religion, where Mr. Jowett says:—

‘Of the many causes, the operation of which may be expected to modify “the Church of the future,” none will probably have a greater influence than our increased acquaintance with the religions of the world, and with the state of heathen countries. Not only may we hope that a door will be thus opened to the spread of true religion, it is scarcely possible that the study of the heathen world should be without its effect also on our own minds. *It is the first step in the philosophical study of revelation itself.* It seems as if in these latter days, in all that relates to man, no less than to the merely material creation, laws of nature were beginning to appear. We feel that we cannot interpret the purposes of God by narrowing them to ourselves. No one who looks at the religions of the world, stretching from east to west, through so many cycles of human history, can avoid seeing in them a sort of order and design. They are like so many steps in the education of mankind. Those countless myriads of human beings who know no other truth than that of religions coeval with the days of the Apostle, or even of Moses, are not wholly uncared for in the sight of God. Can we bear to think that they are equally with ourselves the objects of his love? To the Apostle the mystery was that of past ages, to us it is that of distant nations, so unconscious of Him, yet not the less known to Him; which are still a sort of under-world to us, not yet appearing in the light of day.

‘But it is not only the appearance of law in the religions of mankind, and the consciousness that all men everywhere are within the circle of the moral government of God, that powerfully affect us. *The parallels of heathen religions seem to alter our point of view in respect of many of the details, as they may be termed, of Christian truth.* That the most widely spread form of faith in the world has its canonical books, its councils, its controversy respecting faith and works, its incarnations, its hierarchy, its monks, its saints; and these not derived from Christianity, but of an older date, is a fact, the knowledge of which is not easily effaced from our minds. *Facts of this kind are instructive, partly because they help us to separate the accidents from the essence of the Gospel; and also because they show its adaptation to the mind of man, which is the soil in which true and false religions alike grow; the latter seeming to stand in the same relation to the former as the plant in its uncultivated state to the same plant when sown by the husbandman, which becomes a type of the kingdom of heaven.*

‘In such considerations on the nature of religion the Scripture is no longer our guide. *They go beyond the knowledge of mankind which existed in that age of the world when God was pleased to reveal himself by Apostles and Prophets.* They are not repugnant to the word of God, but independent of it. As in the application of the lessons of Scripture to our lives we comprehend also our own experience, so in the study of Divine revelation we cannot but add what we surely know from our experience of history. There are blinds which we may interpose between the world of history and the world of which religion speaks to us, mists in which we may involve and intercept both; we stumble and fall if we ignore or deny matters of fact.’
—Vol. ii. pp. 386, 387.

This passage is a fair specimen of the way in which just views and observations are combined with what looks very much like placing Christianity as one among the various forms of religion that have existed in the world; and severing from the Gospel

as an accident, and not of its essence, what it has in common with other forms of religion.

It is impossible to shut our eyes to *the consequences* of such teaching as Mr. Jowett's, on those, for instance, who as clergymen are to teach others.

The views and 'doctrines,' considered in their positive and Christian elements, are so vague that it would be impossible for them to be held by ordinary minds. In their negative character they seem to shade off into unbelief. We do not see what standing ground there is between Mr. Jowett's views and the notion that the Christian religion is a temporary form of religion, introduced by God like the Jewish, as suited to the then state of the world, but now to be superseded by superior enlightenment, by increased knowledge of nature, and the advancement of the general moral sense by civilization. Unhappily our own country at this time does not give us much ground to anticipate any advance in this direction. But leaving these considerations, and taking docile minds who ask, What am I to believe—so unsubstantial are the forms of truth, if truth they be, that an ordinary mind could not grasp them? Mr. Jowett says: 'There are some minds to whom it would be impossible 'to conceive of the relation of God to the world, under any more 'abstract form,' than that in which He is represented in the arguments from First and final Causes. We ask, how many minds are there who would be able to conceive of any religious truth in the subtle and abstract form in which it is represented by Mr. Jowett? The writings of Apostles, on which they have hitherto rested, as most certainly true, are represented as full of mistaken notions—and what have they left? They may well exclaim, 'You have taken away my God!' The 'idols of the temple' are the forms whereby God Himself has vouchsafed to aid His poor weak creatures in the knowledge of divine things. The Gospel is distinctively preached 'to the poor:' and the need of the poor is shown by the very fact that mankind have everywhere 'filled up the desire of their eyes by 'imagining an outward form (of doctrine, it may be), instead of 'resting in higher and unseen objects of faith.' (Vol. ii. p. 475.) The writer is speaking here of the doctrine of the Atonement, of our idolatrously believing that 'He was the sacrifice for the sins of men,' instead of resting in the general notion that He 'performed the greatest act that ever was done in the world.' (Vol. ii. p. 475.) What doctrine is there which may not be eliminated by the same process as that by which Mr. Jowett has eliminated the Atonement; as belonging to the accidents of the essence of the Gospel—to the form, not the substance—as

the generally received opinion of the time, which could not but influence Apostles as well as others?

What is to become of the Christianity of the great mass of our fellow-creatures? What is the Christianity we are to preach to the heathen? What is to be the teaching of such a person, were he a clergyman ministering in an ordinary English parish, with but few intellectual hearers? What is he to say to his people about Christian doctrines? That they have believed cunningly devised myths?—which were, in fact, to make them simple unbelievers—or is he to preach and teach the Christian doctrines as commonly received, on the ground that it is good for the people, though he believes it not? It is the people who compel the priests to liquefy the blood of S. Januarius. In what can this end but heartless unbelief? Men cannot go on always preaching vaguely and indefinitely, decking out the cold doctrine of Unitarianism in the terminology of Evangelicism, and so-called Spirituality, uttering unbelief in religious language and a tone of earnestness. The time must come when Englishmen will ask their teachers, What they do believe? and the answer must be, That they do not know.

NOTICES.

THE spread of neology is not an unmixed evil. It makes us feel the large extent of common ground between ourselves and some from whom we are at times compelled to differ. Among books calculated to call forth such sentiments, we may mention, with great pleasure, one by the biographer of Mr. Bickersteth, Mr. T. R. Birks, entitled 'The Difficulties of Belief in connexion with the Creation and the Fall.' (Macmillan.) Without binding ourselves to the immediate acceptance of every position in this interesting little volume, we may yet express our hearty approbation of its tone. Mr. Birks' suggestions may occasionally seem bold, but they are very ably reasoned out, and never, we think, pass the limits of a reverent and Christian philosophy. We fancy that something might be said upon the argument in pp. 94, 95, in favour of the common view. The sin of the rebel angels was (unlike that of Adam) committed with a resolute, unrepenting will, with no excuse of an external tempter, and in the immediate presence and full fruition of God's glory. And while we agree with Mr. Birks in reproving all such denunciations of traducianism as he has quoted in p. 162, and admit the force of much that he has urged on its behalf, we think that he has in turn spoken almost too strongly the other way. But these points do not affect our general verdict.

The Rev. J. Penrose, who was Bampton Lecturer at Oxford so long ago as 1808, has produced a volume concerning natural and revealed religion, which he entitles 'Faith and Practice.' It shows that the writer still retains great mental vigour, can make good use of his classic stores, and keep *au courant* with the scientific and historical literature of the day. But we must add with regret that his language respecting the central verity of the Christian Faith, the Incarnation, does not sound to our ears safe or satisfactory.

'Dorothy: a Tale,' (J. W. Parker,) is of a high range of excellence; not the less so because it recalls several of our favourites. Dorothy herself is a sort of Christian Die Vernon; in some of the Selby family we are reminded of Miss Burney; and Miss Young's manner of bringing out character by long and very domestic conversations is not so much imitated as acquired by this writer. There are delicate shades and *nuances* which lady writers alone can attain; and though their writings generally display the laboured and repeated stippling which is required to produce effect, the effect is produced. For plot, generally speaking, and invention, they have not sufficient sinew; but in telling and distinct conception of a single character, and illustration of it by minute touches, they are unequalled. We class this tale very high in its display of artistic powers.

If, which is not our case, any are persuaded that the Psalms can be translated into English verse, Archdeacon Churton's 'Cleveland Psalter,'

perhaps the very best among the praiseworthy attempts to do a thing, by the nature of language, impossible, constitutes their best argument. To such, a selection from it, in a cheap form, published by J. H. Parker, will be a valuable gift.

Mr. James Anderson's solid and comprehensive 'History of the Colonial Church,' (Rivingtons,) has reached its third volume. The present instalment is chiefly concerned with the New England Church, the fortunes of which are brought down to the inauguration of the Anglo-American Episcopate. Although we cannot award to its author much praise, either for style or arrangement, and though with him the historical muse eschews any lofty flight, we are glad to say that a conscientious examination of documents, and a careful and candid estimate of facts, are always to be found in Mr. Anderson's volumes. A writer who is never betrayed into enthusiasm, and who does not feel strongly enough to become a partisan, is generally to be trusted in his facts. Of these Mr. Anderson is full, not lucidly arranged, or always, as we think, apprehended in their full significance. But they are there. We must say for Mr. Anderson, that the leaden atmosphere of the times of which he writes, the eighteenth century, very possibly exerts its influence over his pages; but there are few indications that the annalist feels that there are influences at work under this dull crust ready in the fulness of time to burst out into a bright and living flame.

Mr. Jelf's edition of the 'Ethics' (J. H. Parker) strikes us as being rather below the mark of the Oxford study of Aristotle. It is certainly *in usum Tironum*, and, in our judgment, of such *Tirones* as are not likely to profit by this or any other system of annotation. Wherever, as far as we can see, Mr. Jelf is right, he is something less than commonplace; and not unusually when he is original he is wrong. His notes are neither scholarly nor philosophical; and, on the whole, they look very much like the first crude marginal scribblings of an undergraduate in his first term.

'Church Poetry.' (Mozley.) This simple and unambitious collection, remarkable for its uniformity of tone, and for the fact that it has revived the knowledge of many of our Elizabethan writers, is to be congratulated on attaining its fourth edition. It is a nice school-book and gift-book.

The immediate motive which has prompted Mr. Singer to publish his new edition of 'Shakspeare' (Bell & Daldy) is to be found in Mr. Collier's famous folio. Strictly speaking, the present text is only the republication of an old edition, undertaken by him in connexion with Whittingham of Chiswick many years ago: but Mr. Singer's veteran reputation was stimulated by Mr. Collier's adventurous pretender. Probably the real text of Shakspeare is incapable of recovery; or, still more probably, even in Shakspeare's own time it was not settled. The author's own copies might have varied, and, as he was constantly recasting his thoughts, did vary. Much of it, in old and uncritical times, depended on the scrupulousness or licence of actors and copyists. The author certainly did but little to secure an authorized text. The quartos look more authoritative than any

later copies; but for half the plays we have only, a book for all critical purposes about the most worthless in existence, the first folio. In this state of things, Shakspeare has been the common prey of conjectural editors. The sticklers for the first folio are refuted by the patent worthlessness of their authority; the conjecturalists, by the fact that they are only conjecturalists. In this state of things, an editor who simply exhibits good sense and modesty, and is tolerably well versed in contemporaneous literature, stands the best chance—for, after all, it is only a chance—of being right. These qualifications Mr. Singer possesses in an eminent degree. He is sober, unaffected, judicious; and he has produced an edition portable, cheap, and singularly unencumbered with critical impertinences. The labours of his coadjutor Mr. Watkiss, who furnishes introductions to each play, and a biography of Shakspeare, are remarkably stupid, yet very pretentious. We should recommend Mr. Singer, in a future edition, which we hope to welcome, to get rid of this nonsense. If we are to have excurses and introductions, Knight's are the best.

Mr. Nugee, who in a practical work has shown an appreciation so keen of the wants of women in the work of penitentiaries, has earned the right to make the female character an especial subject of illustration and instruction. In his 'Holy Women of the Gospel,' (Masters,) we recognise warmth of style, a sound grasp of doctrine, facility of illustration, and warnings warm alike and practical.

A series of 'Lent Lectures' (Masters) on death-bed warnings, by the same writer, and in some respects a companion volume, strikes us as having attained the right pitch—not enthusiastic, but warm and affectionate.

'A Concise View of the Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration,' by Mr. W. H. Hicks, (Masters,) really contains a great deal of matter. It is too closely reasoned for a tract, and too condensed for a treatise, but is a useful syllabus of the subject.

A noble edition of Adams' Allegories, (Rivingtons,) designed for a Christmas book, reached us too late to be acknowledged last quarter. Some accident, we believe, delayed its publication; but it is an edition of no temporary value or purpose. It enshrines what is a household book in Church families, in a suitable casket. The engravings on wood are among the best among many competitors. With the landscapes we were especially satisfied: the distance and atmospheric effects are quite charming. A pleasant memoir of the respected writer is prefixed.

Another Christmas book is Mr. Kingsley's 'Heroes.' (Macmillan.) We like it much better than his prejudiced, one-sided, affected, yet often powerful, 'Westward Ho!' In the 'Heroes,' Mr. Kingsley relates some of the old and better Greek myths, in the form of children's stories, with considerable taste and good feeling, and always with great power of language. But how is it that, in this writer, one always feels that he is condescending? There are some writers of the day—Mr. Kingsley among them—who say good things and true things, but have a very provoking way of dealing out instruction. They are our betters and superiors, much more learned, and kind, and good than ourselves. But they know it—and somehow we find

out that they know it—and, 'still worse, let us feel that they know it, and wish us to know it. There is a mistake somewhere. By the way, Mr. Kingsley should not publish his drawings. They are very well for an amateur, and they show that he has seen Flaxman and Hope's Costumes; but such gawky scarecrows ought not to parade their skinny nakedness to the public. A sense of the ludicrous Mr. Kingsley has yet to add to his accomplishments.

Mr. Ford having completed his body of 'Annotations on the Gospels,' has followed it up by a 'Commentary on the Acts.' (Masters.) For variety and profuseness, this collection stands almost without a rival; but its very exuberance of illustration from writers of every age, sentiment, character and tone is distracting. Prose and verse, exegesis and illustration, practical and critical, all is here. The effect is, of course, that of a commonplace book, interesting and curious rather than systematic. Mr. Ford seems to have read many of the later Latin poets—and very bad poets many of them were—but there is a pleasing tone of piety in the extracts brought before us by Mr. Ford, which may, perhaps, send students as enterprising as himself to Haeftenus, Selneccerus, and Graswinkelius, with whom—if editors can be ignorant of anything—we must profess that we make our first acquaintance in this curious volume.

Two or three Hymnals have reached us. We cannot think them so superior to any extant collection as to justify their publication. One, a 'Hymn Book for the Services, &c., and for private reading,' (J. W. Parker,) announces a mistake *in limine*, 'Hymns for private reading.' The compilers alter and add to extant compositions, often, we think, without reason, sometimes against it.—'A Hymnal for the use of Christ Church, St. Pancras,' by its excellent incumbent, does not compel us to reverse our judgment on the undesirableness of increasing these competing manuals.—After many trials, we have selected one by our own publisher, 'A Hymnal for use in the English Church,' (Mozley,) the compiler of which is unknown to us, but which answers every purpose, and is full and faithful.

In several and important matters, we suspect a divergence between Mr. Gurney, of Marylebone, and ourselves; but, in a volume of 'Sermons on Old Testament Histories,' (Rivingtons,) recently printed by him, we observe so much good sense, real feeling, entire earnest honesty, and application of Scripture to the sort of life in which we live, that we desire to mark it as a very exceptional volume. It is far beyond the run of collections of Sermons.

On a previous occasion, and in the early part of the Series, we spoke well of 'Practical Sermons, chiefly on the Characters of the Old Testament,' (Masters.) This verdict we desire to recal. Some of the Sermons are good; but what shall we say of a writer like this? His subject is the faith of Abraham:—'He who adds to his creed his own correlative practice, and leaves, against the judgment, a Christian life as the apodosis of a Christian faith, is like the child who sows myrtle seeds in the form of the letters of his name, which every warm ray of sunshine, and every passing shower from the sky cherishes,' &c. &c. (p. 270.)

Classical Scholarship and Classical Learning.' (Deighton.) By Dr. Aldson. *O si sic omnia*. Here is a volume replete with good sense,

and creditable to the feeling and scholarship of the writer: creditable to the University which in so many ways Dr. Donaldson adorns, and creditable to his affectionate reverence for his academical mother. The author cannot, of course, quite avoid his pet subject of Scriptural interpretation, and he treats it after his own regrettable fashion. But the volume, as a whole, is one which merits a very cordial welcome from all to whom English scholarship is dear.

After murdering Horace, Mr. F. W. Newman has committed a violent attack on Homer, and we fear meditates running a-muck 'with every serious Greek poet, except Pindar.' This is serious; and much to our annoyance, we fear that we are slightly responsible for his 'Iliad of Homer, faithfully translated into unrhymed English metre.' (Walcott and Maberly.) In noticing his Horace, we happened to say that Homer had been well represented in ballad metre by Maginn. Mr. Newman eagerly caught the hint, and careless of Maginn, plunges into an *à priori* investigation of what sort of ballad metre he could 'do' Homer into. After a great many trials, he falls into the conclusion that, the 'Long metre of our Hymn-Books' most suits the genius of Homer; and then, with admirable consistency, translates him into the metre of,

'For the king hath hired the horned fiend
For twenty maravedies,
And there he goes, with hoofs for toes,
To terrify the ladies;'

which Lockhart prints in two lines, and which, as we have been reminded, is familiar to the world as,

'A captain bold in Halifax,
Who lived in country quarters.'

Mr. Newman, as a pre-requisite for reproducing Homer, remarks that the metre 'must be fundamentally musical and popular,' 'not without a tendency to degenerate into doggerel.' This last condition of the auto-heroic and auto-Homeric the present translator has fully attained; of the 'fundamentally musical and popular' we shall produce specimens. Further, and we are not going to dispute it, Mr. Newman argues that Homer should appear in a certain archaic attire, 'as much Saxo-Norman as possible,' whatever that dialect may be; aware that in adopting it 'the translator ought to be quaint, and not to be grotesque.' In all this, which we are not disputing, Mr. Newman has, we think, got hold of true principles, although we do not agree with him that rhyme is to be proscribed. We think that in a translation of Homer rhyme is to be retained, not because it is an equivalent, but because it is the only possible substitute, for the matchless melody of the hexameter. It does something in the way of satisfying the ear. Mr. Newman has hit the bull's eye, when he says that Walter Scott was the man to translate Homer,—and is right when he says that the principle to be observed in rendering an ancient poet is 'to use little strange diction, but to impart elevation by the mode of combining known words.' We part company, however, with Mr. Newman, when, in allusion to our own strictures on his Horace, he pronounces that it is enough 'to aim at a likeness of moral genius,' while to attempt to produce 'a near likeness or analogy to the metrical form of the original, is a secondary

question.' And, in conclusion, he thinks, and we think with him, that enough is done if a translator 'imparts to the English reader the means of judging for himself what the true Homer really was.' Here, then, we pause, to see how Mr. Newman fulfils his own ideal of a translation of Homer. The Greek Homer was a writer of wonderful variety of strength, richness, and smoothness: his verse is an instrument flowing, 'easy, harmonious, flexible; his syntax is natural, simple, and intelligent; his natural sense of melody refined and constant. In Mr. Newman we find 'the long resounding line' of 'the blind old man' transformed into quick, jerky, broken pants—we find his language, which was a whole, and uniform, and unisonous, reproduced in a piebald dialect, half slang, half Chatterton. Neither, then, in melody or in language does Mr. Newman reproduce Homer. Especially in the former respect does Mr. Newman lack the faculty of translating any poet. He is utterly insensible of metrical beauty. He has no ear. He is apparently a hard-headed, cold, unimpassioned, person; without the slightest requisite of the poet or orator. He has very great powers, as he has shown in other departments of literature; but to have printed this book, and not to have seen its ludicrous absurdity, its absolute contradiction to everything Homeric,—character, melody, *lexis*, *ethos*, manners,—only shows that Mr. Newman utterly mistakes his vocation. He is affected and stiff when he thinks that he is quaint; barbarous in his attempts after the antiquated: when he is literal, he is generally unintelligible: and in striving to reproduce the Homeric feeling, he substitutes Northern mythology for Hellenic, and worn out Scotticisms and Teutonicisms for those of Homer. This is remarkable in the stereotyped epithets; thus that mysterious word *δαιμόνιος*, we believe, Mr. Newman, invariably renders 'elf-possessed.' Zeus, A. 561, addresses Here,—(by the way, how can Mr. Newman, who writes in his preface so sensibly on this point, talk in his poem about Juno?)—as 'O elf-possessed wight, who suspectest and discernest.' Now, to say nothing of the utter confusion between the Teutonic elfs and the Oriental demons and afrits, the word *δαιμόνιος* is utterly untranslatable, as Damm remarks. In scarcely two passages of Homer has it the same meaning: in no language has it any one equivalent; and in no Homeric passage does 'elf-possessed,' fully or nearly represent it. 'Εὐκνήμιδες is 'dapper-greav'd'—in no language, and at no period of it, did 'dapper' convey the sense of *εὖ* or *καλός*. *Κορυθαίολος* 'Εκτώρ is 'Hector with helm of motley work.' We are at issue with Mr. Newman as to the sense of the word. *Χαλκοχιτώνες* is brazen-cloaked: *χαλκός* not being brass, nor *χιτών* a cloak. But here are some single lines taken at random: observe their 'fundamental melody':—

- καὶ μὴν οἱ τότε γ' εἰς ἀγορὴν ἴσαν, οὐνεκ' Ἀχιλλεύς,
 ' Now even then to mote came forth enheartened, sith Achilles.'
 καὶ τὰ γ' Ἀθηναίῃ ληϊτίδι διός Ὀδυσσεύς
 ὕψος' ἀνέσχεθε χειρὶ, καὶ εὐχόμενος ἔπος ἤνδα'
 ' . . . but there aloft divine Ulysses raising
 ' Unto Athene, booty-driving, spake his vow and worship.'
 εἰ δέ κ' Ἀλεξανδρὸν κτείνῃ, ξανθὸς Μενέλαος,
 ' But if the auburn Menelaus slaughter Alexander.'

This is how Zeus, in the 'Council of the Heavens,' discourseth :—
 ' To Menelaus, loved by Ares, victory hath fallen ;
 ' Our part it is to ponder, how may these affairs be ended,
 ' Whether pernicious war to rouse and the grim cry of battle,
 ' Listeth, or amity betwixt the combatants to order.
 ' But if, to all of us aloft, pleasant it be and canny,
 ' Let folk still throng within the wall of Priam's royal city.'

xviii. 360.—

' To Jove thus Juno made address, his sister and his consort :
 ' O Son of Saturn! grim and dire, what saying hast thou blurted?
 ' Man verily, I trow, for man, who mortal is of fabric,
 ' Nor kenneth counsel like to me, is wont his will to accomplish.
 ' How then should I, who claim to be of goddesses the chiefest,
 ' (Eldest by birth and rank alsò,) for that I hold the title,' &c.

Our readers will remember—who can ever forget?—the immortal close of the eighth book :—*ὧς δ' ἔν' οὐρανῷ ἄστροα κ. τ. λ.* This is Mr. F. Newman's notion of it; and it is a favourable specimen :—

' And as around the shining moon the little stars of heaven,
 (*ἄστροα* being not little stars, but constellations)
 ' Glisten with radiance distinct, when all the sky is breathless,
 ' And every lofty peak is shown, and headlong edge and forest,
 ' And from behind the cloven blue uncounted heaven bursteth,
 ' And all above thee seemeth stars, and joyful is the shepherd :
 ' So many fires,' &c.

We remark that Mr. Newman denies that the *Odyssey* is by the poet of the *Iliad*.

From Mr. Van Voorst we have received an elegant and portable 'Hand-book to the Aquarium,' by Mr. Gosse. These cheap and useful appendages to the conservatory and sitting-room bid fair to supersede the useless vase of gold-fish. They are very manageable, as well as beautiful.

We are not going to disturb—but rather choose to co-operate with and confirm—the unanimous voice of approval which has welcomed Mr. Arthur Stanley's 'Sinai and Palestine.' (Murray) The accomplished author has done more to illustrate the geography of Scripture than any extant writer. With a keen and hearty appreciation of scenery,—which is much more in place here than in annotating on the Epistle to the Corinthians,—he is no mere landscape painter; he paints with exceeding taste and skill, but all is subordinated to an historical purpose. He shows (what was new to us) the especial and local propriety of many of the illustrations of the Sacred Narrative. As an instance, we would allude to his discussion of the local characteristics of the trans-Jordanic hills, and his parallel of Galilee to the manufacturing districts. His account of the Sinai localities is of unequalled beauty and interest. We observe that Mr. Stanley moves *sicco pede* over the topography of Jerusalem, and especially he glides lightly over the identification of the Holy Places. We agree with him in wishing that 'some competent' opponent would seriously consider Mr. Fergusson's architectural argument from the dome of the Sakkarah, which undoubtedly is calculated to 'produce a great impression.' We ask, Why are not Mr. Catherwood's

plans made public? What, in our judgment, Mr. Fergusson proves, or shows the strongest evidence for, is, not that the Dome of the Rock is the true site of the Holy Sepulchre, but that it is a Christian building, at least as early as Justinian's time.

'The Week of Darkness: a Manual of Mourners,' (Rivingtons,) is pretty, but verges on the sentimental.

'Selections from the Letters of S. Francis of Sales,' (Masters,) by Mr. C. W. Bagot, has been adapted for English use. It is a very useful monograph of spiritual advice in the common concerns and exigencies of life.

'Sketches on Italy,' (Hamilton, Adams & Co.) is anonymous. It is the production of an Italian liberal of the redder type, and is ushered into the world under Sir C. Eardley's *imprimatur*. For what facts it contains of the recent revolutionary history of the Italian peninsula, we are grateful. We can say nothing for the writer's spirit. He hopes that peace will lead to an Italian unity under Victor Emmanuel, with a suppression of the Papacy.

Mr. Cleveland Coxe, the well-known American Churchman and poet, has just published a small volume, his 'Impressions of England; or, Sketches of English Scenery and Society, gathered during the Exhibition year,' (New York, Dana,) which had already appeared in the columns of the Church Journal. Interesting as the work is, it bears somewhat too evidently the marks of its origin in its collected form. It is, we should imagine, more American, so to speak, than its writer, from having had to be wound up to the tone of trans-atlantic journalism. In particular, its 'No Popery' occurs to us needlessly offensive and personal. We are no advocates, as our pages have repeatedly shown, for Romanizing; but there is no such effective help to give Rome, as to show manifestly that whenever we approach her we lose our temper, and let go our impartiality; *e.g.* Mr. Coxe should have recollected that his book would, in all probability, be read in England, and not have reprinted it with his exaggerated picture of the 'almost maniacal visage' of 'poor fallen Newman,' whom he heard preaching at the Oratory, Birmingham. Full, moreover, of the Papal aggression mania, which was in full blaze during his visit; he lays it down roundly that we ought to have answered the famous brief by a British fleet off Civita Vecchia, calling on the Pope to annul the act,—at all hazards to the peace of Europe,—observing, 'Alas! for the extinction of the England of 1588.' It seems to us that arming a fleet for such an object would have been an exact copy, not of the England, but of the Spain of 1588. These passages are, however, few and far between in Mr. Coxe's volume. The staple of his work is healthy and sound, and if it succeeds in making any section of his countrymen form a different notion of the monarchical institutions, the aristocracy, and the Established Church of England, to that which they are accustomed to hear from orators of the stump, it will be a most useful, as it is an interesting, work.

third of the 'Manuals for Theological Students,' now publishing by Millan, has reached us. It is by Mr. Hardwick, the Christian Advo-

cate; and is his second part of Church History, embracing the Reformation period. We cannot award it higher praise than to say that it equals its predecessor on the mediæval period. If it has a fault, we should say that the history of the Roman obedience was, perhaps unavoidably, treated on a different scale. It is not so full as the chapters on the German communions. The work is a manual, and not a history; had it made the latter claim, we should perhaps have objected to its geographical division. The whole volume displays a profusion of learning, great accuracy and honesty in collecting and collating authorities, a clear as well as concise narrative of events, and, which is the chief value of the volume, it always refers to the authorities on which the history is grounded; and while it is impartial about motives and causes it preserves the critical mean between indifference and partizanship.

'Aird's Poems,' (Blackwood,) have, we believe, established a reputation. The smaller Idyllic poems are fresh and pleasing. We could not master the longer ones.

A full and elaborate 'Book of Family Prayer,' (Bell & Daldy,) has reached us. The only fault we can find with it is its price. Much of the prefatory matter might be retrenched, and a less extensive style of printing be adopted. The manual would then, as it fully deserves, meet with general acceptance.

'The Whole Evidence against the Claims of the Roman Church,' by Mr. Sanderson Robins, (Longman,) is not exactly that which it pretends to be, but is nevertheless a full, and generally speaking fair, controversial manual. To say that it recalls the old school of anti-Roman writers of Laud and Barrow is high praise, and we can conscientiously award it.

Another contribution from Trinity College, Dublin, reminds us that Mr. Lee and Dr. Todd are not alone in their services to the extant and immediate necessities of the Church. Mr. James Byrne has printed 'Six Lectures delivered at the Donnellan Lecture, on Naturalism and Supernaturalism,' (Hodges, Smith, & Co.) in reply to Mr. Newman, Mr. Theodore Parker, and the sentimental theists of the day. They give us great satisfaction, not only because they are an able publication, but because they prove that among ourselves we have writers capable of work which has been done, however ably, by strangers to us, Messrs. Rogers and Isaac Taylor.

We have, on more than one occasion, recorded our dissent from the conclusion arrived at in Mr. Scudamore's 'Communion of the Laity,' (Rivingtons;) but we must express our satisfaction with the ability and temper with which he handles his subject.

Dr. Badham, a superior classical scholar, has printed an edition of Plato's 'Philebus,' (J. W. Parker,) which, in compactness of elimination and general good sense, may serve as a model for lecture-room editions.

Such as consider the late Archdeacon Hare a very great man, will be pleased to hear that an edition of his Charges, from 1843—46, is published by Macmillan. We lay them down with the conviction that he was a very honest, good man, with a considerable amount of self-reliance, which

is the euphemism for conceit, and an utter inability to understand the logical, though he could well sympathize with the moral, position of his antagonists.

Lord Arthur Hervey's 'Five Sermons on the Inspiration of Scripture,' (Macmillan,) are eclectic. As far as we can understand the accomplished author, he professes to hold both Coleridge's views and many of those against whom that eminent but very dangerous writer composed his 'Reflections of an Inquiring Spirit.' Either there is great indistinctness in Lord Arthur, or in the medium through which we see his Sermons; but we must profess our entire inability to understand what doctrine on Inspiration he holds.

The 'Influence of Christianity upon International Law' was the subject for the Hulsean Prize in 1854. The successful candidate, Mr. C. M. Kennedy, of Caius, has printed his exercise. (Macmillan.) It exhibits reading and ingenuity, and may be considered a respectable, if not superior, production.

Mr. Craik, of Christ Church, Louisville, (Hooker, Philadelphia,) has in his 'Search of Truth' presented us with the sort of discourses and manuals which the American Church finds useful in winning on the ranks of the sects by which it is surrounded. In this aspect the volume is full of interest: but it has higher merits. It is written in a readable style, and its principles are generally sound. In one place we thought Mr. Craik was writing below his convictions, when he argues that the 'Christian priesthood of the ministers of the Sanctuary only differs in degree' (p. 228) 'from that of the Christian community.'

A posthumous volume of 'Sermons, chiefly Practical,' (Bell & Daldy,) by the late Mr. Nunns, of Trinity Church, Leeds, is published under the editorship of Dr. Hook. They are sound and simple, and come up to the Editor's estimate of a 'thorough-going Church-of-England-man.'

We find in Mr. Mackreth's 'Churchwarden's Manual' (Rivingtons) much useful information compactly put together: it is small and unpretending, but contains all that is required.

'Dialogues on Universal Restitution.' (Freeman.) This is a curious book. It is anonymous, and it is intended to be a cheap and popular exposition of Mr. Maurice's views on Universalism. What strikes us in this class of writers is the extreme coolness—we had nearly said impudence—with which they flatly contradict Scripture, in an easy, jaunty, patronizing way. This writer, for example, sets out with the strongest conviction that Universalism is true. It must be true, because it ought to be true. Scripture cannot contradict it, because it is true. But Scripture does contradict it. Scripture does speak of 'the fire that shall never be quenched'—or 'unquenchable,' if the present writer prefers it, which is not *ἀσβεστος*. Scripture certainly speaks of Judas, so that 'it had been good for that man if he had not been born.' These passages come before this writer; and thus he meets them. 'Certainly,' he acknowledges, 'I cannot understand, 'if Universal Restitution be a truth, how it can be that it would have been 'well for any one if he had not been born.' (P. 145.) That is to say, in

plain English—Here, at last, is my view and Holy Scripture at direct issue. After this we must say that the pious talk with which the dialogue goes on, expressing its reverence for Scripture, and its complaints against falsifiers of the Word of God, is sheer cant and nonsense. What reverence for the Word of God can a man have, who believes that it contains a deliberately false and cruel statement of doctrine?

Mr. William Heygate's 'Evening of Life' (Masters) is an extremely grave and religious manual for aged Christians. It is a mosaic of scriptures, psalms, meditations, and instructions; and is, perhaps, the best among the many practical services which its author has rendered to the Church.

From Mr. J. David Chambers we have received 'Strictures, Legal and Historical, on Dr. Lushington's Judgment.' (Benning.) It is, as the writer claims it to be, 'a complete exposition of law and fact on the subjects in dispute.' In our judgment it is irrefragable: and we sincerely congratulate Mr. Chambers on achieving this triumph, not the least of his many services to the Church of England. Mr. Chambers combines several qualifications for the task he has undertaken. He is a good lawyer, a good churchman, and his tastes are archæological, and his studies ritual. Except in the first of these qualifications, Dr. Lushington is exactly the reverse. Unless we are much misinformed, the general feeling is that Dr. Lushington has made a mistake: the world at large does not like the tendency of the courts to substitute private partialities for law. We observe two or three misprints in Mr. Chambers' valuable work:—p. 141, Dr. Robert 'Smith' should be 'South.' Who is (p. 117) 'the Marquis of Bawden'? The inventories from the State Paper Office are not the least important contribution of Mr. Chambers to the literature of this subject.

Mr. Henry Denison, Fellow of All Souls, has translated Shakspeare's 'Julius Cæsar' into Latin. (J. H. Parker.) The Latinity is creditable; but the whole play is done into prose. Here is the result:—

'Come, Antony, and young Octavius, come,
Revenge yourselves alone on Cassius,
For Cassius is a-weary of the world;
Hated by one he loves; braved by his brother;
Check'd like a bondman,' &c.

'Veni, Antoni; veni, juvenis Octavi; vosmet de Cassio solo omnium ulciscimini; Cassium vitæ tædet. Bene dilecto odis est,' &c.

Mr. W. J. Blew's Version of 'Agamemnon the King,' (Longman,) is in every respect the antithesis of Mr. Newman's 'Homer.' Without saying that we adopt all his renderings, or see the exact relevancy of all his parallel passages, we may give him the praise of having executed a most poetical and faithful version, which reproduces for English readers, as closely as the genius of two different languages, religions, social laws, and metrical systems would admit, the masterpiece of Hellenic tragedy. In his Preface Mr. Blew shows a great range of reading, a keen sense of poetic excellence, and a scholarly appreciation of the difficulties and pleasures of his task, on achieving which with so much success, he deserves and receives our congratulations.

Mr. Parminter's 'Materials for a Grammar,' (Macmillan,) are a bold, yet we think successful, attempt to make intelligible to English readers the principles of universal grammar, but with an especial view to familiarize them with the classical elements and vocables in our composite language. We shall, perhaps, incur Mr. F. Newman's censure, who in his preface to the Homer to which we have already alluded writes strongly against purists and pedants in English grammar, if we object to Mr. Parminter's rule and syntax, p. 199:—'If the former of two substantives in apposition be an inflected genitive, the latter does not take inflection. *Ex.* "This is 'Byron's work, the poet.'" Nobody would write such a sentence; but if we were forced to it, we should, we fear, say 'poet's.' In a *sustoichia* of genders, Mr. Parminter, after Boy, Girl; Earl, Countess; &c., gives Flirt, *mas.* Jilt, *fem.* We should say that his experience of the *beau sexe* was not to be depended on. Happy man! never to have met with a female flirt, and not to be able to conceive the possibility of a male jilt!

Mr. Nind has printed an elegant little volume of translations of German poetry. Some of his pieces are hacknied: Bürgers 'Leonora,' for example. Those most difficult of songs, the *cruces* of all translators, Margaret's, in the 'Faust,' are very cleverly rendered. So is Körner's 'Sword Song.' The poems from Freiligrath and Geibel are happy innovations on the stock pieces of German anthology.

'The War and the Newspapers,' a Lecture, by Mr. Kennaway of Campden, (J. H. Parker,) is a vigorous and useful protest against the folly of being led, or misled, by the *Times*, and of the mischief which 'Our own Correspondent' has done. Much of Mr. Kennaway's matter is derived from the able and vigorous pages of the *Saturday Review*, a periodical which, at its first start, attained and keeps the highest rank among existing newspapers—though, by the way, it is not a newspaper.

A very beautiful and elaborate treatise on the world of creation revealed by the microscope is before us under the title of 'The Micrographic Dictionary.' (Van Voorst.) It is by Dr. Griffith and Professor Henfrey. It consists, first, of an Introduction descriptive of the microscope and its accompaniments, with various details to assist purchasers and experimenters; and then, in the shape of a Dictionary, it brings down the discoveries of this noble instrument to the latest time. Forty-one plates and nine hundred wood-cuts, all executed with the publisher's usual success, complete this stupendous and beautiful publication. Almost all the foreign authorities, down to the fugitive transactions of scientific societies, have been searched by the unwearied patience of the compilers; and to the anatomist, the botanist, the zoologist, and especially to the physiologist, here, in an available form and moderate compass, are stored an immense number of facts, and the results of thousands of delicate observations. Unscientific readers will be pleased with the sober tone of the inquiries, and there are few educated persons who will not profit by even a casual perusal of this handsome volume. One thing struck us in turning over its pages; which is, the state of our scientific terminology. We must say that scientific writers had better at once write in Latin than in the barbarous and abominable language now in vogue with them. It is utterly

unintelligible to the non-classical reader, and only provoking to the scholar. If we do not understand Latin, we do not understand the descriptions; if we do, they annoy us. Here are some examples:—‘*Draparnaldia*—a con-ferva common in ditches—*plumosa*. Principal filaments somewhat pinnately branched; ramelli in linear-lanceolate tufts, mostly approximated to the axis.’ ‘*Dytiscus*’—a water-beetle, we believe—‘the head is well adapted for the trophi. The labrum is transverse; the mandibles short and robust; the maxillæ are short, flat, and ciliated internally, with the lip acute; the outer lobe palpiform; the true maxillary palpi are about twice as long as the maxillæ; the mentum is transverse, with the sides produced into two lobes; the labium is short; the palpi are joined. The character of the anterior tarsi is curious, the basal joints being expanded laterally into a broad patella,’ &c. Of the *Fossombronia* we receive this lucid description, that ‘the perichæte is large, and the capsule bursts irregularly into four erose valves.’ The ‘*Lycopodium Selaginoides*’ is distinguished as having ‘oosporanges and antheridial sporanges.’ Every page of this volume, and indeed of all such scientific treatises, is treated in this language, or lack of language; and the evil has reached such a pitch, that we are bound to call the attention of the scientific world to it.

We ought long since to have mentioned as a useful and very welcome ally, Mr. J. H. Parker’s periodical, the ‘Literary Churchman,’ which in a modest form contains much learning, an excellent spirit, and sound Church principles. We can speak of it with respect and deference, when its criticisms differ from our own; and with cordial sympathy when, as is usually the case, its judgments agree with us. The ‘Literary Churchman’ is especially valuable in its foreign department.

A Brighton clergyman, Mr. E. B. Elliott, has, it appears, been running a-muck in a pamphlet, which he styles, ‘Delusion of the Tractarian Clergy as to the Validity of their Ministerial Orders shown on their own principles.’ Some of our readers may remember Ware’s ‘Foxes and Firebrands:’ its object was to show that, in the seventeenth century, it was the fashion for Romanists, especially Jesuits, to act Puritan for the purpose of vilifying and disparaging the Church of England. We never had much faith in this alleged plot. But, certainly, Mr. Elliott goes far to justify the view. He is the most complete Romanizer we know. He is exactly the man to endorse and accredit ‘the putrid fable of the Nag’s Head consecration.’ He attacks the Church of which he is a minister with Romanist weapons; only Romanists now-a-days have the decency to disavow them. Mr. Elliott has been answered by two critics, either of whom has in his way admirable qualities for administering a castigation. They are Mr. Neale, in his ‘“Tractarian Delusions” Catholic Truths,’ (Masters,) and Mr. Gresley, in his ‘Answer to Mr. Elliott.’ (Masters.) Mr. Neale replies with learning and vigorous sarcasm; Mr. Gresley, with plain common sense. Mr. Neale shows that his opponent is ignorant of all antiquity; Mr. Gresley shows that he lacks controversial and even moral honesty. Mr. Gresley proves that his opponent ought not to be an English clergyman; Mr. Neale which is superfluous, shows that he knows nothing of the subject on which he writes. In detail, Mr. Neale proves that Mr. Elliott’s assumption, that

Episcopal consecrations by less than three bishops are invalid, is false. He also proves that a layman can be raised *per saltum* to the episcopate, and that the Western chorepiscopi were true bishops. Mr. Gresley contents himself with a calm and confident reference to the formularies of the Church of England, and concludes with this pertinent question, the more stinging from its entire simplicity:—‘Why the Nonconformists professed their inability to receive the doctrine of the Church of England, and withdrew themselves from it; and why you and your friends, being of the same principles as the Nonconformists, not only find no difficulty in continuing members of the Church of England, but seem to think yourselves the only consistent members of it?’ (P. 11.)

In the Penitentiary work—a work which it is our pride and pleasure to have assisted in promoting and inaugurating—we have to record a cluster of important and deeply beautiful productions. 1. The Bishop of Oxford’s touching and eloquent Sermon, ‘Christ the Healer,’ (Masters,) preached at the opening of the noble buildings at Clewer. This great and successful work is too solemn for us to enlarge upon in this place. We can only commit it to the prayers and exertions of the Church. It is preeminent among the signs which assure us of God’s continued presence. 2. ‘Mercy for the Fallen,’ (Masters,) is the title of two Sermons preached in behalf of this noble Institution by its founder, Mr. T. T. Carter, who has also favoured us and the Church with the second edition of ‘The First Five Years of the House of Mercy, Clewer,’ (Masters,) [an affecting and encouraging history of the work, its difficulties, its successes, and its future necessities.

Mr. Carter has also published ‘Inward Life in Outward Troubles,’ (Masters,) a single Sermon, preached at S. Matthias, Stoke Newington, the beautiful services at which deserve, and command, the affection of those who are privileged to attend them.

From the Burntisland, or rather Pitsligo, Press, a valuable undertaking by Mr. George Forbes, which rivals the labours of the Abbé Migne, we have to acknowledge two very important *fasciculi*. They are the first-fruits of considerable works, which we commend to the patronage and support of the Church. 1. The first part of a critical edition of ‘S. Gregory Nyssen.’ The accomplished Editor has examined some unexplored MSS. and is executing, in obscurity, a work which the English Universities ought gladly to undertake. 2. Mr. Neale, in conjunction with Mr. Forbes, is publishing an important revision of the ‘Gallican Liturgies, illustrated by a comparison of the Roman, Ambrosian, and Mozarabic Rites’: that is to say, he is absorbing, enlarging, and correcting the labours on this subject of Bona, Muratori and Mabillon. The edition promises to be beautiful in typography, and correct and critical in its text.

The ‘New Oxford School’ is receiving that attention and refutation on the spot which its serious character demands. Besides the two full and admirable Sermons from Dr. Pusey, which we mentioned with respect in our last number, Mr. Jowett’s unhappy speculations—to which we elsewhere devote a fuller notice—have been commented on successively in the University pulpit, by—1. Dr. Goulburn, in ‘The Goodness and Severity

of God as manifested in the Atonement,' (J. H. Parker;) 2. Mr. Baring, in 'Christ's Death a Propitiatory Sacrifice,' (J. H. Parker;) 3. Mr. Bernard, a select preacher, in two Sermons, 'The Exclusion of Wisdom, and Offences in Christ,' (Hatchard;) 4. Professor Heurtley, 'The Doctrine of the Atonement,' (J. H. Parker;) 5. and by Professor Hussey, 'The Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ,' in an Ordination Sermon, delivered at Christmas. In Mr. Baring's Sermon we select the useful caution 'not to take an opponent's statement of what is the true and orthodox doctrine.' Dr. Goulburn's exhibits a deeper view of the subject, especially on the expiatory nature of the sacrifice. Mr. Bernard's two able discourses rather break up the preliminary ground, and define the office of the reason in judging of revealed truth. Dr. Heurtley's is full and especially satisfactory on the point of reconciliation; while Professor Hussey's, being addressed to the candidates for ordination, presents a condensed and valuable syllabus of the subject. Surely this crisis is one which demands the Regius Professor of Divinity to descend into the arena: although Oxford has done much in protesting against this last assault on the Faith, we must admit that even more remains to do.

Without committing ourselves to the Sabbatarian movement, we may remark, that the case of Sunday trading is entirely independent of those other and perplexed questions which involve the precise relations of Christian festivals to the ceremonial or patriarchal law, or which define, or fail to define, the consistency of recreation with Christian rest. Further, it may be held that an Anti-Puritan observance of the Sunday is quite compatible with the very strictest legislation against Sunday trading. The disciples of Bramhall and Laud may agree with Lord Shaftesbury here. Whatever freedom may attend the Sunday, it is not a freedom to devote the day to business and trade. The writer of 'Sunday Trading in London,' (Rivingtons,) himself an employer on a large scale, has done good service in this his second publication, in what we deem to be the cause of justice. He and his friends had done well had they taken the pains to show that the Sunday Bill of last year, defeated by the Hyde Park outrages, was designed for a protection to the middle classes, rather than an oppression of the lower ones.

We must acknowledge, with especial commendation, Mr. Alford's 'Two Letters to John Sperling, Esq., on the Lord's Day Question.' (Rivingtons.) They are in reply to the 'personal vituperation of that mendacious and unprincipled journal, the *Record*,' of which Mr. Alford thus speaks:—

'It were much to be wished, that men of high standing and undoubted piety in that portion of the Church which the *Record* professes to represent would take courage, and put forth a manly expression of their feelings with regard to it. Every where, there seems to be but one opinion as to the unchristian character of the paper. Many of the best of those who agree with it in theological sentiments disclaim all sanction of it, and some such will not even allow it in their houses. In private society, they do not scruple to speak freely their estimate of its character. But let such persons ask themselves, whether something more than this be not required of them as faithful servants of Christ. While they are secretly complain-

'ing, the wretched journal is going on its mischievous course. The bold 'large-print lie, followed by the insufficient small-print apology, which is 'again neutralized by the subsequently-repeated lie—the shameless attributing of opinions and motives known to be false, and when remonstrated 'with, the hypocritical expression of extreme caution not to be personal—the pertinacious marring of every projected good work of every kind and 'from every quarter, except "what is framed by themselves and hammered 'on their own anvil,"—these, and a long list of similar violations of truth 'and charity, are the "fruits by which" this pretender to the censorship of 'the Christian world "may be known." It is the deliberate conviction of 'the writer,—founded on long experience of hearts embittered, love between 'good men chilled, ungrounded suspicions sown, and mischief occasioned 'by slander and falsehood in parishes and families,—that this paper has 'done and is doing more to hinder the spread among us of "the mind which 'was in Christ," and the progress of His work, than all the infidel publications of our time put together. Their evil influence, sad as it is, affects, 'for the most part, those without: *its* evil influence is exerted over those 'who are Christians in heart and life. *They* are enemies prowling round 'the fold: while it is a wolf in sheep's clothing, admitted and cherished 'within. In the name of our common Christianity, let some such protest 'be made by the Evangelical party,—or, which would be the far preferable 'alternative, let the paper, retaining its present doctrines and predilections, 'cease from its present practices, and learn to write in truth and love.'—Pp. 8, 9.

Dr. Heurtley's Sermon 'On the Lord's Day,' (J. H. Parker,) may be carefully read by all who are desirous to know all that may be said on a single, and somewhat confined, aspect of the subject.

The 'Three-fold San-Tsze-King, or the Trilateral Classic of China,' (Nutt,) is another of Mr. Malan's useful but tenebrose publications on Chinese literature. It consists of three primers: 1. The ordinary Chinese First Book. 2. The Missionaries' Christian Primer. 3. The Primer of Tae-ping-wang, the insurgent chief, who, it is well known, has adopted a sort of Christianity into his pretensions. As far as we can judge, he is following the policy of the emperor Akhbar, who tried an ingenious eclecticism of the same sort, hoping to fuse Mahometans, Buddhists, and Christians into a useful political and social whole, by admitting the correlative claims of each religion to a divine mission. The rebel chief, however, claims to be a prophet.

We have, on a previous occasion, called attention to the labours of Mr. W. G. Jervis, of Kingston, who has taken up the subject of clerical poverty. His scheme is to impose a per-centage on all ecclesiastical incomes. Without going to this extent, we think there is much in the plan—how does it prosper?—which was launched last year, of a Clerical Benefit Society. In a second publication which has reached us, 'The Poor Condition of the Clergy, and the Causes, considered,' (Hatchard,) Mr. Jervis pursues the subject. He had, perhaps, done well to have confined himself to the single point of the extant destitution of the clergy, without entering into historical disquisitions; but we can recommend his pamphlet with confidence.

The subject is especially interesting to ourselves, because we were among the first to call attention to the fiscal burthens of the clergy, and not altogether without success—for the subject is coming before Parliament. Enough cannot be said, however painful it is to say it, of the increasing, daily increasing poverty of the clergy. It threatens to be a social evil of general incidence. If the Church is to be preserved at all, much larger exertions must be made, and all false delicacy must be laid aside. In the richest diocese in the world, that of London, the Diocesan Society for the Relief of the Clergy Widows cannot, with every exertion, obtain an income of 300*l.* per annum from regular subscriptions. Scarcely a single layman in London subscribes to the fund at all. The alms doled out to the widows and orphan daughters of those who in holy things have ministered even in the metropolitan cathedral, are at the rate of 20*l.* a-year. Another sad evidence of clerical destitution is to be found in the fact that there is a society, besieged by eager applicants, for supplying the families of the clergy with cast-off clothes. We are assured by one officially connected with the Clergy Widows' Society in the diocese of London, that in prosecuting a recent appeal in its behalf, in one of the largest suburban parishes, with a staff of some twenty-five clergymen, he did not receive a single shilling from the whole clerical body. Not one could give even a mite to the widows and orphans of his brethren, so severe was the pinch upon melting incomes by war, general distress, and the failure of income by the suppression of parochial burying-grounds.

Mr. Skinner, of S. Barnabas, has very naturally felt himself called upon to bring Dr. Lushington's Judgment before his people, so painfully and personally interested in it. In a Sermon, 'Why do we prize Externals in the Service of God?' (Hayes,) he defends, with sobriety and earnestness, the usages which it is attempted to destroy and prohibit.

Partly in connexion with this subject, we observe the reprint of two warm and impressive Sermons, on 'Choral Services and Ritual Observances,' (Masters,) by Mr. Flower, of Crawley. He has prefixed a very useful letter to his parishioners on the present troubled state of the Church, and on secessions to Rome. Mr. Flower always writes with good sense; and we are assured that he is engaged, heart as well as pen, in the Church's work.

Mr. Alfred Lee has, in the form of an 'Address to the Churchmen of England on the Increase in the Episcopate,' (Masters,) done good service to a cause in which, if common sense and common honesty were to prevail, there would be no place nor occasion for appeals. However, before we can enter very heartily into the plea for more Bishops, we must get some guarantee against an enlarged hierarchy of the Villiers type.—On the same subject we observe a series of Tracts, of which the first two numbers have reached us:—1. 'More Bishops: Why we want them?' 2. 'More Bishops: How shall we pay them?' (Hone & Co.)

'Service, not Rule, the Work of the Ministry,' (Skeffington,) is an Ordination Sermon, preached at Lincoln, by Mr. Henry Mackenzie, formerly of S. Martin's in the Fields. It aims at and attains a cautious mediocrity.

Mr. Clement Moody, as the hard-working, ill-paid, and care-distracted Vicar of Newcastle, may be excused if he writes with more vigour than delicacy on the Cathedral question. His pamphlet, 'Our Cathedrals: Are they to be Reformed or Abolished?' (Longman,) would have pleased us better had it not been addressed to Sir George Grey. We sincerely believe that the present Government is impressed with the duty and policy of destroying the Church of England: the time, therefore, has passed to urge remonstrances in this quarter. We are not disposed to attach the canonries to any benefices; but we certainly sympathize with Mr. Moody's indignation, in the face of the spiritual destitution of Newcastle, at seeing the surplus revenues of the diocese of Durham diverted into other than Durham needs.

We should, were it worth while, have one or two things to say on Dean Bower's general opinions on Church matters—especially should we reprobate his very singular view of the English Reformers as 'those wise and able men who were mainly instrumental in working out the people's will in regard to needful changes from the Romish Ritual;' but in his general statement, however hesitatingly adopted by him, that 'Open Churches, with endowments, are preferable to pew-rents'—the title which he has chosen for an occasional Sermon, (Longman,) preached at Manchester—we are cordially agreed. The very worst feature of the otherwise objectionable measure on Church Rates now awaiting, we trust, its rejection by Parliament, is its scandalous provision for saddling, if remotely, yet certainly, all our free parish churches with seat-rents.

It was, perhaps, scarcely worth while in Chancellor Harington to transcribe his discussion on 'Pope Pius IV. and the Book of Common Prayer,' (Exeter: Holden,) from the congenial pages of 'Notes and Queries.' If we are asked to arbitrate between Mr. Harington and T. L. we should say that the Chancellor has the advantage in precision, accuracy, and book-work, and, in at least one place, he certainly convicts his opponent of great slovenliness in quoting Antonio de Dominis. But, at the same time, the whole story of the Pope's alleged offer is so utterly improbable in itself, Ware was so addicted to retailing gossip and nonsense, and, *pace tanti viri*, Sir E. Coke was so very unscrupulous a person, that we conclude against either of Mr. Harington's alleged authorities for the story; and so far we agree substantially with T. L. We disagree entirely with him as to the grounds of the story. We suspect it to be rather an Anglican fiction designed to conciliate recusants, than 'a Popish invention to create division among Protestants.'

'Remarks on the Legal and other Studies of the University of Oxford,' (J. H. Parker,) by Mr. C. Neate, of Oriel, might much more appropriately be styled, *Grumbling de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*. Undoubtedly one who finds fault with everything, must find fault with many abuses and mistakes; and Mr. Neate has stumbled upon such. But indiscriminate censure defeats its object.

Much more pertinent, because so condensed, is Mr. Drummond Chase's earnest and often touching appeal—we fear a useless one—on behalf of 'The Rights of *Indigentes* in respect to College Foundations.' (J. H. Parker.)

'L'Observateur Catholique' is the title of a Parisian 'Bi-monthly,' of which twelve numbers are before us. It is written with great spirit and ability; and Gallican, or even Jansenist in principles, its object is to expose, which it does in no unsparing language, Ultramontaniam in general, and the *Univers* in particular. Its principles are those of the late Abbé Laborde. It constitutes a very distinct proof that we are not to take for granted the real character of the French Church from its Parisian externals. The *Correspondant*, again, under the influences of MM. Albert de Broglie and Montalembert, exhibits a wide and happy divergence, not only from the politics but from the ecclesiastical tone of the *Univers*. M. de Montalembert's admirable 'De l'Avenir Politique de l'Angleterre,' (Paris: Didier,) has already commended itself to our readers. 'L'Observateur Catholique,' we ought to have observed, signalizes itself by a very strenuous and consistent opposition to the new dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Had we space we would describe and recommend several publications by the late—that is, politely displaced—Bishop of Chartres, M. Clausel de Montals, especially his 'Coup d'Œil sur la Constitution de la Religion Catholique.' (Chartres: Garnier.)

From Bishop Doane we receive as usual another pleasant remembrance of his zealous and loving spirit in the shape of a 'Lenten Offering, 1856.' (Burlington: Atkinson.)

Sir A. H. Elton's—we believe that the author is familiarly known—'Tracts for the present Crisis.' Though we did not in all things sympathise with him, we can speak with respect of the writer's general good and sound feeling, and with considerable admiration of his popular talents and telling style.

Six parts of a serial, published at regular intervals—'The Seasons of the Church; what they teach,' (Mozley,)—have been forwarded to us. They are edited—not, we believe, all written—by Mr. Newland, of S. Mary Church; and on the whole they form a valuable body of instruction and meditation. The style of the Sermons is familiar, without being vulgar, and it is full of illustration, always forcible and interesting, and generally correct. If the series has a fault, we should say that occasionally this fondness for original illustration betrays the preacher into extravagance. In a Sermon on the Day of Judgment (p. 64), we find an allusion to the lost Pleiad. We are told that, many centuries ago, one of these stars was observed to grow much brighter: in a few days it became still brighter; gradually this brightness lessened, and at last the star went out. Now we are quite ready to admit that this fact is a very good illustration, but we hardly think it right to say, 'No doubt in that star this brightness was *its* day of judgment. The earth and all the works therein shall be burned up. *So it was there.*' Surely this assumption of the historical tense is bold even to the limits of presumption.

Among Confirmation Papers we are able to single out two of rare combinations,—brevity, pith, and practical importance: 'A Plain Tract on Confirmation,' and its sequel, 'A Plain Tract for those who have lately been Confirmed,' (Mozley,) by Mr. Ridley, of Hambleden.

Mr. Paget's 'Series of Popular Tales' (J. H. Parker,) has reached its fifteenth or sixteenth monthly issue, and always with sustained life and

interest. 'Windycote Hall' we may select from the series, as particularly popular.

As we are going to press, a translation of M. le Comte de Montalembert's volume on 'The Political Future of England,' already recommended by us, reaches us from the publisher, Mr. Murray.

Mr. Beresford Hope has printed,—or rather Mr. Grundy, a publisher of Maidstone, has printed, from a short-hand writer's notes,—'A Lecture delivered at the Kildown Library,' on the celebrated Greek and Roman writers. This fashion of rural lecturing, with which we sympathize a good deal, is calling out some very useful publications. Among them we specify Mr. Beresford Hope's as a really remarkable effort: to have said so much and yet so intelligibly on a subject somewhat foreign to the thoughts or habits of the Kentish yeomanry, and to say it so flowingly, and yet with such point, does credit to the lecturer's versatile talents and popular habits. And though the thought is obvious, that perhaps not much solid instruction is given in these occasional lectures, we must express our convictions that much of indirect good accrues from them, not only to the lectured in expanding tastes and in stimulating dormant powers,—not only to the lecturers in giving them ease and readiness in expression—but in cultivating intercourses far removed both from mere hospitality among equals and mere condescending charity to inferiors. We are glad to see the clergy in various places taking part, or the lead, in these courses of secular lectures. Nor is this custom confined to the country. We have heard of courses well attended at Stoke Newington, at S. Andrew's, Holborn, and elsewhere, during the past winter.

From this general approval of popular lecturing we desire to except such productions as 'A Lecture on the Jews,' (Oldham,) delivered to a Young Man's Christian Association at Dublin, by a Mr. Fleury, who certainly is not in powers a descendant of the celebrated Church historian. What are we to think of the judgment, either in religious or political science, of a person who asks, 'What more probable than that the present bloody contest between England and Russia should terminate in the stipulation that the land of Palestine, with its holy places, should be resigned to its ancient possessors, the Jews, *in trust*, under the safeguard of the powers now at war, but then reconciled, on condition,' &c. What more probable? We can conceive nothing less probable—except Mr. Fleury's return to common sense.

Among Sermons we have to acknowledge: volumes, 1. by Mr. Alford, of Quebec Chapel, (Rivingtons;) 2. Mr. G. Hill, of S. Philip's, Regent Street, (Rivingtons,)—both, we believe, popular preachers—3. by Mr. Copner, (Darling;) 4. 'Sketches from our Lord's History,' by Mr. Heffernan, (Hatchard;) 5. 'Homilies on St. John: the Fourth Seal,' by Mr. S. Bosanquet, (Hatchard;) 6. 'Five University Sermons,' by the Bishop of Melbourne, (Macmillan.) Unfortunately, we cannot think very highly of any of these Volumes.

ERRATA.

In our last Number, in the article 'Mozley on S. Augustine,' page 154, line 4, for 'they have merits,' read 'they have no merits;' and in page 195, from 'We,' line 17, to 'election sure, line 30, should be removed from the text, and read as a foot-note.

INDEX TO VOL. XXXI.

(NEW SERIES.)

ARTICLES AND SUBJECTS.

B.

Bohlen, Von, on Genesis (*see* Heywood).

C.

Canons of Historic Credibility [*Cornwall Lewis on Early Roman History*], 27—83. Function of History, 27. Criticism, 28. Historical evidence and legendary history, 29. History based on contemporary evidence which has not become legend, 30—49. History based on contemporary evidence which has become legend, 50—64. History resting on no contemporary evidence, 65—82. Exception of the Inspired Volume, 82, 83.

Cureton's *Spicilegium Syriacum* [*Spicilegium Syriacum*, &c.], 198—250. Why was this publication postponed, 198. Anticipations respecting it, 199. Its contents, 201. Bardsanes on Free Will, 201—218. Syriac Version of Melito's Apology, its doubtful authenticity, 219—236. Fragments of Melito, 236—244. Hypommemata, 245—246. The Epistle of Mara, 246—249.

D.

Dulwich College [*Dulwich College Statutes*, &c.], 84—131. Dulwich, 84. Its college, 85, 86. Its foundation, 87—90. A charity—a school—a religious house, 91. The statutes, 91. Its purpose, 92—96. Music an object, 97. Early litigation, 98. Recent disputes, 99—114. Its future: the Charity Commissioners, 114—126. Postscript—the Commissioner's revised scheme, 127—131.

NO. XCII.—N.S.

H.

Heywood, Mr. &c. [*Introduction to Genesis*, by P. Von Bohlen, translated, &c.], 309—333. Change in the characteristics of infidelity, 309. Von Bohlen, 310—314. The translator, Mr. Heywood, 315, 316. Von Bohlen's Prolegomena to Genesis, 316. Analysis and criticism of, 317—332. Mr. Heywood's motion on Bible Version, 333.

J.

Jowett on the Epistles, &c. [*Stanley on the Corinthians*, &c.; *Jowett on the Thesalonians*, &c.], 445—492. Connexion of the two writers, 445. Their respective peculiarities and tempers, 446. Mr. Stanley incapable of the critical function, 447. His merits, 448, 449. His taste for historical analogy, 450. His literary faults, 451—453. His errors in doctrine, 454; and criticism, 455—458. Mr. Jowett—plan of his work, 459; and its contents, 459, 460; its dangerous and unsatisfactory character; its vagueness and heresy shown, 460—492.

L.

Lee, Mr. [*Lectures on Inspiration*, &c.], 1—26. A valuable work, 1. What is the bearing of an inquiry on Inspiration, 1. Is a theory of Inspiration possible? 2. Consequences of resting Christianity on this question, 3. Difficulties not in the assault of those who do not believe in Inspiration, but in our mistaking the question, 5. Testimony, 6. Historical belief, 7. The proof coeval with the fact, 8—12. Criticism and character of Mr. Lee's work, 12—26.

N N

Lushington, Dr. (*Judgment in Consistorial Court, &c.*), 251—260. Organization of Churchmen, 252. St. Barnabas, Pimlico, 253. Character of Dr. Lushington's Judgment, 254. What is servile imitation of Rome? 255, 256. The Cross, 257, 258. Reasons for an appeal, 259—260.

M.

Macaulay [*History of England from the Accession of James II. Vols. iii. and iv.*] 377—429. Agreement of the critics, 377. Macaulay's partiality, 378—382. William III. his character, 382—387. The England of that day, 389—402. Marlborough, 403. Shrewsbury, 404—408. Fenwick's trial, 409—413. The Non-jurors, 414—424. The Currency, 424—428. Conclusion, 429.

Maori Race, The [*Grey's Polynesian Mythology—Taylor's Te Tka a Maui*], 430—444. The Polynesian Race, 430. Traditions, 431. Sir George Grey, 432. The Polynesian Mythology—Specimens of, 434—437. Mr. Taylor's origin of the New Zealanders, 438. The Maoris, 439. History, 439—443. Church prospects, 444.

Mozley on Predestination [*The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*], 132—197. Character of the work, 132. Predestination and Fatalism, 133, 134. Philosophical Fatalism, 135. Theological Predestination, 136—139. Pelagius, 140; his works, 141—148. Opposition to Pelagius, 149. Semi-Pelagianism, 150. History of the controversy, and illustrations from Mr. Mozley's work, 150—196. Dangers of Mr. Mozley's view in connexion with Baptismal Regeneration, 196, 197.

N.

Newton, Life of [*Peacock's Life of Young—Brewster's Life of Newton, &c.*], 334—376. Lives of men of science, 334. Unequal character of the two biographies, 335. Dr. Young and Dr. Peacock's admirable biography, 336—340. Life of Newton, 340. Sir D. Brewster, 340, 341. Newton's biography, 343, 344. Predecessors of Newton, 345. Galileo, 346—348. Kepler, 349—351. Huyghens, 352, 353. Newton's scientific character, 354—364. His moral and religious opinions, 365—376.

P.

Poetry of 1855 [*Poetry by Longfellow, Tennyson, Browning, Bailey, &c.*], 267—308. Unexpected character of recent poetry, Maud, 267—269. Hiawatha, 270—281. Browning's Men and Women, 281—294. Bailey's Mystic, 295—298. Michell's Poetry of Creation, 299—300. Ernest Jones' poems, 301—304. Lushington's War Poems, 304, 305. Peace in War, 306. General reflections, 307, 308.

S.

Stanley on the Corinthians (*see* Jowett).

Y.

Young, Dr., Life of (*see* Newton).

SHORTER NOTICES OF BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

JANUARY.—Bishop Plunket's Charge—Primary Charges by Bishops of Salisbury and Lincoln—Church Almanacs by Parker, Masters, Cleaver, &c.—Kahn's German Protestantism—Kay's Promises of Christianity—Guthrie on Ezekiel—Everley—Eden's Sermons—The Sampler—Archer Gurney's Poems—Mrs. Boss's Niece—Paget's Tales—The Owllet of Owlstone Edge—Beauty of Holiness, &c.—West's Sermons—Gowring's Sermons—Milman's Latin Christianity—Macaulay's History—Pusey's Two Sermons—Laud's Devotions—Spinckes' Devotions—Routledge's Longfellow's Poems—Gresley's Three Sermons—Life of Alderman Kelly—Krummacher's Suffering Saviour—Dr. Lushington's Judgment—History of Sir Thomas Thumb—Blatch's Memoir of Bishop Low—Hewitt's Ancient Armour.

APRIL.—Birks on Difficulties of Belief—Penrose on Faith and Practice—Dorothy—Selections from Cleveland Psalter—Anderson's Colonial Church—Jelf's Edition of the Ethics—Church Poetry—Singer's Shakespeare—Nugee's Holy Women of Gospel, and Lent Lectures—Hicks on Baptism—Adams' Allegories—Kingsley's Heroes—Ford on the Acts—Hymnals—Gurney's Sermons—Practical Sermons on O. T.—Donaldson on Classical Scholarship—F. Newman's Homer's Iliad—Hand-Book to the Aquarium—Stanley's Sinai and Palestine—Week of Darkness—Letters of S. Francis of Sales—Sketches on Italy—Coxe's Impressions of England—Hardwick's Church History—Ald's Poems—Family

Prayer—Robins on Church of Rome—Byrne's Lectures—Scudamore on Communion of Laity—Badham's Philebus—Hare's Charges—Lord A. Hervey on Inspiration—Kennaway's Hulsean Prize Essay—Craik's Search after Truth—Nunn's Sermons—Churchwarden's Manual—Dialogues on Universal Restitution—Evening of Life—Chambers on Lushington's Judgment—Denison's Translation of Julius Cæsar—Blew's Agamemnon—Parminter on Grammar—Nind's German Poetry—Kennaway's Lecture—Micrographic Dictionary—Literary Churchman—Elliott, Neale, and Gresley—Bishop of Oxford and Mr. Carter on Penitentiaries—Forbes' S. Gregory Nyssen—Gallican Liturgies—Sermons by Goulburn, Baring, Bernard, Heurtley, Hussey, &c. on the Atonement—Sunday Trading in London—Alford's Letters to Sperling—Heurtley on the Lord's Day—Malan on Chinese Primers—Jervis on Poor Clergy Question—Sermons on Ritual, by Skinner and Flower—Lee on Increase of the Episcopate—Mackenzie's Ordination Sermon—Moody on Cathedrals—Bowers' Sermon—Harrington on Pope Pius IV. and C. P. Book—Neate and Chase on Oxford Studies and Statutes—L'Observateur Catholique—Late Bishop of Chartres' recent Works—Doane's Lenten Offering—Tracts for the present Crisis—Newland on Seasons of the Church—Ridley's Confirmation Papers—Paget's Tales—Montalembert on England—Beresford Hope's Lecture—Fleury's Lecture—Sermons by Alford, Hill, Copner, Heffernan, Bosanquet, Bishop Perry, &c.

11

11

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THE
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JULY, 1856.

ART. I. *Lectures on the History of France.* By the Right Hon. SIR JAMES STEPHEN, K.C.B., LL.D., Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge. 2 vols. Second Edition. Longmans.

WE may fairly anticipate the inquiry,—for what reason do we propose to enter upon a criticism of the Historical Lectures of Sir James Stephen, after the considerable interval that has elapsed since the date of their publication? We reply, that we had, until lately, been content to read the periods of history to which they refer, in the writings of elder authors, in whose wisdom and fidelity experience had led us to confide. We had learnt the chronicles of the Carlovingian age from the pen of Eginhard, of Alcuin, of Anségise, and of Thégan. We had been satisfied with the rich collection of historic memoirs which had illuminated the annals of the House of Bourbon. And we had sought for more general considerations upon the history of France in the laborious compilations of Sismondi, in the earnest reflections of Thierry, and in the solid philosophy of Guizot. An accident, however, lately directed our attention to certain passages in these Lectures, which led to a general perusal of the work; and it has been the result of this general perusal to impress us with the expediency of bringing under the consideration of the literary world the merits of a treatise which not simply aims at historical narration, but addresses itself, with the stamp of academical and professorial authority, to the special attention of the young. The Lectures of Sir James Stephen, moreover, have been republished in a second edition; and its author has lately received, in addition to his professorship at Cambridge, the office of Examiner in Modern History for the Indian Civil Service. It is therefore a matter of public importance, to which private considerations must yield,

that an accurate apprehension should be formed of the merits of a work which appears to be designed as a permanent text-book, at once for England and for India.

In the first instance, we are compelled to advert to the preface, or dedicatory epistle, which Sir James has addressed to Dr. Whewell, the Master of Trinity. He here offers a defence against the charge,—first, of ‘lecturing prematurely,’ and secondly, ‘of precipitate publication.’ On the one hand, he informs us, that the necessities of the University had compelled him to an immediate assumption of his duties, in opposition to the advice shrewdly offered by Mr. Macaulay to the new Professor, ‘to prepare himself attentively for two or three years.’ On the other, he observes, the alleged ignorance of his audience respecting the French language, and the absence of any text-book from our own, rendered a ‘precipitate publication’ essential to the welfare of the academical system. What fair objection, then, he implies, can be raised to the imperfections of his work?

To this we reply, first, that if Sir James Stephen, on his appointment to the office of Professor, had found himself unequal to an adequate discharge of the duties which it involved, it was competent to him to have surrendered the office into other hands. Secondly, that while he was in no manner restricted in the choice of a subject, the interval between his appointment, and the date of the present edition of his Lectures, involved a yet greater period than that of ‘two or three years,’ which Mr. Macaulay had described. Thirdly, that the expediency, if existing, of the publication of a text-book in the English language, could form no justification of a total misrepresentation of history. Fourthly, that, in point of fact, the text-books which have since been recommended by authority in the University of Cambridge, are not English, but continue to be French; and, lastly, that the publication of these ‘Lectures’ in London, places them within the ordinary class of contributions to general literature. It is obvious, therefore, that the plea upon which it is proposed to exempt the present work from the public right of critical analysis is untenable; and that it is as fairly amenable as any other to praise or to condemnation, according to the accuracy of its statements, and the justice of its reasoning.

It is not our intention to enter upon a discussion of all the four-and-twenty lectures which Sir James has here submitted to the public. The selections, however, shall be fairly and indifferently made. We will take, then, in the first place, the description which the Lecturer has offered of ‘the Character and Influence of Charlemagne.’

This subject naturally divides itself into the character of the individual, the genius of his public policy, and the influence of his achievements upon succeeding ages. Now we readily concede to Sir James Stephen whatever merit may attach to the fact that these Lectures are written in a forcible and happy style. But the relation of this certain felicity of style to the facts and opinions which it serves to clothe, is analogous to the description which Milton has bequeathed to us of rhyme,—that it was ‘the invention of a barbarous age to set off wretched matter and lame metre.’ For under such a guise the author contrives to tell us nothing of which the most juvenile reader could have been ignorant before, either as to the personal life of Charlemagne, or the distinctive characteristics of his reign. Of that, indeed, which is erroneous, there is much at which Eginhard himself would have stared aghast. But of that which is true, there is nothing either important in fact or novel in opinion; nor is there any characterisation of the Austrasian monarch which would not apply, with equal force, to any other chieftain placed in such circumstances as his. Secondly, Sir James appears to have consulted no other ancient authority than the Monk of St. Gall. The stories which he has adduced from that writer, who was no contemporary of Charlemagne, are at least of very questionable authenticity: while the records of Eginhard and others, who *were* contemporaries of the Carlovingian chief, and whose writings the Lecturer too plainly shows that he has never consulted, stand foremost in point of authority, and are yet more circumstantial in point of detail.

In describing the characters of Clovis and Charlemagne, it appears to be the aim of Sir James Stephen to place himself in a successful antagonism to Gibbon, and to lower the one and exalt the other from the respective standards which he alleges to have been assigned to them by that historian. That our readers may be able to adjudicate between the historian of the Roman empire, and the academical professor, we will endeavour to place before them several of the points at issue. We will speak first of Charlemagne, and afterwards of Clovis.

We will advert then, primarily, to the question of the fanaticism, or proselytism of the sword, which has been asserted by Gibbon, and has been denied by Sir James Stephen, to have constituted a feature of the policy of Charlemagne. Let the latter writer state his own position.

‘It has been alleged, indeed, that the Saxon wars were waged in a spirit of fanaticism, and that the Vicar of Christ placed the sword of Mahomet in the hands of the sovereign of the Franks. It is, I think, an unfounded charge, though sanctioned by Gibbon and Warburton, and by names of perhaps even greater authority than theirs. That the alternative,

"believe or die," was sometimes proposed by Charlemagne to the Saxons, I shall not indeed dispute. But it is not less true that, before these terms were tendered to them, they had *again and again* rejected his less formidable proposal, "be quiet and live." In form and in terms, indeed, their election lay between the gospel and the sword. In substance and in reality, they had to make their choice between submission and destruction.—Vol. i. pp. 91, 92.

Now we ask, upon what ground does Sir James Stephen proceed to offer this gratuitous contradiction of the statements of preceding writers? Where is the evidence (for he offers none) in support of his assertion, that the Saxons 'had again and again' rejected a policy of submission at the hands of Charlemagne, before they were subjected to a policy of fanaticism? Independently of this primary evidence, is there no indirect or ancillary testimony to be obtained upon the question?

It is one of the most striking instances of the illogical habit of generalization which pervades this work, that the author ascribes to one single moving cause nearly every act of Charlemagne. To the aim of extending a political organization, he refers almost every feature in the life of the monarch, with an uniformity from which the various impulses and infirmities of human nature must necessarily recoil, in actual life. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that this apparent subordination of history to preconceived theories, should lead to important errors in fact.

In the first place, then, the career of Charlemagne was marked from the very outset (as we shall proceed to show), by a dominant spirit of proselytism by force. There is no evidence to support the assumption that any such system of warfare was conducted by his predecessor. With the accession of Charlemagne to undivided power, in 772, the belligerent policy of the Carlovingian House assumed a new shape. It was then for the first time seriously turned against the Saxons. Yet in the records of that very year we find that Charlemagne at once announced to the Assembly of Worms his intention of invading Saxony, and actually proceeded to the immediate and spontaneous subversion of the Saxon rites.

This is evinced at once in the '*Vita Caroli Magni Imperatoris Augusti, per Eginhardum Scripta*,' and also in the '*Annales*' of the same author. We quote from the latter.

'Rex vero Carolus, congregato apud Wormaciam generali conventu, Saxoniam bello aggredi statuit, eamque sine morâ ingressus, ferro et igne cuncta depopulatus, Eresburgum castrum cepit, Idolum quod Irminsul à Saxonibus vocatur, evertit. In cujus destructione cum in eodem loco per triduum moraretur, &c.'—*Egin. Annales*, DCCLXXII.

What, then, becomes of the assertion of the Professor, that

'a long and deplorable experience had already shown that the Frankish people had neither peace nor security to expect for a single year, so long as their Saxon neighbours retained their 'heathen rites?' (P. 92.) It is true, no doubt, that the aim of Charlemagne would have been more effectually attained, if the moral dominion of the Church over the Saxon people had been added to the physical dominion of the Carlovingian sword. Such a course, indeed, would have been suggested by the plainest and coarsest views of political expediency. But it has been seen that the initiative of the war between Charlemagne and the Saxons, both virtually and actually, sprang altogether from the former; that his military fanaticism, which is described as arising from 'a long and deplorable experience,' was altogether spontaneous and instinctive,—that the first manifestation of this policy by the Franks was coincident with the first year of his accession to undivided power,—and that the assertion of Sir James Stephen is thus decisively contradicted by contemporary records.

So much, then, for the statement, first, that fanaticism formed no part of the belligerent policy of Charlemagne, and secondly, that his religious propagandism formed only a later phase of his career. Let us now inquire whether there is any greater accuracy in the assertion of the Lecturer that this fanaticism had not embraced the alternative of conversion or of extermination, until the Saxons 'had again and again rejected his less formidable proposal to be quiet and live.'

Now we have seen the conduct of Charlemagne in his *very first relations* with the Saxon people, characterised by his own chronicler and personal friend, in the words '*ferro et igne cuncta depopulatus*.' This spontaneous conduct is certainly a very singular illustration of a permission 'to be quiet and live!' In the very next succeeding encounter of the conqueror with the Saxon race, we find him adopting the fanatical policy of the Arabian Chiefs:—

'Cum Rex in Villà Carisiaco hiemaret, consilium iniit, ut perfidam et fœdifragam Saxonum gentem bello aggrederetur, et eo usque perseveraret, dum aut victi Christianæ religioni subjicerentur, aut omnino tollerentur.'
—*Egin. Annales*, DCCCLXXV.

The first invasion of the Saxons by Charlemagne—a gratuitous infraction of their national rights—had taken place in 772. The interval had been chiefly spent by the conqueror in the subjugation of the Lombards. The Saxons had meanwhile risen in 774, against the Carlovingian yoke. Certain terms had been enforced upon them by Charlemagne, at the close of the first campaign. Against these terms the Saxons, who had submitted to them in an hour of necessity, had afterwards not unnaturally rebelled. The complaint of Eginhard,

that the Saxons had broken the Treaty of 772, must, therefore, be received with caution, as the view at once of a writer imbued with the traditions of Frankish conquest, and a courtier of Aix-la-Chapelle. There is no sufficient reason to suppose that the existence of Saxon rights was at that time incompatible with the growth of Frankish civilisation; and the alternative thus offered by Charlemagne to the invaded people, after conquest had trampled on their liberties, was, therefore, as monstrous an aggression as would have been a similar decree, offering to the Prussian people an alternative between extermination and a continued recognition of the Continental System, if promulgated by Napoleon in 1813.

We have seen, then, that Charlemagne at first invaded Saxony in the double character of an aggressor and iconoclast; that he subjected the conquered people, after a gratuitous desolation of their soil, to conditions which no view of national rights could have rendered legitimate or just; and that he availed himself of their very first attempt at retaliation as a pretext for enforcing upon them the choice between extermination and religious conversion.

But apart from this decisive contradiction of the statement of Sir James Stephen, the fanatical spirit which pervaded the Carlovingian conquest is rendered sufficiently apparent by the fact, that it continued to survive after it had proved itself wholly ineffectual as an agent in the establishment of civil dominion. Persecution naturally developed its fruit in hypocrisy; and the manner in which the sacrament of baptism was extended to unbelieving infidels, by the conqueror's command, only instils at this day another sense of gratitude for the Divine preservation of Christian truth amidst the traditionary profanations of the civil power. '*Maxima eorum multitudo,*' says Eginhard of the Saxons in the year 780, '*in loco qui Orheim appellatur, solitâ simulatione baptizata est.*' Ann. DCCLXXX. The fictitious and successive conversions of the Saxon race in no degree tended to their subordination; and baptism, which became a badge of religious hypocrisy, was received by them as the alternative of destruction, as often as they were vanquished by their Frankish oppressors.

But conceding even the accuracy of the facts adduced by Sir James Stephen, the internal evidence arising from the religious polity which the Conqueror sought to impose, conclusively shows that Christianity could not have been introduced among the Saxons with that view of mitigating their moral barbarism, which the author regards as the keystone in the religious policy of Charlemagne. The tariff of religious expiations which that warrior introduced was compounded of the vilest superstition and

the most hideous morality. Human sacrifices are unquestionably the most debasing, the most barbarising practices that have ever formed attributes of heathen ritual. Yet these very human sacrifices—as we learn from Gaillard, and the elaborate author of the '*Corpus Historiæ Germanicæ*'—received the sanction of Charlemagne, subject only to the expiation of penance. (Gaillard. II. p. 241—7. Struv.: *Corp. Hist. Germ.* 133.)¹ Apart, then, from all considerations of morality, of consistency, and of justice, what shall we say for the 'humanising influence' of a system which, while it prescribed death as the alternative of baptism, tolerated the most systematic murder—the most barbarous relic of a heathen faith—the religious feature of all others the most antagonistic to the Christian dispensation—as one of the lightest and most venial sins? Such then, in fact, was the policy which Sir James Stephen represents as an endeavour to abolish 'the ferocious barbarism inseparable from heathen rites!' Such, again, was the 'humanising influence,' as the Lecturer tells us, of the religious system which Charlemagne imported into Saxony!

We will pass, then, to another attribute of the character of Charlemagne. It shall be the question of the cruelty of his government. The Frankish conqueror is everywhere represented by Sir James Stephen, not only as a civilised and intellectual, but as a benign ruler, who resorted to no acts of harshness or oppression, beyond such as were absolutely essential to the preservation of his government, or were justifiable by such principles of public law as were then recognised in Europe. Sir James has told us, in his Preface, that a lecturer does not aim at the dignity of a historian. But we think a lecturer might, at any rate, aim at the dignity of truth. The conduct of Charlemagne towards the Saxons was uniformly characterised by a wanton ferocity, of which the barbaric reign of Clovis itself—with which Sir James affects to contrast the alleged civilisation of Charlemagne—affords no example. The decapitation, in cold blood, of four or five thousand vanquished enemies, of whom it was at least doubtful whether they had not a superior claim to that even of prisoners of war, was an act of barbarism such as has not often stained the Mahometan annals. Thus, on the triumph of Charlemagne over Witikind, we learn from Eginhard:—

'Et cum omnes Witokindum hujus sceleris auctorem proclamarent, eum tamen tradere nequirent, eo quod re perpetrata ad Nortmannos se contulerat; cæterorum, qui persuasioni ejus morem gerentes tantum

¹ These references to Gaillard and Struvius are also made by Gibbon. Ed. Milman. ix. p. 175. It is, therefore, the more surprising that the facts to which they relate should not have been considered by the Professor.

facinus peregerunt, usque ad quatuor millia quingenti traditi, et super Alarum fluvium, in loco qui Orheim appellatur, jussu regis omnes unâ die decollati sunt.'—*Annales*, DCCLXXXII.

The words 'scelus' and 'facinus' are, of course, to be understood with the same reservation as the remarks of Eginhard on the breach of the Treaty of 772. But even independently of this qualification, nearly the whole 'scelus' and 'facinus' involved in the warlike attitude of the Saxons lay, by the confession of Eginhard himself, with their chieftain, Witikind.

We might multiply these quotations, but will quote only the following, in addition to the above:—

Vita Caroli Magni: Cap. xx.

'Facta est et alia prius contra eum in Germaniâ valida conjuratio, cujus auctores, partim luminibus orbiati, partim membris incolumes, omnes tamen exilio, deportati sunt.'

These quotations may suffice to illustrate the spirit which characterised the wars of Charlemagne. We have now, at least, placed our readers in a position to judge between the statements of Eginhard and those of Sir James Stephen. If the whole history of barbarian warfare can attest acts of greater ferocity than this wholesale slavery and mutilation, or than the simultaneous murder of thousands of defeated foes, the Lecturer may perhaps be able, in some slight degree, to relieve by contrast, the monstrous inaccuracies of his portraiture of Charlemagne. But until such instances can be found, he must be prepared, at least, to acquiesce in the conviction of Gibbon, that 'that sovereign's treatment of the vanquished Saxons was an abuse of the right of conquest.'

Sir James Stephen is scarcely more happy or more accurate in his characterisation of the military tactics of Charlemagne: 'Imitating the policy of Cæsar,' he tells us, 'and anticipating that of Napoleon, Charlemagne made war support itself.' And this feature of his tactics is described as a leading idiosyncrasy in the character of the conqueror. The assertion in question, however, simply implies a total misconception both of the character of the wars which were waged in the eighth and ninth centuries, and of the civilisation which they embodied. The narration bequeathed to us by Eginhard, of nearly every campaign of that period, contains the expression, '*totum ferro et igne vastavit*.' This was certainly a very singular anticipation of the principles adopted either in the German or the Italian campaigns of Napoleon! To assert that it was the practice of an invader to 'make war support itself,' is, in other words, to assert that it was his practice to disregard the rights of private property. And what a truism is this, when not only

were those rights disregarded for the sustenance of the army, but when the very subjects of those rights—when the very property itself—was, by almost undeviating practice, put to fire and sword!

But the Lecturer proceeds, in the next sentence, to say, that 'Neither in his (Charlemagne's) capitularies, nor in the chronicles of his reign, is there any proof or suggestion that his troops ever received or expected any pay or military allowances.' If the analogy between the policy of Charlemagne and that of Napoleon is here intended to apply, the Lecturer is once more in error. If, on the other hand, he merely states the abstract proposition as a peculiarity of the reign of Charlemagne, he shows a similar misconception of the general character both of the military system of mediæval Europe, and of the monetary condition of society by which that system was necessitated. The whole of this comparison, indeed, is characterised by a strange confusion of the policy of Napoleon—which, in his early campaigns, in great measure disencumbered his army of the transport of provisions—and of the policy of barbaric and feudal Europe, which almost wholly excluded the notion of allowances from its military systems. A subsistence upon spoil was an inevitable incident of such a system of warfare; and it was in no greater degree originated by Charlemagne than by any other warrior of barbaric France. If, then, it were not the custom of Charlemagne to establish a system of military allowances, what possible distinctiveness, in this respect, is there in his policy? If, again, it were his custom to carry universal destruction by fire and sword, what possible analogy, in this respect, exists between his policy and that of Napoleon?

We are scarcely less startled by the surprising inaccuracies in subordinate matters of fact, which crowd the pages of these Essays, on the part of a writer who affects so much historical precision. We will offer a few instances. Sir James Stephen tells us (p. 45), 'To Charles (Martel) *eventually* succeeded Pepin.' Now it happens that Pepin *immediately* succeeded his father Charles; and he did so in conjunction with his brother Carloman. It would be difficult to imagine any isolated statement contained in so few words, and yet so calculated to mislead the reader on the important question of the principles of the Carolingian succession.

Again: he tells us, in the same page, that Childeric III., and with him the Merovingian dynasty, were deposed by Pope Zachary. If he had referred to the opening sentence in the *Vita Caroli Imperatoris*, he would have found that this deposition was the work of Pope Stephen:—

'Gens Merovingorum, de quâ Franci reges sibi creare soliti erant, usque in Hildericum regem, qui jussu Stephani, Romani Pontificis, depositus ac detonsus, atque in Monasterium missus est, durasse putatur.'—*Vita Car. Imp.* c. 1.

Eginhard, it is true, records elsewhere (see 'Annales') an opinion of Zachary on an abstract question, as to the relative claims of sovereignty by real and nominal rulers; and this opinion Sir James Stephen has apparently twisted into an ordinance for the deposition of Childeric. But we cannot go on chronicling such inaccuracies as these.

The contrast, then, appears sufficiently broad to those who turn from the pages of Sir James Stephen to the boundless comprehension and perspicuity which characterise the historical views of M. Guizot. But we have a heavier complaint than that of negative deficiencies against the Cambridge Professor. We have to call upon him to explain, if he can, his grievous distortions of the pages of Gibbon. We will turn, then, to his character of CLOVIS, which Sir James Stephen, while he professes to describe it in direct and triumphant opposition to the views of Gibbon, takes, nevertheless, almost literally from the words of that writer himself. There is something in this factitious originality—a false brilliancy of all others the least agreeable—which cannot be too much regretted.

Sir James Stephen complains, then, that in Gibbon's History, as well as in the French writers, 'Clovis and Clotaire sweep 'across the historic stage in the garb and character of heroes. 'Their campaigns are depicted in colours brilliant enough to 'reflect the glories of Napoleon. The doctrines of Aristotle 'and Montesquieu are invoked to interpret to us the enigmas of 'their policy; and the revolutions of their kingdom are announced in terms such as might fitly celebrate the overthrow 'of the empire of the Cæsars.'

First, then, these 'brilliant colours,' as we shall see, exist in the Lecturer's imagination. Secondly, Sir James has apparently mistaken the appeals made by Gibbon to Montesquieu *on matters of fact*, regarding the laws and customs of the Merovingian age, for an invocation of the doctrines of that writer in interpreting the 'enigmas' of the Merovingian policy. Thirdly, the asserted magniloquence of Gibbon in describing the revolutions of the Merovings, will be conceded, by any reader of that historian, to be an unqualified misconception of fact.

Sir James then proceeds, in defence of his criticism, and in illustration of his simulated antagonism to Gibbon, to give his own description of the character of Clovis. That our readers may observe the true relation of this description to the views which

it professes to assail, we give the two statements in juxtaposition:—

Sir James Stephen.

¹ 'Clovis was an untutored savage.
² *In peace and in war his hands were ever stained with blood.* ³ At the close of his reign he assassinated every chief of his tribe from whom his children had any rivalry to apprehend.'

Gibbon.

¹ 'His ambitious reign was a perpetual violation of moral and Christian duties. ² *His hands were stained with blood in peace as well as in war.* ³ And as soon as Clovis had dismissed a synod of the Gallican Church, he calmly assassinated all the princes of the Merovingian race.'

Again:—

⁴ 'The most pathetic and heart-subduing motives of the religion which he had embraced, were insufficient to tame his ferocity. ⁵ Even the evangelical narrative of the sacrifice drew from him no other than the exclamation, "*Si ego ibidem cum Frankis meis fuisset, injurias ejus vindicasset!*"'—*Lectures on Hist. of France*, vol. i. pp. 52, 53.

Again:—

⁴ 'But the savage conqueror of Gaul was incapable of examining the proofs of a religion which depends on the laborious investigation of historic evidence and speculative theology. He was still more incapable of feeling the mild influence of the Gospel, which persuades and purifies the heart of a genuine convert.'

⁵ And (in a note to the same page), '*Si ego ibidem cum Frankis meis fuisset, injurias ejus vindicasset.*'—*Gibbon's Rom. Emp.*—Ed. Milman, vol. vi. p. 302.

Such are the obligations of Sir James Stephen to a writer whom he delights to assail for his 'revolting obscenities' (p. 89), for his 'offensive levity,' for his 'disingenuous' conduct. It certainly strikes us as the reverse of an ingenuous action, to enrich oneself by appropriating another's reflections, and then to disparage his celebrity.

A word more on the subject of Clovis, and we have done with it. The claim of that warrior, which the Lecturer denies, to be accounted a hero, is an independent question. But the denial of such a claim proceeds upon totally false principles of characterisation. If the development of human character be influenced by social condition, the claim of a 'hero' must be adjudged by his relation to the standard of civilisation which has existed in his age. Thus, if Napoleon had committed the actions of Clovis, he could not have been deemed a hero. If Clovis had committed the actions of Napoleon, his character would have been, not heroic, but supernatural. Clovis was probably as far removed above the average intellectual standard of the fifth century, as was Napoleon above that of the nineteenth. If Clovis 'assassinated many of the chiefs of his tribe,' the civilized Constantine assassinated his own son. If the

'ferocity' of Clovis were not tamed by his religion, Charlemagne decapitated four or five thousand of his prisoners in a single day. If Clovis were not the legislator of his people (p. 58)—a conclusion which is drawn chiefly from the account given by Tacitus of German institutions as they existed several centuries before him—the fact would be scarcely more essential to the maintenance of the present position, than the 'Capitularies' to the heroic character of Charlemagne, or than the 'Code' to that of Napoleon. On the whole, then, we are compelled to state, in regard to this sketch of the character of Clovis—if we may paraphrase the happy saying of George IV. in reference to Mr. Moore's Life of Sheridan—that we cannot admit that Sir James Stephen has murdered Clovis, but he has certainly 'attempted his life!'

It will be a relief to pass to some other subject. We will take, then, the causes adduced by Sir James Stephen, of the Decline and Fall of the Merovingian and Carlovingian Dynasties.

The leading cause assigned by him to these events is, emphatically, 'Barbarism.' And this 'Barbarism' he clearly, no doubt, and reasonably, defines as a condition of society in which Government is sustained, not by a moral agency, but by physical force. But it is another evidence of the tendency to generalization, and of the want of analysis, which we have before remarked, that a vague and abstract influence is set forth as operating upon a definite entity, without any adequate view of the application of such a generic and unsystematised agent to the special character of the entity in question.

To assert that 'Barbarism,' or a Government of physical force, was the necessary cause of the decline of the elder and the younger dynasty, is, in effect, to assert the general proposition, that dynastic security cannot exist without a national civilisation. Now it is very doubtful, we think, whether the anti-monarchical influences of civilisation are not at least equally powerful with the anti-monarchical influences of barbarism. The inductive and the internal presumptions, indeed, are strongly in favour of their superior potency. It may safely be asserted, on the one hand, that dynasties, under a state of barbarism, have been more often durable; and that, under a state of civilisation, they have been more often transient. On the other hand, it is the genius of civilisation to produce liberty; and it is the genius of liberty—a truth which is illustrated in almost every other history than our own, if not in our own also—to resist Monarchy. Moreover, this 'Barbarism,' in the abstract character in which it is here adduced by Sir James Stephen, must have proved as great an obstacle to the dynastic

security of the local chieftains, who by degrees became virtually independent sovereigns, as to that of the Merovingian and Carolingian princes themselves. If the 'barbarism of Clovis' and his successors rendered them incapable of establishing a 'moral dominion, and therefore incapable of establishing an 'enduring dominion,' (p. 144.)—this influence must apply, irrespectively of a difference in the extent of dominion, which often constituted the only real distinction between the powers of royalty and those of its nominal vassals. And yet the rule of the latter was, for the most part, both durable and strong. This theory, therefore, is one which would furnish an explanation for the overthrow of every dynasty in uncivilised countries on a common principle,—and that principle, too, at issue with fact.

What insight, then, does Sir James Stephen give us into the political character of the Merovingian and Carolingian ages? The chief immediate cause of the decline of the dynasties in question was, beyond controversy, the genius of aristocratic usurpation. Now the lecturer cannot *identify* this aristocratic usurpation with a state of barbarism—a process which is essential to the success of his theory. For such an identification would imply that national barbarism must prevail where an aristocracy stands in systematic antagonism to the crown. Such a theory would involve the barbarism of France so late as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; and would therefore apply, with similar force, to the later dominion of the House of Valois, one of the most 'enduring' of the dynasties of Europe. Again, the decline of the Holy Roman Empire was caused by a progressive aristocratic usurpation. Yet Germany was, at the time of the dissolution of that Empire, at the height of her civilisation. Hence, therefore, although the two principles may co-exist, and be occasionally produced, the one by the agency of the other, they do not admit of identification.

Thus, Sir James Stephen's theory repudiates itself. The Crown was subverted, not by the people, but by a quasi-sovereign aristocracy. The same principle must, therefore, apply to this quasi-sovereign aristocracy itself, which was a durable aristocracy. Hence the impossibility 'of establishing a moral dominion' could *not* involve the impossibility 'of establishing an enduring dominion.'

Here, then, applies the ingenious theory of M. Guizot, that the infancy of civilisation rendered extensive social and political relations impossible for any long period of time. Hence, the unity of great states was impossible, and those states accordingly became divided. The decline of the Merovingian dynasty was caused, not by its own barbarism, nor that of the Carolingian by the abstract fact of the barbarism of its subjects, as Sir

James Stephen would argue; but by the extent of its dominion. Those dynasties, then, fell, not because they had only a dominion of force—for the aristocracy themselves had no other—but because close relations were impossible in extensive states. 'Charlemagne,' says M. Guizot (we give merely the substance of his remarks), 'endeavoured to make a great people an extensive state. The condition of the country was not adapted to such a policy; and with his successors there was soon neither king nor nation.' The rise of social order with the age of Charlemagne forms, as this eminent writer asserts, the distinctive attribute of that age.

'Sans doute,' he elsewhere observes, 'l'Empire de Charlemagne se dissout; mais il se dissout en états particuliers La forme a changé; mais, au fond, l'œuvre est restée.'—*Lect. xx. Hist. Gen. de la Civ. de l'Europe.*

Sir James Stephen, on the other hand, asserts that the career of France, from the age of Charlemagne to that of Hugh Capet, was marked by a *retrogressive* barbarism. So much, then, for the venerable illusion of the civilising influence of Charlemagne upon succeeding ages! This assertion he rests upon evidence deduced from legends in a few hagiologies, and from the superstitious character of the intervening period. We answer, first, in respect to the hagiologies, that it is impossible, even conceding the authenticity of their representations, to found an induction upon such scanty and partial evidence; and that the irruptions of the Normans, during the period in question—a fact wholly independent of the social condition of France—will in itself account for much of that increase of fortification which Sir James Stephen takes for an evidence of increasing barbarism. Secondly, that the increase of religious superstition in this period, forms an evidence of exactly the reverse of increasing 'barbarism,' in the sense in which the Lecturer explains that term. For superstition is essentially an engine of moral dominion; and he defines 'barbarism' as a condition where there can be only physical dominion. It may not be a means of moral dominion of a high character; but as national changes from barbarism to civilisation must be conducted by the slowest gradations, so the introduction of the lower elements of moral dominion must be held in evidence of national progress from barbarism towards civilisation. The essential difference of these two theories is sufficiently obvious. The clear perception of M. Guizot convinced him that any other hypothesis was encompassed with insurmountable difficulty; and although the desire of Sir James Stephen for the display of a little originality of thought evinces a commendable ambition, the adoption of M. Guizot's theory would clearly have offered a wiser and a safer course.

Let us pass, then, to a later period of the History of France. We will select the chapter on the 'Anti-feudal Influence of the Eastern Crusades.' This essay professes to investigate at once the causes and the consequences of these movements, the springs of action which called them into birth, and the influence which they ultimately developed upon the Feudal System. We advert to the views advocated in this chapter with the less reluctance, because—although there are some points from which we are prepared to dissent, and more which (if we had the necessary space) we should be ready to supply—the chapter in question displays more considerate thought, and less indisposition to rigorous analysis, than many of the other lectures which aim at philosophical investigation.

We will take, first, the causes of the Crusades. The springs of action which the Lecturer detects in this mighty movement are, first, those which he terms 'worldly'; and secondly, those which, although he does not characterise them under any special definition, we may regard as 'moral':—

'Nothing is more easy than to detect the worldly motives which impelled the ruder population of the Western World to roll in eight successive and desolating torrents towards the shores of Africa and the East. The Crusader received a plenary indulgence; that is, the remission of all the penances by which, as he believed, his sins must otherwise have been expiated, either in the present life, or in purgatory. During his absence, the church became the protector of his wife, his children, and his estate. Whoever might injure them was declared excommunicate, *ipso facto*, without any further sentence. His debts ceased to bear interest from the day of his departure, even though he had bound himself by an oath to the payment of them. He was authorized to postpone, till the lapse of three years, the full payment of any debt that was then actually due. If his estate had been mortgaged, he was entitled to receive the whole produce of it, during the first year of his crusade, without any deduction for the benefit of his creditor. He was exempted from the payment of any *taille* which might be imposed upon his lands during his absence; and finally, he might insist upon receiving from his parents a tenth of their income for his own support.'—Vol. I. pp. 185, 186.

This, then, formed the 'worldly' motive. The single inadequacy, however, of such a moving power to the accomplishment of the effect produced, is readily acknowledged by the author. 'It would be a libel on our common nature to ascribe to such causes alone, or chiefly, a movement which during one hundred and fifty successive years agitated every state, and almost every family, in Christendom.' (P. 186.) But the inadequacy of such a motive to the production of such a fact, is obvious from other considerations. Not only would these 'worldly' motives have proved inadequate to the continuous sustentation of such a movement; but they would have proved, in all probability, far more incapable of calling it originally into existence. Thirdly,

these worldly considerations could only have addressed themselves, as the Lecturer himself intimates, to a certain portion of the community, and that portion by far the least influential.

We come, then, to the second, or *moral*, cause of the Crusades, according to the view of Sir James Stephen:—

‘The dark mysteries of our existence, though little heeded in our own luxurious and mechanical age, pressed heavily on the spirits of those who lived beneath the tyranny and the gloom of the feudal domination. In their struggle with those inscrutable enigmas of our mortal being, they yielded up their minds to a long succession of superstitious terrors; and the legends of those ages abound with prodigies far more strange than those with which Livy has made us familiar. Men were gazing anxiously on the stars which were ready to fall and crush this antiquated globe. They laid on their own bodies the miraculous impression of the Holy Cross. Nuns and hermits, returning from their cells, alarmed the world with fearful anticipations. The saints, quitting their celestial abodes, reappeared on earth, to disclose to trembling man the awful behests of his Creator. Throughout the whole of Eastern Europe, flagellants exhibited to admiring crowds their self-lacerated bodies.’—Pp. 186, 187.

To this twofold motive, then—the ‘worldly’ and the ‘moral’—Sir James Stephen assigns the institution and sustentation of the Crusades. The statement appears to us unsatisfactory, and the cause defective. To the latter agency the Lecturer would necessarily ascribe the preponderance of motive power; since he confesses the inadequacy of the former so much as ‘chiefly’ to have developed the Crusades. Can we, then, assign to such a moral or religious cause the chief production of such a movement? Would it have sufficed for its maintenance during a period of one hundred and fifty years? If superstition could have wrought, for so long a time, an adequate influence on the ruder classes—which there is good reason to doubt—what degree of influence would it have exerted upon the superior ranks of life, in which the movement of the Crusades must have been mainly directed, after the transient political motives, which might have animated the few, had passed away? Above all, could a superstitious sentiment have originally given birth to this moral and pervading spirit? And if so, can any adequate cause be assigned for its production from religious elements, at a definite epoch, among the many centuries of mediæval superstition; while at that epoch—and at that epoch alone—as we shall see, a new and powerful agency was rising into view?

Here, then, we come to M. Guizot’s definition of the Causes of the Crusades, which he characterises as the moral and the social. To the moral cause, indeed, Sir James Stephen has done justice, and, we suspect, more than justice. But the absence from his lectures of all consideration of the social cause renders his view of this movement essentially defective; and we cannot

but express our surprise that any writer should presume to treat the subject of the Crusades without having considered the views propounded by so deep a philosopher as M. Guizot; or, having done so, that he should have profited so little by their consideration. Crude theories propounded by earlier writers, and more matured reflections from later authors, are in accordance with the laws of nature; nor can we, in such cases, justly complain of the imperfect philosophy which may thus be at first recorded. But Sir James Stephen has inverted the natural order; and instead of adding to a fabric of constructive reasoning, he breaks the chain of progressive thought by introduction of what we can only term, retrogressive reflection.

Let M. Guizot, then, state his view of the magnitude of that social influence which impelled mediæval Europe to the policy of the Crusades:—

‘J’ai cherché à montrer comment les états, les existences, les esprits, s’étaient renfermés dans un horizon fort étroit. Ainsi le régime féodal avait prévalu. Au bout de quelque temps, un horizon si borné ne suffit plus; la pensée et l’activité humaine aspirèrent à déposer la sphère où elles étaient renfermées. La vie errante avait cessé; mais non le goût de son mouvement, des aventures. Les peuples se précipitèrent dans les croisades comme dans une nouvelle existence, plus large, plus variée, qui tantôt rappelait l’ancienne liberté de la barbarie, tantôt ouvrait les perspectives d’une vaste avenir.’—*Hist. Gen. de la Civil. en Europe*, c. 8.

This single quotation will serve very imperfectly to illustrate M. Guizot's views; and we must refer the reader to the chapter in which it is contained. But it may suffice to imply the marvellous clearness of perception, and the soundness of logical deduction, which has marked this great man's research into those conditions of society, and those workings of the human mind, which, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, developed the genius of the Holy Wars. Nor is it possible to resist the conviction, that Sir James Stephen has overlooked the most influential of the causes which he desires to enumerate.

The statement, however, which the Lecturer offers us on the subject of the anti-feudal influences wrought by the Crusades is characterised by greater accuracy, and a nearer approach to completeness of detail. It will not, at least, mislead those whom it is intended to instruct. That, in point of the natural ability it may evince, it will not bear a comparison with the statement of M. Guizot, could scarcely involve a slur on any living author. But that they fall short of the completeness which M. Guizot's lectures display, is a defect not easily to be condoned in a Professor who might have instructed his pupils in the very terms of the great philosopher of history, without extending the compass of his narration.

We will pass from this subject to a later portion of the
NO. XCIII.—N.S.

volumes before us; for it may be said that an author is apt to gain caution and reflection, under the experience with which the composition of a work of considerable prolixity must necessarily endow him. We will take, then, Sir James Stephen's disquisition on the relative growth of the English and French monarchies. It is a subject to which it may be fairly supposed that he may have devoted anterior thought and more earnest reflection.

Let us first state the general principles, as arising out of a scheme of Divine Government of the world, to which the Lecturer traces the gradually diverging characteristics of the European nations, as they rose from their primitive barbarism to a state of modern civilisation:—

'I have already avowed my belief, that to each of the nations of the earth belongs, by a divine decree, a *distinctive character* adapted to the peculiar office assigned to each, in the great and comprehensive system of human affairs. Thus, to France was appointed, by the Supreme Ruler of mankind, the duty of *civilising and humanising the European world*. To England it has been given to guide all other states to excellence in the *practical arts of life, to commercial wealth, to political wisdom, and to spiritual liberty*.'—Vol. ii. pp. 473.

In what degree, then, are these attributes distinctive? To France, as we have seen, was assigned the destiny of 'civilising' other nations. Now Civilisation has three principal elements:—the material, the social, and the intellectual. To France, therefore, must be assigned the development of the 'practical arts of life,' as the condition or offspring of material civilisation—of 'commercial wealth,' as the condition or offspring of social civilisation—and of 'political wisdom' and 'spiritual liberty,' as the condition or offspring of intellectual civilisation. But the attributes of these three elements of the 'distinctive characteristic' of France have been asserted to be the 'distinctive characteristics' of England. Hence, the characteristics of England and those of France are identical. And yet they are distinctive. Thus, according to Sir James Stephen, they are at once identical and distinctive!

But this is not all. The author proceeds with his theory in the following words:—

'But to Germany was delegated the highest and the noblest trust that has been committed to any people since the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Romans fulfilled their respective commissions of imparting to our race the blessings of religion, of learning, and of law. For, in Germany, we revere the *prolific mother of nations, the reformer of a corrupted Christianity, and the conservator of the liberties and independence of the European Commonwealth*.'—P. 473.

First then, it was the idiosyncrasy of Germanic destiny, that Germany should be 'the prolific mother of nations.' This may,

perhaps, be understood either in a physical or a moral sense. In a physical sense, however, the assertion implies a misconception of the plainest canons of ethnology. The assertion, indeed, might be true of the original stem of the great Indo-Germanic race; but in what degree is Germany more nearly identified with that race than many other nations? The only modern nations, in the formation of which the Germanic family can be said to have wrought any considerable influence, are the English and the French. What influence did '*Germany*'—and we are not speaking of the wider term of *Teutonism*—exert in the creation of the Slavonic, of the Scandinavian race—of the races of Italy—of the three nations of the Western Peninsula (the Castilian, the Catalan, and the Gallician)—or of twenty others?

If, again, this term be understood in a moral sense, it could only relate to the civilising influence of Germany over Europe. But this distinctive attribute of Germany has been already claimed as the distinctive attribute, first of France, and then of England.

Again: the Lecturer gives us a list of the moral qualities appertaining to Germany—in contradistinction with the moral qualities of France and England—and so appertaining because they have formed the traditionary attributes of the Teutonic mind. But he tells us that (pp. 487, 495) the elements of the national mind of England have also been always those of the Teutonic mind. Therefore, the moral qualities which are German in contradistinction with English are also German in common with English!

Secondly, it was the idiosyncrasy of Germanic destiny, that Germany should be 'the reformer of a corrupted Christianity.' Now, Sir James Stephen has said that it was the exclusive destiny of England to 'guide all other states to spiritual liberty.' Spiritual liberty and reformed Christianity are not, indeed, identical in the abstract. But it is certain, at least, that the chief means by which this country 'guided other states to spiritual liberty' were, by 'reforming Christianity.' And it is also certain that Germany, in 'reforming Christianity,' did, in a high degree, 'guide other states to spiritual liberty.' What becomes, then, of the asserted antagonism, in this point of view, between the destiny of England and that of Germany?

But, even waiving this self-contradiction, the assertion itself militates against fact. It may be true, indeed, that Germany effected much towards the reformation of Christianity; but the statement that Germany was, distinctively (and therefore in exclusion of other nations in anything like an equal degree), the reformer of Christianity, is the most extraordinary misconception of fact that we happen to have ever read. The leading

individual reformers who were German in origin, and who laboured in Germany, were comparatively few. The wars undertaken, and the sufferings endured, in the cause of the Reformation, were as numerous and as extensive in France as in Germany. The Bohemian movement in favour of the Reformation was not German, but Sclavonic. The success achieved by the Reformers in this country, was by far greater than that which attended the Germans (even inclusively of Bohemia); for here it was universal and complete. In Germany, on the other hand, it was partial in point of numbers, and even deficient in point of security. In what possible point of view, then, can a nation, traditionally divided between Catholic and Protestant, be distinctively the reformer of Christianity? And while our own Reformation was mainly effected early in the sixteenth century, and was soon afterwards immovably secured, can Sir James Stephen be ignorant of the imperfect nature of the securities offered for the Reformed Religion in Germany, by the Treaties of Passau, of Augsburg, and even of Westphalia?

There is, in truth, one point of religious distinctiveness which may be claimed for Germany. That nation has been essentially the 'prolific mother' of heresies. It is, we fear, only by a very comprehensive latitudinarianism that Germany can be said, at this day, to retain the character which she once possessed (though not distinctively, as Sir James asserts), of a 'reformer of a corrupted Christianity.' For, with the revolution of three centuries of time, it would be well if she would begin another Reformation which should proceed from a different quarter. The services of Germany in protesting against the errors of Rome, have been neutralized by worse errors of an opposite character; and it may be with reason apprehended that few nations, at this hour, are further removed from the purity of Christian truth.

But, *thirdly*, we read it was the idiosyncrasy of Germanic destiny, that Germany should be the 'conservator of the liberties and independence of the European commonwealth.' Judging, as we necessarily must, of these characteristics of Germany by the acts of her governments, who wield her power, it is certain that she has done far more for the subjugation of those 'liberties,' and that 'independence,' than for their maintenance. Thus, up to the period of the Treaty of Constance, an indefinite territorial aggrandisement, and an open defiance of national rights, constituted the policy of the Holy Roman empire. Thus, again, the policy of Charles V. developed a similar character. Thus, too, the policy of the elder and the younger Ferdinand aimed at the subversion of the European system. Sentiments repugnant to such a policy, and acts

stronger than any sentiments, were undoubtedly developed by large sections of the German people, at the two later periods to which we refer. But it is obviously true that the political acts resulting from the existence of Germany have been, at different periods, far more strongly directed to the subjugation than to the independence of Europe.

One word more upon this theory. Sir James Stephen asserts that 'each nation of the earth' has its own distinctive characteristics. But he has *absorbed almost all possible national characteristics* in the *three nations* of Germany, France, and England. And not only so; but he has absorbed them, as we have seen, *in each of these nations*. What distinctive characteristics, then, can he find for Italy, Spain, Sweden, Holland, and twenty other nations whom he authorizes to demand them at his hands? Had not Spain and Venice a high claim to an European influence in 'commercial wealth,'—Switzerland and Sweden in 'spiritual liberty,'—Sweden, again, and Holland, in 'international liberties,'—Italy and Spain in imaginative thought (as one element of the 'civilisation' exclusively assigned to France),—Italy, again, and Holland, in the arts,—and many of these in a more than equal degree with the nations to whom the Lecturer appropriates such qualities?

Let us revert, then, from matters of reasoning to matters of fact; and see whether Sir James Stephen is, on other subjects, more fortunate in the domain of history than in that of logic. We will consider the account which the Lecturer has given of the Anglo-Saxon Constitution.

Whatever may be the character of the erudition displayed by Sir James concerning the history of France, we had expected to find that the final divergence of these lectures to the political character of the Anglo-Saxon age would be marked by less of misconception and of error. But the essay in question contains somewhat less of historical accuracy than Sir E. Bulwer Lytton's poem of 'King Arthur.' Our information on this subject is, in very many points of view, defective, contradictory, or uncertain. It is thus impossible—although, again, there are many positions which we may fully establish—to form a complete scheme of Anglo-Saxon polity. But Sir James is evidently a writer of too fertile an imagination to be daunted by any want of historical facts. He supplies us with every link in the chain of government, with a precision in detail, and a dogmatism in narration, which a disquisition upon the reigns of the Tudors would have barely justified. The rigour with which he subordinates every stubborn fact to the consistency of the theory with which he has set out, is only equal to the ready facility with which he fills each eternal vacuum in

the Saxon annals, or confides, for matters of fact, in the conceptions of his own creative fancy.

First, then, the most prominent and important assertion in this essay involves an anachronism of nearly three hundred years. The author has contrived to confound the political features of two periods of Anglo-Saxon history, remote from each other in character and in time. He speaks of the Heptarchy, or Octarchy, as existing in subordination to a central government under Athelstane in the tenth century:—

‘But in the persons of Athelstane and his successors, the Anglo-Saxon realms were united into one confederation, though not incorporated into one kingdom. Over these confederate states (the Octarchy) reigned a sovereign to whom his people gave the name of Brettwalda—that is, the wielder or ruler of Britain. Thus, Athelstane was Brettwalda of the whole of Albion. The men of Kent and the men of Sussex were alike his subjects; but they were not fellow-citizens. *He was not only the king of eight adjacent and rival states, but was also the mediator between them.*—Vol. ii. p. 476.

The same allusion to the existence of the Octarchy, in this period, is to be found in other passages.

Now, it is clear from this passage, and from the context, that Sir James Stephen imagines the later form of Anglo-Saxon government, which witnessed the aggregation of the chief executive power of England under a single head, as a constructive development of the earlier form, which had exhibited the spectacle of an un-united Octarchy, or of eight kingdoms independent of each other. Scarcely any supposition can be more erroneous. Between these two periods, the Heptarchy, or Octarchy, was destroyed by conquest. Egbert, who was the contemporary and imitator of Charlemagne, annihilated the integrity of this system, and probably was the first to shadow forth the office of Brettwalda, as a distinct principle of government. ‘The men of Kent and Surrey, and the East Saxons and South Saxons, considered him as their deliverer from the unlawful power of the Mercians, and from the strange kings whom the Mercians had imposed on them,’ &c. (Sir F. Palgrave's *Rise and Progress of Eng. Com.* c. 18.) The success of Egbert, however, was incomplete; and, as Mr. Hallam says, in his Supplemental Notes, ‘the reduction of England under one sovereign was by Edward the Elder, who, therefore, was the founder of our monarchy more justly than Egbert.’ The assertions of these writers are based upon unquestionable authorities, whereas the Lecturer offers no corroboration whatever. So much, then, first, for Sir James Stephen's theory of a constructive constitutional development; and, secondly, for a assignment of this aggregation of power to the person of elstane in the first instance.

But, independently of this intervening revolution, 'Athelstane and his successors' were not 'placed in authority over eight rival states, each with its peculiar king,' as Sir James tells us, for the very sufficient reason that there were, in their day, no such states, and no such kings. The system of the Octarchy had then been long abolished. The Saxon Chronicle tells us indeed, 'that Athelstane ruled the kings in the Island.' But of the four potentates of any kind which it enumerates, there is but one within the limits of the then extinguished Octarchy who is designated as a king; while a second was king of Scotland, a third, king of Wales; and the fourth styled, not as a king, but as a feudal chief. Sir F. Palgrave, moreover, shows (cclxv.) that the king of Wales maintained his independence; and there is no doubt that the king of Scotland was independent also—a discrepancy which we may explain under the supposition that the Chronicle spoke of 'England' under the term of 'the island.' The one king and the feudal chief would then alone remain to constitute the Lecturer's Octarchy of kings. Sir James, on the other hand, has first taken the aggregate of the English potentates; he has then taken the square of the aggregate; and he has finally taken the double of the square!

If, from the reign of Athelstane, we turn to that of Canute, one of 'his successors,' we find that his government consisted of a *tetrarchy*. One of these four divisions he ruled himself; and the remaining three were governed by Earls whom he appointed to the discharge, like Lords Lieutenants of counties, of the public administration (Sir F. Palgrave, c. 19). What resemblance do we find here either to an Octarchy, in point of numbers, or to 'rival' (p. 476) and 'independent' (p. 484) states in point of political rank?

Sir James Stephen's misconception of the Anglo-Saxon government appears to extend, we regret to say, to nearly all ranks and orders of the state. He defines the Eorls as the titled nobles, and the Ceorls as 'the commons of the realm.' Here he is conclusively contradicted by Mr. Hallam, who shows that 'eorl' and 'ceorl' corresponded to 'gentle' and 'simple;' and that the rank of 'eorl' did not convey any title whatever, until, in a very late period, Anglo-Saxon institutions had been changed by Danish influence. (Suppl. Notes.) Again, his notion of a 'royal caste' requires essential modification; for that caste was exposed to continual revolution. Thus, too, he characterises (p. 488) the Anglo-Saxon constitution, as 'aiming at an equality of rights, and not at an equality of conditions.' Can any description be more erroneous, when the slaves, who are acknowledged universally to have been destitute of political rights, constituted probably the bulk of the community?

Nothing, moreover, can be more monstrously inaccurate than this writer's view of the constitutional relations of the component states of England, as exhibiting 'much of the character of a congress of independent powers' (p. 484). Indeed, there is good reason to doubt whether constitutional relations were in that day in any degree susceptible of legal definition. We learn from Sir F. Palgrave (c. 19), that the Sub-Reguli held their offices 'by grace of the Brettwalda;' and again, that even under the reign of Egbert, 'Wiglaf of Mercia accepted his kingdom as a benefice from the 'Conqueror.' These, and many other statements, clearly imply nothing more than feudal relations; and feudal relations, too, dependent (Pal. c. 21) more on strength than on law. 'It is 'impossible,' says Mr. Hallam, 'to define the subordination of 'different kingdoms, where any subordination existed.' But even conceding the existence of the strictest constitutional relations, the Lecturer's definition of them is, on his own showing, very inaccurate. 'In the Anglo-Saxon king, or Brettwalda,' he tells us, 'resided in theory (if not in fact) all the powers of the state.' And this, because the Wittenagemote was summoned, and its laws were enacted, in his name. But he tells us, again, that the local Wittenagemote of each component state had the power of rejecting, and did frequently reject, the laws of the general Wittenagemote, and this power of rejection was in no way derived from the Brettwalda. There must have existed, therefore, co-ordinate powers with those of the Brettwalda, in direct antagonism to his own, at once 'in theory' and 'in fact.' The powers of the different States, if this description were true, could no more spring from the Brettwalda, than those of the Germanic States, in 1848, from the Administrator at Frankfurt. The Lecturer further illustrates the relation of the central to the local government, on the analogy of the constitution of the United States (p. 476). It would have been difficult to have found a more inappropriate comparison. The component states of the great American commonwealth possess no right of rejecting the law of the Central Congress; and the analogy, therefore, subsides into a direct contrast. Thus, again, if Sir James Stephen had consulted either ancient documents, or Sir Francis Palgrave's writings, on the question of the hereditary descent of the crown, which he considers as essentially analogous to its descent at this hour, he would have seen that a special act of the Legislature was almost invariably deemed essential to the validity of the succession. The crown, therefore, was rather elective than hereditary. Theganus tells us the same of the Merovingian France.

2 will take one other instance of Sir James Stephen's

process of reasoning. It shall be his theory of the Divine Right of Kings, with which his volumes conclude:—

'From the days of Alfred and of Athelstane, to these days, our sovereigns have reigned (every lover of our national liberties will acknowledge, *if wise*, that they have reigned) by Divine Right. There is a deep and generous philosophy, as well as a more than human wisdom, in the apostolic canon, "that the powers which be are ordained of God"—the powers symbolized whether by the staff of the constable, or by the crown of the monarch.'—Vol. ii. pp. 491, 492.

This theory, then, acknowledges a co-ordinate divine right in all possessors of actual power; and, as an inevitable deduction, invests Marat and Robespierre with a corresponding sacred and superhuman authority with Louis XVI. and George III. Who, therefore, can regard the theory of the Divine Right of Kings, as it is enunciated by this author, as conveying any moral force, or as entitling the subjects of such a right to any respect, *as such*?

'The servile maxims,' Sir James continues, 'for which that doctrine has been made the pretext, are not legitimate deductions from it. They proceed upon a total misapprehension of its real meaning. That meaning is, that all human power is indissolubly connected with a *corresponding responsibility* both to God as its author, and to man as the subject of it.'

How does he arrive at this 'corresponding responsibility to God and man?' If man has no share in the investiture of authority, how can a king so acknowledge his subordination as to be responsible to him, conjunctively with his responsibility to the Almighty? If there is, as this theory inevitably implies, an exclusively divine right, how can there be a human right also? To say that a king may be responsible to God for his conduct towards man, is an intelligible proposition. Yet it is a proposition no more true of a king than of the meanest slave. But Sir James Stephen's position, on the other hand, is simply equivalent to asserting that there is an authority, and that there is not an authority.—To this endless concatenation of inconsistencies, then, we are told that, 'if wise' (p. 491), we must subscribe. And it is our acquiescence in reasoning such as this, that is to be held up as the condition and the evidence of our speculative sagacity! The disposition of Sir James Stephen to identify philosophical truth with his own opinions, pervades, indeed, the whole of these volumes, which he here aptly concludes with these violently illogical propositions, in illustration of his own distinctive wisdom.

Here, then, we close this subject. We trust that our observations are not characterised by any gratuitous discourtesy. But it will have been seen that there are other considerations

involved in these volumes than either mis-statements of fact, or the strangest incoherences of speculative thought. To say that such a work will never be regarded as authoritative in this or any other country, would, indeed, appear a truism. But we may declare that we have dealt fairly and impartially with every passage which we have criticised; that we have endeavoured to select the subjects of our criticism with equal justice; and that in many other portions of these Lectures we could have pointed to statements not less obnoxious to dispraise. We deem it a duty to the literature in which we hold a place, fairly to discuss the characteristics of this work; and content with its discharge, we leave our justification with confidence in the hands of the public.

But, as concerns the University of Cambridge, the result is essentially different. It is scarcely flattering to our national character, that while the most powerful philosophical and historical treatises are issuing from the Universities of Northern Germany and of France, such a work as this should emanate from a Professor of the Queen in that illustrious Academy. It is not, however, in Cambridge alone, as we have already said, that this writer holds a position of authority in historical education. We deem it only right to submit, then, that this is not a fit 'text-book' at once for England, and for India. And it is by much too bad that such a work should be perpetuated both in evidence of the critical acumen of our own Universities, and as a book of reference for the rising generation.

ART. II.—1. *Judgment pronounced in the Consistory Court of London, by the Right Hon. S. Lushington, LL.D., &c.*

2. *A Letter to the Right Hon. Dr. Lushington, &c.* By HENRY LORD BISHOP OF EXETER. London: Murray. 1856.

3. *Strictures, Legal and Historical, on the Judgment of the Consistory Court, London, in December, 1855, in the Case of Westerton v. Liddell, &c.* By JOHN DAVID CHAMBERS, M.A., Recorder of New Sarum. London: Benning. 1856.

THAT zeal for the glory of God prompted the proceedings of Mr. Westerton and the party whom he represents against the ornaments at Pimlico, can scarcely be imagined even by those who, on the old Puritanical principles, sincerely object to such things. It is too evident that a desire to oppose others was the moving principle in the whole business; and the promoters of the suit must secretly smile at the position which, in the estimation of some persons, they now occupy as defenders of the faith. We, however, doubt whether Mr. Westerton and his friends are really members of the Church of England, since it is no uncommon thing for Dissenters to get themselves chosen as churchwardens for the sake of opposing the clergy. When the mob take up a matter about which they can know nothing, the originators of the movement cannot expect that their conduct should not lead to a scrutiny of their motives.

Reviewing the whole case, even without reference to the propriety or legality of the matters in dispute, we can come to no other conclusion than that a desire to annoy others, and to obtain notoriety for themselves, as well as to secure a victory over a clergyman, whose acts of kindness will be remembered in the district when his opponents and their crusade are forgotten, encouraged the movers to act in this not very creditable affair. To accomplish their purpose, indeed, pretensions of no ordinary zeal for the Church are obtruded upon the public, though we are by no means certain that the promoters of the suit are not as much opposed to the Church herself as to the clergy at Pimlico. It is certain that some 'whose names are on the back of the Bill' are not members of the Church. That Westerton is a mere *charlatan*, and simply desirous to force himself into notoriety, is clear from his proceedings at a political meeting held in the spring at S. Martin's Hall.

But our business is with the Judgment in the Consistorial Court, and with the arguments on which it was grounded. According to the decision of the Court, it is simply unlawful to place a cross of any kind near the Altar, or in the Chancel,

even as an ornament. We say, as an ornament, for the Court has decided that it is not to be regarded as an image. This decision simplifies the matter; for by declaring the cross to be only an ornament, the arguments in the Homilies respecting images cannot be brought to bear upon the case, nor can the promoters of the suit appeal to the Homilies in the inquiry. Dr. Lushington's decision, therefore, reduces the matter to this simple question, Is the cross an ornament forbidden by law, or is its rejection or adoption within the discretion of the ordinary? Our business will be to establish the latter position. The Court admitted that there was no express prohibition; but it adopted the extraordinary position, that everything not expressly enjoined is forbidden—a position which must, if allowed, overturn many of our present practices, and bring us into a state of utter confusion. Our present inquiry relates not to the propriety or impropriety of crosses in churches—how a Christian can upon principle object to the symbol of salvation is past our comprehension—but to the strange assertion of Dr. Lushington, that crosses were removed from all churches before the end of Elizabeth's reign, and that such as were afterwards found in them had been replaced under the influence of Archbishop Laud.

It may, however, be well, before we enter upon the historical inquiry, to glance at the arguments in the Homilies respecting images, in order to ascertain whether the Reformers gave evidence of any hostility to the figure of the cross in churches; for, notwithstanding the decision of the Court, there are persons who view it as a superstitious image.

Undoubtedly, the Homilies condemn the general use of images in churches, or rather the adoration of them. Following Holy Scripture, and adhering to primitive practice, the Church of England condemns as unlawful the use of images for superstitious purposes. Against such use the Homilies are expressly directed. It is, however, evident that the Reformers, in speaking strongly against images, referred only to such as had been, or such as might be, abused. That the abuse only was intended is evident from the fact that vast numbers of images or pictures (and the terms are used indiscriminately) remained until the period of the Long Parliament; while many exist in our churches at the present time. It is expressly stated in the Homily, that at that time the churches were *clean scoured* of images; consequently, such only as had been abused could have been intended.¹

¹ The passage in 'The Homily concerning the Time and Place of Prayer,' respecting singing and organs, explains the meaning of the framers with respect to other things which had not been abused. If the argument be that organs are forbidden by the Homilies, the reply is, that they were not removed from churches; consequently, such could not have been the intention. Organs and pictures were permitted to remain; but all idolatrous practices were abolished. The Homilies,

The Reformers comprehended under the general term images, not only statues of wood and stone, but all figures painted on glass, or other material. Such as had been abused were designated *monuments of superstition and idolatry*; but in this designation they did not comprehend statues and figures on glass to which no adoration had been paid. Moreover, it is worthy of observation, that the cross is not mentioned in the Homilies in connexion with images; consequently, whatever may be said against the latter, it is clear that the former was not in the minds of the framers of the Homilies. This is a point of great importance in our inquiry, since some persons, whose zeal exceeds their knowledge, are disposed to include in the censure of the Homilies everything which their own disturbed imaginations may regard as superstitious, just as many others consider all practices as Popish which they themselves dislike.

Images of God the Father were entirely prohibited, while such other figures as had been abused were removed. Beyond this limit the prohibition did not extend; for many images or pictures of Saints remained in the churches, and still remain in various places. The cross also remained; and notwithstanding Dr. Lushington's decision, we contend that, in the absence of any express law, the custom long-continued settles the question.¹

The injunctions of Queen Elizabeth must be interpreted by the same rule. When they ordered the removal of all monuments of superstition, such only as had been abused were intended. We may fairly infer that such representations as were permitted to remain, were not contemplated by the royal injunctions. Sometimes the injunctions are alleged to prove that paintings in windows are prohibited by the Church. 'Shrines, coverings of shrines, candlesticks, pictures, paintings, and all other monuments of feigned miracles, idolatry, and superstition, are specified. All such things were to be destroyed, so that there remain no memory of the same on walls, glass-windows, or elsewhere.' The royal Visitation Articles were framed in accordance with the injunctions; and as many images and pictures were destroyed, we may reasonably conclude that such as were permitted to remain were not intended by the

therefore, are as much against organs as pictures; and, as the former were never removed, we argue that it was not the intention to destroy any of the latter, except such as had been abused. The Homilies assert, that organs and images had been removed; yet we know that both remained; the inference is, that the abuse of the latter had been abolished. At all events, if the Homilies are pleaded against crosses, which they do not mention, they must be pleaded against organs, which they do mention. By the Puritans they were pleaded against both.

¹ A writer who was strongly opposed to all innovations, admits that images were lawful in churches, though he considered them dangerous. 'I come to the second thing, that images may be placed in temples, a thing I confess lawful, but dangerous.'—Yates's *Ibis ad Cæsarem*, 1626, p. 18.

Queen's advisers. Moreover, the cross, which is not even mentioned, could not have been included. We shall presently see that vast numbers of paintings and crosses existed in 1640, which had remained since the Reformation. Besides, it can scarcely be supposed, as the Lutherans retained not only the cross, but also the crucifix as well as images, that our Reformers, who had such respect for the Confession of Augsburg, intended to remove anything which had not been abused in the preceding times.¹

We now proceed to consider Dr. Lushington's strange assertion respecting crosses. The judgment is, that the cross is unlawful because it is not prescribed. The consequences involved in this singular opinion will appear as we proceed in our inquiry. He then states, that all crosses were removed from churches before the end of the reign of Elizabeth, and that they were revived in many places by the influence of Archbishop Laud. He first asserts, that all crosses were gradually removed from churches under Elizabeth; and then he assumes, that such as existed in 1640 had been introduced by Laud. We mean to show that crosses existed in churches from the period of the Reformation. Dr. Lushington's assertion is contrary to facts, as we shall demonstrate; and thus the judgment, founded upon his own assumptions, falls to the ground.²

¹ 'It took a middle course—first to condemn all manner of adoration or worship of them; but whereas some use might be made of them for remembrance of histories past, to retain in sundry parts such windows and pictures, as might, without offence, instruct the ignorant, which, if any man since hath been offended at, it must be on other grounds than I understand.'—Twisden's *Vindication of the Church of England*, p. 187. That the first Reformers intended no general destruction of crosses, or even images, beyond such as were abused to superstitious purposes, is obvious from the Act of the 1st year of Elizabeth, restraining persons from interfering on their own authority. It serves also to interpret the Homilies and injunctions. Thus it enacts, that no person should destroy 'of their own power and authority any altar, or any crucifix, or cross, that now or hereafter shall be in any church, chapel, or churchyard.'—*Collection of Statutes from Magna Charta to the thirty-fifth year of Elizabeth*, p. 407. Altars were removed by authority, but crosses never were; consequently, by this Act they may be said to be allowed where they existed; and even a power is implied, at least, of setting them up in future. The Act of Uniformity of Queen Elizabeth, as well as the Rubric, establishes the ornaments in use in Edward's second year. Her Act is confirmed by that of 1662. And though no ornaments of churches are specified in the Act of Edward, yet we may rest assured that a meaning was attached to Elizabeth's, and that ornaments were used in Edward's second year. These, therefore, are confirmed by Elizabeth. Now, we know that candlesticks were used, and sometimes crosses, in his second year; consequently, they are now allowed under the direction of the ordinary.

² The Queen's Proclamation, restraining the excesses in pulling down images, confirms the view here taken. In short, the whole of the documents to which we have referred, admit of no other construction than that which we have put upon them. Thus the Proclamation alluding to the orders for removing images distinctly states, that authority was only given 'to deface monuments of idolatry and false fained images in the churches and abbeyes.' It then orders, that no one should 'break any image in glass windows in any churches, without consent of the ordinary;' evidently meaning, that the ordinary would ascertain whether anything

It may be necessary to remark in the outset, that no distinction is made between a cross painted on glass, and a cross of wood or metal in a screen, or a cross wrought upon a cloth. Dr. Lushington makes no distinction between such crosses; but he decides that all are unlawful. Now, without asserting the general use of crosses, it is sufficient for our purpose to prove that they existed in many churches, and that there was no prohibition against them; for it will thus be obvious that they were altogether within the discretion of the ordinary. Our position is, that the cross in churches is a matter of indifference in the eye of the law, neither enjoined nor prohibited, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the bishop. We find, accordingly, that crosses ever existed. We do not mean to assert that the same feeling existed at all times. At one time the bishops and clergy may have been more zealous in the matter than at another. During one generation, crosses on tapestry on the east wall, or on the frontal, may have been permitted to fade; in the next, they may have been restored or replaced by new ones. So in one generation crosses on screens may have been allowed to go somewhat to decay; in the next, they may have been repaired and re-gilded. Their condition depended on the feelings of the bishops and clergy, who may have evinced more zeal at one time than at another; while by some bishops a stronger desire to preserve them was manifested than by others.¹

The matter is a very simple one. The thing itself is indifferent in the eye of the law; and the question rests with the ordinary. In the absence of any law, we can only be guided by custom; and from the Reformation, it has been the practice to have crosses in many churches; consequently, it is lawful to have them in any. If, as is now argued by some persons, the bare sight of a cross may cause men to rush into Popery, how was it that our an-

had been abused.—Wilkins, iv. 221. Fuller observes of this Proclamation, 'Her princely care took this desired effect, that it stopped the main stream of sacrilege therein, though some by-rivulets thereof ran still in private churches, in defiance of all orders provided to the contrary.'—Church History, lib. ix. 67.

¹ The case in the diocese of Lincoln, under Bishop Barlow, does not bear on our present inquiry; yet we notice it here, lest it should be urged, either that we were ignorant of it, or intentionally avoided any allusion to the matter. We repeat, that it bears not upon our inquiry, because it relates only to images, while we are concerned only with crosses and ornaments. In Barlow's case, the churchwardens, without any authority, set up images or pictures of the Apostles. The bishop ordered their removal, when the churchwardens commenced proceedings in the Court of Arches against his lordship. The case was, however, stopped. The churchwardens had acted contrary to law, since they had proceeded without the consent of the ordinary, 'or the general consent of the parish.' Barlow wrote out his case, and it was afterwards published. It relates only to images, not to the cross or ornaments.—Barlow's Cases of Conscience, No. 1692. The 'Breviate the case of Setting up of Images,' was published in a separate form during the discussions connected with Welton and the altar-piece at Whitechapel.

cestors escaped, who certainly were not alarmed at such things? Indeed, if the mere view of the simple emblem of our profession is sufficient to send a man to Rome, he is not likely to be retained by its removal. But such absurd notions are propagated only to answer an end, and for party purposes; for no one can believe that the figure of the cross can foster image-worship or superstition, though it may serve the purpose of certain persons to say so.¹

It is admitted by Dr. Lushington that Queen Elizabeth retained in her own chapel, not the cross, but a crucifix. At that period there were divisions of opinion on such matters, as there are in the present day, yet no one argued that even the crucifix was absolutely unlawful. The fact relative to the crucifix, is recorded in all our histories. Some contemporary writers speak of it with sorrow, yet the illegality is not even hinted. In 1559, Jewell, writing to Peter Martyr, says, 'That little silver cross, of ill-omened origin, still maintains its place in the Queen's chapel. This thing will soon be drawn into a precedent. There was at one time some hope of its being removed; and we all of us diligently exerted ourselves, and still continue to do, that it might be so. But, as far as I can perceive, it is now a hopeless case.' A year later, Sampson, writing to Martyr, says, 'What can I hope for while the crucifix is allowed with lights burning before it? The altars, indeed, are removed, and images also throughout the kingdom; the crucifix and candles are retained at court alone.' Yet Sampson saw no more Popery in the crucifix than in the bishop's robes, which he calls in the same letter, 'the golden vestments of the Papacy.' In 1560, Parkhurst writes to Bullinger, 'I wrote you word that the cross, wax candles and candlesticks had been removed from the Queen's chapel; but they were shortly after brought back again, to the great grief of the godly. The candles heretofore were lighted every day, but now not at all.'²

The Reformers differed among themselves, just as men will differ, respecting such things as crosses and crucifixes. In the Zurich letters we find evidences of their differences. 'We are only constrained,' says Cox, Bishop of Ely, 'to our great distress of mind, to tolerate in our churches the image of the cross and

¹ We do not enter upon the question of stone altars; though we do not doubt that the Committee of Privy Council will take the common-sense view, namely, that the material is of no importance. Dr. Lushington did not feel himself at liberty to enter at large upon the question, because the Consistorial Court is bound by the decision of the Court of Arches in the Cambridge case. He ventured, however, to express his concurrence in that decision. What that decision was is often forgotten. Sir H. Fust did not prohibit stone altars; still less did he authorize their removal. He only declined to issue a faculty to permit the erection of one.

² Zurich Letters, i. pp. 55, 63, 129.

‘Him who was crucified.’ And Jewell, in 1560, says to Peter Martyr, ‘This controversy about the crucifix is now at its height. You would scarcely believe to what a degree of insanity some persons have been carried upon so foolish a subject. A disputation upon this subject will take place to-morrow. The Moderators will be persons selected by the Council. The disputants on the one side, are the Archbishop of Canterbury and Cox; and on the other, Grindal and myself. As far as I can conjecture, I shall not write to you again as a bishop; for matters are come to that pass, that either the crosses of silver and tin, which we have everywhere broken in pieces, must be restored, or our bishoprics relinquished.’ In the same year Cox says to George Cassander, ‘There is no open quarrel, but yet there does not exist an entire agreement among us with respect to setting up the crucifix in churches. Some think it allowable, provided only that no worship or veneration be paid to the image itself; others are of opinion that all images are so universally forbidden, that it is altogether sinful for any to remain in churches. But we are in that state, that no crucifix is to be seen in any of our churches.’¹

Cox, it appears, wrote to Cassander for his opinion on the subject. The latter was uncertain whether the inquiry related to the figure of the cross, or to the image upon it. ‘I understand that you are not altogether agreed among yourselves with respect to the setting up the image of the cross or the crucifix in the church; but I do not sufficiently understand whether the question refers to the mere figure of a cross, or also to the image of Christ hanging upon it. I have seen a certain print which contained a cross only, with some texts of Holy Scripture in the English language on each side, whence I suspect that your question only refers to the figure of the cross. You are aware in what frequent use, and in what great esteem, the figure of the cross was held among the early Christians, and this too before the practice of setting up other images in the churches. They made a great distinction between the figure of the cross and all other images. This observance I am unwilling should be regarded as superstitious, though I would have the superstition of the people to be repressed and guarded against, and this seems to have been your object in that representation which I saw here.’ It is evident that Cox had sent the print to Cassander for his opinion. The latter suggests a different class of texts, such ‘as explain the mystery and hidden signification of it.’² Cox must have proposed the use of the cross in some way or other, or Cassander could not have replied in such

¹ Zurich Letters, i. pp. 66, 67; ii. 41, 42.
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² Ib. ii. pp. 43, 45.

a strain. It is clear that the simple cross was not disliked by the great body of the Reformers; and the very difference of opinion proves the existence of the thing, and that there was no express law against its use. Dr. Lushington argues that it is unlawful, because not expressly enjoined; yet the Reformers, who are the best interpreters of their own intentions, evidently regarded the use of the cross in a very different light.

Sampson was a violent Puritan, and wrote to Peter Martyr, who says: 'To come to your last question: to have the image of the crucifix upon the Holy Table at the administration of the Lord's Supper I do not count among things indifferent.' Sampson had asked Martyr to write to the Queen. He declines, on the ground of various occupations; suggesting, however, that his letters would be of no avail, since the English were reported to be about to adopt the Confession of Augsburg. 'If, as is reported, it be the determination of your countrymen to embrace the Confession of Augsburg, and court an alliance with the Protestants, you may judge for yourself in what esteem my letters will be held.'¹ The evidence from these letters is very important. The letters show that differences existed on this subject: yet these very differences prove the existence of the cross in churches at that period. The allusion to the Augsburg Confession is also important, as showing the general impression among the foreign Reformers of the views of the Anglican bishops: for though there was no intention of adopting that Confession, yet it is certain that our Reformers did not intend to denounce the practices which it enjoined, and which the Lutherans still retain. In the Lutheran churches the cross and the crucifix still remain. This argument will also apply to the case of Archdeacon Denison: for we may rest assured that our Reformers never intended to condemn either doctrines or practices retained in the Confession of Augsburg.² We are

¹ Zurich Letters, ii. pp. 47, 48.

² In the proceedings which took place after the Restoration, under the Royal Commission, respecting the Liturgy, the bishops, in reply to the objections of the Presbyterians, remark, 'It was never found fault with by those to whom the name of Protestant most properly belongs—those that profess the Augustine Confession.' This was a hard blow at the Presbyterians, who boasted of the name Protestant, yet their brethren on the Continent had not adopted it. The term was applied to the Lutherans, while the term 'Reformed' was assumed by the Presbyterians. Not a few in our own country are still ignorant of the origin and meaning of the name Protestant. It was not adopted by those for whose opinions they express so much sympathy. We cannot resist the temptation to give an extract from an author, who never adopted extreme views, on this word Protestant. Alluding to the opponents of the Church in his day, 1719, he says, 'The word Protestant serves for all ends with them; but who knows what it means more than a protester against the Pope? A man may deny the divinity of Christ, and yet be a true Protestant. And what do they mean by the true Protestant religion? They cannot understand the

now, however, concerned only with the fact, whether the cross, as Dr. Lushington asserts, is unlawful in our churches. As the early Christians held the figure of the cross in such reverence, it would be rash to assert that its use is proscribed by the Church of England, who professed, in her Reformation, to go back to the usages of the primitive times.

The crucifix remained many years in the Queen's Chapel. It was broken in 1571 by the Queen's fool, at the instigation of Sir Francis Knolles. The fact that it was not restored merely shows that the thing was regarded as indifferent, not as unlawful.¹

The sign of the cross in baptism is enjoined by an express Rubric, and explained in the Canon; and no one can honestly minister in the Church of England who objects to its use. It is fair to infer that the Reformers who enjoined the sign could have no objection to the simple figure of the cross: and this view was adopted by the Puritans, many of whom denounced the sign as worse than the material cross. Volumes even were written on this subject, and much labour was employed to prove that the sign was more dangerous than the figure. It was said that the sign was used in a sacrament, in which the minister was an actor and approver; while the figure was merely seen with the eye, and involved no approval on the part of the spectator. If the cross be really obnoxious to blame, this argument was certainly a legitimate one, and one which could not easily be refuted. When the Puritans argued that the sign was made by

religion of Luther, for there are few such in the kingdom; nor of Calvin, for then an infinite number of sects must be excluded; if they design all dissenters from the Church of Rome, they include all religions but that, and make Protestant pagans as well as Protestant Christians. So that our true Protestants are a body of men composed of all religions, provided they do but agree in a common opposition to the Church of Rome. As the word has obtained in the Church of England to signify a member of the Reformation, I confess myself to be a Protestant. Such true Protestants as the canonical sons of the Church I am exceedingly pleased with, both as to name and thing; but as to that adulterate issue who take upon themselves the name of their mother, and yet disclaim her authority and doctrine, they are no other, in my opinion, than so many banditti or debauched branches of a noble family. Yet these men not only value themselves upon their zeal for the king and the Protestant religion, but deliver over to the devil, for plotters and papists, all the true sons of the Church that refuse to join with them.—Lewis on the Consecration of Churches, Preface, pp. vi, viii, ix. Is not this description applicable to some of our own Church, who, because certain of our members are gone to Rome, bring the charge of popery against all who manifest a desire to carry out the obvious intentions of the Church? With these men a Protestant is one who opposes many of the rules and ceremonies of the Church of England.

¹ Heylin's *Presbyterians*, p. 486; *Ecclesia Restaurata*, p. 124. It was broken 'by Pach the fool (no wiser man daring to undertake such a desperate service), at the instigation of Sir Francis Knolles.'—Heylin's *Life of Laud*, p. 15. Parker on *The Cross*, pp. 7, 65; *Fulke's Defence*, &c., pp. 81, 85. Parker says, 'Martial justifieth the popish crosse by the crosse which standeth in the Queen's Chapel,' p. 135. *Strype's Annals*, part i. pp. 259, 262; part ii. pp. 500, 502.

the minister, while the figure was merely seen by the eye, they adopted an argument which no one who denounces the use of the cross in our churches can consistently meet. Like our reforming zealots, the Puritans disliked the cross in every form, but they denounced the sign with more earnestness than the figure.¹

Dr. Lushington affirms that all crosses were removed from churches before the end of the reign of Elizabeth. Hence he argues, that the Reformers were against their use. On this supposition he grounds his decision that they are unlawful. If, then, this position can be overturned by direct and positive evidence, the judgment itself must fall to the ground. If we can prove the existence of crosses in churches from the Reformation to the accession of Charles I., then Dr. Lushington's second assertion, that their use was revived by Archbishop Laud, is disproved.

Since there is no precept, one way or another, the Church having left the matter to the discretion of her bishops, our business will be to ascertain the practice: and to attain our object, we purpose to examine a series of publications from the early part of the reign of Elizabeth down to the period of the Long Parliament. The attacks of the Puritans from time to time will show clearly what was the practice, or what was allowed. If crosses existed, not by express law, but by custom, to 1640, their use was not unlawful. And if the use was not unlawful in 1640, they are not unlawful now. The complaints of the Puritans certainly prove the existence of the things against which their complaints were directed. Of the cross in churches we have numerous complaints from an early period of Elizabeth's reign to 1640.²

¹ 'The aerial cross is worse than another image.' 'Is it not common to sew red crosses under the shrewdes of the dead overright the heart? To lay white crosses upon the beare?' Parker also speaks of the dove over the font, which, according to Dr. Lushington, must be as unlawful as the cross. 'Doe we not crie out upon the dove let downe of old upon the baptized [one of which I saw at Wickham not abolished some 25 years past].' 'The cross aeriall is an image and an idoll as well as the materiall: and in some respects far worse.'—Parker on *The Cross*, folio, 1607, pp. 65-81, 83, 101. Part ii. pp. 138.

² 'Ornaments are recognised by law, though particular things are not specified. It would seem, therefore, that they are to be regulated by the Ordinary. Superstitious pictures cannot be removed without a licence from the Ordinary: and if he is to decide what is superstitious, surely he may decide what is not: and, therefore, a cross would be within his jurisdiction. Ornaments are recognised in various instances, but not specified.—Godolphin's *Ecclesiastical Laws*, pp. 138, 149, 150. 'If a man, who is not any inhabitant within the parish, but hath land there, be rated for the ornaments of the church according to the land, a prohibition lies, for the inhabitants ought to be rated for that.'—*Ib.* p. 152. Such a person is chargeable for 'the reparation of the parish church, but not to the buying of the ornaments of that church, for that should be levied of the goods of the parishioners, and not of their lands.' 'In the case of churchwardens the Chief Justice said,

It is admitted that copes are enjoined by law, and some of them exhibited the figure of the cross, which was seen by the people in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. In 1570 the Puritans ask: 'Doe not the people every where thinke a more grievous fault is committed, if the minister doe celebrate the Lord's Supper, or Baptisme, without a surplesse, or a cope, than if the same through his silence should suffer an hundred souls to perishe?' In the same document they assert that strict laws are made for 'mayntayning abominable images.'¹ In 'A View of Antichrist,' put forth at the same period, among the Popish things said to be retained in the Church, are mentioned, 'Images of the Trinity, and many other monuments of superstition generally in all church windows: the cope in great churches: the organs playing away half of the Psalms: the grey amise with catted tails: silken hoodes upon a surplesse: crossing the corps with linnen cloathes.' In 1573, Dering says, 'Our bishops, our deans, our archdeacons, and some other readier to come into the pulpit than well able to preach, were always crying out against copes, tippets, chaunting, organs, belles, crosses, &c., till they brought the people to this passe you see them, and then ran back againe themselves from their first doctrine.'² Dering seems to allude to some who had

that for the repairing the fabrick of the church the charge is real, and charges the land and not the person: but for the ornaments of the church it is personal: and if a man be not an inhabitant he is not chargeable in respect of his land, for such tax doth charge the goods only.—Pp. 137, 154. 'A man is chargeable for reparation of a church by reason of his land; and for the ornaments in the church by reason of his coming to church.' This was held by Yelverton, while other judges held that the person was chargeable for both, whether he came to church or not.—Ib. p. 157. It is held that a person may have 'his carpet, livery, and cushion' in his seat; why, then, may not the minister introduce ornaments in the chancel with the bishop's consent?—Ib. p. 155. Prideaux published his 'Directions to Churchwardens' in 1701. It was printed at Norwich, and is a book of great rarity. We quote a few passages from this edition, to show that at that time some ornaments were recognised; whereas, according to Dr. Lushington's notion, nothing is allowable which is not enjoined. After an enumeration of certain things to be kept in repair by the churchwardens, he says: 'To which, for greater ornament or decency, are added in many churches, paintings, altar-pieces, rails at the altar,' &c. Among the movable goods of the church he mentions such 'as either the law or else the nature of the things themselves make necessary.' Of these he makes a division, the second comprising such things as are added 'only for the better and more decent administration of the Divine offices.' And among these are, 'a decent pulpit-cloth, a pulpit-cushion, a cloth for the reading-desk, organs, silver basons, branches for lights, candlesticks,' &c.—Prideaux's Directions, 4to., Norwich, 1701. These things are not enjoined by law, they rest with the Ordinary. Now, if the Ordinary can authorize rails at the Communion-table, he may sanction the use of a cross. The Communion-rails and other ornaments, which are not enjoined by law, fall within the discretion of the Ordinary. We argue, therefore, that where the consent of the Ordinary has been obtained the things cannot be removed.

¹ Parte of a Register, p. 45.

² Parte of a Register, pp. 62, 63, 84, 85. In the Act of the 13th of Elizabeth there is this singular clause:—"If any person bring in any token or tokens, thing or

changed their opinions in favour of the ceremonies. Of the particulars we know nothing, but the passage proves the existence of crosses in churches in his day. These passages show that crosses were not disallowed in the earlier portion of the reign of Elizabeth.

Then comes the question—Were they subsequently removed? Dr. Lushington replies in the affirmative: we shall prove the contrary. The same complaint continued throughout the reign, and was unusually loud during the first few years of James I. If crosses were common in churches at the commencement of the reign of James I., they must have existed during that of Queen Elizabeth, and Dr. Lushington's assertion respecting Laud is disproved.

Some years later, in Elizabeth's reign, we meet, in one of the Mar-Prelate tracts, with the following description of a Puritan, which proves that crosses were then common in churches:—

'Whose haire and ruffles dare not his eares exceed:
That on high saints' dayes wears his working weed.
That crosses each doth hate, save on his pence,
And loaths the public robe of penitence.
That in his censure each alike gainsayes,
Poets in pulpits, Holy Writ in playes.
Roods in the windows, and the marriage ring,
The churching vaile, and midwives' christening.
That loves alike an organ in a quire
As th' elephant delights a swine to heare.'¹

At the close of the reign of Elizabeth, in a work which was not published until James's accession, but which embodied the views of all the more rigid Puritans, they charge the Bishop

things, called or named by the name *Agnus Dei*, or any crosses, pictures, beads, &c., from the bishop or See of Rome,' he should incur the penalties of a *Præmunire*. Such things, as the Act states, were hallowed or blessed at Rome; and so were superstitious. The images removed from the churches were of the same character. They had been abused. It is evident that the cross in churches was not so regarded.—Gibson, p. 535. 'A Collection of Statutes, from Magna Charta to the 35th year of Elizabeth,' folio, 1594, p. 96. Our present Church Reformers should bear in mind that their predecessors included many other things in their catalogue of popish enormities. Bishop Cooper tells us that in his day pulpits were comprehended: 'These will have no fonts, but christen children in basins: they will weare no caps nor surplices: many of them will not use the olde pulpits, but have newe made. I marvaile that they use the churches themselves, than which nothing hath bin more prophaned with superstition and idolatrie.'—Cooper's Admonition, p. 97.

¹ A Dialogue, wherein is plainly laid open the Tyrannical Dealing of Lord Bishops, &c. by Dr. Martin Mar-Prelate. Harding charged the men of his day with disliking the cross. Jewell replies: 'Whereas Mr. Harding saith the professors of this new Gospel cannot abide the signe of our Lord's crosse; let him understand it is not the crosse of Christ, nor the signe thereof, that we find fault all, but the superstitious abuse of the crosse.' Jewell, moreover, distinguishes between the cross and an image, as well as between the cross and a crucifix.—*Jewell's Works*. Reply to Harding, 372.

of London with being only fit for 'wearing of a white rochet, 'walking with a pastoral staffe, hallowing of fontes, whyting of 'walles, painting of tombes, preserving of superstitious monuments in glasse windows, repaying and gylding rotten and 'worn out crosses.'¹ This work was drawn up by the Puritans as a reply to 'Cooper's Admonition to the People of England,' and describes the practice of that day, or the state of things in 1590. Here, then, the Bishop of London is charged with regilding a cross, and doubtless the charge is intended to apply to other bishops. The cross must long have existed, or the regilding would not have been necessary. Another allusion in this work illustrates the meaning usually attached to the Royal Injunctions respecting superstitious monuments. 'It is doubted 'whether it were a good manner of ecclesiastical discipline for 'the High Commissioners to command the magistrates of the 'town of Banbury, at the suit of certain companions, to reset 'up a crosse which, by virtue of the Queene's Injunctions, they 'had peaceably and lawfully pulled downe.'²

Similar complaints were constantly made by the Puritans, and as constantly answered by some of the clergy. We have a very remarkable document privately put forth by the Puritans at the commencement of the reign of James I., which, of course, describes the customs and the practices of the preceding reign. This document gives the views of the whole body. It specifies their grievances, and among them the cross is especially mentioned. We give a few extracts:—

¹ An Assertion for True and Christian Church Policie, 1604, p. 430.

² *Ib.* pp. 347, 348. The cross at Banbury was not in the church; but the circumstance shows how the Injunctions were interpreted by those in authority. They were only levelled against such things as had been abused. In a subsequent page we shall prove the growth of popery in consequence of the sects and divisions under the Long Parliament; and we may here adduce the testimony of one of Elizabeth's prelates, a man of great moderation, to the fact that the converts to popery in her reign were influenced in their change by the strange opinions which prevailed among the Puritans, not by the adherence of churchmen to the rites and ceremonies of the Church. 'The doctrine of the Lord's Supper hath been so slenderly taught by some, that a number have conceived with themselves that they receive nothing but the external elements in remembrance that Christ died for them. And these their cogitations have they uttered to others, to their great misliking. Private baptisme, yea, and publike also, if it be ministered by one that is no preacher, hath been so impugned, as if it were no sacrament at all. These, and a number of such others, have bred great offence, and wounded the hearts of an infinite number, causing them partly to revolt to papistie, partly to atheism. As I have talked with many recusants, so did I never conferre with any that would use any speech, but that he hath alleged some of these offences to be the cause of his revolting. If God moove not the heartes of the Church-rulers to seeke some ende of this schisme and faction, it cannot be but in short time for one recusant that now is, we shall have three.'—Cooper's Admonition, pp. 121, 122. Loose opinions, not adherence to the rules of the Church, were ever the cause of secessions to Rome. Cooper's prediction was fulfilled. Numbers went to Rome under the rule of the sectaries. Let our present Reformers take warning. They are the men to send others to Rome

'If that great idoll of the Popish masse, with all the copes, vestements, surplices, crosses, kneeling, candles, &c., be 'abominable and accursed.' They speak here only of such things as were used in the Lord's Supper: consequently the crosses must have been on the wall behind the altar, in the east window above it, or wrought on the copes, or upon the cloth for the table. Thus they say: 'As well the 'magistrates and ministers and people may be snared, and shall 'be accursed with, and for the command and use of copes, 'crosses, &c. Therefore copes, crosses, &c., may not be commanded,' &c. 'If your Lordships answere, that copes, surplices, crosses, be things indifferent,' &c. 'We pray your 'Lordships to resolve us by Holy Writ, that God hath by his 'worde as well purified copes, surplices, crosses, as He hath 'purified meats,' &c. 'That copes, surplices, crosses, candles, ' &c., authorised by that man of sin for the service of his great 'idoll the masse, be of the nature of meats, we deny.' 'The 'Popish masse is an idol, and all the copes, surplices, crosses, 'candles, &c., have been and yet be ornaments to that idol. 'Therefore all crosses, surplices, candles, are to be cast 'away.' 'No copes, surplices, crosses, &c., ought to be a badge 'to the Spouse of Christ.' 'Whether this outward pompe consist not partly in copes, surplices, crosses, &c.? And whether 'these copes, surplices, crosses, &c., be not designed by that 'whore to be the proper tokens of her lovers committing fornication with her great idoll, the breaden god?' 'If your Lordships say, that the maid of England, being instructed that no 'cope, surplice, or crosse, is unclean in itself, may command her 'damsels to fashion their liveries and badges like to those which 'the minions and lovers of the great whore, we then,' &c. 'We 'pray your Lordships to resolve as to whether among our 'priests, whosoever shall come to pray, to preach, or to administer the Sacraments, with a cope, with a surplice, with 'a taper, with a crosse, &c.'¹

The work from which these extracts are given is very curious. It is but little known, since the questions which it discusses have not of late excited much attention: but it is most important in this inquiry, for it proves the general use of crosses at the

¹ 'Certaine Demandes with their Groundes drawne out of Holy Writ, and Pounded in *foro Conscientie*, by some Religious Gentlemen, unto the Reverend Fathers, Richard Archbishop of Canterbury, Richard Bishop of London, William Bishop of Lincolne, Garvasse Bishop of Worcester, William Bishop of Exeter, and Thomas Bishop of Peterborough, whereunto the said Gentlemen require that it would please their Lordships to make a true, plaine, direct, honest, and resolute Answer.' 1605, pp. 19—22, 24, 27—29. The work is privately printed. It proves most incontestably that the cross, in some form or other, was usually seen, at all events, in cathedrals and large churches, in the administration of the Holy Communion.

time. Had Dr. Lushington ever seen it, he never could have hazarded his rash assertion that all crosses were removed before the end of Elizabeth's reign. Though the Puritans remained comparatively quiet during the latter part of the reign of Elizabeth, their pause must be attributed to the hopelessness of their case under her Majesty. From James they expected much, and therefore their grievances were anew put forth after his accession. Here, then, we have positive evidence that crosses were common in the year 1605: that they were used in the chancels: and that they were especially seen in the administration of the Lord's Supper; for this circumstance constituted one of their greatest grievances. In some cases, crosses were embroidered on the copes: in others, painted or sculptured on the walls behind the altar: in others, wrought on the cover of the altar. At all events, the figure of the cross existed in many churches. There was no prohibitory law, though it was not enjoined: and in cases in which there is no law the bishop becomes a law, provided he prescribes nothing contrary to any express canon, law, or injunction. Custom not contrary to law or reason has always obtained the force of a law. An Act of Parliament prescribing some things does not prohibit laudable customs not contrary to the rites and orders of the Church. At all events, if a custom is not to be observed, because it is not expressly enjoined, how will those men stand affected who violate positive rubrics which are a part of the law of the land?

In 1607, a Puritan writer complains that the magistrates 'have ceased to execute lawe against the crosses of church windows for the crosse's sake in baptisme. The preachers' lips 'in a manner are sewed up from speaking against the very abuse 'and superstition of the crosse, lest they should seem to speake 'against the crosse in baptisme.'¹ The argument is perfectly just, for it would have been most absurd to have removed the figure from churches, while the sign was retained in one of the Sacraments. The Puritans were consistent in opposing both: it would have been unreasonable to have opposed one only.

In replying to Kellison in 1624, Montagu says: 'No Protestant ever said that it was unlawful to make or have images. 'That which Protestants mislike and condemne in Papists is

¹ Parker on The Crosse, p. 132. 'Sanders,' says he, 'justifieth popish images by the crosses, which we use.' 'Papists are scandalized with our kneeling before images in glasse windows, with the lifting up of our hands at Paul's crosse.'—P. 135. Part ii. p. 62. The Puritans wrote more against the sign of the cross in baptism than against the figure in churches, because the former was expressly enjoined, while the latter merely existed by custom. They could not avoid the one, but they could contrive to get rid of the other from their churches. Still the notices of the figure of the cross are very numerous.

'not the having, but adoring, and worshipping, images.' Alluding to the picture of the Saviour he distinctly says: 'So is hee in many churches with us, betwixt the Blessed Virgin and St. John. Not the having images is condemned, but the profaning them to unlawful uses in worshipping and adoring them.'¹ Kellison had charged the Church of England with casting out images. He did not mention the cross, which he certainly would have specified if it had been cast out. We may also be certain that if the figure of our Lord and the Virgin existed in many churches, the cross also remained.²

Undoubtedly more zeal was evinced after Laud's advancement in keeping crosses, and windows, and churches, in repair. He was anxious to keep everything in decent order, but still crosses existed from the Reformation. The controversy with Williams, Bishop of Lincoln, respecting the Communion-table, proves that Laud was no innovator; that he merely preserved such ornaments as existed, though he sometimes restored some which had fallen into decay. Williams admits that the table in his own chapel at Bugden was 'furnished with plate and ornaments above any he had ever seen, the Chapel Royal only excepted.'³ This he says in his assumed character of a Lincolnshire minister. From other sources we have the particulars respecting the ornaments in Williams' chapel: 'Besides the altar so furnished there are to be seene many goodly pictures—as the picture of the Passion, and likewise of the Holy Apostles, together with a faire crucifix, and our Blessed Lady and St. John set up in painted glasse in the east window just over the holy table or sacred altar.'⁴

That even a crucifix existed in Williams' own chapel we have the most abundant evidence, though such a custom was an exception to the rule of almost all churches, which retained only the

¹ Montagu's *Gagge for the Newe Gospell*, 1624, pp. 299, 303.

² James the First took a very sensible view of these matters; for when the people in Scotland said that 'the organs came first, now the images, and ere long we should have the mass,' because some pictures were introduced into the Chapel Royal, his Majesty replied, that persons who could not distinguish between pictures intended for ornaments, and images erected for adoration, were justly chargeable with ignorance. 'You can endure lions, dragons, and devils,' said the King, 'to be figured in your churches, but will not allow the like place to the patriarchs and apostles.'—*Spottiswood*, 530.

³ *The Holy Table: Name and Thing*, &c., 1637, p. 12. Williams merely wrote to oppose Heylin. His own practice was the same as Laud's. At a later period the charge of popery was alleged against Williams on the ground of this very book. It occurs in a most extraordinary work by Dey, *Two Looks over Lincoln*; or, a *View of the Holy Table*, &c., *Discovering his Popish Tenets*, 1641. A thorough-paced zealot will discover Popery in the most harmless things. Dey is a type of some modern controversialists, who allege the charge of popery against others, while they themselves are constantly breaking their own solemn oaths by their violation of the Church's express orders.

⁴ *Pocklington's Altare Christianum*, 1637, p. 87.

cross. Some of the Puritans confounded the two, and called the cross a crucifix, charging the bishops with favouring the latter, while they merely encouraged the former. Henry Burton, that most violent incendiary, says: 'To bring our new rites to this rule, doe they make to the advancement of God's glory? What! superstitious, idolatrous worship of wooden altars? A complimentary crouch to Jesus when they crucifie Christ? To bow before a crucifix?' The wooden altar was the table: the crucifix was the cross. So again: 'Our new reformers are tooth and nayle for setting up Popery againe: witnesse their hoysing up altars in most places, as also of images, crucifixes, with adorations.' 'Our changers do plead that they do bring in no changes, but revive those things which ancient canons have allowed and prescribed—as standing up at *Gloria Patri*, and at the reading of the Gospel; placing of images in churches; erecting of crucifixes over the altars.' He asks: 'Must the cathedrals in Oxford—I mean those College churches—become the nurseries of idolatry, because of late days they have erected goodly new altars, images, crucifixes? Must other churches have organs, altars, images, crucifixes, tapers, copes, and the like, because such is the guise of cathedrals?'¹

Burton enumerates as popish several things ever retained in the Church, and some which are now allowed even by Dissenters, who call themselves the descendants of the Puritans. But besides these he mentions the crucifix, evidently meaning the cross. The cross, however, as is clear from Burton's charge, was usually above or behind the communion-table, and was either of wood, stone, or metal, or wrought on tapestry. In his reply to these charges, Heylin says: 'For images in churches and crucifixes over the altars, finde you of all loves that the Church hath any where commanded them, or the prelates in their visitations given order for their setting up? So that your answer being thus come to nothing, the objection by you brought on the Church's part remains unanswerable, viz., that the prelates have brought in no changes, but only have revived those things which the ancient Canons have allowed and prescribed, the law of God and the King, and the Act of

¹ Burton's *For God and the King*, 1637, pp. 66, 158, 162, 163. In another work, written by Burton, as he acknowledges in his *Grand Impostor Unmasked*, though published anonymously, he alleges the same charge respecting the crucifix. The Liturgy is branded as popish, as well as the 'rich copes,' and 'faire crucifixes,' and 'loud-sounding organs.' From one expression it may be inferred that sometimes a cross was suspended over the table on the wall, for in speaking of altars he uses the terms, 'and that which hangs over them.' In another place he calls this 'a crucifix over the altar.' He asks: 'Is there no idolatry in bowing before your crucifixes over your altars?' He condemns the singing also, because it shortened the sermon. Thus he speaks of the 'halfe-houre sermons.' See 'A Replie to a Relation of a Conference between William Laud and Mr. Fisher. By a Witnesse of Jesus Christ. Imprinted Anno 1640,' pp. 66, 84, 335, 340, 344, 335.

'Parliament, either enabling them to doe so, or not gainsaying it.' Heylin has hit the mark, namely, that the law, while it does not prescribe, does not prohibit, the use of the cross.

The charge of setting up crucifixes is repeated in numerous works of those times: and it is important, as proving the existence of crosses, which the Puritans, in order to excite odium, designated crucifixes. In a notorious publication, ascribed to Prynne, which abounds in lies on almost every page, the charge is repeated. We have the following marginal notes: 'Witnesse their alterations of the Gunpowder Treason Book, their pleading for the Pope, and setting up altars, images, crucifixes.'² In other publications of this bitter and foul-mouthed author we meet with constant allusions to the crucifix. 'Our prelates would have all men bowe and cringe to altars, images, crucifixes.' 'We must have images, crucifixes,' &c. 'They cry for altars, images, crucifixes. They are not content to set up altars and crucifixes. Men must bow downe and worship the golden images, the crucifixes, images. Commanding to set up images, crucifixes. We must have images and crucifixes.' The charge of Popery is alleged on the ground of 'images, crucifixes, and crosses.' 'The Archbishop of Canterbury hath erected altars, images, crucifixes, in the chappels of Lambeth, Croydon, London House, Fulham. The Bishop of Litchfield set up a monstrous crucifix, as bigge and large as any three men.' 'That good man, S. Godfrey, of Gloster, hath also erected a crucifix.'³ In another publication we have the charge of setting up 'crosses and crucifixes.' 'The Bishop of Gloucester is charged with setting up 'a new crosse at Windsor with a glorious large crucifixe, not fearing to write thereon, in capital letters, This cross was repaired Anno Domini 1635.' This cross, therefore, existed previously; but Prynne argues that it was forbidden by the Homilies and Injunctions, which 'our cross-erecting prelates have often subscribed, and therefore are worthy of no painted but a real crosse themselves.' Prynne therefore would have used the prelates with greater severity than that with which he himself was treated. But he is a witness in our case, and an impartial one. He proves the existence of crosses before his own times. Alluding to the sentences probably sometimes inflicted in the Star Chamber, he charges the bishops with crucifying 'Christ in his image and saints, which makes them so much in love with the sight of the crucifix.'⁴

In another work of the same period, probably written by

Heylin's Briefe and Moderate Answer, 1637, pp. 171, 172.

Newes from Ipswich, &c.—Printed at Ipswich.

Prynne's Looking Glasse for Lordly Prelates, 1636, pp. 16, 17, 33, 34, 36, 43.

Breviate of the Prelates' Usurpations, 1637, p. 320.

Looking Glasse, &c., pp. 50, 65.

Prynne, the bishops are condemned for 'their altars, crucifixes,' &c. The writer recommends 'a *Quo Jure* to examine by what law they have turned Communion-tables into altars, and set 'up crucifixes.' The Last Supper is considered, he says, to be useless, 'unlesse there be a crucifixe there standing on or over the altar.' Cathedrals, churches, and chapels, 'wherein they have set up crosses to crucify their Saviour,' are, he thinks, forfeited to the king. Even their bishoprics ought to be forfeited, 'which they better deserve to lose for erecting crucifixes, altars, tapers, than any godly ministers to be deprived for not 'wearing the surplesse.' Yet all the vestments, in the writer's estimation, were as popish as the cross; for he asks: 'Whether the prelates, for disguising themselves with strange vestments, as rochets, copes, stoles, and dancing and playing the mummers, piping organs and minstrelsy, before their new-erected altars, hopping like the pagan priests, or like mummers about a cobloase, &c., be not finable and to be imprisoned?'

In these extracts there is a strange jumble or confusion: but the passages prove the existence of many crosses, which the writers chose to call crucifixes. The crucifix did not exist, except in a few places, or sometimes in windows, while the cross was common in every part of the country, and had continued from time immemorial. This fact has been established beyond dispute: but much evidence still remains to be adduced.

The case of Smart at Durham was notorious. In 1628 he preached a sermon in that cathedral. It was published during the same year, and was chiefly directed against Cosin, the Dean. A few passages will serve our purpose:—'The masse coming in, brings with it an inundation of ceremonies, crosses, crucifixes, images, copes, and candlesticks; all which we have seen in this Church since the Communion-table was turned into an altar.' 'If religion consist in altar-ducking, cross-wearing, organ-playing, setting basons on the altar, candlesticks and crucifixes, we had never more religion than now.'²

¹ New Quaeres proposed to our Lord Prelates, printed in the year 1637, pp. 10, 11, 13—15. Donne had a very different idea of a simple cross:—

'Since Christ embraced the crosse itself, dare I
His image, the image of his crosse deny,
Who from the picture would avert his eye,
How would he fly his pains who there did die!'

Donne's Poems, 1639, pp. 342, 343.

² The Vanitie and Downfall of Superstitious Popish Ceremonies, 1628, pp. 11, 23, 24. Sometimes it is attempted to prove that copes are not enjoined by the Rubric, which sends us to the second year of King Edward; yet Baxter and the Nonconformists, who acted an honest part in leaving the Church, in the simple exercise of their common sense, admitted that they were included. 'The Liturgy requireth that such ornaments of the Church, &c. The canon of the same Church expoundeth their meaning, Can. 58. We suppose, in the 2d of King Edward VI, the cope, alb, and other vestments were in use.'—Baxter's Nonconformist's Plea for Peace, p. 190.

In 1641, Smart brought his case before Parliament, with many accusations against Cosin. In 1629 he wrote an account of what he called the Innovations at Durham, but it was not published until 1641. He asserts, that the innovations commenced in 1617, under the new Bishop, Neal: and he dates the commencement from Durham of the corruptions 'which have spread over all the Cathedral Churches; yea, and many parish churches have set up altars, images, and organs. The velvet cloth for the Communion-table,' he says, 'was embroidered with images;' and 'a golden pall' had 'the false story of the Assumption of our Lady.' A stone altar is mentioned with 'crosses, crucifixes, basons, tapers, and candlesticks,' none of which, he says, existed before 1617. He alleges, that sixty wax candles were on one occasion 'on and about the altar burning at one time, and images and angels set up aloft round about the quire, with abominable and ribald copes. Can such paltry toys bring to our memory Christ and his blood-shedding? Crosses, crucifixes, tapers, candlesticks, gilded angels, painted images, golden copes, sumptuous organs, piping so loud at the Communion-table, that they can be heard halfe a mile from the Church.' He admits that in previous times copes were worn, 'decent, as the canons prescribe, not party-coloured nor pibald, like ours at Durham, but plaine, without any picture or other embroidery of crosses or images.'¹

Cosin met the charges before the Parliament, which could make nothing of the matter, a proof that Smart had acted the part of a slanderer. In the charges exhibited to the Commons, it was stated that certain images 'with the picture of Christ,' which had been mutilated in Queen Elizabeth's days, were 'repaired and most gloriously painted.' It was alleged that Cosin had purchased a cope from a priest. He denied that 'he erected an altar of stone, or that he brought in any of the copes, images, and pictures.' All these things existed long before. The images and pictures had been in the church before the memory of man. The figures of angels, the only figures in the church, had existed several hundred years, and the wood work was merely repaired by the Dean and Chapter. Smart called this a setting up of images.

¹ A Short Treatise of Altars, Altar-Furniture, Altar-Cringing, and Musick of all the Quire, &c. when the Holy Communion was administered in the Cathedral Church of Durham, by Prebendaries and Petty Canons, in glorious Copes embroidered with Images, 1629. It is unpagined in the introduction, from which the first and second extracts are taken, pp. 1, 2, 10, 19. Smart regarded the organ as popish as the cross. According to his notions, the Homilies forbid 'piping and singing, and playing on the organ,' pp. 4, 8. If Smart's notion be correct, Dr. Lushington will have enough to do in removing organs, which, whether forbidden or not by the Homilies, are certainly not enjoined by any law; so that, according to the doctrine of the Consistorial Court, they must be unlawful.

The lights were only used at Evening Service in the winter, for the use of the clergy and choristers. The matters alleged as innovations were as old as the time of the Reformation. This was satisfactorily proved, and so Cosin escaped.¹

We now approach the period of the Long Parliament, under whose fanatical sway many of our churches were not only stripped of their ornaments, but almost ruined, in their zeal against what they called monuments of superstition and idolatry. Dr. Lushington would have us believe that the crosses destroyed by the Long Parliament were recent erections under the influence of Laud. Before he pronounced his decision, he certainly should have better studied our history. That vast numbers of crosses existed in 1640 he will not deny; but he chooses to consider them as innovations. We have the record of the destruction of large numbers in various parts of the kingdom during the Civil Wars, so that in 1640 they must have been general. We find them alluded to in various ways. Warmstry advocates their removal, on the ground that they might be a scandal to the Jews. 'The material crosses in our churches may be a block in their way as well as the cross of Christ.'² Crosses, therefore, were common at this period; and they were not new erections, as we have fully proved. In this speech we find an allusion to lighted candles by day in some churches: but doubtless, the cases admit of the same explanation as those at Durham. 'The crucifixes are already upon the altar, on the tapestry, on the walls, on the glasse windows in faire and large figures,' says Baily, one of the Scots ministers, in London.³ He found them

¹ An Illustration of Neale's History in the Article of Peter Smart, 1736, pp. 85, 92, 93, 95, 99, 101. Diurnal Occurrences, 1641, pp. 52—56. Fuller's Church History, lib. xi. 173. Heylin's Examen, pp. 284—293. Cosin was charged with Popery; yet he stood his ground in exile, while some of his accusers in England became Papists. The truth is, they had no fixed principles, and took refuge in Rome, while he remained steadfast in the truth, being the same man at all times, because his views were sound. The risks to which he was exposed on the Continent, in consequence of his attachment to the Church of England, are detailed by Nalson, who had the particulars from Cosin's own lips.—Nalson's Collections, vol. i. pp. 519, 520, 568, 789—792. The reckless proceedings of the Commons were more manifest, perhaps, in the case of Laud than in anything else. The subject is too extensive for discussion: but we may allude to an Order of March, 1644, that Prynne should publish an account of the trial. 'It were well,' says the Perfect Diurnal, 'it were printed in all languages and sent abroad, for the sermon he made when he lost his head is translated into several languages, and published in all Christendome. Such is the diligence of the enemy to get advantages.'—Perfect Diurnal, 663.

² Warmstry's Convocation Speech against Images, Altars, Crosses, &c., 1641, p. 4.

³ A Parallel, or Briefe Comparison of the Liturgie with the Masse Book. By R. B. 1641, p. 58. In this inquiry we have not entered upon the question relative to the material of which the altar is to be formed. We view it, however, as a matter of indifference; and our belief is that it was so regarded by the

in the churches, and censured the practice, not caring whether the crosses were new or old.

The evidence during the period on which we have now entered is most copious. As early as 1641, an ordinance was issued by the Commons against monuments of superstition, among which are enumerated the crucifix, images of the Virgin, tapers, and candlesticks. The ordinance was repeated, with some additions, in 1643, though at this time the work of destruction had proceeded to a very great extent. The cross is not mentioned in the former ordinance, from which circumstance we infer that the feeling against it had not then arrived at its full proportion, confining itself to the crucifix and images. The rabble, however, soon gathered themselves up for the work, being encouraged by the saints in Parliament, and by the disaffected clergy. Westminster Abbey, though Williams was its Dean, was assailed; and the monuments, the organs, and the windows, were demolished. The desecration of other cathedrals followed in rapid succession. A few passages from contemporary accounts may serve as specimens of the reforming rage which had then seized upon the rabble, and upon many of the clergy. In the Iconoclasts of that day, our present Church

Church. The following extract from a very able writer deserves the attention of those who are called to sit in judgment on such questions. 'Whatever difference is, or hath been, about the name, I think there need be little about the matter or material, whether it be made of wood or stone; for an altar may be made of wood to serve the turn of *Papists*, as a table may be made of stone for the use of *Protestants*.'—*Staveley's History of Churches in England*, p. 209. The Reformers continued to use the same chalices which they had used in the mass, and to wear the same surplices, not regarding the abuse of a thing as rendering it unlawful. An able writer, speaking of Beza, says, 'He holds it not necessary that the same Altar which hath bene abused unto Popish idolatry should be altered: but that it may serve as well as a table for the use of the Sacrament: in which judgment diverse martyrs in Queene Maries Dayes concurred, who were content to use the same surplices and chalices which had bene used in the Popish masse.'—*Bishop Leslie's Treatise on the Church*, 1639, p. 137. The same author, in reference to the Puritans in 1639, says, 'If the Papists be guilty of corporeal idolatry in worshipping of images, the Puritans are guilty of Spiritual idolatry in worshipping their own imaginations.'—*Ib.* p. 171. A very learned author, in a sermon in the year 1605, alludes to the old surplices, to which the Puritans objected, because they had been worn by the priests under the reign of Popery. 'In all likelihood all those surplices are consumed and worne away, and not now used in the Church of England.' In another place he says, 'not many of Queene Maries surplices do now remaine, and if they did, the matter were soone remedied, and time itself in short time would wear them away.'—*Mason on the Authority of the Church*, pp. 42, 44. The Puritans first objected to the surplice altogether; then to the particular surplices which had been used by the priests under the rule of Popery. The same learned writer says elsewhere of the cross: 'We approve of Litanies as much as ye do; and we are not against the ensign of the cross, provided it be not superstitiously used. And in the use of images we come nearer to Augustine than yourselves. He commends the historical use of images; and so do we commend them: but he condemns the worshipping of them: and so do we also condemn them.'—*Mason's Vindication of the Church of England*, p. 73.

Reformers may see their own pictures, for our churches would not fare much better now could some amongst us obtain the fulfilment of their wishes.

'They made an Order at a Committee for demolishing all pictures, and the defacing of glasse windows, with the like idolatries; and perhaps churches will come next as having been abused in former times to superstitious and idolatrous uses.' Somewhat later we read, 'It was advertised this day from Peterborough, that Colonel Cromwell had bestowed a visit on that little city, plundering a great part thereof, and, in pursuance of the thorow Reformation, he did most miserably deface the Cathedral, break downe the organs, destroy the glasse windows.' 'April 25th, a Committee, thereto authorized by the House of Commons, and guarded by a band of soldiers, purged S. Margaret's Church of all the scandalous pictures (that is, all painted glasse) in the windows.' 'According to the order of the House of Commons, all the glasse windows in the Cathedral Church of Westminster, whereon was any imagery, were defaced and broken.'¹ 'To show their hatred to idolatrie, they have broke downe the glasse windows of many churches, thrown down the pictures of Christ, taken the surplices to make frockes to preserve their clothes when they dressed their horses; and in Worcester they have done what I am ashamed to speak, made the pulpit and the font their house of office, as I was informed by one of the gravest Doctors; thrown down the organs, and taken the pipes and copes of the Prebends, and gone about the streets, with the copes on their backs and the pipes in their hands, dancing the morris-dance.'²

It is curious to mark how these Church Reformers jumbled

¹ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 1642, pp. 217, 218, 228, 231. Soldiers were quartered in the Abbey, who 'brake down the rayl and burnt it: they brake down the organ and pawned the pipes at several ale-houses. They put on some of the singing-men's surplices, and ran up and down the church—he that wore the surplice being the hare, the rest were the hounds.'—*Mercurius Rusticus*, p. 236.

² *The Discovery of Mysteries, &c.* By G. Williams, Bishop of Ossory. Printed in the year 1643, pp. 46, 47. 'After this the House of Commons fell upon abolishing innovations in the Church, as pulling down the rayles, taking away images, crucifixes, &c.' *Diurnal Occurrences*, 1641, pp. 354, 359, 360. *Vicars' Parliamentary Chronicle*, Part I. pp. 42, 43. *Heylin's Presbyterians*, pp. 464, 465. *Nalson's Collections*, ii. p. 482. After the Ordinance it was resolved by the Lords, in September, 1641, that existing rails were not to be removed, while others were not to be erected: that steps in chancels raised within fifteen years should be levelled; and that 'crucifixes, scandalous pictures of any of the persons of the Trinity, are to be abolished.' *Nalson*, ii. 483, 484. This was an attempt at compromise by the Lords: but it proves that some things existed from an early period. This is clear in the order to remove recent erections, which implied that some were not recent, and thus our position is confirmed.—*Mercurius Civicus*, p. 110. *Rushworth*, iii. 358.

together all sorts of things as Popish—as organs, surplices, and crosses. ‘Sir John Lamb and Sir Nathaniel Brent were questioned for enjoying the repaying of organs, and setting up ‘new organs in churches.’¹ ‘After this manner was the ‘Cathedral of Exeter served, where the Commandments were ‘defaced, the Common Prayer-book burnt, the glasse windows, ‘monuments, statues, and organs broke; and the name of ‘Jesus, over the Communion-table, blotted out as superstitious. ‘Nor can some honest people of London yet forget the intolerable actions of the saint-like soldiers at St. Peter’s, Paul’s ‘Wharf (Sunday, 9th September, 1647), who rode into the ‘church with swords drawn.’ At Chichester, ‘The organs and ‘Ten Commandments were broke down. The ancient Cathedral of Durham can yet show her ruins.’²

At Cambridge, the havoc was most tremendous, under Will Dowsing, the leader of the mob. ‘Nor was it any whit strange ‘to find whole bands of soldiers training in the Chapel of King ‘Henry VI. One who calls himself John Dowsing, and by ‘virtue of a pretended commission, goes about the country like ‘a Bedlam, breaking glasse windows, having beaten downe all ‘our painted glasse, defaced and digged up the floors of our ‘chappels, many of which had lien so for two or three hundred ‘yeares, compelled us, by armed soldiers, to pay forty shillings ‘a College for not mending what he had defaced.’³

These extracts are from friends of the Church, who detailed scenes of which they were eye-witnesses. Such evidence, however, standing alone, would be questioned by some of our

¹ Diurnal Occurrences, p. 41. Foulis’s Presbyterians, p. 86.

² Foulis’s Presbyterians, pp. 137, 138. Mercurius Rusticus, p. 241. ‘Nor did the famous organs escape their fury, being pulled to pieces and employed to private uses; as one at York something advanced his houses (if my memory fails me not) with organ and church wood.’—Ibid. The following scenes were acted at Chelmsford, in 1641:—‘When this order came out, there was standing in the chancel a goodly faire window at the east end, untouched from the first foundation of the Church, in which was painted the History of Christ, from his conception to his ascension. In obedience to the order, the churchwardens tooke downe the pictures of the blessed Virgin, and of Christ on the Crosse.’ This, however, was not sufficient. ‘The Sectaries, that they might make a thorough reformation, on the 5th of November, in the evening, assembled, and in a riotous manner, with long poles and stones beat down and defaced the whole window.’—Mercurius Rusticus, pp. 22, 23. St. Paul’s is mentioned in the Perfect Diurnal, p. 190. It had been the custom in Twickenham Church to break two large loaves in the church on Easter Sunday. This was deemed superstitious, and the practice was abolished—Perfect Diurnal, p. 699.

³ Querela Cantabrigiensis, pp. 17, 18. Dowsing’s Journal affords abundance evidence of his zeal against crosses. One entry will suffice to show the character of his proceedings. ‘March 20, we break forty superstitious pictures, two crucifixes; order a cross to be taken from the steeple, and the steps to be levelled.’ Dowsing and his fellows pleaded conscience, as some of our modern reformers plead. Dowsing’s Journal has been printed several times.

modern reformers, who prefer the testimony of a Presbyterian or Dissenter to that of a Churchman. But we have abundance of evidence from the self-styled saints, the actors in these iniquitous proceedings. William Culmer has left to posterity an account of his own doings in one of the most singular works of that fanatical period. In 1640, a Petition was presented to the Commons from Canterbury, in which 'Service in Prick-song, and Chanting,' are mentioned as Popish. The Altar was 'dressed after the Romish fashion, with candlesticks, and tapers, &c., for which Altar they have lately provided a most idolatrous costly glory-cloth, or back-cloth.' They mention 'a carved image of the Holy Ghost in the form of a dove,' and 'a carved image of Christ.' Culmer describes the Cathedral as it existed before he commenced his work of destruction, and then its fall: 'On the 26th of August, 1642, some zealous troopers, after they had taken the ammunition out of that malignant Cathedral, fought with the Cathedral gods, namely, altars, images, service-books, pricke-song-books, surplissses, and organs. They slasht some images, crucifixes, and pricke-song-books, and a ragged smock of the whore of Rome, called a surplisse, and began to play the tune of the "Zealous Soldier" on the organs, or case of whistles, which never were in tune since.'¹ This was in 1642: but Culmer did not think this reformation sufficient. 'This was but a forerunner of a more orderly and thorough reformation, which (according to another pious ordinance) began upon the 13th day of December last. The worthy mayor put on that blessed work of

¹ Notwithstanding the troubles from 1640 to 1660, and the disappointment of the Presbyterians in not getting the Idol of Presbytery set up, they were not cured of their hatred to the Church of England at the Restoration. Thus, in a most singular work, in 1660, we read, 'Upon the 5th November, 1660, two great hogges came two severall and very unusual wayes up divers steps into the Cathedrall of Canterbury, and went into the quire when the prebends were in the midst of their devotion, and there continued till they were driven out by the vergers. The generality of the inhabitants do very well remember that a little before the downfall of the hierarchy, in the year 1641, the same thing happened in the same place. *Malum Omen.*' *Mirabilis Annus*; or, the Year of Prodigies and Wonders, &c. Printed in the year 1661, p. 50. This work, printed before the Act of Uniformity, when the Presbyterians and Sectaries retained their Churches without conforming to the Liturgy, abounds in stories of judgments upon those who began to read the Common Prayer. It is scarcely credible, that men professing godliness should have given their sanction to such notorious lies for the purpose of stirring up a feeling against the Book of Common Prayer. One Clergyman, according to this scandalous production, was struck dead in the act of reading in the Church. The Bishop of Oxford was nearly killed while in the act of Confirmation at Christ Church. Dr. Barton Holiday 'fell down and hit his face against the chalice' in administering the wine. One man was nearly destroyed by a dog on the morning of the execution of Hugh Peters, and fearful sights were seen above the quarters of the regicides suspended over the city gates. Pp. 5, 6, 76, 77, 85. Several apparitions were seen in the air, of Cathedrals, 'some burning, others rent and torn, others subverted, with the pinnacles downwards.'—*Ibid.* 17.

' reformation. When the commissioners entered upon the execution of that ordinance they knew not where to begin, the images and pictures were so numerous. Coming to the east window, the first picture was of Austin, the monk; and so it casually fell out that the image of this arch-prelate was the first that was demolished. Many window-images, or pictures in glasse, were demolished that day, and many idols of stone.' The commissioners fell to work on the great idolatrous window on the left hand. In that window was now the picture of God the Father, and of Christ, besides a large crucifixe and seven large pictures of the Virgin Mary. As that window was the superstitious glory of that Cathedral, so now it is more defaced than any window.' He mentions 'a minister with a pike in his hand rattling down proud Becket's glassy bones. Some wished he might break his neck: but he finished his work, and came down well, and was in very good health when this was written. Many other images were defaced, several pictures of crucifixes, and men praying to crucifixes, and to the Virgin Marie. When the cathedral men heard that ordinance against idolatrous monuments was to be put in execution, they covered a complete crucifixe in the sermon-house windows with boards, and painted them to preserve the crucifixe, but their juggling was found out and the crucifixe demolished.'¹

Culmer himself was the minister who battered down the glass with a pike. The circumstance is alluded to in a contemporary pamphlet. 'Having what he long wished for, an opportunity of revenge, under pretence of letting in new lights, he falls to threshing down the old, their much-admired, but since the Reformation never till then abused windows;

¹ Cathedral News from Canterbury, &c. Recorded by Richard Culmer. London, 1644, pp. 2, 3, 19, 20—24. These scenes are largely described by Vicars, who says that they 'destroyed many crucifixes' in the Cathedral.—Parliamentary Chronicle, Part III. p. 101.—Heylin's *Presbyterians*, p. 452. As a set off to the descriptions by the actors, the following just picture may be given:—'After all the clamour about religion, the care of it was now transferred from a Convocation to a new assembly of Divines, and from them transferred to the House of Commons, and from thence to the mob, between whom the regular clergy suffered such a persecution, and the churches such a deformation, as is hardly to be paralleled, even in the Pagan Annals. For, in all places within the power of the rebel Reformers, all the monuments of superstition (as Church-ornaments especially were then called) were defaced, and the loyal and orthodox clergy harassed, plundered, imprisoned, and sequestered as malignants and Papists, by men who were open rebels themselves, actually managed by Popish engines, and favourers even of the Alcoran itself: whose committees were no less cruel than the severest inquisition. And treachery and hypocrisy, licentiousness and profaneness, enthusiasm and atheism, together with a violation of all the laws of nature and humanity, were the natural effects of such a revolution.'—Lindsay's *History of England*, p. 286.

‘and to clear the place of monuments of superstition, down go crowned kings for canonized saints; and, to show whose son he was, he knocks down Christ and spares the devil. A young gentleman observing from without his wild zeal within, ironically falls to applauding of the action, telling him that he would help him; and thereupon, catching up a good thumping stone, takes his aim at the place where the pike-man was standing, mounted on his Haman-like ladder.’¹ This points to Culmer as the man with the pike mentioned in his own narrative.

None of these things were of recent introduction: they had remained from the Reformation. Some of the actors in these scenes mention the fact, that the images and pictures had not been removed at the Reformation; and their testimony will be received by such men as the Pimlico Reformers. ‘Besides the long-desired, and now happily-effected ruine and razing down of Popish high places, never since the first Reformation till now taken away, in defacing and destroying Popish images, organs, crosses, crucifixes, and such-like abominable and idolatrous superstitions, Popish and apish trinkets, both in churches and elsewhere.’² Here is the testimony of a man of that day flatly contradictory to Dr. Lushington’s assertion. Vicars, who knew whether the crosses destroyed were recent erections, affirms that they had never been removed. This same writer gives us a most graphic account of other scenes. Of the Cathedral at Lichfield, he says—‘But take this note by the way, that though the soldiers were merciful to the men, yet were they void of all pity toward the organ pipes, copes, and such like Popish trumperies.’ He mentions the destruction of ‘crosses, pictures, and images.’ Of Westminster he says, ‘Now the Popish Altar is quite taken away, the bellowing organs are demolisht. For the gaudy gilded crucifixes, and rotten rabble of dumbe idolls, Popish saints and pictures set up and placed where that sinful singing was used, now a most sweet assembly and thick throng of God’s pious people, and well-affected living teachable saints, are there constantly and most comfortably every morning to be seen at sermons.’³

¹ Culmer’s Crown Crackt with His own Looking-Glasse; or, the Cockscombe’s Looking Glasse broken about his Ears, &c. pp. 3, 4. Calamy says, ‘It was he that brake the great window there, at which many were enraged against him.’ Calamy speaks of him and his violent proceedings in these gentle terms—‘He was one of those appointed by authority of Parliament to detect, and cause to be demolished, the superstitious inscriptions and idolatrous monuments in the Cathedral there.’—Calamy’s Account, &c., ii. p. 389.

² Vicars’ Looking Glasse for Malignants, 1643, p. 9.

³ Vicars’ Parliamentary Chronicle, Part I. p. 273, 327. Part III. p. 185. ‘December 30, 1643, the High Altar and other superstitious pictures and crucifixes in King Henry VII. Chapel were taken away.’—Ibid. p. 113.

In 1644, the Commons issued another Ordinance to enforce that of the previous year. 'Copies, surplices, crosses, crucifixes, pictures, organs and their frames,' were to be utterly destroyed.¹ Organs are always specified; and the evidence which proves their existence in churches, prior to 1640, proves also the existence of crosses. Organs must stand or fall with crosses, since neither are recognised by law.

In that scandalous performance, 'White's Century'—scandalous to its author, on account of its abominable lies—we meet incidentally with evidence of the existence of crosses in windows, which had continued since the Reformation. Had they been of recent introduction, the slanderous writer would have mentioned the circumstance as an aggravation of the offence. The charge against the Vicar of Maching, in Essex, was this: 'He hath often refused the Lord's Supper to such as refused to come to the rails, there being a crucifix in the window over the altar, and he would not suffer it to be pulled down, notwithstanding the order of Parliament.' John Mountford was removed from Anstie, Herts, for bowing 'towards a great crucifix and picture of the Virgin Mary, in the east window over the table.' Further 'he did arrest the churchwardens and the glazier for pulling down the said scandalous pictures in obedience to the order of Parliament.' Against Richard Taylor, of Buntingford, was alleged 'a crosse at the head of the font.' Edward Marten, of Houghton Conquest, was charged with 'adoring the altar with his eyes on a crucifixe in the east window.'² In all these cases it is clear that the crosses had long existed; consequently, the Homilies and the Injunctions, in the estimation of their framers, comprehended in their censures only such things as had been abused.

Among the innovations alleged against Laud was the setting up of crosses. 'To begin with his own kennel at Lambeth, we shall lead you into the chapel, and evidence what superstitious pictures, utensils, vestments, be there introduced, never heard of in any of his predecessor's days.' Prynne says that the windows were defaced at the Reformation, 'that naught but a few broken fragments remained,' and that Laud replaced them from patterns in the Missal: 'A large crucifix in the east

¹ Vickers, p. 322, 323.

² White's First Centurie of Scandalous and Malignant Priests, 1643. Pp. 6, 13, 38, 42. Sometimes, indeed, the Reformers of that period pretended that the crosses and pictures were innovations. 'If the times go ten steps further, we shall have a brass nail upon a flat stone as a rare piece of antiquity; and the sight of a bit of red glass go for pence a piece; and indeed it concerns our new Government to get the world into a belief that it was made but in 1640 at farthest.'—Carey's Memoirs of the Civil War, ii. pp. 400, 401.

window taken from the Missal.' In another window, the picture of the Virgin was 'broken by the soldiers by reason of the great scandal it gave unto them.' He mentions 'silver candlesticks and tapers on the altar,' and 'a picture of Christ 'on a piece of arras behind the altar, and a crucifix in the 'window over it.' Standing at *Gloria Patri*, and the organs, are specified as innovations. On the Archbishop's trial it was deposed that there was at Whitehall Chapel 'a peece of arras with a crucifix, never used since Henry VIII. his reigne.' It was produced before the Lords, and was 'very large, naked, scandalous, offensive.' Sir N. Brent deposed that before Laud's chancellorship, 'there were no copes nor crucifixes in 'Oxford, but such as were defaced, or covered with dust, and 'quite neglected;' but that afterwards 'the old crucifixes were 'repaired, adorned, and new crucifixes set up.'¹ This was the substance of the charge against Laud, with respect to the matters relating to our present inquiry.

We take Laud's answer from his own papers. It seems that in Laud's time a new piece of arras was placed in the Chapel at Whitehall. 'The piece of hangings which hung 'constantly at the back of the altar, thirty years together, upon 'my own knowledge (as I offered proof by the vestrymen), 'and so all the time of Sir Henry's being at court, had a 'crucifix in it, and yet his conscience never troubled at it.' This crucifix, therefore, was not introduced by Laud. It was no innovation to substitute a new cloth of the same pattern for the old one. The crucifix had long been there. Of Lambeth he says, 'The crucifix was standing in my predecessor's time, though 'a little broken; so I did but mend it: I did not set it up, as 'was alleged against me.' In reference to the statute of Edward VI. against images, Laud says, 'The contemporary 'practice (which is one of the best expounders of the meaning 'of any law) did neither destroy all coloured windows, though 'images were in them, in the Queen's time, nor abstain from

¹ Prynne's *Canterburie's Doome*, pp. 59, 65, 68, 71. In one of the libellous publications of those days, we have the following account of the Chapel at Whitehall:—'Upon Good Friday, as I came through Whitehall, a countryman had me in to give me a dish of drinke, and then carried me to the King's Quire. When I came, the people were all grovelling on the ground. Downe I was driven on my maribones, and about halfe an hour after, they all stood up, turning their — to the east, and their snouts to the west, to hear an anthem; which being done, a tall thin carle in a long gown made the people turne their faces to the east, where I spied a curious wrought crucifix hanging over the High Altar.' *The Scots Scout's Discoveries*, London: Printed, 1642, p. 40. Laud's enemies never chose to admit that the crosses existed before his time. Burton says, 'Witnesse the goodly crucifixe over his Altar at Lambeth, Whitehall, and elsewhere.'—Burton's *Grand Impostor*, p. 2.

'setting up new, both in her and in King James his time.'¹ Surely Laud was a better lawyer than Lushington. Had the latter read this important passage, his judgment might have been different. These answers were given by Laud at his trial. They were published by Wharton, and partly by Prynne, who, in his usual style, attempts a reply, though he is unable to refute the Archbishop's statements. Some of the charges involved practices ever recognised by the Church. These the Archbishop admits and defends; and those which bear on our present inquiry were fully answered. Prynne's attempt at a reply only establishes the Archbishop's positions. The accuser could not deny the existence of the crucifix at Whitehall; and his reply is, that 'the old was hardly visible, and scarce observed by any.'² The existence of the thing is admitted, even by Prynne; so that Laud was not an innovator, as Dr. Lushington asserts. From recent proceedings it is evident that the same ignorance, bitterness, misconception, and a disregard of truth, are still inherent in the race of which Prynne may be viewed as the type. The same senseless charge of Popery is still made against Laud by men whose ignorance is only exceeded by their effrontery,—men who are unacquainted with the history of the Church, and who adopt the rash assertions of the Puritans as truths—assertions which Laud had the good sense to despise. Yet these men would be teachers of others. Nay, they would compel all to adopt their own views. Such are our modern reformers among the Clergy, who resolve all ordinances into preaching,—who read little, and think less,—and wish to impose their own rude and rashly-formed opinions on the public as the views of the English Church. Even Andrew Marvel, a Dissenter, is more just to Laud than some of our own clergy, who, as they read but little, speak in total ignorance on all historical subjects. Marvel says of Laud:—'Who, if for nothing else, yet for his learned book against Fisher, deserved far another fate than he met with, and ought 'not now to be mentioned without due honour.'³ We venture to express our belief that many of the traducers of Laud never heard of his book against Fisher.

Even the satires of these times might have convinced Dr. Lushington of his erroneous impressions respecting crosses. In a curious work of the period, we find a chapter—'How to cure Crosses.' The writer's prescriptions are not a little

¹ Wharton's *Troubles and Tryals of Laud*, i. pp. 311, 312, 313, 316, 332—334. Rushworth, Part II. pp. 274, 275.

² Prynne's *Canterburie's Doom*, p. 75.

³ *The Rehearsal Transposed*, p. 281.

singular. 'Carry no coyn about with you; for you know that there is an image on one side, and a crosse on the other: and I would have you so much avoid it because you are already prone to worship it, and some think it is the only way to make a Papist on you. Forbear to walk in these forbidden paths, till their names be changed,—White-Crosse Street, Red-Crosse Street, Charin-Crosse, Cow-Crosse, Ratcliffe-Crosse. If any man's name be Crosse, let him change it, and call himself Overthwart, as William Overthwart. I will not wish you to put away all crosse wives, because I would not debar you of the general society of women.' In allusion to the contempt in which churches were held in those reforming times, the writer says:—'If preaching is as sacred in a stable as in a church, why not in a church as well as a stable? If ye do it in remembrance that it was the necessitated place of our Saviour, ye stand in your own light, and confute yourselves; you may with as little idolatrie keep in view the form of that whereon he died, as of that where he was born.'¹

¹ *Medicine for the Times.* By T. J.: London, 1641. An unpag'd Tract. If amusement could be experienced on so sad a subject, we might certainly derive much from the proceedings of these strange times, to which some of our modern reformers would drive us if possible. It is a well-known fact, that the Lord's Supper was not administered in some places for twenty years, because the ministers who usurped authority could not agree about the manner of the administration. 'I will make affidavit that some parishes among us have been interdicted from the Lord's Supper by the hirelings that teach them from anno 1642 to 1659; and this famine of the Holy Bread is like to continue among them.'—*Hacket's Life of Williams*, Part II. p. 107. Hacket was a witness of the scenes of those sad times; but he does not stand alone, for Baxter himself, a Nonconformist, confirmed the statement, saying, that for twenty years the Lord's Supper was not administered in many places, because persons could not agree about the mode of administration. Were our zealous reformers to succeed in their attempts to alter the Liturgy, is it probable that they would proceed better in a new settlement than their predecessors of 1640? Opinions would be so numerous that no two men would agree to worship together. We read in another author, 'How many churches are there where there hath been no speaking of a Sacrament these fifteen or sixteen years?'—*History of the English and Scotch Presbytery*, 1659, p. 199.

While the publications against Laud and the Bishops prove the existence of Crosses, they also prove the existence of that spirit of detraction which is now so prevalent. The following lines will explain our meaning:—

'But presently they heard strange fables,
The Bishops went to Lambeth with their bables;
Where a new faire was lately consecrate,
For Popish garments that were out of date.
Buy a Crucifix, another loud doth call;
'Twill scare the Devil, and preserve your soule.'
Buy this brave Rochet; buy this curious Cope;
The Tippet, Scarfe, they all came from the Pope.
Then after that unto this jolly faire,
A little wren came flying through the aire,
And on his back betwixt his wings he bore
A Minster staff with crosses, altars, store,

In another satire we read,—‘ Truly, brother, I am very much
 ‘ offended with a foule superstition, which I wonder is so easily
 ‘ passed over by others: our windmills, you know, are framed
 ‘ in so perfect a crosse, as if they were erected in defiance of
 ‘ reformation. To what purpose do we banish the crosse out of
 ‘ our churches and markets, if we allow it upon our city walls
 ‘ or in our fields. It is no marvel, if our corne that is ground
 ‘ with so idolatrous an engine turne to no better nourishment,
 ‘ and serve only to feed wicked humours.’ ‘ If you mark it,
 ‘ they are commonly seated upon high hills that their offence
 ‘ may be the more notorious: my advice therefore is, up with
 ‘ all windmills.’ The writer then proposes an invention of
 a round mill. ‘ Why may there not be a device of a round
 ‘ windmill free from offence? First, it is new, and that, I
 ‘ suppose, is no small praise: away with the rotten fashions of
 ‘ our doting ancestors. Secondly, this is a fashion that hath
 ‘ never been taken up by Papists or Heathens. I am much
 ‘ afraid lest, when they see the better fashion of our grinding
 ‘ engine, they will go near to conforme, which if they should do,
 ‘ they will soon drive us to seek some other device.’ He pro-
 poses, ‘ that even the horn-book should be rejected, on account
 ‘ of the cross. A good sister of ours, Mistris W., a school-
 ‘ mistris, would not suffer her little ones to make that idol in
 ‘ their first lesson, but taught them to say *black-spot*, instead of
 ‘ Christ’s-Crosse: and our brother, H. L., the baker, in detest-
 ‘ ation of this figure, would not so much as prick his loaves
 ‘ with an headlesse crosse, but contented himselfe with one
 ‘ single motion of his knife.’¹

It is evident that in those days crosses in churches were no
 novelties. The absurd opposition was the novelty. The current,
 however, had set in, and many years elapsed before it was
 checked. Various individuals were summoned before the
 Commons to answer charges of innovations; and the cross was
 always one. In the list of charges against Pocklington, we
 find this: ‘ He hath placed a crosse in a cloth behind the altar,
 called the altar-cloth.’² John Squire, a clergyman, was

With sacred fonts and rare gilt cherubims,
 And bellowing organs chaunting curious hymnes;
 Wax candles, tapers, another cries and calls,
 These brought I with me from Cathedral Paul’s.’

Lambeth Faire, wherein you have all the Bishop’s trinkets set to sale. Printed
 in the year 1641. In the woodcuts, Crosses are among the articles exposed
 for sale.

¹ A New Windmill, a New. At Oxford. Printed by Leonard Litchfield, 1643.
 Pp. 3, 4, 5.

² The Petition and Articles against John Pocklington. London: printed in
 the year 1641.

charged with allowing pictures of the Virgin Mary and of our Lord. The parishioners wished to have a crucifix; but Squire refused. His reply to the charge was, that there was a picture of the Virgin, but that he had refused to allow a crucifix.¹ Sherfield's case made a considerable noise, and was urged against Laud. We do not justify his censure; but it was the custom of the times to punish with severity; and the Presbyterians, when they acquired power, far outstripped the Bishops in the race of persecution. Sherfield proceeded to break the figures in the window, on the authority of a parish-vestry. The act, therefore, was illegal. The window could only lawfully be removed with the consent of the Bishop; and on this point the sentence depended. 'For so doing, in contempt of the Bishop, and without any authority, he was fined 1,000 pounds.'²

It is unnecessary to pursue the inquiry beyond the period of the Long Parliament, since crosses are lawful now if they were lawful in 1640. Many were destroyed before the Restoration; but some escaped, and others were restored subsequent to the year 1660. Our object is answered when we have established the fact of their existence, in larger or smaller numbers, from the Reformation to the year 1640, and this we regard as fully proved. If at that time all such matters were within the discretion of the Ordinary, and not affected by any law, they must be regulated by the same authority at the present time. In the times to which we have alluded, every

¹ An Answer to the Articles against John Squire. Printed in the year 1641. In 1637, Squire, in a sermon, which was published, refuted some of the lies in the News from Ipswich. This was enough to render him obnoxious, and to secure his sequestration. The sermon is sufficient to disprove the charge of Popery. See a 'Thanksgiving for the Decreasing and Hope of the Removing of the Plague.' London: 1637. The sermon was preached in S. Paul's Church. Squire states, that Divine Service was then celebrated thrice every day in S. Paul's. Being charged with Popery, he says, 'This Mother Church of S. Paul was built by Ethelbert above a thousand years since, anno 605, long before that *Popery*, the *Latine Liturgy*, was crept out of the nest, or the *Papacie* out of the shell.'—Pp. 40, 41.

² Autobiography of Sir John Bramstone, p. 62. Heylin's *Certamen Epistolare*, p. 193. Noy, the Attorney-General, said at Sherfield's trial, 'If windows containing memorials of Saints, Prophets, or Jesus Christ, were to be demolished because some men conceived them superstitious, for the same reason they might take upon them to pull down all Cathedral Churches because they are made in the form of a cross.'—State Trials, i. p. 585. It would seem that, after all, Sherfield was not influenced by religious feeling in his fury against the window at Sarum, though the act elevated him into a Saint with the Puritans. Thus we are told, 'About this time (1633) died Sherfield, the glass-window breaker, some thousands in debt; and most wickedly cheated those that dealt with him for that little land he had in a manor near Marlborough.' The inconsistency of the man was remarkable, for his land was mortgaged no less than four times; yet, on his death-bed, he sent a key of a box in his room at Lincoln's Inn to Noy, the Attorney-General, in which was a conveyance of an earlier date than the earliest mortgage, by which his estate was devoted to '*pious uses*.'—Strafford's Letters, i. p. 206.

thing disliked by the Puritans was branded with the odious name of Popery; and in our day, not a few, even among the Clergy, either from ignorance of the principles of their own Church, or from hostility to those principles, regard many customs as Popish which they themselves are pledged in the most solemn manner to observe. In short, many persons are more superstitious in their avoidance of practices which they may dislike, than even Papists in bowing down before the crucifix.

Dr. Lushington's Judgment necessarily militates against all carved figures in churches; yet, since the Restoration, many such things have been erected; and some of the old crosses in windows still remain, having escaped the fury of the parliamentary and military saints. In 1773, several specimens of both kinds were found in Oxford, and probably they still exist. At S. Michael's Church, 'in the east window are detached figures of the Virgin Mary, with her son in her arms. On the north window remains a saint at his devotions.' In the north window of S. Peter's Church was 'a symbol of the Trinity. Above are three figures, and at the top certain others of the Holy Apostles. In another window, a cross quartered. On the middle window, a capital figure of a saint, bearing on his garments crosses.' In the churchwardens' accounts of S. Giles' parish we have this entry:—'1563. Paid for mending the cross.' This cross was probably in the churchyard: yet it was as likely to be an object of superstition there as in the church. But the circumstance shows that the Queen's injunctions were not directed against crosses. In All Saints' Church, a modern erection, 'the altar is richly executed, being a stone, supported by two pilasters, and adorned on each side with two golden cherubims.'¹

Kennet mentions a rather singular instance of church ornaments in 1708. Describing the chapel erected by the Duke of Devonshire, he says, 'The altar-piece is an admirable frame of white marble and alabaster, supported by two pillars of black

¹ Peshall's *Ancient and Present State of Oxford*, 1773, pp. 23, 42, 81, 82, 217. If we prove that certain ornaments existed in the last century, our object is gained, whether they now exist or not; since the question is simply whether such things are prohibited, or whether they are within the discretion of the Ordinary. The following extracts prove the existence of Crosses and other ornaments in Cambridgeshire in 1750. 'A large painting of S. Christopher carrying our Saviour, is over the north door.' 'The Altar-piece is wainscot, and in the midst a picture of the Salutation. The cloth for the table is of velvet, on which stand two large silver-gilt candlesticks, &c.' 'The east window, containing the History of Christ's Passion, is very fine and whole, being hid in the late troublesome times.' 'Over the Altar is a fine large picture of Our Lady offering our Saviour in the Temple to the Priest.' These extracts relate to the church of Hinton, and the chapels of Caius, Peter House, and Trinity Hall.—*Bloomfield's Collectanea Cantabrigiensiæ*, pp. 3, 101, 157, 206.

'marble, adorned with lively statues on the top of each, and 'with a dove and glory very curiously cut in stone; and over it, 'in an oval black frame, a picture of S. Thomas convinced of 'his infidelity.'¹ No cross is mentioned; but all these figures are ornaments, if not images, and according to Dr. Lushington they were, and still are, if they yet remain, unlawful. Hundreds of churches are in the same state. They have altarpieces or carved figures. It appears novel and strange now for the first time to have the cross pronounced to be an unlawful ornament. Even Richard Baxter was not offended at the figure of the cross. Nay, he says of the crucifix, 'It is not 'unlawful to make an image of a crucifix to be the medium of 'our considerations, exciting our minds to worship God.'² Upon this passage Stillingfleet remarks, 'If any divine of the 'Church of England had said anything like this, what outcries 'of Popery would have been made against us.'³

Notwithstanding the destruction to which all such things were subjected under the Reformers of 1640, many painted windows still remain, and the cross, the sacred emblem of our salvation, is still to be found. Crosses and pictures, or figures, are very numerous in the church of Fairford.⁴ There are twenty-four windows, and all are perfect. When the Long Parliament commenced its work of destruction, these beautiful windows were taken down and concealed, and subsequent to the Restoration they were reinstated in their proper places. To this care on the part of individuals in those distracted times we owe their preservation. In one the Crucifixion is represented; in others the various scenes in the Redeemer's life are described. These representations, though of an early period, were set up after the Restoration; but most of them, on Dr. Lushington's principle, must be unlawful.⁵

¹ Kennet's Sermon at the Funeral of the Duke of Devonshire, 1708, pp. 141, 142. We have not entered upon the question of candlesticks, because they are allowed by Dr. Lushington, though it would be difficult to show that they rest on any authority beyond that which we plead for the use of crosses. But at the period of the Scottish Union candlesticks were so common as to be enumerated among the things which were calculated to offend the Presbyterians. Thus a writer, opposing the Union, says, 'We shall have blind lights, altars, and bowing to the altar.' This writer opposed the Union, among other things, on the ground of the Covenant. 'In the first article we swear to contribute our endeavours to reform England in worship and government, but by the Union we lay an eternal embargo on such endeavours. In the second article we abuse prelacy, and by the Union we establish it.' See a very curious tract, 'Lawful Prejudices against an Incorporating Union with England; or, Considerations on the Sinfulness of this Union.' Edinburgh, printed in the year 1707. Pp. 5, 11.

² Baxter's Christian Directory, pp. 875, 876.

³ Stillingfleet's Unreasonableness of Separation.

⁴ Heylin's Laud, p. 15.

⁵ The History of Fairford Church, in Gloucestershire, 1763. It is curious to

The case of S. Margaret's Church, Westminster, is well known, and it bears especially on our present inquiry. In the year 1757 a sum of money was voted by the House of Commons for the restoration of this church. The window intended for Henry VII.'s Chapel was purchased by the committee appointed to superintend the work, and placed at the east end of the church. From some cause or other the Ordinary, the Dean of Westminster, took offence, and proceeded against the churchwardens, and the charge is almost the same as that recently exhibited in the Consistorial Court. 'They have set up, or suffered to be set up, a certain painted glass over the Communion table, whereon is represented by delineation and colours one or more superstitious picture or pictures, image or images, and more particularly the painted image of Christ upon the Cross; and that they had not a licence or faculty from the Ordinary of the place for so doing.' Such was the charge, and the sting is in its tail, for the Dean of Westminster had not been consulted. After some time the Court of Arches decided that the window was not unlawful, and it still remains in its position. This case might have guided Dr. Lushington to a different decision.¹

trace the gradual introduction of some practices since the Reformation, and the disuse of others. Among the former we may notice communion-rails. They are now universal, though enjoined by no law. But in 1701, when Prideaux wrote, there was no uniformity in the matter, as is clear from the following passage: 'And therefore, for example, the rails at the altar being not required by any law, or of themselves absolutely necessary in any church, as they cannot be first erected without the consent of the parish and parson, and the licence of the ordinary first had thereto, so neither after forty years' disuse can they be again restored without the same consent and licence to authorize the churchwardens to do the thing, and levy a rate upon the parish for it; and therefore, though it be very decent and fitting that there should be rails in every church, to keep the communion-table from profanation, yet since this is a matter which often raiseth great contests and disturbances in parishes among weak and scrupulous persons, it is proper that churchwardens have this advice given them. But here it is to be observed, that the consent of the parish is not required as necessary to authorize the thing, but only to oblige them to pay for the doing of it. Whether it be fitting to be done or no, belongs to the ordinary to judge, but whether the parish will pay anything towards it being wholly in their power. Therefore if the parson or any other person, with the consent of the ordinary, have a desire to set up rails at the altar at their own proper cost and charges, the parish is no way concerned either to give or deny their consent thereto.'—Prideaux's Directions, 1701, p. 9. At this time then altar-rails were not general, but the matter rested with the parson and the ordinary. Can Dr. Lushington, therefore, remove a cross which has been allowed by the incumbent and the bishop, and which is not prohibited by law? But though no law enjoins altar-rails, would not the cry of Popery be raised against any bishop who should venture to consecrate a church without them? Times are now changed; and to remove some things, which at one period were regarded as Popish, would now be considered as an undoubted evidence of Popery.

¹ Wilson's *Ornaments of Churches*, 1761. A modern writer, alluding to the zeal of some persons against images in churches, says, 'No images but of lions and unicorns are now the embellishments of our churches; and the arms of the

Our task is completed. We will only add, that Dr. Lushington's judgment, if it be regarded as law, will unsettle a vast number of things which have never been disputed, though they are not enjoined by any express law. That some things not expressly enjoined may nevertheless be used, has ever been the opinion of those who have paid attention to this subject. Communion rails are not prescribed, and on Dr. Lushington's principle they are unlawful. Organs and many other things are in the same case. Yet it has ever been allowed that various ornaments in churches, not actually enjoined, may be repaired by the churchwardens. After long disuse, the churchwardens may require the permission of the Ordinary to restore such things; but no one until now has doubted that the bishop had power to replace or set up such ornaments as are not expressly forbidden. Consequently crosses, inasmuch as they are neither enjoined nor prohibited, are within the power and discretion of the bishop; and as the Bishop of London consecrated the church at Pimlico with the cross, and with perfect knowledge of its presence, it is not in Dr. Lushington's power to order its removal.

civil magistrate may stand with applause, where the cross, the arms of our crucified Saviour (if we believe the Calvinist), must be defaced as Popish and idolatrous.—Lewis on the Consecration of Churches, 1719, pp. 93, 94. Biog. Brit. vi. 4051, 4052.

- ART. III.—1. *History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth*. By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M. A. Vols. I. and II. London: J. W. Parker & Son. 1856.
2. *The Annals of England: an Epitome of English History, from Contemporary Writers, the Rolls of Parliament, and other Public Records*. Vol. I. Oxford: J. H. Parker. 1855.

IN the volume of 'Oxford Essays,' published about twelve months since, Mr. Froude supported the claims of the 'Statutes at Large' to be regarded as the text-book for the study of English History. He has there forcibly and clearly stated the advantages of reading the history of our own country by the light of these authoritative documents. As to their value for the purposes of education, we fully agree with Mr. Froude. But beyond this, they are of the first importance as the skeleton, or lay figure, for the historian. If there are obvious and great advantages to the educator and the historian, in the calm and careful examination of the mere legislative results of growing tendencies and gradual policy, it must not, however, be concealed that a history written on this principle will be likely to put out of sight much of that real living action which is above and out of the reach of law, and of which statutes of Parliament are an inadequate representation. Whether from a too rigid attention to his own theory, or from circumstances arising out of his distance from large libraries, Mr. Froude's book, in our opinion, fails to give us a sufficient insight into the springs and workings of political and social life. It is some gain, indeed, to find these neglected materials taking their proper place in the van of kingly biographies, and the wearisome roll of military and diplomatic achievements. What we search for in vain in these volumes, is a sufficient acquaintance with the life of the people, the state of the country, and that shifting temper of the nation which outruns law, and gives a terrible energy to a chafed and neglected will.

There is another disadvantage with which Mr. Froude has to contend. National life has so few real resting-places, that the historian of a single and limited period is tempted from the nature of his subject to make imaginary starting-posts, and to fancy that to be a *mirabilis annus*, which is, in fact, only important because it happens to be the date from which he has chosen to commence his history. To remedy this, most writers find it necessary to sketch, more or less vaguely, the past history, and to picture, as well as can be pictured in brief, the existing condition of the nation. The opening chapters in Mr. Froude's first

volume are wholly taken up with this rapid survey; but that defect which is almost inherent in all such summaries, is too apparent in the volumes before us. They do not give such an insight into temper and motive, into inner feelings and outward circumstances, as suffices to explain the events which succeeded each other in such portentous rapidity. Mr. Froude has, indeed, made good use of public records, many of which have been hitherto unused. He has carefully collated the narratives of ambassadors, and has arranged with industry the state papers of the period, leaving these documents, as he himself says, almost to tell their own tale; but, with the exceptions of an interesting volume published by Archdeacon Hale, and some valuable papers discovered by Sir Francis Palgrave, he has scarcely availed himself of those far more important records which are to be met with in the bye-ways of history, and which, though often minute and trivial, and domestic in character, enable us to disentangle so much that is perplexed, and to understand so much of what would otherwise be inexplicable. Whoever would build up a monument to himself in the shape of a real history of a living people, whilst he studies the public writings to which we have referred, must give a large portion of his days and nights to domestic correspondence, to 'household books,' to private diaries, to the wills, the songs, and the whole individual and common life literature of the age. This is more especially true of such periods as that which Mr. Froude has selected. When a nation is in a ferment, the causes of action are oftener to be gathered from its accidental and indirect confessions than from its formal state papers. He has shown, it is true, that the Reformation, which is, of course, the central group on his canvas, had but little dependence upon the accidents which accompanied it; but from a neglect of what we may be allowed to call the undesigned sources of history, he has not sufficiently made apparent the hollowness of the whole fabric of ecclesiastical society, and the fearful consequences of that delay in the reformation in Church and State which had been, for at least two centuries, clamoured for from one end of Europe to the other.

Whilst regretting these defects, it would be unjust not to indicate some of the excellencies of the volumes before us. In favourable contrast to the wearisome glitter of Mr. Macaulay, and the harsh mannerism of Mr. Carlyle, Mr. Froude's style is singularly clear and forcible. Incidents are grouped by him with picturesque effect; and whilst he writes with the earnestness of deep conviction, his narrative, even when necessarily brief, is remarkable for its precision. The chapter on early Irish politics and history, may be pointed out as combining these ex-

cellencies, whilst it possesses a value of its own from the insight it gives into the causes and origin of Irish grievances. With some of his opinions in ecclesiastical matters we cannot be expected to agree, and the tone in which he speaks of the authorities in the Church in the early part of the sixteenth century, will, to many of our readers, seem harsh and unjust; but having travelled over much of the same ground, we are compelled to add, that had the plan of his work forced him to deeper research into the state of society, lay and clerical, at the accession of Henry the Eighth, his language would have been more unmeasured; and he would have been called upon to draw such a picture of the fearful corruption of society, as to justify every strong word, and to account for every burst of honest indignation.

The period, indeed, which Mr. Froude has chosen for illustration is one which will always be of painful and absorbing interest. It is a time fruitful in lessons for all ages, and full of warnings to the Church, of what must ensue when zeal has given place to lukewarmness, and indifference has settled down into noisome and seething corruption. Pedants fondly rush to the closing years of the Middle Ages to fortify themselves with precedents: they who are wise will desire to know the whole story of this period, because of the importance and the vitality of principles. By the one it will be hastily regarded as the time of the triumph of man's petulance; others, who look deeper and more reverently into the history of the world, will search in it for the outward and visible signs of those sins for which God punished, and still will punish, a slumbering and a corrupt Church. To attribute the events of history to trifling and accidental causes alone, arises from the same infidelity of heart which assigns the origin of the world to the fortuitous concurrence of atoms.

But though the state of the Church, and the changes which rightly or wrongly then took place, will always naturally possess the chief interest, since the life of a people depends upon the depth of its religious instincts and the fidelity of the national conscience, it has been too much the fashion to regard this period solely as one of ecclesiastical revolution, to consider it with the temper of theological partisans, and to work out a picture in accordance with preconceived theories. Historians have overlooked the social state of the kingdom at large; or, touching upon it with reluctance, have turned to more exciting themes, and hurried to more interesting subjects—the sins and mistakes, the virtues and the vices, with which times of revolution usually abound.

The battle of Bosworth Field at once brought to an end the

worn-out dynasty of the Plantagenets, and the long wars which had, with other causes, led to so fatal an effect in destroying the moral character of the English people. The task which was allotted to the family then called to the throne, was little short of an entire reconstruction of political society. How deeply the very instincts of that society had been corrupted, may yet be learnt, and remains still to be written. This is, to our mind, more important than even the purely ecclesiastical one of the autocracy of the Roman pontiff. It was an incident in the rebuilding of the decayed framework of the nation that this autocracy was rejected. But it is a manifest injury to allow an episode to absorb the whole interest which the great drama itself demands. In endeavouring, then, to ascertain from the testimony of cotemporaries, what was really the aspect of society, and with it the state of the body politic, lay and ecclesiastical, at the close of the fifteenth century, we have no intention of referring to any polemical question. So far as we are concerned at this moment, the benefit or the sin of the Reformation may be all that its opponents or its advocates assert. The necessity or the recklessness of the change, we shall neither grant nor deny. It is our wish merely to review the condition of the people of this country in times immediately preceding the Reformation, and to endeavour to ascertain how institutions which were calculated to hold the affections of men with a firm grasp could have fallen almost without a murmur—certainly without a serious struggle to maintain them.

The difficulty of attaining a full and clear view of the state of English society in the latter half of the fifteenth, and the first quarter of the sixteenth century, arises from that singular dearth both of chronicles and official records which has been regretted by every writer on the history of the period. From the time of Stephen until the middle of the reign of Henry the Sixth, we have a series of annalists, leaving us little to desire. After this period, however, by some strange fatality, we are left with but scanty assistance from either cotemporary history or authoritative document. Thus, the border land between the Middle Ages and modern times is one of obscurity. Whether, with Sir James Macintosh, we imagine this to arise from a decline in the use of the Latin language, and a disinclination for a time to employ the vernacular tongue in the service of historical literature,¹ or whether we believe that the recent invention of the printing-press discouraged the multiplication of manuscript copies of new books, and, at the same time, was too much employed on old and favourite authors to concern itself with its

¹ History of England, vol. ii. p. 17.

own times,' certain it is that this period is the darkest, and its events the most debatable, in English history.

This failure of the historian's usual materials has added to the temptations which the writers of cabinet pictures of history fall into of regarding even great and germinant events as isolated facts, and so neglecting to trace the sources of even important national movements beyond the more immediate and often trivial accidents of the day; as though the broad current of history could be drawn off into artificial lakes, and analysed and treated of apart from the one ceaseless, ever-flowing tide of events. History, to borrow the appropriate illustration of a modern writer, may have its *reaches*, and it may be convenient to concentrate the attention on some small portion of the river of time, but it is impossible really to detach any one decade or century from the past or the future. If the simplest deeds of an individual survive for ever in their influence upon his life and character, the actions of a State, at any one moment, have as permanent an influence upon the future life and history of the nation.

So long as Church and State are exactly co-extensive, any inquiry into the moral condition of a people must necessarily have chief reference to the Church, which is the great moral agent: not its aspect only in the cloister, and its actions in the synod, but its effects on the face of society, and its influence in restraining the corruption of man's nature. At the period of which Mr. Froude is writing, outwardly the English Church stood in the same position it had filled for some centuries. There was the same hierarchy: two archbishops, both legates, and one a cardinal; bishops as numerous as in the Conqueror's time; abbots and priors, with the same gorgeous state, and more refinement than in the days of the Plantagenets; secular priests, rectors, curates, and mortuary chaplains, monks of all orders, and, where all these failed, mendicant friars. The whole framework of the Church, to a casual observer, seemed as compact and weather-proof as ever. The king was no mean theologian, and had entered the lists, the champion of Rome, withal 'he was very religious, heard three masses daily when he hunted, and sometimes five on other days; and heard the office every day in the queen's chamber, that is to say, vespers and compline.'² All this time the bulk of the nation was rigidly orthodox, and few sights, on the whole, gave greater satisfaction than the punishment of heretics. The laity was a church-

¹ Sir John Fenn, Preface to Paston Letters, vol. i. p. viii.

² Giustiniani, Four Years at the Court of Henry the Eighth, vol. ii. p. 312.

'The king yesterday deferred to write unto you his letters of his own hands for the saying of his mattins in honorem Dive Virginis; and this day harts and hounds let his grace to do the same.'—Pace to Wolsey, State Papers, vol. i. p. 51.

going people, and those accustomed to Italian indifference pronounced the English a right religious nation. One of the Venetian ambassadors, writing to the Doge his Relation of England, remarks, that, 'Although they all attend mass every day, and say many paternosters in public (the women carrying long rosaries in their hands, and any who can read taking the Office of our Lady with them, and, with some companion, reciting it in the church verse by verse, in a low voice, after the manner of Churchmen), they always hear mass on Sundays in their parish church, and give liberal alms because they may not offer less than a piece of money, of which fourteen are equivalent to a golden ducat; nor do they omit any form incumbent upon good Christians; there are, however, many who have various opinions concerning religion.'¹

Though thus seemingly fair, it yet required no great sagacity to know that all this was hollow, and that underneath the smiling surface a very lava flood was bubbling, and threatening, every moment, to destroy all faith, all order—and, what many a man feared more than these, all rights of property, and security of person. Let us stop our ears for awhile to the voices which tell us, by the aid of formal state papers, what the prejudices or the interests of the historian would have us believe. Let us listen for a time, with Mr. Froude, to the language of Acts of Parliament; but, more than this, let us gather up the secret confessions of men who lived amidst the scandals of those days; the lamentation of honest orthodox piety: the truth, which comes, because unwelcome truth will come, at times, even to the pages of apologists; the records, not of kingdoms, but of police courts, and the pitiable wail of dying testators—and we shall learn why this goodly structure crumbled into dust, and the attachments, and the interests, and the prejudices of centuries fell without a blow, or under one so trivial that it is the bitterest condemnation of any church to attribute so great a change to so marvelously inadequate a cause.

As in the whole of the Western Church, so in England, the traces of ecclesiastical discipline had for some time been difficult to discover; men were reminded of the existence of the Canon law, chiefly by some squabble between the sovereign pontiff and the king, respecting the right to present to a prebendal stall in a cathedral, and by some edifying question, as to whether an Italian youth, or a decayed Secretary of State, had the fitter claim to a bishopric. The Consistory Courts were busy with what ecclesiastical lawyers thought important causes, arising out of the refusal to pay mortuary fees. Convocation had for some

¹ Venetian Relation of England, circ. 1500, p. 23.

time ceased to regard anything beyond the subject of clerical taxation.¹ Bishops, when the pressure of their secular duties permitted, were engaged in ruinous victories over obstinate heretics; but as to moral discipline, or the oversight of manners, and the correction of sin, all that had been long ago given up, and not the faintest shadow of it existed; or it existed, rather, in the shape of a licence for sin, than as the penalty of past guilt. Sir Thomas More tells us that, 'not only the rich, but the 'poor, also, keep open queans, and live in open adultery, without payment, or penance, or anything almost once said unto 'them.'² That this is not an over-statement, those who have examined the wills of this period will readily admit. Illegitimate children are as carefully provided for, and as publicly acknowledged, as legitimate offspring.³ The Communion Service in the Book of Common Prayer expresses the lamentation of religious men *of that time*, at the decay of that godly discipline which the Church still prays for, and then first lamented as a thing 'much to be wished.' The profanity of the oaths in general use was appalling. To swear deeply was one of the first lessons of childhood. Sir Thomas Elyot complains: 'We daily hear, to our great heaviness, children swear great 'oaths, and speak lascivious and unclean words by the example of 'others, whom they hear, whereat the lewd parents do rejoice.'⁴ From the oaths themselves, we seem to see the necessity of some such teaching as that contained in the first of the Thirty-nine Articles, which declares the true God to be without body, parts, or passions. The last-named writer tells us that, 'in daily 'communication, the matter savoureth not, except it be, as it 'were, seasoned with horrible oaths, as by the holy blood of Christ, 'his wounds, which for our redemption he painfully suffered, his 'glorious heart, as it were mumbles chopped in pieces. Children ' (which abhorreth me to remember) do play with the arms and 'bones of Christ, as they were cherry-stones. The soul of God, 'which is incomprehensible, and not to be named of any creature 'without a wonderful reverence and dread, is not only the oath 'of great gentlemen, but also so indiscretely abused, that they 'make it (as I might say) their guns, wherewith they thunder 'out threatnings, and terrible menaces, when they be in their 'fury, though it be at the damnable play of dice.'⁵ Roger

¹ 'As for my days, as far as I have heard, nor, as I suppose, a good part of my father's neither, they [the clergy] came never together to convocation; but at the request of the king, and at their such assemblies concerning spiritual things, have very little done.'—Sir Thomas More, *English Works*, p. 914.

² *English Works*, p. 249. See also 'Letters on Suppression of the Monasteries,' p. 243.

³ Sir Harris Nicolas, in Preface to *Testamenta vetusta*.

⁴ *The Governor*, p. 15 (ed. 1565).

⁵ *The Governor*, p. 161.

Ascham, in similar language, expresses his horror at the universality, the frequency, and the blasphemy of the oaths.¹ On this subject we purposely abstain from quoting the writings of theologians of the period, nor is it necessary; every writer testifies to the same purpose. What Sir Thomas Elyot and others say in nervous prose, Alexander Barclay sings in fluent if not melodious verse:—

‘Some sweareth armes, nails, heart, and body,
Tearing our Lord worse than the Jews him arayed.’²

And again:—

‘If any discord
Among them fall, the wounds of God are sworn,
His arms, heart, and bones almost at every word;
Thus is our Saviour among these catifs torn.’³

We are only now escaping from this contamination. Whatever some may fancy about a love of truth, and a regard to the sanctity of judicial oaths being English characteristics, the men of that time had escaped from such trammels; falsehood and universal perjury went hand in hand with profanity; and notwithstanding stringent laws, and every possible contrivance to ensure truth-speaking, the writers whom we have already cited, and their cotemporaries, lament that it was almost impossible, either in a court of justice or in private life, to guard against the general untruthfulness, not of the race, but certainly of the race at that time.⁴ This evil had infected all classes. ‘Perjury reigneth everywhere,’⁵ is Tonstall’s testimony. It must have been well-nigh inveterate before Archbishop Wareham could, for this reason, have declined to make a return of the value of the benefices of his peculiars, and recommended that this should be done by the ordinaries ‘wher ther benefices liethe, wher they ‘cannot so wel hied the value of ther benefices, and *clooke ther* ‘*perjurie*, as they might to me, that knoweth not the value of ‘ther benefices, ne yet can lieghtly come to the knowlege ‘thereof.’⁶ These are not light words lightly spoken. They are not the rhetorical exaggeration of a preacher. They were written by a statesman-archbishop to a minister, who knew well

¹ *E. g.* Toxophilus, p. 34. Schoolmaster, p. 225. English Works (edit. 1815). ‘Everything that we affirm or deny must have an oath coupled with it. When men do buy or sell anything, more oaths be oftentimes interchanged betwixt them, than pence that the thing is sold for. In communication, and all pastimes, as many oaths as words be used. In playing at any games, there the tearing of God’s name, and particular mention of all the wounds and paines that Christ suffered for us, be contumeliously in vaine brought forth.’—The Bishop of Durham (Cuthbert Tonstall), Sermon before Henry VIII., p. 37.

² Ship of Fools, fol. 34 (edit. 1570).

³ *Ib.* fol. 149.

⁴ The Governor, p. 161.

⁵ Bishop of Durham, Sermon, p. 37.

⁶ Archbishop Wareham to Wolsey. Ellis, Original Letters, Third Series, vol. ii. p. 34.

how to detect a true statement from a false one, and who was not a man to be trifled with. To Wolsey, the Archbishop dared not have uttered a causeless slander; and this is the character which Wareham gives of the clergy of the province of Canterbury.

The lying and perjury were of no recent date, however much they might have increased of late years. The general untruthfulness showed itself in many ways, and in all classes of society. England, with little trade-competition, was suffering under what we are in the habit of attributing too exclusively to that cause. The staple exports of the kingdom had been injured by the dishonest practices of the manufacturers. The tanner sent his half-tanned leather into the market with the seal of the searcher affixed, vouching it to be well and sufficiently tanned, and, as a consequence, 'the kynge's poore subjects be greatly 'hyndred, and decayde, and fewe of them can go or ride drie, 'either in shoes or bootes, nor have any good or strong horse 'harneis of lether, ne any enduryng sadells, maales or boud- 'gettes, ne any other thynges made of tanned lether, to ther 'great damage, losse, and hynderaunce, notwithstanding dyvers 'good statutes have been made,'¹ &c. The clothier cheated his customers, foreign and domestic, in a similar way. His pack of cloth, when unrolled, was found to have a smaller quantity than it purported to contain. The outer fold was of a finer and better quality than the rest of the roll. Commonly, the maker racked his cloth until it was stretched a full third beyond its length, and then thickened the whole with 'flock powder,' made of woollen rags, ground down for that purpose.² Statute after statute, at least as far back as the reign of Richard the Second, had attempted to make tradesmen honest; but, apparently, with no effect. The 'deceitful cloth' of England was still the subject of Acts of Parliament in the reign of Henry the Eighth; and we learn from Latimer the way in which the cheat was effected: 'If his cloth be eighteen yards long, he will set him 'on a rack, and stretch him out with ropes, till the sinews 'shrink again, while he hath brought him to twenty-seven 'yards. When they have brought him to that perfection, they 'have a pretty feat to thicken him again. He makes me a powder 'for it, and plays the poticary; they call it flock powder; they do 'so incorporate it to the cloth, that it is wonderful to consider: 'truly a goodly invention.'³ The invention of devil's dust and shoddy was no modern one. An Act of Parliament of Richard the Third tells us that 'the same clothes deceyvably wrought

¹ See e. g. 13 Rich. II. c. 12; 1 Hen. VII. c. 1, and 24 Henry VIII. c. 1.

² Giustiniani's Four Years at the Court of Henry the Eighth, vol. ii. pp. 46—Statutes 3 Rich. II. c. 2; 7 Rich. II. c. 9; and so *passim* till 27 Hen. VIII.

³ *Third Sermon before Edward VI.*

'after they ben fully wette, and shorn ben sett uppon tayntours
'and drawn out in leyngth and brede, that is to say, some of the
'same clothes beyng but of the length of xxiii yerdys ben draweh
'out into length of xxx^{ti} yerdis . . And also the clothmakers . .
'beyng bare of threde usen for to powder and caste flokkys of
'fynner cloth uppon course clothes to thentent to make the same
'clothe to appere fyne and good.'¹ Thus it passed into the hand
of the foreign merchant and of the retail dealer. The latter in
selling it to his customers had his own vulgar method of
cheating. The apprentice in *Piers Plowman* informs us,—

'First I lerned to lye,
A leef outhur tweyne;
Wikkedly to weye
Was my firste lesson.'²

His donet, or grammar lesson, was how to draw the yard
measure over the cloth so as to defraud the buyer of an inch in
a yard. But particular instances afford a slender idea of the
depravity of trade at this moment. During the whole reign
of Henry the Seventh, the statutes of the realm give sad evidence
of national dishonesty. If we except what we may properly call
private Acts of Parliament, such as bills of attainder, and the
reversal of former attainders, scarcely anything remains except
acts against fraudulent cloth-workers, tanners, fustian-weavers,
upholsterers, embroiderers, coiners, forgers, poachers, perjurers,
usurers, convicts who had escaped hanging by pleading the
benefit of clergy—the ticket-of-leave men of that day. In short,
almost every trade and calling is declared by the statutes of this
reign to be conducted dishonestly. London—Catholic London
—with the population of one of our county towns, and a large
staff of clergy, possessed no advantage in point of trade, or other
morality, over that over-grown mass, which, at the present time,
we call by the same name. The moral features were the same.
Making allowance for its enormous growth since those days,
there was far more social crime, far more sin, far more distress.
The card-sharpers and swindlers of that time were as dexterous
as those of our own; the retail dealer and chapman, at least as
unscrupulous as now; the adulteration of food as common.
In the streets, the Irish costermonger³ used precisely the same
arts of deception which the English costermonger does now;
and there were the same showily-dressed and importunate fallen

¹ 1 Rich. III. c. 8.

² Vision of *Piers Plowman*, lines 2877—2880, Wright's Edition.

³ 'All costermongers are Irishmen, and all your chimney-sweepers likewise.'
Dekker, *Old Plays*, vol. iii. p. 330. So Skelton, in 'Spekeparrot' (*Works*, vol. ii.
p. 5, line 87), mimicking the Irish dialect:—

"Moryshe myne owne shelfe," the costermonger sayth;
Fate, fate, fate, ye Irish waterlag.'

ones. In short, every social evil, every moral pollution which we deplore, we have received, as a fatal heritage, from ante-Reformation times.

The fountains of public and private morality were fast breaking up. A general deluge of licentiousness, and profanity, and perjury had spread itself on all sides. And the alarmed guardians of public safety tried, since religion seemed wholly to have failed them, to reach security by the stern teaching of the axe and the rope. At the accession of Henry the Eighth, society in this country had almost reached the point at which society ceases to exist. We have, hitherto, chiefly spoken of immoralities, which indicate the corruption of the conscience, and the lack of spiritual discipline, which should have corrected the evil. But, beyond this, crimes punishable by the state were so general, that the ordinary prisons were insufficient for the number of criminals, and the hangman's office had lost much of its terror, from the frequency of executions. Hollingshed asserts that seventy-two thousand thieves were hung during the reign of Henry the Eighth,¹ a period of thirty-eight years. Here we see at once the prevalence of ordinary crimes, and the uselessness of attempting their cure by the existing modes of punishment. It was society itself that had become corrupt. The controversialist is ready enough to attribute this to the suppression of the monasteries. This, however, is the plea of ignorance. In the preceding reign, matters were still worse; and we are told by one not likely to exaggerate on this subject, that 'thieves were then hanged so fast that there were sometimes 'twenty on one gibbet; and one could not wonder enough how 'it came to pass that since so few escaped, there were yet so 'many thieves left, who were still robbing in all places.'²

This is the testimony of an Englishman, whose office specially fitted him to be a witness; others tell us the same. 'There is 'no country in the world,' says the Venetian ambassador, 'where there are so many thieves and robbers as in England; 'insomuch, that few venture to go alone in the country, excepting 'in the middle of the day; and fewer still in the towns at 'night; and least of all, in London... People are taken up 'every day by dozens, like birds in a covey, and especially in 'London; yet, for all this, they never cease to rob and murder 'in the streets.'³ As to London 'there was, every week, some 'executed in one place of the city or other; for there were three 'weeks' sessions at Newgate, and fortnight sessions at the 'Marshelsea, and so forth.'⁴ But, however prevalent crime

Hollingshed, *Chronicles*, vol. i. p. 314, edit. 1807.

² Sir Thomas More. *The Utopia*, Book I.

³ Venetian Relation of England, about 1500.

⁴ Latimer's Sermons.

might be in the capital, it was little less so elsewhere. 'Behold,' exclaims Sir Thomas Elyot, 'what an infinite number of English men and women at this present time wander in all places throughout this realm, as beasts, brute and savage, abandoning all occupation, service, and honesty. How many seemly personages by outrage in riot, gaming, and excess of apparel, be induced to thefts and robbery, and, sometimes, to murder: to the inquietation of good men; and, finally, to their own destruction.'¹

When it is remembered that at this time, and until the twenty-third year of the reign of Henry the Eighth (1531), criminals convicted of murder, arson, and other offences, had the punishment of death commuted if they were 'lettered,' and so entitled to the benefit of clergy; and, therefore, that this frightful number of executions was of illiterate persons only, some idea may be formed of the quantity of great offenders, and the insecurity of life and property.²

Such general depravity might seem to justify any measures of repression. When ordinary means have confessedly failed, no one can, in reason, object to extraordinary ones. Amongst others who bewailed the all but universal corruption of the nation, the Earl of Surrey is remarkable for what appears a whimsical attempt at reformation. On the 1st of April, 1543, he and two others were 'called before the Council, charged with walking about the streets of London during the night time, breaking the windows of the houses with stones, shot from cross-bows.' His companions 'at first denied all knowledge of the breaking of windows; but Lord Surrey admitted that he had done so, beseeching the council not to impute the offence to levity, and protesting that his motive was a religious one. "Observing the corrupt and licentious manners of the citizens, and that the remonstrances of their spiritual pastors had been urged in vain, I went," he exclaimed, "at midnight, through the streets, and shot from my cross-bow at their windows, that the stones passing noiselessly through the air, and breaking in suddenly upon their guilty secrecy, might remind them of the suddenness of that punishment which the Scriptures tell us

¹ The Governor, p. 171.

² Formerly, 'benefit of clergy' might be pleaded by any lettered layman, however often he was convicted; this privilege was curtailed by an Act of Parliament of Henry the Seventh:—'Item,—Whereas upon trust of privilege of the Church, diverse persons lettered hath been the more bold to commit murder, rape, robbery, theft, and all other mischievous deeds, because they have been continually admitted to the benefit of the Clergy as oft as they did offend in any of the premises: In avoiding of such presumptuous boldness, it is enacted, ordained, and established by the authority of this present Parliament, that every person not being within orders which once hath been admitted to the benefit of his Clergy oftsoons arraigned of any such offence, be not admitted to have the benefit of his Clergy, &c.'—4 Hen. VII. c. 13.

‘Divine justice will inflict on impenitent sinners, and so lead them to reformation.’”¹

The untrodden wastes of Africa, and the pathless steppes of Tartary, have, at different times, been imagined to be the realm of Prester John. The same fancy has assigned the close of the fifteenth century as the true time when England was indeed ‘Merrie England.’ We have been of late years invited to consider all time before the religious cataclysm of the sixteenth century as the ‘Ages of Faith.’ We have no wish needlessly to dispel the dreams of pleasant romance; but we are unable to discover the causes of joy, or to see the signs of anything, save that wild mirth which breaks at times from the mob around the gallows, or the mirth, half madness, if not wholly licentious, which the great Italian novelist has marked as one of the characteristics of the plague-time at Florence. Happily for England, the race of the Plantagenets, which had degenerated into a Richard the Second, and had fallen to a shadow in Henry the Sixth, had been swept away; and Providence—whose mercies faith will always acknowledge, and the eye may sometimes see—had placed at this time in the seat of power a family, beyond all others fitted to grapple with the sins and the corruption of the times. Stern and rough were the Tudor methods of government; but theirs was a true government, and under it the people of this country were dragged out of the slough of despond into which they had fallen, and shook off much of the mire which had gathered on their garments in the passage.

Whilst the whole of the documentary evidence of these times leads us to but one conclusion as to the condition of the laity of this country, who formed the great bulk of the Catholic Church, polemical historians have painted the ecclesiastics in colours as varied as their own prepossessions. In history, as in other matters, ‘the eye sees what the eye brings means of seeing,’ and narrative writers have a wonderful facility in overlooking facts which are inconsistent with their own theories. So long, indeed, as ‘State Papers’ are the chief authorities, it is comparatively an easy task to make the history of a people shape itself to any conclusion that may be required. All that is needed is an hypothesis, selected facts, and dexterity in the use of the subjunctive and potential moods.

Whoever will honestly examine the materials which yet remain to us, will, we believe, come to the same conclusion as to the state of the Church, which men of such different opinions and cast of mind as the late Mr. Pugin and Mr. Froude have arrived at. When speaking of the dissolution of the monasteries, the latter writer says: ‘If the extracts which I have made lead

¹ *Archæologia*, vol. xxv. Surrey’s Poems, p. 69, ed. 1831.

‘persons disposed to differ with me to examine the documents which are extant upon the subject, they will learn what I have concealed as well as what I have alleged; and I believe that, if they begin the inquiry (as I began it myself) with believing that the poor monks have been over-hardly judged, they will close it with but one desire—that the subject shall never more be mentioned.’¹ And Mr. Pugin, glancing at the state of the whole Church in this country at this period, tells us what the result of such an investigation was, as to his own mind: ‘Let us examine the ordinary Catholic idea that prevails among our own body... All anterior to the Reformation is regarded and described as a sort of Utopia,—pleasant meadows, happy peasants, merry England... Such charity, and such hospitality, and such unity, when every man was a Catholic. I once believed in this Utopia myself; but when tested by stern facts and history, it all melts away like a dream.’² It does, indeed, *all* melt away; and after the first view has dissolved, a very different picture will appear on the canvas.

The effort to make a ‘council of perfection’ the rule for a whole class, was, in the nature of things, likely to be attended with failure. The attempt to enforce the celibacy of the clergy gave rise to continued resistance, and called out the perverted ingenuity, or encouraged vice in an order of men who were required to be examples of honesty and of chastity. At first, the law of celibacy was evaded in a way which threatened to extinguish the entire order of the priesthood. Beneficed clerks were content with the first tonsure, and declined to advance beyond the minor or ‘unsacred orders.’ During the fourteenth century, it would seem that half the number of rectories throughout England were held by acolytes, unable to administer the Sacrament of the Altar, to hear confessions, or even to baptize. Presented to a benefice often before of age to be ordained, the rector preferred to marry, and to remain a layman, or, at best, a clerk in minor orders. The choice of the patron of a living was, indeed, in nowise limited to clerks, provided he did not present an Israelite; any other layman was considered eligible; with regard to tonsured persons, the single class prohibited from holding a benefice, was that of the friars. ‘*Exceptis judeis et viris religiosis,*’ are the general words occurring in the deed of sale of an advowson. This latter exception, however, was not such as to prevent a friar having the temporary charge of souls. In short, during the time to which we refer, rectories were looked upon and treated as lay-fees. Benefices under the value of five marks

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ii. p. 429.

ment of the Hierarchy, p. 13.

could, according to the canons, be held only by clerks ministering in person; but if above that value, they might legally be held in plurality, or *in commendam*, sometimes by priests, at other times by clerks in minor orders, by laymen, and even by children.

Synod after Synod, and Archbishop after Archbishop, laboured in part to correct this evil. It could not be permitted by the rule of the Church that the Rector should remain an acolyte. Under ordinary circumstances, he must advance to the priesthood. In fact, this latter was the only order, save the episcopal one, which was at all a reality. In the fifteenth century, men usually passed within three or four months, through the orders of acolyte, sub-deacon, deacon, and priest. It is rare to find instances of persons who suffered the interval of a twelvemonth to elapse, between receiving the lower and superior order. A maxim of the ecclesiastical law of that time shows the laxity of discipline. All that was thought necessary was that the clerk should officiate once in each of the grades of the ministry. But even this was wholly set aside with reference to the lower orders, and the young neophyte was usually ordained on the same day acolyte and sub-deacon. Even this was too stringent a rule to be at all times enforced; and just before the Reformation we meet with large and important benefices with cure of souls, and ecclesiastical dignities, held by laymen. Poggio, for instance, was not thought disqualified for holding a benefice in this country to which he was presented by the Bishop of Winchester, though he was ignorant of the language, a layman, and, moreover, 'had great objections to the clerical life.'¹ Colet² was rector of the large living of Dennington at the age of nineteen, and held this and several other benefices before he had received the first tonsure; and Reginald Pole³ was not only Dean of Exeter, but sat and voted in the Convocation of the Clergy for eighteen years before his ordination.⁴ Whatever casual aid might be given by any of the itinerant friars, or by

¹ Shepherd's Life of Poggio, p. 124. (Second Edition.)

² Knight's Life of Colet, p. 20. (First Edition.)

³ Philip's Life of Pole, vol. i. pp. 6, 159. (Second Edition.)

⁴ Roger Ascham, when offered a prebendal stall, very honourably declined to be benefited by such a common but yet sacrilegious perversion of the goods of the Church. 'Mr. Petre said he would find the means the Queen's majesty [Mary] should bestow such prebends on me as I should be well able to live. Mine answer was, seeing my service shall be in civil jurisdiction, and not in ecclesiastical, and seeing prebends were rewards for the one life and not for the other, surely I would not crave the profit where I should not do the duty; and as I would not be busy to condemn other men that took them, so would I not be greedy in this kind of life to receive them; but had rather live by duty, under order in my poor estate, than with catching of both sides enrich myself with disorder.'—See Ascham to Gardiner, in Whitaker's Richmondshire, i. 272; and to Mr. Secretary Petre, in Report of Cambridge Antiquarian Society, 1854.

the chantry priests of the parish, who, however, held themselves exonerated from the cure of souls,¹ pastoral care must in such parishes have been unknown, ecclesiastical discipline impossible, and even ordinary clerical ministrations at all times uncertain, and often wholly wanting.

Whilst so many benefices were thus held, frequent complaints were made both of the number and the mean condition of the priests,—evils which, in the laxity of discipline, or rather the absence of all discipline, were difficult to be guarded against. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the territorial jurisdiction of a bishop had, in fact, come to be uncircumscribed. Suffragans, and even foreign prelates on their travels, granted indulgences to a shrine, or abbey, or a church, and conferred orders sometimes without reference to the bishop of the diocese. This abuse was encouraged by the confusion of the times, and was sometimes almost necessary from the absence of the proper Bishop: its effects, however, in swelling the ranks of the priesthood, was at best occasional and local. A permanent and almost universal cause was the increase of income, which might be derived from the fees received at ordination—a practice, though denounced by repeated canons and injunctions, unremedied before the Council of Trent. These priests, ordained without titles, or upon those that were fraudulent and fictitious, added largely to the disrepute into which the whole clerical body had sunk. Clemangis speaks of the ‘enormous multitude of base and worthless priests’² throughout Europe; and that this was literally true in this country so late as the beginning of the sixteenth century, we learn from Sir Thomas More, who draws the following picture of the English priesthood:—‘The time was, I say, when few men durst presume to take upon them the high office of a priest; not even when they were chosen and called thereunto. Now runneth every rascal, and boldly offereth himself for able. And where the dignity passeth all princes and they that lewd be desireth it for worldly winning; yet cometh that sort thereto with such a mad mind that they reckon almost God himself much bounden to them that they vouchsafe to take it. But were I Pope, I could not well devise better provisions than are by the Church provided already, if they were as well kept as they be well made. But for the number I would surely see such a way therein that we should not have such a rabel that every mean man must have a priest in his house to wait upon his wife, which no man almost lacketh now, to the contempt of the priesthood in as vile office as his horsekeeper.’³

¹ Johnson's Canons, vol. ii. p. 421, Ang. Cath. lib. edit.

² ‘Illa copiosa vilium atque indignissimorum presbyterorum multitudo.’—De Corrupt. Eccles. Statu, c. xvi.

³ Dialogue on Heresies, book iii. chap. 12. Eng. Works, 227, 228.

To this we may add some touches which Ascham has preserved, and which are in keeping, even if they extend the sketch given us by More:—"If a man, now-a-days, have two 'sons, the one impotent, weak, sickly, lisping, stuttering, and 'stammering, and having any misshape in his body, what doth 'the father of such an one commonly say? This boy is fit for 'nothing else but to set to learning, and make a priest of; as 'who would say, the outcast of the world, having neither 'countenance, tongue, nor wit (for of a perverse body cometh 'commonly a perverse mind), be good enough to make those 'men of, which shall be appointed to preach God's Holy Word 'and minister his blessed Sacrament, besides other most 'weighty matters in the commonwealth.'¹

This is not a random assertion. However incredible at first sight such an utter disregard of ecclesiastical discipline may appear, the complaint which Roger Ascham here makes had been made thirty years before by Alexander Barclay, 'priest and chaplain in the College of S. Mary Ottery.' In the section on 'the abusion of the spiritualitie,' he says:—

'If he be
Misshapen of his face, his hands, or his feet,
And for no business worldly profitable,
For the holy Church then think they him most meet.'²

Of this crowd of priests many were settled as chaplains in the houses of the nobility and gentry, and held there a dubious position. Where many servants were kept, as in the households of the greater barons, the chaplain held the fifth or sixth place amongst the servants. His wages and livery were apportioned to him with the other servants, and he was required to take his share in the menial work. He accompanied his patron's children to school, was employed to deliver messages, and especially letters. Even in the family of the princely Earl of Northumberland, amidst his affectation of regal state, the Dean of his Chapel sat at dinner at the table of the chamberwomen and ushers; and though in this instance he was required to have graduated as bachelor of divinity, besides presiding in the chapel, he kept account of the entry of provisions into the kitchen.³ Abroad it was difficult to distinguish the chaplain priest, either by dress or occupation, from the rest of the people. Whatever Canonists

¹ Toxophilus. The condition of the English Church was not an exceptional one. In this respect it resembled that of every other country in the Roman obedience. In the heads of reformation submitted to Paul III. by the Council of Cardinals, we are told that 'Nowhere is any care or diligence shown in the ordination of clerks; whoever offers himself, however ignorant, mean in condition, or vicious in life, though he may be a boy, yet is he admitted to the priesthood, to the scandal and contempt of Holy Orders.'

² Ship of Fools, fol. 144.

³ Northumberland Household Book.

and Synods might determine, he bore his bow and quiver like any yeoman, carried his knife in his girdle, and slew his man when necessary without any stain upon his priestly character.¹ Even the public lists at Smithfield sometimes witnessed a clerical duellist, and the only favour granted him over his lay opponent was time and opportunity to be instructed in the use of arms, should he be proved inexpert.² In addition to the chaplain, priests were to be met with filling various domestic offices in all large households. Wolsey had a steward who was always a priest. Cardinal Bainbridge was poisoned by a priest who held a menial office in his establishment. Nor was this any peculiarity of churchmen; the same arrangement is met with in the household rolls of wealthy laymen, in defiance or ignorance of the Canons, which directed that 'beneficed Clergymen, or clerks 'in holy orders, be not stewards of farms, bailiffs, or seneschals, 'and so bound to give account to laymen.'³ Account they did render in many capacities. In the farm and the kitchen, the meanest offices were often undertaken by priests, who obtained their present livelihood and acquired a claim for future clerical preferments by the assiduity with which they performed their secular duties. In the household accounts of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, reference to priests occurs in connexion with the most undignified and degrading occupations. 'Given to the friar that brought beer to my master, viij.'⁴ 'Paid to the priest,' as we learn shortly after, 'the French priest, the 'pheasant breeder at Eltham, for to buy him a gown and other 'necessaries, 40s.'⁵ 'To the priest that wrestled at Cirencester, 'vi. viij. ;⁶ and such like items are to be met with in the family accounts of this period. In the "Plumpton Correspondence"⁷ we have a plaintive letter of one who tells us that he is 'a good preacher,' and at the same time complaining that he has 'no living but his buying and selling.' Clemangis declares that the swarm of priests who at Rome were waiting the chance of

¹ Depositions in Ecclesiastical Cases. Surtees' Society, Pub. p. 14. Barclay's Ship of Fools,—Of newe fassions and disguised garmentes, fol. 9.

² Proceedings of Privy Council, vol. vi. p. 57. &c. Chronicle of London, p. 90. English Chronicle, p. 34. In such cases there appeared a desire to prevent either of the combatants being subject to a disadvantage from inferior skill or strength. In the reign of Henry IV., 'a woman accused a Grey-friar of Cambridge, an old man, of certain words that he should have said against the king, and his judgment was, that he should fight with the woman and his one hand bound behind him: but the Archbishop of Canterbury was the friar's friend, and ceased the matter.'—Ib. p. 23.

³ Archbishop Langton's Constitutions, A.D. 1222; see Johnson's Canons, vol. ii. p. 106.

⁴ Household Book of Sir John Howard, edit. Beriah Botfield.—1463.

⁵ Privy purse expenses of Henry VIII. Ed. Nicolas, 1532.

⁶ Privy purse expenses of Henry VII. 'Excerpta Historica,' 1496.

⁷ P. 41.

benefices which the Pope claimed the power of conferring, were drawn, 'not from the study or the school, but from the plough and the shopboard.'¹ In keeping with this assertion, after the beautiful delineation which Chaucer has left us of the 'poor parson of a town,'—he adds:—

'With him there was a ploughman, his brother.'

And Dame Margaret Paston, anxious to provide for the child of one of her servants, is unable to decide whether she shall make him a priest or a ploughman. In either station he was equally respected, and equally subservient. The livery, which in common with the carter and the hind he received from his patron, was carried by him into the House of God. There, as regularly as the serving man bore his lord's cognisance on his sleeve, the priest's vestments were brodered with the same emblems of vanity and submission. The processional cope, azure and gold, and blazoned with fess, cheveron, and lions rampant,² mingled incongruously, but significantly, with the unearthly symbols of man's redemption. So again within the Church the same tokens of worldliness were obtruded. Although no scrupulous conscience was wounded by an ordinance enjoining the placing of the Royal Arms over the chancel-arch, the windows and walls were gay with the shields of the knightly or lordly families in the vicinity; and whatever might be the party prejudice of the worshipper, he bowed before an altar resplendent with the last triumph of faction,—the red rose and daisy of Dame Margaret of Richmond, or the sacred monogram surmounted by the portcullis of the House of Lancaster.³ If he approached to receive the Body of his Lord, in the magnificence around him, he was reminded of the willing subjection of the spouse of Christ to 'the pomps and vanity of this wicked world.' Around the neck of the celebrant hung the stole, the symbol of the spiritual yoke of Christ, embroidered, it might be, with the cross, but certainly countercharged with the arms of the patron or donor. With many a fervent aspiration for mediæval glories, and a lament at the disuse of such earthly gauds,

¹ De Corrupt. Eccles. Statu.

² Every inventory of the goods of a church will illustrate this:—

e.g. 'Cope venise gold, with Lord Monteaigle's arms.

Another of cloth of gold with the said Lord Monteaigle's arms.

Another with the said earl's coronet.'

Coucher-book of Whalley, (28 Hen. VIII.) vol. iv.

³ Amongst the goods given by Bishop Fisher to S. John's College, Cambridge, was,—

'First, a suit of vestments of red cloth of gold with spangles and crosses, in the midst embroidered with Jesus Christ and portcullis.

'Item, a vestment of green velvet, embroidered with red roses, with a cross of gold of stole work wrought with daisies.'—*Lewis's Life of Bishop Fisher*, in Appendix, vol. ii. p. 297.

Dr. Rock especially instances two stoles, superb specimens of worldliness, which have been handed down with religious care and veneration. The one bearing the solemn suffrage in the Litany, '*In hora mortis succurre nobis Domine*,' worked in large letters all down it; each letter of the inscription being in the centre of a quatrefoil on a gold ground; at each end a shield displaying *or a cross sable*; and in the middle of its length the arms of Lacy, Earl of Lincoln, *or a lion rampant purple*. The other stole, 'ten feet long by two inches in breadth, and ornamented with no less than thirty-eight shields of arms on a ground alternately green and pink, worked in silk and gold . . . from the heraldry of its bearings it would seem to be of the date of Henry the Sixth.'¹ Few churches but possessed some such heraldic vestments; for if the sinner on his death-bed, clothing himself for his last struggle in the cloak of S. Francis, or S. Dominic, bequeathed in return his own best robe to the altar of the neighbouring church, he fettered the gift with the condition that it should for ever after bear the arms of the giver.²

From the evils of pluralities we are only now entirely escaping. This is, however, an evil which has been gradually diminishing. The scandal of the last century was but a faint shadow of that of earlier days. Before the Reformation it had reached to such a pitch, that men whose fidelity to Rome is unquestioned, and whose knowledge of the actual state of the Church cannot be doubted, tell us of Cardinals who were at one and the same time monks and canons, regulars and seculars, holding every office, however seemingly incompatible, and possessing not ten or twenty, but sometimes the incredible number of from four to five hundred benefices, and these not the poorest, but the wealthiest, and the largest parishes.³ In this country

¹ Church of our Fathers, vol. i. p. 412. So completely had this deference to secular dignity and power become the normal condition of the Church in the Middle Ages, that it is almost impossible to separate it even in thought from the history or the art of the fifteenth century. We may see ludicrous instances of this in the works of a great modern architect. Mr. Pugin had succeeded in imbibing the very spirit of the age whose glories he laboured to restore. Hence he sometimes imitated, even with an almost Chinese exactness, the symbolism which proclaimed this very undignified and irreverent alliance between the Church and the world. At this day the worshipper in his magnificent church at Cheadle passes into the house of God through doors covered with the *Lion rampant* of its patron; and whatever thought of devotion the Calvary Cross at Alton is capable of calling up is instantly checked, when midway on the shaft of that Cross, which is surmounted by shields bearing the emblems of the awful passion of our blessed Lord, the eye is forced to rest painfully upon the four shields, which occupy the place of honour, each covered with the lion of the Talbots.

² Wills of the period, *passim*.

³ Clemangis, De Corrupt. Ecc. Statu. cap. xi.—'Quæ utique abominatio, quod unus tenet ducenta, alter trecenta beneficia ecclesiastica? Nonne inde divinus

the statutes of provisors had put some check upon this abuse; our pluralists were forced to rest contented with a more moderate number of cures of souls; but even here instances of twenty and thirty parishes, cures in almost every diocese, and benefices in England, Ireland, and Wales, held by one man, were too customary to be considered exceptional.¹ Provincial Synods and several Archbishops by their injunctions had attempted a reformation in this matter; but the ease with which dispensations were obtained at Rome frustrated every attempt at amendment. No language can well be more direct than that embodied in the local canons; but so long as appeals to Rome were allowed, the scandal remained without chance of abatement. If, however, the grievous injury inflicted upon the Church by the accumulation of benefices, were in some degree checked by the laws of the country, the evils of non-residence continued to be a constant source of irritation. What it was two hundred years before it continued to be at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

In Chaucer's prologue to the *Canterbury Tales*, amongst the virtues of his parson, he instances that,—

‘He set not his benefice to hire,
And let his shepe accomber in the mire,
And renne to London to saint Poules,
To seken him a chauntrie for soules:
Or with a brotherhode to be withhold,
But dwelt at home and kept well his fold.’

It was a fertile subject of complaint from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, that the parson, if in priest's orders, deserted his proper charge to gain an increase to his living by mortuary masses, annals, trentals, masses of requiem, and such like. The usual fee for such masses varied from threepence to eightpence; and, notwithstanding the attempts by repeated canons to make them a less tempting employment, the sums that could be easily obtained from this source led the Clergy to abandon the more laborious work of the pastorate. The popular poet of the fourteenth century preserves the common complaint that,—

‘Parsons and parisshe preestes
Pleynd hem to the bisshope,
That hire parissches weren povere
Sith the pestilence tyme,
To have a licence and leve
At London to dwelle
And syngen ther for symonie,
For silver is swete.

*cultus diminuitur, ecclesiæ depauperantur, valentibus viris et doctoribus privantia
‘elibus mala exempla dantur.’—Henricus de Langenstein apud Von der Hardt,
nc. Const. t. ii. pt. 1, p. 52.*

¹ Gibson's *Codex*, p. 946, note. (1st edit.)

Bisshopes and bachelers,
 Bothe maistres and doctours,
 That han cure under Crist,
 And crownyng in tokene
 And signe that thei sholden
 Shryven hire parisshe,
 Prechen and praye for hem,
 And the povere fede,
 Liggen at Londone
 In Lenten and ellis.

Somme serven the kyng,
 And his silver tellen
 In cheker and in chauncelrie,
 Challengen hise dettes
 Of wardes and of wardemotes,
 Weyves and sheyves.

And some serven as servauntz
 Lordes and ladies,
 And in stede of stywardes
 Sitten and demen.¹

Thus sings the poet of the people. But the picture he draws owes nothing to the power of imagination, and derives no colour from satire. It is plain, unadorned truth. It falls very far short, indeed, of the language which Archbishop Islip uses on the same subject:—'We are certainly informed by common fame and experience that modern priests, through covetousness and love of ease, not content with reasonable salaries, demand excessive pay for their labours, and receive it; and do so despise labour, and study pleasure, that they wholly refuse, as parish priests, to serve in churches or chapels, or to attend the cure of souls, though fitting salaries are offered them, that they may live in a leisurely manner by celebrating annals for the quick and dead; and so parish churches and chapels remain unofficiated, destitute of parochial chaplains, and even proper curates, to the grievous danger of souls; and the said priests, pampered with excessive salaries, discharge their intemperance in vomit and lust, grow wild, and drown themselves in the abyss of vice, to the great scandal of ecclesiastics and the evil example of laymen. We, therefore, desiring a quick cure of this plague, do, with the advice and consent of our brethren, enact and ordain that all beneficed chaplains, especially such as are qualified for parochial churches and chapels and the cure of souls, be bound to officiate and attend them at the moderate salaries mentioned below.'²

The income gained from such sources was large, though uncertain; and, of course, fluctuating. When masses for the

¹ 'Piers Plowman, 165—191.'

² Archbishop Islip's Constitutions. Johnson's Canons, vol. ii. pp. 421, 422.

dead were directed by will to be said in numbers varying from a thousand to ten thousand, and that 'with all speed,' 'in all possible haste after my decease,' 'in all the haste that may be goodly,' 'as soon as notice may come of my death,' or 'immediately after my death, on the following day, if possible; or the second or third at the farthest,'¹ they furnished occupation for a large number of priests; who, when not so occupied, according to other testimony besides that of Islip, led an idle, and, too often, a dissolute life. Every attempt at abating the scandal utterly failed. When the sixteenth century opened, the wound of at least two hundred years was yet unhealed; still 'the order is rebuked by the priests' begging and lewd living, 'which either is fain to walk at rovers and live upon trentals, or 'worse, or else to serve in a secular man's house.'² The law of the English Church was sufficiently explicit, but the readiness with which dispensations could be obtained made the law useless. The appeal was always to the canon, yet still the corruption of practice went on unchecked. 'Let the laws be rehersed 'that command personal residence of curates in their churches. 'For of this many evils grow, because all things now-a-days 'are done by vicars and parish priests;' ye and these foolish 'also, and unmeet; and often times wicked; that seek none 'other thing in the people than foul lucre, whereof cometh 'occasion of evil heresies and ill Christendom in the people.'³ Scarcely a synod but complained of this practice; yet the evil was too inveterate for cure. Men who were indignant enough when looking at it as an abstract question, complacently followed the crowd, and walked in the tradition of Western Europe when the matter presented itself as one of personal wealth and personal influence. In 1537, Pole was one of four cardinals who declared it to be an abuse which they 'deemed of great moment to the Church of God' that cardinals should be also holders of bishoprics, 'because the office of a cardinal is incompatible with the Episcopate.'⁴ His biographer indeed claims for him the chief or entire merit of the suggestion. Yet, but a few years after, he himself did that which he here considers of so great injury to the Church, and accepted the see of Canterbury.

But any inquiry into the state of the Church, either with regard to her lay or clerical members, would be incomplete if we omitted all reference to the morals of the clergy. History

¹ *Testamenta Vetusta, passim.*

² Sir Thos. More, *Dial. on Heresies*, book iii. c. 12. Eng. Works, p. 228.

³ i.e. chantry priests.

⁴ Dean Colet's Convocation Sermon.

⁵ *Conciliorum delectorum Cardinalium et aliorum prælatorum de emendanda ecclesia, 1538.*

is an old almanack, and under similar circumstances the same events may yet return. There is nothing in the national character which will prevent us from sinking as deeply as Naples or Spain, with reference to clerical morality. We were once, at least, as low as either of these countries. The subject is an unpleasant one, and we gladly pass it by as briefly as possible. With Mr. Froude, we may confess that when we began to examine into this matter, we did so with an impression that the clergy, before the Reformation, had been unjustly charged. With him we would now gladly escape from such a subject. Words give but a feeble conception of the degradation of the body of the priesthood. This is unmistakeably stamped upon every page of the writings of every one of the apologists of the Church. We shall not attempt to cite cases of individual sin, unsatisfactory and inconclusive as this must needs be. No age or condition of the Church can hope to be exempt from the scandals of 'criminous clerks;' but the language of official documents and of the zealous defenders of the clerical order at that time is totally irreconcilable with the belief that the scandalously immoral formed the minority of that body. At the Council of Constance we find the Cardinal-bishop of Cambray exclaiming, 'The merciful Lord avert from His Church this reproach, that *every* prelate, priest, or other ecclesiastic, should be found guilty of this lamentable charge. As, formerly, God reserved to himself seven thousand who had not bowed their knees to Baal, so now we may believe that in every condition of the Church *some* can be found who, inflamed with Christian zeal, will set about their own reformation; and, by their precepts and examples, amend others.'¹ In answer to charges of gross immorality brought too sweepingly against the whole body of the English priesthood, Sir Thomas More never ventures beyond, 'Though there be many amongst the clergy full bad, . . . yet are there, again, therein many right virtuous folk.'² Of this there could be no doubt; and yet that the openly wicked were numerous enough to throw obloquy on the whole class, is clear, amongst other evidence, from such official language as is used by Richard the Third, in his Circular Letter to the Bishops:— 'Forasmuch as it is not only known that in every jurisdiction, as well in your pastoral care as other, there be many, as well of the spiritual party as of the temporal, delirring from the right way of virtue and good living, to the pernicious example of other, and loathsomeness of every well-disposed person: We

¹ Petri de Alliaco Cardinalis Cameracensis Canones Reformationis Ecclesie, cap. vi. in fin. Von der Hardt, Conc. Const. t. i. pt. 1. p. 433.

² English Works, 735.

'therefore will and desire you,' &c.¹ We have before quoted a part of an Act of the 4th Henry VII., ch. 13; the remainder was upon the subject of which we are now speaking. The first part of the Act referred to 'lettered' laymen claiming the benefit of clergy; the latter part has reference to criminals in orders, and attempts, by a technicality, to limit the privilege in their case. It is directed against those who 'hath been the 'more bold to commit murder, rape, robbery, theft, and all 'other mischievous deeds;' and it provides that 'if any person, 'at the second time of asking his clergy, because he is within 'orders, hath not then ready his letters of his orders, or a certificate of his ordinary, witnessing the same, that then the 'justices afore whom he is so arraigned shall give him a day by 'his discretion to bring in his said letters or certificate; and if 'he fail, and bring not in at such a day his said letters nor 'certificate, then the same person to lose the benefit of his 'clergy, as he shall do that is without orders.'² Mr. Froude has selected from the records of the Archidiaconal Courts of London some instances of the kinds of sin which were then common. The volume from which he has quoted a few cases, presents a most painful picture of wide-spread clerical profligacy; but nothing, to our mind, shows more clearly the inveteracy of the evil and the general depravity of morals, than the ludicrously light penalties with which the offender was visited. When a London rector confessed himself guilty of unchastity, and when the partner of his sin was the prioress of a neighbouring nunnery, thus making his crime of a deeper dye, and yet he was only mulcted of a sum of money equal to the week's wages of a journeyman carpenter at that time,³ little account could have been made of such sins, and the penalty itself became but another name for a licence to commit wickedness. No wonder, that whilst the courts were making themselves parties to such an abomination, when discipline was an empty name and a forgotten thing, the populace of our towns should be employed in hooting priests, monks, and friars, through the streets, and charging them with participation in such deeds of profligacy. 'Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake;' but surely woe to those, and to the Church in which they are still allowed to minister, who are persecuted for unrighteousness' sake. To find a priest of fair, virtuous character, was, rightly or wrongly, thought a matter which required care; and good orthodox laymen, who loved their Church and clung to every

¹ Halliwell's Letters of the Kings of England, vol. i. p. 154.

² This was sometimes an expensive, if not a difficult thing to do.

³ Archdeacon Hale's Precedents and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, 475—1640.

observance of religion, when on their death-bed, expressed their deep anxiety on this score. In the wills of that period we constantly meet with such language as this:—‘I will that if the said priest be not virtuously disposed, as is convenient to the order of the priesthood, that . . . the said aldermen shall . . . avoid him, and purvey another priest of good guiding’ (1492). ‘I will that a good and virtuous priest read and sing for me; and if he be not virtuous, I pray you that be mine executors, let him be changed’ (1501). ‘I will that if my priest or priests be not well-disposed and of good conversation, then I will that they shall be put out’¹ (1504). But we gladly pass from this hateful topic; on the sins of the clergy of that day let the veil of obscurity for ever rest. Sins they were which had long before destroyed their influence, and had made religion itself despised. Had Mahomedanism or decent paganism offered themselves as a refuge from the only form of ‘the Catholic religion’ with which the people of this country was acquainted, they would, in all human probability, have been preferred by great numbers to that powerless, worn-out, debauched Christianity, which was spread over the land. Spasmodic efforts were, it is true, here and there made to restrain the clergy from notorious crime; but the utter failure of all such efforts proved that sin had taken too deep root to be corrected by any power wielded by the ecclesiastical authorities of that day. The salt had, in truth, lost its savour; it was cast out; it was ‘trodden under foot of men.’

Great have been the advantages which not only devotion, but political civilisation, have received from monastic establishments. In times of disturbance, they were the places of comparative peace; in days of ignorance, the retreats of learning; in periods of profligacy, the abodes of devotion. Men and women who fled there from the trials of the world found cities of refuge from every temptation except those of the heart, the flesh, and the devil. It is no slight benefit to us that they preserved from destruction many of the precious treasures of Roman and Greek intellect; that they fostered the fragile flowers of art, and sometimes encouraged the development of human skill. In the rich slopes of meadow and of pasture land which stretched around the towers tenanted by the Carthusian and Benedictine brethren, agriculture advanced almost to the dignity of a science, and within the walls of convent gardens horticulture was sheltered into comparative perfection. We, who

¹ Bury Wills, published by Camden Society.

² It is evident that paganism was at this time not only making itself felt and respected in literature and the arts, but that, in its religious aspect, it was taking hold of those on whom Christianity could have little or no influence.

look upon the ruins of Tintern and of Fountains, are able at best to form a vague idea of those stately houses in the times of their prosperity. At the period of which we write it was as difficult for those who looked upon the moral ruin to recognise in these establishments the chosen abodes of learning, of sanctity, and of self-denial. For many years before the beginning of the sixteenth century so great a decline was evident in the whole of the religious houses, that men of every shade of opinion considered their fall to be inevitable. Scarcely any of the abbeys were able to procure sufficient inmates to maintain their numbers.¹ Letters of dispensation, by which the monks were freed from their vows, and enabled to enter upon secular occupations, were frequent, and the numbers of runaways who dispensed with a formal dispensation increased. The cells and smaller monasteries were often abandoned, from the difficulty of finding occupants; and their lands were transferred to the parent abbey, or appropriated to the uses of education. Everything boded the approaching extinction of monastic institutions. Popular predictions, which show the temper, and keep alive the expectations, of a nation, had long before declared,—

“Ther shal come a kyng,
And confesse you religiouses,
And bete yow as the bible telleth,
For brekyng of youre rule;
And amende monyals,
Monkes and chanons,
And puten to hir penaunce
Ad pristinum statum ire.”²

The firm conviction of the impending fall of these societies was felt as a reason for the endowment of colleges rather than of monasteries. In place of the foundation of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, it had been at first the intention of Bishop Fox to endow a religious house; from this he was, however, dissuaded by the remark of Oldham, Bishop of Exeter, that the monks had already more than they were long likely to keep. This was not the belief only of far-seeing statesmen. Plain John Baret, citizen of Seynt Edmunds Bury, when leaving by will, in 1463, an endowment for a chantry priest, is careful to provide, ‘If the office of Saint Mary priest fail, as God defend,

¹ See 27 Henry VIII. c. 28. This same decay of the continental monasteries is asserted by the writers of the period. Gerson speaks of those which scarcely had a tenth part of their proper number of monks, others absolutely without one inmate. Joannes Gerson, de Modo Reformandi Ecclesiam, apud Von der Hardt, Conc. Const. t. i. pt. 4. p. 91.

² *Piers Plowman*, 6239—46.

then I will that the parish priest have as much, &c.;¹ without referring to the general moral condition of the monastic body, a subject from which we gladly shrink, it was clear to observers, long before the close of the fifteenth century, that the most trivial circumstance alone was required to cause their overthrow. Without doubt many causes concurred to render the suppression of the monasteries a popular measure. Cupidity may be allowed some weight, though by no means so large a share as is commonly supposed.² The jealousy of trade, some branches of which were interfered with, if not almost monopolized, by these societies, had its natural influence.³ The classical infidelity of the renaissance, which regarded these institutions with contempt, together with political circumstances and the private passions of the king, may all have swelled the torrent of popular feeling. But these combined would have been insufficient to cause the overthrow of the monastic orders, and much of the indifference and enmity with which they were regarded can only be accounted for by granting all that their opponents allege. The ease with which they were suppressed is sufficient to convince us that the life which once existed in these religious corporations had greatly decayed, if not utterly ceased. Hence they no longer possessed that influence which contemplative piety or religious energy will exert even over the unbeliever. The members of the monastic bodies in this country were popularly regarded as luxurious, slothful, covetous, and consequently useless; and against this no prescription, however venerable—no immunity, however sacred—will long avail. That which is dead will not be allowed to cumber the ground, and traditional excellency is no substitute for present vitality. In estimating the forces required for the overthrow of old institutions, we must remember, that to extinguish corporate life, or to maintain corporate privileges after life has departed, is in either case all but impossible. Whether the monasteries could have been reformed, may be doubted. With whatever suspicion we naturally regard the reports of the visitors, it must not be forgotten that the firmest friends of the papacy advised their utter extinction. A twelvemonth after the Act of Par-

Bury Wills, p. 18.

² 'I never found, in all my time while I was conversant in the court, of all the nobility of this land, above the number of seven (of which seven there are now three dead) that ever I perceived to be of the mind that it was either right or reasonable, or could be to the realm profitable, without lawful cause, to take any possessions away from the clergy.'—More's *Apology*, ch. xxii. He afterwards (*Debellation of Salem and Byzance*, cvi.) explains this statement to mean that there were not seven who in any way thought that the possession of the clergy could be secularized, and not one who thought it 'right, reasonable, and profitable.'

³ Dodd's *Church History* (ed. Tierney), vol. i. p. 251. Lewis's *Life of Fisher*, vol. ii. p. 35. More's *Utopia*, pt. 2.

liament of 1536 had directed the suppression of all 'religious houses of monks, canons, and nuns, which may not dispend manors, &c., above the clear yearly value of 200*l.*' and 'where the congregation of religious persons is under the number of twelve,'¹ Pope Paul III. appointed a Committee of nine of the most eminent ecclesiastics in the Western Church, and directed them to examine into the state of the Church, and to advise as to its reformation. Of this Council four were afterwards raised to the Cardinalate; four were already known as the ablest members of the Conclave. The orthodoxy of Contarini, Sadolet, Caraffa, and Pole, is, we believe, unimpeachable. They had just witnessed the suppression of the smaller monasteries in England. Not only did they entirely acquiesce in that act, but they were urgent to outstrip it. So universal and inveterate did they consider the corruption of the monastic bodies, and so hopeless the prospect of reforming them, that they united in recommending the total suppression of every monastery in Europe. When these men could say, '*Conventuales ordines abolendos esse putamus omnes*,'² we cannot but be sure that they were in possession of facts with regard to the general state of the monasteries which would fully substantiate the evidence collected by the Commissioners of Henry the Eighth. Nothing short of this would have elicited or can justify so sweeping a condemnation. Facts are strikingly at variance with present popular belief. If charges of the foulest living be a calumny against the nuns of that day, then Bishop Fisher is a greater calumniator than any agent of Mr. Vicar-General Cromwell; and if the seizure of the lands of religious houses, and their appropriation to other purposes, were a sin, it is one that Pole and Fisher are answerable for even more than Wolsey and Henry the Eighth. In seizing the nunnery of Higham,³ after a vain attempt at its reformation, Fisher set the example, and justified subsequent confiscations; and, as we have just shown, Pole not only advised an universal sequestration of all convents, but on his arrival in England did not scruple to receive a grant of abbey lands for his own use.⁴ In fact whilst the reforming party in the Church were pleading for the preservation of some of the convents, the opposite party were contending for their utter overthrow. Latimer would have spared what Gardiner joined in extinguishing.

¹ 27 Henry VIII. c. 28.

² Concilium Delectorum Cardinalium, &c. 1537.

³ See the details in Lewis's *Life of Fisher*, Appendix, vol. ii.

⁴ 'To my Lord Cardinal's Grace, for one hole yeres rent of the tythes of Kirkbie-upon-the-hill, Norton, Cundall and others, 3*8**l.* 12*s.* 4*d.*,' parts of the dissolved priory of Newburgh, granted to him doubtless by Queen Mary.—Will of William Knyvett, 1557, and Note of Editor in '*Richmond Wills*,' p. 102. (*Surtees' Soc. Publication.*)

We have sought from unexceptional authorities to ascertain the state of the Christian commonwealth—the Catholic Church as it manifested itself not merely in the convent and within the walls of the parish church, but as it acted upon and influenced the whole body of its members. Such a sketch, however, would be incomplete, unless we extended our view so as to take in those who should have been the governors of the Church, and who had been consecrated as the overseers of the flock of Christ.

Mr. Macaulay, in a lively chapter of his *History*, thus speaks of the clerical body before the Reformation: ‘The place of the clergyman in society had been completely changed by the Reformation. Before that event ecclesiastics had formed the majority of the House of Lords—had in wealth and splendour equalled and sometimes outshone the greatest of the temporal barons—and had generally held the highest civil offices. The Lord Treasurer was often a bishop. The Lord Chancellor was almost always so. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and the Master of the Rolls, were ordinarily churchmen. Churchmen transacted the most important diplomatic business. . . . Men who were averse to the life of camps, and who were at the same time desirous to rise in the state, ordinarily received the tonsure. Among them were sons of all the most illustrious families, and near kinsmen of the throne, Scroopes, Nevilles, Bouchiers, Staffords, and Poles. Down to the middle of the reign of Henry the Eighth, therefore, no line of life bore so inviting an aspect to ambitious and covetous natures as the priesthood. Then came a violent revolution . . . The princely splendour of William of Wykeham, and of William of Waynflete had disappeared. The scarlet hat of the cardinal and the silver cross of the legate was no more . . . Thus the sacerdotal office lost its attractions for the higher classes . . . The clergy were regarded on the whole as a plebeian class. And indeed for one who made the figure of a gentleman, ten were mere menial servants.’¹

Mr. Macaulay’s facts are often no better than his inferences. It is true that before the sixteenth century a Neville, a Bouchier, and a Stafford—he might have added a Beaufort and a Plantagenet—were to be found amongst the bishops of the English Church; but beyond this fact, which was a symbol of the weakness, and not of the strength, of the Church, the statement of Mr. Macaulay must be received with considerable limitations, and his view of the effect of the Reformation on the social state of the clergy at large is altogether a mistaken one. So far as can be ascertained, that event had little immediate influence one way or another upon the position or the character of the cleri-

¹ *History of England*, vol. i. chap. iii.

éal body. The Church in this country was far from our ideal of perfection under the Stuart kings; but low as was her condition in the time of Charles the Second, it was immeasurably more degraded under the house of Lancaster, and during the reign of the first two kings of the house of Tudor. Nor is it any presumption to the contrary that before the Reformation the sons of the greatest nobles were often enrolled in the ranks of the Episcopate, and that for long after that time the position of a priest was regarded as beneath the ambition of a gentleman.¹ The inference drawn by Mr. Macaulay from the names he registers, as to the state of the clergy and the influence of the Church, is not borne out by history.

During the whole period from the Norman Conquest until the Reformation, two circumstances weakened the efficiency and diminished the natural influence of the Church. From the reign of William the First until that of Edward the Third, two antagonistic races occupied this part of our island, and from the smaller, but dominant one, the bishops were almost exclusively chosen. When we remember that for several generations such bishops were called upon to govern and direct a laity and clergy whose speech was unknown to them, and who were rendered sullen and hostile by the oppression of their Norman conquerors, we shall feel that but little sympathy could exist between such shepherds and their flocks. His ignorance of both the language and the temper of the English was pleaded by Lanfranc as a reason for his wish to resign the see of Canterbury.² Other bishops, however, were less scrupulous. The serfs of Lincolnshire and the burghers of York clung with tenacity to the rude, forcible Saxon of their fathers; whilst the French and Italian prelates disdained the use of any other tongues than the courtier Norman or the fashionable Provençal. An unsatisfactory and imperfect medium of communication existed, it is true, in the common ecclesiastical language, but this was chiefly confined to official documents and the records of the

¹ "Why doth the foolish world scorn that profession
Whose joys pass peace? Why do they think unfit
That gentry should join families with it?"

DONNE: *To Mr. Tilman after he had taken Orders.*

A friend of George Herbert's, so Walton mentions, tried to 'persuade him to alter his resolution to enter into sacred orders, as too mean an employment, and too much below his birth.' And Cave, in dedicating his 'Primitive Christianity' to the Bishop of Oxford (Crewe) compliments him on 'the great honour which your Lordship has done, not to the Episcopal only, but to the whole ministerial order, that a person of your rank and education would stoop to an employment so little valued and regarded in this unthankful and degenerate age.' These, however, and other proofs that might be cited of the low estimation in which the ministry of the Church was held, are not peculiar to post-reformation times. The position and influence of the clerical body was, as we have shown, lower and less considerable before the time of Henry the Eighth.

² Collier's *Eccles. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 12 (Ed. 1845).

courts of Law. When at length the two races had been blended into one nation, speaking but one language, and Norman and Saxon had become English, the inconvenience no longer existed. Shortly before that period, however, the mischief of 'papal provisions' was beginning to be felt, and from that time the bishoprics and wealthier benefices were often filled by Italians who, in a remote land, enjoyed the revenues without being able to perform the duties for which the endowment had been given. It has been questioned which of these two evils was the greatest.¹ On the one hand, the presence of the Norman bishop perpetually reminded his people of national disaster and oppression. On the other hand, the virtues of Italian prelates who never visited their sees were of necessity unknown. Under such circumstances some may think it difficult to determine whether the residency of Ralph de Flambard was not a greater curse than the non-residency of Silvester de Gigles: without attempting to adjust the balance between these two evils, we may remark that the first is the more excusable, since, if not inevitable, yet it arose naturally out of the circumstances of the country. The intrusion of Italian prelates, however, was not only as great an inconvenience, but was also a sin on the part of the Pope, who, in defiance of continual remonstrances and struggles, clung to an abuse which equally added to the wealth of the Roman Court, and alienated and exasperated the whole body of the English people.

It is but an unsatisfactory answer to this, to say that the bishops appointed by the Crown were often as little able to add dignity or weight to their office, and to perform their spiritual duties as these Italians. The frequent unfitness of bishops made by the direct influence of the Crown rendered the intrusion of alien prelates a greater hardship to the Church, thus on both sides deprived of her proper pastors. The nominees of the Sovereign were but too often men distinguished chiefly for 'diplomatic activity,' or the younger and youthful children of the greater nobility. Mr. Hallam speaks of the bishops of the middle ages as generally appointed before they had arrived at canonical age.² How far this is borne out by records we cannot say, though the appointment of children was certainly not exceptional; and in the case of the sons of baronial houses, they were more frequently minors than otherwise. Thus, the names recorded by Mr. Macaulay are not those of noble birth, who condescended to the service of the sanctuary, but of those who made the Church to minister to the needs of nobility. The history of the appointment of two of these 'sons of the most illustrious families' will, however, best illustrate the mode

¹ Dodd. Ch. Hist. edit. Tierney, vol. i. p. 143; note.

² History of the Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 175; note. (Ed. 1855).

of making bishops in the times immediately preceding the Reformation.

George Neville, Bishop of Exeter, Chancellor of England, and afterwards Archbishop of York, is now chiefly remembered for the largeness of the bill of fare at his installation feast. He was son of Richard, Earl of Salisbury, the friend and counsellor of Richard of York. His uncle was Bishop of Durham from 1437 to 1457. His brother was the last of the barons—'the King-maker, Warwick.' Whilst a minor and a laic, the Privy Council, then under the influence of his powerful relatives, 'advised and assented,' on the 30th March, 1454, 'considering 'the bloode, vertue, and cunningg that Maister George Neville 'soone to therle of Salisbury, Chancellor of England, is of, that 'he shoulde be recommended to the holy fadre for to be promoted to the next bisshopprie that shalle voide within this 'reaume.'¹ As death could not be calculated upon, and detraction, in the case of an obstinate bishop, was a hazardous experiment; he was a few months afterwards collated to the Archdeaconry of Northampton, and, after the lapse of four months (Dec. 21, 1454), received the first tonsure. In September of the following year the death of Lacy, Bishop of Exeter, left the road open to 'Master Neville.' In order, however, to give a monopoly of bishoprics and benefices to approved Lancastrians, an earlier ordinance of the Privy Council had provided that 'when they 'voiden, such as be the king's own servants, and have served 'his fater or grandfather, be preferred unto them like as it 'hath been promised often, and assured before this, so that they 'have no cause to complain, as it is said they do daily, for lack 'of furthering.'² The King, who had been compelled to nominate the uncle Robert Neville to the Palatinate see of Durham, had no desire to strengthen the same family, and the Yorkist faction, by the promotion of the active and youthful nephew; and in hot haste nominated John Halse, Archdeacon of Norwich, to the vacant see, who was accordingly appointed by papal provision.³ Neither King nor Pope, however, was powerful enough to resist effectually the house of Salisbury. The king, in November, was compelled to write to the pope, 'pleading forgetfulness of the Privy Council's arrangement, and his own promise; and showing that Cornwall required a man of might as its bishop, which, as poor John Halse was of no family, could not have been his case. In December this was followed by a letter of the Privy Council, specially recommending George Neville,

¹ Acts of Privy Council, vol. vi. p. 168.

² Ibid. vol. iv, p. 28.

³ The Letter recommending John Halse, and signed by Henry the Sixth, and Queen Margaret, is still in the Chapter Archives.

⁴ *Fœdera*, vol. xi. p. 367, edit. 1727.

who, in obedience to a *congé d'élire*, had already been chosen by the Canons of Exeter as their Bishop. The Pope cancelled his first letter of provision, John Halse withdrew his claim under a promise of the next bishopric, and Crown, Chapter, and Pope, having reconsidered the matter, accepted the Yorkist nominee.

Such, in the fifteenth century, was but too often the history of appointments to bishoprics. At the same meeting of the Privy Council, in which the *blood* of Master George Neville had thus been rewarded with a bishopric, 'It was advised and ordained, 'at the desire and request of the Council of this land, that the 'right reverend Father in God, the Bishop of Ely, for his great 'might, virtue, and *great blood* that he is of, should be recommended to be promoted to the see of Canterbury.'¹ The claims, indeed, of Thomas Bouchier were of no ordinary kind. Son to the Earl of Essex, and, on his mother's side, grandson of the Plantagenets, he had, whilst still a youth, been appointed to the valuable deanery of S. Martin's-le-Grand. In Dec. 1433, he was elected, in compliance with a mandate from the Crown, to the bishopric of Worcester. The preceding Bishop had died at Basle whilst attending the council held in that city. The Pope, as soon as the death of Bishop Polton was known, 'provided to this see Thomas Brown, Dean of Salisbury . . . then at the council.'² The interest, however, of Thomas Bouchier, sufficed to set aside this 'provision,' and the Pope ultimately consented to cancel the appointment of Brown, and to issue a bull directing the appointment of Bouchier, who, some months before, had been elected to the vacant see.³ On the 30th March, 1454, on the death of Archbishop Kempe, the Privy Council, as we have just seen, 'ordained' the translation of Bouchier, then Bishop of Ely, to the archiepiscopal see of Canterbury. On the 3d of April, the Prior and Monks of Christ Church, in that city, having met and received this mandate, sued for permission to elect,⁴ received in due time a *congé d'élire*, and returned as the object of their choice the nominee of the Privy Council.

These, on the whole, are fair specimens of the motives which dictated the selection, and illustrations of the mode in which bishops were appointed, in the years immediately preceding the sixteenth century. Indeed, this very appointment of Thomas Bouchier to the metropolitan see is cited by Collier as an

¹ Acts of Privy Council, vol. vi. p. 265.

² Le Neve's Fasti Eccles. Ang. vol. iii. p. 61; note (ed. Hardy).

³ Acts of Privy Council, vol. iv. p. 133. The *congé d'élire*, signed by the King and Council, was issued 22d Nov. 1433, and states that Thomas Bouchier was nominated at the request of Parliament, and in 'consideration of nighness of blood . . . and the cunning and virtue that resten in his person.'

⁴ Acts of Privy Council, vol. vi. p. 170.

instance of a more than usually free election.¹ In what that freedom consisted it is difficult to discover. At all times the *congé d'élire* was as unreal as it is in our own day. The direct influence of the Crown, or rather of political parties, Lancastrian or Yorkist—the Whig or Tory of the fifteenth century—was as great as now. There were, however, always occurring more scandalous nominations, too common, perhaps, to be regarded as exceptions, but attended with resistance, or other circumstances which prevented such appointments being more frequently made. When, for instance, Henry Beaufort, 'the offspring, begotten by double avowtry' of John of Gaunt and Catherine Swineford, was to be elevated to the Episcopate, his 'great blood' procured him consecration, and revolted at the poverty of the only see—Llandaff—open to his ambition. This, however, was arranged in a manner which savoured of the violence of the age, but which gives but a poor idea of its ecclesiastical discipline. At the request of the Crown, the Pope directed the translation of the aged Bishop of Lincoln to the inferior see; and in defiance of his remonstrances, and in spite of his refusal to undertake the oversight of a Welsh diocese, Henry Beaufort was intruded into the cathedral which John de Bokingham can hardly be said to have relinquished.²

Few instances, indeed, occur of any one of noble birth taking orders, except as the immediate preliminary to his intrusion into accumulated benefices or a bishopric. There, without any of the restraints thought necessary to an ecclesiastic beyond the name of marriage, he found in the sacred revenues of the Church a provision which the law of primogeniture denied him from the ancestral estates of his family. Between such a bishop and the priests of his diocese there could be no sympathy, and but little communication. His splendid equipage seldom, however, provoked their jealousy. He was not expected to reside within the limits of his bishopric, which he was not fitted to direct.³ The profuse luxuriousness of his table, which rivalled the board of Heliogabalus, was not hospitality. The retinue with which he was surrounded was calculated, indeed, to strike the senses; but the silver crosses and the gay processional copes, the sleek mules and the well-fed hounds, but poorly atoned for the virtues of a pastor and the presence of one who should have been a director and an evangelist.

¹ Eccles. History, vol. iii. p. 387.

² 'Henricus Beaufort filius Joannis ducis Lancastriæ et Catarinæ Swineford, admodum juvenis factus episcopus Lincoln, fere per vim detruso Joanne de Bokingham sene episcopo anno Richardi 2ⁱ. 21^o.'—Leland's Collectanea, vol. iii., p. 405.

³ Bishop Kempe, the predecessor of Thomas Bouchier both in the sees of Ely and Canterbury, performed mass only once in the cathedral of the first-named see, though he held that bishopric for ten years.

The whole *rationale* of the episcopate in those days differed so greatly, both from the design of its institution and from the decencies of modern practice, that it is difficult for a reader to understand it. The sovereign possessed no civil list. There were no pensions at the disposal of the minister or favourite. The landed property of the crown, if alienated, would not suffice to reward the ability nor to satisfy the expectation of all public servants. There remained only the property of the Church available; and able diplomatists, successful pleaders, assiduous secretaries, when worn out by secular labours, and sometimes veteran soldiers, were rewarded with ecclesiastical possessions, and bound to the performance of spiritual duties of which they were altogether ignorant. Those who have remarked the preponderance of clergymen in the secular offices of the State, have fancied that this arose from the inability of laymen to perform the duties of such offices. This is not even partially true. It is attributable to the narrow revenues of the Crown, and the want of means to reward the exertions of laymen. This difficulty was too often obviated by the profanation of orders, and by adding to the emoluments of the king's kitchen or mint an archdeaconry or a deaconry. Thus, to take the most favourable of all instances, it was the secular ability of William of Wykeham which led him to be rewarded, whilst a layman, with wealthy benefices, and eventually a bishopric, not the eminent ability of the priest which caused his employment in secular matters. Whether all this tended even to the stability of the *establishment* may be doubted. Whether the presence of the sons of noblemen, purchased at such a price, and occasionally enrolled amongst the bishops, added to the efficiency of the Church, will be questioned. That the system worked ill in those days; that it produced scandal, disgust, and strenuous resistance; and that at length its own internal weakness caused its overthrow, will be acknowledged by all who are acquainted with the literature and the official records of the closing years of the Middle Ages.

At the accession of Henry VIII., ecclesiastical propriety was in many respects more rigidly regarded than heretofore; yet even then the episcopal office was in a great measure sacrificed to the convenience or the needs of the sovereign or the pontiff. In the early part of this reign, the bishopric of Worcester was held by Jerome de Ghinucci, the third Italian who in succession had occupied this see; that of Salisbury was possessed by Cardinal Campeggio; Landaff, by George Athequa, a Spaniard. Bath and Wells, after having been held for fourteen years by Cardinal Hadrian de Castello, on his resignation of the see of Hereford, and for five more *in commendam* with York by Cardinal Wolsey,

was then conferred on John Clerk, Ambassador at the Court of the Emperor. Other bishops were withdrawn for years from their dioceses, and employed as residents at foreign courts. If we suppose that the Lord Chancellor (Wareham), the Master of the Rolls (Tunstall), and the Lord Privy Seal (Fox), were at the same time able to administer the duties of these secular offices, and to perform their spiritual functions as bishops, still, even then, more than a fourth of the whole number of the bishops were utterly unknown to the people of their bishoprics; and on the most important debates on ecclesiastical matters, such as the suppression of the convents and the supremacy of the Crown, the hierarchy of England was represented by seven bishops.

Great saints sometimes arise from the depth of great corruptions. As a general rule, however, the spiritual degeneracy of the age makes itself seen in the feeble religionism of all classes. We know not which is the more unsatisfactory point in this survey of civil and religious society in England,—the utter want of religious control which was evident in the mass, or the readiness with which the Church conformed herself to those who were in some degree faithful to the yoke that she offered them. The Holy Communion was received once a-year; indeed, one of the objections urged against the Reformation by the Cornish rebels was the attempt to make 'at the least three times a-year' the future rule of the Church. Margaret of Richmond is held up as a pattern to a lax age, because she was wont to communicate 'near a dozen times every year.'¹ As to fasting, the Church, throughout this country at least, directed vespers to be 'said and sung' before noon, so that the ecclesiastical rule of fasting until evening might be seemingly carried out even whilst it was really neglected.² Such a manner of playing fast and loose with the conscience was not calculated to win the respect of those for whose benefit this piece of indulgent casuistry was engrafted upon that religion, which, the more it raised the soul above the things of earth, was careful the more to inculcate the duties of a straightforward and manly uprightness. The world and the Church were mutually acting upon each other, and mutually corrupting each other.

In no quarter did there appear much hope of reconstructing a society out of such a chaos. The 'different opinions' of which

¹ Lewis' *Life of Fisher*, vol. i. p. 37.

² 'The Church, to condescend unto our infirmity, hath been fain to say in Lenten they Evensong before noon; and besides the natural days to devise us new ys, *ex fictione juris*, that we should, at the least, have Evensong in the Lenten it before we fall to meat. And yet we keep not that neither.'—Sir Thomas More's *pology*, ch. xxxi. *English Works*, p. 895.

the Venetian ambassador had spoken, were every day sundering the only remaining social bond—a common sentiment of devotion. Religion, the tie which holds humanity together, and, binding man to man, binds him also to God, was almost broken. From the one end of Europe to the other, men had long been plaintively calling for some authority earnestly to set about a reformation of manners. For two centuries the cry was unheeded, and corruption had become more corrupt. Princes never met, but the one anxious subject on which they conferred, or were suspected of conferring, was as to the means of curbing the sins of their people, even if they took no thought of their own. Christendom was full of shakings, and doubts, and heresies, and all moral corruptions; and England was, in all respects, a part of the general body of Christendom. In vain did the Lord Chancellor publish his witty and convincing ‘dialogues, confutations, and apologies:’ in the abstract they might have been successful; but when men opened their windows upon the concrete mass of wickedness in sacred and unsacred places, they needed no arguments, and were proof against any defence of such a worthless reality. The torrent of indignation could, indeed, be repressed; but nothing could shield the Church against the far more dangerous weapon of contempt. And whilst Archdeacons were punishing those who treated priests with contempt; and religious, honest-minded laymen were trying, with great pains—as so difficult a matter required—to devise means of discovering ‘virtuous priests,’ to sing mass for their souls, and Sir Thomas More was jesting pleasantly on the frailties and the ignorance of the clergy, and men were disputing of and denying the immortality of the soul,—the Church was sinking daily deeper and deeper into disorder, and the clergy into profligacy. Then it was that statesmen who saw nothing before them but a shoreless waste of waters, who had a passive habit of relying on the Church, but no faith in her divine mission, and were ready to give up all hope if the anchorage of the Papacy should fail them, strove to rectify all disorders by the vulgar remedies of the rack and the faggot. All would not do; men were asking, sometimes with little respect, but always with importunity, for the bread of life,—and the cries of hunger were not to be appeased by fire, and a stone.

We have, as we have before said, no intention of measuring and determining the far-goings or the short-comings of the Reformation in this country. When that history is worthily written, let the reformation of society which was then effected be no longer forgotten. Without losing sight of questions about the Papal see and the supremacy of Rome, ‘provisions,’

'annates,' 'first-fruits,' and 'appeals,' let it be remembered that men had then to be brought under the yoke of moral restraint, to be taught truthfulness, and to be rescued from the supremacy of perjury. What was done, like all work in times of confusion, cannot expect to be accepted in days of complacent routine. It was done under His guidance from Whom 'every good gift and every perfect gift cometh,' by men hampered by average human weakness, and fettered by ordinary human infirmity. Those who do God's work are men suited to the age; and to be far above the times even in moral purity is often fatal to all good influence. The works they do, bear for ever with them the stamp of man's imperfection: His footmarks are seen in the marvels effected by such an imperfect administration.

- ART. IV.—1. *Popular Astronomy*. By FRANÇOIS ARAGO, Perpetual Secretary of the Academy of Sciences. Translated from the Original and Edited by Admiral W. H. Smyth, D.C.L. For. Sec. R. S. &c., and Robert Grant, Esq. M. A. F.R.A.S. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. 1855.
2. *Outlines of Astronomy*. By SIR JOHN F. W. HERSCHEL, Bart. K. H. &c. Fourth Edition. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. 1851.

WE suppose most persons have been encouraged in their early efforts to master the First Book of Euclid by the quotation of the Greek geometrician's answer to Ptolemy, that there was no royal road to geometry—*μη εἶναι βασιλικὴν ὁδὸν πρὸς γεωμετρίαν*. The sentiment does but express a truth which admits of a much wider application; and, if stated in language adapted to these times, would run as follows:—There is no popular road to science. If we were disposed to exhibit the same truth as a Roman would have viewed it, we should give it in the still wider generalization of the words of Virgil—

‘ Nil sine magno
Vita labore dedit mortalibus.’—

And yet, from the immense number of popular treatises on science, one might be disposed to think that the nineteenth century has at least made an attempt to disprove the truth of this assertion. Indeed, it is but the natural consequence of books being written on all other subjects for the million, that some effort should be made to popularize science; and the difficulty of the task has not deterred either shallow or deep thinkers from making the attempt. The mere enumeration of the volumes that have been written on subjects of physical science during the last quarter of a century, would occupy more space than is devoted to the whole of this article. One evidence of success these treatises certainly possess: in commercial language, they have sold, and, we may reasonably infer, have also paid; what success they have met with beyond this, it would be difficult to estimate; for, in point of fact, there is no standard by which to measure the success, nor would it be easy, if a standard were agreed upon, to ascertain the facts from which we should be enabled to pronounce a judgment.

If it be asked, what peculiar difficulty there is in writing a popular treatise on a scientific subject? the answer is, that science alone, of all the subjects of human knowledge, mus

make sacrifice of that which is its very essence, in the attempt to make itself intelligible to the vulgar. We speak now, especially, of those physical sciences, whose principles have been ascertained to so great a degree of accuracy, as to allow of their being reduced to mathematical calculation. Other subjects, including even those of the fine arts, may, by skilful treatment, be reduced, for a considerable part, to the level of ordinary comprehensions, and may be rendered intelligible to those who have neither the time nor the inclination to pursue them further. History, for instance, in the hands of a judicious and powerful writer, may be rendered both instructive and interesting to the student who does not mean to make this subject the business of his life. And, in adapting himself to such class of readers, a historian does not need carefully to keep out of view principles which his readers will not be able to follow, or to forego arguments which to himself are conclusive, because of the inability of his pupils to appreciate their value or understand their expression.

Or, to take another instance from one of the fine arts,—the study of architecture has been of late years rendered acceptable to a very large class of people by means of popular manuals and handbooks; whilst the greatest writer on art of whom we can boast, has largely contributed to this popularity: yet no one would accuse Mr. Ruskin of keeping in the background the principles of art, or confining himself to superficial descriptions or disquisitions.

In both these, as well as in many similar cases, the popular treatise may be a good,—we do not say that it is necessarily the best,—foundation on which to build an accurate and extensive knowledge of the subject in hand; and it may, at least, have served to give the original impulse without which the study never would have been taken in hand, or supplied the interest, the want of which would have kept the student from pursuing the subject upon which he had once entered. This method of study is not, indeed, without one serious disadvantage, viz., the liability to create a distaste for the facts and minute details of the subject, which are necessary to the complete understanding of its principles and their results; and thus the learner may attain but a partial and superficial knowledge, for want of having seen general principles exemplified in particular instances, and illustrated in variety of applications. This is precisely the evil which almost invariably attaches to any attempt to build an acquaintance with the physical sciences upon the foundation of popular treatises. It is singular to observe, how the very word popular has gradually come, in this relation, to have the meaning of inscientific and inaccurate. People would scarcely like to

acknowledge their fondness for unscientific works in science, the contradiction in terms being so glaring when they are brought into such close juxta-position; yet, in point of fact, we believe this is the notion which most people possess of what are commonly called popular treatises on Physical Science; and whether this be the common opinion or not, it is without doubt true that this class of treatises has to make sacrifice of that instrument which alone can ensure the learner's being able entirely to comprehend their arguments and their scope. It is not here, as in other departments of human knowledge, where the defect at the commencement may be atoned for and in part remedied, by attention at the subsequent stages of the progress; the start here is made upon wrong principles, and, from the nature of the case, prejudices him who has made it against the attempt to set out anew on right principles, as well as obscures his view, and renders him unable to distinguish accurately between those truths which he has derived from the one source, and those which he is endeavouring to trace up to the other. To illustrate our position, let us take the case of mechanical science. We will suppose a person whose bent of mind is in this direction, and who is without that previous acquaintance with algebra and geometry which, in our opinion, ought to form a necessary part of all University education, and be regarded as a *sine qua non* in the examination for the first degree. Such a person will, with common diligence and interest in the subject, soon become far better acquainted with the practical details of the subject than the student who has made it part of his mathematical studies, and has with it obtained the highest honours at one of our Universities. Whilst the latter has, from the necessity of the case, confined his attention to abstract investigations, and solved problems which exist only in idea, and knows comparatively little of the modifications which his formulæ must undergo before they can exhibit results at all corresponding with observation and experiment; the other is familiarly acquainted with the practical working of machines, and is certainly able to make a far greater display of his knowledge, however inferior it may be in real value. Now we say that the knowledge that this man possesses will actually be in his way, and prove an obstacle to his thorough mastering of his subject, if ever he should propose to himself such a task. The knowledge which he possesses will not only give him a distaste for the dry and apparently barren analytical investigations, which, to the regularly educated mathematician, are, independently of any practical application, full of beauty, but deprives him also of that satisfaction which the other from time to time experiences, in acquiring that practical knowledge to which his theory

conducts him. We are even inclined to think that the student who has been regularly instructed in pure mathematics, will stand a better chance of making progress in mechanics, supposing him entirely ignorant of the subject beforehand, than in the case of his being well read in popular works upon it. We do not assert this positively; and, indeed, it is probable that upon differently constituted minds this preparation would act in different ways; but, in the general, we make no doubt but that a wide and superficial acquaintance with scientific subjects acts as a very decided barrier to the acquirement of a deep and accurate acquaintance with them.

In what we have said we have taken it for granted that ordinary people are able to understand the subjects treated of in such popular works, to the extent that they can be rendered intelligible without the aid of mathematics; but, in further disparagement of the value of such works, we have to observe, that we believe the number of persons in this predicament is very small; that the great mass of readers of these books gain nothing but confused ideas of their subject-matter—a result not much to be wondered at when the confusion of thought which many of their writers betray is taken into consideration. As the most recent instance of this style, we may refer to Mr. Hunt's 'Elementary Physics.' Still, it cannot be denied that it is possible to gain an interesting, and indeed profitable, acquaintance with the various branches of physical science from such treatises as those published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, the volumes of the 'Cabinet Cyclopædia,' and others, the names of whose authors are a sufficient guarantee for the value of their works. Neither are the most elementary treatises without their value, even if they do no more than contribute to the amusement and relaxation of those whose hours of rest would otherwise be spent in less profitable employments. To this class belong such books as 'Joyce's Scientific Dialogues,' which has hitherto held its place a long time, and which we are glad to see reprinted with additions and corrections, in the Scientific Library of Mr. Bohn. The other books which we have mentioned are addressed to a higher class of readers, and, in the case of persons who are not likely to have the advantage of a stricter education, these books may be made instrumental in disciplining the mind, though we are inclined to think little use is made of them in this way, and that those who possess them, in the great majority of cases, do not advance through more than a very small portion of their contents. They are, in fact, read in a desultory way, and probably few surmount many of the difficulties which must of necessity occur in them. We have always felt that the chief difficulty

in these subjects was the want of opportunities of witnessing the experiments alluded to, or, what is still better for the learner, of making them for himself. Even in the metropolis, there are few facilities of this offered, except to those who can afford to pay heavily for the indulgence; and, in the country, it is next to impossible to meet with the advantages of seeing a skilful lecturer perform the requisite experiments; and even then, not one person in a hundred in the audience has the opportunity of asking for explanations, or of re-performing the experiment for himself. Without this there is little chance of the principles of the science being understood at all, and still less of their being remembered. We may give, as an easy instance of this, the ordinary explanations of specific gravity, and the common methods of ascertaining it in the cases of solid or liquid bodies. There is scarcely any difficulty in understanding the accounts given in ordinary elementary treatises of these methods; yet we suspect many persons may have laid down the book with a full belief that they understand the mode, and could easily apply it in practice, who would, nevertheless, fail in the attempt to ascertain the specific gravity of any given substance placed in their hands, for want of having never made the experiment, and performed the requisite calculations.

Every one is familiar with the Roman satirist's lines—

‘*Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures,
Quam quæ sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus;*’—

but it is only during the last twenty-five years of the present century that the maxim has been really appreciated and acted upon in systems of education. During that time, maps, plans, designs, &c., have improved in their execution in proportion as they have been more widely diffused. The comparison of any educational catalogue of this day with a similar document bearing date within the first quarter of the present century, will convince any one of the immense improvement that has taken place in this respect; whilst within the last few years, we have to notice the further advance implied in the construction of educational models of various kinds designed to facilitate the comprehension of the laws of nature, and to throw an additional interest upon their study. Thus, we now see advertised from various quarters, models to illustrate the working of the mechanical powers, the law of acceleration of falling bodies, the properties of elasticity, and the more elementary parts of the sciences of hydrostatics and pneumatics. What was formerly from its great price confined to the public lecture-room, or to amateurs whose fortunes allowed of such costly purchases, may now be procured, if not exactly by the million, at least by a

very large class of people, without any great sacrifice on their part.

And, indeed, it is almost necessary to the full understanding of the value of any experiment to have performed it oneself. We may, indeed, believe what we see another do, but it is possible we may not comprehend it till we have done it ourselves. Nor is it any objection to these models that the rude style in which they must of necessity be constructed, does not allow of any refined experiments being performed, and can exhibit in no case anything more than an approximation to the truth of theory. The former part of the objection is irrelevant, for refinements of experiments are not wanted for beginners; and, as to the latter, these rough models are precisely in the same predicament with the most elaborately constructed instruments. It is impossible, under the most favourable circumstances, to eliminate all sources of error. The difference between the finest and the coarsest style is simply one of degree; though it must be admitted that modern art has done wonders in point of accuracy, and has produced results apparently in exact correspondence with theory; and the very imperfection of the model serves the important purpose of keeping before the learner's eye the difference between abstract laws and truth, and the approximate representations of them which alone it is in our power to exhibit. In point of fact this is a truth often lost sight of, both in books and in public lectures. It was, perhaps, scarcely to be expected of public lecturers that they should be continually disparaging the most interesting portion of their lectures—viz., the experiments. The success of a lecturer depends so materially upon the skill with which he can perform delicate experiments, and an audience is so little inclined to question the exact grounds of their belief, or indeed to analyse too closely what it is they believe, that few lecturers would be found willing to explain to their hearers how little an experiment is really worth, in the way of proof, or indeed in any other way than in exhibiting in a clear light some abstract truth, which is represented as nearly as in fact it can be. But in books that make any pretensions to philosophical accuracy, it is very important that this distinction should be kept always before the reader's eye; and, we are sorry to say, that the absence of this precaution is the great blot of almost all our popular treatises on physical science, as well as in most of the works in the various branches of mechanics, which have formed the text-books at our Universities for the last thirty or forty years. We will give two instances of what we mean: one on subject of the evidence usually adduced for the most elementary laws of motion; the other relating to the law of the

acceleration of falling bodies, which it is admitted can be rigidly demonstrated on the hypothesis of these laws being true.

With regard to the former of these, we do not mean now to enter upon the *veraxa questio*, whether it is an *à priori* truth, or whether it is suggested by observation, and afterwards confirmed by experiment, and our belief in it established by its manifest utility in mechanical and astronomical science. We have our decided opinion, which we have expressed elsewhere, that this, as well as Newton's second law of motion, is an *à priori* truth; and if this be so, no amount of evidence will disturb the belief of one who has once grasped the true idea of it, either for confirmation or for throwing doubt upon it. There are, indeed, writers who, like Mr. Mill, believe that the principles of mathematical science are arrived at by induction. Such an opinion we do not wish to controvert, otherwise than by the remark that it falls to the ground by its own weight, inasmuch as our persuasion of their truth manifestly is unalterable by any amount of alleged experience. But whether the first law of motion be of this kind or not, what we are objecting to now is the form in which its illustrations in books on the subject are generally put. Nothing can be clearer than that Newton intended, by the brief illustrations which he gives of it, to put it in a clear and intelligible light. He speaks of his three laws as having been received by mathematicians and confirmed abundantly by experiment; but the amount of evidence which he gives for the first law is contained in the few following lines:—‘Projectiles
‘persevere in their motions, so far as they are not retarded by
‘the resistance of the air, or impelled downwards by the force
‘of gravity. A top, whose parts by their cohesion are per-
‘petually drawn aside from rectilinear motion, does not cease
‘its rotation, other than as it is retarded by the air. The
‘greater bodies of the planets and comets meeting with less
‘resistance in more free spaces preserve their motions, both
‘progressive and circular, for a much longer time.’

Now the evil to which we are referring is this,—that many of the mathematical treatises on mechanics which have been in use at our Universities, actually speak of these laws as being proved by experiment; and even in more philosophical writings, such, for instance, as Dr. Whewell's treatises, there is little care bestowed upon making the student see what is proved and what not, and what is the value of the evidence upon which he receives either fundamental truths or propositions deduced from them. How much is assumed, and how much logically proved, is not distinctly enough laid down. If more attention were paid to this point, the student would be saved from a great deal of that disgust for the subject which most well-instructed

students of pure mathematics have in their time felt when entering upon their first treatise on mechanics. The distress felt by logical minds at not knowing what they ought to admit, and how far they ought to feel certain of what, as far as *formulae* go, seems proved, is familiar to all who have had any experience in teaching mathematics, or who can recal their own feelings at this period of their educational course.

It cannot, indeed, too often be repeated to learners, what in the abstract no sane person would think of attempting to deny, viz., that an experiment never can prove anything beyond itself. It may, indeed, be suggestive of a principle, and generally is corroborative of an assertion previously made, but no amount of experiments can do more than make an abstract truth probable. We remember once hearing a lecturer on experimental philosophy remark, after performing the well-known experiment of the guinea and the feather, that the feather had fallen quickest; but he did not take the opportunity which the fact afforded him, of reminding his audience of the difficulty of adjusting the complicated circumstances under which experiments are made to the ideal case proposed to the mathematical theory.

This difficulty appears very strikingly in Atwood's Machine, which shall be our second instance of the unsatisfactory nature of the attempt to prove theory by experiment. We must take it for granted that our readers are acquainted with the construction of this elegant machine, and content ourselves with referring any who have never seen it or heard it described, to any elementary work on mechanics which they may happen to possess, observing only that the machine itself is very simple, and its construction easily understood, though the law which it serves to illustrate is extremely difficult for a beginner to comprehend.

This machine has been pressed to do service in two different relations. In public lectures upon mechanical science, as well as in most elementary books upon the subject, it is generally made to exhibit the truth that the spaces through which a heavy body falls vary as the squares of the times, both being reckoned from the beginning of the motion. Of this we shall only observe, that probably the impression left on the mind of an intelligent auditor is, that it proves no such result to him. He finds it extremely difficult to argue from a case of constrained motion, in which a slight preponderance of weight on one side is made to set in motion two equally balanced weights, to that of a body falling freely from its own weight. The truth is, that the experiment takes for granted that the person who witnesses it fully understands the third law of motion as enunciated

by Newton; and the difficulty of making this intelligible even to a learner who, up to this point, is accurately acquainted with the mathematical theory of a constantly accelerating force, and uniformly accelerated velocity is well known to all University tutors. Again, this experiment fails in another essential point. Probably no one who ever saw it feels satisfied that his senses can sufficiently or accurately distinguish minute intervals of space or measurements of time, to make him rely upon this for his belief that the spaces vary as the squares of the times. Fortunately it is not necessary to rely on anything so precarious, as this deduction from the two first laws of motion can easily be made by any one who understands the enunciation of these two laws, and is acquainted with the merest elements of algebra.

The other end which this machine is made to serve in treatises of a higher class, is to prove the third law of motion, which we have said it is taken for granted, in mere elementary works, that the reader either understands or receives on the *ipse dixit* of his instructors. Neither is its application in this point of view at all more satisfactory than in that which we have just noticed. It obviously does not prove anything at all, but only exhibits a more or less near approximation to a theory which takes for granted that strings have no weight, friction no existence, the air no effect upon a body in the way of retarding its velocity. And we appeal, with the most undoubting confidence as to what the answer will be, to any fair logical mind, whether this experiment has or ever had any weight in convincing it of the truth implied in the third law of motion, be it worded in what way you will. Is it not absurd on the face of things to adduce this experiment as proof of the law that 'action and reaction are equal and opposite,' or that 'the moving force is proportional to the pressure?' Perhaps it will be said that we are arguing against a mere chimera, and that writers really do not mean that these experiments actually prove the law which they in some sort exhibit. We do not accuse them of any such absurdity, but are only protesting against the ambiguity of expression into which they allow themselves to fall, in treating a subject the difficulties of which to beginners are confessedly so very great. In evidence of the charge which we make, we may refer to Mr. Potter's 'Elementary Treatise on Mechanics for the use of Junior University Students,' and Mr. Pratt's 'Mathematical Principles of Mechanical Philosophy;' the one perhaps amongst the best introductions to the subject which our language possesses; the other the most systematic account of the theory of universal gravitation to be found in a single volume. The expression used by

the former is, 'the law is proved experimentally by Atwood's Machine.' The latter says, 'this is proved by numerous experiments.' This author, we must admit, does supply the antidote to this incorrectness of expression, by observing in another place, that 'these experiments do not *prove* the truth of the law here enunciated the law is only *suggested* by the facts we have detailed,' &c. We may, however, safely say that the law is not, and never was, suggested by any such facts. In striking contrast with modern English writers stands the beautiful simplicity with which Newton has expressed his meaning in the enunciation of these three laws, with just sufficient instances as will serve to explain the meaning of the terms used, and then proceeding to the corollaries immediately deduced, which seem further to illustrate their meaning to those who may, perhaps, have failed to grasp it from the mere statement of the laws and illustrative examples. Indeed, we believe the '*Principia*' is the only book in the language in which the young mathematician knows, or, at least, may know if he pleases, where he stands, how much he is obliged to assent to, and how much he must for the present take for granted. We do not say that he will not find difficulties; on the contrary, if they do not present themselves sooner, they certainly will begin to appear at the third corollary from the axiom on the laws of motion: but the difficulty here will not arise from any ambiguity on the author's part, but from the learner's having forgotten what is so difficult in such abstractions perpetually to keep in mind, viz. the definitions with which the First Book of the '*Principia*' commences—especially the first two, of 'the quantity of matter,' and the 'quantity of motion.' This difficulty will occur to many even of those who have mastered the first difficulty, which occurs in the very first words of the '*Principia*,' which, without the accompanying explanation, would convey scarcely any idea to the student's mind. They are as follows:—'The quantity of matter is the measure of the same, arising from its density and bulk conjointly.' The very terms are unintelligible till the reader goes on further, and finds this explanation:—'It is this quantity that I mean hereafter everywhere under the name of body or mass.' And even now, to understand its meaning, he has to take for granted what he finds no evidence for, till he gets further in the '*Principia*' than nine-tenths of its readers ever reach, viz. 'that the body or mass is known by the weight of each body, for it is proportional to the weight, as I have found by experiments on pendulums, very accurately made, which shall be shown hereafter.'

The real difficulties of this subject would, we believe, be indefinitely diminished if more attention was paid to the first

section of the 'Principia,' before going on to the second and following sections. As a discipline for the mind in careful reasoning there is nothing in the whole study of physical science at all comparable to this immortal work; and we believe the delay caused in the student's progress by adopting this method instead of the short cut which the analytical method offers towards the same results, would be amply compensated by the greater accuracy of knowledge and powers of mind acquired thereby.

We hope we have said enough on the difficulties of mechanical science, to convince any one that no amount of popular reading will be at all likely to surmount them all, and so to enable the reader to estimate popular science, as it is called, at its proper weight. There is one kind of value which works of this description, if well written, possess, to which we have as yet made no allusion. We believe the principal use which they are calculated to serve, and which, in point of fact, they do serve, is to act the part of handmaids to more exact treatises, to remind the student of the abstract theory of the practical applications which mathematical works can but briefly allude to, and so to fill up those blanks which (every learner of mechanical science will understand us when we say) exist in the mind of the reader who only knows the theoretical investigations, and who, in consequence of their abstract nature, is uncertain how far exactly his comprehension of them goes. We can ourselves remember the case of a young student in mechanics boasting that it was demonstrable that no force could draw a rope into a line accurately horizontal, and being quite puzzled by the simple practical question whether it would first break. He had never contemplated the possibility of the thread snapping, simply because the theory of the composition and resolution of forces to which he had been accustomed demands the hypothetical concession that the string is inextensible and infinitely strong—i.e., incapable of stretching or breaking. His view had been limited to the fact, that there would always be some, though perhaps imperceptible, curvature in the perfectly flexible cord he had been in imagination working upon.

We must not conclude these remarks without adding the masterly view of this subject which appears in the Introduction to Sir John Herschel's 'Outlines of Astronomy.'

'On the other hand, although it is something new to abandon the road of mathematical demonstration in the treatment of subjects susceptible of it, and to teach any considerable branch of science entirely or chiefly by the way of illustration and familiar parallels, it is yet not impossible that those who are already well acquainted with our subject, and whose knowledge has been acquired by that confessedly higher practice which is incompatible with the avowed objects of the present work, may yet find their account in its perusal,—for this reason, that it is always of advantage to present

any given body of knowledge to the mind in as great a variety of different lights as possible. It is a property of illustrations of this kind to strike no two minds in the same manner, or with the same force; because no two minds are stored with the same images, or have acquired their notions of them by similar habits. Accordingly, it may very well happen, that a proposition, even to one best acquainted with it, may be placed not merely in a new and uncommon, but in a more impressive and satisfactory light by such a course—some obscurity may be dissipated, some inward misgivings cleared up, or even some links supplied which may lead to the perception of connexions and deductions altogether unknown before. And the probability of this is increased when, as in the present instance, the illustrations chosen have not been studiously selected from books, but are such as have presented themselves freely to the author's mind as being most in harmony with his own views; by which, of course, he means to lay no claim to originality in all or any of them beyond what they may really possess.

‘ Besides, there are cases in the application of mechanical principles with which the mathematical student is but too familiar, where, when the data are before him, and the numerical and geometrical relations of his problems all clear to his conception,—when his forces are estimated and his lines measured,—nay, when even he has followed up the application of his technical processes, and fairly arrived at his conclusion,—there is still something wanting in his mind—not in the evidence, for he has examined each link, and finds the chain complete—not in the principles, for those he well knows are too firmly established to be shaken—but precisely in the *mode of action*. He has followed out a train of reasoning by logical and technical rules, but the signs he has employed are not pictures of nature, or have lost their original meaning as such to his mind: he has not seen, as it were, the process of nature passing under his eye in an instant of time, and presented as a consecutive whole to his imagination. A familiar parallel, or an illustration drawn from some artificial or natural process, of which he has that direct and individual impression which gives it a reality and associates it with a name, will, in almost every such case, supply in a moment this deficient feature, will convert all his symbols into real pictures, and infuse an animated meaning into what was before a lifeless succession of words and signs.’—*Outlines of Astronomy*, pp. 6, 7.

We should have been glad to transfer the whole of the introduction to this volume to our pages, as it contains so exact a representation not only of the difficulties of the case, but of the proper plan for such a treatise, and the objects which can be attained as well as those which cannot by this style of reading. We must content ourselves with referring to the work itself, which no one will be without who has any pretensions to more than the merest superficial acquaintance with the subject.

We are not afraid of being accused either, on the one hand, of overrating the value of popular works on Astronomy, or, on the other, of making an assertion contradictory to the remarks which we have made on popular treatises in general, when we say that such works as those which we have placed at the head of this article, are absolutely indispensable both to the mathematical student and to the man who would acquire such a knowledge of Astronomy as can be gained by one who is not familiar

with the notation of algebra, or the figures and demonstrations of geometry. The use of such a volume to the mathematician is exhibited in the strongest light, by referring to any strictly mathematical treatise on Plane Astronomy that has been published during this century. There is scarcely one that is without its introductory chapter, the object of which is to give a rough view of the outlines of the subject, and to render the subsequent mathematical investigations more interesting and intelligible. Even in the edition of '*Maddy's Astronomy*,' as published by Hymers—which professedly confines itself as much as possible to the mathematical theory, and is evidently written much more with the view of enabling students to answer questions at examinations, than to put them in possession of a real knowledge of the science—the Introduction forms a prominent feature of the work, and occupies more than the fourth part of its bulk. In other treatises of a more philosophical caste, such as the elegant work of Professor Woodhouse, the part that is generally consigned to the introduction, is judiciously mixed up with the mathematical investigations; and this, perhaps, is still the best treatise in our language for enabling the student to obtain a complete view of Astronomy. It would, indeed, be useless to recommend its perusal to young students at our Universities. Pupils, as well as tutors, would exclaim against it, as they cannot afford to sacrifice time which must be spent in acquiring what will tell in the examination. It is, then, in filling up the gaps that are left, by purely mathematical treatises, that such works as those by Sir John Herschel and M. Arago have their principal value.

But, again, the science of Astronomy differs from most other physical sciences in this particular, that it admits of being studied both agreeably and profitably by those who never will have the power, or, if they had the power, never would have the inclination, to carry their investigations far into its depths. What may be called a superficial knowledge of it, has not the disadvantages under which a superficial knowledge of almost any other science lies. In the first place, there is here little danger of the learner materially overrating the amount of his knowledge. Of the immense amount of distinct facts which Astronomy presents—whatever number of them he is conversant with—whether he has only reached so far as to distinguish accurately between the earth's diurnal motion of rotation on her axis, and her translation through space in her annual orbit round the sun; or whether he has been enabled to comprehend, in some sense, the steps by which the periodic times of the double stars have been ascertained; his knowledge is always, so to say, visibly lying close beside his ignorance. Suppose him

to be where you will, his knowledge depends upon testimony, and he knows that he cannot prove for himself what he, nevertheless, knows others have proved, though he has more or less insight into the methods of proof which have been used. Again, as he proceeds he is ever reminded of the incompleteness of knowledge he has as yet attained. At each step which he takes in advance, he is reminded that the mode of expression of the last was but a condescension to his inability to understand the whole truth. Correction after correction has to be applied. The effects of refraction, parallax aberration, &c., all admit of being explained independently of each other; and each, as it comes before him, convinces him of the imperfection of his past knowledge of the subject, and significantly points out the incompleteness of his present acquaintance with the results of observation. And this is one reason why we are inclined to give a hearty welcome to popular books on Astronomy. The proverb that 'a little knowledge is a dangerous thing,' scarcely applies to this subject, because, as we have said, the reader cannot turn his eyes in any direction without being convinced not only of the immense amount of truth that he does not know, but also of the impossibility under which he lies of proving for himself what he does comprehend. It is on this ground that we think such works may be made to serve a useful purpose in the way of education and discipline, regarded as distinct from the value of the instruction imparted by them. However, apart from this, there is real and available value for most situations in life in even the most elementary acquaintance with Astronomy; and, perhaps, there is no other subject so full of interest from the first commencement of its study, down to the extreme limit which the capacity of the learner enables him to reach. The mere knowledge of the position of the sun, or of the face of the heavens, has often proved useful in ascertaining the time or the direction of a traveller's route; and even an amateur observer, totally unacquainted with Physical Astronomy, may add materially to the known facts of the science. Mathematicians have themselves made the division of the science into Plane and Physical: the former occupied principally with phenomena; the latter, with the mathematical investigation of their physical causes; and a very accurate acquaintance with one of these branches of the science, may be possessed by one who has no acquaintance with the calculus necessary for the calculation of Planetary Perturbations, nor even sufficient knowledge of mathematics to be able to demonstrate Kepler's laws. We believe we might mention the name of more than one great observer who possesses but a slender acquaintance with the higher branches of mathematics. Now, though the man who understands only

Plane Astronomy may be said to possess but a superficial acquaintance with the science as compared with the mathematician, who can follow the demonstrations in the *Mecanique Celeste*; and yet his knowledge, so far from being contemptible, may be of the highest advantage to others as well as of the highest interest to himself; so it is with the still more superficial knowledge of him who attacks the subject, furnished only with the arms of a slight acquaintance with the principles of algebra and geometry, plane and spherical trigonometry. Such a person may safely and profitably go a certain way, and how far he can reach will depend partly upon the accuracy and extent of his preliminary information, and partly upon his capacity—more especially his power of giving his undivided attention to any given subject. Nay, to go still lower down in the scale of intellect, it may be possible to gain some useful knowledge of the subject, with only so much previous acquaintance with it as M. Arago presupposes in his hearers—and that is absolutely nothing. His introductory address concludes with the expression of the wish that the audience should be composed in greater part, even altogether, of persons entirely unacquainted with mathematical studies.

It is hardly possible to imagine a greater contrast than appears in the two volumes, the titles of which we have placed at the head of this article, when it is remembered that they profess to treat of the same subject and adopt somewhat the same style of teaching. We say somewhat of the same style, because it would not be fair to represent them as written with precisely the same objects in view or for exactly the same class of persons. The very titles of the works distinguish them; one is in the strictest sense '*Popular Astronomy*,' and professes to address itself to a much larger class than the other, and one much lower in the scale of intellect; whilst the '*Outlines*' are addressed to all who understand the subject, as well as those who towards [its] comprehension can bring a moderate acquaintance with mathematical science.

In saying that Sir John Herschel's work answers the purpose for which it was intended, and that M. Arago's does not, we do not mean to contrast the two works further at present; or in any way to disparage the latter work, which we think fails to do what it professes only because it professes what is impossible, viz., to carry an unmathematical reader over the whole ground of modern Astronomy. On the great value of the work in another respect we shall have something to say presently.

The '*Outlines*' consist of an expansion of a treatise written more than twenty years ago for the '*Cabinet Cyclopædia*.' In its original form, it was, perhaps, the most popular as well as the most useful of all the publications of that series; as it at pre-

sent appears, it is perhaps the most complete and the most philosophical work which has yet been written. It still retains the character of a *work of explanation*; the principal changes being in the part which treats of sidereal and nebular Astronomy, the subjects of which are brought up to the level of our present knowledge, and in that part which relates to the Lunar and Planetary Perturbations. It is no slight proof of the intrinsic value of so large and expensive a book on such a difficult subject, that the preface to the first edition is dated April, 1849, and the note appended to the fourth, August, 1851. The author sets out with the demand for a much greater amount of previous cultivation of mind than M. Arago, and frankly confesses that he makes a further demand on those who would understand the abstruser parts of the subject. Speaking on the subject of Perturbations, he says that the subject cannot be made *elementary* in the sense in which that word is understood in these days of light reading. The chapters devoted to it must, therefore, be considered as addressed to a class of readers in possession of somewhat more mathematical knowledge than those who will find the rest of the work readily and easily accessible; to readers desirous of preparing themselves by the possession of a sort of *carte du pays*, for a campaign in the most difficult, but at the same time the most attractive and the most remunerative, of all the applications of modern geometry.

It is in this power of understanding his readers, his ability to change places with them as it were, that Sir John Herschel stands pre-eminent amongst astronomers. It is a rare gift seldom seen, except in the men who are deepest in their respective subjects, and we are inclined to think but rarely found in them, unless they have risen to eminence almost by their own unassisted efforts. This distinguished astronomer cannot be quoted as an instance in point here. Probably few mathematicians have entered upon their field of labour with greater advantages, but we cannot refrain from here offering our humble tribute of admiration for his extraordinary powers of mind as exhibited not only in this volume, but in his other great works, as well as for the unwearied perseverance which has enabled him to enrich this science with so large a number of facts derived from observation. Any one who will take the trouble to read the work through, and to master its details, will find that explanations occur just where they are wanted; that scarcely anything remains to be added to make the theory of the subject intelligible. Whenever he feels inclined to think that an illustration would have cleared up a given point, or that the subject has not been sufficiently enlarged upon, he will find by reading on that the fuller explanation or illustration is made to his hand; and

thus a very difficult subject has been made as accessible almost as it is possible to conceive to a class of readers possessing the *minimum* of intellectual qualifications for such a study. The style, too, is lucid and perspicuous, and the book possesses the additional merit, and no mean merit it is, that the author scarcely ever alludes to himself or his own discoveries. There is only one point that we dislike in the whole volume, viz., that the author has printed Greek words without either accents or breathings. This is a fault which we have noticed in many of the publications of Messrs. Longman, and we must express our surprise that so great a disfigurement should be allowed to remain, which could be removed by so small an amount of trouble. Again, let us not forget to notice the religious tone, as well as the calm and philosophical spirit, which pervades the book. It would be impossible to quote passages in evidence of this, for the author nowhere affects the philosophical, and does not appear by any means anxious to screw his subject into the service of natural theology. Yet the passages at the beginning of the eighth chapter, and in the ninth at p. 311, remind us of the author who, near thirty years ago, observed at the commencement of his treatise on Physical Astronomy in the 'Encyclopædia Metropolitana,' that—

'Secrets which an angel might penetrate at a glance, become revealed to man by the slow yet sure effects of persevering thought. The progress of modern science has done more than the keenest metaphysical reasoning, and has given us the most convincing proofs of the agency of one general and intelligent cause throughout the whole system of nature. When we see on all sides phenomena grouping themselves under laws intelligible and simply expressed, which are themselves subordinate to others yet more simple and extensive; when we see every anomaly which threatened destruction to a theory becoming, in the progress of our knowledge, its firmest support; every inequality disappearing when viewed from a higher level; every exception proving a rule of greater generality; all, in short, conveying more and more towards order and simplicity the more severely we scrutinize it,—it is impossible not to allow that that last great step which unites all the phenomena of the universe under one general head, and refers them to one all-pervading agency—however inconceivably remote, and surpassing probably the utmost limits of the human intellect to comprehend, if explained,—would still be but the continuation and final completion of a chain of reasoning whose first links we hold within our grasp—the consummation of a process actually begun—the termination of a course into which we are fairly entered.'

It would be almost impossible by any number of extracts to give the reader an adequate idea of this work, which, to be estimated properly, must be viewed as a whole; but before we go on to notice more at large M. Arago's interesting treatise, we will give, abridged from it, an account of the most extraordinary piece of additional evidence in favour of the Newtonian law of gravitation which this century has produced,—we mean

judge of the fitness or unfitness of their condition from what we see around us, when, perhaps, the very combinations which convey to our minds only images of horrors, may be in reality theatres of the most striking and glorious displays of magnificent continuance.'

In the place of this passage we have substituted, in the edition of 1851, the following:—

'The exterior ring of Saturn is described by many observers as rather less luminous than the interior, and the inner portion of this latter than its outer. On the night of Nov. 11, 1850, however, Mr. G. B. Bond, of the Harvard Observatory (Cambridge, U. S.), using the great Fraunhofer equatorial of that institution, became aware of a line of demarcation between these two portions so definite, and an extension inwards of the dusky border to such an extent (one-fifth, *by measurement*, of the joint breadth of the two old rings), as to justify him in considering it as a newly-discovered ring. On the nights of the 25th and 29th of the same month, and without knowledge of Mr. Bond's observations, Mr. Dawes, at his observatory at Wateringbury, by the aid of an exquisite achromatic by Merz, of 6½ inches aperture, observed the very same fact, and even more distinctly, so as to be sure of a decidedly darker interval between the old and new rings, and even to subdivide the latter into two of unequal degrees of obscurity, separated by a line more obscure than either.'

'Dr. Galle, of Berlin, however, would appear to have been the first to notice (June 10, 1838) a faint extension of the inner ring towards the body of the planet, to about half the interval between the then recognised inner ring and the body, *as shown by micrometrical measures*. But this result remained unpublished (or at least not generally known) until after the observations of Messrs. Bond and Dawes. The most remarkable feature of this singular discovery is, that subsequent observations, from many quarters, have concurred in showing the new ring to consist of *semi-transparent materials through which the limb of the planet may be seen up to the edge of the interior bright ring*. Dark lines (apparently of a transitory nature) have been observed on the bright rings parallel to the permanent dark interval dividing them, and appear to indicate a fluid (possibly a vaporous) constitution of these wonderful appendages.'—*Outlines of Astronomy*, pp. 321, 322.

We now proceed to the account of the discovery of Neptune.

The problem of 'Three Bodies,' as it is called, is well known to mathematicians for its great difficulty. Not only does it imply a knowledge of the higher parts of analysis merely to comprehend its method, but the computations involve an immense amount of laborious calculation. Few, comparatively, have taken the trouble to wade far into its depths, though some portion of the subject is indispensable for acquiring the highest honours at our Universities.

Its object is to calculate the amount of disturbance produced in the motion of a secondary in its orbit round its primary by the action of a third body. One method of calculation has been successfully applied to determine the moon's place regarded as a satellite moving round the earth, and deflected from her path by the

attraction of the sun, which in this case represents the third body. It has been found necessary to adopt a different method for the case of a planet moving round the sun and disturbed by another planet. Both these methods have been successful, when combined with, and corrected by, a considerable number of observations, in enabling astronomers to construct tables which predict almost to perfect accuracy the places of the moon and the planets for any given moment of time for many years to come. Thus, when a new planet is discovered, a provisional orbit is obtained for it, and the corrections which determine its exact place and the true elements of its orbit are afterwards applied. But whatever may be the difficulty of this problem, the reader, without any acquaintance with mathematical science, will easily be able to comprehend how much more difficult is the inverse problem of Perturbations. It may be stated thus, as Sir John Herschel has given it:—‘Given the disturbances to find the orbit, and place in that orbit, of the disturbing planet.’ Not one of the elements of the orbit of the disturbing body is in this case known—the planet itself is simply hypothetical—and the problem is, to ascertain, on the supposition that a certain derangement in the motion of a known planet is due to the attraction of an exterior planet, where this latter body ought to be. And this was the process which actually led to the discovery of the new planet Neptune. All the other planets owe their discovery to accident—if that can be called accident which is the natural fruit of continued observation. This alone was discovered by theory. Of the seven planets which, with the earth and the smaller fragments of planets, which have been discovered in the present century, form what is called the Solar System, five have been known from remote antiquity. The sixth, now called Uranus, was discovered by Sir William Herschel, in 1781. All these, even including the last, when sought under favourable circumstances, are sometimes visible to the naked eye. Soon after its discovery its orbit was calculated and marked out with tolerable accuracy; and upon the calculation being carried backwards, it was discovered that the planet had actually been seen by different observers about twenty times during the eighteenth century without the smallest suspicion of its planetary nature. These recorded observations served still further to correct the theory, and ‘it was reasonably hoped and expected that by making use of the data thus afforded, and duly allowing for the perturbations produced since 1690, by Saturn, Jupiter, and the inferior planets, elliptic elements would be obtained, which, taken in conjunction with these perturbations, would represent not only all the observations up to the time of executing the calculations, but also all future observations, in as satisfactory a manner as

‘those of any of the other planets are actually represented. This expectation, however, proved delusive.’ From 1795 to 1822 the true place of Uranus was in advance of the calculated. This discrepancy, after reaching a maximum, began to diminish till about the year 1830, when the observed and calculated longitudes agreed, and after this date the planet fell behind its calculated place. After calculating and making due allowance for errors in the supposed elements of the orbit of Uranus, which have been assumed as the basis of calculation, there remained a residuum of difference between theory and observation, which indicated some extraneous cause which had not yet been taken into consideration. This cause appears to have come into action with sufficient power to manifest itself about the year 1804, and its action began to be reversed in 1822, and to operate more energetically than before.

The problem of ascertaining this cause was worked out by two mathematicians independently, and the longitudes assigned to the supposed planet for a given day by the two calculators were nearly within three degrees of each other. The French astronomer was fortunate enough to be the direct cause of its discovery by writing to point out to Dr. Galle, of the Royal Observatory at Berlin, where to look for it; which accordingly he did, and found it between the two places indicated by the two calculations, about a degree nearer the French than the English place. Perhaps there are few discoveries in which good fortune has not had some part. Its share in the present instance is exhibited in the guess which these astronomers were enabled to make as to the distance of the disturbing planet from the sun. There is a curious law known by the name of Bode's Law, which is in point of fact nothing more than an empirical statement of facts, viz., that each superior planet is double the distance of the next inferior planetary body from Mercury. This was simply a statement of the results of observation, and there was no theory proposed to account for it—and the distance at which Neptune is now known to be from the sun entirely breaks down the statement of the law—yet it was on the assumption of the truth of this law that both discoverers proceeded in their investigations. Both took for granted that the major axis of Neptune's orbit was 38 times that of the earth's mean distance from the sun. Both in the course of their investigations were compelled to reduce the value of the assumed distance—the one to 36, the other to 37—until at last Mr. Adams came to the conclusion that the mean distance of 33 would probably nearly satisfy all the observations. Subsequent calculations gave the still further diminished result of 30. In other respects the elements which they assign to the planet's orbit differ very widely

from the elements which have since its discovery been calculated for it. From these elements, as laid down by Professor Walker of the Washington Observatory, it was ascertained that Lalande had seen Neptune on the 8th and 10th May, 1795, and thus it became possible to determine the elements with still greater precision. The planet appears to be attended by a satellite, which has enabled Professor Peirce, of Cambridge, U. S., to compute its mass. And here the difference between the results is so great that, taking into consideration the other discrepancies, he 'pronounces it impossible so to extend fairly the limits of Leverrier's analysis as to embrace the planet Neptune; and that although its mass, as determined from the elongation of its satellite, renders it possible to account for all the perturbations of Uranus by its action in the most surprising manner, yet in the opinion of Professor Peirce it is not the planet to which geometrical analysis directed the telescope.' We will conclude this part of the subject with the remarks of Sir John Herschel:—

'Posterity will hardly credit that, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances attending this great discovery—of the calculations of Leverrier and Adams—of the communication of its predicted place to Dr. Galle—and of the new planet being actually found by him in that place, in the remarkable manner above commemorated; not only have doubts been expressed as to the validity of the calculations of those geometers, and the legitimacy of their conclusions, but these doubts have been carried so far as to lead the objectors to attribute the acknowledged fact of a planet previously unknown occupying that precise place in the heavens at that precise time, to sheer accident!'¹ What share accident may have had in the successful issue of the calculations, we presume the reader, after what has

¹ 'These doubts seem to have originated partly in the great disagreement between the predicted and real elements of Neptune, partly in the near (possibly precise) commensurability of the mean motions of Neptune and Uranus. We conceive them, however, to be founded in a total misconception of the nature of the problem, which was not, from such obviously uncertain indications as the observed discordances could give, to determine as astronomical quantities the axis, eccentricity, and mass of the disturbing planet; but practically to discover where to look for it: when, if once found, these elements would be far better ascertained. To do this, *any axis, eccentricity, perihelion, and mass, however wide of the truth*, which would represent, even roughly, the amount, but *with tolerable correctness the direction*, of the disturbing force during the very moderate interval when the departures from theory were really considerable, would equally serve their purposes; and with an eccentricity, mass, and perihelion disposable, it is obvious that any assumption of the axis between the limits 30 and 38, nay, even with a much wider inferior limit, would serve the purpose. In his attempt to assign an inferior limit to the axis, and in the value so assigned, M. Leverrier, it must be admitted, was not successful. Mr. Adams, on the other hand, influenced by no considerations of the kind which appear to have weighed with his brother geometer, fixed ultimately (as we have seen) on an axis not very egregiously wrong. Still it were to be wished, for the satisfaction of all parties, that some one would undertake the problem *de novo*, employing formulæ not liable to the passage through infinity, which, technically speaking, hampers, or may be supposed to hamper, the continuous application of the usual perturbational formulæ when cases of commensurability occur.'

been said, will have little difficulty in satisfying himself. As regards the time when the discovery was made, much has also been attributed to fortunate coincidence. The following considerations will, we apprehend, completely dissipate this idea, if still lingering in the mind of any one at all conversant with the subject. The period of Uranus being 84.0140 years, and that of Neptune 164.6181, their synodic revolution (art. 418.), or the interval between two successive conjunctions, is 171.58 years. The late conjunction having taken place about the beginning of 1822, that next preceding must have happened in 1649, or more than 40 years before the first recorded observation of Uranus in 1690, to say nothing of its discovery as a planet. In 1690, then, it must have been effectually out of reach of any perturbative influence worth considering, and so it remained during the whole interval from thence to 1800. From that time the effect of perturbation began to become sensible, about 1805 prominent, and in 1820 had nearly reached its maximum. At this epoch an alarm was sounded. The maximum was not attained,—the event, so important to astronomy, was still in progress of development,—when the fact (anything rather than a striking one) was noticed, and made matter of complaint. But the time for discussing its cause with any prospect of success was not yet come. Everything turns upon the precise determination of the epoch of the maximum, when the perturbing and perturbed planet were in conjunction, and upon the law of increase and diminution of the perturbation itself on either side of that point. Now it is always difficult to assign the time of the occurrence of a maximum by observations liable to errors bearing a ratio far from inconsiderable to the whole quantity observed. Until the lapse of some years from 1822 it would have been impossible to have fixed that epoch with any certainty; and as respects the law of degradation and total arc of longitude over which the sensible perturbations extend, we are hardly yet arrived at a period when this can be said to be completely determinable from observation alone. In all this we see nothing of accident, unless it be accidental that an event which must have happened between 1781 and 1953, actually happened in 1822; and that we live in an age when astronomy has reached that perfection, and its cultivators exercise that vigilance which neither permit such an event, nor its scientific importance, to pass unnoticed. The blossom had been watched with interest in its development, and the fruit was gathered in the very moment of maturity.¹—*Outlines of Astronomy*, pp. 516—518.

We have already said that the two works, which form the subject of this article present a singular contrast in many points of view. Their difference of plan does not in fairness allow of their being compared in the same manner as would have been allowable if their object had been the same. But we may be

¹ 'The student who may wish to see the perturbations of Uranus produced by Neptune, as computed from a knowledge of the elements and mass of that planet, such as we now know to be pretty near the truth, will find them stated at length from the calculations of Mr. Walker (of Washington, U. S.), in the "Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences," vol. i. p. 334, *et seq.* On examining the comparisons of the results of Mr. Walker's formulæ with those of Mr. Adams' theory in p. 342, he will perhaps be surprised at the enormous difference between the actions of Neptune and Mr. Adams' "hypothetical planet" on the longitude of Uranus. This is easily explained. Mr. Adams' perturbations are deviations from Bouvard's orbit of Uranus, as it stood immediately previous to the late conjunction. Mr. Walker's are the deviations from a mean or undisturbed orbit freed from the influence of the long inequality resulting from the near commensurability of the motions.'

permitted to say that the French astronomer's work has some very marked defects; and as this is the least pleasant part of the task we have assigned ourselves, we will dismiss it in as few words as possible. In the first place we must notice a grave fault for which the author certainly cannot be made responsible. The work is very badly translated. Every here and there, there are obscurities of expression arising wholly from the neglect on the part of the translators to notice the difference between the idioms of the two languages; and in other cases where there is no danger of misconceiving the author's meaning, there are sentences which run strangely awkward to an English ear. This is the more to be regretted because, as the editors have observed in their advertisement, 'it would be difficult to explain the 'truths of Astronomy in popular language with more convincing 'force of logic, or in a more lucid, concise, and unaffected style 'than the author has done in the present work.' That the reader may not suppose that we are making a charge without the power of substantiating it, we give the following instances, selected from a large number of similar expressions, in which the idiom of the original language is allowed to peep through the translation.

In the Preface, p. xiv. :—

'It is not I who would consent to degrade . . . a science respecting which it has been justly said, that it affords the true measure of the strength of the human intellect.'

At p. 191—

'It will no longer happen that an astronomer may hear the same hour struck by different clocks during a whole half-hour, as Delambre stated to me to have remarked several times.'

Again, at p. 222 :—

'The Book of Job . . . ascends at least to the year of the death of Moses.'

There can be no reason why in such a treatise as this we should be continually reminded of the original language in such expressions as—'This branch of astronomy is the fruit of *yesterday's* research' (p. 303); or why we should perpetually meet with such very bad grammar as the following: 'In others we might *imagine to see* the head of a comet with its nucleus.' These expressions, it must be remembered, are not solitary, but give a fair specimen of the mode in which the whole volume has been translated. We could fill many pages with extracts in which similar blemishes would appear. We might add that there are instances of carelessness in which the omission or addition of a single particle entirely alters the meaning of the whole sentence (see pp. 190 and 221); but these, though apparently errors of the translator and not of the printer, will admit of being added

to the short list of former errata which has been prefixed to this volume, upon the appearance of the second and concluding volume.

Again, it may fairly be expected of a book which is evidently intended for the perusal of gentlemen and scholars that mistakes of scholarship should not be so abundant as they are in this volume. Surely proper names of Greek or Latin authors ought to be spelt correctly. We do not expect to find such novelties as *Timeus* (p. 481), and *Sozomenes* (p. 557), in a book of such pretensions as this; and, after making all due allowance for printers not being accustomed to Greek type, we can scarcely reconcile ourselves to seven misprints in five Greek words which occur in a single paragraph (p. 56). We have not examined the book carefully with any view to the detection of misprints, but several which we have discovered—such as *Vindematrix* (p. 202), *Atair* (p. 232), &c., &c.—lead to the supposition that there may be others, particularly in the catalogues of the elements of the asteroids and comets.

With regard to the execution of the work itself, the principal fault which occurs to us is its want of unity and regularity. It is in this respect most strikingly contrasted with the '*Outlines*,' where everything is in its proper place, and where the reader may proceed from the beginning to the end without meeting with anything to obstruct his progress except his own deficiency in that knowledge which the author sets out with requiring from him. It is true, perhaps, that most of his readers will omit the second of the four parts into which the work is divided, and which treats of the Lunar and Planetary Perturbations; but this will not be the result of any deficiency in the writer, but will be simply owing to the incapacity of the reader, or his unwillingness to give to the subject all the amount of attention which it requires. In *M. Arago's* work, on the contrary, will be found a series of subjects more or less distinct, and which may be read independently of each other, and in almost any order which the reader chooses to adopt. This was, perhaps, scarcely avoidable in a work which professes to be a reproduction of a course of lectures delivered during eighteen consecutive years; but it is unfortunate that his grouping of the separate subjects of the nineteen books into which this volume is divided does not admit of its being read straight through without reference to subsequent parts of the treatise, even in order to secure that amount of comprehension of the subject which the author guarantees to his attentive auditor or reader. To give but one instance of this, we notice that in the interesting book which treats of multiple stars, most of the latter half is occupied with the determination of the relative motions of double stars and

that of their masses, on the hypothesis of their distances being known, implying that the reader understands not only Kepler's laws of elliptic motion, but Newton's theory of gravitation; and yet we believe we are correct in stating that Kepler's laws have only once before been cursorily alluded to, whilst, for all that appears in M. Arago's volume, the reader may be profoundly ignorant of the name of Newton, and of his great discovery of the principle of universal gravitation. The explanation of the former is not given till we arrive at the sixteenth book, and for the account of the latter we have to wait till the appearance of the second volume.

Another anticipation which occurs in the same chapter is of less importance; still it is to be regretted that the author should have implied the theory of aberration, as dependent upon the transmission of light through space with a certain velocity, before he has given any account of that theory. All these and other similar transpositions seem to arise from the author having inverted the usual order observed in books of Astronomy. The same observation applies to the author's acknowledgment of his inability to explain in that place (p. 524) how it is that three observations of a comet suffice to determine its parabolic orbit. The whole theory of comets, of multiple stars, and nebulae, should, we think, have been reserved to the conclusion of the treatise.

We will conclude the ungrateful task of picking holes in our author with noticing another peculiarity in which he is most disadvantageously contrasted with Sir John Herschel—we mean the tone that pervades the book. We noticed that there was no display of the bearings of his subject upon Natural Theology in the 'Outlines,' neither is there any definite attempt to deny the unity or personality of the Divine Author of Creation in the 'Popular Astronomy;' yet the perusal of the two books gives the reader a very different impression of the tone of mind of the two writers. We do not object to the absurd conjectures of writers on science being treated with the ridicule which, if they are wholly unfounded, they may perhaps deserve; but M. Arago's remarks have a somewhat flippant appearance when he alludes to mistakes which have any connexion with the religious view of the subject.

In objecting to what he calls the famous *cui bono* argument, he is by no means careful to guard his remarks from the suspicion that they are directed against the whole doctrine of what are called final causes (p. 316); and there is nothing so extremely absurd in Derham's inquiring whether 'there was not beyond the sphere of the most distant stars, a region entirely luminous,' as to call for the sneering quotation from Voltaire, which the

author has inserted, much less to justify him in pronouncing that Voltaire knew everything, when M. Arago must have been perfectly aware that the celebrated infidel had not mathematical knowledge to enable him to read and understand the 'Principia' (p. 332). We do not like the remarks which he has made (p. 304) on the law of gravitation being an inherent property of matter; which may possibly be true, but certainly is as far from being proved true as it was in Newton's time, in spite of the immensely extended sphere in which it is now (thanks to recent observations of the movements of double stars) tolerably well ascertained to operate.

Again, when proposing the question whether the number of the stars is infinite, we should have been glad to see the difficulty solved in the only way in which it admits of solution—by showing the contradiction in idea involved in creation being infinite. The author, however, seems by no means anxious to take for granted that there is One Intelligent Mind which created the universe. The two chapters in which this discussion occurs are the most misty in the book, and the author is guilty of an egregious fallacy, which, however it may deceive unlearned readers, is very transparent to any person conversant with the laws of infinite series.

'If the universe of stars is infinite, as everything leads us to suppose, there is not a single visual line extending from the earth to the regions of space which does not encounter some one of those bodies. However minute their superficial dimensions may be, the stars will produce, by their continuity, the aspect of a luminous envelope without any obscure part. The interval included between two constituent stars of this sphere, placed at a certain distance, would be sometimes filled up by a star situate at an infinitely greater distance; but this does not prevent the phenomena of brightness from being the same as if all the stars were attached to a spherical vault, and were consequently at the same distance from the observer. The brightness of this vault would be everywhere the same, if all the component stars had the same intrinsic brightness. Assuming this brightness to be equal to that of the sun,—a supposition natural enough, since the sun is undoubtedly a star,—each individual region of the heavens of an apparent amplitude of about 321 would transmit to us a quantity of light equal to that which comes from the sun. The reality presents itself to us under a very different aspect. How are we to explain everything without renouncing the idea of a distribution of stars throughout the whole extent of infinite space?'—*Popular Astronomy*, vol. i. p. 247.

The fallacy consists in the assumption that an infinite number of points must of necessity fill up a given superficial area; when it is obvious that any part of that superficial area contains an infinite number of points. This point admits of being illustrated by taking the extreme case of a number of bodies placed one behind another in a straight line from the spectator's eye. In theory this number might be absolutely infinite, yet

would have no tendency to fill up the apparent interval between two observed stars.

With all the drawbacks to which we have alluded, M. Arago's volume is a delightful book; and we may gain some notion of the interest with which the original course of lectures was listened to, from the pleasure with which it will be read, under the disadvantages both of arrangement and translation which have been noticed. It forms the second volume of a proposed translation of all the principal works of the author. The first volume of the series appeared last year, and was translated under the superintendence of Colonel Sabine. Other portions are advertised to appear from the pen of Professor Powell. The order in which these volumes issue from the press is much to be regretted; for the first, which contains the Meteorological Essays, is perhaps the least interesting portion of our author's works; but it gives a favourable specimen of M. Arago's power of accommodating himself to the lowest capacity, and the least conceivable amount of information in his readers. It cannot be expected that this part of his works will be interesting to general readers; but on the subject of thunder and lightning, which is the first of the subjects treated in this volume, it contains every piece of information that could be collected. The writer has ransacked classical literature and mediæval works, and has put together from diaries and journals, and casual remarks in books now almost forgotten, everything that could throw any light upon the matter. Private letters from various correspondents contribute their quota of information, and the beginner in science may learn a useful lesson from the trouble which this great observer has taken in chronicling apparently unimportant facts. In fact, the very value of the book detracts materially from its interest; a theory, with a few facts to bear it out, affords much more agreeable reading than an impartial account of everything that has fallen under the writer's notice, when there is no theory for the facts either to confirm or disprove. However, we do not purpose to allude to this volume any further than as it may serve to illustrate the qualities of mind which the author brought to bear upon physical investigations. We shall, therefore, content ourselves with extracting from the Introduction a short account of this extraordinary man, as given by his friend Humboldt, omitting all allusion to a subject from which Humboldt himself seems unable to refrain, his own life and adventures.

M. Arago early came under the notice of Laplace, upon whose recommendation the Bureau des Longitudes had chosen him to assist M. Biot in measuring the arc of the meridian. He had also been favourably spoken of by Lagrange, a writer whose

praise is valuable, because he was in general very sparing in bestowing it. Lagrange appears to have frequently spoken of him as a young man of extraordinary promise, and that principally on the ground of the faculty which he possessed of fixing on the important points of a problem; it was this faculty which enabled him so well to point out the path in which other observers and calculators might but follow up investigations which had been left incomplete. In September, 1809, when only twenty-three years of age, he was chosen by forty-seven out of fifty-two votes to succeed Lalande as a Member of the Academy of Sciences. He had before this distinguished himself not only in Geodesical Investigations, but by several discoveries in Physical Optics. And here we are glad to be able to record the fact that '*Smith's Optics*' was one of the first books the perusal of which gave him a predilection for the study of light. The subject of refraction, the paths of luminous rays, and the causes which alter their velocity, was his favourite pursuit. And we take this opportunity of recommending this work to all who would gain a thorough knowledge of the subject, so far as it was known at the time when it was published. It was more than half a century old, and therefore would have been spoken of as an old-fashioned work when M. Arago read it, yet another fifty years have passed without producing a book which is a fit substitute for it. The merest elementary works on the subject recently published, will indeed be found to contain a great deal which this work does not; but there is none so calculated to give the learner an interest in optics as this apparently cumbersome quarto volume, adapted, as it is, to all classes of readers, and containing, in fact, four treatises, one popular, and the others mathematical, mechanical, and philosophical. Our recommendation does not extend to the mathematical treatise, the methods of which are too tedious to be adopted in the present state of science; but the other three parts contain information which we should be at a loss to find in any other work of the present day.

The writer of the Introduction to his works appears to think that the nature of M. Arago's employment during the three years occupied by him in the Trigonometrical Survey, directed his attention to the phenomena of Meteorological Optics. To this period of his life he traces his fondness for investigating the laws which regulate the perpetual variations of the colour of the sea, the intensity of reflected light on the surface of clouds, and the play of atmospheric refractions. The great discoveries of M. Arago range over a period of about ten years, from 1811 to 1821. His experiments and investigations were continued for many years later. His last great effort he was enabled him-

self to complete. Mr. Wheatstone's experiments for ascertaining the duration of the electric spark, by rotation, suggested to him the principle of a similar experiment, which he projected in 1838, for measuring the difference of the velocity of light in a liquid and in air. In 1850, when everything was prepared, M. Arago's sight quite failed; and in a note presented to the Institute, he observed that his pretensions must be limited to having propounded the problem, and publicly proposed certain means for its resolution, adding, that with his defect of sight, he could only accompany with best wishes the experimentalists who should be willing to follow out his ideas, and thus add fresh evidence in favour of the undulatory theory to those which he had himself deduced from the phenomena of interference. This was the conclusion of his optical researches, which had extended over a period of more than forty years. The subjects of magnetism and electricity occupied much less of his attention, though these sciences are considerably indebted to him.

Baron Humboldt enumerates the labours and discoveries of his illustrious friend under six heads, the first of which, which he calls the literary and biographical part, we may soon expect to appear in an English dress; whether the rest will be translated will, we suppose, depend upon the reception which these volumes meet with; and if so, we are much inclined to fear that the unreadable style of the two volumes which have come out, will render the appearance of many more highly improbable. For the rest of the character of M. Arago, we must give it in Baron Humboldt's own words:—

‘His name will be honoured wherever respect for services rendered to science, a just sentiment of the dignity of man, and the independence of thought, and the love of public liberty, are preserved. But it is not alone the authority of a mighty intellect which has given to M. Arago the popularity which he enjoyed: the conscientious zeal, which failed not when death approached, the desperate efforts to fulfil up to the last moment the most minute duties, have contributed to the honour in which his name is held. Nor should the charm of his diction, the amenity of his habits and manners, and the kindliness of his character be forgotten. Capable of the most tender devotion, the vivacity of his ardent mind and disposition always tempered by its natural sweetness and kindness, M. Arago enjoyed, in the midst of an intelligent and affectionate family, the peaceful happiness of domestic life. In the surviving circle of those most dear to him, M. Arago found all that a touching assiduity, the exercise of intelligent foresight, and the most tender and inventive zeal, could offer to soothe and alleviate during the slow exhaustion of his strength. He died surrounded by his sons,—a sister, Madame Mathieu, worthy of the tender affection of such a brother,—and a niece, Madame Langier, who gave to him the most unremitting and devoted care, and who, at the last moment, showed no less fortitude in grief, than she had done nobleness in her entire and touching self-devotion.’

The editors of ‘Popular Astronomy’ appear to have enter-

tained fears that the author may be thought verbose. So far from this being the case, we are quite surprised to find that in a course of lectures extending over so wide a field, and containing such an immense amount of details, there should be so little repetition. The author has entirely avoided what in a large number of lectures appears almost inevitable, and is, indeed, occasionally almost necessary,—a brief recapitulation of subjects previously discussed, and arguments adduced in their support. This complete separation of subjects, though detracting from the unity of the book, has the advantage of enabling the reader to devote his attention to any one part of the subject exclusively, and also offers great facilities of reference. It is in this last respect that we think the book is especially valuable, containing, as it does, a complete mine of information as to all astronomical facts and discoveries; the tediousness of the enumeration of mere facts, such as catalogues of stars, elements of orbits, amount of small corrections, &c., being most agreeably relieved by anecdotes connected with the times of the respective discoveries, or relations of incidents of adventure, which from time to time occurred to the author himself.

However, this work by no means confines itself to the past history or the present state of Astronomical Science. The author does not abstain from expressing his opinion as to doubtful points, and, in particular, gives a variety of information respecting the opinions and guesses of philosophers, frequently offering criticisms upon them, and presenting us with his estimate of their value.

Though we are not inclined to think M. Arago's volumes will do much towards remedying the evil of which he complains, we gladly present the reader with his estimate of the value of the literary conversation of society, and the amount of solid information that is derived from attendance at Professorial Lectures; and we commend his remarks especially to the attention of those who have been instrumental in altering the system of education established at our Universities.

'Listen when you are present at one of those brilliant *réunions*, where are gathered together those whom it is usual to call the social notabilities, listen for a single instant to the long discourse of which the future comet furnishes the text, and then decide if we can congratulate ourselves upon that pretended diffusion of intelligence which so many optimists love to point out as the characteristic feature of our age. As regards myself, I have long since abandoned these illusions. Under the brilliant and superficial varnish with which the purely literary studies of our colleges almost invariably invest all classes of society, we generally find—let us be brief—a complete ignorance of those beautiful phenomena, of those grand law which are our best guard against prejudice.'—*Popul.*

But though neither M. Arago's

edly popular treatise can take its readers to the bottom of the subject, yet his peculiar powers of illustration must have tended considerably to inform his hearers on the more difficult portions of the science, as his lively style and manner probably created an interest for it in the minds of many. He frequently uses the most homely comparisons, as, for instance, the slices of a melon to illustrate the division of the sphere by the hour-circles, and the slow crawling of a fly upon the surface of a globe from west to east, whilst the globe itself revolves in the opposite direction for the apparent motion of the sun with reference to the fixed stars. The occasional anecdotes which are interspersed with the view of contrasting the rude state of science in ancient times, with the extreme exactness required now, considerably enlivens the volume. Thus, in contrast with the minute divisions and subdivisions of time now used, he quotes the Roman method of the announcing of the moment of sunrise, mid-day, and sunset, by the Consul's *Lictor*, adding, 'when the sun was concealed by clouds, the reckoning of the day fell into complete confusion.'

In no part of Astronomy is there more room for conjecture than in the Theory of Comets; and here M. Arago's volume is very full of matter. It seems, indeed, as if every possible question with regard to the nature and the paths of these bodies had been touched upon, and it is curious to observe the headings of the different chapters of this 17th Book, which is devoted to 'the Comets.' The subjects are stated one after another—as, indeed, they ought to be—as questions and not as truths. Thus, we have treated in succession the following queries:—

- 'CHAP. XXXII.—Can a Comet come into Collision with the Earth or any other Planet?
- 'CHAP. XXXIII.—Does a Consideration of the Totality of Astronomical Phenomena furnish any Reason for supposing that Comets have ever fallen into the Sun?
- 'CHAP. XXXIV.—Have Comets fallen into Stars?
- 'CHAP. XXXV.—Is the Earth liable to pass into the Tail of a Comet? What Consequences would ensue to our Globe from such an occurrence?
- 'CHAP. XXXVI.—Were the Dry Fogs of 1783 and of 1831 occasioned by the Tails of Comets?
- 'CHAP. XXXVII.—Can the Earth ever become the Satellite of a Comet? and, in the Case of the affirmative, what would be the Lot of its Inhabitants?'—*Popular Astronomy*, vol. i. Contents, p. xli.

We know of no other work in the language which gives so much information on this subject. Professedly Mathematical Treatises, such as are used for educational purposes, scarcely touch upon it, and questions regarding them are so much involved in obscurity, that, in popular works in general, they cut a very inconsiderable figure, seldom occupying many pages.

In this volume, we have one-fourth of its bulk dedicated to the Comets and their theory; and as this part of the work represents a favourable specimen of M. Arago's style, and embraces a subject with which most readers will be less familiar than with any other part of Astronomical Science, we will make some extracts from it.

In the preliminary remarks at the commencement of the 17th book, the author gives the following account of his having devoted so large a portion of the volume to this subject. He says—

'Perhaps the reader will find, on perusing this book upon Comets, that it has an extent out of all proportion with the object proposed in a general treatise upon Astronomy. I must explain the motives which induce me to treat this subject with so much detail.

'Comets no longer frighten the public, I admit. This is a result respecting which science has certainly the right to congratulate itself. But, in other respects, there remains much to be done. To diffuse in the public mind sound and precise notions will be the best means of preventing writers without authority from placing it at pasture, when one of those mysterious bodies appears suddenly in the heavens, upon predictions, recitals, and accusations, doubly ridiculous from the ignorance and incredible assurance which their authors exhibit. I have proposed to render the astronomy of comets accessible to the public generally. Everybody will thus be in a condition to appreciate, if he please, the immense progress that has been made during the last century and a half. Every one will understand that the gaps which are remarked in this branch of our subject ought to be imputed to the astronomers of antiquity, and not to those of our epoch. In every case the technical expressions designating certain points of the orbits will not be confounded with the points of the heavens distinguished by special physical properties. The *node*, for example, will not be any longer, as was supposed by the writers to which I have just alluded, a region from which the comet had difficulty in disengaging itself. It will be seen, also, what we are to believe of those pretended influences of comets upon terrestrial phenomena. Finally, upon making out the balance-sheet of science (pardon the expression, borrowed from commercial language), it will be admitted that if the *passive* is still considerable, the *active* presents very satisfactory results. Attentive readers—young astronomers—will know towards what points they ought to direct their researches. Such a consideration was of a nature to put an end to all hesitation on my part.'—*Popular Astronomy*, vol. i. p. 521, 522.

As we do not profess to write for a class of readers so entirely ignorant of science as M. Arago wished his hearers to be, we shall omit all reference to the following chapters, which give the definitions of terms employed in the theory, as well as the mode of observing and computing the supposed parabolic orbit, and comparing its place as calculated backwards with ancient observations; and, indeed, on this latter subject we have already spoken in describing the discovery of Neptune's orbit. Subsequently the author gives a valuable catalogue of 197 comets, whose elements have been computed, on the hypothesis of their revolving in parabolas—in which catalogue we of

course miss the periodic time and the excentricity. Of the four comets which are certainly known to have returned, we have a very interesting account. They are known by the names of their discoverers—Halley, Encke, Biela, and Faye. We prefer the usual designation of the third comet as Biela's to altering the name to Gambart's, as M. Arago has done, the editors of the translation having clearly shown that the author's observations disparaging Biela's claim to its discovery and the calculation of its orbit are unjust. Want of space obliges us to confine our notice to Halley's comet—which, owing to its long period of seventy-six years, may be regarded as the most wonderful discovery in the field of science—and Encke's, which, in consequence of its short period, has been observed in twelve successive revolutions. Halley's was observed in 1682; and, by comparing its orbit with that of the comets observed respectively in 1607 and 1531, there remains no doubt of the identity of the three bodies. Halley, who was unable, owing to the state of science in that day, to calculate the perturbations, could only predict its reappearance either at the end of 1758 or beginning of 1759. Clairaut performed the necessary calculations, and estimated that its reappearance would take place in April, 1759. The general accuracy of his calculations was proved by its return to its perihelion in March, 1759. And the next step was to calculate the time of its appearance in 1835. This was done by four different astronomers, all of whom agreed that it would pass its perihelion within a few days of the 5th of November, on which day it was actually seen, and passed its perihelion on the 16th day of the same month. By comparison with ancient observations, seven appearances of this comet have been established, and five more, at intervals extending backwards to the year 52 B.C., are more or less probable. Much of the interest attached to this comet consists in the fact that it appeared in a part of the heavens that is known to everybody. We suppose there is no constellation so generally known as the Great Bear; and probably many of our readers who can remember twenty years back may have noticed it there for themselves in October, 1835. It was, in fact, so striking an object that it could not fail to arrest the attention of any one who was acquainted with the seven principal stars in Ursa Major. Encke's comet is called the comet of short period, from its occupying less than three years and a half in its revolution. It was discovered, and its elements calculated, in 1818; and the strong resemblance of its orbit to that of a comet seen in 1805 led to the supposition that they were identical. This supposition has subsequently been proved to be true; and it appears that the same comet must

have been observed in 1786 by Mechain and Messier, and in 1795 by Miss Herschel. That it cannot be connected with a larger number of observations, is owing to its smallness and the faintness of its light, which render it invisible to the naked eye. In his account of this comet the author has been guilty of one very singular omission. This is the more remarkable, because, whatever may be thought of the probability of a theory which this must have been the cause of suggesting to astronomers, it at least should have been noticed as a matter of history. The editors have supplied the omission in a foot-note, which we reprint:—

'When all the disturbing influences which can affect the motion of this comet are duly taken into account, it has been found that the time of revolution is gradually diminishing on the occasion of each successive return to the perihelion. M. Encke has been induced by this circumstance to suspect the existence of a resisting medium; and by introducing this supposition into his researches on the motion of the comet, he has been enabled to account pretty satisfactorily for the observed diminution of the period. No indications of a resisting medium have been furnished by observations of the motion of any other celestial body; the existence of such a medium cannot, therefore, be considered as definitively established.'—(Editor.)—*Popular Astronomy*, vol. i. p. 541.

The theory of a resisting medium, supposing it to be once established, is fraught with momentous consequences; for it proves that the present order of the solar system cannot subsist for ever, the unavoidable result being that after the lapse of countless ages the planets will fall into the sun. We must not allow ourselves to dwell upon this subject, which is ably handled in Dr. Whewell's *Bridgewater Treatise*, and to that volume we refer our readers for the bearing of this question on the subject of Natural Theology.

The account of Biela's or Gambart's comet gives the author an occasion of discussing the question of the probability of collision with the earth. The following is M. Arago's *παρ' υπόνοιαν* on the subject:—

'It was found that the comet of $6\frac{3}{4}$ years ought to traverse the plane of the ecliptic, that is to say, the plane in which the earth revolves, on the 29th of October, 1832, before midnight.

'The earth in the course of its annual motion around the sun never quits the plane of the ecliptic. Thus it is in this plane alone that a comet could come into collision with it; consequently, in a case wherein we should have some cause to dread the comet of 1832, it would be on the 29th of October, before midnight, that the danger must have ensued.

'Let us now inquire whether the point at which the comet ought to pass through the plane of the ecliptic was near any point of the curve described by the earth; for in order that a collision might take place between the two bodies, this condition was no less necessary than the former.

'Upon this point calculation informed us that the passage of the comet through the plane of the ecliptic would take place a little within the earth's

path, and at a distance from it equal to $4\frac{1}{2}$ radii of the terrestrial orbit. We may mention that this distance, already so small, might vanish entirely if the elements as calculated by Damoiseau had been subjected to small variations, which it appeared difficult to say might not have brought them nearer the true values.

'Moreover, let us assume as real, the distance of $4\frac{1}{2}$ terrestrial radii. Let us remark that it is referred to the centre of the comet, and let us see whether the dimensions of that body are sufficiently great that any of those points might have encroached upon points of the earth's orbit.

'During the apparition of 1805, the observations made by Olbers, the illustrious astronomer of Bremen, gave for the length of the radius of the comet $5\frac{1}{3}$ rd terrestrial radii. From this number compared with the former, it plainly results that on the 29th of October, 1832, a portion of the earth's orbit was included within the nebulosity of the comet.

'There now remains only one simple question to solve, and it is this :— At the instant when the comet was so near the terrestrial orbit that its nebulosity enveloped some parts of it, where was the earth itself to be found?

'I have already stated that the passage of the comet very close to a certain point of the terrestrial orbit took place on the 29th of October, before midnight. Well, the earth arrived in the same position only on the morning of the 30th of November, that is to say, more than a month afterwards. We have now only to remark that the mean velocity of the earth in its orbit is 1,665,000 miles per day; and a very simple calculation proves that the comet of $5\frac{1}{3}$ years, at least, during its apparition of 1832, must have been always more than forty-five millions of miles distant from the earth!' —*Popular Astronomy*, vol. i. pp. 542, 543.

We had marked many more passages of this interesting volume; but we have already exceeded our proper limits, and we must hasten to draw this article to a conclusion. It will have been seen that we do not anticipate much benefit to the student of Astronomy who attacks the subject without any preliminary knowledge of Mathematics. But we may observe that it may be commenced with a very small stock of such knowledge. A *thorough* acquaintance with Euclid is indispensable, and an acquaintance with the elements of Plane and Spherical Trigonometry will soon be brought into play. With these he may acquire a knowledge of most parts of Plane Astronomy. Physical Astronomy *must* be reserved for the mathematician. But in order to gain any hold upon the subject that is worth having, he must see and do things for himself. He must have his celestial globe, and learn the names and places of the stars by comparing his globe with the heavenly vault. He must be provided with the Nautical Almanack; and though his observations may at first be made with the naked eye, the growing interest of his subject will soon induce him to procure a telescope, to enable him, to some extent, to verify for himself the accuracy of the tables which he uses. Should he be fortunate enough to be enabled to travel, so as to change, to any great extent, his longitude and latitude, he will

gain more insight into the meaning of those terms by one comparison of the time as indicated by his watch with the time pointed out by the clocks of the place where he is, or by the observation of the sun if he is at sea, and by an observation of the altered place of the pole-star, than by many days of reading. There is one disadvantage which to a resident in this country is not removable; we mean the unfavourable nature of the climate. It is not to be wondered at if Englishmen know less about the face of the heavens than the inhabitants of the south. The difficulty of observing the heavens for many consecutive nights, even in the height of summer, is not to be got rid of, and will probably deter many from commencing a subject which, if they had commenced it under a more favourable star, they would never have ceased to prosecute. Again, they must actually go through the calculations for themselves which the treatise they are reading points out the method of performing. It is possible that some who will take as much trouble as this requires, may be led on, in their desire to learn more, to acquire that additional knowledge of mathematics which alone can enable them to advance even a few steps in Physical Astronomy. Even the amateur astronomer may have it in his power to enrich the science with new facts. M. Arago has pointed this out with particular reference to the subject of variable stars, which, as he says, present a rich mine with which professed astronomers, distracted with other labours, have not been much occupied, and which appears to admit of being explored without the use of any larger instrument than an ordinary telescope (p. 261). For those who are more ambitious, and whose ambition is such as to induce them to exert themselves further in this field, we may be permitted to point out, in M. Arago's words, the magnificent future which lies open before them.

'There are in the heavens phenomena which are, relatively to our actual telescopes, what the irregularities in the form of Saturn were, when observed with the very inferior instruments of Galileo. The application of very powerful telescopes, and very high magnifying powers, will render obvious what is yet merely problematical. With these telescopes, when they are adapted to a parallactic mounting, we shall be enabled to determine, by the method of observation of two neighbouring stars, the real distances from the earth of a much larger number of stars than those whose distances are known in the present day; we shall know if there are several which are nearer than α Centauri, δ Cygni, and α Lyrae. Then we shall be enabled to follow the changes of form experienced by those agglomerations of luminous matter which we have called nebulae, and to know if the last traces of concentration of these lucid substances are stars properly so called—are real suns. We shall then acquire more precise ideas respecting the physical constitutions of the planets and satellites, which at the present day are included in the domain of conjectures. We shall then study with pre-

cision the revolutions of double stars — those suns which revolve the one about the other—and our geometers will be furnished with the means of deciding whether the force of attraction which governs the movements of the planets of our system, extends even to the extreme limits of the visible universe. Finally, we shall then be able to follow the comets even to their greatest distance, and to deduce, from their changes of volume and form, valuable conclusions relative to the condition of the ether pervading the celestial regions.

‘If we consider that in science the faculty of discerning beforehand forms always the lion’s share, we shall understand how desirable it is that the heavens should be explored by powerful instruments adapted to exact measurement. The discoveries with which astronomy will then be enriched will touch upon the most delicate points of natural philosophy.’ — *Popular Astronomy*, vol. i. pp. 379, 380.

- ART. V.—1. *Memoir of the Rev. W. H. Hewitson, late Minister of the Free Church of Scotland at Dirleton.* By the REV. JOHN BAILLIE. Fifth Edition. Nisbet.
2. *A Memoir of Adelaide Leper Newton.* By the REV. JOHN BAILLIE, Minister of the Free Church of Scotland, Hanover Square. Third Edition. Nisbet.
3. *A Stranger Here: the Memorial of one to whom to live was Christ, and to die gain.* By the REV. HORATIUS BONAR, Kelso. Third Edition. Nisbet.
4. *Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars, 97th Regiment.* By the Author of "The Victory Won." Twenty-first Thousand. Nisbet.

PROBABLY no kind of reading enjoys such a steady popularity as Biography. Persons who profess to have no head for philosophy, nor memory for history, nor taste for poetry, nor feeling for art—who think science dry, and works of fancy frivolous—will yet sit down with intelligent curiosity to a biography or a memoir. The life of one of the world's good or great men—of any one distinguished as wise, or useful, or adventurous, or humorous, or eccentric—excites expectation in most minds. A page of human nature is about to be unfolded. Our sympathies are at once awakened. How is it, then, that with all this openness to any impression, which is the very spirit of this class of study—this readiness to follow any train of thought the subject may lead us to,—how is it that the whole aspect of things changes in a moment, if the biography proves to be 'religious' biography?—that the curiosity flags at once, the interest fails, and the book, after a cursory glance through its pages, is laid down with unmistakeable distaste, though not without a feeling of self-reproach that it should be so? The authors of the works in question of course find a very ready answer to our question; they bring an artillery of texts to bear on those who cannot read their books:—'The things we tell are to the Greeks foolishness;' 'The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit;' and much more of the like summary condemnation. Nor would we deny the force of this argument in many cases; but there is another aspect of the question, which, after a perusal of several works of this character, weighs very much with ourselves, by no means so favourable to the biographers, and, in a large degree, exculpatory of the general reader; and this is, that religious biographers, as a class, studiously exclude all *nature* from their subjects. They think it a merit to record only the spiritual element; and while God has made us men and women, with human instincts, feelings, desires,

tastes, affections, sympathies, the more they can produce a character—though this is not the word—a being divested of every characteristic, the more they suppose they are serving the interests of true religion; and having drawn a portrait that every one can see is not human, they congratulate themselves as though it must, necessarily, be divine. There is an interpretation of the doctrine of Original Sin which leads to much of this generalizing. It is taken for granted by a particular school that because man is a fallen creature, and prone to sin, that therefore every impulse, every instinct, every natural emotion and thought, is sin; and that, therefore, virtue and spirituality consist in a suppression of all natural impulses and convictions; they believe, practically, in no inborn monitor, in no inherent love of virtue, in no generous natural emotions. These, if they seem to exist, must all be suppressed, as so many treacherous, specious forms of evil. Every natural taste or sentiment comes under condemnation, and meets the same rough usage—it is natural, and, therefore, it is wicked; and so this fair ruin of fallen humanity, which even in degradation still retains so many traces of its divine parentage—all its sympathy with goodness, all its aspirations after excellence, all its feeling for beauty,—this ‘human heart, by which we live,’ is with all its ‘tenderness, its hopes, and fears,’ ignored, suppressed, defied: and there is exhibited instead, a solemn, self-sufficient, talking, writing, preaching, admonishing, reproving abstraction;—a being before whom we, in imagination, chase away our smiles, compose our features, regulate our movements, conceal our thoughts;—a being, in fact, before whom human nature cowers;—not as it trembles before Divine Justice—not because this abstraction sees into our sinful hearts,—but rather because it judges without seeing, because it assumes a power it possesses not, because it is ignorant, because it has no sympathy, because there is nothing in common between it and ourselves.

The reader of such books as we mean is transported into the cold and dreary land of illusion, where things are not what they seem; where words fail in producing their ordinary impression on the mind; where solemn statements, and even asseverations, produce no conviction; where the personages talk like the publican, but leave a pharisaical savour behind them; where they aver themselves sinners, not once, but a thousand times; yet the persuasion grows strong upon us that they altogether over-estimate their spiritual condition; where the most awful denunciations of self-righteousness, or self in any shape, seem only to echo back the boast, ‘We are the people, and wisdom shall die with us.’

The fault does not always lie with the subject of the Memoir;

it more commonly, indeed, lies with the biographer himself; who, intent, as we have said, on exhibiting spirituality at the cost of nature, puts all his facts in a wrong light, by giving public expression to private feeling; proclaiming from the house-top that which was spoken in closets; and, above all, by suppressing all connecting matter which might give a reason and propriety to sayings and doings, which, standing by themselves, unassisted and unexplained, are conspicuously devoid of both: by these means turning a religious life into a life of professing, talking, religion.

Now, life is a natural process: a man cannot get through it without performing a great many natural processes; without eating, drinking, and sleeping; acting and suffering, loving and hating, quarrelling and making up, thinking, talking, singing, rejoicing, sorrowing, and all after his own fashion, and in a way peculiar to himself: no other man, in all the myriads of beings, like him; no course or experience like his own. And all with circumstances of peculiar interest—every life with a mysterious charm of its own, which we should seek for in vain elsewhere. There is, we believe, no life, however obscure, which a man of genius could not make interesting, awaking thereby a thousand echoes from the general heart. Nay, it scarcely needs genius: sympathy with humanity is enough. We would engage that the bitterest enemy of any of these pattern men—these formal party exhibitions of Christian faith and piety—if he possessed but the gift of reading the human heart, and would tell us all he saw there, though he betrayed every weakness, noted all shortcomings, and gave black prominence to every darker fault,—if only he showed us the man as he really was, would produce a far more loveable creature than we see in the most flattered of these partial, one-sided, ultra-spiritualized portraits; while he would also produce a history of much more general utility. But this sympathy seems peculiarly wanting to religious biographers; and so far from wishing to distinguish between man and man, it seems essential with them that all workings of the soul should be identical. The theological judgment is not satisfied unless its minutest variations of feeling follow in an exact order in fixed rotations, from despair to rapture; all confessions must be in the same words; certain doctrines must in every mind take the same rule of precedence, and new convictions enter in at the same appointed intervals. The effect—if several of these compositions fall in our way at one time—is more monotonous than can be described. We seek in vain for a parallel to it in our own experience. The men we meet with in life seem diverse one from the other; each succeeding person in these books is only a repetition of the last. The question becomes an irksome

and growing perplexity, until the reader, in self-defence, begins to think for himself.

Now where do we find the largest storehouse of sacred biography?—to apply a modern term to the lives of godly men, their ways, words, and works.—In the Bible. The Bible is full of biographies. It contains lives, more or less detailed, of men for four thousand years. Does it follow any formula? Is *their* humanity quenched in the divine life? Do *they* cease to be men because they are saints? On the contrary, natural characteristics are even elaborately portrayed, where the spiritual condition is only implied or taken for granted; or rather we learn it *through* the exhibition of natural character. What care (humanly speaking) is evident not to overlay these human features; to give them play, and let the light shine on them; to show that each man keeps his identity; that natural gifts are good gifts, as far as they go, and are made the instruments of the Divine Spirit for the carrying out the work God gives each of his saints to do; that our hearts may thus be drawn towards them by the strong feeling of brotherhood and a common nature.

As an instance—we choose one where, if anywhere, human characteristics might well be lost in the superadded gifts of the Spirit—take the history of Elijah's translation, and the use, so to speak, that is made of it to exhibit the character of Elisha. All the details lead us to sympathize with him; we are made to dwell on his bereavement and the intensity of his natural affection, and it is through him we learn to realize, in some degree, the miracle itself, and the impression of so stupendous an event on our nature; as well as to understand that congenial natural qualities were selected as the element of the prophetic character, seeing how ardent and intense was the nature chosen in this instance by the Holy Spirit to receive Divine inspiration. How remarkable is his resolute and fixed resolve, twice confirmed by solemn oath, not to leave his master! What keenness of sorrow at the parting! What yearning, what faith through all! What natural (not sinful) impatience at interference from without; showing the nerves high strung, as though at that crisis he could endure no other teaching than from his departing master, or from God Himself! 'Knowest thou that the Lord will take away thy master from thy head to-day? And he said, 'Yea, I know it. Hold ye your peace.' And this twice repeated, and his answer twice recorded. What those two mighty men of God said at their parting, as they still went on and talked, the Spirit has not imparted to us. But the passionate cry of anguish, 'My father, my father,' and the garments rent in two pieces, are recorded *for our learning*. Even the double portion

of the Divine Spirit, just infused into his soul, was not designed—*could* not destroy its human, but still sacred, impulses and emotions.

But it is time to turn from generalities to the particular examples before us. The biographical writers who have given present occasion for these remarks are certain Ministers who seem to represent a school in the Scotch Free Church—a school which appears to unite in itself the rigid peculiarities of the old Covenanters, the flights of modern revivalists, and certain opinions on prophecy which seem to have no necessary connexion with either. Their works have considerable popularity beyond their own body, being published in England, where some have passed through several editions. One, indeed, of the volumes before us, is the Memoir of a lady of our own Church, apparently entrusted by her family to one of these gentlemen—Mr. Baillie—as finding in him more congeniality with her tone of feeling and opinion than they could hope to meet with in a fellow-Churchman. The first, however, that we shall treat, is Mr. Baillie's Memoir of a brother Minister, a Mr. Hewitson, held in high estimation by his brethren, and set forward as an example and almost an achievement of their own peculiar doctrines and principles of action, of which, indeed, he may be regarded as a complete development, his natural disposition well suiting him to be the exponent of a system.

There is one class of persons to be met with in every circle, alike in the world, in literary coteries, and in religion, singular for their sense of personal importance,—of being set apart for great things. It matters not what *line* they take, the impression seems to date from their first consciousness; a sense of pre-eminence never deserts them; they feel their own individuality so intensely as to detract from their belief of the same in others. They cannot help feeling themselves as it were on a pedestal, subject to the universal gaze; what they do is of general consequence; how they should act on any given occasion, is of moment not only to themselves, but to the cause. What they think must be communicated with some circumstances of state to the world, under the impression that their world, whatever that may be, is waiting to know their judgment. What they are, must be constantly settled with themselves; and being endowed with some force of character, and uniformly with a strong will, they are able to state with precision all these necessary enunciations. This peculiar self-assertion inherent in some minds, does in fact set them apart, and make them representatives of their party, and subjects for the biographer. Because such persons are always in an appropriate attitude, their picture is one readily taken; their draperies are arranged in proper

folds; the light upon them is studied; there is nothing careless or hurried about them; they do not make mistakes or forget themselves into the inconsistencies of common existence. Such men are fitted to be leaders of sects and parties, as being little subject to impulses, except such as their will approves, and perfectly safe at least from being misled by any impulse but their own, for they have small sympathy or appreciation of the gifts, the necessities, or characteristics of others. They do not observe others as an independent study, only in their bearing upon themselves, or the cause they identify with themselves, which all gives the effect of singleness as well as strength of purpose, and makes it easy to them to impose rules, to enforce discipline, and an unflinching adherence to principles once laid down. Nature made Mr. Hewitson one of this class; and his religion, genuine though it was, never interfered in this respect with her arrangements.

William Hepburn Hewitson was born in the village of Maybole, in Ayrshire, in 1812. Natural delicacy of constitution preserved him, Mr. Baillie informs us, from any taste for the 'boyish frolics in which the young tinker of Elstow so much delighted,' leaving us thus at starting in doubt whether he censures all boyish frolics, or applies that indulgent term to the 'cursing, swearing, lying, blaspheming,' Bunyan confesses to have been the habit of his boyhood.

'But a spirit was in him which, though it was not to be developed in the form of any glaring enormity, was yet as essentially set on earth, and on earth's things, as ever was Bunyan's in its darkest days. The form which the boy's earthliness took was ambition—love of praise. That fire which afterwards threatened to consume him, body and soul at once, was even now, at the age of five or six, sending forth its scintillations. He used to say, in his boyish simplicity, he would either be a minister or a king; and he would often ask how long time it would take to be a king, and how long to be a minister. At times he would mount a chair, and, with one of his little sisters for precentor, and the rest for audience, would strain his every effort, and often not without success, to move to tears by his words. "I remember," he has been heard to say long afterwards, "what a wicked little creature I was; I got Jane to weep at what I said; I felt pleasure at seeing the effect of my eloquence."—*Memoir of the Rev. W. H. Hewitson*, p. 2.

After a temporary residence in England, his father was appointed parish schoolmaster of Dalmellington, in Ayrshire, a position which offered few advantages to his son, who early manifested a desire for learning, and great powers of application. He studied alone, under great disadvantages, but made considerable progress, being stimulated rather by a desire for success and distinction, than by love of learning for its own sake. His ambition was to be a minister; preaching was an instinct with him, and the desire was as strong in him before his conversion as after. From the time he was three years old, he had

looked forward to it; though as an instance of his early truthfulness, it is recorded that he declared 'he never would be a minister unless he were first a Christian.' Long detained at home by feeble health, at the age of twenty-one he became a student in the University of Edinburgh; there he worked so hard, as seriously to threaten his life, and in less than two years won the Gold Medal and other distinctions. Mr. Baillie boasts, too, of his grasp of thought, of his turn for metaphysical speculation, and even of an incipient genius for poetry, which manifested itself 'in a partly-executed framework of an epic poem;' but if so, we can only suppose that when shortly afterwards he abandoned these pursuits as unworthy a Christian, the renunciation was mutual, and that he was finally deserted by the muse which he contemned; for anything more repulsively dry, and crabbed, and prosy, than his converted style, cannot well be imagined. Previously to this event, however, he wrote for the University Essay, and gained the prize. Mr. Baillie is immensely pompous on the occasion of these successes; there is a sort of swelling elation in recording while he contemns them, which he can scarcely find words big enough to express; as, for instance;—'the glory he has won in the academical arena is "the centaur's maddening tunic."' And again,—

'That winter was a momentous era in his life. It witnessed at once the ascending smoke of the most grateful incense which self had yet offered at Fame's golden altar, and the rude dashing by a gracious God of the censer from the offerer's hand.'—Pp. 13, 14.

Nor is Mr. Hewitson himself less impressive in treating of this period:—

"I was burning to enter the arena of learned competition, and thought life without fame not worth the having. For a while the demon of ambition was lord of the ascendant, and baleful was the influence which it shed upon my character: it was working so effectively the ruin of my soul, that Satan ceased to harass me with fears, as he had done for years before: he deemed it then his most subtle policy to lay to my soul a flattering unction, and, with the bland flapping of a vampire's wings, to lull me into perfect security."—P. 16.

And again, in describing the depression that followed upon his success:—

"My internal history," he again writes—and the words are written on the very scene of desolation—"may be generalized by the remark, that around my heart's fixed centre there has been revolving in panorama a wide circumference of change. The autumnal leaves are now sere and fallow; they tell, with prophetic significancy, of the blight and shrunkenness of youthful hopes; the wind is now passing with fitful and melancholy howl; so, too, there is a stir and a rush, as it were, of winds in the atmosphere of the soul; there are, as it were, sighings around the casements and doorways of the heart."—P. 16.

Then follows the history and course of his conversion, for which we have not space. We are told of a period of dejection and anguish of spirit; a period of 'self-righteousness,' and attempts at a 'religiousness' of his own; a sense of failure; and at length sunshine and peace, and full reconciliation. There is a danger of insufficient sympathy towards such communications, but we believe it is in no irreverent spirit that we still trace the influence of a strong will through it all. Two things had from his childhood been determined by him—that he would be a 'minister,' and a minister under certain indispensable conditions. When the time came, the conditions were complied with.

"My mind is composing itself," he writes to the same friend, on 4th May, "under the solemnizing influence of one vast, overwhelming, all-absorbing idea,—that of the responsibilities belonging to the ministry of reconciliation. When I wrote you last (30th January), that idea was oppressive—it sank me into despondency. *For two months past*, however, I have been all but settled in the determination to go forward, in the strength of the Lord, as a labourer into his vineyard; and so much are my feelings changed, that, whereas I was before afraid to intrude myself into the work of the gospel ministry, I am beginning to be afraid to hesitate or to draw back. 'If any man draw back, saith the Lord, my soul shall have no pleasure in him.'"—P. 29.

Mr. Baillie, who has a curious way of disgorging his reading in whole sentences, the very reverse of the digesting process of which we hear so much, brings much of it to bear upon the solemn occasion of Mr. Hewitson's 'self dedication.' 'Dr. Payson, an American minister, much quoted by him, has 'supposed the various classes of Christians to be ranged in 'different concentric circles round Christ, their common 'centre. In the innermost concentric circle Mr. Hewitson 'now took his stand.' Mr. Hewitson was not at all behind his biographer in the state and circumstance with which he announced this long-looked-for occasion:—

'In May he returned to Dalmellington for the summer. His relatives at once remarked the great change. The very night he arrived, he spoke to all the family most solemnly on the concerns of eternity. And the whole village soon saw that he was another man. He had been known hitherto as the great scholar, and the exemplary divinity student; but now they "took knowledge of him that he had been with Jesus."'

"That," said he, one day soon after his return, laying his hand upon the open Bible,—"*that shall henceforth be my daily study; I desire to converse through it daily with God.*" The purpose was not unaccomplished. The Bible may be said to have thenceforth become his library. No longer regarding it as a mere hieroglyphic to be curiously examined by the eye of the scholar, he came to it with the heart of a child to listen to the voice of his Father. And out of it he learned that living and fresh divinity which impregnated with its savour his whole future conversation, and correspondence, and ministry.—P. 33, 34.

On this principle he immediately expresses himself, even on common events, in Scripture words. It is quite easy to him to

adopt the language of saints: he would think it a false humility to shrink from doing so. Thus a visit to some friends—"is a pleasant episode in my *pilgrimage*." He writes to a friend that he is 'determined to confess God before men and devils.' 'Experience has taught me that in my journey heavenward I must 'pass through much tribulation.' He solemnly renounces ambition—"I shall now be careless that my name pass away from 'the earth along with this mortal body, if only it be written in 'the Lamb's book of life in heaven. God will not suffer me to 'be ambitious now.' 'A little incident,' writes Mr. Baillie, 'strikingly illustrates the intensity of his devotedness;' to us this incident illustrates in a much more striking degree his natural character.

'The gold medal—once the idol of his heart—he forwarded from Dalmellington to a friend in Edinburgh,¹ to be sold, and the proceeds put into the Lord's treasury. His friend, deeming the idol harmless, laid a plan for sparing it: he sent him a cheque for its full money value, and craved leave to retain the medal itself as an *in memoriam*. "My mind is made up," was Mr. Hewitson's characteristic reply, "as to devoting it to the object which I mentioned. This may weigh with you in counterbalance to the feelings which have influenced your—shall I call it?—condemnation of the act. It was only natural that, at first, my reluctance to parting with an object which I once regarded as a trophy of praiseworthy ambition, and round which many once pleasing associations were gathered, should be almost unconquerable; but, by the grace of God, I have got the victory over my natural feelings of reluctance, and most grievous it would be to find them again rising to the ascendant. If the gaining of the prize was a trophy of nature, the parting with it will be, in some measure, a trophy of grace. Your own feelings in the matter will enable you to appreciate the force of what I say. In the meantime, while you keep the medal *in retentis*, it will be my part to keep *in retentis* the cheque which you so kindly transmitted. The medal is to you not of the slightest intrinsic value; it is only the *pretium affectionis* which it can have in your eyes. I shall be glad to learn by your next that your difficulties have given way and that you have succeeded in effecting the sale."—P. 41.

A simpler and less self-conscious person would have kept the medal, because he would not associate it with self so much as with the giver, and if the idea had been suggested to him, it would have seemed a breach of duty to his University to part with it. Naturally he would not retain any active recollection of it as a possession at all; but if through any reason he did perceive it was a snare to him, the sale would have been effected stealthily and quietly, for only thus could the movements of natural pride be surely defeated.

But Mr. Hewitson always let both hands know what he was about; he must employ a partial friend, who he knew would remonstrate to assist in this sacrifice of his idol; or, as Mr.

¹ William Dickson, Esq.

Baillie expresses it, this taking 'away the names of Baalim out of her mouth, and they shall no more be remembered by name.'

In the meanwhile he was injuring his health by over-study as a preparation for the ministry, taking no advice till he felt some rest necessary even for his life. This repose was found in what Mr. Baillie designates as 'a mountain apart,'—which means in secular language that for a few months he was tutor in a family of rank. Delicacy of chest, which gave the impression of actual consumption to all who casually met him, indefinitely delayed his ordination; but he was not one to yield to the enervating influence of illness. Perhaps, indeed, a feverish excitement was one attendant of his ailments. He studied, he wrote letters, he laboured. Ordinary relaxations were not congenial to his nature: his religion invested them with positive sinfulness in his eyes—even the ordinary intercourse of society was not lawful; having fallen into a scene of so-called harmless amusement, he writes (for he writes everything): 'Immediately afterwards I made my escape with pleasure. No amusement is innocent which takes away the soul from Jesus, or does what it can to take it away.' And again: 'I never have a moment's peace when I return in the slightest degree to conformity with the world.' And Mr. Baillie's records that—

"With characteristic energy and decision," says Mr. Dodds, alluding to this Fifeshire residence, "he carried out his new views and convictions, even in his familiar letters. No more letters did he write merely as the friend or scholar. Every production of his pen showed the Christian. Not that he gave up the graces of classic allusion, or never indulged in the playfulness of friendship; but he mingled with all he wrote that salt and savour of Christianity, that scriptural illustration and experimental feeling, which gave such a distinctive character to his future life."—P. 46.

The 'playfulness' we cannot respond to; none of it is printed in the book, nor do we believe it to have existed; but we can answer for the fact of his letters containing nothing 'worldly;' which would, no doubt, be the charge against them if they contained any facts, any information, any record of what he saw, any notices of friends, any recognition of the tastes or circumstances of the persons he addressed. They are solemnly free from all these drawbacks. It was his relaxation, no doubt, to write letters; but how they ever came to be *read* or preserved is a real phenomenon. It is a little out of place in the order of dates, but as we are upon the subject of Mr. Hewitson's letters we will present the reader with a specimen of his style, leaving him to judge whether a letter gains in true value by not being a letter at all:—

"TO WILLIAM DICKSON, ESQ.

Madeira, June 5, 1845.

"My very dear Friend,—You are the only one of my Edinburgh correspondents to whom I stand at present indebted; and I gladly take an

opportunity which is now afforded me of balancing accounts, and throwing you again off the side of creditor. Have not we many prayers in heaven, of which we have not as yet received a full acknowledgment? God will surely yet acknowledge them fully, and grant us according to and beyond the desires of our hearts. Though sovereign and free in all that He does for us and gives to us, yet He has, and that likewise in the sovereign, free exercise of His grace, put Himself, by a thousand promises, as it were, into the position of a debtor, on whom we may prefer boldly our claims in Christ, as if we were creditors of the Lord. His promissory notes—His magnificent issues of heaven's paper-currency, representing the unsearchable riches of Christ, the untold bullion of heaven—these coming to us, each with an 'I will give payment on demand to whosoever will,' are sure to be, at length if not instantly, honoured and redeemed. Earthly capitalists can soon run themselves into liabilities which they have not assets enough to liquidate; but 'what God has promised, He is able also to perform.' 'If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth.'

"Unbelief is often dishonouring God's letters of credit, as if the kingdom of grace were tottering on the verge of bankruptcy, or heaven's traffic in spiritual blessings were subject to the fluctuations and uncertainties which belong to the commerce of this world. But amidst the cautious stock-jobbing hesitations and misgivings of unbelief, the Spirit of Jesus, who has ransacked all the treasures of grace and truth that are laid up in His infinite fulness, restores confidence to the hearts of the merchantmen who crowd the heavenly exchange, saying, with still small voice, 'Blessed are they that believe, for there shall be a performance of those things which were told them from the Lord.' When man's unbelief is asked the value of Jesus, 'Thirty pieces of silver' is the unblushing reply. When the Spirit of God declares His value, he finds the language which men can understand too mean and vile, too poor and shallow, to express the matchless excellence and worth of the Lamb. He speaks of 'height and depth, and breadth and length'—of things past all knowledge and understanding—piles hyperbole on hyperbole; but still the inadequacy of human language leaves the price of Jesus untold. Mountain is piled on mountain; but God's throne is as much unreachd as ever, and the light of the glory of Immanuel shines still but faintly on the highest summit of the mountain-pile. Our faith, in its hour of greatest confidence and enlargement, sees only a little, and that little but dimly, of the worth, power, and glory of Jesus. Our liberty, even when our goings under us are least straitened—when we rise on wings like eagles—is fitted to give us only a faint idea of the glorious liberty with which Christ has made us free, and which we are in Christ entitled to enjoy at all times.

"When we become bankrupt ourselves in duty, insolvent, and reduced to extremities, we are sometimes led to think that it is grace that has had an edict of bankruptcy passed upon it; and that the law has found our liabilities so great, that the assets of Christ's merits are not sufficient to meet them. But if we would let God's thoughts, as they are revealed in the Word, come in and fill the chamber of our minds, how different our views and feelings would be regarding both God and ourselves, both His thoughts towards us, and our standing in His sight!" —Pp. 187—9.

This is only half, but the letter never descends to any other tone, or touches on other topics. It charms Mr. Baillie, who ushers it in with the exclamation, 'How vividly he stands before us, the man of prayer and of expecting faith!' We can well understand how a man who always talked and wrote in this

strain, who argued that whatever 'we say to others we ought to 'say it more to God than to them;' who says that 'nothing 'makes this world so much like a wilderness as desire after 'holiness' (p. 239); who 'avoided all fellowship that was not 'in the spirit;' who 'consecrated *all* his private conversation to Christ;' and this, not as every Christian should do, by having Christ in our hearts, but His name for ever on his lips, to the exclusion of every topic suggested by the occasion—should come to have a pretty strong opinion as to the state of religion in the people he found himself amongst; who, whatever efforts they might make to maintain their reputation in his eyes, must necessarily flag in the long run. Indeed it is one of his merits with Mr. Baillie that he was a discernor of spirits: which means, that he was a very free judge of his neighbours' spiritual condition, which he tested by what he believed his own, and had very little scruple about expressing his opinion when formed. Immediately after his conversion, we find him arguing, on the occasion of attending Service at his parish church, that a preacher cannot be 'evangelical,' however sound his doctrine, if he preaches a dull sermon,' saying, 'If Christ dwell in us, the evidences of His gracious presence are not indistinct and illegible.' And again—'So much of Christ as there is in every one, so much of beauty and desirableness, and no more.' He complains when people spoke to him on general topics . . . 'How 'many speak to you with as much "strife," or earnestness and 'interest, about the vanities of this passing world, as if they were 'still of the world, and not born from above! You would ever be 'looking unto Jesus; but they will have you to look away to something else, as if something else were more lovely than He who 'is altogether lovely!' 'More converse with God,' he exclaims, 'and less with man, would be health to our flesh and marrow to 'our bones. We cannot converse with God in the company of 'our brethren, unless we meet in the name of Jesus.' And again: 'I find that few seem to love the Lord as the redeemed should 'love Him: often do I feel longings for a higher fellowship than 'I am privileged to enjoy at least with the saints.' 'Scottish 'Christians in general seem not to realize everywhere—in all 'companies and at all times—the presence, the indwelling of 'the Lord Jesus—not to realize in any great measure that they 'are not of this world.' When he has a parish, he describes it as 'physically a wilderness, with here and there a fresh spot, 'adorned by a single lily;' and again while he owns them a people 'united and attached;' yet, while the place is physically beautiful and fertile, it is spiritually 'unshapely and barren.' And this of his own parishioners.

And again he complains with regard to this practice of discerning:—

"A man of spiritual discernment can scarcely open his lips to one who has none," was his remark another day, "without incurring the unmerited charge of uncharitableness, of captiousness, of censoriousness, of assumption, or something similar. He must, in the presence of the ungodly or carnal, 'withhold his mouth even from good,'—or his 'good will be evil spoken of.'" This observation explains not a little of his way in his intercourse with men. His very silence sometimes brought on him reproach.

'If his silence brought on him reproach, his words sometimes not less offended. Alluding one day to an erroneous construction which a brother had put upon some expression used by him respecting the state of his people, he vindicated the exercise of his spiritual judgment as to the presence or the absence of grace, thus:—"To discern," said he, "is not to act the part of a censor,—it is an act of perception, not an act of judgment at all, in the forensic sense. We may spiritually discern a man's words and doings to be carnal, and yet not be sitting in judgment on the man, in the offensive sense of the expression. Just as we discern colours, saying, that this is red and that blue,—so does the man of God, who has spiritual perceptiveness (*αἰσθησις*), discern the character of moral actions, saying that this is of the Spirit, and that of the flesh—this is of God, and that of the world."—Pp. 389, 390.

In the great national contest which split in two the Kirk of Scotland, Mr. Hewitson sided with the Free party; and David Deans himself could not be more summary in condemnation of the opposite side, as the *world*: 'I regard the "moderate" party as belonging not to the Church, but to the world.' And when some of his brethren evidently objected to the style of his conversation, and that obtrusion of the sacred mysteries of the Gospel upon every company on every occasion, he never for an instant doubts his own discretion, but sets them down as carnal. Mr. Baillie informs us that the following remarks apply to 'cutting reproaches from brethren:—

"If the Lord will," says he, writing to Mr. Dodds on 18th September, "I shall be with you on your communion-Sabbath. May His Spirit be present when the day comes, to make it a day of sweet communion, in the faith and hope of the gospel! How mad a true minister of Christ must appear in the eyes of many! He breathes a spirit, and displays an ardour, which the world cannot understand. The more that we are like Jesus, whom the zeal of his Father's house consumed, or like Paul, whose enthusiasm in advocating what the flesh was unable to appreciate or relish brought on him the charge of being mad,—the more shall we lie open to the ridicule and obloquy of the carnal, and the more shall we be censured as imprudent by those who, though evangelical in face, are 'Moderates' at the core. Eternity with its unchangeable heaven and its unchangeable hell, rebukes the 'moderate' and the carnal,—calling on us to exhibit yet a more close resemblance to Paul in his mad-like enthusiasm, or to the Lord himself in His consuming zeal. Jesus coming into our closet, and breathing on us that we may receive the Holy Ghost, makes us able ministers, and therefore fools in the world's esteem."—P. 323.

The truth was, his mind was too narrow, too absorbed in its own speculations, to be able to receive impressions from without—to receive lessons of any kind from others. Deeply possessed of certain truths viewed through his own medium, and realizing no other truths, he had no patience or toler-

ration with any who would not see things as he saw them: he could not conceive them as otherwise than in that '*satanic* state of the flesh' he so often talks of. Of such he says: 'Enjoyment without Christ is the beginning of hell;' though the enjoyment he means might be perfectly innocent in its nature, only not consciously connected with the great work of our redemption. For the wonders of creation engaged none of his attention. He was utterly blind to them, not so much by nature as on principle, and through the inevitable consequence of his being engrossed with his own thoughts. He says: 'These holy sentiments can only be cherished and strengthened by looking *away* from things created;' and this he did with a remarkable consistency on all occasions. He travels—sees Germany, Lisbon, Madeira, but has never anything to say about all these places, not one remark to make but on the state of his own soul; of Madeira, that loveliest of God's works, he just says, after he has left it:—

'I saw little of Madeira, but it will be more worth while to see it when the new heavens and the new earth are made. I care not though I never see the magnificent places of the earth till then.'—P. 246.

And this insensibility towards the works of God's hands all passes for the extreme of spirituality with his biographer. But in spite of the pains he takes to prove the success of Mr. Hewitson's invariable tone of conversation, it is evident many were repelled, if not disgusted. Persons who saw him for a little while, and who were equal to the demands made upon them, would, like Dr. Chalmers, notice complacently 'the unction of spirituality that savoured his conversation;' and others, 'that 'he was more like a being come from another world to declare 'his message and return to it again.' But it was clearly otherwise with those whom circumstances brought into constant communication. Mr. Baillie speaks with bitterness of his loss being a relief to *some*. If he stays any length of time in one place we find him complaining of 'dryness' and 'deadness,' as we have shown, and there are indications of impatience which would increase this distaste; and of intolerance of opposition hardly consistent with that 'heavenly savour' which he is stated always to have left behind him. This he confesses with more candour than his biographer, though in his own characteristically pompous way:—

'A letter of this period illustrates a feature of character which those who knew him will recognise. In conversation, he had been betrayed into warmth of argument: he had abruptly left the table, and sat alone on the sofa all the rest of the evening, uttering scarcely a word. "My last visit," he writes, on December 21, expressing, some time afterwards, the pain which his hastiness of spirit had occasioned him, "was, in one respect, to myself a memorable because an humbling one. The spirit of the meek and lowly-hearted Jesus was grieved by my want of long-suffering. If my sin had been secret, I would have spoken of it to the Lord alone; but,

when we sin in one another's presence, we should remember the words, 'Confess your faults one to another.' We are Christ's witnesses in the world, called on to show forth His glory by our lives as well as by our lips. We must live over the life of Christ on earth; we must breathe the breath of Christ among men; we must show what He is, by being in the world even as He was in the world; we must be holy as He is holy. We need to walk circumspectly, ever identifying ourselves with Christ."

"I am sure," remarked Mr. Hewitson on one occasion, "many think me very disagreeable." Without waiting for a reply, he added, "I never utter my mind on a subject till I have studied it, and formed my judgment. I like then to meet with sympathy, and shrink from those who cannot extend it to me." This often gave to him an air of dogmatism, which strangers did not relish. But the instance narrated will show how tenderly alive he was to this failing.—Pp. 260, 261.

There was, in fact, that 'sourness' in his nature which a conscientious overstrained spiritualism always engenders. We find him nearly at the close of his long illness repelling sympathy in an ungracious way. It is, no doubt, troublesome to many invalids to be inquired after and questioned as to the state of their health, but an amiable disposition appreciates the motive, and patiently bears the inconvenience. Mr. Hewitson paid visits, and talked to strangers, looking like death itself: people pitied him, and expressed solicitude which annoyed him and rankled in his mind, and no man of the world could have shown his annoyance more testily or at a worse time:—

'A characteristic little incident occurred as he was leaving the house where he had been sojourning. "I hope you have been comfortable during your visit," said his kind host. "Yes," was his reply, "with the exception of one thing—I have been annoyed by so many people continually inquiring about my health." "He never felt comfortable," adds our correspondent, "when any one did so. I recollect, on one occasion in my presence, he said to a friend of mine, 'I shall never be better than I now am, until the resurrection day,'—meaning, he was quite happy under all his infirmities."—Pp. 350, 351.

Asceticism is a charge usually confined to Rome, and to those who are supposed to have 'Romanising tendencies;' but when it is with any fairness used as a term of reproach, we presume it means man's imposing harsher terms of salvation than God prescribes in his Holy Word. It ought not, certainly, to mean a man's laying down rules for himself, as thinking that certain restrictions benefit him personally, are good for his individual soul,—for natures do differ, and indulgences, innocent and even salutary to some minds, are injurious to others. But when a man from laying down rigid rules to himself and denying himself certain allowed pleasures, proceeds, as he too often does, to impose his own personal rule and law upon the Church at large; because he thinks it best for himself not to marry, to disparage marriage as a state; because he finds it best for himself not to drink wine, to assert all wine drinking as unlawful, because he finds ordinary social intercourse too great a

temptation in his case, to cry down all cheerful society; because the cultivation of the taste in his own case ministers to vanity, to forbid all accomplishments to the whole body of Christians; because he needs no relaxation, to impose unlimited labour on all around; because he can sustain contemplations and a spiritual frame of mind for a long period undisturbed, to condemn all others differently constituted as carnal:—this we call asceticism, when men by that word mean not the enduring hardness ourselves, but something false and unscriptural; and in this sense the Church of Rome is not so ascetic as Mr. Hewitson, for she distinguishes between one nature and another, Mr. Hewitson and his party would govern the whole Church by their own idiosyncrasies. The rule of Scripture seems to be that individuals may follow their own leanings in spiritual self-government to almost any extent, so long as they do not interfere with the liberty of others and the rules of the Church; but when once men set up their private rule as a general law, then Scripture steps in to reprove them as being wise above what is written, as making the heart of the righteous sad whom God has not made sad, as interposing their human law between the soul and its Creator, Redeemer, and Judge. For this rigour is a dangerous thing; it not only imposes needless restraints, inducing in characters not strong enough to bear them, and too weak for resistance, a tendency to pretence and mere profession; but it always results in the imposition of new articles of faith, as we believe the history of Christianity will show. The simplicity of the Gospel is unsatisfactory to minds who have to sustain these self-imposed efforts. Having rejected natural relaxations of thought, they need stimulants of another kind; they need a feeling of partisanship, a companionship in certain exclusive views, which are, as it were, the travail of their own souls, and which assume a proportionate prominence in their system. With Mr. Hewitson and his party this new dogma is what they designate Premillenarianism. Towards the end of his career it becomes evident that Mr. Hewitson could not cordially sympathise with, nay, more, we suspect he could scarcely be patient in the company of any persons, whatsoever their profession, who were not Premillenarians: a wonderful delusion, we must submit, without entering into the question of its truth or falsehood; only of its relative importance amongst other articles of belief. For what is the question of the *time* of Christ's coming, compared to the fact that He will certainly come at some time to judge the world? ¹¹ with Christ a thousand years on earth reign with Him an eternity in heaven that opinions that are disputed obtain their adherents, and this dogma is

advocates to have great quickening power; and it evidently has a very exciting influence, and may lie at the root of much of the irreverence in the mention of our blessed Lord which disfigures the devotions of this party. Not so much in Mr. Hewitson, who had certainly a serious mind, and a deeper earnestness than others we shall have to notice, together with more practical ideas on the subject of confession and self-discipline, and a larger understanding; still in him there is something to regret on this head. His excitement, however, lay more in anticipating and exulting in the prospect of the tribulations and convulsions that were to usher in this advent so immediately at hand. He sees its approach in every event, great and small; it is his only gauge of the interest and importance of any question; he hails it in the troubles of his own communion, in the disturbances of nations; and the conviction founded on this interpretation of prophecy he calls 'a second conversion,' an expression which affords a curious comment on that state of feeling which he calls his first. We might extract largely from his letters on this subject, showing the confidence of his predictions, sometimes not so much predictions as history; but late events have made our readers so familiar with the language and views held on this question, and with the irrepressible arrogance, which no failure can humble, of these interpreters, that we will spare them. He thus expresses his view of the benefits of this expectation, premising that with this school the words 'Hope,' 'Blessed hope,' 'that day,' all the allusions to the judgment-day, are interpreted to mean the 'Personal Reign.'

'In Kelso I find many godly people, who are waiting for the Lord's coming. Our hope is truly a blessed one, and much to be cherished. It has power, more than anything else, to make us feel that we are set down as strangers in a strange land, and to wean our affections from the things of this evil world. Anything that keeps us near the living person Christ Jesus, transforms us into his likeness; and the expectation of his advent is especially fitted to have this effect.'—P. 296.

Partly his precarious, failing health, and partly, we believe, the nature of his views, and the effect they had on his practice, made his life a desultory one. Before his ordination he was licensed to preach, but found his strength unequal to any continuous effort. The principal labour of his life was in association with Dr. Kalley, who will be in our readers' recollection, in his proselytizing efforts in Madeira about ten years ago. Finding that Mr. Hewitson's health forbade his preaching in his own country, for the present, at least, it was proposed that he should go to Lisbon and there study the Portuguese language in preparation for preaching to the natives of Madeira. With few he was ordained by the Free Church Presbytery in proceeded at once to Lisbon, where he made rapid

progress in the language. Eventually he joined Dr. Kalley, who had already become exceedingly odious to the authorities in Madeira. Jointly they are represented as producing great effects, and their converts suffered much from imprisonment and various forms of persecution, while the clergy, perplexed by this inroad into their province, could find, we are told, no better argument than to denounce the Bible as a book of hell. The history of this mission is given at much length, and Mr. Hewitson laboured with great zeal. But the position of affairs was necessarily not satisfactory. In the first place, it hardly seems fair to attack popery in Madeira, because that country is open to the English as a kind of hospital for our national disorder. Backed as our countrymen are by a powerful government at home, the temporal evils that ensue must inevitably fall on the converts, and be felt comparatively lightly by the apostles of the movement. True Dr. Kalley once suffered imprisonment, but of a very different character from his proselytes, for he kept his room full of Bibles, which he could supply to the colporteurs at his discretion; and he was visited, on Sabbaths, by seventy or a hundred friends. Eventually Lord Aberdeen took the middle course of demanding damages for his imprisonment, and warning Dr. Kalley that he could not be supported by the English Government if he assembled Portuguese subjects at his house contrary to the wish of the Madeira authorities. After this his proceedings were carried on with some secrecy, but still so as to raise much suspicion and to excite popular rage and tumults, so that Dr. Kalley at length escaped to an English ship from the clutches of the mob, disguised in woman's clothes. And here, though we do not say it was necessary that he should stay to be murdered, yet it jars upon one's feelings to read,—

'The converts were now to enter the seven-times-heated furnace. Shall they stand this fiery trial? The removal of Dr. Kalley was to them the signal to expect all manner of cruelty and oppression. Many of them immediately fled from their houses to the mountains, where they have been savagely hunted by their relentless persecutors. It is truly heart-rending to hear of their sufferings. When discovered in their hiding-places, they were mercilessly beaten, to extort from them a promise that they would go to confession. A few days ago a man was most brutally murdered, and several women have sustained injuries from which they are not expected to recover.'—P. 225.

This happened in August, 1845. In the previous May Mr. Hewitson had been 'led in the providence of God to form the resolution of leaving Madeira for a few months,' intending afterwards to return and resume his labours. He pressed upon the Free Church of Scotland the necessity of a *native* ministry, which at this crisis we do not understand; in fact, he proceeded to ordain six elders and several deacons to conduct the meetings during his absence. He himself returns to England, and writes his poor persecuted flock a pastoral letter. Ultimately the

body of converts, who seem to have been very sincere and much enduring, emigrated to the number of 700 to Trinidad, where the next year Mr. Hewitson paid them a three months' visit. Altogether the history does not bear out Mr. Baillie's lofty tone, though we attribute any shortcomings rather to a want of heartiness in Mr. Hewitson's nature,—of love to his fellow-creatures, because he knew them and they knew him, not as just so many abstract souls,—than to want of courage. We are struck by the coolness and conciseness of his notice of his first meeting with these poor converts at Trinidad. All he says to his sister, to whom he writes, on his landing, is:—

'Passing by the meetings and greetings and embraces, the tears and laughings, of kind and cordial welcome on the part of many well known in Madeira,—I had a meeting for worship on Saturday evening, and on Sabbath I entered upon a regular system of ministration once more in a foreign tongue.'—P. 269.

We should have thought some *names* might have been mentioned, some intimation that he had made his own family acquainted with some of these poor people on whom he had brought such an amount of temporal evil and suffering, though he was satisfied it was for their real and lasting good. We only relate Mr. Hewitson's success at Madeira, as he thinks proper to state it. We believe that this proselytizing was simply mischievous, and that though Dr. Kalley and his friends destroyed the old faith of the converts, they supplied no substantial religion in its place. We know that the persecution is exaggerated. But we are only concerned with Mr. Hewitson's account of his own conduct; and we must remark that, in fact, he had not the genial qualities suited to a missionary. On his return to Scotland, he commenced what is called a 'wandering ministry,' 'preaching on Sabbaths and week-days, and leaving behind him in every place the savour of his heavenly walk.' A sense of dulness and flatness seemed to haunt him. He was always longing for 'revivals.' 'I feel the effects of the deadness which is reigning around. There is a much-to-be-lamented want of lifelikeness and of spiritual sensibility in the Church, at the present hour. O that these brassy heavens were rent.' At his own home, Dalmellington, he is particularly sensible of this '*restraining grace*,' this '*prevailing drought*,' 'the Lord's *marked silence*;' indeed, we must say that the inhabitants of Dalmellington, and of his subsequent charge of Dirleton, must be more than human if they do not take a little in dudgeon the mode in which their shortcomings are paraded before the world; but we perceive from his other work before us, that Mr. Baillie is quite independent of all such feelings; he writes for a small elect circle, and the world outside are as much dogs to him as ever the Gentiles were to the Pharisees of old.

This is not the spirit for a parish pastor, and no sooner does Mr. Hewitson receive a unanimous call to Dirleton, than he proceeds to make a church within a church, though that at Dirleton had already been sifted of its carnal element, by the recent disruption.

'In Dirleton there was formed, secretly and unostentatiously—known, indeed, only to its members and to him whom most of them regarded as their spiritual father—a little circle of believers, with whose exercises, and trials, and triumphs of faith Mr. Hewitson was not less familiar, and for whom he watched daily with a not less tender solicitude. These were the Aarons and Hurs of his ministry; held up by their prayers and sympathy, he fulfilled his course. As each new convert entered the little family, gladness pervaded all. During all the time of his ministry at Dirleton, he was never without at least one anxious soul. And rarely did the anxiety fail to issue in true peace.'—P. 351.

However, though he intimates that labouring amongst his parishioners at large was like preaching to clods of the valley, he did not neglect them. He was energetic in his preaching, which is called his ruling passion; he held meetings and Bible classes, and visited from house to house; in all his proceedings showing that profound ignorance, and indifference to individual character, which marks this class of minds, and is an especial feature in Mr. Hewitson's. This is a specimen of the mode in which he introduces himself and his ministry to his people.

'Another example may be noted. "Where do you live?" said he to a member of his congregation, whose face he knew, but whom he had not yet visited. "In the room up-stairs," was the answer. "Well, I hope you invite the Lord Jesus into your room to dwell with you. He always delighted to enter into the upper room in Jerusalem, with the disciples of old, to hold converse with them. And Jesus is the same to-day as He was then—still as willing to hold communion with the sinner. Would it not be blessed to dwell with Jesus, the eternal Son of God?" He spoke home to her conscience, and pressed on her the duty and privilege of immediately closing with Christ.'—Pp. 330, 331.

As a specimen of the tone of his ministrations at this period, Mr. Baillie also inserts some of his letters, from which we extract one or two paragraphs, as curious instances of his entire absorption in his own meditations, irrespective of the probable state of feeling of the recipient, in this case his father.

'*"April 17, 1848.—[To his Father].—*'Christ our passover is sacrificed for us.' Am I in a blood-sprinkled dwelling? Is the blood of Christ really on my soul? Have I peace with God through the blood of Christ? Have I no false peace, that is, no peace but that which the blood of Christ gives to my guilty soul? Do I see and feel that the blood of Christ destroys guilt, even as stubble is destroyed by the flaming fire? Do I know that the blood of Christ has extinguished the flames of hell which were kindled for me? or are these flames, in consequence of my unbelief, still burning?"'—P. 317.

'*"What need of being in earnest! I flee from the wrath to come; my dear father, flee with me to the blood of Christ—come with me into the blood-sprinkled dwelling. You will be safe there; but, without, there is*

no safety. The storm is lowering, the flames are burning, the wrath of God is coming; but here is an open door, sprinkled with blood—come in fast; here is a cleft in the rock—come and hide here; there is yet room in the wounded heart of Jesus—room for you, room for dear mother, room for all the rest. Oh, come in—come in, all! Let us all hide in the bleeding Saviour, till the indignation, which is coming, be overpast.”

‘And again:—

“‘Damned,’ ‘lost’—these are God’s words; and, oh! who can fathom all the depths of horror, and despair, and woe, which they mean? When a sinner is dragged to hell, with these words, ‘damned,’ ‘lost,’ written upon his forehead,—who can tell the millionth part of the pang of anguish that pierces him through and through, and that is doomed to pierce him through and through for ever?’”—Pp. 317, 318.

We often hear of the enormous length of the ‘table services,’ and the prayers and preaching connected with them, in the Scotch kirk. Mr. Hewitson, in spite of his health, was not likely to abate a moment of time on that account; indeed, while he was himself officiating he never seemed to feel fatigue; but how must a congregation suffer under such protracted excitement, or what is designed to be such, as is implied in the following account of one of these days?

“Yesterday we had a full, or very nearly a full, church; and the season was exceedingly solemn outwardly. I trust that in many cases the inward experience was of a suitable kind, and that the Lord was working with power in many hearts. His own believing people seemed to be glad. We were in from half-past eleven A.M. till half-past four P.M., and afterwards from half-past five till, I think, nearly half-past seven. I am fatigued this morning, but have great cause to be thankful to the Lord for all the good which He yesterday made to pass before me.”—P. 316.

Nor did the strain on the attention of his flock end here, for, as may be supposed, he was very rigid on the question of keeping the Sabbath.

‘Nothing more grieved him than to find topics uncongenial with its true sanctity forming the theme of conversation. To substitute, for news or business, only sermons, or ministers, or doctrines, or ecclesiastical policy, he regarded as the mere shell of Sabbath-sanctity. His Sabbath evenings did not obliterate the holy impressions of the sanctuary.’—P. 328.

While he himself was the talker, and could descant on the subjects his own mind was full of, he might possibly satisfy himself; but to expect this effort from mankind at large, implies a really wilful blindness to human capabilities.

But though his spirit did not flag, his frame sank under exertions so peculiarly trying to his constitution. His active labours did not continue more than a year; and after lingering through the last stages of consumption, he died in August, 1850, supported through the last struggle, not by those speculations which had so possessed his living mind, but by the consolation

common to every Christian, that Christ had trod the way of death before, endured its agony, and conquered its terrors.

The life of every earnest Christian demands respect. It is as an example to others that we take leave to question the value of the present memoir, and especially of Mr. Baillie's share in the work; but if his peculiarities as a biographer offend our feelings and taste, when he exhibits a character so rigid and angular as that of his brother minister and friend, who, after all, is too marked in his outlines to be susceptible of much misrepresentation—much more do they jar upon us when he undertakes to portray a female saint, upon his own ideas of excellence; for, though the memoir is of a real person (Miss Newton), the book is so full of Mr. Baillie—his thoughts, his reading, his views—that the young lady sinks into an abstraction beside the living memorialist. We are told of the lady, but we cannot help being absorbed in Mr. Baillie. The memoir itself contains so little to fasten on the mind, the events are so simple—an occasional journey to Malvern or Torquay, or a visit from a congenial friend, expressed by an initial or a blank—the letters are all so exactly alike, to whatever letter of the alphabet they may be addressed, that, in the presence of Mr. Baillie's affection, ignorance, parade, and general obtrusiveness, they all recede into the background. The showman's burly air and peculiar diction so engross our faculties, that we are comparatively careless of the exhibition we have come to see. For example, the table of contents in a book is generally supposed to refer to its main subject; we should expect all the notices there to refer, in some way or other, to Miss Newton, but their real use, in this case, is to display the varied reading of Mr. Baillie. For instance, when we see the words, 'Blumlis Alps,' in the heading of a chapter, we should conclude her on a tour in Switzerland, but, on looking to the page, we find the chapter opens with the following reference to those mountains.

"Our drive through the vale," writes a Swiss traveller, "brought us full in the view of the snowy Blumlis Alps, at sunset. What a form of majesty and glory! How he flings the frowning mantle of the evening sun down upon us, as if he were about to ascend in fire from earth to heaven!" Adelaide Newton now enters on a course of discipline which reminds us, at every step, of that sun-mantled Alp.—*Memoir of Adelaide Leper Newton*, p. 41.

Frequently we find the name of Lord Bacon amongst these headings, from which we might at least infer that the young lady's mind had been formed and strengthened under a patient, deep study of his philosophy. We have no reason to suppose she ever read a line of Bacon, nor do we imagine that Mr. Baillie himself has drunk deeply of that spring; nevertheless he thinks

this a good occasion for showing what he *has* read. Thus we have in the contents, at one time, 'Living Martyr—Bacon—Cecil;' at another, 'The earthen pitcher,—Bacon—Birthplace,' at another, 'Lord Bacon, another self.' On reference, we find all these pompous allusions have no other bearing on the subject than Mr. Baillie chooses to give them, and that if he were entirely to reverse his authors and quotations the sense would not suffer. One chapter complacently opens, both in the heading and the page, with the poet *Spenser's* lines, which prove to be Waller's well-known simile of the 'soul's dark cottage,' misquoted. A man can never have read a line of either poet with any intelligence thus to confuse the thought and style of the two; which would, after all, signify little, if there was not the pretence of general reading. All this parade, this ushering in each chapter with recondite authorities, as though all the intellect of the world had been prophesying of Miss Newton, is simply to conceal the real poverty of the subject; for there is nothing in the character of the young lady, as he shows it, or in the incidents of her life, to make a book of.

And this straining after great effects, this unvarying posture of admiration in her eulogist, is most unfavourable for the end he has in view. Indeed, how a young girl gradually failing under that most interesting of all disorders, pulmonary consumption—one, to judge by her portrait, of pleasing countenance, and whom we see to have been deeply interested in the one greatest concern of her immortal soul—could be made so unattractive, is a mystery. We suspect it can only have been done by Mr. Baillie's carefully excluding every natural trait that came under his observation, as an impertinence, a thing to be hustled out of the way, as interfering with his ideal. In ignorance of the actual character, we can only judge of the portrait drawn by Mr. Baillie, which is founded, we presume, on his personal knowledge, her own writings, and her friends' reports; of which his bad taste, and little discernment of what is lovely in the female character, has made the worst. And, really, the poor young lady, thus handled, is made a sort of paragon of assumption and egotism—one long I, I, I, from beginning to end. What she is, what she thinks, what she feels, what she does; her theological opinions, her judgment on controverted points, her decisions on spiritual difficulties, her interpretations of Scripture, her insight into mysteries, are all detailed, laid down, and enlarged on, with visible self-satisfaction, and a confidence in her own judgment which admits of no misgiving. She has no doubts of her fitness, intellectual or spiritual, for the determining of any question whatever, from a passage in the Canticles, or the Epistle to the Hebrews, to the precise condition, in the sight of God, of any

of her acquaintance. Of course, it is the exclusive exhibition of one side of her character, what may be called the preaching element, and the exclusion of everything simple, natural, or unconscious, which makes the picture so intolerable; and much of the unfavourable impression is directly traceable to Mr. Baillie's swelling, turgid style, his adulation of his subject, his extravagant encomiums, and the disproportion between the incidents he has to relate, and the language he employs. She probably won this doubtful gain of his warm regard by her enthusiastic appreciation of his *Life of Hewitson*, which she read four times, with ever increasing delight, feeling his mind so exactly like her own. Stimulated by this sympathy, his narrative opens with the following preposterous exordium:—

'The town of Derby cannot boast of many holy memories; but He who noted Bethany as "the town of Mary and her sister Martha," has noted the birthplace of ADELAIDE LEPER NEWTON. It was on the 1st of March, 1824, that an infant who was to leave behind her so precious a fragrance was ushered into this vale of tears.'—P. 2.

How a 'minister of the Scotch Free Church, Hanover Square, London,' which is Mr. Baillie's present style and address, should be able to pronounce so decidedly on the 'holy memories' of a town in the Midland Counties, of some forty or fifty thousand inhabitants, is not explained; but it is a curious example of the length to which this school will go in forming spiritual estimates. Further on we find the following language employed on occasion of a change of lodgings at Torquay. The chapter from which we extract it is headed, 'Living Martyr—Bacon—Cecil.' 'New Tent in the Wilderness,' &c. &c.:—

"Martyrdoms," says Lord Bacon, in one of his essays, "I reckon amongst miracles, because they exceed the strength of human nature." Of martyrdoms there are two kinds. "Perhaps," writes Cecil, "it is the greater energy of Divine power which keeps the Christian from day to day, from year to year, praying, hoping, running, believing against all hindrances, which maintains him a LIVING martyr, than that which bears him up for an hour in sacrificing himself at the stake." Bacon in his essay above quoted has the same thought; for after reckoning martyrdoms among miracles, because they exceed the strength of human nature, he adds, "I may do the like of superlative and admirable holiness of life."

'It is this kind of martyrdom which is before us in the subject of our memoir, and each successive season seems to encircle it with a brighter halo of Divine glory.

'Writing to one of her sisters, from her "new tent in the wilderness," she says: "The first note I write is to you, on a day which I trust is to both of us but a foretaste and pledge of that eternal Sabbath which remaineth for us! Oh! what a prospect for souls who find no rest for the soles of their feet in the ocean of life! Tossed to and fro, sometimes in their temporal circumstances, sometimes from one home to another; sometimes in their souls, beat about, buffeted by the god of this world, and tormented by the evil workings of their corrupt natures, till really they do

literally feel like the dove out of the ark, hovering over a boundless expanse of ocean. I have never felt so more than lately."—*Ibid.* p. 73.

Denuding the narrative of such ornaments as these, and endeavouring to reach the correct facts of the case, the real truth seems to have been this:—Born apparently in a luxurious home, where, we are told, 'her charming manner was never for an instant spoiled by the praises which were continually heaped upon her by the social circle;' surrounded all her life by the tenderest cares, she early took up religion (there is much to justify the expression) with great enthusiasm, receiving the admiring sympathies of her family and friends for the mode in which she carried out her convictions. She seems never to have encountered the smallest difficulty, nor was her will once checked on this point. Having a father and mother, of whom there is only a casual mention, and sisters—what may be called the ordinary ties of family—she seems, nevertheless, to have been permitted from the first absolute control over her own actions, the mode of spending her time, the choice of her friends. She gives up her girlish accomplishments, thinking her success in them might minister to carnal pride, without apparently raising a single remonstrance; there is no trace amid all her trials in that 'living martyrdom' claimed for her, of her ever having been once interfered with or thwarted in any of those points which are the salutary discipline of so many. Before she is twenty she injures her health by district visiting. How she should have been allowed to do so is strange to us, though it seems all proper and creditable to Mr. Baillie. How she should have been permitted up to the age of twenty-two to spend four days at least of every week in her district, 'of at least one hundred houses:' which means in her case preaching premillennarianism from door to door, from ten in the morning till five in the evening, constantly hurrying home from these seven hours' labours too late for dinner, 'fairly tired out with each day's work;' how the duties and wholesome restraints of home lay so light upon her, we are not told, but so it was. Eventually her health broke down; after one of these exhausting days she took a chill which fell upon the chest, and for the last seven years of her life she was an invalid, not, however, receiving any reproaches from her own family or her conscience for the imprudence which led to these consequences. After this period she suffered from ill health, nor do we wish to make light of this trial, but *every* alleviation came with it. Long seasons of relief from pain; constant change of scene; freedom from the irksomeness of uncongenial society; and the unrestrained companionship and correspondence of persons of her own views; an active brain, a ready pen, an intense enjoyment in expressing her

thoughts, convictions, and states of feeling, sustained by the sense that everything she said, thought, and wrote was of importance and destined to perform a great work in God's service—that every spoken and written word was, as she expresses it, 'seed;' with unlimited time at her command to study Greek and Hebrew, and to write tracts and commentaries and paraphrases—works with which we are unacquainted, but which her friends congratulated her upon, and which constituted her happiness in the doing, in the retrospect, and in their supposed efficacy, of which she records many examples.

Such a life is *not* one of extraordinary trial, whatever Mr. Baillie may say. It was as far as we can see, a life of congenial excitement from beginning to end, sustained by a sense of usefulness and importance and superiority which really never flags. Thus we find such sentences as these; writing to her sister, 'Should we ever have been what we are if we had led the uncrossed lives so many young people lead?' On one occasion she is left in a boarding-house for a few weeks, and after alluding to her utter inability to speak to '*these people*' (p. 76), she adds, 'but I pray that God may use me to say what He wants saying to them.' And again: 'Don't you find more and more 'that the things which occupy the minds and hearts of others 'lose their interest with you? There is a craving of the immortal soul for higher objects.' In May, 1848, in her twenty-fifth year, she writes: 'I am now re-writing my texts on 'Canticles, and fresh beauties open to me in every verse. And 'yet how intensely little the most deeply experienced Christian 'knows of the fulness of the Word of God.' Again: 'I have 'been trying lately rather to lay aside all difficult subjects on 'Scripture study, from the conviction that I am studying them 'intellectually rather than spiritually. Perhaps it is a danger 'few are so much exposed to.'—P. 120. Again:—'Do all to 'the glory of God. Do, if you can, make that a higher aim and 'object even than your own benefit. Forgive me for saying so. 'It is because I have found such precious enjoyment in turning 'my ordinary employments to spiritual good in that way, that 'I mention it to you.'

If we wish to know a person's real estimate of themselves, we must study their language of self-depreciation. In spite of the humility on the surface of the following words, we see that their only possible meaning implies a belief in herself as the instrument of direct inspiration, thus putting herself on a wholly different and higher footing from those commentators who fit themselves for their work by careful study and sound learning:—

'I cannot do Hebrews, I am so humbled over it still. I seem to have no power to touch it. How dependent we are upon God, are we not? I

have not a word to say till He opens my lips; and I feel as if He had laid me down with my face on the ground, and as if I must wait till His hand touched me and set me on my feet again. It is worse than useless to try to do anything in my own weakness (I need not call it strength).—P. 329.

On one occasion, recording a visit to the Hon. Mrs. C——, she writes:—

‘I have not been able to enjoy Mrs. C—— at all as I hoped, for they have another friend staying here, who cannot understand anything beyond the merest A B C of religion, and Mrs. C—— is one of the few who love to read the word of God with me, and to dig into the hidden treasures of Christ to be found in it. Still I hope that though disappointing, I may be learning lessons to conform me to Jesus, especially in bearing the infirmities of the weak, and in feeling what it is not to be at all *understood*. How trying that must have been to Him; must it not?—P. 223.

She believed herself peculiarly endowed with natural feeling:—‘I love so deeply.’ ‘This place is so beautiful that perhaps natural feeling excites me too much;’ and of her accomplishments:—‘Like yourself,’ she writes to a schoolfellow, ‘my heart naturally clung very much to the world. Music was my great snare. I took infinite pains to play well, and delighted secretly in the praises I got *whenever I played before any one*. Fancy now its being nearly four years since I have touched piano or organ, and my singing, which I had once even more reason to be satisfied with, is probably for ever silenced. You cannot think how I thank God from my heart that He would not let me gratify the secret pride which was lurking in it, and which was stealing my heart from Him.’—(P. 3.) Here we must pause to doubt whether her music actually received all the commendation she fancied. It is not according to the common usage of society to lavish praise in this manner; but such reminiscences show a disposition naturally retentive of compliment, and making much of the commonplace civilities of society. Therefore we would have our young lady friends go on with their music in spite of such warnings as these, and try to play well too; for it is with music as with all other skill, ‘whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might.’ If they *weigh* the praise they get they will not value it too high; but, playing with taste and feeling, they will not need flattery to make the occupation pleasant. They will soon forget themselves in their art, and will be content too, as so many charming musicians of the domestic circle are daily content, to be forgot, by accustomed preoccupied listeners, whose nerves are soothed and tempers attuned to harmony by a process they are scarcely conscious of enough to analyse. Music, if regarded as a means of winning compliments, may be the ‘world;’ but cultivated, as it should be, for its own sake, and as simple-minded people pursue it, it is a foretaste of heaven. If Miss Newton

had kept up her music, we think her style would have been the gainer. This is the opening of one of her tracts:—

‘A SECRET.

‘I’ve just heard a bit of uncommon good news from Ireland; and in these times, when the plague is already begun among the people, I think it is a shame to keep it to myself. Everybody knows how bad the cholera is, and nobody can say that they mayn’t be the next to be taken with it; but everybody does not know *how to live through it*.

‘I’ve just heard of a ‘Healer;’ and if you like to know where He is I’ll tell you. The word ‘Jesus’ in Irish means ‘Healer,’ and Jesus is the most wonderful man for healing diseases that ever was heard of.’—P. 55.

If there were not several allusions to the good the authoress’s tracts actually effected, we should doubt the possibility of such familiar irreverence as this doing anything but harm (and we must still doubt it) to the reader, probably—to the writer, inevitably. The assumed vulgarity is, of course, in sympathy for the class for whom it was intended, who we cannot suppose would thank any young lady for forgetting her natural dialect and her education in consideration to their deficiencies. We have the less dependence on her ideas of sympathy with her inferiors, when we see what they are for her equals. It needs, in fact, what this school is especially without, the heart to be

‘At leisure from *itself*,
To soothe and sympathise.’

The predominant idea in their minds is to teach, that is, to make impressions, not receive them; the very opposite, it is evident, of the sympathetic temperament. Now, to take an instance, when a friend informs us he or she is just married, or about to be married, we ought to be passive recipients of that idea; our friend should have the glory of impressing us; but no fact can reach such busy minds as the one before us, without its suggesting something to be done, some impression to be made; so she hastens to respond to her friend’s communication, by changing the bearing of the subject to her own point of view, taking possession of it thus: ‘True, you are married; but your husband may die, and then where will you be?’ This is technically called *improving* the subject, and, undeniably, is an attempt to make an impression: though that death’s head was not likely to be wholly a stranger to the young bride, for

‘All pleasure is a fearful thing.’

‘Poor M—, on her becoming Mrs. —, once wrote to me so very strongly about the blessings of having at last one earthly friend to whom she could confide everything; and when I reminded her of the possibility of her losing that one earthly friend, and the blank which would then be felt, poor soul! she could not bear it.’—P. 83.

She was so ‘faithful’ to another friend on a similar occasion, *that intercourse seems to have been discontinued*, but such a

result does not give Miss Newton a moment's doubt as to the propriety of her own line of remark, as she seems to have felt herself rather great on this topic. Thus, to another more docile friend, she writes encouragingly:—

'I am far from looking on marriage and love as trifling or *unsacred* subjects; they are designed of God amongst men, as I feel convinced, to set forth the love and marriage union of Christ to His Bride the Church, and are, or may be, sweet and holy earthly ties. But it has strongly been on my mind lately, that they are ties only for time. In heaven they neither marry nor are given in marriage. . . . It must be remembered constantly that the sweet enjoyments of mutual affections must be held in subordination to the lasting, ceaseless, pure, and unrestrained affection which, through time and eternity, must exist between the soul and Jesus. All that comes in subordination to THIS, dearest, I wish you,' &c.—P. 63.

Mr. Baillie ushers in this sententious epistle with one of his flourishes: 'She was no cynic, but rejoiced, like the Master, to 'make all around her happy, delicately tempering congratulations with a seasonable admonition.' A girl of three-and-twenty delicately seasoning her congratulations, at such a time, with admonitions, can only remind us of Malvolio's familiar smile quenched with a severe regard of control; but it is singular how, at all ages, and under all circumstances, the disciples of this school refer all things back to themselves. Thus, *her* theory of the merely temporal nature of the union *might* annoy and could not interest or in any way concern her correspondent, and seems an incivility, while the good advice could scarcely be new to her. Such persons never give others credit for spontaneous thoughts; they must be infused by themselves or they will not be there at all.

How young people manage these matters amongst themselves is, it may be said, of small consequence to the world at large; and, no doubt, what young people, like the subject before us, think on abstract questions, is of little moment to any one, and their conduct in life only of importance to themselves and their immediate connexions; but when they are brought forward as examples, it is a different thing. So many more people admire goodness, than have practice and skill to discriminate between real goodness and assumption, that whenever they see zeal, devotion, and earnestness, they will be disposed to take everything for granted that accompanies those qualities, however much they may be marred and spoiled by individual or party errors: and, for their benefit, it cannot be amiss to analyse motives, and to trace out principles of action. Most of our readers would think it a serious matter if our young ladies, *en masse*, set themselves, after our present pattern, to decide who amongst their parents' acquaintance were worldly, and who not; who must be summarily broken with, and who might be

retained; and thus turned every hearth into a seat of judgment on our neighbours. If they all agreed with Miss Newton that 'letter writing, only on ordinary subjects, is a sad waste of precious time, and very unpardonable amongst the Lord's people,' and that henceforth we must be no more cheered by the graphic liveliness of the female pen, but receive instead, from our wives, and sisters, and daughters, crude sermons, solemn warnings, vague confessions of sin, and long, confused, formulas of doctrine; if, finding it ministered to pride for them to amuse the family circle by their accomplishments, they left their elders, on principle, after the fatigues of the day, to their own resources, while they occupied themselves in the humbler duties of the pastoral office, or in the composition of tracts for unconverted sinners—it cannot be amiss, then, to prove that what would be so very inconvenient, irksome, and disagreeable, would not be good in *any* sense; that the truest Christian life does not interfere with the order of nature, nor give young people duties to perform for which their age and qualifications naturally unfit them; and that they cannot assume uncongenial occupations without injury to the simplicity and grace of their Christian character.

We have alluded to Miss Newton's ministerial labours, for her system of district visiting can go by no other name; she did not wait for opportunities for saying something seasonable on religious subjects, but she felt she was the appointed bearer of the Gospel message to each house, adding the stimulant of her interpretation of prophecy, which she found, and others with her, made them feel 'less concern and love for the world than anything we can imagine.' This supervision she kept up at a distance, by sending her own tracts ('Just as I am,' or a 'Shadow of Death,') and passages of Scripture for meditation, regretting that she had only 'spoken once faithfully' to so-and-so, rejoicing over others, and the like. Now, having a district implies that it was given her by her pastor, who trusted her to labour after her own manner in his parish. It strikes us that this confidence is not handsomely returned, either by the lady or Mr. Baillie, who, however, being what he is, is not likely to have much sympathy for an English parish priest, and probably is not unwilling to express his own feelings towards the body through the reflections of one of their flock in individual cases. So he takes care to record that these sisters were '*dreadfully starved* with their afternoon sermons,' one particular summer; of course those interested to know the preacher amongst them can easily compare dates, and find out who starved these ladies, who were certainly rather formidable members of a congregation, not only critical at the time, but causing their dissatis-

faction to be printed years after. But much worse follows, when, later in the volume, in 1852, we come upon the following impressions on listening to a sermon, while at her own home, and therefore we conclude at her own church :

‘Never can I forget yesterday’ (she writes, February 9, to Mrs. C—W—); ‘you can scarcely conceive what I felt, in the midst of what would otherwise have been a very good sermon from Mr. —, on the Spirit moving upon the face of the waters (Gen. i. 2), to hear him come out with the waters of baptism, while he strongly denied baptismal regeneration; yet to as strongly affirm that, where there was no conversion, there was still a great benefit conferred, by the doing away of original sin!!! This he also partly unsaid; but I really don’t know how, for I felt so stunned, that I retreated behind a pillar in the corner of the pew, and only entreated that the stream of deadly poison might not flow in through the congregation, and that the dishonour done to the BLOOD which alone can take away sin, might be forgiven. I don’t know what to do; it has wounded me to the quick. I feel, do you know, just as if I had been thrown into a dungeon, like Jeremiah, surrounded with filthiness, in this fallen world, from which there is no escape, till the word is given, “Come up higher!”’ —P. 271.

To this Mr. Baillie appends the insolent question, ‘Do Christian men, whose trumpet, in this matter, gives such uncertain sound, know how grievously they wound some of the holiest of the saints? It is no light matter to offend one of these little ones.’ So between the two, the hapless preacher comes off ill. We do not extract this for the sake of Miss Newton’s views on the subject of Baptism, nor of those of her pastor, nor yet for the petulance and arrogance apparent in the tone. Though a member of our Church in profession, we see that its spirit was throughout uncongenial to her, and that some of those to whom she looked mainly for instruction and sympathy were not of our communion.¹ Therefore our present comment is not because we find in the mind of this young lady no recognition of the fervent devotions of our Liturgy, nor acknowledgment of any kind to her appointed pastor, as such; for such a mind would naturally prefer choosing for itself, and would lean to ministers and ministrations in proportion as she had herself chosen them; but we notice this breach of decorum and good feeling as one instance out of very many within our own experience, as, we doubt not, within that of our readers, that turbid

¹ *E.g.* Take the following account of an occasional visitor. What sober English pastor could stand a chance with such exciting rivals? A visit which a Free Church minister, Mr. C—B—, had paid to her, she sketches thus:—‘I greatly enjoyed it, because he seemed so very happy in God and in His Lord. When he was up with me in this room, he appeared as if he could scarcely sit still sometimes for delight, especially when speaking of Psalm lxxxv. 10, “Righteousness and peace have kissed each other.” He clasped his arms and looked all he seemed, as if he would like to say of the exquisite beauty of God’s own joy in the perfection of his own attributes. It is impossible to put it into words; but perhaps the idea may strike your mind, as it did mine, in a way it never did before.’—P. 380.

enthusiasm, a chronic state of religious excitement, of whatever creed or party, does obscure the moral sense, blinds people to the rules of common fairness and honesty, and unfits them for seeing the road of duty and honour in the intercourse between man and man. If it were not so, Mr. Baillie would not have had the *power* thus to publish private letters reflecting on private individuals, as we find him doing in his biographies.

But it is time to pass on to other works on our list. The transition can scarcely be called one from Mr. Baillie to Mr. Horatius Bonar, their intercourse and acquaintance seems so familiar, from the frequent recurrence of the names in one connexion, and the close accordance of their views. Their taste, too, in this chosen line of biography, is as similar as can well be, and their gratitude for the appreciation of admirers and converts prompts to the same profuse return in kind. But if Mr. Baillie is often extravagant in his own style, Mr. Bonar is no doubt far more extravagant in his subject, and in his indiscriminate praise of the most offensive peculiarities. The language of Mr. Hewitson, and, more frequently, of Miss Newton, has often made us feel the need of the Preacher's warning, 'God is in heaven, and thou upon earth, therefore let thy words be few,' while startled by the familiarity of that young lady's tone, the namby-pamby, affected homeliness of style, the 'revelings' in Scripture, the 'nice texts,' with which she is 'so very much pleased,' the 'so delightful,' 'so sweet,' 'I like so very much;' the spiritual inquiries, 'Have you seen much of *Him* lately?' 'How are you getting on?' the very painful application of certain texts from the Canticles, on the confession, 'He (the Almighty) must often be intensely provoked with me,' and so forth. But this is all so much surpassed by Mr. Bonar's great example of piety, that we cease, as it were, to see irreverence anywhere else. With his 'Stranger Here,' this easiest familiarity is inseparable from the mention of our Blessed Lord at all. It does not taint her religion; it is her religion itself. We can only think of her, and of those who talk like her, as of the same fellowship with that rude multitude who thronged Him and pressed Him while He was still upon earth. But this is the feature in her religion which especially delights Mr. Bonar. Her real excuse is weakness and giddiness of mind. It is preposterous to have to review anything so trifling, so beyond the pale of rational discussion, as the greater part of the four hundred pages of this volume. But in excuse for noticing a work of so feeble a character, we can only say that it is *read*. Our copy is one of a third edition, and it is certain that people's critical acumen sleeps more in reading religious books than any other. Thoughts and feelings are more taken

for granted. It is supposed to be right and charitable to accept fervour in place of sense and propriety, and what would at once be detected as impertinence or fatuity if addressed to a creature, passes only for a spirituality beyond their powers of comprehension if addressed to the Maker and Sustainer of the Universe.

It is not indeed the unknown author of these effusions we wish to notice. Mr. Bonar, by publishing them, has made them his own; nor would he at all wish to shrink from the responsibility—he accepts them as exponents of his view of truth. What we object to as irreverent, strikes him as singularly fresh and real, as ‘natural and original even to simplicity,’ whatever that may mean; as possessing a tone of profound reality; as ‘produced ‘by the in-dwelling Spirit, and regulated by His in-working ‘Hand.’ He rejoices in his convert, and is not a little proud of being the human motive power which put into action such a whizz and whirr of feeling, and talk, and excitement. He endeavours to introduce order and succession of time—to make out, in fact, the history of a mind out of the chaos of his materials—to give the impression of regular growth, and progressive development, to the uncertain fluctuations of an undisciplined fancy and feeble judgment. His history takes the following course, in the Table of Contents:—‘The Sleep of Death—The Awakening—‘The Rest—Trials and Joys—Progress in 1842-43—Conflicts—‘Labours and Longings—Progress in 1844-45—Features of a ‘Saint—Progress in 1846-47—Her last year.’

This list puts our readers as much in possession of the design of the book, as the volume itself would do; nay, more, for every page, from its stationary character, and resemblance in tone to the last, seems to set at nought the dignified order of the programme. To us, the whole book is the picture of a mind simply intoxicated by religious excitement, and stimulated and kept up to that state by the system in which she was first brought to think of religion at all. There is sincerity, and undoubted ardour of devotion; but the language in which all this is expressed is so absolutely contrary to all Scripture example or warrant, that we are sometimes forced to the conclusion, that the *object* of worship set before us by the same Scriptures must be wholly misunderstood by such minds; and that persons of this sort differ from the Christian Church as much in their views of the Supreme Being, as in their mode of addressing Him. To give an instance of what we mean—is there anything in Scripture to sanction the following mode of addressing and contemplating the Father and the Son? Can we trace any realizing the awfulness of the Divine Nature? Must it not be a truth hidden from a mind that could write in this strain, or approve it when written, ‘If I am a master, where is my fear?’ Can a true servant so forget

due reverence? But Mr. Bonar inserts this letter to a female friend, as a sign of *progress*. 'There is great singleness of heart,' he says, 'in these letters. They contain no reference to passing events, and even personal or domestic circumstances are only introduced in their bearings upon that eternity, towards which her eyes so intently and fervently turned. With what solemn steadfastness of purpose she pursued her heavenward path; with what zeal she laboured for her Lord; and with what willingness she bore His cross; the reader will discover in these letters, which mark her progress in the years 1844, 1845.'—P. 206.

'My very dear friend,—I have been long in answering your last sweet letter, but, since I received it, the chastening hand of my Father in Heaven has again been laid upon me; yet it was all in love, and I feel that I needed all He sent me, for I am very, very unlike any one of Jesus' dear "little ones," far less am I like Jesus Himself. You must pray, dear friend, that every sight that God gives me of my utter unworthiness may make Jesus more and more precious to me. I have been thinking much lately of this verse, "To them who believe, He is precious," and I long to be able to say He is precious to me. God has given me lately greater desires to know Jesus, and to feel His preciousness, and to feel my entire need of Him, and my entire dependence upon Him, than I have ever had, and I cannot doubt but that He will satisfy the desires He Himself has given. I feel my utter ignorance of Jesus, and His finished work, so much, I seem to know less about Him than I did at first; but one thing greatly rejoices me, and for that let us praise Him, that He is showing me, and making me *feel*, more than ever I did, *my need of Him*. I sometimes feel it so sweet, I cannot describe to you how sweet, to ask the Father to reveal the Son to me, *to tell me about Jesus*. I think *then* He will really smile upon me. I have very little joy, or even peace, just now; but sometimes God gives me such a desire to learn about Jesus, that the very desire is very, very sweet. I should wish to speak about Jesus with you, but everything I say seems like hypocrisy; and yet all I can say of Him, as being the loving One, is true, though I don't feel it so. Let us have a pen-and-ink talk about our Beloved, in spite of Satan and a cold heart. Can you always say, "*My Beloved?*" I still tremble to do it; but we need not fear when we think how kind, how gentle, how tender He is. "He can be touched with a feeling of our infirmities, for He was in all points tempted like as we are, *yet without sin*." Oh! I am so *very* glad He is without sin; if He had even one taint, we could have no hope. But is He not "the Lamb, without blemish and without spot?" Is He not the *Holy One* of God? Even the devils confessed that He was; and does not the Father (*His Father and therefore ours*) say of Him, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased?" and could God be well pleased with anything that was not perfectly holy? It is difficult to realize it. *We* are so unholy, we cannot understand how any one can be perfectly faultless; but let us be exceedingly glad that it is true, and also rejoice to know that when we shall see Him as He is, *we* shall be holy too; you, my beloved J—, and I, poor, sinful I, shall one day stand, *without fault*, before the throne of God. Isn't it wonderful? I shall be very glad when the journey is all over, for I cannot stand my earthiness any longer, it is so painful.'—*A Stranger Here*, p. 210.

In another place we find this extraordinary misgiving. 'Sometimes I think I am ungrateful to Jesus, in praying more *to my*

'*Father* than to Him, and it is curious, though I pray most to God, it is always Jesus I think of, and long to be with in heaven.'—P. 70.

Elsewhere we meet with the following views of a 'wonderful Christian':—

'I have been twice to see old Miss D——. She is a more wonderful Christian than ever. She said to me, "Satan has been telling me that the Bible is a fiction, and that Christ is a fiction, but I told him that He was a fiction only to Hell." And then she said, "Oh! Christ is a jewel! I am always asking to have that jewel!" We spoke about getting near Christ in heaven, and she said, "We shall each get a whole Christ and a whole throne to ourselves." She said, too, that there is *a war* in heaven; the redeemed tell each other their history; each says he is the greatest debtor; and then they always end with "Holy! holy! holy! is the Lord God Almighty!" She said that if we were oftener to tell one another what God has done for our souls, we too would end with, "Holy! holy! holy!"'—P. 214.

We ought to apologize for giving the dignity and durability of print to these profane ramblings, but the worst of making assertions is, that we must prove them; and though they were an old woman's ramblings in the first instance, their reproduction is deliberate and premeditated in Mr. Horatius Bonar. And as this wonderful Miss D—— lived in Kelso, the scene of Mr. H. Bonar's ministrations, and of the conversion of 'the Stranger here,' it is no violent supposition that she, Miss D——, gained her insight into mysteries from the lips of her pastor.

The subject of the present volume, after leading a careless, heedless girl's life, came to visit a religious friend at Kelso, expecting to be much worked upon, and resolved against any change. Her arrival coincided with 'a peculiarly refreshing and prayerful season.' Under Mr. H. Bonar's direction, 'souls were brought to peace in believing, and some awakened, besides God's people being quickened;' and though her case was known to be an 'unlikely and unhopeful one,' she was made the special object of prayer in these meetings. She went with her friend, though unwillingly, to an evening service, and her soul was troubled. On the following day Mr. Bonar called, but she was 'reserved in the extreme,' and her object was evidently to make the visit as disagreeable as possible. Still she went to the next Monday evening prayer-meeting, and in the midst of the address was so deeply smitten as to turn to one sitting next her, and exclaim (characteristically enough)—'What *does* the man mean?' On returning home from the meeting, she abruptly begged them 'not to suppose she cared for that man's words, for she was determined not to mind him.' Next morning she was unhappy; throughout the forenoon she was unsettled and uneasy, impatiently dashed down her pen, and declared she could not

even write to her mamma; and finally, the pent-up feeling bursting forth, she exclaimed, 'Oh! that man's words have done for me.' Her friend, eager to assist at this crisis, proposed reading the Bible, and read to her the greater part of the Song of Solomon, which happened then to be engaging her own thoughts. She wept very much, and seemed a little relieved, still recurring to the fact that that man had *done* for her. This expression, in its connexion with himself, greatly pleases Mr. Bonar, and probably is the reason of his delight in her peculiar style of expressing herself. 'She always took the word nearest at hand; hence the vigour and point of all she said.' Throughout the whole period of her rapid conversion the only symptom of self-righteousness (a stage which is looked for always till it is found) she manifested, was her preference of a small dark room, where she sat alone reading her Bible during the few days that elapsed before she 'found peace.' Her friend conversed with her. She had an interview with Mr. Bonar. She attended meetings and Bible-classes, and 'never showed any desire to return to the world;' only once, during this period, going to a dancing-party, and leaving it with a resolution never to return to such scenes. At length 'she got her eye upon the cross, and in seeing it, peace flowed in upon her.' On the 13th of June she heard the first sermon; on the 21st of July she is writing with fluency on the state of her feeling, and her new life was fairly set in.

We have given an abstract of the history of this conversion as it is told us, not doubting all its leading circumstances. The theory of Conversion, true or so-called, is too large a one for us to do more than touch upon it here, but one thing is clear with reference to all statements of this class. No amount of testimony, no startling suddenness of change, no consistency in that change, must allow us to relax the vigilance of our own judgment, nor to see evidence of a *Divine* illumination because wonderful phenomena are brought before us. We must appeal all the same to the law and to the testimony; we must judge by the fruits, by the spirit, and temper, and faith, that follow upon them, precisely the same whether the change is produced by slow, gradual, imperceptible conviction, or by the lightning's shock of what seems revelation. Every system that recognises excitement as a means, the most opposite the one from the other, has these conversions to boast of. Wherever the proselytising spirit is at work—wherever there exists in any body a longing earnest desire for others to join their body, whether through the purest charity or party spirit, there will these Divine (truly Divine) or material wonders take place; it needs the religious exercise of judgment to discriminate. And under the

most opposite systems, which cannot both be true, the course of the seeming miracle is often identical, as though some mysterious natural law were followed. Whoever is versed in the history of Roman Catholic conversions will recognise precisely the same course of events as we find in the history of Free Church revivals; the same *revelation*—it is believed without human interference—of the peculiar distinctive doctrines of each communion, in addition to, or often paramount to, those first principles of the Gospel which were the subjects of conviction in all the cases of conversion recorded in Scripture. Some natural, though mysterious, law of association must account for facts like these on one side or the other, unless we would flatly deny an immense amount of credible testimony. These general remarks are in reference to Mr. Bonar's use of the sudden change from indifference to ardent interest in the concerns of religion, in the case of the strange, weak, excitable being before us, as though he might claim from it a divine sanction and approval of the tone and language henceforth adopted by her. And there are many minds so unreasoning, that if they believe *at all* any part of the story of this 'conversion,' will think they see in it a warrant for the extravagances and improprieties that follow. But to return—as indeed we are conscious that this is scarcely a case to found general remarks upon.

All these books treat the subject of *souls*, and *sinners*, and *conversions*, in a very technical manner. In the midst of all their zeal, a narrowness is manifest, as if realizing nothing beyond the acceptance of certain formula and the importance of bringing these *souls* to say certain things. But in the singular case before us, this pursuit of souls, and earnestness to win them, is carried on in so talkative and trifling a manner, as actually to degrade the effort to '*win*' them into a sort of spiritual *game*. Our own soul recoils at the prattle and chatter that is permitted and put forth for imitation on this subject; there is such a monstrous discrepancy between the vast momentous idea of an immortal soul brought into favour and communion with its Maker and Redeemer, and the frivolous, vain, and ignorant means set busily and confidently at work to produce this glorious and stupendous result. Mr. Bonar's prayer-meetings were apparently the head-quarters of all such intelligence, and the report of persons' spiritual progress circulated there in phraseology condensed for the initiated into a form unintelligible to the world without. The Correspondence is full of the same subjects; the progress of their acquaintance showing that so and so 'is very ignorant about God and eternal things,' and often says, 'he can't understand a thing,' or 'What a wonderful conversion I——'s has been,

without any fear or doubt;’ or again, ‘We met another child of ‘Jesus to-day,—how old do you think? Ninety! She is a dear ‘old body.’ By this lady souls in the abstract are discussed very much like counters. ‘My darling R. is gone for a month into the ‘country. I hope the Lord will be with her, and enable her to ‘win some souls where she is.’ (P. 212.) ‘I have got a district ‘here. R., pray for me, that I may be enabled to speak to the ‘people in it, and that, during the short time I am here, I may ‘win some souls.’ (P. 216.) Again—‘You will be *obliged* to ‘go to dear old Lizzy. Oh! I am so glad, you *must* win that ‘soul, and I won’t be *jealous* if she is yours.’ (P. 226.) This Lizzy is often mentioned, and from her extreme docility and acquiescence in all that was told her, we are puzzled at the continued doubt concerning the poor old woman; it gives us a miserable insight into the mode in which the poor are worked upon by this class of chattering, babbling religionists. To follow the kind of teaching in this instance, and the utter unreality of the seeming test of success,—‘I have been with her about two hours to-day, ‘reading and praying, and urging her to come to Jesus. She says ‘she has been very miserable and anxious since I came to her, and ‘that she is now much happier, and has no fear.’ (P. 218.) But in another letter we have the concise message, ‘Ask her from me if ‘she can say, Abba, Father, yet?’ (P. 231.) And again—‘O that ‘Lizzy would really come to Jesus; tell her from me that God ‘is satisfied with his beloved Son, and that He requires nothing ‘from her but just that she bring Jesus in her arms, and plead His ‘name—she is sure to be accepted.’ (P. 237.) ‘Give my love to ‘dear old Lizzy, and tell her that Jesus says, “Him that cometh ‘unto me I will in no wise cast out.” I love her soul so much, but ‘Jesus loves it far more. Let her choose Jesus this day, that she ‘may serve Him.’ (P. 243.) And again,—‘Oh! tell her to delay ‘no longer, but to come *now*, for all things are ready.’ (P. 247.) And last,—‘What do you think of old Lizzy? Tell her from me ‘to beware of resting short of Christ. Perhaps God has sent ‘you to speak the word to her that will be blest. Jesus walked ‘till He was weary, just to convert one soul.’ (P. 260.)

There is a singular love of sporting at the edge of profanity in minds of this class; and especially in this poor lady, who must have been *encouraged* to follow out every outrageous fancy, as the Pythoness of old was stimulated into prophecy and oracles; we hesitate in transcribing some of her sentences, but Mr. Bonar extracts the first into his preface for its remarkable depth of spirituality. She is speaking of the Saviour’s love:—

‘I was so happy, so *very* happy. Oh, how I longed to share my joy with you! I wonder what gave me such delight; it was not any clear views of my interest in Christ; on the contrary, I never stopped to inquire! I

could not help rejoicing; and when Satan whispered that he would get me yet, I felt no alarm; indeed, the strangest thought came into my mind. I thought, Well, if I am lost, I will sit in a corner, and think about Jesus; and I actually felt as if I could be happy even there if I could think for ever about Jesus,' &c.—P. 6.¹

And the following incoherent aspirations she writes from home in the midst of her family:—

'I wish I could write you a letter *full of Jesus*; but oh! I have such a cold heart, and I know nothing of Him. I do long to know Him, to be intimately acquainted with Him! I long to be at *home*; this earth seems sometimes like hell. I cannot stand it; no one cares for God, or speaks of Him, or seeks to glorify Him. I wish Jesus was glorified. I should not care for myself, I think, if only He got the glory due to His holy and blessed name. I *must* live for Jesus, and I must live near Him, else this earth will indeed be a wilderness. R. and I had a very precious meeting last night. Jesus was very near; and oh, He was so loving, I felt as if I could not have any fear.'—P. 222.

She hears a sermon that pleases her, and thus easily describes the impression made upon her. 'It was all Jesus together; I

¹ This surely is a travesty of Bunyan's prison experience. When expecting to be hanged for his opinions, and assailed with doubts within, he thus powerfully describes the mental contest that tried his soul, and the final victory of faith:—

'Wherefore, when I first began to think of this, it was a great trouble to me; for I thought with myself, that in the condition I now was, I was not fit to die; neither indeed did I think I could, if I should be called to it; besides I thought with myself if I should make a scrambling shift to clamber up the ladder, yet I should either with quaking, or other symptoms of fainting, give occasion to the enemy to reproach the way of God and His people for their timorousness. This, therefore, lay with great trouble upon me; for methought I was ashamed to die with a pale face and tottering knees in such a case as this.

'Wherefore, I prayed to God that He would comfort me, and give strength to do and suffer what He should call me to. Yet no comfort appeared, but all continued hid. I was also at this time so really possessed with the thought of death, that oft I was as if I was on a ladder, with a rope about my neck. . . . Thus was I tossed for many weeks, and knew not what to do. At last this consideration fell with weight upon me. That it was for the word and way of God that I was in this condition, wherefore I was engaged not to flinch an hair's breadth from it.

'I thought, also, that God might choose whether He would give me comfort now, or at the hour of death; but I might not therefore choose whether I would hold my profession or no. I was bound, but He was free; yea, it was my duty to stand to His word, whether He would ever look upon me, or save me at the last; wherefore, thought I, save the point being thus, I am for going on, and venturing my eternal state with Christ, whether I have comfort here or no. If God doth not come in, thought I, I will leap off the ladder, even blindfold, into eternity; sink or swim, come heaven, come hell. Lord Jesus, if you wilt catch me, do; if not, I will venture for Thy name.'—Bunyan's *Grace Abounding*.

Much of this book is unquestionably the history of a state of mind bordering on insanity. Yet Bunyan is calm, reverent, and collected by the side of these wordy modern enthusiasts. But genius, and a sort of *truth* that these books are a stranger to, give a weight and continuity, reasonableness and moral value, to the treatment of any subject, however wild.

just wondered why everybody did not come to such a Saviour.' (P. 224.) She begins a letter: 'My dear R.,—I have taken a great longing to know more about our dear Redeemer.' But enough of this; every page presents similar passages; not one but is offensive, from the same cause. There is not one practical lesson, not one rational notion of duty, not one sober thought of temporal things, or one reverent idea of things eternal (that we have met with), throughout the whole book. After frequent longings for death, impatience of the burden of sin, weariness of this earth altogether, and longings for heaven, the lady *marries*, and settles in a country manse, but dies in her first confinement. Domestic matters are little entered into, beyond perpetual allusion to the unconverted state of most of the members of her own family, and the disunion consequent upon religious differences, and a uniform preference of Kelso, the grand scene of religious excitement to home, where she never thinks things are right, unless what she calls 'battles' are going on.

It is, we suspect, a new thing in professing Christians to be wholly careless in their *style* of expressing themselves on sacred subjects, and in supposing there is merit in this indifference. A useful barrier is broken down when pains and deliberation in the choice of words are despised. For our part, we do not see that a little ceremony even comes amiss when the court of the King of kings is approached. Serious thoughts indeed *cannot* clothe themselves in careless language; but a great deal of religion is not serious, and this fact comes out in this whole class of books, and it is a point to be dwelt upon; for what is that religion worth which does not make men less frivolous than they were before, but only frivolous on more solemn and momentous matters. Then indeed the very salt has lost its savour, and wherewith shall we season it?

The religion of the last century contrasts favourably, in this particular point, with a large share of the popular piety of our own time. No one then was careless or familiar. Sententious, prosy, merely moral, and dry, they might be, and often were, but the inborn awe and fear of God as our Maker, a deep sense of a superintending Providence—that natural religion, in short, which no revealed religion was ever designed to supplant, is apparent throughout. The Unity of the Godhead is an actuating doctrine, which it is *not* in any system of religious excitement, where the precious doctrines of grace are taught exclusively, and not as part—though that part is the crowning glory—of God's revelation of Himself to man. In that darker age their religion was often vague, and their creed ill-defined; but at least there was no chatter about theology, no bandying to and fro of the most sacred terms, as if they were subjects

for common gossip. They held religion to be a calm, grave, sedate, and reverential influence; and therefore, when they wrote of it, they formed their sentences with care, that no hurry or impertinence of language should misrepresent or profane this idea.¹ As a contrast to the hasty scribbling, the pretences of knowing the Divine mind as they would guess at the thoughts of a friend, the 'jottings down,' as they are affectedly called, of crude thoughts set down pell-mell in ostentatious confusion, a little of the formal divinity and precise biography of a past age makes very pleasant reading; all the more for the latter being much more comprehensive and conscientious in its matter than these ultra-spiritual lives ever are, and giving the reader altogether a truer and more ingenuous picture of the whole man.

¹ There were female religious writers of the period of which we speak, and the same deliberate care, the same respectful attention to style—that sentiment which dictates a stately propriety of dress in the presence of royalty—is apparent in them. They always wrote as well as they could, and would have been ashamed to do otherwise, to be betrayed by haste and inconsiderateness to a mean, or familiar, or intemperate mode of expression. Take for example the following measured, carefully weighed, and often musical sentences, forming the greater part of a farewell letter from a lady to her friend—a composition, we think, as remarkable for recollection of spirit and Christian hope and confidence, on the very verge of the grave, as for elevation of style. It was written about 1735.

'To the Rt. Hon. the Countess of Hartford.

'Madam. . . . I am now taking my farewell of you here, but 'tis a short adieu, for I die with full persuasion that we shall meet again. But oh, in what elevation of happiness! in what enlargement of mind, and perfection of every faculty! What transporting reflections shall we make on the advantages of which we shall feel ourselves eternally possessed. To Him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in His own blood, we shall ascribe immortal glory, dominion, and praise for ever. This is all my salvation, and all my hope. That name in whom the Gentiles trust, in whom all the families of the earth are blessed, is now my glorious, my unfailing confidence; in His merits alone I expect to stand justified before infinite purity and justice. How poor were my hopes if I depended on those works which my own vanity or the partiality of men have called good, and which, if examined by Divine purity, would prove perhaps but specious sins! The best actions of my life would be found defective, if brought to the test of that unblemished holiness in whose sight the heavens are not clean. Where were my hopes but for a Redeemer's merits and atonement!—how desperate and undone my condition! With the utmost advantage I can boast I should start back, and tremble at the thoughts of appearing before the unblemished majesty. O Jesus, what harmony dwells in Thy name! Celestial joy and immortal life are in the sound. Let angels set Thee to their golden harps; let the ransomed nations ever magnify Thee!

'What a dream is mortal life! What shadows are the objects of sense! All the glories of mortality, my much beloved friend, will be nothing in your view at the awful hour of death, when you must be separated from the whole creation, and enter on the borders of the immaterial world.

'Something persuades me that this will be my last farewell in this world. Heaven forbid that it should be an everlasting parting! May that divine Protection, whose care I implore, keep you steadfast in the faith of Christianity, and guide your steps in the strictest paths of virtue. Adieu, my most dear friend, till we meet in the paradise of God.

'ELIZABETH ROWE.'

We now turn to a little book emanating from one who has evident sympathies with the same school, but yet forming a most agreeable contrast to the works previously discussed. The memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars, drawn from various sources, show a really attractive, and in its way charming character, though we own it is not *our* way in every respect. It is the history, or rather sketch, of a young soldier, in the various stages of his course, from the thoughtlessness of his youth to the ardent enthusiasm of later years, and the earnest practical religion which sustained him through all the trials of the Crimean winter, in noble unselfish devotion to his duties—duties which to him had a very comprehensive range, until his career was suddenly cut short by a hero's death, as he led his men on to the charge. The sketch is by some loving hand, liking him altogether too well to be able to assume the cold forbidding tone of the professional pen, though no doubt respecting that style in others; delighting in his natural character *always*; seeing something amiable in his natural warmth of feeling, something consolatory in his natural remorse at the errors of a very thoughtless, and, probably, much worse than thoughtless, youth, in the midst of all the temptations incident to his profession. She—for there are clear indications of a female hand—is proud of his constitutional good-nature, his cheerfulness, his manly bearing, his high courage, his unselfishness, and has pleasure in giving traits of such qualities; and the effect is that we have a real picture, and a very attractive one, even to those who cannot always sympathise with his tone in speaking and writing on spiritual subjects, and who feel something uncongenial and grating to their feelings in his utter unreserve in the mode of expressing his own convictions and personal experience in sacred things, continually, on every occasion, before the least sympathising audience. But it is quite fit that we should realize that there are differences of temperament that *must* result in wide differences in action; and wherever a course of conduct is natural, the spontaneous consequence of nature and disposition, there we must make the most ample allowance for any divergence from our own standard. Many of Captain Vicars' isolated acts bear a close resemblance to acts of Mr. Hewitson and these ladies of his school whose spirituality has been paraded before us by their eulogists; but with him these acts are not efforts, not self-conscious performances, but parts of himself, exhibitions of his peculiar open, unembarrassed, somewhat off-hand temper, finding a very congenial home in the religious school to which he naturally belonged when he began to be religious at all.

As is the case with most persons, we suspect, who are very

demonstrative in their manifestation of religious feeling, who find it easy to say all they think, and are unvisited by the timidity and reserve which restrain, as with bands of iron, so many deep, thoughtful minds, when they are expected to talk of what they feel, Captain Vicars had an undisciplined childhood. His father was abroad on military duty, and he was, therefore, brought up by his mother, with whom he seems to have been able to do pretty much as he pleased, the only apparent check being his own warm, tender, constant affection, influencing him for good throughout his whole course: 'To study he showed a marked and positive aversion,' but was great in all school sports and pranks, and a favourite with his schoolfellows. In 1843, when he was seventeen, he received a commission in the Line. The news reached his mother, we are told, on Christmas-day, by the same hand which, twelve years after, on Good Friday, informed her how faithfully unto death that commission had been fulfilled. He soon joined the *dépôt* of the 97th regiment, and threw himself with characteristic ardour into all the duties of his profession, to which he was devoted from first to last.

His eldest sister well remembers his joyous bearing as he first exhibited himself to them in the Queen's uniform, and her own admiration of the bright, intelligent countenance, broad shoulders, and well-knit, athletic figure of her young soldier brother. A few weeks afterwards he sailed for Corfu—now fairly launched in the world and in a profession beset with temptations.

He still retained the frank demeanour and kind and generous disposition which had distinguished him as a boy, with a keen relish for adventure, and a quick perception of the beautiful in all around him, as his descriptions of scenery sufficiently show. Gifts are these, lovely in themselves, but dangerous, often fatal, to their possessor, as the wrecks upon many a shoal of life too truly testify.

He had a pleasant and prosperous voyage out; with his usual activity lending a helping hand to the sailors in the work of the ship, and winning their hearts by his genial manners. At Corfu he entered with spirit into all the amusements which offered themselves to him. His letters to his family were now less frequent than ever before or afterwards, and at this period of his life his reckless disposition often led him into scenes of which his conscience disapproved, and to excesses which, though never matured into habits, and, by the grace of God, early and for ever abandoned, were afterwards the subject of bitter and humiliating remembrance. In reference to this he wrote in 1854, "You will be spared poignant remorse in after years by remembering your Creator in the days of your youth. I speak from heartfelt experience. I would give worlds, if I had them, to undo what I have done."—*Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars*, pp. 7—9.

He remained there about two years, and then was ordered with his regiment to Jamaica. From Maroon Town he thus writes to his mother, on hearing of her dangerous illness:—

"I see it all now. It is I that have caused your illness, my darling mother. Ever since the receipt of your last letter, I have been in a dreadful

state of mind. I feel that I deserve God's severest punishment for my undutiful conduct towards the fondest of mothers, but the excruciating thought had never before occurred to me, that He might think fit to remove her from me. Oh, what agony I have endured! what sleepless nights I have passed, since the perusal of that letter! The review of my past life, especially the retrospect of the last two years, has at last quite startled me, and at the same time disgusted me. You will now see the surest sign of repentance in my future conduct; and believe me, that never, as far as in me lies, shall another moment's anxiety be caused you by your dutiful and now repentant son."

"The remorse which he thus affectingly expresses, was caused by his having incurred debt, to no great amount, but such as he knew would become a burden to a widowed mother. During his residence in one of the Mediterranean isles, he had become acquainted with a family who showed him great hospitality, and in maintaining social intercourse with them, and sharing their pleasures, he had involved himself beyond his means. It was the first and the last time that his unselfish nature thus transgressed.

"In the depth of his penitence for his errors towards an earthly parent,—called forth by the patient bearing of her forgiving love,—do we not see the foreshadowing of that prostration of soul with which he humbled himself, when once the kindness and long-suffering of his God and Saviour were manifested to him in the fulness of redeeming love? And thus it was first through the raising of his moral nature, by means of the holiest affections of man's heart, that he was eventually, after many a fall and rising again, to be drawn up into the higher life of fellowship with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ."—Pp. 13, 14.

For the three years he remained in the West Indies his life was one of habitual carelessness and deadness to religion, with occasional impulses to better things, caused by any startling event in the scenes around him, reminding him of death and eternity. His letters to his mother and sisters express these feelings, and give pretty descriptions of his cottage, flowers, and poultry, with which he amused himself in his hours of leisure. During this time, by the strictest economy, he paid all the debts (not considerable) that weighed on his mind, writing at one time to his mother: 'In a short time, dear mother, your son will be entirely out of debt; hurrah!' But all this time he totally neglected prayer and the reading of the Bible; so much so, that for five years at this part of his life, he did not possess a Bible, having lost that which his mother gave him, at Corfu: and even when aroused to the duty of *having* a Bible, the one he bought was of so indistinct a print, that he seldom read it. But the time arrived for a total change of thought and habit.

"It was in the month of November, 1851, that, whilst awaiting the return of a brother officer to his room, he idly turned over the leaves of a Bible which lay on the table. The words caught his eye, "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." Closing the book, he said, "If this be true for me, henceforth I will live, by the grace of God, as a man should live who has been washed in the blood of Jesus Christ."

"That night he scarcely slept, pondering in his heart whether it were presumptuous or not to claim an interest in those words. During those

wakeful hours he was watched, we cannot doubt, with deep and loving interest, by One who *never* slumbereth nor sleepeth; and it was said of him in heaven, "Behold, he prayeth!"

"In answer to those prayers, he was enabled to believe, as he arose in the morning, that the message of peace *was* "true for him,"—"a faithful saying, and worthy of *all* acceptance." "The past," he said, "then is blotted out. What I have to do is, to go forward. I cannot return to the sins from which my Saviour has cleansed me with His own blood."

"An impetus was now given in a new direction, of sufficient force to last till the race was run—until he could say with the Apostle Paul, "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith." Thenceforth *he lived*. And the life he now lived in the flesh, he lived by the faith of the Son of God, of whom he delighted to say, with realizing faith and adoring gratitude, "He loved me, and gave Himself for me."

"On the morning which succeeded that memorable night, he bought a large Bible, and placed it open on the table in his sitting-room, determined "that an open Bible," for the future, should be "his colours." "It was to speak for me," he said, "before I was strong enough to speak for myself." His friends came as usual to his rooms, and did not altogether fancy the new colours. One remarked that he had "turned Methodist," and, with a shrug, retreated. Another ventured on the bolder measure of warning him not to become a hypocrite: "Bad as you were, I never thought you would come to this, old fellow." So, for the most part, for a time, his quarters were deserted by his late companions. During six or seven months he had to encounter no slight opposition at mess, "and had hard work," as he said, "to stand his ground." But the promise did not fail, "The righteous shall hold on his way, and *he that hath clean hands* shall wax stronger and stronger."

"All this time he found great comfort in the society of a few brother officers who were walking with God, but especially in the faithful preaching of the Gospel of Jesus Christ by Dr. Twining, Garrison Chaplain at Halifax, and in the personal friendship of that man of God, which he enjoyed uninterruptedly from that time until the day of his death. Under so deep an obligation did he consider himself to Dr. Twining, that he frequently referred to him as his spiritual father; and to his scriptural preaching and teaching, and blessed example of "walking with God," may doubtless be traced, under the mighty working of the Holy Spirit, those clear and happy views of religion and that consistency and holiness of life which succeeded his conversion."—Pp. 32—34.

From this time his zeal knew no intermission. He began to teach in the Sunday-school, to visit the sick, and to read and pray with the soldiers singly. And over these he seems always to have exercised great influence for good. The adjutancy of his regiment was offered him at this time, with the flattering compliment from his Colonel, that he could best trust him with responsibility, and the appointment was popular in the regiment, except that one objected to him as 'too conscientious.' His letters home all enlarge on his change of feeling, but their tone has a reality that such letters often want. Thus, in general confessions of sin we are often, in others, painfully struck by their merely theological character; they are more statements of the doctrine of human depravity than an

individual sense of *guilt*; they only amount, whatever the extreme language used, to the formula, 'All men are bad. 'I find in myself, being by grace brought to a clear insight 'into my condition, symptoms of the general evil.' But here the tone is different. He is conscious of something special in himself, making him feel *worse* than others. Thus, writing to his sister:—

"What I pray for most constantly is, that I may be enabled to see more clearly the wicked state of my heart by nature, and thus to feel my greater need of an Almighty Saviour. You cannot imagine what doubts and torments assail my mind at times, how torn and harassed I am by sinful thoughts and want of faith.

"You, Mary, can never experience my feelings, for you know not in what a sinful state my life has been passed. Well may I call myself the 'Chief of sinners.' "—P. 37.

And, writing to his brother—though, probably, some of the 'amusements' he denounces in another part, as incompatible with a religious life, were harmless in themselves, and he had not learnt to distinguish between things positively sinful, and others only evil if misused, and made the business of life, instead of an occasional relaxation—his tone is natural and sincere:—

"As Newton says, 'I know what the world can do, and what it can not do.' It cannot give or take away that peace of God which passeth all understanding. It cannot soothe the wounded conscience, nor enable us to meet death with comfort. I have tried both services. For twenty-four years have I lived under the thralldom of sin, led by the Devil. None need despair of being welcomed by the Saviour, when He has pardoned and brought to repentance such a sinner as I have been. The retrospect of my past life is now miserable to me; yet, before I was taught by the Spirit of God, I thought and called it a life of *pleasure*! The very name, when applied to sin, now makes my heart sicken. Even then I never could enjoy recalling the occupations of each day; and think you my conscience was quiet? No, though again and again I stifled it, as too many do. Bitter experience has taught me that 'there is no peace to the wicked.' Blessed be God, I know now that I am pardoned and reconciled to God, through the death of his Son. How happy is the Christian's life, when he has this assurance!

"Do not think, dear Edward, that because I write thus, I wish you to think me very religious, or that I consider myself better than you. I do not. But I find more pleasure now in writing on these subjects than on any other, and I want to draw out your thoughts about them. If you have not yet turned entirely to God, take my advice, and if you want to find true happiness, do so at once."—Pp. 41, 42.

Whether it was *natural* to him to begin to write a diary, we do not know; but he, probably, thought it necessary to a good profession, and there are some few pages devoted to extracts from his. This style of composition is in its nature so unreasonable—as we understand it,—it must be so very difficult to write to our own selves, about our spiritual condition, with any ease or pro-

priety—absolute truth and sincerity are so unattainable in the business of telling one part of our being what the other part of us knows—it must be felt at the time to be so fallacious an instrument for testing progress, and must seem such a wasted and unthankful labour, if really and truly designed for one's-self *alone*, with a stern resolution that no other eye shall see it, that we cannot enter into the meaning or design of the system at all, except perhaps as a substitute for confession, for which 'frames' of mind, mere elevations and depressions of feeling, are no fit subject. We have called it thankless labour, if persons write only for themselves; nor is it less so, if these private diaries, either by the connivance of the writers, or against their intention, ever reach the public. We believe there is the stamp of uselessness and barrenness upon them; that they are essentially a mistake; that, beyond the facts and incidents which they embody, and which are not of the essence of the thing at all, they are simply curious phenomena, which must be regarded—the best and most sincere of them—not as useful to direct edification, but as a page of human nature, for those who are interested in that study. Captain Vicars' mind was not *curious* or intricate enough to afford matter for such students. His record of impressions is generally concise enough. Aug. 9th. 'In a happy frame of mind all day,' &c. Aug. 10th. 'Had happy thoughts of Jesus,' &c. 16th. 'Still in a torpid state of mind,' &c. 23d. 'My mind more tranquil during the day,' 24th. 'My mind more composed to-day than usual,' &c., with now and then little confessions and practical rules of more value:—

"I must have a regular system of reading the Scriptures every day. Psalm in the morning, Gospel in the afternoon, and Epistle in the evening. Did wrong in the evening in laughing at poor ——. I must give up teasing him, for it is unchristian-like. O God! give me thy Holy Spirit to enable me to overcome this habit.

"26th.—I begin to see more clearly every day the depravity of my heart, and my own utter inability to turn to God of myself. At the class, in the evening, about fifteen. I went to Dr. Twining's afterwards. Spoke ill-naturedly of one or two. I would that I could do two things—never speak about myself, and never speak evil of any one."—P. 57.

Some reflections there are which strike one as set down because something *must* be said, such as—

"October 29th.—Remained in bed till eight o'clock. *Must* give up this slothfulness. Had no time to read my chapter till twelve o'clock, all owing to love of sleep. At mess scarcely any thoughts of Jesus; slight symptoms of a desire to return to the world and sin.

"November 5th.—Rose at seven o'clock. Would that I could fix my waking thoughts on Jesus! How few are the moments I think of Him to those in which I forget Him! Walked with Desmond and Nash. Kirby

wrote me a letter thanking me for bringing him back to trust in Jesus. He talks of his sins. Little does he know the sinner he talks to.

"15th.—Arose at seven. A few thoughts of Jesus whilst dressing. I would that I had a heart more entirely set on things above! What a body of sin I carry about! Received the reports of the Mic-mac Missionary Society—rather proud at seeing my name in the list of subscribers. When shall I conquer this detestable pride? When shall I look upon myself as the vilest of sinners, as indeed I am?

"16th.—At the class offered up a few ejaculatory prayers to Him who seeth in secret. Walked out with Dr. Twining,—spoke very profitably together about our precious Saviour."—Pp. 59, 60.

However, the extracts are all from within a period of ten months, so that probably the diary afterwards degenerated into a simple record of events, which we suspect wise men's journals generally are.

He returned to England in May, 1853, and there ensued a very happy period, lasting just a year, of home, and intercourse with intimate, congenial friends, whose views were in close accordance with his own, and who were circumstanced to give life and development to his energies. He visited the poor, devoted himself to many spiritual labours, made speeches and addresses, especially worked amongst the 'navvies' engaged upon the Crystal Palace, of whom he was led to see much, while visiting Dr. Marsh and his family, at Beckingham. There was in all this happy, exciting period, a fervour of zeal, of family affection, of friendship, ripening, in one case, into the closest of all ties. A fine, frank, warm-hearted young soldier, ardent in his piety, enthusiastic in all his undertakings, expansive in his benevolence; with manners easy, winning, and cordial to his equals, and gracious to his inferiors, was sure to create a great impression; and there does seem to have been a general effusion of heart, leading to much natural excitement on all hands. We get almost confused amidst the multitude of his avocations, and calls upon his time and energies. The prayer-meetings, cottage addresses; the sick poor visited and prayed with, in hospitals and at their own homes; the public meetings, of all sorts, at Exeter Hall and elsewhere; the family gatherings, the old recognitions, and new friendships, the letters of counsel, and encouragement, and instruction, with warnings against Popery, and the like. It was the very acmé of religious activity and bustle, both public and private. There are indications of much which, told more in detail, we could not sympathise with. He was led to talk of himself, in his addresses to the 'navvies,' a practice about which, however, he had always misgivings, and, in one instance, certainly not without grave reason. We are satisfied that no good could result from telling a set of rough labourers acts of his own previous reckless and wild life. Indeed we are a little surprised at the cool way in which the following is

recorded, illustrative, certainly, of the length to which practical jokes are carried in the army :—

‘A large number of young men, chiefly navvies, were present that evening, and, at our request, he told them the story of his conversion. To illustrate the recklessness of his life before that great change took place, he mentioned, amongst other acts of useless and even sinful daring, that when he was in the West Indies, at the time the cholera was raging, he and one brother officer determined to punish another for being afraid of it.

“Let us put him into a coffin!” said Hedley. No sooner spoken than acted upon. A row of coffins stood at the hospital door. Undeterred from their reckless purpose, by finding one after another filled by a silent occupant, they at last succeeded in their object.

‘The companion of Hedley Vicars in this sinful practical joke was seized with cholera shortly afterwards; but, by God’s forbearing mercy, he was spared for better things.

‘At the close of his address, he turned round, and said to me, with characteristic frank simplicity, “I am sorry you asked me to speak of myself; one is afraid of being proud even in speaking of one’s sins!”’—
Pp. 135, 136.

The joke was really a brutal one, and there is danger in allowing rude minds to associate such acts, for which they have too much zest already, with names and persons they respect. They were not in a condition to be very much shocked with anything Captain Vicars could ever have done, and would only see less harm in such an outrageous proceeding than it deserved. But it is easy to understand how one of his temperament might be betrayed into ill-judged confessions of this kind, urged on as he no doubt was by admiring, sympathising friends, who had clearly great faith in the efficacy of religious excitement.

But now another scene was to open upon him. The war broke out, and the 97th was ordered to be in readiness, and eventually sailed for Greece. The parting was a sad one to many, and he himself seems to have had a presentiment of his end; though this, after all, only means that he knew he was entering upon scenes of extreme danger, for the feeling, as it generally does, gave place to hope, when on the actual scene of conflict.

‘On the evening of Wednesday the 17th, he attended the first public Meeting in Exeter Hall, for the Soldiers’ Friend Society, in which he was warmly interested. Some of his men were also present.

‘He found time for the service of God, and for promoting the interests of His kingdom upon earth, without neglecting any of the last obligations of friendship before his final parting, and whilst occupied, almost from morning till night, in arranging and providing for the wives and children of the soldiers of the Light Company.

‘The order had come for the embarkation of his regiment on Friday in that week. The fulfilment of an old promise was now claimed by him, that we should meet him at Waterloo Station, and cheer him with a last “God bless you!” there.

‘But, on Thursday afternoon, he sent a note by express, to say that they had just received orders to leave London at six o’clock; and that much as

he had rested on the promise of this last act of friendship in England, he could not request its fulfilment, as the hour was so early.

'It need not be said, that the hour was of no moment to those who loved him. By six o'clock we drove up to the Waterloo Station.

'It was a lovely morning, that 19th of May. The sunshine, glittering on the bayonets of the men, as they marched up the steps to the station, seemed to mock the tears of wives, sisters, and friends, who accompanied them.

'I saw a young wife quit her hold of her husband's hand, and approach Hedley Vicars, with a manner of respectful confidence, as she said to him, "Oh, Mr. Vicars, *you* will see that Cottrell writes to me *regular*, won't you? It is my only comfort to know that you will."

'The kindness and sympathy of his tone, as he answered her, told that her confidence was not misplaced.

'Just then his brother arrived; and during the delay which followed before the train started, we read the 121st Psalm in the waiting-room. I remember the deep well of quiet confidence in his eye, as the words were repeated to him, "The Lord is *thy* keeper."

'There was something in the tone of his voice that day which struck like a distant knell upon our hearts. It was a foreboding tone. However strongly hope may have sprung up afterwards, we felt at that moment that it was our last parting.'—Pp. 148—150.

The object of their stay in Greece was to form an Anglo-French force there, for 'the purpose of bringing King Otho to his senses.' It proved a disastrous encampment, for the cholera broke out among our troops, and in the space of thirty-four days, the 97th lost a hundred and twenty of its best men. It was no part of the officers' duty to attend in the hospitals, but here Captain Vicars's unselfish qualities and high sense of duty shone out. A brother officer thus described him at this period.

"I was constantly with Vicars there, and know what his daily life was better, perhaps, than any one else. But about that, it is difficult to say more, than that he never for a moment seemed to forget 'whose he was.' When we were in camp, on first landing, he was in the habit of going out alone for hours amongst the rocks on the sea-shore, having only his Bible, which, I remember his telling me, Dr. Marsh called 'his *sword*.'

"As you know, of course, there was no Chaplain for the English troops there. The Chaplain attached to the English Legation at Athens came over to the Piræus at first to perform a short service in one of the barrack rooms, but as soon as the sickness broke out he was not allowed to come. Part of the service was generally read, on Sunday, by the officers to the men of their own companies; and the officers, in rotation, took the duty, morning and evening, of burying the dead, which sometimes, of our English regiment only, exceeded ten daily. Hedley Vicars undertook this duty several times for others, and seldom, *if ever*, performed it without adding a few earnest words to the men present. Soon after the sickness broke out, he used regularly to visit the hospitals, reading and praying with the dying men, and taking every opportunity of speaking of the 'one thing needful' to others. In these visits to the hospitals he was sometimes accompanied by two or three of his brother officers, one of whom, Major Colville, has since died in the Crimea.

"With all his zeal he was ever careful to avoid giving offence. I have known him to erase passages which seemed to speak harshly of Roman Catholics from tracts he was about to distribute generally amongst the men.

Much as he abhorred Popery, he had the greatest tenderness for the feelings of Roman Catholics. His constant sympathy and kindness for all, of any creed, and whether officers or men, is not easily to be described. When others were depressed, he was always hopeful. His spirits were hardly ever cast down.

“All these things you must have heard from others. The most remarkable thing about him—his great consistency of life and conversation, with his entire devotion to the one cause ever set before him—I seem to be unable to put into words.”—Pp. 170—172.

His own letters tell the tale at greater length, but we have not space. It was by services such as these that he won the hearts of his men, who would all do anything for him. He kept his health in the midst of the general sickness, and in constant attendance night and day at the hospital; and when advised to seek change of air at Pentelicus, ‘certainly would not leave’ till the cholera was over. He seems to have been chaplain too, all the time, for there was no other. After remaining at the Piræus from June to November, they embarked for the Crimea; a change which he had been longing for, having a soldier-like desire to be ‘let loose at the Russians.’ The horrors of sickness he had witnessed in Greece were only a preparation for the greater horrors of that dreadful winter campaign into which he was now plunged, and where the same singular unselfishness and Christian fortitude were shown.

‘During the severe cold of that winter, the only bed he allowed himself was made of stones and leaves, until a fur rug arrived from England, which he felt was invested with a kind of claim of friendship to be retained for his own use. Everything else which could bear the name of luxury, or even of common comfort, was given to the deeper necessities of the suffering soldiers.’

‘Towards the end of November, he was in command of an outpost, which was not only an important position, open to the attack of the enemy, but was also a picquet, furnished by the 97th. On either side of it were hills, covered with stunted brushwood: in front was a ravine, leading to Sebastopol. Here, by day, a subaltern was in command of fifty men; by night, the captain on duty with fifty more. The first force was then sent up to a cave on the left of the ravine, where a breastwork had been thrown up. For nearly three weeks, the party defending the outpost had to sleep in the open air, or at best under roofing made of bushes, through which the wind and rain freely penetrated. At length, however, two tents were pitched,—one for the company, the other for its officer. Hedley gave up his own tent to his men, and continued to rough it in the open air, considering himself more hardy than many of them.’

‘There is in many of his letters at this time a singular combination of almost apostolic devotedness and love, with the gallant ardour of the soldier—leading to an almost boyish anticipation of “a brush with the Russians.”’—Pp. 211, 212.

His letters, without any design to raise compassion, indeed making as light as possible of the hardships of that time, bear out all that has been said of its misery and desolation. His letters from the Crimea improve in intelligence and interest. Hitherto they have been too much on the subject of religion to be really

letters at all, but now they give news, they contain anecdotes, and express natural feeling, as well as always a hearty, cheery courage, and a deep-seated faith, which impresses the reader more because it is not always on the tip of the pen. How many hearts, like his, were warmed by thoughts of love and home; how many dreams like this may have been dreamt on those snowy heights.

"I have the tent to myself to-night, Brinkley being on duty in the trenches. It is curious what delightful dreams I have every time I fall asleep: now I am at Terling, surrounded by all your beloved faces; then again at Beckenham, with those I love so dearly; at another time I am going to read to old Sophy; again, sitting by the blazing fire in the drawing-room, telling tales of the war to dear John; and awake to find my teeth chattering in my head, a sharp stone sticking into my side, the wind howling in gusts and squalls, and a concert of cannon and small shot, with variations from English, French, Turkish, and Russian performers, instead of a chant in the hall."—P. 221.

And in another letter:—

"I had begun to fear before I left the Piræus that something was wrong; but you would have felt with me that it was worth while to have had the suspense, if you could have seen me whilst I was reading those precious letters on my arrival here (besides my budget from Terling). My heart and arm are nerved *now*, and I am utterly indifferent to hardships or external trials of any kind . . . It is six months since I have been within reach of a house of prayer, or have had the opportunity of receiving the Sacrament; yet never have I enjoyed more frequent or precious communion with my Saviour than I have found in the trenches or in my tent. When, I should like to know, could one find a Saviour more precious than when bullets are falling around like hail?"

"Ten days later he gives an account of "such a happy Sabbath," and speaks of his thankfulness in receiving the sacrament of the Lord's Supper after having been so long deprived of it:—"I am delighted to say we had twenty officers there. I like what I have seen of the chaplain to our division, Mr. Parker, very much. He has hard work indeed, but seems to love it, because it is the service of Christ Jesus."—Pp. 225, 226.

Of all the miseries in the trenches, in the hospitals, in watching, weariness, rain and cold, and sometimes even hunger, he had his full share, which he bore in a perfectly contented and unrepining spirit, except that he shared the general longing to have 'a brush with the Russians,' instead of seeing his men melting away from the effects of mere hardship:—

"The nights are very cold now, and that dear fur rug, when it arrives, will be most acceptable indeed. I will not disguise from you the truth, that we have to endure days and nights of hardships; but what are soldiers meant for? I *willingly* submit to them, and would to greater. Yet I cannot but feel, and deeply too, for the death of so many of my comrades; but I keep hope alive in my heart that many amongst them *died in Jesus* at the last. He is so tender and loving a Saviour, and so willing to hear poor sinners when they cry unto Him, that I believe He will not turn a deaf ear to the faintest sigh of a broken and contrite heart that may mount upwards to the mercy-seat, even from the soldier who has longest trampled on His love and forbearance. I cherish this hope, and will, as long as I live.

"Whenever I am off duty, I visit the tents of the sick. They are full

again, although forty were sent to Balaklava a few days ago. The weather is very wet and damp, with snow every now and then; but I am, thank God, as safe and sound as ever I was in my life. I feel persuaded that the Lord is keeping me for my L——'s sake and yours, in answer to your prayers."—Pp. 238, 239.

In January he very nearly lost his life, and was actually reported home as dead, from the effects of charcoal: but he was reserved for a nobler death. The last weeks of his life were spent in a continuance of the same course of duties and religious observances. Their Chaplain was invalided, but he and their officers conducted the Sunday services besides many private ones. The last day of his life was the Day of Humiliation, the 21st of March, 1855. He had been very anxious that it should be appointed, and himself observed it as a solemn fast:—

'At eleven, and at three o'clock, services were held in Mr. Smith's tent. Hedley Vicars had himself chosen the Psalms and Lessons, which he read, as well as the remainder of the service, with an earnest solemnity which impressed all present. "If it had been the Archbishop of Canterbury," said one, "he could not have done it better."—P. 281.

On that day, he wrote to her who had a right to his most intimate thoughts:—

"The greater part of another month is past, and here I am still kept by the protecting arm of the Almighty from all harm. I have been in many a danger by night and day since I last wrote to you, my own beloved; but the Lord has delivered me from them all, and not only so, but He has likewise kept me in perfect peace, and made me glad with the light of His countenance. In Jesus I find all I want of happiness or enjoyment, and as week after week, and month after month roll by, I believe He is becoming more and more lovely in my eyes, and precious to my soul."—Pp. 283, 284.

Soon after ten that night, the Russians commenced an attack in the direction of the Victoria Redoubt, opposite the Malakhoff Tower. With a force of 15,000 men, they effected an entrance into the French advanced parallel, who, after a short but desperate struggle, were obliged to fall back on their reserves.

The Russians then marched up the ravine on the right of the British lines, for the purpose of taking them in the rear. They were supposed to be the French on their first approach, till Captain Vicars, with whom this was the first actual engagement with the enemy, discovered them to be Russians:—

'With a coolness of judgment which seems to have called forth admiration from all quarters, he ordered his men to lie down until the Russians came within twenty paces. Then, with his first war-shout, "Now, 97th, on your pins, and charge!" himself foremost in the conflict, he led on his gallant men to victory, charging two thousand with a force of barely two hundred. A bayonet wound in the breast only fired his courage the more; and again his voice rose high, "Men of the 97th, follow me!" as he leaped that parapet he had so well defended, and charged the enemy down the ravine.

† One moment a struggling moonbeam fell upon his flashing sword, as he

waved it through the air, with his last cheer for his men—"This way, 97th!" The next, the strong arm which had been uplifted, hung powerless by his side, and he fell amidst his enemies. But friends followed fast. His men fought their way through the ranks of the Russians, to defend the parting life of the leader they loved. Noble, brave men! to whom all who loved Hedley Vicars owe an unforgotten debt of gratitude and honour.

"In their arms they bore him back, amidst shouts of victory, so dearly bought.

"An officer of the Royal Engineers stopped them on their way, to ask whom they carried. The name brought back to him the days of his boyhood. The early playmate, since unseen, who now lay dying before him, was one whose father's deathbed had been attended and comforted by his own father as minister and friend.¹

"Captain Browne found a stretcher, and placing his friend upon it, cooled his feverish lips with a draught of water. That "cup of cold water shall in no wise lose its reward."

"To each inquiry, Hedley Vicars answered cheerfully that he believed his wound was slight. But a main artery had been severed, and the life-blood flowed fast.

"A few paces onward, and he faintly said, "Cover my face; cover my face!"

"What need of covering, under the shadow of that dark night? Was it not a sudden consciousness that he was entering into the presence of the Holy God, before whom the cherubims veiled their faces?

"As the soldiers laid him down at the door of his tent, a welcome from the armies of the sky sounded in his hearing. He had fallen asleep in Jesus, to awake up after His likeness, and be satisfied with it.

"We "asked life of Thee, and Thou gavest it him, even length of days for ever and ever."—Pp. 289—291.

Then follows an appendix, containing some striking and interesting letters from friends, privates and officers, superiors in command, giving expression to their deep feelings of affection and sorrow, with official condolences from Lord Panmure to Lord Rayleigh, Captain Vicars's brother-in-law, expressive of his high sense of his services, and regret for his loss.²

¹ The Dean of Lismore.

² Amongst these, we are tempted to extract the following simple effusion of grief and affection, written by his young friend, Douglas Macgregor, to his own mother, the day after. He only survived his friend six months.

"TO LADY MACGREGOR.

"*Camp before Sebastopol, March 23, 1855.*

"DEAREST MOTHER,—This is a dark and sorrowful day with me; my heart is wrung, my eyes red and hot with crying. I feel gloomy and sorrowful altogether. My very dear friend Vicars was killed last night! The Russians made a sortie; and while gallantly leading on a handful of our men, to charge them outside our works, he was mortally wounded by a ball striking his right breast. He died soon after, and is now enjoying a glorious rest in the presence of his Saviour. I do not pity him. What more could we wish for him! He was fully prepared for the most sudden death, and he died bravely fighting and doing his duty. But my heart bleeds for the loss of my dearest friend, and for the sake of his poor mother and family.

"Such a death became such a life,—and such a soldier. The most gallant, the most cheerful, the happiest, the most universally respected officer, and the most consistent Christian soldier, has been taken from us by that bullet; and I know

It was an heroic end to a truly Christian life. We have been so impressed by the genuineness and power of Captain Vicars's

not how to live without him. He was my truest friend, my most cheerful companion, and my friendly adviser on all occasions. But, as his Sergeant remarked bitterly this morning, 'He was too good to live.'

"Oh! how many happy little schemes of mine does this at once put an end to! I had fondly hoped that we should live to go home, and that I might bring my dear departed friend to you, and proudly show him as a specimen of what a model soldier should be. But God's ways are *not* our ways. He spared him from the horrible death of suffocation by charcoal, for a few months, that he might die a soldier's death.

"Noble fellow! he rushed in front of his men; and his powerful arm made more than one Russian fall, before that cruel bullet brought him down. It must have been fired close to him, for his coat was singed. I never knew how much I loved him, until he was so nearly dying of the charcoal. When I heard, at daylight this morning, that Vicars had been brought home dead, you may imagine my excessive grief. I loved that man as dearly as a brother; and it seems that I almost hear his voice sounding in my ears, as he read (two days ago) the Service,—when some of us met on the Day of Humiliation.

"There was a little locket which he always wore round his neck; and I remember, when he heard we were to come here, he said, 'We should all be prepared to give directions what we wished done in case we get killed; for instance, I have got a little Book of Psalms and a locket, which I would wish sent home, in case I die!' Poor fellow! I remembered this; and as I took the locket (a small gold one, which opens like a watch, and has a small picture)—sprinkled with his life-blood—I cried so that I thought I would get ill.

"Oh! his poor mother and sisters, that he loved so dearly. But she is a Christian; and has lived to see her once wild and reckless son come to the fold of Jesus, and prove his sincerity by a long, unswerving, and consistent course. I also cut a lock of his fine curly hair this morning, as I knew his mother would like to get it. If I was to try to write all the good that my beloved friend did, I should not have room. How he fearlessly visited and spoke to the men in the worst times of the cholera: but, as he told me, he got his reward,—for the soldiers' dying lips besought blessings on his head. Oh, how happy he is now! Such a death, and such glory now! Even in death his habitual happy smile did not forsake him. The Lord knew when and how to take him; but it is a severe and unspeakably painful trial to me.

"EVERY ONE liked and respected Vicars; even those who did not agree with his strict religion; and those who had known him so long as the leader of every mad riot, when, after closely watching him for years, and finding that, once enlisted in Christ's army, he NEVER flinched—at last gave in, and acknowledged that Vicars, at any rate, was a true Christian. How sadly we shall miss him in all our little meetings! O God, help me to bear this sad affliction! I can't go on. He died gloriously, and now he is perfectly happy. God help his afflicted family, and help me also to bow submissively to His will!

"Our men got great praise for the fight last night; but who would not go anywhere with such a leader?

"Somehow, I passed a restless, almost sleepless night, and I then heard different arrivals of our wounded men, but did not know that my poor—no, my happy—friend was amongst the number, until parade at daybreak. If you have not lost that crocus which Vicars sent a few weeks ago, please to keep it. Oh! blessed are the dead that die in the Lord!

"Farewell, Vicars, my loved companion! I knew when he went into action he would show that a Christian soldier was a brave, as well as a happy man. I do not exactly know how it all was. I only vouch for the above facts, and the terrible reality of poor Vicars's noble frame lying in the hospital tent, where I saw it. We are in tents here, too. God bless you, dearest mother, and may He sanctify this severe trial to my soul!

"Your

DOUGLAS."

religion, that we have not cared to dwell as we might have done on points of difference, or to adduce the passages which most show this difference. But, in fact, where differences do not proceed from motives and first principles, but from temperament and external circumstances, they cease to have any vital importance. If a certain strain of religious talking is accompanied by an assumption of superiority—if the most fluent and incessant allusion to sacred doctrines and sacred names is attended by *as* perpetual a reference to self—if the tone implies an habitual hard judgment of others, and consequent want of charity, we are justified in being offended and in mistrusting the system which produces such results;—but if the same fluent strain is free from these deformities, if it flows from an exuberance of spirits which cannot feel without giving expression to what it feels, whether it accords with our taste and judgment or not, we must make the best of it. We must tolerate where we cannot fully sympathise.

Some persons must talk of what is on their minds; keeping all these things in the heart, and pondering over them, is a characteristic of certain minds. We may encourage it on religious subjects as tending to seriousness, reality, and reverence; but if we enforce it on all alike, it becomes a tyranny, and leads to affectation. The heads and leaders of parties are universally prone to stamp their own idiosyncracies upon their systems, and to impose them on their followers. We thus constantly see absurd departures from nature; the pliant temper of the disciple striving against its bent to adopt the style of the master mind which has won his allegiance, to the sacrifice of all independence and vigour. And besides this, reticence in expression may easily be carried too far; it is not natural to suppress the free mention in friendly intercourse and companionship of those deep inner truths which are our greatest comfort and our hope; it is not natural, we mean, to a great many minds, and we plead for some vent to natural feeling. Because minds of intensity, realizing in a peculiar degree the awfulness of the deep things of God, recoil from an unchastened, irreverent, thoughtless treatment of them, must *all*, the young, the simple, the eager, the enthusiastic, be held in a check their own feelings cannot respond to or understand? Such natures will talk: if a system tacitly enforces on them the necessity of being silent on their holiest convictions, and they obey it, they *may* cease to think of them; and while we trust that these impressions are fructifying in the brooding silence of the soul, and that the heart of the neophyte has an inner sanctum to which the soul resorts all the more duly and reverently, because the lips reveal it not, a wholly different result *may* follow. For-

bidden to enlarge on the great and glorious truths of our redemption, except indirectly through symbols and externals, may not those externals become the embodiment of religion—those symbols take the place in the affections of the things symbolized — *solely* because he is permitted to expatiate on these, and to cultivate his taste and exercise his fancy on them, and is expected, contrary to his nature, to observe reserve and self-restraint about the other? We greatly suspect that one of the joys of ‘converts,’ so frequently dwelt on by them, is the immediate enlargement given to their tongues in the new regime, causing, by a merely physical and natural process, a corresponding enlargement of heart. Let every one do as he is moved in his heart, as far as is compatible with the one faith—not judging one another. To us, we must own, it seems a strange impulse in writing to a friend—in *all* our letters to all our friends—to transcribe familiar texts at great length, or many verses of hymns, which must alike be in the memory of writer and reader (which was the habit of this young captain). We can neither comprehend the motive of writing, or the pleasure of reading, these efforts, to the exclusion of all ordinary topics of correspondence. It seems to defeat the use and purpose of letter-writing, which are either to put our friend in possession of our doings or our thoughts, or of the doings or thoughts of others. We should be sorry if this epistolary style were to spread by means of these memoirs, for it *must* result in many cases in affectation and assumption; but it is clear that certain sincere, eager minds find this style congenial to them, that it satisfies a craving, that they feel strengthened by the transcription of the words impressed on their own mind, and that the simple reception in return of similar transcriptions fulfils all their ideas of sympathy. And what is said of letters refers also to conversation, of which, of course, we have had specimens in the letters. Where all this is done in truth and honesty, we would wish to do more than acquiesce; we would wish to admire where we cannot sympathise; only entreating such persons not to judge others, who *cannot* go along with them in their habits, practices, observances,—we know not how to designate them. They are utterly contrary to the whole framework of many natures; that spontaneous, easy, fluent manner in divine things, would be as strange to them as armour they had never proved, or costume that they had never worn; and if these ready lips infer from this that they are still of the world, still unconverted, and far away from God (which it is too clear they do), we reply that conversion changes the heart, but it does not change the constitution of the mind; that regeneration subjects it to new sanctifying influences, but not to another construction altogether.

Our appeal throughout has been to nature—to that teaching to which the Apostle referred as of universal and inalienable weight; meaning by nature, both that human heart with which God has endowed our whole race, that common kindred of sentiment, instinct, and conviction which constitutes humanity, and that particular temperament which makes each man's acts and thoughts his *own*; which gives the stamp of individuality to all his words and works; and which makes him a law unto himself.

It is because biographers of the school of Mr. Baillie and Mr. Bonar despise nature, and would prove, if they could, that the highest spirituality annuls and wholly supersedes it, that we take such exception to them; feeling that no system can infringe the great original law and charter of our being with impunity; that in proportion to their success harm will follow, for that, next to the inculcation of positive evil, the confusion of the barriers of right and wrong, the confounding things indifferent with things sinful in one wholesale condemnation, is most certain to result in mischief.

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ART. VI.—*The Primitive Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration.*

By J. B. MOZLEY, B.D., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford.
London: John Murray, Albemarle Street. 1856.

THE volume now before us takes up the conclusions of the treatise on Predestination which Mr. Mozley published about a year ago, and applies them towards the proof of the theory set forth in the present work. The argument of the earlier treatise is to this extent subordinated to that of the latter; and views respecting the effects of Baptism, which are there only hinted at, are here fully unfolded.

The doctrine that all the baptized are regenerate, is exposed to contradiction on two grounds; the one ground wholly untheological, the objection of sight, of supposed personal religious experience, and of what is called common sense, viz. that the baptized, as a body, are manifestly not holy persons—are not 'regenerate,' if the word expresses a continued condition of holiness, nor have ever been regenerated or brought into a state of grace, so far as we can see. This, we suppose, is what the mass of people would object, and Mr. Mozley states it thus: 'the body of persons baptized in infancy are evidently not all good or holy persons,' or more fully:—

'For I would put it to any unsophisticated person, who did not come with a bias to the subject, whether it was a natural use of language to call wicked men regenerate, born again, children of God, and members of Christ?—to call them so, not hypothetically, and as a charitable presumption *before* we *know* they are wicked, but literally, when we know the fact of their wickedness?'—Pp. xxxi. xxxii.

The fallacy of this we shall consider presently.

The other ground is theological, based upon a certain view of Christian doctrine, an extreme theory of predestination, according to which they only who shall finally be saved—the true elect—are at any time really partakers of divine grace sufficient for their salvation. Mr. Mozley (most erroneously, as we trust to show) attributes this form of predestinarianism to S. Augustine; and accordingly argues, that as S. Augustine's belief was allowedly consistent with Catholic doctrine, the statement that all the baptized are regenerate must necessarily be understood in such sense as to be compatible with this view, which he represents as the teaching of S. Augustine.

These difficulties—this apparent inconsistency of the Church's doctrine that regeneration is given to all the baptized, with what we experience, or with a particular theological system—have been

felt by many at all times, and have been explained in many ways. Some have lowered the sense of regeneration, and represented it as meaning only a change of relation, an admission to privileges, the external profession of Christianity, or a mere capacity, as Mr. Mozley is fond of expressing it, for holiness. Others have admitted the greatness of the gift of regeneration, but have either severed it from baptism wholly, or represented it as symbolized only, not given by that rite, or as sealed thereby to those to whom it had before been given, or as given to some only of the baptized, whether adults or infants, according to the faith or prayers of themselves, or their sponsors, parents, or the minister of the sacrament. These last have usually explained the language of the Church, which speaks of the gift as universal in the case of believing adults and of infants, as the language of hope or supposition.

Mr. Mozley has seized on this last explanation, but has carried it out with a boldness of imagination and an universality of application which renders his theory absolutely new and original. What others have timidly alleged in excuse for their use of the Church's formularies, and in apologetic explanation of her language, he has manfully set forth as the one account of the Church's language—justified it, if we may so say, on principle, and established it on a breadth of analogy which gives his theory every semblance of truth, except that one of its having any, even the slightest, foundation in fact.

Mr. Mozley states his case (in connexion with the predestinarian view) thus:—

'The position which the Church imposes is, that God gives regenerating grace to the whole body of the baptized; the position which the Church tolerates is, that God gives grace sufficient for salvation to some only of that body. These two positions, inasmuch as the Church contemplates the case of one and the same person holding both, cannot really be in collision with each other; yet apparently they are. Some explanation, then, is evidently needed to reconcile the two, and to show their consistency. I have endeavoured to give this explanation, by considering the predestinarian doctrine last year, that of baptism now.'—Pp. v. vi.

Mr. Mozley's theory of 'sufficient grace' we at present reserve. It is sufficient now to say that the Church's teaching has reconciled the two positions, in that sense of the predestinarian position in which she does tolerate it. Mr. Mozley is not content with any explanation of this same position, except one which is inconsistent with the doctrine of *real* regeneration being given in baptism. He has, therefore, written the treatise before us to show that whereas, as he most fully admits, and earnestly maintains, Holy Scripture, and the Fathers, and the whole Catholic Church, teach that all the baptized are regenerate, they really an nothing by these words: that they use them only accord-

ing to 'the rule of supposition,' by which persons are said to be that which, in point of fact, they are not.

It ought to be stated at the outset, that when Mr. Mozley, in this work, (or when the Church, whose language herein he adopts,) declares that *all* the baptized are regenerate, the proposition is strictly true only of persons baptized in infancy, and in the case of adults should be limited to those who receive baptism in real and true faith and repentance. So, in a note at the opening of the Preface, Mr. Mozley says:—

'The phrase that "all the baptized are regenerate," is used throughout this treatise as expressing the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. I am aware that it does not express it accurately, because in cases of *adult* baptism, the doctrine even of baptismal regeneration does not allow the individual to be regenerate, unless he has fulfilled the conditions of faith and repentance; and, therefore, inasmuch as all adults may not fulfil these conditions, the doctrine even of baptismal regeneration does not assert that all the baptized are regenerate.'—P. v.

It must also be noticed not once only, that whereas the Church's doctrine is, that every one who receives baptism rightly is *thereby* regenerated, whatever he may afterwards become, Mr. Mozley finds it more convenient to avoid this form of statement, and to speak of 'all the baptized being regenerate,' as if the Church's doctrine was that all persons who have been baptized are at all times afterwards regenerate; that, moreover, he uses the word regenerate as an adjective, not as a participle, and, in accordance with this, he speaks of 'regeneration' as a certain state or condition, not as an event: he regards it as something permanent, as equivalent to 'holiness,' or 'righteousness,' not as something wrought at a definite time; as if we were to discuss what 'manhood' is, instead of what 'birth' is: he treats it as expressing what we are, not what we were once made. The confusion of these two ideas runs through the work, and makes continued reflection and explanation necessary; as may be seen when we say that Mr. Mozley defines regeneration to be *a state* of indefectible holiness. It is quite superfluous to inquire whether this *takes place*, or is given, at baptism. But of this hereafter.

Mr. Mozley then, maintaining that Holy Scripture, as well as the Church, asserts that all the baptized are 'regenerate,' (not, be it observed, have been thereby regenerated,) 'and that 'the literal interpretation of this assertion would be opposed to 'the plainest facts,' infers that another interpretation must be adopted, and that grounded on a principle of language, which he calls the rule of supposition. 'It is common,' Mr. Mozley says (Pref. p. xx.), 'to suppose or presume men to have all 'kinds of good qualities, when they may or may not have them 'in fact. A man in society addresses his next neighbour, whom

'he never saw before, as if he were an excellent and good man, and assumes the fact in his whole tone and manner. The orator addresses a whole crowd as all honourable men, and national poets speak of whole nations as heroic and magnificent.' This view is drawn out at length, and the general principle established, in the third chapter of the work, with a fulness of analogy, and richness of thought, and eloquence of language, which we admire, and presume not to praise. It is shown to pervade the conversation, the addresses, the poetry of mankind. In intercourse with others, we suppose all the feelings, the principles, the conduct of good men, and expect, as a matter of course, certain sympathies and judgments from them; still more in bodies of men and societies, of whom, though we well know that many individuals are wholly wanting in such qualities, we yet attribute a character to them, and regard them as noble, brave, honourable, by class or profession. Such would be the feelings among the members of a tribe, in which the great deeds of the few shed light over the whole, from the effect of which each individual seemed to participate in the supposed glory and bravery of his race. We extract some portions of this part of the work:—

'Strictly speaking, character does not belong to bodies as such, but only to individuals; by a law of the imagination, however, we are able to, and we habitually do, attribute character to bodies; form a certain idea and impression of them, which we carry about with us in our minds, and which makes the body of which we entertain it an object of our affections. A natural tie of common blood or local boundary binds the nation and tribe: an artificial one gives unity to the guild, corporation, university, and such institutions; but both kinds of bodies are susceptible of a character, can excite affections and form a moral object before our minds. We know well enough, as a matter of fact, that the whole of the body is not really what we suppose it to be in the grand or fascinating image of it that we raise in our minds; but yet we suppose it to be what we picture it. We form a high supposition about it; and according to that supposition we think and speak of the whole society as being noble, virtuous, brave, honourable, and the like. And the reason, why this supposition is made with so much greater feeling in the case of bodies than it is in the case of individuals, appears to be this, that in bodies there is, however partial a one, a ground of fact on which the supposition is reared. Every large body of men, whether united by a natural tie or an artificial, contains men of real virtues and high qualities, who make themselves prominent in the history of the society. The character, then, of these individuals is by a law of the imagination extended to the whole body. There is a principle of *imputation* which enters into the supposition about bodies, which does not enter into that about individuals: the few are noble and good in themselves; and the body to which they belong is allowed a participation in their character by a kind of reflection—it is seen in their light, and shines with a vicarious virtue.'—Pp. 62, 63.

And again:—

'Let us take as an illustration of this mental process with respect to bodies of men, the feeling of the ancient bard with regard to his nation or

tribe. It was the function of the bard to glorify the nation or tribe to which he belonged in verse or song; but, in order to do this, he had himself to form and to produce in his own mind the highest conception of it. And how did he do this? By the process which has been just mentioned. The tribe that, travelling slowly from its northern or eastern birthplace, had traversed half the globe, or that had lived immemorially within the circle of native rocks and mountains, presented to his mind an origin lost in the mystery of remote time. But, as it gradually emerged out of the unknown, it revealed the characteristics of national life in the shape of remarkable men and remarkable events. As his eye ranged over the past, the image of one hero after another rose up before him, who had led his tribe on to conquest, or had headed it against assault, and had signalized himself by heroic courage, ardour, and devotion. Again, event after event rose up before his mind; remarkable occasions and junctures, which had called forth and brought into action the spirit of the whole body, presenting unanimous and inspiring displays of zeal and self-sacrifice, where the people acted as one man, and every one appeared to be a hero. Here, then, was a twofold basis of imputation; he extended the heroism of the great men to the whole body; he extended the heroism of the whole body at particular junctures to the body always. Thus, in proportion to the rapidity with which the men and the events followed each other in his imagination, the average character of his tribe or nation became absorbed in the high specimens of it, its ordinary life in its great events; till, as each succeeding instance confirmed and enforced its predecessor, and the extraordinary manifestations became more and more prominent in his view, to the exclusion of the intervals between them, the whole life of the nation seemed ultimately one heroic energy, and the mind of the bard was raised to the highest pitch of admiration and enthusiasm. His nation became a glorious object,—an impersonation of noble and sublime virtue, which gratified and satisfied the high instincts of his nature. In this state of mind he performed his appropriate function, and communicated his own conception and impression to others. The image he raised lodged itself in every breast, kindling love and enthusiasm; and the nation appeared to every individual member of it a sublime object, to which all devotion was due, and for which the individual ought to live and die. It is true, his moral standard, which was the heroic, was a defective one,—the standard of a rude and uninstructed age, in which the vital flame in human nature wasted itself in action for action sake. But, according to the standard of his day, his nation figured as an impersonation of virtue; which virtue it reflected on all its members. As connected with the body, all the individuals were heroes in his eyes.

‘There is, then, a certain rule of supposition, such as that which has been described; an established and recognised form, which prevails in society, and pervades the intercourse of man with man, which is the foundation of numberless details of behaviour in private and public life, and moulds the whole system of common manners; a form, again, which is applied to bodies of men, to nations, to institutions, and applied with a strong sentiment and feeling. And with this introduction we come to the examination of the language of Scripture respecting that body called the Church, and the individual members of it considered as members of that body.’—Pp. 64, 65.

And Mr. Mozley proceeds to show that this rule has been adopted and sanctioned by Almighty God in speaking of and with His creatures. In the Old Testament, the Israelites are throughout spoken of as a holy nation, a peculiar, a chosen people, as beloved of God, and precious in His sight. Individuals are sinful, the nation is disobedient, still, as a body, they

are designated as holy and righteous; while prophecy, anticipating the brighter radiance which should be shed over the future Church in the Messiah's kingdom, depicts the people as all righteous, and describes an universality of peace and goodness which, it would seem, could only be realized in heaven, or in a millennial heaven on earth:—

‘ But not only is the Jewish people described as the holy people and as collectively the servant of God, and peculiar object of his love, but this very state, which was so much an advance upon that of any other nation in the world, was spoken of as itself only introductory to a still higher and more perfect state, to which the Jewish race was ultimately to rise. The nation at present, though described as “the righteous nation,” and God’s servant, exhibited much alloy, and its service was but a frail and imperfect one, distorted by a headstrong self-will, and debased by constant defections and sins, especially that of idolatry. They departed largely from their own peculiar law and light, and adopted the morals and the religion of the heathen world. And, accordingly, those very pages of prophecy which represent the nation so strongly as the righteous nation, the people of God, and the object of his love, abound with the sternest rebukes and denunciations of its sins, for which they threaten certain punishment—a threat of which the captivities were the fulfilment. The prophets represent the people as on the one side the object of Divine love, so on the other as the object of Divine wrath; not indeed that these two contradictories attached to the nation in the same sense and equally, but that, just as one who is on the whole a good man and a saint, like David, may commit great sins, and bring on himself severe punishment, so the Jewish nation, which was on the whole God’s servant, was still at the same time also a sinner, and the object of Divine vengeance. The Jewish nation was sinful in no other sense than that in which a good man might be: in that sense, however, it was sinful. Up to this point, then, the righteousness of the Jewish people is a mixed, defective, and debased one; and the Jews so far figure in the prophetic books as the holy people in an inferior and imperfect sense. But this state of things was not to last; it was but a preliminary and an early stage in their career, and a brighter day was approaching. The prophet saw in the distance an era, the characteristics of which, if they belonged to any state of things in this world, could only exist in a world much altered and marvellously renovated and improved,—an era when the whole nation would obey consistently and perfectly the law of God, no longer submitting to it as an external yoke, but having it written in their hearts, and following it as their own choice and inclination. This wonderful change was to take place by the influence of a great King who was to rise up amongst them; who, by the force of his character and example, by persuasion, by animating and inspiring exhortations as their Leader and Champion, and, lastly, by a Divine power which belonged to him, would raise in the nation one universal celestial enthusiasm, lodging his image in all breasts and communicating his own virtue to them, kindling in them the love of holiness, and directing the hearts of the people, as the heart of one man, to God as their final rest and object of desire. So great a moral event was to have consequences proportionably great. Such a nation under such a head must convert the whole heathen world to God; for how could such a collective example and the force of such united virtue be resisted? Jerusalem would thus be the head of a converted and renewed world, and all nations would flow into her as their spiritual centre, acknowledging her as their teacher, enlightener, and guide; and repaying the inexpressible benefits received at her hands by humble and grateful deference.

Such, after the preparatory chastisements of captivity and dispersion, would be the ultimate triumph of the holy people, conquering, under their Messiah, all the nations of the earth, not for a selfish and private, but for a spiritual end; riding victoriously over falsehood and vice, overthrowing idolatry, and bringing mankind to the light of virtue and truth. Such a moral renovation of the world again would issue in universal peace and happiness. Man would no longer be the enemy of man; strife and confusion would cease, and all hearts meet in communion and love; the curse would be rescinded; paradise would return, never to be forfeited and lost again; and the world would, under the Messiah and righteous Prince, enjoy a glorious and eternal repose.'—Pp. 68—70.

And again:—

'Now it is evident that this whole prophetic account of the Jewish nation, as a righteous nation, the holy people, the servant of God, of its progress and ultimate glory and triumph, proceeds upon a supposition. The prophet well knew that in matter of fact the whole Jewish nation was not righteous, holy, or God's servant; but that it was an aggregate of individuals, some good men, and others bad, some who were, and others who were not, of the character assigned by him to the whole. He well knew that the whole Jewish nation would not be ultimately triumphant, arrive at a state of final perfection, happiness, and glory, and from this sublime position rule over a renewed and spiritualized world. He knew that only the holy and virtuous portion of the nation could ultimately receive such a reward and such a supremacy; that they alone would be saved, and would be kings and priests for evermore. When he spoke then of the nation as righteous, of the nation as ultimately attaining this triumphant position, he spoke on a supposition. He first assumed the holiness of the nation; then he regarded all the individual members of it as, by virtue of such membership, holy men. The Jew was, as such, a saint in his eyes. He passed over the individual, and only saw the member of a chosen race, one of a divine society, the band of the elect, the Church of the Most High.'—P. 77.

So, in the New Testament, the apostles address those very Christians, whom they yet reprove and warn, many of whom had fallen into grievous sin, and were labouring under great imperfections, as holy and beloved, dead to sin and alive to righteousness, translated into the kingdom of God, sons of God, elect, predestined to eternal life. That is, the qualities which, in a measure, are possessed by some—which ought to be, if God's work were unimpeded, imparted to all, which in His counsels and in their future condition are to be the characteristics of His true people—are attributed to all. All are addressed as ideal Christians, on the rule of supposition. We extract the passage which sums up and justifies the adoption of this rule of language:—

'The language of supposition, indeed, so far from being artificial or insincere, is the natural language of the human heart, the form which true feeling and love instinctively adopt. It is the language which we use to children when we would raise their tender minds to acts of virtue; we exhort them in this form, persuading them by an innocent flattery, that we think, we know them to be good, in order that, with this impression

about themselves, they may do what we bid them as a matter of course, and as if they could not act otherwise. And as it is the earliest, so it is the latest form of exhortation. It is the form used when, with deep convictions, matured powers, and serious aims, the self-respecting mind exhorts itself. The man first thinks and conceives of himself as a virtuous being; one whom a mean action would soil, and an inferior one lower, and then steps to high action upon this impression. A sense of his own moral dignity strengthens him for the moral work, and he advances to the achievement of it on the supposition that he is already of such a character as that particular action indicates and expresses. Thus the ancient bard taught his nation heroism, by supposing it of them, by representing them to themselves as already of that character, and so binding them to support and maintain it. And by the same form of supposition does Scripture teach, addressing itself to mankind in that style which suits alike the child and the man; giving us, like children, the parental pledge that we are good, and telling us, like men, to look on ourselves as such; and so, on the ground that we already are, exhorting us to be, virtuous and holy. Upon this principle proceed the cheering and animating appeals of S. Paul to his Christian converts, when, assuming that they are already dead to the world and risen with Christ, he treats it as impossible that they should sin; will not hear of it, so to say; rejects the very idea as soon as it occurs. This is the mode of exhortation which suits high natures, and all human nature, so far as it is aspiring: and the true teachers of souls know this secret. They know that the power of sin is a depressing thought, a burden on the mind; then they lift it off for the time, they arrange that we start well and unencumbered; they will not say "begin," but "go on as you have begun," because it is cheering to think that the beginning, which is the most difficult part, is over; the impression inspirits us, and gives strength to overcome ensuing difficulties, which become really less, because they seem so; or, rather, they assume the goal already attained, and only say "remain there." Thus a great supposition, a high assumption, is made, and what we have to do is to verify it. In heaven above, within the repository of the Divine mind, and as it were suspended over his head, resides the archetype of every man,—the divine idea in his creation which he was intended ultimately to embody, the designed man. And up to this standard, all who are sincerely bent on fulfilling the will of God and the end of their being are gradually rising, and growing into this sacred, heavenly, and final form. The inspired teacher anticipates this work, and supposes this ultimate state already attained.—Pp. 96, 97.

On this rule of supposition, then, it is (Mr. Mozley says) that Scripture addresses all the baptized as regenerate, and in this sense asserts them to be regenerate.

And as they profess to follow Scripture, it must be in the same sense that the Fathers and our own Church make the same assertion.

Now, before we proceed further, let our readers observe the advantage Mr. Mozley gains by stating the question in his own words. All the baptized are said to be regenerate, in the same way of supposition as, in every ordinary society, all men are said to be as a body what they ought to be. But the real question at issue is—'Does baptism convey regeneration?' Is each one that is baptized with right dispositions thereby

regenerated? We apprehend that if the point were thus stated, Mr. Mozley's whole fabric of analogies would fall to the ground.

It is well that we should at first state distinctly to what extent it may be allowed that the rule of supposition, supposed to be on the whole a principle in the use of language, can legitimately be applied as a rule of interpretation. First, it may be applied when the state or moral condition of bodies of men is spoken of, because man cannot discern the hearts of individuals; and so it is to be observed that the author, in alleging the language of Holy Scripture, scarcely refers to those texts of Scripture which are usually alleged as connecting baptism and regeneration; but on the contrary, considered as an event, adduces various general addresses containing expressions which, he says, are equivalent to 'regenerate,' (meaning by regenerate a certain state,) as 'sons of God,' 'dead to sin,' 'children of light,' &c.; all which it is said, not that Christians ought to be, but that they are. In such general addresses and designations, there is no doubt whatever that the rule of supposition does apply.

Secondly, it applies to the case of baptism itself, thus far, that whereas to the rightly disposed alone, the believing and the penitent, the graces of baptism are promised, they alone would be admitted to baptism; and so the Church, as before baptizing an adult she ascertains, so far as it is possible, that he possesses the qualities to which the promises of baptism are made, so, after he has been baptized, she supposes that he has received them. Accordingly, the Fathers address the newly baptized as really regenerated, and partakers of the fulness of baptismal grace. Why? Because, if they be what they profess, and what the Church supposed them to be, they are regenerate; just as we should address a body of communicants as having really received what, if rightly minded, they have received.

It is on these principles that, thirdly, the prayers and thanksgivings of the Church are composed, it being *supposed* that those who use them, or for whom they are offered, are true Children of the Church, as in the familiar instance of our Burial Service.

But these are very different applications of the principle from that made by Mr. Mozley, because, *first*, according to his view, no one whatever really receives regeneration in his baptism; it is, in all cases whatsoever, matter of supposition. Regeneration, in his theory, is that indefectible state of holiness which the blessed enjoy in heaven, who cannot sin. And this same holiness is by supposition attributed to all Christians on their admission into the society, without its being really conveyed to any. The

Church *supposes* all adults whom she admits to baptism to be thereby regenerated, because she knows that if they had the dispositions they were supposed to have, they would be regenerated. Mr. Mozley says all the baptized are alike *only supposed* to be regenerate, for that any should truly and actually be regenerate is in the nature of things impossible. We cite his own words, at the beginning of the second chapter, referring to what he had proved in the first:—

‘It appeared that regeneration was a final and a heavenly state, supposed by anticipation to take place in this world when the individual was admitted by baptism into the bosom of the Christian Church, into the communion and fellowship of saints. When once a member of the Christian Church, it was supposed that he had entered a pure and heavenly society, and a high and glorious state, from which he could not afterwards fall away; that he was out of reach of farther danger, and was lodged within the walls of the heavenly Jerusalem.’—P. 42.

Again, there is this fatal objection, that Mr. Mozley’s theory of supposition can only hold of classes of men addressed as possessing certain characteristics, whether privileges or graces, and not of the pledged effects of a given rite; and so it must be observed that, in dealing with the statements of Scripture, he omits to refer to two classes of texts which are most essential in the question before us—those in which grace is *promised* as the effect of baptism, and those in which it is *doctrinally* spoken of as its result. The rule of supposition is a rhetorical figure, and it may rightly be alleged as interpreting the language in which bodies of men are addressed, whether exhorted, or reprovèd, or stimulated by the thought of what they are by profession, or ought to be if they had done their part, or might be if they would yield themselves to their Saviour’s will. But rhetorical figures are out of place in doctrinal statements, such as that baptism saves us, or that we were saved by the washing of regeneration, or that persons are born anew of water and the Holy Ghost. What can such words mean—if we consider by whom they are spoken—but that baptism does actually convey the gifts in question by its own virtue, if men be not wanting to themselves? And in *promises*, figures of rhetoric and the rule of supposition are eminently out of place. It does not save a man from the imputation of falseness to plead the courtesies of society, when he promises a reward on the performance of a certain act, and never gives that reward on the act being performed; it avails nothing to say that he meant nothing by the promise; that he only spoke according to the rule of supposition. When our Lord says, ‘He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved;’ or His Apostle, ‘Repent and be baptized, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost,’ surely we must believe that the promise *would be fulfilled*; that He would not hold out the hope of

bread, and then only give us a stone, or promise a fish, and give a serpent.

The case, then, of baptism being the instrument of regeneration, whereby they that receive it rightly have the graces which it visibly signs and seals conveyed to them, is quite distinct from the case of all baptized persons as a body being addressed as regenerate. The latter is rightly explained on the principle of supposition; the former, being the subject of promise and exact statement, cannot be so accounted for.

And this distinction becomes still more evident when we pass from Holy Scripture to the writings of the Fathers; because they are more copious and more varied in their statements than Holy Scripture; and because the progress of time brought out controversies which required more explicit statements to be made respecting the effects of baptism, particularly in relation to the dispositions of the recipients; and these are such as to determine absolutely that persons were held to be regenerated really, not in supposition.

But as Mr. Mozley ignores the promises and the exact statements of the New Testament, dwelling only on its general designations and addresses, so does he avoid all the explicit and determinate statements of the Fathers of the Church.

He would first of all take those passages of Scripture only which speak of Christians as a body: these he would interpret by the rule of supposition, and thereby would conclude the point, that 'all the baptized are regenerate,' was only to be understood hypothetically. As, then, he says the Scriptural language must be explained on the rule of supposition, so must that of the Fathers; thus deciding the point antecedently to any examination of that language. He says:—

'I will make the general remark that the language of the Fathers on this subject is not much more than an expansion or enlarged repetition of that of Scripture. Indeed, to suppose that the Fathers and early writers and teachers of the Church should substantially depart from the language of Scripture, especially on so important a subject, would be a supposition fatal to their authority. But they do not. Their language is such as we should naturally expect would rise upon such a type. The language of Scripture is the root and stock upon which that whole rich, varied, and adorned growth of centuries is formed; and, when the sense of Scripture is ascertained, it becomes at once a key to the language of the Fathers.' —P. 20.

But it may so happen that the language of the Fathers may refuse to submit to the theory of supposition. It may be so explicit, so evidently real, so determined in its meaning by contexts and controversies, that it cannot be understood in any such way. And as Mr. Mozley professes to set forth the *primitive doctrine* of Baptismal Regeneration, the teaching of the primitive

writers is the very point to be ascertained—we are really only concerned with the *fact*; we have only to ascertain what the primitive writers said, and by the ordinary principles of interpretation to determine what they meant.

Now that the Fathers themselves have no notion of their language being to be so interpreted, that they uniformly speak as if what they said was true and real, ought of itself, considering the extent and copiousness of their writings, to be sufficient to determine the question. That cannot well be the primitive doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration which was absolutely unknown and unthought of by the primitive teachers. Mr. Mozley was conscious of this difficulty, and meets it thus:—

‘Will it be objected that the Fathers do not *say*, when they use this language, that they use it hypothetically? such an objection proceeds on a forgetfulness of what the form of supposition is. If we suppose, according to common etiquette, in public or social life, a man, of whom we know nothing, to be good and upright, and address him as such, do we intimate to him at the same time that this is a supposition on our part, and perhaps not a true one? Such an intimation, it is evident, would undo the very form of supposition, and deprive it of all its meaning, as a rule of courtesy. Thus in poetry again: does the bard, when he sings the praises of his nation, and represent them all as heroes, *say* that it is a supposition which he is making? No; he would by doing so neutralise it. He puts his supposition to his own mind as a fact, and will not see, while he makes it, any fact opposed to it. It is, in short, of the very nature of such suppositions as we are speaking of, that they are stated as facts, not *as* suppositions. Accordingly, this language, as employed in prophecy and the New Testament, is in *form* literal; and so it is as employed by the Fathers. Regeneration and the other heavenly and perfect attributes ascribed by them to all baptized persons, are ascribed in the form of literal statement. The supposition, if made at all, could not be made in any other way.’—Pp. 90, 91.

The weakness of all this is patent. The Fathers are not engaged in one continuous act of courtesy, nor are their writings an epic poem. They are like other men in common life, who say what they think, and are compelled, by the cross-examination of controversy, to give evidence as precise as that of a witness at a trial. But Mr. Mozley proceeds:—

‘And if the question be asked, whether the Fathers were themselves always conscious, while they were using this language, that they were using it hypothetically, the answer is, that it is not necessary to the present argument to suppose that they always were. Strong representations, however in the nature of the case hypothetically made, occupy for the time the whole mind of the representer, to the exclusion of opposing facts; and they have only the image which they raise, or the fact of their own creation, before their minds. The human mind is remarkably constituted with respect to the consciousness of its own processes and acts; and is sometimes in one sense conscious of them, in another sense not. Imagine one of the ancient Fathers asserting regeneration, perfection, glory, salvation of the whole baptized body: while he makes the assertion he has only the perfected Church before his mind, not the earthly and mixed one; the Church only as it was designed to be, not as it is. His language is of *such* a Church

literally true, and therefore he may appear to himself at the time to be using such language literally. But ask him, when he has the fact of the mixed or earthly Church distinctly before him, whether he used such language literally of this body, and he would, as a rational man, see that he did not, and that he spoke by supposition and anticipation. And we shall see further on that he himself confesses that he does so.—Pp. 91, 92.

On this last point the issue really turns. We can find no such confession. It will be observed how quietly Mr. Mozley passes from the real question, 'Is the statement that Baptism conveys regeneration one of supposition?' to that of the attributing holiness and goodness to the Church or whole body of Christians. But since modern writers, especially those who write on the history of doctrines, profess to be wiser than the Fathers themselves, and to tell them what they really meant, though they were not conscious of it themselves, it may be necessary to show that the Fathers not only do not say, but that they could not possibly have held, that persons were 'regenerate' only in supposition.

And here one important portion of Mr. Mozley's work is itself the best refutation of his own theory; that portion in which he shows that regeneration, in the view of the ancient Fathers, involved the idea of actual holiness. Mr. Mozley most earnestly argues from the Fathers that regeneration, as they understood it, included not only the power of becoming good, but the actual being good; and to prove this point he alleges their own language, from which, if words mean anything, we must infer that they regarded regeneration as a real change, not a mere supposition. He says:—

'But the sense in which the Fathers understand regeneration is principally seen through the medium of their doctrine of baptism, or their account of the nature and character of the baptismal state; for the Fathers undoubtedly, whether hypothetically or literally, regard baptism as conveying regeneration; and therefore, whatever they assert of the baptismal, they assert of the regenerate state.

'Now, in describing the baptismal state, the Fathers use a whole class of expressions, of a kind obviously inapplicable to the mere capacity for, and applicable only to the actual state of, holiness and goodness. So that, making every allowance for the disposition of writers to exaggeration and over-high colouring, we cannot possibly suppose that they could have used such language of a state which was no better than an indeterminate and neutral one, common to good and bad alike. "We descend into the water," says S. Barnabas, "full of sins and defilement, and come up again bringing forth in our hearts the fruit of a holy fear and hope." "We descend into the water," says Hermas, "consigned to death, and come up assigned to life." Baptism is a "cleansing," a "quickening," a "reformation," "the attainment of eternal life," says Tertullian. "Come," says Hippolytus, "to the immortality of baptism, come to freedom from slavery, to a kingdom from tyranny, to incorruption from corruption." "Being baptized we are enlightened," says S. Clement of Alexandria, "being enlight-

ened we are adopted sons, being adopted sons we are made perfect, being made perfect we are rendered immortal." "Baptism," says Optatus, "is the life of virtues, the death of crimes, the obtaining of the heavenly kingdom, the port of innocence, and the shipwreck of sins." "It is," says S. Cyril of Jerusalem, "the ransom of captives, the remission of offences, the death of sin, the regeneration of the soul, the garment of light, the holy seal indissoluble, the chariot of heaven, the luxury of Paradise, the attainment of the kingdom, and the gift of adoption." And he thus addresses the baptized person:—"Thou art transplanted among the invisible olive-trees, grafted from the wild to the fruitful, from sins to righteousness, from pollution to purity. . . . Dead in sins thou wentest down, quickened in righteousness thou comest up. . . For, having been baptized unto Christ, and put on Christ, thou hast been made conformable to the Son of God, thou art predestinated to the adoption of a son, thou partakest of the fashion of Christ's glorious body, thou partakest of Christ, thou art properly called Christ; and God said, 'Touch not my Christ, my anointed,' of thee." Baptism, according to Jerome, imparts the new heart and the new spirit spoken of by David and Ezekiel. "The spirit deifies me in baptism," says S. Gregory Nazianzen; "I become the image of God, I am clothed with Christ, I am changed into Christ at baptism." "In the sacrament of baptism," says S. Ambrose, "thou puttest off the old, and puttest on the new-born man. . . Thou art dead to the world and risen to God, dead to sin and raised up to life eternal." "Blessed be God, who alone doeth wonders," says S. Chrysostom, "who made all things, and changeth all. Behold! they enjoy the calm of freedom who a little before were held captives; they are denizens of the Church who were wandering in error, and they have the lot of righteousness who were in the confusion of sin. For they are not only free, but holy; not only holy, but righteous; not righteous only, but sons; not sons only, but heirs; not heirs only, but brethren of Christ; not brethren of Christ only, but co-heirs; not only co-heirs, but members; not members only, but a temple; not a temple only, but instruments of His spirit." "Dost thou," says S. Basil, "invited to ascend to heaven by water and the spirit, as Elias did by fire, not hasten to the call? O wonder! thou art renewed, yet not dissolved; re-cast, yet not broken; cured, yet not pained, and thou thinkest it no gain!"—Pp. 22—24.

Now that it was regeneration, in that sense in which it was the effect of baptism, which was thus a real and actual change, is manifest from their account of baptism and its effects, the allowed difficulty and mysteriousness of it, the arguments and controversies respecting it, and the high esteem in which it was held.

When Origen, for example, speaks of the grounds for the baptism of infants—"that tradition which (he says) the Church had received from the Apostles"—it is 'because there is in all (by birth) the defilement of sin, which must be washed away by 'water and the Spirit.' (Hom. in Rom. v. Opp. iv. p. 65.) 'If the reason be asked why infants should be baptized, as is the practice of the Church, when baptism is given for the remission of sins, seeing that the *grace of baptism would seem to be superfluous* if there were in infants nothing that needed remission and 'forgiveness,' &c. (Hom. in Levit. viii. Opp. ii. p. 230)—whereas,

on Mr. Mozley's view, the grace of baptism is always superfluous—or again, 'How can there be any ground for baptizing infants except upon that view, that "No one is clean from defilement, though his life on earth be but for a day?" and because the defilement of birth is put away by the sacrament of baptism, therefore children also are baptized; for "Except one be born again of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven:"' surely this implies a real and actual change wrought by baptism even in infants; and this is but a specimen of a class of passages, many of which are infinitely more decided.

Again, Tertullian (to take but one instance of the kind) commences his tract *On Baptism* with the question, 'How can so simple a thing as the washing of water produce so great an effect upon the soul?' He regards it, as it was regarded by all, as a difficulty, an inscrutable mystery; and he answers the objection grounded on it by considering the omnipotence of God, not by saying that the alleged effect was in supposition only. It would have been very easy, on Mr. Mozley's theory, if Tertullian had had any inkling of 'the Primitive Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration,' to have said, 'Oh, the change we speak of, for which we pray before we go down into the water, and give thanks after we have come up from it, is all a supposition; it is a mere symbolizing of what the true elect are ultimately to be. Regeneration, if rightly understood, is a final and heavenly state, supposed by anticipation to take place in this world, when the individual is admitted by baptism into the bosom of the Christian Church.' But Tertullian, knowing nothing of all this, and supposing (as they whom he was answering, and indeed all Christians, it would seem, then did) that the change was real, writes a treatise on the subject which, on Mr. Mozley's view, would be perfectly superfluous. That the effect of baptism is a mystery goes wholly on the view that it is real. So, when the same writer recommended delay in the baptism of children, it was clearly because he believed in its real effects. On the rule of supposition there could be no reason for delay.

Can any one read S. Cyprian's account of the effect of baptism on himself, and not see that it was a real thing, an actual and entire change? And does not Cyprian speak of what he himself experienced as the proper effect of baptism, which would be bestowed on all who received the sacrament with like faith and repentance?

Or how else can we understand S. Cyril of Jerusalem, whose general statements Mr. Mozley cites, in addressing those that are about to be baptized, lays down, in precise terms, that if they come hypocritically they receive nothing, but if they come in sincere faith and penitence, they will all certainly receive

the forgiveness of their sins; still that the degree to which they would receive the influences of the Holy Spirit would depend on their preparation of heart? He says: 'If any has a secret hypocrisy, the Lord rejects that man as unfit for His service: but if He find a man worthy, to him He gives grace readily.' And again, speaking of the sincere: 'Remission of sins is given equally to all: but the communication of the Holy Ghost is bestowed according to each man's faith. If thou hast laboured little, thou shalt receive little: but if thou hast wrought much, ample is the reward.'

Of the unreality and hypothetical character of the gifts, we hear nothing. The subject is treated as a real, practical thing, a matter of common sense, in which the promises of God will really be fulfilled to those who seek Him according to His will, and not to others.

Again, if there had been even the slightest notion of Mr. Mozley's rule of supposition, it must have come out when S. Augustine was discussing the effect of baptism when received insincerely, or administered by heretics. Such baptism is not to be repeated. Why not? Because in those instances the proper effects of baptism were given in the administration of the sacrament, but sealed up, and suspended, as it were, until faith and penitence came to bring forth their full influence. Surely here was an opportunity to bring in the doctrine of supposition, because here was a case in which the effects of baptism were not at the time really enjoyed by the baptized person. But the very exception proves that if there had been the right dispositions, and the sacrament had been administered in the Catholic Church, the graces would have been given not in supposition, but so as really and actually to be enjoyed by the baptized person.

If, indeed, there be any doctrine, the primitive understanding of which has been thoroughly laid open and sifted by controversy, it is that of the effects of baptism, as it was held by the Church in the days of S. Augustine, and expounded by that father himself. And the one father, whose views are important in Mr. Mozley's argument, is S. Augustine. The two great controversies of his life were the Donatist and the Pelagian, and the doctrine of baptism was a cardinal point in each. In the first, the question was as to the effect of baptism when administered out of the pale of the Church; and in this controversy, as we have said, if the gift of regeneration in supposition only had been held by any persons at that time, it must have been brought out, because the very distinction drawn between heretical and Catholic baptism was, that the former gave the graces sealed up, the latter in actual and real possession; and, further, because

the question leads S. Augustine to discuss very fully the case of persons baptized without faith and repentance, who do not receive those graces, which, if they had believed and repented, they would have received; whereas, on Mr. Mozley's view, there is nothing really received by any, but is all an unreality. Let any one read S. Augustine's work, '*De Baptismo*,' and he must see that that Father believed the effects of baptism to be real; and that, if they be only in supposition, the whole controversy is a sham; and had S. Augustine and the Donatist Bishops, when they were assembled in conference, held Mr. Mozley's view, they could scarcely have kept from laughing, any more than the Roman augurs, when they met, at the ridiculous farce they were enacting.

In the Pelagian controversy, the Baptism of infants, as every one knows, was a crucial argument. 'Why are infants baptized for the remission of sins, if they have no sins to be forgiven?' was the unanswerable question of the Catholics; and the hesitation, and difficulties, and tergiversation of the Pelagians, show the straits to which they were reduced. It would have been easy to answer, on Mr. Mozley's theory, that it was all done in the way of supposition. It were easy to allege, as the Pelagians did allege, that it was done in anticipation of future sins, or in an edifying conformity with forms intended for adults, or, almost in Mr. Mozley's own words, that 'the form of baptism was an unreal thing, in which the forgiveness of sins was indeed spoken of and appeared to be conveyed, but was not really given at all,—' than which,' says S. Augustine, seeming unable to find words to express his abhorrence of such a notion, 'NOTHING MORE EXECRABLE AND DETESTABLE CAN BE SAID OR THOUGHT.' We give the passage where he treats of this point in his own words, and we do most seriously recommend to Mr. Mozley's study the sentiments of this great Doctor, whose views he professes to exhibit, and whom he so grossly misrepresents. S. Augustine would not knowingly have admitted a person as sponsor at baptism, who did not believe that the gifts which the Church ritual supposed to be conveyed were actually and really conveyed by it:—

'Suppose' (he says) 'that one of them was to bring a little one to be baptized by me, what effect has my exorcism on the child, if he be not held under the servitude of the devil? At any rate (the Pelagian) himself would have to answer me on behalf of that same child which he bears, because the child cannot answer for itself. How, then, will he say that the child renounces the devil, when he has no part in him? how that he is turned to God, from whom he had never been turned away? that he believes, among the other articles of the faith, the remission of sins, which is not (in his view) given to him at all? For my own part, if I thought that the man held doctrines opposed to these truths, I would not even allow him to come in with the child to the sacraments; but for himself, I know not, what face he

would show towards man, what mind towards God, in this action, nor do I wish to say anything more severe. Some of them, indeed, have already seen that *nothing more execrable or detestable can be said or thought, than that when the form of baptism is imparted to infants, it is unreal or fallacious, in that remission of sins is spoken of and appears to be given, and yet is not at all effected.*'¹

Yet this is the writer whose views Mr. Mozley undertakes especially, if not exclusively, to expound, of whom he says:—

'If one father has, in the theological movement of the last twenty years, been quoted and appealed to more than another, it is S. Augustine. Yet I must be pardoned if I say that this constant appeal to his authority has not involved much apparent acquaintance with his system of doctrine. By his system of doctrine I mean that great system of which he was the first expounder in the Church, and which will always be connected with his name. S. Augustine's typical interpretations of Scripture, his devotional writings, and other portions of his works not connected with his characteristic teaching, have been read and quoted; but that great doctrine which constitutes his peculiarity as a teacher and crowned his theological career, which fixed him alike in the chair of mediæval and Protestant theology, and to the inculcation of which the principal energies of his life, as a thinker and writer, were devoted, has hardly been looked into. With the exception of a faint allusion to it here and there, Augustinianism has been left untouched, and persons have been content with the vaguest ideas of what Augustine said or did not say, on what was to him the most important and absorbing question of his whole theological life. With a general impression that he taught predestination, nobody appears to have examined at all the particulars of his doctrine, to have compared his statements, elicited his grounds, or made out his system and *rationale*. This was not, of course, to *know* S. Augustine, for persons cannot be correctly said to know an author if they have not made themselves acquainted with his distinctive and characteristic teaching. But want of acquaintance with S. Augustine was not of itself, perhaps, a matter of so much consequence. What made it of consequence was, that he was often quoted as a witness to a particular doctrine, to which his doctrine of predestination bore an important relation—a relation intimately affecting the mode and sense in which he held the former doctrine;—I refer to the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. It ought to have been ascertained what his doctrine of predestination was, before he was brought forward so confidently as a witness to a doctrine of baptismal regeneration.'—Pp. ix. x.

What S. Augustine's doctrine of regeneration in relation to predestination was, we shall see presently. That Mr. Mozley utterly misapprehends both the one and the other is quite

¹ Veilem aliquis istorum, qui contraria sapiunt, mihi baptizandum parvulum afferret. Quid in illo agit exorcismus meus, si in familia diaboli non tenetur? Ipse certe mihi fuerat responsurus pro eodem parvulo quem gestaret, quia pro se ille respondere non posset. Quomodo ergo dicturus erat eum renuntiare diabolo, cujus in eo nihil esset? Quomodo converti ad Deum, a quo non esset aversus? credere inter cætera remissionem peccatorum, quæ illi nulla tribueretur? Ego quidem si contra hæc eum sentire existimarem, nec ad Sacramenta cum parvulo intrare permetterem: ipse autem in hoc *qua fronte ad homines, qua mente ad Deum se ferret, ignoro*; nec volo aliquid gravius dicere. *Falsam igitur vel fallacem tradi parvulis Baptismatis formam in qua sonaret atque agi videretur, et tamen nulla fieret remissio peccatorum, viderunt aliqui eorum nihil execrabilius ac detestabilius dici posse atque sentiri.*—De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, lib. i. c. 34, § 63.

certain. But the cause also is clear. Mr. Mozley's great abilities have not been subordinated to facts. He has not been content with S. Augustine's own account of his own opinions; he thought the holy Father of Hippo inconsistent, and only half-enlightened. He undertook, in his own words, to '*elicit his grounds*,' and to '*make out his system and rationale*.' It is S. Augustine's doctrine developed, the supposed 'grounds' of his views drawn out, the latent system unfolded, and the *rationale* of it 'made out;' it is logic applied to some only of S. Augustine's principles, carrying these out to their furthest results, and throwing aside all that seemed inconsistent with them. S. Augustine held views on regeneration, and views on predestination; Mr. Mozley would explain away the former, and develop so as to corrupt the latter. He theorises on S. Augustine, and erects a logical edifice, very philosophical, very consistent, but neither primitive nor true.

But though it may be shown most certainly that the primitive Fathers knew nothing of a regeneration by supposition, it is necessary to consider what the grounds are on which Mr. Mozley adopts this theory. They are of two classes. The one, almost entirely independent of predestinarian questions, rests on the nature of regeneration itself, the descriptions of the condition of the regenerate in Holy Scripture and the Fathers, the ideas involved in it as they appear in the writings of the Fathers, in the Services for Baptism, in the doctrines of the Primitive Church about Baptism. All these, in Mr. Mozley's view, represent regeneration to be so high and holy a thing, that it must be literally understood of the state of the blessed in heaven, and can only be associated with baptism in the way of supposition, each baptized person being *supposed* to be endowed with those glorious qualities which are the ultimate and final perfection of a few, the few whose outward calling is realized, and perfected by their final perseverance. This ground, it will be seen, may be taken without reference to the doctrine of predestination.

The second ground is based upon that doctrine. Let it be as Mr. Mozley states it, that sufficient grace is really given only to a few of the baptized; and it follows that when the Church says that all the baptized are regenerate, it can only be in name and in supposition, through their outward admission into the visible Church, whilst in reality they have no part or lot in this matter.

We will examine these grounds. But first, we must state that Mr. Mozley appears to us to treat the whole subject in an unreal way: he alleges the doctrines and expressions of the Fathers; their definitions of regeneration, and grace, and predestination, in a mere eristic, dialectical tone—alleging one

doctrine, or supposed doctrine, and its logical results, for the sake of overthrowing another doctrine, and thus exaggerating the views he puts forth, and stating them much more strongly than has ever been done by those who really believed and advocated them.

For instance, he maintains most strongly that Holy Scripture and the Church uniformly teach that all the baptized are regenerate, and notices only in a note, on the first page of the preface, and practically neglects, in the process of his argument, the fact that the Church limits the beneficial effects of baptism in adults to those who receive it in faith and repentance.

He exalts to the utmost the greatness of the gift of regeneration, exaggerating the holiness implied in it to a height as yet unheard of, not in order to show how great the gift bestowed in baptism is, but in order to prove that it is so great a gift that it can only be given in the way of supposition; *i. e.* not be given really at all.

He carries out the doctrines of Calvinism to an extent at present practically almost unknown among us, so as to maintain that no grace is given to any one except those who shall finally persevere; that God would not give anything, unless He gave everything; and that salvation nowise depends upon ourselves. And why? Apparently not so much from having any practical belief of all this, as in order to use it as a basis from which to contravene the literal understanding of the proposition that all the baptized are regenerate.

The difficulty of dealing with Mr. Mozley's work is, that the views he maintains are so utterly inconsistent with facts, and apparently so self-contradictory, that one does not know how to argue upon them. It is very much like arguing on the principles of necessity, or about the theories of Bishop Berkeley. We will do it as well and as fairly as we can.

The first ground, then, on which Mr. Mozley adopts the theory of regeneration being given in baptism only in name and supposition is, that the nature of regeneration is such that it cannot be given in any other sense than this.

And in order to show this, he puts forth a view of the nature of regeneration, which we believe to be absolutely new and unheard of among Christian divines. Regeneration, according to Mr. Mozley, is the final, perfect, and indefectible state of holiness, that of the saints in heaven. It is only in a lower and incorrect sense that it is applied to any person on earth; and when so applied, it indicates a state of settled goodness corresponding to this. When connected with baptism, the word is *used* in its highest sense, but applied only in the way of supposition. Thus we have three uses of the word: (*a*) all the

baptized are *called* regenerate in the way of supposition, without being really regenerate at all; (b) Christians who have attained to a settled state of holiness are called regenerate really, but in a lower and incorrect sense of the word; (c) the blessed in heaven are alone really and truly regenerate.

It will be seen from this, that Mr. Mozley simply reverses what has been the uniform, as it is also the primitive and Scriptural, use of the word. Regeneration or new birth has hitherto been understood to mean the beginning of the proper Christian life, that is, of the life of grace in the soul,—notwithstanding there may have been some previous influences of the Divine Spirit on the heart preparing and predisposing it for this new birth, (in which view, and relatively to which preparation in adults, regeneration, it is true, is a crowning and final thing.) They in whom the change thus wrought has been carried out to its proper effects, are in a further sense called regenerate; and so, by a derived use, the term expresses the actual condition of those who are living in faith and love—the true children of God. What Mr. Mozley makes the proper sense, is one in which the word is never used at all. There is, indeed, one place in Holy Scripture in which the word ‘regeneration’ is applied to the future state—‘In the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of His glory,’ &c. (St. Matt. xviii.) But in this place the word does not refer so much to the regeneration or new birth of individuals, as to the new birth, as it were, of creation—when there shall be a renewal of all things,—‘a new heaven and a new earth,’—when, in this sense, ‘old things have passed away, and all things have become new.’

The process by which one may come to this view of the nature of regeneration, considered as a state or condition, is by dwelling on the thought of the holiness of the regenerate, considered in its fullest development and most perfect form. If we would arrive at a just idea of the nature of any thing, we consider it in its best state and its highest perfection. If we would ascertain what man’s nature properly is—physical, moral, or intellectual—we consider it not in its incipient, imperfect, stunted, or distorted specimens, but in its highest and finest condition. So it is if one would ascertain the proper idea of the regenerate nature considered as such—one would contemplate the ripest fruits of the Spirit, and the most finished specimens of holiness. Regeneration, in the sense in which Mr. Mozley uses the word, is the name of the fully perfected condition of those that have been regenerated. But though the word ‘regenerate’ may be used in a sense corresponding to this (as it is popularly used to indicate the character of a good and holy man, he being one in whom his regeneration, or new birth, has

had its perfect work), we believe that the word regeneration must mean an act, not a state or condition. Indeed, in its proper etymological sense, and in the languages in which the Fathers wrote, the word, be it *regeneratio* or *ἀναγεννησις*, could not be so applied. Mr. Mozley's use of the word is wholly his own. It is, of course, evident that to discuss the question, whether in this sense regeneration takes place in baptism, is a mere waste of time.

According to this view, Mr. Mozley's favourite formula is, 'all the baptized are regenerate.' He uniformly avoids the expression, 'all that are baptized, being rightly disposed, are thereby regenerated;' and going upon that formula, he repeats again and again, as an argument absolutely decisive of the question, 'all the baptized are regenerate; but they are evidently not all good and holy persons; therefore they are only called regenerate in the way of supposition.'

He disposes of that sense of the word in which it has hitherto been unvaryingly used in the Christian Church, in the following passage:—

'Again, I will caution the reader against a particular use which is sometimes made of the term birth, in the phrase "born again," which will lead him in a wrong direction as to the meaning of this phrase. Birth is sometimes regarded in this phrase, as if it were used in tacit distinction to subsequent growth; and the distinction between birth and growth thus assumed is turned into a distinction between the faculty and the state of goodness; the birth, as the beginning, standing for the *faculty*, and the subsequent growth and life, to which it is supposed to be contrasted, for the *state* of goodness. The result of this distinction is, that regeneration or the new birth is regarded as a capacity for holiness, instead of holiness itself. But, first, were this distinction between birth and subsequent growth and maturity intended in the phrase, it would not be the same distinction as that of the faculty and the state, but a very different one. For growth follows inevitably upon birth, the proper circumstances permitting: the plant grows to be a tree, the child to be a man, necessarily; but the state of goodness does not at all necessarily follow upon the faculty. But the distinction is, to begin with, untrue, and is not designed in the phrase. In the phrase "born of God," and "born again," though birth is commencing life, the stress is laid evidently not on the commencement, but on the life; it is a new life which is contrasted with an old one, not one part of the new life which is contrasted with another part. The stress is not upon the birth, but upon the peculiar kind of birth,—that it is a second one, and a Divine one. Nor, indeed, is "born" or "birth" the word always used in this class of expressions; "*son* of God" being used as often, and the term "son" being plainly independent of any distinction of this kind.'—Pp. 4, 5.

What Mr. Mozley means by contrasting a 'mere faculty of goodness' with actual goodness will be seen shortly. But we must place the author's views before our readers in his own words. In the first chapter of his work he undertakes to establish these four propositions:—

' I. Regeneration implies in the primitive sense real and actual goodness, in distinction to a capacity for it.

' II. Regeneration implies final goodness, as distinguished from goodness for the time being.

' III. Regeneration is an imparted as distinguished from an acquired goodness.

' IV. Regeneration is not the less real and actual goodness because it is imparted.'—Pp. 2, 3.

About the last two propositions we need raise no questions. The first we admit with a qualification; the second we quite deny.

It will be observed that, in the first proposition, Mr. Mozley contrasts 'regeneration as implying real and actual goodness,' with 'a capacity for it;' and this contrast pervades his work. At the very opening he sets forth an alternative, which he maintains to be the only possible alternative, in these words:—

' It must be observed, then, to begin with, that the alternative with respect to regeneration lies between two senses, that of actual goodness, and that of a grace enabling to be good. By some regeneration is regarded as a new state of spiritual power or capacity, and no more; and, so understood, it does not include actual goodness and holiness in its meaning at all, but is a state which the most wicked as well as the best of men may be in alike. We see men in common life endowed by nature with greater powers of mind than others, with finer affections, with a quicker sense, with deeper tastes, and with a whole temperament which would have enabled them, had they chosen to direct it to such an end, to have attained a higher goodness than the average of men can attain to, but who, in the absence of such a moral use of their gifts, are by no means better than ordinary men, but very often worse, and sometimes, indeed, the worst of men. In the same way the possession of the highest spiritual powers and capacities is wholly distinct from spirituality in fact, and in forming our idea of the state of regeneration in this sense, we must wholly put the idea of actual goodness aside; for in whatever language we may exalt this state, and however incomprehensible we may assert it to be, and whatever gifts and powers we may include in it, and however mysterious and sublime we may suppose these to be,—it is plain that, so long as we regard regeneration as a state of spiritual capacity simply, or contemplate the gifts and powers contained in it, as depending for their fruit upon a contingent will, regeneration does not imply any actual goodness. The height, or extent, or mysteriousness of the spiritual capacity does not make it differ in the least from the commonest moral one in this respect, that the possession of it is no pledge for the use of it, and is therefore consistent with the greatest actual wickedness in the possessor. Regeneration is in this sense no more than a neutral and indeterminate state common to good and bad alike'—Pp. 1, 2.

On this alternative Mr. Mozley's argument to a great degree depends; for if he can show that Scripture or the Fathers hold regeneration to involve more than this 'mere capacity,' as here described, or to imply any measure of actual goodness, he forthwith infers the other alternative, that it implies settled and final goodness. For example:—

'S. Peter speaks of the effects of the new birth, as being "a lively hope, and an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away," thus identifying the new birth with an actual state of goodness and holiness, together with all its hopes and prospects. On the other hand, a mere power of leading a holy life is never called in Scripture a new birth, nor are men ever supposed to be the sons of God because they simply have the capacity for attaining a high and spiritual character. If it were so, it is obvious that our Lord's whole argument with the Jews would fall to the ground. The Jews that persecuted, calumniated, and killed our Lord, would be just as much the sons of God as those who believed in Him and became His disciples. And, in the same way, those that were not led by the Spirit of God would be just as truly the sons of God as those who were; and those who had not faith would as really be the children of God as those who had.'—Pp. 6, 7.

The utter fallacy of this alternative we shall trust to show. Suffice it now to say that (as Mr. Mozley states) the schoolmen, some at least of the Reformers, and some (as he himself admits) at the present day, hold that regeneration implies more than a mere capacity for goodness and holiness; that it implies the actual imparting of those graces, in a manner and degree, as we conceive, proportioned to the capacity of the subject, with a tendency as well as a power for their growth and full development; that regeneration involves actual imparted grace, and the gradual development of the fruits of grace, although that grace and goodness be not necessarily either permanent or final. Mr. Mozley's statement, that persons hold that a man living in allowed wickedness is regenerate, is a play on words.

We have said that Mr. Mozley's arguments from Scripture are derived, not from the use of the words 'born again,' &c., when connected with baptism, but from all those expressions which describe the perfect Christian; and they are full of extraordinary and groundless assumptions, such as these:—

'To be a son of God means, in Scripture, not only to be good, but to be necessarily and finally good. That which belongs to sonship in general only metaphorically, belongs legitimately to sonship of God; for God is good by nature; and therefore a son of God, in inheriting the nature, inherits properly and really the goodness of his Father. And this involves a peculiarity in the goodness itself which is inherited; for if God is good by nature, or necessarily, that goodness which a son of God inherits from his Father is a perfect and necessary goodness. Accordingly S. John describes sonship, or being born of God, as involving a perfect and necessary goodness in the creature. Our Lord is, indeed, the only Son of God by nature; and therefore He is the only Son of God who derives naturally from the Father a necessary goodness. The creature, however, is represented in Scripture as receiving, by a wonderful act of Divine condescension and mercy, a sonship of adoption analogous to the natural sonship of the true and only Son; and this sonship of adoption includes a perfect and necessary goodness upon the basis of adoption, as the natural sonship includes it upon the basis of nature.'—P. 7.

And again:—

'To be born of God, then, or to be regenerate, means in Scripture to be perfectly and necessarily good; it is as being "partakers of the Divine

nature" by adoption, to share, by virtue of such adoption, the Divine immutable goodness.—P. 8.

'The goodness of the regenerate man, considered as being born of God, was shown to be a perfect and unchangeable goodness; and his goodness is the same, considered as being born again. For this is implied, in the first place, in the very notion of a new birth, or departure from one life and entrance into another. For death is not only departure from life, but final departure. A man dies once for all, when he dies: a death unto sin, then, is not only a separation from sin, but a final separation; and a final separation from sin is perfection. In the next place, a second or future life differs from the present one not only as being another life, but as being a life of another kind,—as being an eternal and fixed state of existence succeeding a temporary and changeable one. The goodness, therefore, of that second life has the constancy and fixedness of the life. Just as S. John therefore describes the man "born of God" as one who "cannot sin," so S. Paul describes the man "born again" as "dead to sin," "free from sin," and "become the slave of righteousness." That is, he describes him, as S. John does, as unable to sin.—P. 15.

And the conclusion is thus expressed:—

'But the conclusion to which I wish to draw attention *now*, and which I next draw from this form of exhortation, is that it implies not only actual, but final and indefectible goodness, in the Christian. For if the Christian is unable to sin, he is finally and indefectibly good.

'Regeneration, then, is, in the Scriptural sense of the word, final goodness. And as such it is a wholly future or a present state of the Christian according to the sense in which final is understood. If final be understood literally, regeneration does not belong to this life, for the actual final state is future. Regeneration, then, in the correct and literal sense, is a future and a heavenly state of goodness, after trial is passed and all alloy removed. It will only take place when we shall be made the children of God, being the children of the resurrection.—Pp. 17, 18.

'In another and lower sense, however, regeneration may be regarded as taking place in this life. For the final state of the moral being may be allowed to act retrospectively, and appropriate him from a previous and introductory stage; in which case regeneration belongs to this life, and is a present fruit of the Gospel dispensation. Because the final state has clearly its beginning in this world, the goodness of the perfected creature is the same goodness in substance with that which he had in this life before he was perfected; so long as he is the same being, it is the same goodness in both states, only in the one mature, in the other incipient. But this, though an allowable, is a secondary and incorrect sense of regeneration. For the essential characteristic of the regenerate state is not the substance but the mode of goodness,—the mode of its existence in the soul, which in the regenerate being is constant, eternal and divine, as distinguished from being changeable and interrupted, which it must always be in this world.—P. 18.

We have here exhibited Mr. Mozley's view, and given specimens of the arguments by which he supports it, in his own words. It will be seen that, as we have said, he chooses to apply the term regeneration to the full development of the spiritual nature, the ultimate perfection of those gifts of grace the first bestowal of which has hitherto been called regeneration; and that if we wish to know—which is the real question

—whether baptism conveys to the rightly-disposed recipient any spiritual benefit, and what that spiritual benefit is, we must escape from the ambiguities of language by which Mr. Mozley has thrown a mistiness over the whole subject.

When Mr. Mozley proceeds to consider the doctrines of the Fathers, there is a like avoiding of everything definite and exact. He omits all their precise statements of the effects of baptism, and gives us instead their most rhetorical pictures of the blessedness of the baptized. In the work itself, and in the preface, Mr. Mozley selects the very strongest extracts from the ancients that occur in Dr. Pusey's work on Baptism, and then argues from them that regeneration must be in the way of supposition.

He says:—

‘I cannot but express my opinion that had the very work, which most contributed to form the general feeling which brought on the Gorham contest, been read with due accuracy of thought, and a sufficient exertion of reason in the reading of it, this whole contest, with all the trouble and excitement, might have been saved. Dr. Pusey's tract on baptism made a deep and permanent impression by its faithful representation of the baptismal or regenerate state, as described by the Fathers. But so far from the representation of the baptismal or regenerate state, given in this tract, being at all at variance with the Gorham judgment, it appears to me strongly to support and confirm—I might almost say, *anticipate* it.

‘The regenerate or baptismal state is described in this tract in the words of S. Chrysostom, as “righteousness, sanctification, adoption, unnumbered blessings,” “being not only free but holy, not holy only but righteous, not righteous only but sons, not sons only but heirs, not heirs only but brethren of Christ;” as “the putting on of Christ the Son of God, the being transformed into His likeness, the being brought into one kindred and species with Him; being incorporate with Christ, being made flesh of His flesh, and bone of His bone;” as “the same life which Christ had, the life which is above, which appears not, but is in heaven with Christ, health, salvation, renovation, the burden of sin laid aside, the old man with his evil actions thrown off, the new man with his good actions put on;”—in the language of Basil, as “conformation to the likeness of Christ's death, the abandonment of the former course of life, and the commencement of a second; the devil dethroned, God reconciled, salvation and life from the dead;”—in the language of Ambrose, as “dying to earth, and having nothing more to do with it, dying to sin and rising to God, burial with Christ and resurrection to life eternal, the whole outward man perishing, the old man nailed with Christ to His cross;”—in the language of Tertullian, as “a separation of our members from unrighteousness and offence, and joining them to righteousness and holiness; a transference of them from the ways of sin to the gift of life eternal;”—in the language of Hermas, as “the laying aside the deathliness of the former life, being freed from the doom of death and made over to life, discharged from the bond of death and assigned to life;”—in the language of Clement of Alexandria, as “sin washed away, the man no longer evil, the soul enlightened, the character changed;”—in the language of Jerome, as “the robe of royalty, the garment of princes, the putting on of the new man from heaven, the being clothed with mercy for cruelty, with patience for impatience, with righteousness for iniquity, with virtues for vices, with Christ for Anti-Christ;”—in the language of Hilary, as “a return to innocence, to

immortality, to the knowledge of God, to the faith of hope;—in the language of Gregory Nazianzen, as “the health of the soul, the garment of immortality;”—in the language of Gregory Nyssen, as “intimacy with sin abandoned, conformation to Christ’s death, death to sin, such death consisting in not loving the flesh, not desiring riches, not lying, stealing, reviling, but being as a dead man;”—in the language of Cyprian, as “being dead and buried to the carnal sins of the old man, and bearing the image of Him who is in heaven;”—in the language of Origen, as “the spiritual circumcision of the mind, fleshly pollution cut off, the heart cleansed, the soul purified from all defilement;”—in the language of Hippolytus, as “the evil one renounced, the enemy of souls denied, Christ confessed, slavery put off, adoption put on, and a gleaming with the rays of righteousness as with the brightness of the sun;”—in the language of S. Cyril of Alexandria, as “the change from unbelief to belief, from ignorance to knowledge, from the things of the flesh to the life holy and pure, from the things of the world to the love of the things above the world;”—in the language of Gregory Nyssen again, as “being unclothed of the slavish flesh, unclothed of our sins, unclothed of the filthy garment, and clothed with the pure one, unclothed of the beggarly and many-shredded garment, and clothed with the sacred and most beautiful one;”—in the language of Jerome again, as “being clothed with the white, as Christ was with the filthy garment,—with the garment of righteousness as Christ was with the garment of sin;”—in the language of Hilary again, as “the circumcision of Christ, being reborn unto the new man, dying unto the old, being quickened, burial with Christ, and return to eternity, death to sin and birth to immortality;”—in the language of Tertullian, Justin, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Cyril of Alexandria, the Gregories, Jerome, Theodoret, as “pardon, the enjoyment of the inheritance, the glory which is on high, the stripping off of the defiled garment of sin, the sprinkling of the conscience, the cleansing and purification of the soul, the destruction of the devil, sin dead, powerless, and drowned like Pharaoh in the Red Sea, countless vices which dwelt in us destroyed, spiritual circumcision, circumcision from error and wickedness, the old man with his carnal life, desires, concupiscence put off, the defilement of our soul melted away, the very approach of sin cut off, the spots of sin effaced, the stain of disobedience cleansed, the cleansing with the invisible hyssop, the righteous mind restored, reformation from evil, spiritual reformation, restoration of original righteousness, the return of the original formation, the stony heart removed for the heart of flesh, a new heart and new spirit imparted, the drinking in of immortality, the overflowing of spiritual graces as of torrents and rivers in the wilderness;”—in the language of the liturgies, as “the blotting out of all stains of sin, purification from the defilement of the old man, nature restored to its first estate, the new infancy of a real innocence, transformation, the putting off of the old man which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts, and putting on of the new man which is renewed after the image of Him that created him, the incorrupt and spotless clothing, the garment of redemption, the robe of glory, the loosing of bonds, the enlightenment of souls, the purification of flesh and spirit, the clothing of immortality, being a clean vessel, a child of light, an heir of the kingdom, being marked unto life, written among the children of grace, being marked with the mark which shall not be effaced, sealed to life everlasting.”—Preface, pp. lv.—lix.

But surely, if Mr. Mozley would clearly set forth what the primitive doctrine of regeneration was, he ought not to have been content with these general, not to say rhetorical state-

ments, but to have considered the most precise, exact, doctrinal statements on the subject that could be found.

He has omitted to consider what Dr. Pusey himself says of the language of the Fathers, viz., that they do not *define*, but *describe* the effects of baptism. They describe them, too, as they are manifested in adults—as they are in their fulness—as what God's work is, or would be, if not hindered by man. The Fathers are not tying themselves down to an exact logical definition of what regeneration is, but, in glowing and eloquent and often highly rhetorical language, setting forth the immensity of the blessings thus given to the worthy recipient; stimulating persons to seek the glorious privileges there held out, dwelling on the great goodness of God, and His willingness to bestow the largest gifts on the most faithful. We have before referred to S. Cyril's words, that, as was the preparation of the candidate for baptism, such would be the spiritual blessing obtained. The more thorough his examination, the more earnest his confession, the deeper his penitence, the larger his faith, the more abundant would be the outpouring of the Spirit upon his soul. 'As is thy faith, so be it done unto thee; 'Open thy mouth wide and I will fill it.'

Probably the translation of S. Cyril's 'Catechetical Lectures' is in the hands of many of our readers, or can be easily obtained by them. Let any one read the Introductory Lectures, and judge for himself. He will there see an explicit, definite account of the effects of baptism, which are certainly not greater than could be realized on earth.

Let it be remembered that in the passages that have been cited, the Fathers set forth, in their popular treatises, the effects of baptism as wrought by God in an adult coming with earnest preparation, and receiving the fulness of the Divine gifts. They are not defining the nature of the gift necessarily conveyed by baptism to all who did not come to it in hypocrisy. Let it be remembered that to such sincere converts this was the turning-point of their lives; it was looked forward to with fear and anxiety, yet with eager hope; prepared for by special instruction, self-examination, and prayer. It was the act of renouncing the long-cherished service of sin and evil, of embracing a new and holy course of life. It was the means of obtaining all the blessings which Christ had purchased, and which the Gospel offered. In it was promised forgiveness for all the sins that were past. Independently of, and additional to, the special regenerating work of the Spirit wrought in the soul, Baptism combined all that is now associated with the feelings of the Christian, when he lays down his burden at the foot of the cross—all that is felt when a lively perception of the saving work of Christ for us is

brought home to the soul—when an assured hope of forgiveness beams upon us; all that would be felt by a deeply penitent sinner, after he had unburdened his conscience in a sincere and perfect confession, had determinately given up his sins, and heard ‘the absolving words,’ assuring him that his sins were forgiven. It is plain that an exact definition of regeneration in itself—that is, of the very work wrought by the Holy Spirit in the soul of every one in his baptism—would be very different from the glowing pictures of its effects set forth in the popular discourses of the ancient Church. Consider what a wide difference there is between a description of man, and a bare and bald definition of a human being. If we would know how the ancients understood ‘regeneration’ and the effects of baptism when viewed as common to adults and to infants, we must examine their own statements on the subject. Some we have already given from Origen; others we shall give from S. Augustine.

But before we leave this subject of the language of the Fathers about baptism, it is necessary to show how very loose and inaccurate Mr. Mozley is in his account of what they do actually say. We are obliged to limit our remarks. We shall be content, therefore, with taking the first great Father whom he cites, and from whom his extracts are most numerous—Clement of Alexandria. We are quite sure Mr. Mozley does not intend to misrepresent the views of S. Clement; but he has been content with a very superficial study of his writings.

‘S. Clement of Alexandria,’ Mr. Mozley says, ‘uses it’ (regeneration) ‘as identical with “a meek disposition,” with “being “like a little child,” with “repentance,” with “conversion of life,” with “obedience,” with “faith,” with a “putting off of the garment of wickedness, and a putting on of “immortality.”’¹

¹ ‘Ο πατήρ ἀναγεννήσας πνεύματι εἰς υἰοθεσίαν ἡπίους οἶδεν, καὶ φιλεῖ τούτους μόνους.—Pædagog. lib. i. c. 5.

Ἦκετε, ἤκετε, ὦ νεολαία ἡ ἐμὴ· ἦν γὰρ μὴ αὖθις ὡς τὰ παῖδια γενήσῃσθε, καὶ ἀναγεννηθῆτε, &c.—Ad Gentes, c. 9. The word ἀναγεννηθῆτε is put as a synonym for στραφῆτε, Matt. xviii. 3.

Οὕτως οὖν ἐπιστραφέντας ἡμᾶς αὖθις ὡς τὰ παῖδια γενέσθαι βούλεται, τὸν ὄντως πατέρα ἐκδυσάμενοι τὸν χιτῶνα, ἐπενδυσάμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα καινὸς γενόμενος λαὸς ἅγιος ἀναγεννηθέντες, ἀμύαντον φυλάξωμεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Καὶ νῆπιος μὲν ὡς βρέφος τοῦ θεοῦ, κεκαθαρμένος πορνείας καὶ πονηρίας, &c.—Strom. i. 1, c. 6.

Ἡμᾶς γὰρ εἰσπεποιήται, καὶ ἡμῶν ἐθέλει μόνων κεκληθῆσαι πατήρ, οὐ τῶν ἀπειθούντων.—Ad Gentes. c. 12.

Such is Mr. Mozley's assertion, but the very contrary is the fact. S. Clement very carefully distinguishes regeneration, or the being born again, from any one of these dispositions. We will examine each of the passages.

Mr. Mozley's first extract is from the 'Pædagogus,' (lib. i. c. 5,) where S. Clement is speaking of the love that parents have for their *little* ones—whose helplessness, and tenderness, and gentle sweetness win their especial love,—'so,' he says (we give the context), 'the Father of all receives those that come to Him 'for refuge, and having begotten them again by the Spirit unto 'adoption, so as to be gentle, knows them; and these alone 'He loves, and helps, and fights for, and such an one He calls 'a little child.' Here the gentle or meek disposition is the result of regeneration.

The next, from 'The Exhortation to the Gentiles,' (chap. ix. § 82,) calls on them to come in these words: 'Come, come, my 'little ones; for except ye *again* become as little children, and 'be born again, [as the Scripture says, ye will not receive Him 'who is indeed a Father (for your Father), nor will you ever 'enter into the kingdom of heaven.]' Mr. Mozley omits the words we have enclosed in square brackets, and observes:—'The 'word *ἀναγεννηθῆτε* ("be born again") is put as a synonym for 'στραφῆτε ("be converted"), Matt. xviii.' On the contrary, it is introduced to express an entirely different idea, as the latter part of the sentence shows. S. Clement is bringing together other expressions and ideas besides those of Matt. xviii., and the expression 'the Scripture' alludes, we apprehend, to S. John iii. 6. But, as to *ἀναγεννηθῆτε* being a synonym of *στραφῆτε*, S. Clement shall speak for himself. In the 'Pædagogus' (lib. i. c. 5, § 12), near the beginning of the chapter from which Mr. Mozley's first extract was made, S. Clement cites these very words of our Lord. He says:—'What is meant by the words '("of such is the kingdom of heaven"), the Lord Himself will 'explain, saying, Except ye be converted, and become as these 'little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of 'heaven; *not alluding to* (*ἀλληγορῶν*) *our regeneration* here, 'but setting before us the simplicity of children for our 'imitation.' That is to say, S. Clement expressly distinguishes our regeneration from our being converted, and becoming as little children, while Mr. Mozley says he makes them identical.

Mr. Mozley's next extract is from the 'Stromata,' (lib. iii. c. 12, § 88.) 'Thus, then, He wishes us, having been converted,' (or rather, having turned to Him,) 'to become again as little 'children, having come to know our true Father, 'having been born again through water.' Here the new birth

is clearly distinguished in idea from conversion; it is that whereby, after we have turned to God, we are born anew as His children.

The next passage (Strom. lib. ii. c. 13, § 58) is as follows:—‘For one that is born again (not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, but) by the Spirit (δεῖ), ought to (or ‘must’) forsake not only the idols which he previously regarded as gods, but also the deeds of his former life.’ Mr. Mozley observes:—‘The δεῖ’ (which we translate ‘ought’) ‘here means that the regenerate man *must* act so in consistency, and to verify his name and profession as regenerate.’ We do not see any ground for this observation; δεῖ seems to mean ‘ought,’ in the sense of ‘it is right,’—what we are bound to do, what is our duty. The context appears to show this. The whole chapter is on men falling into sin after baptism. It begins in these words:—‘He, then, that hath received the forgiveness of his sins ought (χρῆ) ‘not to sin any more;’ and the words immediately preceding the quotation are—‘He, then, that has come to the faith from out of the Gentiles, and out of his former way of life, and has once for all obtained the remission of his sins, and after this has sinned, and then repents, even if he obtain forgiveness, ought to feel shame, as he is not again washed unto the forgiveness of sins. For one that is born again,’ &c. What becomes of Mr. Mozley’s view ‘that the regenerate man *must* act so,’ or of his theories of the Fathers holding the holiness of the regenerate to be in supposition only. S. Clement speaks of realities, of real forgiveness, real renewal, a real falling away, a real return by repentance, a renewed real forgiveness, only without our having the assurance given of it that is conveyed by baptism.

The next passage speaks of the true ‘children of God,’ and describes them as having put off the garment of wickedness, &c. A description of the children of God must not be made identical with a definition of regeneration, though it may readily be admitted as a description of its effects. It is difficult to see why the last passage is introduced. It says that God would be called the Father of Christians only, not of the ‘disobedient’ (τῶν ἀπειθούντων), *i.e.* of the heathen who refuse to submit to the faith of Christ.

Mr. Mozley has omitted one passage in S. Clement which is more to his purpose than any he has cited. It is in the well-known story of the young man who had lapsed after his baptism, and was restored by S. John, of which restoration S. Clement speaks as ‘giving a great example of true repentance, and a great evidence of regeneration (μέγα γνώρισμα παλλινγενεσίας), and a trophy of the future resurrection.’

But even allowing that the term is here applied to the restoration of the young man, (and not, as it might well be, to the power of his original new birth in baptism, vindicating and exhibiting its hitherto latent force in his repentance,) one instance of this kind is not to be set against the otherwise uniform sense of the word by S. Clement, who uses it to express the effect of baptism.

The rest of the citations from the Fathers are just of the same kind. We return to the question of the nature of regeneration.

Mr. Mozley complains that those who opposed Mr. Gorham never gave any definition of regeneration. A reason for this, not indeed connected with that controversy, but with a much higher and nobler aim, he would have found given in a work often referred to by him—Dr. Pusey's '*Treatise on Baptism*.' That author says:—

'Before entering upon the consideration of these passages, however, some may wish to know the meaning here attached to the Scripture words "regeneration," or "new birth," and "birth from above." This were easy for practical purposes, by way of description, so as to set before ourselves the greatness of the gift by baptism bestowed on us; but it is not so easy by way of a technical definition. This arises from the very nature of the subject; for we can only accurately define that which we understand, not in its effects only, but its cause. Things divine, even by describing, we are apt to circumscribe; much more, if we attempt strictly to define them: the depth of things divine cannot be contained within the shallowness of human words. The more carefully we express ourselves in the one way, the more escapes us in another.'—*Pusey on Baptism*, p. 19.

It is plain, indeed, how very different must be a definition of regeneration which is to apply equally to the case of adults and unconscious infants, from a description of it in the case of one of formed character, powerful understanding, and deep religious earnestness. Mr. Mozley does not establish his own views by asking questions about the precise effect of regeneration on infants. The Church doctrine is not affected by the difficulty of solving these questions. We cannot trace the workings of the infant's mind, nor yet of the Divine Spirit upon it. But as we believe that there is in that mind from its birth naturally a corruption and a tendency to evil, so do we believe that that corruption must be removed, and a principle of good, a germ of holiness, and actual holiness so far as the nature of the subject allows, implanted instead of it.

Again, as to the state of a baptized person who has fallen away, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine the exact state of one who has thus come under the influence of grace, and has been made the temple of the Holy Ghost, by the

presence of the Spirit, even when the individual who is the subject of that presence is resisting that Spirit, and wholly living in sin. Such an one is indeed separate from God, spiritually dead, dead in sin; yet we cannot believe him to be in the same state—be his condition better or worse than that of one who has never been admitted to Gospel privileges. He is *regeneratus*, one that has been regenerated; though it only leads to a confusion of ideas to say that he is regenerate.

All these topics Mr. Mozley treats in a very rough and rude manner. He selects a definition of regeneration from the work of a recent writer, which seems to represent regeneration only as a power. Then, throughout his work, he treats this notion of a mere power, mere capacity for goodness, as something mean and contemptible, unworthy to be called regeneration. He seems to forget that a power of doing God's will is not natural, but a high gift indeed. He does not consider that the term power, thus used, implies a tendency. And if, as he seems to think, no change deserves to be valued at all in our moral and spiritual condition, unless it be complete, final, indefectible, we would remind him of the state in which Adam was before he fell. Surely one who professes to receive the teaching of S. Augustine, might regard it indeed as a new birth, and a dying to sin and rising again to righteousness, if baptism restores the soul to the condition in which Adam was first created, if, as S. Augustine ever teaches, it reverses in the little infant the evil condition into which he is born, restores him to God's favour and to a state of grace, though not of indefectibility. Surely the angels themselves were not gifted with indefectibility: yet would not that change be worthy the name of regeneration, or, a new birth, which placed us in the spiritual condition of angels? So deeply imbued does Mr. Mozley seem to be with the idea of indefectibility being the only gift worth having, that we read in one place, where he is engaged in showing that the high value which the primitive Church set on the gift of baptism, in comparison of any previous aids from God, proves that it must be a final, crowning grace:—

‘It is evident that we are put, or supposed to be put, into an entirely new state at baptism, and that regeneration is a new life, a new creation. But does a merely higher degree of the same grace fulfil this complete distinction between the two states before and after baptism? What can a man, by any degree whatever of assisting grace after baptism, do which is wholly different from what he has done before it? He believes and repents before he is baptized; if he lives ever so long in the enjoyment of an assisting grace ever so high after baptism, will he end with anything more than that with which he has begun—faith and repentance? *Will he ever be perfect* so long as he has only a grace which depends on his own will for its effect? He cannot be. *His religious course will at best be a mixture throughout*

of success and failure; the result, so long as it depends at all on himself, will be unsatisfactory; from first to last he will have to grieve over shortcomings and sins; and when he comes to die he will have to do simply that which he did when he was baptized, believe and repent. Then there is no new kind of effect which can be produced in him by assisting grace; and therefore, if this is all that baptismal grace or regeneration means, the latter is not a wholly new state, as it professes to be, but substantially the same with the state antecedent to baptism.—P. 45.

We extract this passage, first to show the unreality of Mr. Mozley's view that indefectibility, secured by irresistible grace, is alone worthy of being regarded as the gift of baptism, (for do not these words describe the life even of saints; as shown, for instance, in the Confessions of S. Augustine, or the narrative of his death?) secondly, to remind our readers that, after all, this indefectible grace was not, on our author's theory, given in baptism at all, only said to be so on the rule of supposition. So that the rite of baptism was a mere dramatic act—an exhibiting, in the way of symbolical representation, of the doctrine of Divine grace, to which there is no corresponding reality except in the condition of the elect in heaven. Indeed, the absurdity to which Mr. Mozley's theory reduces him cannot be better shown than by citing his own words about persons falling away after baptism:—

⁷ 'There cannot, indeed, be any fall, *really and in fact*, from a final state; for such a state is, by supposition, one from which there can be no fall; it is the perfect and eternal state of the soul. But when the baptized person sins, he falls from the supposition which has been made about him that he is in this state, and can never have the same supposition made again about him in this life. He has falsified a great title which was given him, and it can never belong to him on earth again. He has been supposed by S. John to be unable to sin, by S. Paul to be for ever dead to sin; but the event has proved that he is still accessible to the power of sin and alive to its pleasure. His heavenly life, then, has vanished; and he can never regain it below. He has not verified it in act, and therefore the supposition falls to the ground; he returns to the earthly life of alloy, struggle, and difficulty, and no longer has, but waits for, his adoption and regeneration.'—Pp. 48, 49.

We return to the subject of the dilemma, grounded on the alternative which Mr. Mozley proposed between two senses of the word regenerate. Throughout his work, Mr. Mozley argues on the supposition that no third view is possible beside these two,—either that regeneration conveys a mere power without any real goodness whatever, or that it is the gift of final, indefectible holiness.

Yet in page 35, in adducing the authority of the schoolmen to prove that regeneration is more than a mere capacity, incidentally proves against himself that there is a third a native:—

'To this proof of the nature of regeneration, as understood by the inspired writers and the Fathers, I will briefly add the sense attached to it in the schools. The schools, as represented by Peter Lombard and Aquinas, certainly do not regard regeneration as a state of mere capacity for holiness and goodness, but as involving that character itself. They understand by it a state of grace; but grace signifies, in the schools, not grace as a means, but as an effect; *i. e.*, not merely assisting grace, which depends for its effect on the human will, but grace which is effective, or carries its own designed effect with it. The function of grace is to infuse the theological and moral virtues into the human heart, which thus receives in grace a renewal in fact, and not merely an assistance of which that renewal is the object. Baptism was pronounced, in the schools, to "confer grace and the virtues." "Baptism," says Peter Lombard, "is the abolition of sin, the apposition of virtues." Aquinas lays down the position just mentioned, and carries it out both by explanation and application. The grace and virtues conferred in baptism imply fruitfulness in good works; and children obtain grace and the virtues in baptism. The schools had indeed a remarkable machinery in readiness for reconciling this language with facts; but I am speaking here simply of the sense in which they understood the term regeneration. In their interpretation of that term, they did not venture to depart from the great Scriptural sense of it, which the Fathers had followed and handed down, as goodness *in esse* and not *in posse*. We have nowhere, either in Scripture or antiquity, any authority for understanding regeneration as a state of mere power and capacity for the spiritual life and character—a state involving only assisting grace, means of grace, and the like. One meaning is stamped upon the word in Scripture—and the Church has never used it in any other,—that of real holiness and goodness.'—Pp. 35, 36.

But surely neither of final nor indefectible holiness and goodness, but only of such degrees of them that if the person lived after baptism he might fall away.

Again, in the note at the end of the work, Mr. Mozley at last finds out that almost in our own day a third view is definitely held. He says:—

'I have assumed in this treatise that the alternative in the case of baptismal regeneration lies between an actual goodness which is hypothetically, and a capacity which is literally, possessed by all the baptized. Bishop Bethell, however, in the preface to his work on Baptismal Regeneration notices an opinion, entertained, it would appear, by some even now, that actual virtues and holy dispositions are infused into the minds of infants at baptism, and that this constitutes their regeneration. On this idea, then, as being an attempt to unite both points, *i. e.* actual goodness as the sense of regeneration, with the literal bestowal of such regeneration on all the baptized, *i. e.* all baptized in infancy, I will make one or two remarks.'—P. 137.

The remark he makes is this:—

'In the first place, then, I must observe that this idea, if tenable, is wholly at variance with the more common and received doctrine of regeneration as a spiritual capacity simply, imparted in baptism; and that it would alter the whole of that more common and received language with relation, founded on the latter supposition. For regeneration, consisting in actual virtues and holy dispositions among the baptized, so long as he remained such; the

adult so long as he retained the holy dispositions imparted to him in infancy; but one who lost these holy dispositions, and fell into sinful habits, would be no longer regenerate. But the more common and received language, which is founded on the supposition of regeneration being a capacity, speaks of men as wicked and as regenerate at the same time. According to this idea of regeneration as a literal infusion of holy dispositions, however we might speak of all *infants* as regenerate, the growth of vice, carelessness, and irreligion after that age would prevent us from applying the term to the great majority of adults, that is to say, to the great mass of Christian society, to the Church as a body. We could not speak of their regeneration as a present but only a past fact, which would be a complete subversion of the received language to which I have referred, on the subject of baptismal regeneration.'—Pp. 137, 138.

We will not cite Mr. Mozley's further remarks, which object to the possibility of infants having any holy dispositions, asserting that 'reasonableness and intelligence in the agent is essential, and is part of the very meaning of virtue and moral disposition.' It is so in adults. But will one who holds the doctrine of original sin, maintain that the reverse of that corrupt condition of birth is impossible—that it is not as possible for one to be 'sanctified from his mother's womb,' or to be freed from his original guilt, and, if it so pleased God, even from tendencies to evil, as it is to be born in sin, and with such tendencies to sin that nothing but grace—and that, as is alleged, irresistible—can save him from them!'

In the next paragraph Mr. Mozley admits that infants may have the germs of particular dispositions, which he thus explains:—

'By the germ of a character we mean particular latent tendencies in the natural constitution, which afterwards, as the infant grows up into a reasonable, intelligent being, and according as, in this new state of existence, he uses or abuses, cultivates or neglects these tendencies, become formed habits and dispositions. These tendencies, then, so long as they are latent, incipient, and elementary, and exist in the being while he is as yet without intelligence and reason, are not virtues, are not moral habits and dispositions.'—Pp. 138, 139.

Now, it will be seen that much of this is a dispute about words, and about what we cannot discover, viz. the condition of an infant's mind. But we are not, on account of our ignorance of this, to deny the power of Divine grace.

But further, Mr. Mozley goes on to show how both the schoolmen and some of the Reformers, including Luther, maintained 'that baptized infants are in possession of actual virtues and holy dispositions, which are imparted in baptism to them.' We have no space now to go into this question, but we must observe that Mr. Mozley's alternative between regeneration not implying any real goodness at all, and its implying established, nay, indefectible goodness, really omits the view which,

it would seem, has been pretty universally held by Catholics, that regeneration does imply the gift of real and actual goodness, according to the spiritual capacities of the subject, but that this real and actual goodness is neither final nor indefectible.

If any one wishes to know what may be fairly regarded as the Anglican view of the nature of regeneration, he may read Hooker's definition, thus cited and endorsed by Dr. Pusey:—

'The view, then, here held of baptism, following the ancient Church and our own, is, that we be engrafted into Christ, and thereby receive a principle of life, afterwards to be developed and enlarged by the fuller influxes of His grace; so that neither is baptism looked upon as an infusion of grace distinct from the incorporation into Christ, nor is that incorporation conceived of as separate from its attendant blessings.

'The following sentences of Hooker express, in that great master's way, the view here meant to be taken:—"This is the necessity of Sacraments. That saving grace which Christ originally is, or hath for the general good of His whole Church, by Sacraments He severally deriveth into every member thereof. By baptism therefore we receive Christ Jesus, and from Him the saving grace which is proper unto baptism.—Baptism is a Sacrament which God hath instituted in His Church, to the end that they which receive the same might be *incorporated into Christ, and so through His most precious merit obtain as well that saving grace of imputation, which taketh away all former guiltiness, as also that infused divine virtue of the Holy Ghost, which giveth to the powers of the soul the first disposition towards future newness of life.*"—Pusey's *Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism*, p. 24.

But now, since the subject before us is the '*Primitive Doctrine of Regeneration*,' and since the great Doctor whose views Mr. Mozley, as we shall see, would allege, in order to disprove his literal acceptance of the statement, that all the baptized are regenerate, is S. Augustine, that holy Bishop shall speak for himself as to the effects of baptism and the nature of regeneration; and we will only draw our readers' attention to these points:—1. That regeneration, in his view, involves some actual goodness, in the 'doing away of the sins which separate us from God,' and 'the healing the bite of the old serpent,' and 'the destroying the body of sin.' 2. That this actual goodness is by no means final, but is compatible with a concupiscence remaining in the regenerate, against which they have to contend, which they may overcome, or which may overcome them. We leave it to Mr. Mozley to decide whether this is what he so contemptuously calls 'a mere capacity.' 3. That the gift of regeneration and the effects of baptism are real and actual, and that there is not a shadow of the notion of the gift being in supposition. Regeneration is given to all the baptized, if rightly disposed, and it involves a real inward change and a real forgiveness of sin. It is the beginning of the Christian life, the first-fruits of the Spirit.

S. Augustine says :—

'In infants, at any rate, the effect of the grace of God, through His baptism who came in the likeness of sinful flesh, is that the body of sin is destroyed. *It is not, however, so destroyed that the concupiscence which has been sprinkled into, and inborn in the very living flesh itself, should be at once annihilated and no longer exist ; but so that, what existed in him when born, should not harm him when dead.*'

To appreciate the greatness of the change involved in these words, S. Augustine's doctrine of original sin must be kept in mind :—

'For' (he proceeds) 'if he live after his baptism, and come to an age capable of obedience, he has there this concupiscence with which to contend, and by the aid of God to overcome it, *if he has not received His grace in vain,—if he would not be a castaway.* For not even to adults is this granted in baptism (except haply by an unspeakable miracle of the most omnipotent Creator), *that the law of sin, which is in the members, fighting against the law of the mind, should be wholly and entirely extinguished, and cease to be :* but that whatever of evil hath been done, or said, or thought by a man, when he was serving that same concupiscence with his mind subjected to it, is wholly put away, and reckoned as if it had not been done ; yet that the concupiscence itself continues, the bond of guilt being undone by which the devil held the soul in bondage through this concupiscence, and the obstacles being destroyed, whereby he separated man from his Creator,—yet that it should remain for us to contend against, in that struggle wherein we chastise our bodies and bring them into subjection.'

It is quite clear, then, that, in the belief of S. Augustine, the effect of baptism did not leave man morally and spiritually what he was before. Whereas he had been the slave of sin and guilt, he is now not only set free, and reconciled to his God by assured forgiveness, and stimulated by the power of Divine love and the sense of reconciliation to contend against the remains of his original evil nature, but has an inward power enabling him to contend, which before he had not, and which renders him susceptible of the influences of Divine love. This could only be by the grace of God's Holy Spirit, whereby the

¹ In parvulis certe gratia Dei, per Baptismum ejus qui venit in similitudine carnis peccati, id agitur, ut evacuetur caro peccati. Evacuatur autem, non ut in ipsa vivente carne concupiscentia conspersa et innata repente absumatur, et non sit ; sed ne obsit mortuo, quæ inerat nato. Nam si post Baptismum vixerit, atque ad ætatem capacem præcepti pervenire potuerit, ibi habet cum qua pugnet, eamque adjuvante Deo superet, si non in vacuum gratiam ejus susceperit, si reprobatus esse noluerit. Nam nec grandibus hoc præstatur in Baptismo, nisi forte miraculo ineffabili omnipotentissimi Creatoris, ut lex peccati, quæ inest in membris repugnans legi mentis, prorsus penitus extinguatur, et non sit : sed ut quidquid mali ab homine factum, dictum, cogitatum est, cum eidem concupiscentiæ subjecta mente serviret, totum aboleatur, ac velut factum non fuerit, habeatur ; ipsa vero soluto reatus vinculo, quo per illam diabolus animam retinebat et inclusione destructa, qua hominem suo Creatore separabat, maneat in certamine, quo corpus nostrum castigamus et servituti subicimus (1 Cor. ix. 27), vel ad usus licitos et necessarios relaxanda, vel continentia cohibenda. — De Pecc. Mer. et. Rem^u lib. i. c. 39 (§ 70).

love of God is shed abroad in the heart. We do not see how this doctrine of S. Augustine differs from that of a 'capacity' for holiness, which Mr. Mozley denounces—that of a 'sufficient grace,' which we ourselves believe to be given to all the baptized—that grace which might be ultimately effectual or not, which he will not hear of.

Again, in order to show S. Augustine's views most fully:—

'Who knows not that if a baptized infant come to years of discretion and believe not, nor restrain himself from unlawful lusts, *what he received as a little one will profit him nothing?*' [observe, he does not say the child received nothing.] 'If, however, after receiving baptism he depart out of this life, the guilt by which he was originally bound being removed, he will be perfected in that light of truth, which abiding unchangeably for ever, enlightens the justified by the presence of their Creator. For sins alone separate between man and God, which are removed by the grace of Christ, through whom as our Mediator we are reconciled when He justifieth the ungodly.'¹

Again, in the second Book of the same treatise:—

'When infants, then, are conformed to the death of Christ by the Sacrament of baptism, we must acknowledge that *they are freed from the bite of the serpent* [that is, the evil wrought by the fall], *if we would not err from the rule of the Christian faith.*'²

And soon after, most explicitly:—

'Those that have been born of sinful flesh, escape from the condemnation which is the due of the old man by the sacrament of spiritual regeneration and renewal. For on account of the questions which have been raised, or yet may be raised on this subject, we ought especially to observe and remember this, that the *remission of all sins is alone effected fully and perfectly in baptism*, yet that the *quality of the man himself is not wholly changed at once*; but that by a *newness increasing from day to day in those who make good progress, the spiritual first-fruits change into themselves what was old and carnal, till the whole is so renewed* that even the animal infirmity of the body comes to spiritual firmness and incorruption.'³

¹ Ceterum quis ignorat quod baptizatus parvulus, si ad rationales annos veniens non crediderit, nec se ab illicitis concupiscentiis abstinuerit, nihil ei proderit quod parvus accepit? Verumtamen si percepto Baptismate de hac vita emigraverit, soluto reatu cui originaliter erat obnoxius, perficietur in illo lumine veritatis, quod incommutabiliter manens in æternum justificatos præsentia Creatoris illuminat. Peccata enim sola separant inter homines et Deum, quæ solvuntur Christi gratia, per quem mediatorem reconciliamur, cum justificat impium.—De Pecc. Mer. et Remiss. c. 19 (§ 25).

² Cum itaque per Baptismi sacramentum morti Christi conformentur infantes eos a serpentis morsu fatendum est liberari, si a Christianæ fidei regula nolumus aberrare.—Ibid. lib. ii. c. 27 (§ 43).

³ . . . Filii ex parentum reliqua vetustate toti vetusti, et in peccati carne propagati, damnationem veteri homini debitam Sacramento spiritualis regenerationis et renovationis evadunt. Illud namque præcipue, propter quæstiones quæ de hac re motæ sunt vel moveri adhuc possunt, attendere ac meminisse debemus, tantummodo peccatorum omnium plenam perfectamque remissionem Baptismo fieri: hominis vero ipsius qualitatem non totam continuo commutari; sed spirituales primitias in bene proficientibus de die in diem novitate crescente commutare in se quod carnaliter vetus est, donec

ut animalis etiam infirmitas corporis ad firmitatem
—Ibid. (§ 44).

Baptism then was, in S. Augustine's view, the beginning of the Christian course, and the grace then given—that is, regeneration—was the first-fruits; 'a man not being wholly changed at once, but proceeding on from grace to grace from day to day.'

Again:—

'As long, then, as the law remains in the way of concupiscence in the members, the guilt of it is taken away whilst itself remains; but it is taken away (only) for him who has received the sacrament of regeneration, and has already begun to be renewed.'¹

And:—

'If he depart this life immediately (after baptism), there will not be any thing whatever to hold him as guilty, all that held him being taken away.'²

Mr. Mozley says, the proper meaning of regeneration is that of the final, indefectible holiness of the saints in heaven, and that when used of anything which takes place in this life, is used in a lower and imperfect sense. Now, what says S. Augustine? He cites S. Ambrose, and evidently approves of his words, speaking doubtfully on the point whether the term 'regeneration' can be applied to anything after this life, and explaining and justifying the use of the word from the meaning of that regeneration which takes place at baptism; *i. e.* the regeneration that takes place at baptism is regeneration properly so called—that which is spoken of after this life, is so called in an improper and derived sense.

'Let us see' (says Ambrose) 'whether there be not a regeneration for us after the race of life is run; of which it is said, 'In the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of His glory.' For as that is called the regeneration of baptism, whereby the foulness of sin is washed away and we are made new; so does this appear to be called a regeneration, whereby we are purified from every stain contracted in the body, and the senses of the soul being cleansed, are born anew unto eternal life.'

Our readers will now be able to judge how far Mr. Mozley's theory can be called the primitive doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, or how far he can be considered a competent

¹ Quamdiu ergo manet lex concupiscentialiter in membris, manente ipsa reatus ejus solvitur; sed ei solvitur, qui sacramentum regenerationis accepit, renovarique jam coepit.—Ibid. lib. ii. c. 28 (§ 45).

² Denique si continuo consequatur ab hac vita emigratio, non erit omnino quod obnoxium hominem teneat, solutis omnibus quæ tenebant.—Ibid. (§ 46).

³ Videamus, inquit, 'ne qua sit post hujus vitæ curriculum nostra regeneratio, de qua dictum est, *In regeneratione, cum sederit filius hominis in throno gloriæ suæ.* Sicut enim regeneratio lavacri dicitur, per quam detera peccatorum colluvione renovamur; ita regeneratio dici videtur, per quam ab omni corporeæ concretionis purificati labe, mundo animæ sensu in vitam regeneramur æternam.—Cont. Julian. Pelag. lib. ii. c. 8, § 22.

exponent of the teaching of S. Augustine, to whom he is diametrically opposed in all the great features of his system;—we will not except even that of regeneration, as implying actual goodness (in whatever sense infants are capable of goodness), because the *regeneratus*—that is, the person who has received regeneration, and has been born again—may, in the view of S. Augustine, become the slave of sin, and finally perish.

But Mr. Mozley cites several passages out of S. Augustine, with the view of showing that that Father held that the baptized were said to be regenerate only in the way of supposition. Here we have again to remind our readers of the fallacy arising from the confusion of 'regenerated,' as expressing a past event, and 'regenerate,' as expressing a present spiritual condition. Mr. Mozley's extract (p. 115) out of a homily of S. Augustine (in Ep. Joan. Tract. V. c. 3, § 6), speaks of one that has been baptized, and is now without love. 'Let him look within, and see if that is accomplished in the heart which is done in the body. Hath he love? If he hath, then let him say, I am born of God. If he hath not, *a mark indeed hath been placed upon him*; but he is a deserter and a vagabond. Let him not say he is born of God unless he hath love.' That is, no one is truly and effectually regenerate—regeneration has not had its fruits in him—unless he have love. But yet he has been marked as the soldier and servant of Christ.¹

The important words of the next extract (p. 116, De Bapt. cont. Don. iv. 24, 25) are:—'In baptized infants, the sacrament of regeneration preceded; *and, if they hold to Christian piety*, conversion of the heart will follow that of which the outward sign preceded.' That is, whereas in the case of adults conversion comes before baptism, in the case of infants, from the necessity of their circumstances, it follows it. But observe

¹ We may notice incidentally that in this place, as in others, (as De Bapt. cont. Don. i. 4, § 5, *Intueatur similitudinem notæ militaris, &c.*) S. Augustine teaches—and much of his argument against the Donatists, on rebaptizing, turns upon this view—that baptism impresses 'a certain mark or character upon the soul'; whereas Mr. Mozley, at p. 115, says that 'the schoolmen introduced this idea of the baptismal character,' though they never spoke of it as regeneration, or grace of any kind, from which they carefully distinguished it, though it is difficult to know what they meant by it.' So, at p. 30, he says—'The schoolmen adopted, indeed, another sense of the term "seal." They explained the difficulty that all Christians were spoken of in the New Testament as sealed, while all Christians were not in fact holy, by attaching a neutral sense to the term; and the scholastic "character" stood for a mark simply representing the rite of baptism, and, though indelible, adhering to the saved and to the damned alike. The grace of baptism was indeed wholly separated from this "character," and ascribed to another and a different act of God. But this was a complete departure from the Scriptural meaning of the word.' The schoolmen here simply repeated the doctrine of S. Augustine; a of which Mr. Mozley does not seem to be aware.

the words, if they *hold to* Christian piety, 'Si Christianam tenuerint pietatem;' that is, if they *continue in* that grace which was given them in baptism, not if they begin anew.

S. Augustine says in the next extract (p. 117): 'God distinguishes the regenerate from the unregenerate, in mature life,' [it ought to be more exactly translated, *if they be already* adults—*si jam in majoribus ætatibus sint,*] 'by their actions;' and in the next, 'nec regenerati spiritualiter in corpus et membra Christi cœdificantur nisi boni'—a sentiment in which, we suppose, all Christians would agree. Mr. Mozley does not seem aware that the three next passages (pp. 117—119), which distinguish 'between inward and outward, between spiritual and bodily, baptism,' and on which he lays much stress, refer exclusively to those who receive outward baptism without faith or repentance, like Simon Magus, who is alleged as an instance; they come to be baptized hypocritically. We cannot suppose that Mr. Mozley would, knowingly, have cited these passages thus, because he is well 'aware,' as he states in the note at the beginning of the preface, 'that the doctrine even of Baptismal Regeneration does not allow the individual to be regenerate, unless he has fulfilled the conditions of faith and repentance.' And yet it seems that the passages on which he bases his position, that S. Augustine held that there could be outward baptism without inward grace, are passages which are quite foreign to the question. Nay, Mr. Mozley alleges S. Augustine as here speaking of 'baptized persons living in sin,' whereas he is speaking of adults baptized without believing and repenting. But we cannot leave unnoticed the fact which Mr. Mozley observes, that in treating of these very persons, who, coming to baptism without faith or repentance, received no inward benefit whatever, S. Augustine doubted whether he should not allow that even these were 'born of the Spirit.' What becomes, then, of Mr. Mozley's allegation of S. Augustine's words, a little, three or four pages, before, that they only who had love were born of God? He now says:—

'In the following passage, it is true, he hesitates at first between two modes of speaking respecting baptized persons who live in sin; between saying that they are born of the Spirit, though not profitably, and not in such a way as to admit them into the kingdom of heaven, and saying that they are *not* born of the Spirit; but he evidently inclines to the latter language.'—P. 118.

And again:—

'The alternative of language, that the wicked are born of the Spirit in baptism, so far as it is allowed, is only allowed in this passage in an ambiguous and inconsistent way, with the qualification that they are not admitted into the kingdom of heaven; a salvo which greatly neutralizes it,

for to be born again and to enter into the kingdom of God are evidently different portions of one whole language representing a particular spiritual state, one of which, therefore, cannot be excluded without impairing the other. But this alternative evidently is made to give way at last to the other more straightforward and consistent mode of speaking, and the writer recurs to his general and established distinction between the outward and the spiritual baptism.—P. 119.

It appears, then, that S. Augustine doubted whether he should or should not call those who were baptized without faith and repentance, and who, as all allow, received no benefit from their baptism, ‘born of the Spirit’ or not. Will Mr. Mozley now reflect on the contemptuous manner in which he has spoken (Preface, p. xli.)¹ of those of the present day who use the term ‘regenerate’ of all the baptized, and also of those only who are actually holy, sometimes in the one sense, sometimes in the other? Will he consider that the cases about which they doubt, whether persons should be called regenerate or not, are those in which the validity and efficacy of the rite of baptism was

¹ ‘I have said that the alternative, in the case of regeneration, lies between two senses, one involving actual holiness, and the other only a capacity for it. Now, if persons clearly embraced the fact of this alternative, they would come to a proper understanding with themselves on this question; they would proceed at once to compare these two interpretations, and would choose the one which had least difficulties. And in that case, I cannot but think that they would find the difficulties on the side of considering regeneration only a capacity insuperable, while those on the side of considering it actual holiness were very small. They would find that in the one case they had a whole array of plain Scriptural characteristics of regeneration to explain away; while, on the other, the only difficulty would be the hypothetical application of the term, which, considering the abundance of precedent for this mode of speaking, would be no great one. But unfortunately they do not clearly embrace the fact of this alternative. They go on with a vague indefinite sense of regeneration as including both of these alternatives at once; each of which they use according as they want it. When the greatness of the baptismal gift is the point, regeneration is actual holiness, *i. e.* is described without qualification in all the strong language, Scriptural and Patristic, of which actual holiness is the natural meaning. When the universal conveyance of it in baptism is the point, then regeneration is a capacity only, it being contrary to facts to suppose it more. They thus go on combining two contradictory meanings of the term; thinking of it as involving actual holiness, and as *not* involving it; as being more than a capacity, and as being *only* a capacity. And such indefinite conceptions as these are very difficult to deal with; the *vis inertiae* of inconsistency is strong; and the hammer of reasoning beats in vain on the rock of ancient confusion. You may talk to a person in this state of mind ever so clearly, without effect. You will say, “a thing cannot be, and not be at the same time.” If regeneration is actual holiness, it cannot be anything *short* of it; if it is more than a capacity, it cannot be only a capacity. He will answer you by pointing to a volume of extracts from the Fathers. You will then repeat the argument, and say,—“Very well, you are quite right; that is all correct language; now, then, what do you think it *means*? Is regeneration, as there described, actual holiness or not actual holiness, more than or only a capacity? Choose one of these meanings, for you cannot choose both.” But the appeal will be still often ineffective. Those elementary reasonings, which are so simple and clear on paper, are often the most difficult to embrace in practice; and the mind of your opponent, after a momentary conception of the truth that contradictory things cannot be true together, will relapse, like a spring, into its old attitude, in which it practically thinks they can be.—Preface, pp. xl.—xlii.

not rendered nugatory by any fault of the recipient; and then reflect that the Doctor, whose teaching he professes to follow and maintain, doubted whether the terms, 'born of the Spirit,' which is at least as strong as 'regenerate,' should not be applied to those hypocrites whose baptism was only outward, and had never touched the soul at all? Did S. Augustine, then, hold so clearly that 'regeneration' involved inward holiness? or would he not have said that the word could be used in either of these two senses?

But on the strength of these passages Mr. Mozley says:—

'These are specimens of a general use of language in S. Augustine; and they appear to decide his sense of the term regeneration: viz., as being the Scriptural one of actual holiness and sanctity of life. How, then, with this meaning of the term regeneration, does he hold *baptismal* regeneration, or speak of the whole body of the baptized as regenerate? The answer is, that he speaks so hypothetically, and not literally; and that he himself tells us with his own mouth that he *does* speak so.'—Pp. 119, 120.

Before we examine the passages which Mr. Mozley alleges, in which S. Augustine does *not* tell us that he speaks hypothetically, or anything whatever of the kind, we must revert to the main cause of S. Augustine's being so prominent in Mr. Mozley's argument. This cause is his 'predestinarianism.'

Mr. Mozley says:—

'A reader of S. Augustine cannot at first understand how it is that he maintains the latter position, and yet maintains everywhere baptismal regeneration; and that without any sign of a peculiarity in his sense of baptismal regeneration, or difference from antiquity in it; or the least apparent idea on his own part of any difficulty in holding the two together, or need of explanation for it. But here is the solution. The assertion which is to be reconciled with predestinarianism in S. Augustine is not a literal but an hypothetical assertion; and in this combination there is no difficulty.'—P. xliii.

Again:—

'I cannot but observe, too, that had baptismal regeneration been commonly understood in S. Augustine's age in the same literal sense in which it is taken by one religious school now, it appears morally impossible that S. Augustine's doctrine of predestination should have been overlooked by the Church. If their account of baptismal regeneration is true, S. Augustine's doctrine of predestination was in plain and palpable contradiction to a fundamental doctrine of the faith.'—P. xliv.

We are obliged to say, that Mr. Mozley fastens on S. Augustine views connected with grace and predestination which he did not hold, and which are inconsistent with the Church's doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration; which S. Augustine's own views are not. Mr. Mozley has adopted, as the only mode of reconciling these statements, what he must himself allow to be a novel interpretation of the Church's doctrine, 'the rule of supposition;' and so it would seem that while S. Augustine's writings have been the text-book of the theological schools of Europe

for a thousand years and more, it was left to Mr. Mozley to discover the incompatibility of his doctrines of predestination and regeneration, and that they can only be rendered consistent by making his statements about regeneration mere 'suppositions.' Others are accused of sinking S. Augustine's predestinarian doctrines by exaggerating his baptismal doctrines; Mr. Mozley sacrifices S. Augustine's baptismal doctrines to his own theory of predestination.

The fact is, that S. Augustine's doctrine of predestination was a new doctrine; but he intended to hold it, with whatever logical inconsistency, in such sense as to be consistent with all that the Church Catholic taught. His case was parallel to that of persons who would hold the doctrine of necessity in such wise as to be consistent with what we experience. S. Augustine meant to hold the doctrine of predestination in a way running parallel with, but not crossing or contradicting, anything which the Church taught of man's responsibility, or of the efficacy of the sacraments, or of grace. It was like a secret key to or explanation of them. What the Church Catholic held of the doctrine of baptism he held. Nor does the doctrine of predestination in itself at all interfere with that doctrine; for men may be predestined to receive baptism and baptismal grace, and afterwards to fall away and perish finally, just as they may be predestined to receive it, to fall away, and then to recover and be finally saved. The two sets of doctrines may be held, and may co-exist in the mind, like parallel lines, which, produced ever so far, do not meet.

But Mr. Mozley has introduced a doctrine unknown to S. Augustine, about 'sufficient grace,'—and a notion also unknown to S. Augustine, that God does not really give such grace to any except those who shall finally persevere,—and a view of the *rationale* of final perseverance, which is also unknown to S. Augustine. With these notions the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration is certainly incompatible.

The words in which Mr. Mozley expresses the opposition are of frequent occurrence in his volume: if regeneration imply the giving of 'grace sufficient for the attainment of salvation,' it is inconsistent with his doctrine of predestination; because that doctrine, 'representing Divine grace, as in its very nature 'efficacious, and accomplishing the end for which it is given, 'cannot allow grace for the attainment of this end to have been 'possessed at all, where this end is not attained.'

This doctrine is brought out most fully, but in connexion with other views of the subject, in the treatise on Predestination.

In that work it is maintained (pp. 189, 190) that, according to S. Augustine, grace sufficient for salvation is not given to any

but those who shall finally persevere;¹ and Mr. Mozley proceeds, in the next chapter, to determine what sufficient grace is. He says:—

‘The measure of this (irresistible) grace which is required for salvation is the same as the measure, whatever it may be, of goodness and holiness which is required. As this grace is the efficacious cause of goodness, exactly as much is wanted of the cause as is wanted of the effect. And to ask this question is exactly the same as to ask, how much goodness is required for salvation.

‘If the question, then, be asked, how much goodness is required for salvation? while it is plain that no definite amount can be fixed upon in answer, a certain indefinite one can be. Disobedience and sin for an indefinite portion of life are not incompatible with it; but a man must *on the whole* have manifested a good character. And if it be asked, further, what constitutes such a manifestation, and what is the test of goodness on the whole? the answer is, the end of life—that which the man is at the close of the state of probation in which he has been placed.

¹ ‘In the next place I will guard the reader against a mistake which is not unlikely to arise with respect to this doctrine. For it may be asked whether the assertion of an efficacious or irresistible grace involves more than maintaining that there is such a grace which God chooses to give to certain select and privileged persons, without maintaining that it is the *only* grace by which holiness and salvation can be obtained? Whether it cannot be held that God gives an irresistible grace to some, and also gives a sufficient grace to the rest? Whether the higher gift to a select number, which ensures holiness, is not compatible with the lower one to the rest, which gives them the power to attain it?

‘But, indeed, if we consider the matter, such a question as this will be seen to proceed from a confusion of thought on this subject. For upon what ground does any one hold that there is this irresistible grace, except on the ground that human nature needs it, and cannot do without it? but if human nature cannot do without it, nothing short of it is sufficient. This is the ground on which Augustine raises the doctrine, and on which all who do maintain it do maintain it. Indeed, on what other ground can it be seriously maintained? For whether or not it *might* attach as a superfluity to a nature able to do without it, its existence could not be other than a mere conjecture in such a case. For *asserting* its existence there must be an adequate reason given; and what adequate reason can be pretended, except that which is given, viz. that it is necessary? Were this grace, then, maintained as a superfluity, there might consistently be maintained together with it another grace short of it, and only sufficient; but it is maintained as remedial to a fatal disease, as supplemental to an absolute want. The first dispensation did not provide it because man could do without it; the second provides it because he cannot. If any irresistible grace then is maintained at all, it cannot be maintained as a grace along with the other or merely assisting one, but must be maintained as *the* grace of the Gospel dispensation,—the grace by the operation of which all the goodness and holiness there is in men arises. To endeavour, then, to combine it in one system with the other would be to treat it apart from and in opposition to the very ground on which we suppose it to exist. The doctrine of an absolute predestination cannot combine with any other account of the origin of human goodness; it must either be denied altogether, or applied to the whole. An antecedent moral inability in the whole human mass is the very occasion of that decree, which is made for no other reason than to provide a remedy for it. It follows, that while those who are affected by its remedial provisions are endowed with that certainty of attaining to holiness which they impart; those whom the decree does not affect remain in their original inability; and therefore, that, besides those who have an irresistible grace, there are none who have sufficient.’—Hist. Pred. pp. 189, 190.

We cite this passage as a remarkable instance of the method of determining a matter of fact, as S. Augustine's view of sufficient grace, on *a priori* grounds.

'The amount of efficacious grace, then, which is required in order to salvation, is that which produces this final state of goodness, *i. e.* the grace of final perseverance.'—*Hist. Pred.* pp. 191, 192.

Mr. Mozley here introduces arguments which have no place in a predestinarian theory; for in that theory what has the 'manifestation of goodness,' what have 'tests of character,' to do with salvation? With what earnestness would S. Augustine have repudiated such an interference with the inscrutable ways of God! According to Mr. Mozley, the grace of final perseverance is that measure of efficacious grace which will secure such an amount of goodness as is sufficient to make a man regarded as fit for salvation. We must say, simply, that all this is Mr. Mozley's own speculation—wholly alien from the doctrine and the entire line of thought which pervades S. Augustine's writings on the subject. This is, indeed, manifest to any observant reader of the extracts given from S. Augustine in pp. 202—207 of the *Treatise on Predestination*.

S. Augustine knows nothing of this 'measure and amount of grace.' He hints not at such a view as this, which speaks as if there was a certain quantity of grace given out, as of oil for the virgins' lamps, which would burn brightly enough and long enough for the Bridegroom's coming. On the contrary, he regards final perseverance as a distinct gift, depending (as Mr. Mozley himself shows, pp. 202 and 209) on the inscrutable exercise of the Divine will in terminating our life, as well as on the amount of grace given to us. We may hold, even on a predestinarian theory, that grace sufficient for salvation is given to those in whom it will not be ultimately effectual. Sufficient grace for salvation by no means implies final perseverance.

The final perseverance of any one depends on two conditions—his being brought into a state fit for heaven, and his life being terminated whilst he is in that state. Now there is nothing in a predestinarian theory, as such, inconsistent with the belief that God gives grace and takes it away. S. Augustine, at all events, most certainly held that grace sufficient for salvation was given to persons who finally fell away. He repeatedly asserts and argues that men finally perish, who, if they had been taken out of this life earlier, would have been saved. S. Augustine does not involve himself in any of the intricate questions, as to a sufficient length of the time being allowed for probation, tests of character, and the like, on which Mr. Mozley dwells; he simply says, this man would have been saved if he had died before he fell. His life has been prolonged—he falls away, and is finally lost. And this he sets forth in many points of view, as being one of the most inscrutable mysteries of the Divine government.

But there is this fundamental error in Mr. Mozley's theory:—that nothing can be regarded as a gift of God unless it be a final gift; that a gift given to be taken away is no gift. This assumes that the gift of grace is an absolute gift, nowise contingent on our use of it. But even on a predestinarian view grace may be given absolutely and irrespectively of our conduct, and absolutely and irrespectively be taken away. But most of those who hold the view that grace is given and taken away, would say that the gift of grace was contingent on our use of it; and even if it were not, we could not in anywise be judges, whether there may not be sufficient reasons for bestowing a gift of grace for a time, and then withdrawing it. The doctrine of predestination must be held, if held at all, as that of necessity must be, so as to be consistent with what we experience, or with the known conduct of God. Now all the general statements of Holy Scripture go to show that God does give grace, and afterwards (if we must submit to Mr. Mozley's mode of expression) takes it away. All experience goes the same way. There are those of whom there could be no doubt, humanly speaking, that they were influenced by Divine grace; of whom equally there can be no doubt, humanly speaking, that they die in their sins. Scripture and experience alike teach us that the righteous man may turn from his righteousness, and commit iniquity, and in his iniquity may die. Each alike teaches us to pray that God would not take His Holy Spirit from us. These facts, then, may be held by predestinarians, as they were held by S. Augustine. How they are consistent with predestinarianism it is not for us to show; it may be sufficient to suggest that that doctrine, like the doctrine of philosophical necessity, if speculatively true, is practically false. Surely God gave gifts to the angels in their first estate; it is plain that when they fell, these gifts were withdrawn. Adam had gifts, but he also lost them.

The gift of real, nay, sufficient grace, then, cannot be shown to imply final perseverance, from any view that God's gifts must be final; that the bestowing a gift which afterwards is withdrawn, is incompatible with His attributes.

In fact, the gift of final perseverance is quite distinct from the gift of sufficient grace. S. Augustine clearly distinguished them, and thereby was able to hold all the Christian doctrine of baptismal grace, and all that Holy Scriptures and our own experience show to us of the defectibility of grace, consistently with his theories of predestination. Mr. Mozley refuses to admit the distinction—he habitually confounds the two; nay, he studiously endeavours to prove their necessary connexion, and thereby involves himself in the denial of baptismal grace.

He argues the point in the following passage:—

‘It may be said, again, that the predestinarian need not believe in the indefectibility of grace, but may hold that grace may be given for a time, and then withdrawn; that, consequently, he may believe baptism to be always accompanied *at the time* by grace, and that this is all that is required for a belief in baptismal regeneration. But baptismal regeneration, as above defined, is a *sufficient* grace always accompanying baptism; and such a temporary grace as is here spoken of is not always sufficient grace. Grace may be temporary, or may be given for a time and then withdrawn, for two reasons—either because the person himself has neglected it, when it would have been sufficient for his salvation, had he availed himself of it; or because it was never the design of the Donor to continue it beyond a certain time. If it is temporary for the *former* of these two reasons, it is undoubtedly sufficient grace; but it is a grace which no predestinarian can allow to be universally given in baptism. If it is temporary for the *latter* reason, the predestinarian can allow *such* a grace universally to accompany baptism (*i. e.* such a grace; *at least*, where more is not given); but such a grace is not sufficient grace. The reconciler of baptismal regeneration with the doctrine of absolute predestination confounds temporariness with one of these reasons with temporariness for the other. He first presents to himself a grace which need be no more than temporary, because it may be withdrawn for neglect, and identifies this grace with that of baptismal regeneration. He then substitutes for this grace a grace which is temporary, because it was always the design of the Donor to withdraw it, and continues the same identification, forgetting the substitution.’—Pp. 108, 109.

Now we conceive that the confusion is produced by our author himself: by his mixing up his own theory of predestination with S. Augustine’s doctrine of grace. The question as to the nature or amount of the grace given in baptism is quite independent of the question of final perseverance. The grace is not the less real or the less efficacious while it is possessed, because it will only be possessed for a time. The notion that the grace given in baptism, is that grace which is to last on till it results in final perseverance, is a view of Mr. Mozley, not of S. Augustine. In considering the sufficiency of the grace given at Baptism, we have nothing whatever to do with the question of final perseverance, as will appear from the many extracts we shall make from his works.

Final perseverance depends not only on the amount of grace bestowed, but on the shortening of life. Many a Christian may have grace in such wise sufficient, as that he may live many years in faith and piety; and if it pleased God to cut him off in that state, he would be saved. In the inscrutable justice and holiness of His providence and counsels, He continues the period of probation, and the unhappy being falls away.

Indeed, S. Augustine throughout speaks of perseverance as a distinct gift. He nowhere propounds the view which Mr. Mozley seems to hold, that grace is of a certain strength to carry one on, from the first bestowal of it to ultimate perseverance; that it is one gift, one propulsion, so to say, of the

soul, which has momentum enough to carry it on to the end. He who perseveres, according to S. Augustine, perseveres because God bestows on him this special gift. God wills he should live a longer or a shorter time; but, anyhow, that when he dies he should die in a state of grace.

And as regards the doctrine of sufficient grace, suppose the matter was stated thus, that grace may be given such as that men shall believe, shall live religiously, shall love God, be holy, be such as that if they died they would be saved—who yet, through their life being lengthened, do fall away; can it be denied that grace sufficient for salvation was given to them? They had grace such as to bring them into the condition of children of God, in that sense in which all that are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. They had grace such as to bring them into a state of acceptance with God, and of actual holiness such as to fit them for admission into heaven.

But here, again, Mr. Mozley, in the passage just cited (p. 244), introduces a theory which is wholly his own, and gives a further definition of sufficient grace. It is, he says, that amount of grace which will ensure such a degree of goodness and holiness, and such a perseverance in it as will bring man to the close ‘*of the state of probation* in which he has been placed.’ But this is introducing a view which does not appear in S. Augustine’s theology. S. Augustine does not argue that the duration of life is determined by the close of our state of probation. On the contrary, he considers that the time when our life ends is one of those inscrutable things which are hidden with God. He speaks of God’s cutting off or prolonging our life as being determined by His own absolute will. He looks to the facts, and does not theorize upon them. The notion that our life ends when our sufficient probation ends, belongs to a free will theory, and has no place in a predestinarian argument. But Mr. Mozley joins this on to Augustinianism, and the result is, that the Augustinian view is quite distorted. He says:—

‘Final perseverance, then, is, upon the Augustinian doctrine, the true and absolute gift of God to certain members of the human race; to whom, according to an eternal decree, He has determined to give it: and it has that prominent place which it has in the predestinarian scheme, because it is that measure of Divine grace which is sufficient for salvation. The predestinarian doctrine is that certain persons are predestined by God from all eternity to be saved; but God only saves the righteous, and not the wicked. It must therefore be provided, in accordance with this doctrine, that those persons shall exhibit as much goodness of life as is necessary for the end to which they are ordained; and final perseverance is this measure of goodness. The gift of final perseverance, then, is the great gift which puts into execution God’s eternal decree with respect to the whole body of the elect. He may predestine some to a higher and others to a lower place, but He predestines all the elect to a place in the kingdom of

heaven; and therefore, while He provides that some shall exhibit higher and other lower degrees of sanctity and goodness, He provides that all shall exhibit enough for admission; which sufficiency is final perseverance.'—*Doct. Pred.* p. 208.

It is true that the doctrine of final perseverance being a test, is 'no predestinarian one, but only one of ordinary religion and morality.'—(P. 200.) But on that very account it ought not to be joined on to predestinarian doctrines; it cannot be so joined to them without producing inconsistencies. Ordinary religion and morality may make it probable that God would not terminate the life of any one, till he had had a sufficient period of probation; though on all such subjects we must speak very cautiously. But what has a rigid predestinarian to do with a period of probation, when his theory really excludes the idea of probation altogether? If you introduce the view of probation, you cannot object to the view that grace is given to men, by which they might be saved if they would; and that it is withdrawn because they resist it. But if it be maintained that 'besides those who have an irresistible grace, there are none who have sufficient,' then the whole theory of probation must be put aside.

S. Augustine does not involve himself in any theories of this kind. He maintains a predestination in such sense as to be consistent with known facts, and with the received doctrines of the Catholic faith.

Now, one of the things which the Church held as a part of the Catholic faith, which the Pelagians did not venture to deny, was the efficacy of baptism; and the Church held, that by it was conveyed regeneration, the forgiveness of all sin original and actual, the reversing the effects of the fall, except only a root of sin—that is, a tendency to evil—left in the Christian for him to contend against, but which he had the power to overcome; and this was S. Augustine's doctrine respecting baptism.

Again, it was a matter of experience, so far as experience can determine such cases, that men lived religiously, truly believed, loved, and feared God—were in such a state that they would be saved if they died in it, and yet fell away. Now, S. Augustine does not say, as Calvin does, that all this faith and piety is an unreal thing, a falsity, and a deceit, like a base coin, which seems only and is not. He admits its reality; he speaks of it as the fruit of grace—as, indeed, he must have held that if real, it is the work of God's Holy Spirit. He admits the difficulty resulting from it: How can God allow such to perish? and he answers it by saying, that in all these respects the persons in question are truly children of God, but that in the secret depths of the Divine counsels they are not of the

number of those chosen ones who are the children called according to His purpose. On this point Mr. Mozley not only generally misstates S. Augustine's views, but does so with the very passages that assert the contrary cited in his book, only in one case mistranslating his words, and giving them the very opposite meaning to what S. Augustine intended.

Mr. Mozley says (Doct. Pred. p. 413)—‘I see no substantial difference between the Augustinian, and Thomist, and the Calvinist doctrine of predestination.’ This may be true as regards the doctrine of predestination in itself; but it is not true as regards the doctrines held together with it. In this respect the two doctrines differ entirely.

I. S. Augustine held that all the baptized were regenerate; that baptism had a real efficacy in the case of all infants and of all adults who came to it in sincerity. Calvin held that the elect only were regenerate; and that to the rest baptism was only a form, or only related to the visible and external name and privileges of Christians.

II. Consistently with this, S. Augustine held that grace was given and was effectual, to such an extent that if the person had died in that state of grace, he would have been saved. Calvin held what Mr. Mozley holds, that ‘besides those who have an irresistible grace, there are none who have sufficient grace.’

And Calvinism is the result of Augustinianism only through that error which is the cause of all heretical aberrations, the taking up one position and carrying it out to its (supposed) logical consequences, irrespectively of any other truths, or their logical consequences, which ought to be held together with it,—we do not say consistently with it; for the reducing the two to a consistency may be quite beyond our power.

But we will let S. Augustine speak for himself; and we wish our readers to see that he holds that persons may have real grace, holiness, piety, and faith, may be such as if they died they would be saved, and yet may fall away, die in their sins, and perish eternally; that he holds that the cause why God cuts short the life of one and protracts that of another is wholly inscrutable; that it can only be paralleled by the inscrutable exercise of His Will, by which, of two twins, one dies before baptism and loses a place in the kingdom of heaven, another lives, is baptized, dies, and is saved. Here we take the extracts as Mr. Mozley translates them (Doct. Pred. pp. 206, 207):—

‘If any one asks me why God does not give perseverance to those who by His grace lead a Christian life, and have love, I reply that I do not know,’ &c.¹ . . . ‘Of two children, why one is taken and another left; of two adults, why

¹ De Corr. et Grat. c. viii.

one is so called that he follows the caller, and the other either not called at all, or not *so* called, belongs to the inscrutable judgments of God. *Of two pious men, why final perseverance is given to one and not to the other, belongs to His still more inscrutable judgments.*"¹ . . . The *grace of beginning* and the *grace of persevering to the end*, is not given according to our merits.² . . .

Let us here observe, once for all, that if the one of these men be not really pious, if his seeming goodness be not real, (and it cannot be real if it be not the fruit of grace,) if according to the horrible view of the Calvinist, it be but a splendid sin; then there is nothing at all inscrutable in God's not giving perseverance, which indeed would only be a perseverance in hypocrisy.

Again:—

'Wonderful indeed, very wonderful, *that to some of His own sons, whom He hath regenerated, and to whom He hath given faith, hope, and charity, God does not give perseverance.*'³ I am speaking of those who have not the gift of perseverance, who have turned from *good* to *evil*,⁴ &c.

We think it is plain from these passages, that, as has been generally held by theologians of all schools, S. Augustine taught that it was God's grace, which produced the fruit of faith and piety in those who would not finally persevere. If so, there is nothing inconsistent whatever in his holding that all the baptized are regenerated, on the view that regeneration implies actual holiness, and that some only of them persevere.

The fact also, that S. Augustine held that these were real graces, and yet temporary, shows us the true meaning of the following places, which Mr. Mozley quotes in the work now before us, pp. 120, &c., to show that S. Augustine, 'with his own mouth, 'tells us that he speaks in the way of supposition, and not 'literally,' when he says that all the baptized are regenerate. 'His explanation,' Mr. Mozley says, 'is, that those who are 'called by this name are not always really what they are called, 'the regenerate, when wicked men, being regenerate only by 'supposition and presumption.' He begins by citing the last extract but one of those we have given above. He states S. Augustine's difficulty and explanation thus:—

"'Wonderful that is that some should be regenerate and yet not be ultimately good men.'" This is his difficulty: now for his explanation. "We *call* them," he says, "elect, disciples of Christ, and children of God, because those whom we see to have been regenerated and to live piously *are to be called so*. But if they have not perseverance, and do not abide in that in which they have begun, they are not truly called so: *they are only called, and are not really, children of God*, inasmuch as they are not so in His eyes who knows what they will be, and knows they will turn from good to evil.'"⁵—P. 120.

¹ De Dono Persev. c. ix.

² Ibid. c. xiii.

³ De Corr. et Grat. c. viii.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ 'Appellamus ergo nos et electos, et Christi discipulos, et Dei filios, quia si appellandi sunt, quos regeneratos pie vivere cernimus; sed tunc vere sunt quod

Now this is not S. Augustine's explanation of the difficulty; his explanation of the difficulty, if explanation it can be called, is the answer of analogy, the adducing the parallel difficulty of the taking away the children of holy and believing men without baptism, and allowing those of unbelieving, unholy men to be baptized. It is all, he says, one great mystery:—'We are speaking of those who have not the gift of perseverance, but, when their good will falls away from good to evil, die. Let them answer, if they can, why God did not take them out of the perils of this life at the time when they were living faithfully and piously, so that wickedness might not change their understanding, nor feigning deceive their souls?'¹ The whole difficulty then, and the whole answer to it, go on the supposition that their faith and piety are real and genuine.

What Mr. Mozley alleges as the answer to that difficulty, is the answer to another, which he cites himself in the next page (p. 191, note 2), which is more subtle, because of the twofold sense of the words, 'sons of God.'

"Let not the fact that God withholds perseverance from His sons surprise us. God forbid, indeed, that this should be true of those who are predestinated and called according to His purpose; *i. e.* of the true sons of promise. But others who will hereafter live and die in sin, though for the time that they live piously they are *called* the children of God, are not considered the children of God by the foreknowledge of God."—P. 121.

They are the sons of God who are now walking after the Spirit; they are the sons of God who are His secret and hidden elect. And S. Augustine's answer is not that they seemed to be His sons when they were not by the semblance of righteousness; but that while they were His sons by present adoption and present obedience, they were not such by His secret election. He says this again and again, in the chapter of which Mr. Mozley has extracted, and, we think, misinterpreted, a few lines. 'They *whilst they live religiously* are called the sons of God,' (observe they do live religiously, really so,) but inasmuch as 'they will live irreligiously, and will die in that irreligiosity, he does not call them sons of God *in the foreknowledge of God*. . . 'Some who are called the sons of God by us *on account of grace*

appellatur, si manserint in eo propter quod sic appellantur. Si autem perseverantiam non habent, id est in eo quod ceperunt esse non manent, non vere appellantur quod appellantur et non sunt: apud eum enim hæc non sunt, cui notum est quod futuri sunt, id est, ex bonis malis.—De Corrept. et Grat. c. 9.' "Regenerate" is used here partly as a technical synonyme for *baptized*.¹ Such is our author's quiet method of explaining away S. Augustine.

¹ De his enim disserimus, qui perseverantiam bonitatis non habent, sed ex bono in malum deficiente bona voluntate moriuntur. Respondeant, si possunt, cur illos Deus, cum fideliter et pie viverent, non tunc de vitæ hujus periculis rapuit ne malitia mutaret intellectum eorum, et ne fictio deciperet animas eorum. —De Corr. et Grat., c. viii. § 19.

'received though but for a time (*vel temporaliter*), are yet not so 'to God.'¹ So it seems S. Augustine's explanation was not the hypothetical character of grace, but that which Mr. Mozley denounces so vehemently, its being given only temporally. Again, their righteousness is real, not pretended, and still less a supposition. 'They were not sons, even when they were 'in the profession and name of sons, not because *they simulated 'righteousness*, but because they did not continue in it.'² Again, 'They were not in the number of sons, *even when they were in 'the faith of sons*.'³ Of a piece with all this is the passage cited by Mr. Mozley, which says, 'We call them elect, disciples 'of Christ, and children of God, because they have been regenerated and live piously,' though they are not of so *apud Eum*, that is, are not of the secret elect, the sons according to God's foreknowledge. It is not the reality of their present regeneration or grace which is denied, but their belonging to the number of the chosen; as the saintly doctor goes on to speak of some that '*love God*, and do not *continue in that love to the end*.'⁴

This is confirmed by the next passage cited by Mr. Mozley:—

'Have not both been called, and both followed the call, and both been justified, and both renewed by the laver of regeneration? They have; but if one who had foreknowledge heard this said of both, he would answer and say, This is all true *according to our temporary standard*, but, according to another, one of these two never was with us; for, if he had been with us, he would have remained with us. There was even before a distinction between them. What distinction? The books of God are open, and let us not avert our eye. Holy Scripture cries aloud, and let us hear it. They were not of us, because they were not called according to His purpose; were not chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world; not predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things.'⁵—P. 121.

¹ Isti cum pie vivunt dicuntur filii Dei (really so), sed quoniam victuri sunt impie et in eadem impietate morituri, non eos dicit filios Dei *præscientia Dei*. . . Quidam, qui filii Dei propter *susceptam vel temporaliter gratium* dicuntur a nobis, nec sunt tamen Deo.—Ibid.

² Non erant filii, etiam quando erant in professione et nomine filiorum: *non quia justitiam simulaverunt*; sed quia in ea non permanserunt.—Ibid.

³ Non erant in numero filiorum, et quando erant in fide filiorum.—Ibid.

⁴ Propter hoc Apostolus cum dixisset, 'Scimus quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia eo-operatur in bonum;' sciens *nonnullos diligere Deum*, et in eo bono in finem non permanere, mox addidit, 'his qui secundum propositum vocati sunt.'—Ibid. § 23.

⁵ 'Nonne postremo utrique vocati fuerunt, et vocantem secuti, utrique ex impiis justificati, et per lavacrum regenerationis utrique renovati? Sed si hæc audiret ille, qui sciebat proculdubio quod dicebat, respondere posset et dicere: *Vera sunt hæc, secundum hæc omnia ex nobis erant; veruntamen secundum aliam quandam discretionem non erant ex nobis*; nam si fuissent ex nobis, mansissent utique nobiscum. Quæ est tandem ista discretio? Patent libri Dei; non avertamus aspectum: clamat Scriptura divina; adhibeamus auditum. Non erant ex eis quia non erant secundum propositum vocati; non erant in Christo electi ante constitutionem mundi, non erant in eo sortem consecuti, non erant predestinati secundum propositum ejus qui universa operatur.—De Dono Perseverantiæ, c. 9.'

Here we are obliged to correct Mr. Mozley's translating, which is generally free, but in this place is incorrect, making S. Augustine say exactly what he does not say. S. Augustine does not deny the *reality* of their calling, following the call, being justified, regenerated, and renewed; he admits it; he represents one admitted to see the secret things of God, saying, 'These things are true; *in all these respects (secundum hæc omnia)* they were of us; but according to another distinction, that of being elect in Christ before the foundation of the world, they were not of us; that is, in their calling, obeying the call, being justified, regenerate, renewed, they were of us; not as Mr. Mozley renders the words *secundum hæc omnia*, according to our temporary standard,' but really. In all these respects the elect and non-elect, who live religiously, are alike. There is no denial of the reality of the gifts to the one any more than the other; but the one is of the secret elect and the other not.

The same is the explanation of the passage cited p. 122, where the question turns on the twofold sense of the word 'elect,' a title given to Christians, '*so long as they believe, are baptized, and live well.*' S. Augustine does not deny the reality of their faith and good living. He admits it. He knew that grace was given temporarily, notwithstanding Mr. Mozley's Calvinistic difficulties, or his denying the possibility of there being any sufficient grace which does not result in final perseverance.

Again, 'regenerated parents, *if at least they persevere in the same grace*, without doubt will not be hurt by (the root of original) sin, on account of the remission of sin, which has been wrought in them, except when they use it (the remaining root of bitterness¹) ill.

Again, of those that are not predestined to life, 'they either lie under original sin which is never remitted by regeneration,' (i.e. they die without baptism) 'or they receive the grace of God, but are only for a time (*temporales sunt*) and do not persevere; they forsake God and are forsaken by Him.'²

And this temporary grace was also in S. Augustine's view sufficient for salvation. By 'grace sufficient for salvation,' we understand such a measure of grace as shall suffice to bring a person to such faith and holiness that if he died in that state he would be saved. For the grace, if we may be so allowed to speak, has done its work when it has done this; that holiness is

¹ Ideo regeneratis parentibus, si tamen in eadem gratia perseveraverint, procul dubio ista propter remissionem peccatorum, quæ in eis facta est non nocebit, nisi cum ea male utantur, &c.—De Pecc. Orig. x. 38.

² Aut enim jacent sub peccato, quod originaliter generatione traxerant, . . . quod non est regeneratione dimissum . . . aut gratiam Dei suscipiunt, sed temporales sunt, nec perseverant; deserunt et deseruntur.—De Corr. et Grat. c. xiii. 24.

sufficient for salvation, which would ensure the salvation of a man if he died in that state. Theories of the adequate manifestation of character are wholly foreign to S. Augustine's mind.

We shall cite some passages as they occur in the work, 'De Dono Perseverantiæ;' and first we extract two passages by the way, as indicating S. Augustine's way of viewing the subject, in contrast to Mr. Mozley's:—'If any one has lived (say ten years) 'from the time he became a believer, and in the middle of that 'time has lapsed from the faith, did he not persevere five years?'¹ This is the question on the meaning of the word 'perseverance.' 'No,' says S. Augustine, 'I mean final perseverance, 'and he 'rather has this who has been a believer for one year, or as much 'less as you may imagine, if he has lived faithfully till his death, 'than a believer for many years, if a short time before his death 'he fell from the steadfastness of faith.' This is not like the theory of sufficient manifestation of character. Again:² 'We 'call a man chaste whom we know to be chaste, whether he is or 'is not to continue in that chastity; and *whatever other Divine 'gift there be that is capable of being possessed and lost*, we say 'that a man has it as long as he has it;' but perseverance none can have unless he has it to the end; this indicates that the gifts of grace may be lost. The other passages express the view which runs through the work, and which is introduced by S. Augustine to show that perseverance is really a gift of God; the duration of life as well as the bestowal of grace, being irrespective of any merits of man, being determined by His own unsearchable will. He is speaking of those 'pious men' 'who 'have been called, have obeyed the call, have been justified, 'regenerated by baptism, and renewed;' to whom, in the passage cited above, p. 252, it is not given to persevere, he says, 'God, knowing beforehand that they would fall, could have 'taken them out of this life, before that fall took place.'³ It is clearly understood that in that case they would have been saved. Therefore they had had grace sufficient for salvation. Again, more explicitly:⁴ 'We see, that by His secret yet just judgment,

¹ Si ex quo fidelis quisque factus est, vixit, verbi gratia, decem annos, et eorum medio tempore a fide lapsus est, nonne quinque annos perseveravit? . . . potius hanc habuit unius anni fidelis et quantum infra cogitari potest, si donec moreretur fideliter vixit, quam multorum annorum, si exiguum tempus ante mortem a fidei stabilitate deficit.—De Dono Pers. c. i. (1).

² Dicimus quippe castum quem novimus castum, sive sit sive non sit in eadem castitate mansurus; et si quid aliud divini muneris habeat, quod teneri et amitti potest,' &c.—Ibid. c. viii. (10).

³ Certe poterat illos Deus præsciens esset apuros, antequam id fieret, auferre de hac vita.—Ibid. c. x. (22).

⁴ Videmus ejus occulto, justo tamen judicio quoniam non est iniquitas apud Deum quosdam etiam post Baptismum pessime vivendo perituros, in hac tamen vita quo usque percant detineri; *qui non perirent, si eis corporis mors, lapsum eorum præveniens, subveniret.*—Ibid. (23).

'for there is no unrighteousness with God, some even who will be lost by living wickedly after baptism, are yet kept in this life until they are lost, who would not have been lost, if the death of the body, anticipating their fall, had come to aid them.' Again:¹ 'Of the regenerate themselves, we see some persevering to the end and so departing from life, others kept in this life till they fall away, who certainly would not have fallen away, if they had departed hence before they lapsed; and again, others who have lapsed, not departing out of this life until they return (to God), who certainly would have perished, if they departed out of life before they returned. Hence it is most clear that the grace of God, both for beginning and for persevering to the end, is not given according to our merits, but is given according to His own most secret, and yet most just, and wise, and beneficent will.' It is clear that this argument would be worthless if the regeneration, and faith, and piety, and good life of these persons had been in supposition only, or pretended, or not the effect of Divine grace.

We are sorry thus to part with Mr. Mozley; but we cannot but express our judgment of his work as a treatise on theology. His theory is bold, striking, effectual for reconciling the Church's statement with the judgment of men of the world, or with the theological system of Calvin, but it is utterly without foundation in fact. There is no semblance of evidence for it in primitive antiquity, or in the writers of later times. It represents the whole of the Church's teaching about grace as well as baptism to be a mirage, utterly and absolutely unreal; and obliges us to believe that the teachers and professors of Christianity from the first have been unconsciously supposing that to be real which is fictitious, and the whole faith of the Church to be one complex dream. Happily the theory is so contradictory to fact, that it will itself vanish as a dream, or as the morning mist, which, bright and beautiful as it may look, will only for a moment obscure our view of the everlasting hills, soon rolling away, and leaving them standing, as of old, majestic and immovable.

Mr. Mozley has done many services to Christian literature. In such fields we trust again to welcome him; and we only regret that he has wasted his great powers on inventing a theory which is neither theologically nor historically defensible.

¹ Ipsos regeneratos, alios perseverantes usque in finem hinc ire, alios quousque decedant hic teneri, qui utique non decidissent, si antequam laberentur hinc exissent; et rursus quosdam lapsos quousque redeant non exire de hac vita, qui quæ perirent, si antequam redirent, exirent. Unde satis dilucido ostenditur et oandi, et usque in finem perseverandi gratiam Dei non secundum merita a dari; sed dari secundum ipsius secretissimam, eandemque justissimam, ntissimam, beneficentissimamque voluntatem.—Ibid. c. xiii. (32, 33).

NOTICES.

'THE Delegates of the Press,' at Oxford, have just favoured the reading public with an edition of 'Burnet's Life of Hale and Fell's Life of Hammond.' Unfortunately the book is priced at twice its market value, and the University authorities have, at the same time, contrived to make it valueless, by selecting the worst edition of the 'Life of Hammond' from which to make their reprint. The Delegates of late seem to have been influenced but by one motive, that of wasting the funds at their command upon republishing books neither scarce nor valuable. With the exception of Le Neve's 'Fasti,' and the recent 'Bingham,' scarcely any book has of late issued from the Oxford press which was worth reprinting, or which might not better have been left to the ordinary channels of publication. 'Carte's Life of Ormond,' 'Burnet's Lives of the Dukes of Hamilton,' 'Smalridge's Sermons,' and such ware, are surely not the class of books which we have a right to expect from the Oxford Delegates. We protest against this waste of trust funds. Such, if any such there be, as wished for a book like Smalridge, might on any day, from the shelves of the second-hand booksellers of London, collect fifty copies. We have seen a large handsomely bound folio copy sold for eighteen-pence. But not only do the Oxford Delegates reprint worthless books, but their editions of good books are much below the mark. A few years hence, in despair, the Delegates of the Press will sell for waste paper what the present Delegates have wasted the money of the University upon. The Oxford reprints, which possess in themselves a permanent value, are too often deformed by careless editing. The Clarendon Press edition of Strype's works, for instance, perpetuates almost all the blunders of the old editions. The twenty-one volumes of Strype might have been made of still greater value to historical literature if a careful collation had been undertaken of the records which Strype copied from, and which, from insufficient acquaintance with ancient MSS., he too often copied inaccurately. We have surely a right to expect that the Delegates of the Clarendon Press will turn their thoughts to works of too slow a sale to be remunerative to booksellers, and at the same time of such lasting value as to make their republication a real boon. Why should not the University commission a competent Editor to prepare an amended edition of 'Wilkins' Concilia,' with such a supplement as additional researches might enable him to give? Or again, why should not the Delegates make some effort to publish an 'Anglia Sacra' worthy of the Church? Countless are the treasures which lie buried on the shelves of the College and University libraries in Oxford. An accidental fire may make us deplore the loss of what is as completely disregarded as if they had already perished. Several times we have been promised the publication of the 'Theological Dictionary of Gascoigne,' a solitary MS. of which is in existence, and that in a College library at Oxford. It contains the most authentic materials for the history of the English Church during the dreary interval from Edward the Third to Henry the Sixth. Literary societies, however, have not found this work of sufficient general

interest to justify their undertaking its publication; but surely the University might and ought to cause such MSS. to be no longer the mere literary lumber of College libraries. When an attempt shall have been made, and perhaps with success, by the Heywood of the future, to seize the funds now so sadly misused, we shall hear lamentations of what might have been done, and shall have to deplore that so little was really effected by the Oxford Delegates.

It is only courteous to acknowledge the sort of compliment which Mr. Brudenell Barter, in the preface to a 'Postscript' to his tract on the 'Progress of Infidelity,' (Rivingtons,) pays to the literary acquirements of the writers in this Review: this recognition, however, is balanced by an offence against truth, which in other days one so just, as well as warm-hearted, as Mr. Brudenell Barter would not have committed. Is there no true friend to remind the Rector of Highclere of the Archbishop of Granada? If Mr. Barter considers our recent strictures on the Chevalier Bunsen, on Dr. Donaldson, Professor Jowett, and Mr. Stanley, 'long and complimentary,' we can only say that our own view and that of Mr. Barter as to 'complimentary' criticism differs. However, to pursue the subject would be unkind and ungracious. To those who have read Mr. Barter's pamphlet, we shall have to assign no reasons for declining to enter into a dispute with one whom we cannot but deeply respect; while to those who are strangers to this publication, we gladly leave the remembrance of a warm-hearted and dutiful clergyman, who in his day has done service to the Church, whose ministry he has by his life adorned.

There seems to be a desperate disturbance in the ranks of Dissent. The outward form of the present heart-searchings is contemptible and even ludicrous. A Mr. Lynch publishes a small volume of poetry, called the 'Rivulet.' As far as we can judge from extracts—for in the course of the controversy almost the whole volume has been produced—name and matter tolerably agree. Mr. Lynch's little stream glides glibly along: it is not very deep nor very picturesque, but pretty and at least colourless. The 'Eclectic Review' praises the volume; when, much to the surprise of the religious world, the pothouse journal, the notorious 'Morning Advertiser,' the paper owned by the publicans, and whose specialty is the prize-fight and the turf prophecy, the organ of the licensed victuallers and the ring, in the name of dissenting orthodoxy denounces Mr. Lynch and the 'Eclectic' as unevangelical. Fifteen dissenting teachers, and some of them certainly men of note in their way—such as Mr. Newman Hall, Mr. Binney, and Dr. Vaughan—come forward with a testimonial to Mr. Lynch's orthodoxy and the soundness of the inculcated versicles. Nothing daunted by this theological phalanx, but of course pleased with the good luck which had turned him into the Athanasius of the occasion, Mr. James Grant, Editor of the 'Morning Advertiser,' fires away article after article, in his own newspaper, of the most rampant and truculent abuse of Mr. Lynch and dissenting preachers in general; which articles he reprints in an ugly pamphlet, 'The Controversy on important Theological Questions,' &c. (Collingridge,) of which, so he assures us, the sale is immense and the popularity unbounded. That is to say, Dissenters have greater confidence in the theological powers of the distinguished author of 'The

Great Metropolis,' than in their chosen pastors. The 'Patriot' newspaper, which is, we believe, the dissenting organ, not caring to be unceremoniously ousted from its accredited post of literary theologian to the three denominations, defends Mr. Lynch, not without a reasonable growl at its brother 'the Tiser.' Whereupon one 'John Campbell, D.D.' Editor of a rival dissenting print, called the 'British Banner,' of course because the 'Patriot' takes one side, takes the other, and publishes 'Seven Letters on Nonconformist Theology,' written in a style which we should consider as simply savage. The 'Record,' true to its affinities, joins battle on the side of the 'Morning Advertiser;' and as the conflict widens so it deepens in scurrility and bitterness. *Non nostrum est*: and to the parties most immediately concerned our judgment would go for nothing: but such as it is we volunteer it. The 'Rivulet' we consider an inoffensive publication, but from its mere prettiness and sentimentality rather unfitted for 'congregational purposes;' at least we should consider them very irreligious congregations which addressed Almighty God with such commonplace maunderings as Mr. Lynch's. The controversy has, however, brought out this, that the disorganization of Dissent is complete; and that in the breaking up of its old traditions, nonconformity is in many influential quarters not unjustly suspected of rationalizing tendencies. But that any system can only find its defenders of the faith in such champions as Dr. Campbell and Mr. James Grant, is a slur on its intellectual and moral capacity, which evangelical dissent has yet to account for. Meanwhile indirect advantages to truth are spreading: Mr. Binney publishes a pamphlet in favour of liturgies: and not content with building Gothic chapels, we now hear of congregations adopting regular Prayer-books and chanting as signs of an improved tone among Dissenters. The representative of the old narrow-minded prejudices is the young conceited fanatic Mr. Spurgeon, whose devotees denounce all dissenting preachers but their oracle, as unfaithful to the Gospel. While, partly from envy and partly from higher motives, the ministers generally seem to consider the new Whitfield as a charlatan. Out of this chaos, however, we can only anticipate great gains to the Church and to Divine truth, if in a serious as well as loving spirit we can contrive to show in this Agramant's camp of divided sects and failing religionism a purer and more perfect way.

Ludicrous as is the attitude taken by the 'Morning Advertiser,' it is not more absurd than the position chosen for Lord Palmerston, by Mr. J. W. Lester. This gentleman indites a letter to the Premier, under the title of 'Suggestions for Increasing the Efficiency of the Church of England,' (Heylin,) an object which the genial Viscount has of course shown to lie very near his heart. Mr. Lester's suggestions are to shorten the service by 'omitting the Litany, the Chants, and the pre-Communion Service,' whatever that ritual peculiarity may be, and 'to grant permission to clergymen of the English Church to allow Ministers of orthodox churches,—Presbyterian, Wesleyan, Independent, Baptist, and Free Kirk ministers,—to occupy occasionally their pulpits.'

Mr. Maw Shaw, Curate of Highgate, in a 'Letter,' (Rivingtons,) addressed to, but not inserted in, a newspaper, has done much to prejudice Churchmen against the amiable and excellent scheme for 'promoting union between

the Church and Wesleyans.' This gentleman characterises the Wesleyans as 'equals,' and is content to view 'the reordination' of Wesleyan ministers, not as conferring on them any gift or privilege which they had not before, but only on their part 'as an act of conformity,' rather than of submission. Deference to, that is, an exclusive recognition of the Apostolical Succession, the Curate of Highgate, with a feeble effort at fun, stigmatises as 'wrapping up ourselves in our warm comforters and 'high Church cloaks, our exclusiveness and stateliness, and such like 'nonsensical vanities, in deference to the wishes of the most Christian 'nabobs of this world.' A more foolish and ignorant pamphlet we have not seen for some time; and we regret it the more as it gives force to much of the injudicious language which some adherents of the scheme, with whose hearts we have more sympathy than with their heads, are in the habit of using. This, at any rate, *we* can afford to say, as our pages were the first to inculcate the possibility of incorporating Wesleyanism into the Church: but this let us add, with an estimate of the Church very different from any which has yet possessed itself of Mr. Maw Shaw.

Some of our readers may remember a book which came out about a couple of seasons since, with the rather clumsy title of a 'Glance behind the Grilles of French Religious Houses,' and professed to be the narrative of a tour to Paris and back again, undertaken with a view to studying the religious system of the country, by a Clergyman of the Church of England. With strong Romanising tendencies, the author still maintained the character of a devoted member of our communion, and paraded what professed to be allusions to his own work in his own parish. Our anonymous traveller has just brought out a sequel volume upon Belgium, called 'Flemish Interiors.' (Longman.) We were not a little surprised on opening the book to find all disguise thrown off, and without the slightest intimation being given of any intermediate change, the author talking purely and simply in the character of a Romanist, entitling Dr. Manning the Apostle of England, and so on. If the real condition of the author were what it proclaimed itself in the 'Grilles,' such a trick would have been sufficiently discreditable; but we cannot help suspecting that the two books carry with them the additional disingenuousness of being a romance, if anything so wire-drawn and colourless can be designated by that appellation. Internal evidence points to the writing being not that of a clergyman or even a layman, but of a woman. How far the Anglican colouring of the first volume was part of the machinery we do not pretend to surmise, nor to bestow any detailed examination on the second work. In a merely literary aspect, it is notably inferior to its predecessor. Its facts are discursive and ill-marshalled, while the lighter portions are simply twaddle. Besides the moral harm which works of this sort occasion, they carry with them the additional disadvantage of forestalling the market against really sterling publications. There is no book which, if well done, would be more interesting and useful than a really sensible and dispassionate examination of the religious condition of our continental neighbours by an English Churchman, combining orthodoxy of belief with knowledge of the world, and acquaintance with ecclesiastical history. It is strange that with so full a Church literature as we possess no one has

produced this desideratum. In the present work we see what the book ought not to be.

A fresh proof of the reaction in favour of moderate or Gallican views in France, which the audacious assumptions of Ultramontanism in late years has aroused, and of which reaction the '*Observateur Catholique*' is the type, is afforded in the '*Essaie sur la Réforme Catholique, par MM. Bordas Dumoulin et F. Huet.*' (Paris: Chamerot.) The volume, as its title implies, is a collection of separate essays on various Church matters, written at different periods, by the authors; who combine, in a remarkably fearless and outspoken way, the profession of strong political liberalism, with a zeal for the searching reform of the Roman Catholic Church on a Gallican basis. The Immaculate Conception forms the specialty of the third and concluding part of the volume, with a particular reference to Cardinal Gousset's treatise in favour of the fashionable view. Our authors condense in the body of the work some very interesting information on a by-passage of ecclesiastical history, almost unknown in England, the later days of the Constitutional Church of France, an establishment which we are accustomed to look at in the light of the apostasies of a Talleyrand and a Gobel. MM. Bordas Dumoulin and Huet introduce us to a later period, after the persecutions had consumed the chaff, and the restoration of comparative political quiet permitted a return to social and religious organization. We then find the constitutional Church, with the tacit sanction of the Directory, engaged, under much poverty, in the religious cure of France, with an episcopate completely organized, not only over the country itself, but in the French colonies. Nay, we see it, in spite of the frowns of the Pope, actually holding two National Councils within the walls of Notre Dame, in 1797 and in 1801, with all the formalities requisite to give sanction to their acts, which were chiefly directed to measures of practical reform, and of the accommodation of the Church's system to a republican polity in the State. The leading spirit of this second period of the Constitutional Church was Gregoire, the Bishop of Blois, who is the hero of our authors' admiration, and whom they energetically defend from the charge of having voted for the death of Louis XVI., though it is certain that he voted for his punishment. The republican prelate shows in a more favourable light after he had retired from politics, having, at much risk to his personal safety, publicly refused to renounce his orders, after the example of Gobel, and devoted himself, in his character of constitutional Bishop, to the charge of his diocese. It was quite a possibility at one time, when Bonaparte determined to restore national religion, that he might have recognised the constitutional Church. However, the Pope adopted a concordat, framed on easy terms for the new ruler, and Ultramontanism at last prevailed in France, twelve of the constitutional Bishops having their consecrations confirmed, and being incorporated into the new hierarchy, though with different sees. Gregoire, with characteristic obstinacy, refused to the latest days of his long life, which lasted down to Louis Philippe's reign, to enter into the new state of things, and continued to assert the legitimacy of his episcopal mission. Visiting England during the peace of Amiens, he wore his violet dress in St. James's Park, and boasted that he was the first Roman Catholic Bishop who had dared so to do since the time of James II.

The late Dr. Mill's '*Lectures on the Catechism*,' (Deighton, Bell & Co.) are just what might be expected from the well-known learning and moderation of their author. It was his custom, as we learn from the prefatory notice of this volume, to catechise daily in church after morning prayer the children of his parish schools; and on Sunday afternoons his catechetical class embraced all the young members of his flock who could be induced to attend. On these more formal occasions he substituted for the sermon a short address, in which he recapitulated the substance of his previous oral instruction. From these addresses his son-in-law, Mr. Webb, has compiled a series of lectures which follows the course of the Church Catechism; and the volume strikes us as being likely to be useful not only to such parish priests as may need guidance in what is by no means the easiest part of their duty, but to all who are entrusted with the religious education of the young. To sponsors especially a work like this may be recommended as a most suitable present to their godchildren. There is no task, perhaps, more difficult than to present the mysteries of the Christian faith in simple and intelligible language to the minds of children. It requires a profound knowledge of the subject in order to be a good catechiser. In no branch of science is it more true than in theology that the teacher must be himself not a learner. It is a strange practical error of these days that religious instruction is so generally imparted in the ordinary Sunday schools by those who ought themselves to be the members of a catechetical class. We have heard it said by a shrewd observer, that if he knew a single church in London where a sermon was addressed in plain earnest language, by a competent theologian, to a class of children, he would go to hear no other preacher. We will not say that Dr. Mill in the present lectures never rises above the level of his audience; but certainly many of them are eminently simple, and lucid, and intelligible. His style here is characteristically like that of his greater works, and yet, unlike them, remarkably free from obscurities or involution. The language is vigorous, but grave and unaffected, occasionally rising into passages of much warmth and eloquence. As to matter, no one who knew the author will need to be told that the doctrine of the Incarnation forms the key-note, as it were, of the whole series. Especially useful are the practical refutations of many of the more common errors of popular religionism. In particular it is shown, over and over again, how impossible it is to divorce the doctrine of the Atonement from that of the Incarnation, to exalt one part of the Creed above the other, and to view the meritorious death of our Lord apart from His nativity, His resurrection or exaltation. Again, the vulgar use of the word '*Jehovah*,' as a proper name, is most earnestly reprobated; and it is pointed out that in truth this incommunicable name is involved in that Holy Name of the New Covenant at which every knee shall bow. The concluding Lecture, on the Doctrine of the Eucharist, is, perhaps, the most remarkable of the series. We subjoin two extracts, interesting for their uncompromising antagonism to two opposite errors of the present day. First, as to the Immaculate Conception:—

'It should inspire us also with a reverent admiration of the Blessed Person who was thus divinely and pre-eminently favoured; and that without forgetting that the favour was, through her, to the whole human

'family, with whom the Son of God has thus assumed kindred and relationship. As the person of Christ is one and indivisible, and what He was as man and in His human nature, are the acts and properties of God; therefore the Blessed Virgin, though Christ's mother only as to His humanity, is truly called the "mother of God," as the ancient Church declared at the Council of Ephesus, in its care to guard against all heresy as to our Lord's person. Let us therefore honour her and all saints in their proper place, being careful, at the same time, not to ascribe to any of them any of the attributes of Christ's humanity, such as freedom from original sin. From this birth-sin the Virgin-born Saviour was indeed free, as it was impossible that He should be contaminated with it; but none other born of woman beside Him. "Thou only art holy; Thou only art the Lord;" is the voice of the Church in the angelic hymn that is sung at the Holy Communion. No other was free from our race's sin, but He who alone expiated it—the Incarnate Son of God."—Pp. 78, 79.

And again, with reference to the proper observance of Sunday :—

'Still the error is far from harmless which gives to this holy feast of Christ's resurrection a character so unlike that which it legitimately bears under the Christian dispensation; which instructs people to regard it in much the same light in which earnest Christians of the old stamp observe the great fasts of the year, such as Ash Wednesday or Good Friday; which seems to make the sanctification of the day to consist in a sombre proscription of the kind of cheerfulness which would be innocent on ordinary days. This is utterly unlike the religion of the Old Testament as well as of the New; unlike the Jewish Sabbath as well as the Christian's Lord's-day. Any person may observe that some of our Lord's works of mercy, performed on the Sabbath day, was performed at the houses of Pharisees or others where He was entertained at dinner. This social assembling was without offence on either side; the sole objection of His hypocritical enemies was to anything that bore the semblance of work. Our business on this day is to abstain from worldly work in a far different spirit from theirs; not as if the rest, *as* rest, were a divine service, in imitation of the rest of the Creator; but that our powers and faculties may be more freely employed on the blessed contemplation of His religion, who has opened to us everlasting life. And the more cheerful that contemplation is felt to be by us, the more healthy are our souls.'—Pp. 119, 120.

A well-reasoned Sermon was delivered at the Bishop of Oxford's recent Ordination by Mr. H. J. Pye, of Clifton Campville, and has been published by Masters, under the title, 'The Teacher sent from God.' It deals with the favourite and, we may add, hackneyed difficulty, that the Church of England claims at once to be general and particular, and delivers her doctrines with authority and at the same time as private conclusions. Mr. Pye makes out with precision the abstract and relative character of a particular Church as regards both an undivided condition and a state of schism. Besides the general argument, which is tersely put, there are some very serious and solemn observations on the personal duties of the clergy.

The Ecclesiological Society has at length completed the series—or rather a second series—of that useful and important work, '*Instrumenta Ecclesiastica*,' (Van Voorst,) a collection of working drawings of church furniture, fittings, and the general apparatus of divine worship. Although the work is intended chiefly for the colonies and remote districts, yet by the purity of the designs the principles of Christian art may be profitably studied in this manual. From the nature of the case great simplicity in construction has been aimed at: and we are glad to see that the Society to which more than any existing body the revival of Church Architecture in this country is owing, far from stagnating, seems to be animated with a practical and liberal desire to incorporate into the service of the sanctuary every advance in construction or new adaptation of materials. The last number of the series contains designs for an Iron Church, in which, though perhaps we think that we discover rather the predominance of an attempt merely to translate a stone construction into metal-work, yet there is displayed this laudable desire to keep the Church's work up to the discoveries and requirements of the age. Not, as it seems, that an iron church or palace is, after all, such a discovery: Statius literally describes it:—

'Ferrea compago laterum, ferro arcta teruntur
Limina, ferratis incumbunt tecta columnis.'

Mr. J. H. Parker has published a series of '*Cottage Prints*,' from Scripture subjects, which, from their boldness of colour and decision of design, seem likely to rival with success in general effect, while they exceed in didactic purposes, those rough and irreligious daubs which are to be found in most poor houses. We have to thank Mr. Parker for this attempt, which has considerable success; and perhaps we have not yet realized how important an element of religious instruction to the poor consists in these common prints. As there is a print, and generally a Scripture print, in the poorest room, it is of some consequence to see that it teaches a good lesson.

A second volume of that important and practical history, the '*Annals of England*,' has just reached us from Mr. J. H. Parker, which for use in the better class of schools we recommend highly.

'*Disciplina Rediviva*,' (Bell & Daldy,) is the title of a series of Essays by Mr. Gilderdale, originally contributed to the '*Journal of Education*.' It consists of advice to young men in reading, and forms, as it were, a skeleton map of the world of letters. But it is more than this. Mr. Gilderdale has read largely, and he writes of his own reading in a pleasant genial tone, occasionally reminding us of Lamb, or even of Walton, with better feeling and principles than the one, and a higher scholarship than the other. Merely as a collection of literary recollections this volume deserves to take a permanent rank.

[P.S. Many of our short Notices are, from the length of our Articles in the present Quarter, unavoidably postponed.—ED. C. R.]

THE

CHRISTIAN REMEMBRANCER.

OCTOBER, 1856.

ART. I.—1. *The Roman Empire of the West. Four Lectures delivered at the Philosophical Institution, Edinburgh, February, 1855.* By RICHARD CONGREVE, M.A., late Fellow and Tutor of Wadham College, Oxford. London: J. W. Parker & Son. 1855.

2. *Études sur l'Histoire du Gouvernement Représentatif en France, de 1789 à 1848.* Par LE COMTE LOUIS DE CARNÉ, ancien Député. Paris: Didier. 1855.

3. *De l'Avenir Politique de l'Angleterre.* Par M. LE COMTE DE MONTALEMBERT.

It is a blessed and consoling thought for all Christians, and one which they may well lay to heart amidst the social and political changes which are everywhere in progression round them, that there is no form of earthly government which can rob them, so but they be true to themselves, of their most precious heritage in this world—namely, the hope of salvation in the world to come. When men think upon the dead in Christ, it seldom occurs to them to pause, even for a moment, upon the thought of the temporal rule under which the friends, now in the world of spirits, lived and died; neither are such questions among those which have the most prominent place in the contemplation of our own eternal destiny. They must, when regarded from this point of view, occupy at best but a secondary rank; and over the portals through which we enter upon the study of earthly polity, there should ever be manifest to the mind's eye the solemn warning: '*Querite ergo primum regnum Dei, et justitiam Ejus.*'

And as from the very highest place of survey political questions appear to lose much of the importance which many might feel inclined to assign to them, so too must it be confessed that from much humbler considerations that importance is again liable to diminution. We all remember how Goldsmith sings, in concluding his sketches of the various realms of Europe in

the 'Traveller' (though, by the way, Dr. Johnson is said to be partly responsible for the passage):—

'In every government, though terrors reign,
Though tyrant kings or tyrant laws restrain,
How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws or kings can cause or cure!'

Even Rogers, identified as he was with what is called the liberal school in politics, yet tells us, in a note to his 'Italy,' that 'to judge at once of a nation, we have only to throw our eyes 'on the markets and the fields. If the markets are well 'supplied, the fields well cultivated, *all is right*. If otherwise, 'we may say, and say truly, these people are barbarous or 'oppressed.' (A test this, we may observe in passing, which, while hopelessly condemnatory of the Turkish empire, would tend to justify the Austrian occupation of Lombardy.)

A friend of ours, who printed privately an interesting volume of travels, and has always been ardently attached to the free institutions of his own country, yet closed his book with the admission, that he had learned from travel 'that a fertile soil, a 'genial climate, and a bright sunshine, may produce much individual happiness even in those countries where trial by jury is 'unknown, and the writ of *Habeas Corpus* runneth not.' And a curious illustration of this truth is supplied, if we remember rightly, by the well-known American authoress, Mrs. Beecher Stowe, who, in her 'Sunny Memories,' mentions that she met with Prussians who had emigrated to America, and returned to their native land in despair of being happy on the other side of the Atlantic. The absence of amusements, the gravity, and the strain of constant work, had made life unendurable; they preferred the surveillance of Berlin police to the freedom of the United States. Cheap newspapers and universal suffrage had not proved to be the sole conditions of human happiness.

Shall we say, then, that political theories and questions concerning government are alike unworthy the attention of the religious thinker and of the philanthropist? Not so: we would only allot to them their due place, that so, within the limits thus affixed, they might be treated the more worthily. Although there may, and doubtless do, exist men for whom such problems have no charms, because their hearts are pre-occupied with higher, holier themes, yet in this, as in most things, there is room for much self-deceit. The lack of interest may arise from carelessness and indifference, quite as much as from high principle. If the time and thought devoted to these subjects might in some cases have been better spent, it is undeniable that in many instances they might and would have been spent in a far worse manner. If both the higher and the lower interests of the human race be frequently removed beyond the

sphere of political considerations, it nevertheless remains true, that both are also frequently intertwined with matters of state. The Book which contains the revelation of God's will assuredly does not ignore the possible existence of a science of temporal government. Therein we see portrayed, with great detail, the foreign and domestic policy of the chosen race, combined with partial but invaluable glimpses into the secrets of the great empires with which Israel came in contact; therein we find it prophesied that Christ's spiritual kingdom upon earth should have kings for nursing fathers, and queens for nursing mothers. The Head of our race, as man, not only condescends to be the Prophet of prophets, and the Priest of priests, but is likewise for all time the King of kings; nor does He disdain to recognise within their lawful sphere the prerogatives of Cæsar, while they trench not on those more sacred dues to the heavenly Father with whom He is One from all eternity. And the great Apostle of the Gentiles, while spending and being spent for the extension of his Master's name, is yet permitted to make full use of his privileges as a Roman citizen.

It must, therefore, be possible to consider the problems which temporal government suggests, not only in a philosophic, but likewise in a Christian, spirit. But the task is not an easy one. Not only are the landmarks of definite and universally acknowledged principles scanty and but faintly discernible, but they are also liable to that extensive, and often unconscious, modification which is caused by the circumstances under which each one has had his own lot cast. He who is sensible of many blessings vouchsafed to him through the agency of that government under whose shadow he has grown up—be its institutions imperial, democratic, or constitutionally regal—must be pardoned if he display some prejudice in favour of the system thus endeared to him. And not merely in different countries, but even within the same country, in how different an aspect will the same forms of government appear to men differently nurtured! How natural is it, for instance, that the mercantile class should imbibe a tone of mind unlike to that of the agriculturists! how often, too, are particular specimens of an order unfairly accepted as its true representatives! The student, brought up in the neighbourhood of some true-hearted squire or noble, accustomed to regard the great house as the focus of improvement and benevolence, will read history with a mind predisposed to recognise the merits of aristocracy. On the other hand, Wordsworth relates of himself, in the 'Prelude,' that—

' Born in a poor district, and which yet
Retaineth more of ancient homeliness
Than any other nook of English ground,
It was my fortune scarcely to have seen,

Through the whole tenor of my school-day time,
The face of one who, whether boy or man,
Was vested with attention or respect,
Through claims of wealth or blood.

And this was a dispensation which, while it may have contributed largely to the late Laureate's fund of sympathy with the poor, and the human-heartedness of his poetry, yet likewise, we imagine, tended to make him in early life so warm a partisan of the first movers of the French Revolution. Bearing, therefore, in mind these differences,—remembering that it is impossible to write upon questions of policy in the style either of a treatise on pure science, such as mathematics, or of dogmatic expositions of religious doctrine—explanations of creed and catechisms, wherein one teaching is rightly proclaimed as a divine truth, and its opposite as deadly heresy,—remembering, we say, this great distinction, we submit to the charity and good temper of our readers the following pages upon the subject of Imperialism. If those who agree in the main with the principles advocated in this Review are unable to follow us in many of our arguments and assertions, let them understand, once for all, that we are discussing, for the most part, very open questions, and by no means consider our private sentiments concerning them to be binding upon the consciences of others.

By Imperialism we understand that form of government by which a country, sufficiently powerful to manage its internal affairs without the interference of neighbouring states, submits to the rule of one man, who executes its laws, controls its revenue, and commands its army, and thus becomes essentially responsible before God and man for the domestic and foreign policy of the realm beneath his sway. And not only is this the most ancient form of government, originally springing, as Aristotle admits,¹ from the patriarchal headship of families; but even to the present day it is more widely extended than any other. Whether we consider the amount of square miles, or the number of souls, the greater portion of the earth is at this moment under autocratic rule.

There are, indeed, very different species of autocracy; but they will be found, we believe, principally to fall under the four following heads:—

1. The Imperialism which, though not in strictness limited to Asia, may be roughly termed Oriental. Here the ruler is generally the head of the national religion, as well as of all temporalities. Sometimes he is actually a priest, as, in patriarchal times, Melchisedek. Such was the Virgilian idea of a sovereign

¹ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ συνήλθον. πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ. (Polit. i. 2.)

in heroic ages: 'Rex Anius, rex idem hominum, Phœbique sacerdos.' Such, too, the sentiment of the founders of the Athenian and Roman republics, when they retained those officers (the ἀρχων βασιλεὺς and *rex sacrificulus*) who performed the priestly functions of the abolished monarchy. In China, the emperor is the only priest: the earliest Mahometan caliphs were likewise high-priests; and even now, in Turkey, the chief mufti is but the sultan's representative. It is a peculiar feature in this type of Imperialism, that the land is frequently assumed to belong theoretically to the sovereign alone; that he is, as in China and Turkey, the sole fountain of rank and honour—which are only in rare cases hereditary; and that the law of succession does not recognise the right of the firstborn, but depends upon the will of the emperor. Thus, David of old appointed Solomon in preference to Adonijah; and, within the current century, the lord of the Celestial empire has been known to bequeath the sceptre to his seventeenth son. The Muscovite monarchy has only within the last two or three generations become hereditary; and, remembering the circumstances attending the inauguration of Nicholas' reign, it may scarcely be so considered at present. And, not to speak of Charlemagne's bequests to his different sons, we may remember that it was on the ground that Edward the Confessor had *willed* the kingdom to him, that the Duke of Normandy claimed the crown of England; whence lawyers have maintained that posterity has thwarted that monarch's desires by its obstinate refusal to translate *Gulielmus Conquestor* into anything but William the Conqueror. As, however, this system has died away in the West, we now venture to call it Oriental.

2. A second form of absolutism, and consequently of virtual Imperialism, is that attained to by the inheritors of limited monarchies, who have, either by individual strength, or by the progress of events, been enabled to break through the shackles which lessened their power. Thus, in ancient Greece, as Thucydides informs us in a well-known passage, despotism was established in the cities, in place of hereditary monarchies with defined privileges.¹

Thus Spain—which has been shown by Robertson, Hallam, and her own Balmes, to have been, at an early period in the history of modern Europe, one of the most strictly limited monarchies—had become, by the time of Philip II. a despotism. Thus France—the land of feudal barons, who had bearded their sovereign—was brought by Richelieu to that state of kingly absolutism, which culminated in Louis XIV. The same may be said of Hungary and Bohemia. Indeed, Blackstone asserts, 'that the limitation of the regal authority was a first and essen-

¹ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρας πατρικὰ βασιλείαι. I. 13.

'tial principle in all the Gothic systems of government established in Europe, though gradually driven out and overborne by violence and chicane, in most of the kingdoms on the Continent.'¹

And, perhaps, under this class of imperial rulers may be fitly included those conquerors who, though kings by birth, have infinitely extended their rule by force of arms, and thus brought their own people into a state of greater subjection. Such, for example, is Alexander, who begins his career as king of Macedon; such Attila, originally monarch of the Huns alone; such, possibly, may be considered that hero of romance, as well as of history, the majestic Charlemagne.

3. A third form is that of the power conferred by several princes upon one of their own number. Such we may probably, with Arnold, imagine to have been the old chieftain-monarchs whom Homer paints. Poland long supplied a somewhat similar example. But the most dignified and famous was the Emperor of Germany; that emperor, whose coat of arms, when blazoned on the walls of English churches, took precedence of the bearings of England herself; who was raised to his proud pre-eminence by the vote of independent princes:—

'The Arch-Electoral Seven,
Like choral stars around the sun,
Gird him whose hand a world has won,
The anointed choice of Heaven.'

4. A fourth species of Imperialism remains. There have, in various ages of the world, been states of society, where either the old race of monarchs has been supplanted by a *novus homo*, who has contributed to their downfall; or where, amidst anarchy and sanguinary strife, some master-spirit has arisen, who has vaulted on the steed which was running wild and riderless, and bitted its mouth and brought it into sober paces; a deed of daring which, if tending to the aggrandizement of him who thus triumphs, is often not the less a blessing to the nation. In either case, the ruler who has thus arrived at supreme power, commonly holds it by uniting in his own person the functions of various offices, which had previously been a check upon each other. Among such men we think upon Dionysius I. and Agathocles in Sicily; upon the founders of Roman Imperialism, whose names are to this day given throughout Christendom to two of our summer months, July and August; we almost pause upon the name of Cromwell; and at length alight upon that of Napoleon Buonaparte, and of his nephew, the present Emperor of the French.

Such is a classification—a very rough one, and by no means unobnoxious to criticism, but sufficient for our purpose—of the

¹ Book I. chap. 7.

different species of Imperialism. We proceed to remark upon certain characteristics which are common to all the forms, and upon some of the attractions and the dangers, of such government.

And, firstly, let it be observed, that scarcely in any country, or at any period, has there existed such a thing as pure and unmitigated despotism. Some check is generally at hand, either in the customs of the people or a written code, in the influence exercised by soldiers, priests, or nobles, or again in the very dread of violence and assassination. Mahometan princes have been, of all rulers, perhaps the most absolute. But in their palmiest days of power, the Koran was always a real limitation; and now, as passing events may teach us, the endeavours of an amiable and personally excellent sultan may fail to command the conduct of subjects, who resent a *hatti-shereff*, as opposed to the first principles of their religion. Concerning other Asiatic despots, the reader may find, in M. Hue's 'Empire Chinois,' a just and amusing notice from the pen of one of the first of Oriental scholars, M. Abel Remusat. 'In India,' says M. Remusat, 'not all the adulation of language, which is lavished upon kings, can enable them to tax a Brahmin, or make a husbandman turn merchant. There is the code of Manu ever by his side,—a code considered to be revealed, and finally decisive, upon matters civil as well as religious. The *Son of Heaven*, as the Chinese emperor is termed, cannot choose the sub-prefect of a town out of any class of men, saving the list of candidates presented to him by the *literati*; nor could he omit to fast upon the day of an eclipse, without incurring the reprehension of a thousand pamphlets, which would immediately remind him of his duty.' Roman emperors, who had trampled on the *Lamie* and other noble houses, yet learnt (as the satirist reminds us) to fear the cobblers. Louis XIV., while designedly humbling his *noblesse*, did not lose all dread of the mob of the capital. The emperors of Germany had to struggle not only against the successful opposition of such pontiffs as Hildebrand and Innocent III., but likewise against the complexities of that intricate system of government, which at length broke down under the attacks of France, in the year 1806. It is impossible to read any history of the Germanic Empire without being struck at the amount of limitation imposed upon the will of its august sovereign; and the memory of its difficulties is preserved in one of those piquant fables of La Fontaine, which are often as just as they are witty. That lively writer makes an envoy of the sultan argue in favour of his master's powers as compared with those of the Teutonic Cæsar, by relating how he once found himself safe from the assaults of a hydra with an hundred heads, because these numerous heads prevented it from breaking through a hedge, but was thrown

dynasty. We may see him with that powerful tract of 'Killing no Murder' in his hands, pondering its famous question,—Whether those who had struck down the lion should pay homage to the wolf—with armour beneath his dress and pistols concealed upon his person; his routes continually and suddenly changed; his chamber seldom the same; until the spirit that had never quailed in the open field of battle, is broken down and crushed by this constant dread of assassination. That dread, however, is not entirely limited to those who have carved their own way to supreme power. Oriental monarchies have been defined as 'despotism tempered by assassination:' and it was within the present century that a czar was described as having been seen preceded by the murderers of his grandfather, surrounded by those of his father, and followed by those who would probably become his own.

If the fear of such a fate has at times inspired cruelty, it has also, probably, in other cases, whispered counsels of moderation, and thus become a check upon the excesses of despotism.

It must not, however, thence be argued that there is, after all, but little difference between an autocrat and a constitutional king. Not only is the range within which the autocrat can act freely, and of his own will, far greater; but he is likewise able to *initiate*, and thus become (as has been intimated) responsible to a far greater degree than is possible for the bearer of a limited regality. It may illustrate our meaning, if we remind the reader that hundreds, if asked what one person was, in their opinion, most responsible for the last great European war, would at once name the late Emperor Nicholas; that as many, if called upon to select the chief author of the peace, would choose the Emperor Napoleon III.; but that it would be hard to find a single person who attributed either the war or the peace to the individual authority or influence of Queen Victoria.

We have said that absolutism is, of all forms of government, the most widely extended. Must it not in fairness be added, that it possesses a wonderful fascination for the human heart,—that it has rallied around itself, in many an age and many a clime, some of the noblest and most generous sentiments of which man's nature is capable,—that it has wrought great benefits for mankind, which could scarcely have been effected by any other kind of rule;—and that, even when abused, it has often proved a wonderful instrument in the hands of Providence for the accomplishment of great designs? Of the four great empires of antiquity, three were ruled by autocrats throughout, and the fourth at length adopted the same regimen. And among the possessors of such formidable power, how many have there been whose very names it is impossible to recal without that conscious thrill of emotion which the contemplation of departed

greatness can hardly fail to evoke! Cyrus, Nerva, the Antonines, Charlemagne, Rodolph of Hapsburg, Akbar, and many more, *must* be ranked among the benefactors of their race. Even the most ardent republican, who looks upon the days which needed such governance as past, might willingly admit thus much. Writers of another school have maintained that such monarchy alone is really government; that it alone reproduces upon earth an image of the Divine Sovereignty, and thus becomes an antidote to our individual self-will, and a school of training for the courts of heaven. For ourselves, without adopting to the full so extreme a doctrine, we do not doubt but that millions of souls have lived in peace, and have attended to their domestic and religious duties with greater steadiness and zeal, from the consciousness that their lives reposed under the safety-giving shadow of Imperialism.

And if the rule of one man has been endeared to many nations by the prestige of custom, and the attachment felt to ancient families,—so, too, has the order produced by such sway been welcomed as an improvement upon the lawlessness of feudal barons, or as a source of peace and rest after the strife of factions. When we read of the obstacles to commerce, such as the blocking-up of rivers, and the fees and annoyances upon the roads in France (where an overturned vehicle could not be righted without the leave of the seigneur)—of the difficulties in the way of navigation and of agriculture, which feudality caused, and which the vigorous hand of an unchecked royalty removed—we recognise one of the many benefits to be derived from the voice of a master.¹ Nor need we pause again to do more than allude to the sense of weariness which, after the experience of the bloody alternations of a Sylla, a Marius, and the Triumvirs, at Rome—the ravages of civil war—and the oppression of the military in England, and the Reign of Terror in France—caused numbers who had little affection for the new chieftain, to acquiesce respectively in the rule of an Augustus, a Cromwell, a Napoleon.

Another claim advanced by the admirers of Imperialism is, its patronage of every kind of talent, more especially in the fields of literature and art. They remind us that letters began to flourish at Athens under the sway of the Peisistratidæ; and that the most splendid ornamentation of that city went hand in hand with one of the most wondrous outbursts of genius which the world has seen under the rule of Pericles, when (as the great historian remarks) the Government, though in name a democracy, was, in reality, under the guidance of its greatest man.² They

¹ See article *Roi* in M. Cheruel's excellent *Dictionnaire Historique* (Paris, Hachette, 1855). For our acquaintance with this work we must thank our able contemporary, the *Saturday Review*.

² Thucyd. ii. 65.

point to Hiero, at Syracuse, with Æschylus and Pindar for his guests—Epicharmus and Simonides, his correspondents: to Alexander, with Aristotle for his tutor—Apelles, his chief artist: to Augustus, irradiated by Virgil, Horace, Livy, and some lesser stars of the literary firmament: to Lorenzo de Medici, with Ficino, Landino, and Politian, by his side: to Philip IV. of Spain, the patron of Calderon's pen, and of the pencil of Murillo and Velasquez. They bid us observe that the Elizabethan constellation of Sidney, Raleigh, Spenser, Shakspeare, shone forth around the throne of a Tudor princess, than whom few in England have been more absolute. And, while they claim for the first Napoleon and his nephew the merit of having rendered Paris so striking a capital, they look backward to the reign of *Le Grande Monarque* for a more varied display of genius round an autocratic sceptre. In the well-known words of a panegyrist of Louis XIV. (and *this* eulogy, at least, is simple fact), 'Turenne, Condé, Luxembourg, were his generals; Colbert, Louvois, Torcy, were his statesmen; Vauban, his engineer; Perrault constructed his palaces, and they were adorned by Le Poussin, and Le Brun; Le Nôtre laid out his gardens; Corneille and Racine wrote his tragedies, Molière his comedies; Boileau was his poet; Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Massillon, were his preachers.'

Another advantage, almost too obvious to need mention, is the rapidity, secrecy, and freedom, of movements in war, and in all the procedures of diplomacy, attained by Imperialism. Examples of superiority thus won may be found *passim* in the pages of history.

We may add, too, a point upon which Republicanism claims a kind of sympathy with Autocracy (it is not the only political illustration of the proverb that *extremes meet*); we refer to what may be termed the openness and directness of the rule. In a limited Government, as that of a Constitutional Monarchy, there exists a real and practical danger of the system pretending to be one thing, while it is, in fact, another. It calls itself *μοναρχία*—the rule of one; it is constantly found to prove the rule of an oligarchy, or of the populace. But democracy proclaims the governance of the people by itself, and carries out its theory into practice. Imperialism, in like manner, professes to be the sway of an individual mind, and acts accordingly; perhaps even more purely and consistently than democracy itself. For democracy may be often leavened by the influence of the old families in a State, and thus imbibe a tinge of the oligarchical spirit. Such was often the case with the Italian Republics; such appears to be the idea of that somewhat inconsistently aristocratic republican, Sismondi; such was the political condition, until a very recent period, of Geneva; such is

even now, if we mistake not, that of Berne. Still there remains in this feature of directness, enough that is common to autocratic and to democratic rule to create a certain occasional sympathy between the partisans of either regimen. Thus we see individuals, and entire nations, rush from one to the other of these poles of the political globe. Thus Louis Napoleon, in those 'Idées Napoléoniennes' which he published while yet uncalled to power, declared that, in *his* estimation, the Governments of Russia and of the United States were the only two that were really fulfilling their functions: and these two great nations, apparently so estranged from each other's modes of thought, have hitherto preserved an unbroken, nay, even a cordial amity, throughout the whole of their diplomatic intercourse.

But that which indeed distinguishes Imperialism from every other kind of rule, and which constitutes at once its peculiar force and charm, is its attribute of *Personality*. Abstract principles, codes of law, a national cause—all these are great things in their way; but they do not satisfy the heart's instincts. Man loves to look up to the spirit of his brother-man; while time lasts, he must be a hero-worshipper. Even in the region of science, does not the young aspirant after fresh discoveries turn fondly to the great names—perhaps to *some one* favourite name—in the records of the past? Archimedes and Galileo, Kepler and Newton—are they not as kings of his spirit, embodiments of all that he is striving for? The rising orator may study the technicalities of his art, but his great teacher is the actual speech once uttered by a Chatham, or a Demosthenes. The poet reads pages of criticism; but his model is drawn less from the precepts of Aristotle, or Boileau, than from the ever-living impress of a Homer, a Dante, and a Shakspeare. What 'Epitome Rei Militaris' by a Vegetius, or others, can avail to the young soldier, in place of the vivid narrative of the campaigns of a Hannibal, a Cæsar, a Napoleon? Not all the attractions arising out of the Great Exhibition in Hyde Park, of 1851, could suffice to win for the 'Illustrated London News' so large a circulation, as the single event of the Duke of Wellington's funeral in the year following. Even republics look back—now in the dim twilight of legend, now in the clear page of history—to a single name as for ever entwined with their origin—a Brutus or a Tell, a Washington or a Bolivar. And if for a moment we turn from things of earth to those of heaven, how deeply do we find all true religion to be imbued with the doctrine of Personality! In this respect, Christianity stands pre-eminent, as over all the false religions of the universe, so, likewise, over the less perfect revelations accorded to the patriarchs and to Moses. The Christian is not called simply to obey a law, nor to reverence an abstract, impersonal *anima mundi*. But he has

learnt to look upward to a living Jehovah, who has revealed Himself as possessing, in the unity of the Divine Essence, a threefold Personality. A personal Creator and Father; a personal Redeemer, the Eternal Son; a personal Sanctifier, the Holy Spirit; a personal Arch-enemy, the apostate Angel with his followers; a personal leader, S. Michael, of those obedient spirits who wage war against the dragon and his angels; a personal Head of the human race, as truly our Elder Brother in his manhood, as our Saviour, by the might of His Godhead;—these are the teachings of the Church. Respect, therefore, admiration, reverence for some even of our fellow-mortals, arise naturally out of men's mental constitution; an enthusiasm most miserable and pernicious, if it merely rest on man—if it be perverted from its true direction, to a weak idolatry of power, genius, beauty, apart from true wisdom and benevolence; but excellent, if it leads men onwards from all these glorious gifts to their One Giver; if it come to see in the leaders of our common humanity—heroes, chieftains, poets, inventors, saints—a broken and partial reflex of the Light that never pales; a ray to direct our gaze to Him, who is King of Kings and Lord of Lords.

It is, we repeat, this notable characteristic which lends to Imperialism its attraction, and confers upon it its potent influence for evil or for good, in a manner which no other form of Government can possibly attain to. Patriotism may exist in equal strength under democracy, autocracy, or constitutionalism. Witness the constant glorification of America by our republican cousins;¹ the intense affection of the Russians for their native land; the love of Englishmen (sometimes, perhaps, narrow and insular, but not the less sincere and hearty) for their sea-girt home. But neither democracy nor constitutional monarchy can, of themselves, gratify that yearning which, at times, is felt in all communities for the strong hand and concentrated will of an individual mind. We say *of themselves*, because it is perfectly possible that a Camillus or a Chatham may, for a season, become the virtual ruler of such states. But it is individuality, and that alone, which summons other spirits around itself, and awakes their burning hatred or undying love.

Segno d'immensa invidia,
E di pietà profonda,
D'instinguibil odio,
E d'indomato amor.

¹ 'Le premier trait de caractère que je remarque . . . c'est l'occupation constante et la glorification perpétuelle de la patrie. L'Amérique est l'idée fixe des Américains: la conviction de la supériorité de leur pays est au fond de tout ce qu'ils disent: on la retrouve même dans l'aveu de ce qui leur manque.' (M. Ampère: Promenade en Amérique, p. 3.) Compare, with respect to Russia, Mr. Cobden's pamphlet, *What Next? and Next?* And on the general question of *personal* arbiters of the world's destinies, see a passage of much force and beauty in one of Trench's Hulsean Lectures, headed *The Vanquisher of Hades*.

What code or principle has ever made men fight so ardently as the Tenth Legion did for Cæsar, or the Old Guard for Napoleon? It is upon Achilles, not upon the cause at stake between Greece and Troy, that our interest is centered in the *Iliad*. The Jacobites of the Scottish Highlands, the Legitimists of La Vendée, strove and suffered for *persons*, although (as in many other cases) an idea was entwined with the career of these persons. It is in no spirit of disloyalty that we avow our conviction, that it is simply impossible to bear precisely the same feeling towards the holder of a limited monarchy, because we do not receive from such a personage, however august, the same kind of influence upon the career of ourselves and those around us.

If further illustration of this point be needed, it is not far to seek. There is one of the dependencies of Great Britain, which, though governed like the rest by a subject, yet remains peculiarly free from the machinery of our home administration. We allude to Hindostan. Now, not to speak of the strong impression for good or evil, of terror or of justice, of magnificence in either case, made upon the population (whether native or British) of India, by Clive, Warren Hastings, Wellesley, and others, let us glance for a moment at the rule of its latest Governor-General. Other Colonial Governors may have rivalled the Marquis of Dalhousie in antiquity of lineage—perhaps even in ability; many have surpassed him in the influence conferred by wealth; several, perhaps, also, in popularity of manners. But he has had a position where a man, endowed with the requisite courage and talent, may still govern monarchically; and, as our French neighbours would express it, he has proved equal to his destiny. ‘He has governed us,’ say the Anglo-Indians, ‘like a king of the olden time. When danger or disturbance lowered, the question was—not what will the Government do, but—what will Lord Dalhousie do?’ And mark the termination of this noble man’s tenure of power. When, prematurely worn out by the cares of state and effects of climate, this Governor takes his departure from the country he has administered so grandly, men’s hearts prove too full for utterance; they feel that a presence, which had been a pledge of safety, of stability, and progress, is being withdrawn, and the broken cheer dies away in sobs of lamentation. Strange power of a kingly and commanding spirit; causing others to lean upon it, as by native right, and without involving, on the part of the homage-givers, the slightest shade of meanness or servility!

‘A despot thou, and yet thy people free,
And by the heart, not hand, enslaving us.’

It is high time, however, to mention some other drawbacks besides those incidentally alluded to, to which this form of

government is liable. But it may be well, before proceeding to these, to speak briefly upon the much-vexed question of the origin of executive, and more especially imperial, power in the State.

Waiving upon the one hand the extravagant theories of Rousseau's '*Contrat Social*,' and on the other the teaching of those who would represent monarchy as the only form of government which can claim Divine sanction, there remain two leading theories concerning the rights of sovereignty, both of which have found supporters among reasonable and religious men. These opposite schools agree in allowing that all temporal power is derived from God; but they are at issue upon the question whether, in the case of monarchy, the original tenure is mediate or immediate. On the side of its being immediate, we see quoted the expressions of Homer and Hesiod, the canonists and doctors of their day; the language of the upholders of the patriarchal theory, from S. Chrysostom to the Caroline divines in England, and Fleury, Bossuet, and their followers, in France; to whom, possibly, we may add Count Joseph de Maistre. Perhaps, too, appeal might be made to the expression *vicarius Dei*, so often applied to kings by bishops in ancient times, and by legal writers of the middle ages. Further, an example of a royalty thus emanating directly from on high is seen in the line of David, established on the throne of Judah (for it is idle, as some writers seem inclined, to restrict the *jus Divinum* in this case to Saul, David, and Solomon, against the direct teaching of Scripture¹); and the claim to a resemblance of this right is expressed or implied in the language of Oriental monarchs, and of many princes of the Stuarts and of the house of Bourbon. But the contrary doctrine—that royal authority, though permitted of God and surrounded by Him with sanctions peculiarly august and solemn, yet comes *mediately* through the people—is likewise supported by great names. It has been disgraced, it is true, by such advocates of the wicked theory of tyrannicide as the Presbyterian Buchanan and the Spanish Jesuit Mariana; but it is a mistake to imagine that it does not number more sober and trustworthy thinkers among its advocates. It is, beyond question, the doctrine of Hooker; it is taught, too, by Aquinas; by Suarez (whose words are quoted with delight by Hallam, in his '*Literature of Europe*') probably by Fenelon and a large party of the Gallican divines; by the later Spaniards, as recently by Balmes, with much fulness of detail in his chief work, that upon comparative civilisation; by M. de Carné, in the book named at the head of this article; and finally, with great

¹ Consider, *e. g.*, 2 Samuel vii. 12—16; Lamentations iv. 20.

dignity, and in a very religious spirit, by Sir Francis Palgrave, in his 'Normandy and England.'

Where doctors disagree, it becomes us to speak modestly. We are far from thinking that the direct or patriarchal theory is so devoid of reason as many would represent it to be. It has a *quasi* sanction from Aristotle, and its principles could hardly, perhaps, have won so much affection and support in the day of its distress, had they been wholly devoid of truth. Balmes, who is one of its most recent antagonists, must be read with caution; although too upright for intentional dishonesty, he catches so readily at everything that makes for his case, as to quote one page from an author without observing the modifications introduced into the next. If, as none can doubt, the royalty of Judah was a channel of blessing to God's ancient people no less than its priesthood; if, with Hengstenberg, we may recognise a type of the twofold rule in Zechariah's vision of the two golden pipes conveying the golden oil; then, assuredly, any reproduction of such a rule, even if faintly imaged, must be a blessing still, and that people has preserved no light treasure which can point to a royal sceptre descending down a long line, and wedded, as in Jerusalem of old, to the concomitant authority of God's Church.

But still it must be remembered that the same voice which founded the throne of Judah, did likewise permit, and even in some sense sanction, the rebellions and treacheries connected with the foundation and continuance of the kingdom of Israel. Not, of course, in such wise as that sin could become right; but with a kind of recognition, if one may so speak reverently, of the principle *fieri non debuit, factum valet*. Jeroboam, having received a promise of the ten tribes, ought to have waited in faith until God should put them under him in His own good time. But his restless ambition, as well as the folly of Rehoboam, was overruled to the fulfilment of the Divine purpose. So strongly, indeed, does S. Augustine appear to have been struck by the sanction thus afforded to the new kingdom, that he considers it (though this is probably an overlenient judgment) to excuse both prince and people.¹ But whatever be the theoretical claims of patriarchism, there is probably no temporal government now extant upon earth which could take its stand upon those claims. One power indeed there is which holds directly of the Almighty, in the unbroken series mounting up to the day of the resurrection of its first Giver, to last until the resurrection of all mankind;

¹ 'Prohibitum est populus pugnare cum fratribus suis, dicente Deo per prophetam, se hoc fecisse. Unde apparuit nullum in eâ re, vel regis Israël, vel populi fuisse peccatum, sed voluntatem Dei vindicantis impletam.'—De Civ. Dei, lib. xvii. cap. 21.

we mean, of course, the power of the priesthood—‘that golden chain which is bound unto the Apostle’s bench.’¹ But where, in casting our eyes over the list of earthly potentates, can we find a similar spectacle? The Chinese monarchy is, no doubt, of immense antiquity; but the present dynasty of Mantchou Tartars has only reigned for 200 years, and it gained its seat by force of arms. The native princes of Hindostan are, for the most part, of comparatively recent origin. The family of Romanoff, in Russia, may have been religiously chosen; but still it *was* chosen by subjects, and that not 260 years since. Rodolph of Hapsburg was also an *elected* emperor. The house of Bourbon is probably the oldest line in Europe. Charles X. could trace in a direct line for a period little short of 900 years; but his claim rested at length upon Hugh Capet, and Hugh Capet won his own way to a throne which he did not inherit. What does the very title given in Germany betoken? *Der Kaiser* assumes a succession to the office and dignity of the Roman emperor, and thus recalls our minds, if we suffer them to dwell upon it, to the career of a soldier of fortune. One can hardly wonder at the words which Walter Scott places in the mouth of Cromwell:—‘What can they see ‘in the longest kingly line in Europe, save that it runs back ‘to a successful soldier? I grudge that one man should be ‘honoured and followed because he is the descendant of a ‘victorious commander, while less honour and allegiance are ‘paid to another, who, in personal qualities and in success, ‘might emulate the founder of his rival’s dynasty.’ We do not mean that the sentiment admits of *no* reply; but it is natural, and not without foundation.

We are not, of course, denying the submission due to dynasties in actual possession, though their career may have thus commenced. It was through obedience to the decree of a sovereign *de facto* only that the Holy Nativity took place, as had been foretold, at Bethlehem. It is of such rulers that the Apostle speaks, in the famous chapter of the Epistle to the Romans; and likewise his fellow Apostle, in a passage which certainly seems to make for the theory of Hooker and Suarez.² And it has been ingeniously and not irrationally suggested, that our Divine Master’s sanction of the payment of tribute-money to Cæsar may afford a hint to Christians of the point at which *they* may conscientiously yield obedience to a fresh civil authority. If that authority is so recognised that its coin is admitted as the medium of exchange, its tenure may be fairly considered as a *fait accompli*. Questions of casuistry may no doubt arise concerning fair occasions of recalling the

¹ Le Bas.² 1 S. Peter ii. 13, 14.

deposed family; but if, when a throne is vacant, there be elected to the vacancy one who had no concern in disinherit his predecessor, and had not taken oaths of allegiance to him, we see not how it is possible to deny to such a monarch a certain sort of right divine, nor why there need be a necessary inconsistency in a legend which admits the *voluntas populi* as a condition or a medium of the *gratia Dei*.

Apologising for this meagre treatment of questions, which would demand a separate essay to sift them thoroughly, we turn to the consideration of some of the drawbacks and evils but too frequently attendant upon Imperialism.

The patriarchal rights of the firstborn were the throne, the priesthood, and a double portion. But, as if to show the danger of too great a concentration of power in a simple person, it was ruled that in the chosen race the royalty should go to Judah, the priesthood to Levi, and the double portion to the sons of Joseph. And when we reflect upon the degree of influence exercised in Israel by prophets, in Judah by both priests and prophets, we may gather some idea of the importance of a check upon the sway of absolute monarchy. *Some* check, as we have said, does generally exist; but it may become infinitesimally small. And so unfitted is human nature, under these circumstances, for the immense power devolving upon it—so utterly does it tend to blind the mind's eye and indurate the fibres of the heart—as to render but too intelligible the assertion of Plato, that he of all men would be most miserable who, desiring to become a tyrant, should have his wishes gratified. Hippias, Dionysius, Julius Cæsar, Bajazet, Timour, and a long list of despotic rulers besides, may have been great men, but can hardly be accounted good or happy ones. True that such have been instruments of good, but too often only in that way in which the Almighty brings good out of evil. We must not allow ourselves so to be dazzled by the lustre of great exploits, as to forget the amount of misery inflicted upon thousands of the poor and humble (nor those alone) by mighty conquerors. It is no retraction of what has been said upon *personality* to remember that the meadow of Runnymede, and the battle-fields of Marathon and Morgarten, have likewise associations for which we must be deeply grateful, and a magic and a poetry of their own.

'Two voices are there; one is of the sea,
One of the mountains—each a mighty voice:
In both from age to age thou didst rejoice;
They were thy chosen music, Liberty!'

It is, perhaps, the simplicity of each extreme, democracy and imperialism, that wins the suffrages of those who are fond of

bold and vigorous outlines in their creed. Thus poets often, like Shakspeare, or the Jacobite minstrels of Scotland, breathe contempt for the multitude, and deep loyalty to persons; or else, with Milton, are democrats even to the point of being regicides at heart. Thus music unlocks her treasures for Haydn's 'God save the Emperor,' and the wild wails of high-land minstrels lamenting for Prince Charlie; or bursts forth into the terrible but grand and triumphant strain of the 'Marseillaise.' But those who are not advocates for either of these extreme forms of government, will naturally call to mind that it is not only in their attractive features that they have points in common. They will remember the famous *dictum* of the Stagyrite (to which Burke so naturally appealed in reference to the French revolutionists), that there is a kind of democracy analogous to a regal tyranny, the temper of each being identical; the popular decrees in one case corresponding to the royal injunctions in the other, and the demagogue in the republic playing the part of the flatterer in the court.¹

In Asia, no other rule than that of an individual autocrat appears even conceivable. The native Hindoos, as is well known, imagine the East India Company to be an old gentleman, or a princess. But if this be an argument in favour of Imperialism in Oriental climes, and perhaps in Africa, it must not be forgotten that Thucydides and Aristotle both pronounce limited monarchy to be more ancient than despotism in Europe. Blackstone and others, as we have observed, say the same of the Gothic monarchies of Christendom. It may likewise be argued that some of the benefits attributed to imperial regimen are equally attainable under any government containing a reasonable degree of centralization; while the honours of others must be shared with diverse, and frequently antagonistic, elements of social existence. If, for example, one emperor created the route of the Simplon, and another that of the Stelvio, yet the Swiss cantons of Uri and Ticino emulated these achievements by the formation of the road over the S. Gothard. If Julius Cæsar projected, and Justinian magnificently carried out, the codification of the Roman laws, that work was nevertheless, in Gibbon's phrase, 'a tessellated pavement of antique and costly, but too often of incoherent, fragments;' those fragments being derived from the decrees of the Senate, the writings of the Stoic philosophers, and the labours of great lawyers, not merely of the empire, but of the republic—as Ælius Pætus, the Catos, Mucius Scævola, and Servius Sulpitius. If, as Napoleon himself prophesied, and as great English lawyers maintain, the Code Napoleon will outlast the

¹ Aristot. Polit. Lib. iv. cap. 4th (ed. Bekker).

fame of all its author's victories, yet a great portion of that widely-extended code was a mere transcript of the decisions of the French parliaments.

Still greater must be the deductions from the praise which is given to absolutism for its patronage of literature and art. In at least three remarkable instances of literary effulgence under individual rulers, the *litterati* who were indebted to the peace enjoyed under the sway of a dictatorial authority, were no less indebted to the free air which they had inhaled in earlier days. The great writers who surrounded Pericles, Augustus, and Lorenzo de' Medici, were not the children of an age inured to settled despotism. The era of Pericles was succeeded by one of still greater liberty, and Athenian letters continued to flourish. The age of Augustus was followed by a period of iron despotism, and the human mind seemed to be dwarfed—to lose all original and creative force. Even in *his* day, while we think upon the liberal patronage extended to the author of the *Æneid*, and his friend the lyrist and satirist, we must not forget that other bard, who, no less favoured than these until his fiftieth year, was suddenly banished for life to the wild and barbarous shores of the Euxine. Still less must we pass over that reign of Domitian, when imperial wrath raged not only against authors, but against their works; and officers were deputed to burn in public the writings of the brightest geniuses of the day; when philosophers were expelled from Rome, and memory herself (to adopt the vivid imagery of the biographer of Agricola) might have perished, if oblivion had been as possible as silence. The low standard of literary excellence produced under the imperial *régime* of Rome is certainly most remarkable. Yet a parallel upon a smaller scale is afforded by the first French empire, when, as a contemporary reminds us, Fontanes was considered a great orator, and Lebrun a master of fiction. Nor have autocratic patrons of literature always proved felicitous in their choice of objects, if we look to the tone, rather than the ability, of the patronised. The school of thinkers and of artists encouraged by the Medici was, after all, a sadly heathenised school. And if we recal the name of the one writer of the last century who, above all others, has poisoned the mind of Europe, and injured the largest number of souls, it can hardly be overlooked that no light part of the dire influence of Voltaire arose out of the countenance which he received from two despotic sovereigns—Frederic of Prussia, and the Czarina Catherine.

It may well be doubted whether religion has, upon the whole, gained by the existence of despotism. We do not indeed dispute that the work of Constantine, and again that of Charlemagne,

were highly beneficial to Christendom, despite the lines of Dante on the imaginary *ricca dote*, and the too great tendency to interference in affairs of the Church which Palgrave attributes to Charlemagne. But, independently of the temptation to individual baseness and hypocrisy, there are two ways in which absolutism has proved injurious to religion. In the first place, as extreme begets extreme, and violence violence, political despotism has given birth to spiritual despotism. The lawlessness of German emperors led to the unfounded and extravagant claims of the Papacy. Instead of each being a check upon the other, each sought to usurp the other's place. It was well that Solomon should fulfil prophecy, and depose the priest Abiathar for rebellion. It was well that the priesthood should withstand Uzziah, when he presumed to usurp Aaronic functions. But it is a very different case, when either bishop or emperor attempts to unite in himself the twofold power. For a comment on such attempts, with reference to the Papacy, we may refer to the famous lines of one who, though an ardent Ghibelline, was certainly no Protestant.

'Soleva Roma, che 'l mondo buon feo,
Due Soli aver, che l'una e l'altra strada
Facean vedere, e del mondo, e di Deo.
L'un l'altro ha spento, ed è giunta la spada
Col pastorale, e l'un coll' altro insieme
Per viva forza mal convien che vada;
Perocchè giunti, l' un l' altro non teme.

* * * * *

Di oggimai, che la Chiesa di Roma,
Per confondere in sè duo reggimenti,
Cade nel fango, e sè brutta e la soma.' ¹

Palliation for this conduct, and for the claim of the deposing power on the part of the Papacy, has been made on the avowed ground of the brutality, and the disregard of all mercy and justice, displayed by the mediæval monarchs. Such is the line taken by latitudinarian or unbelieving writers in France, as

¹ Dante, *Purgatorio*, Cant. XVI.—

'Rome that turn'd [the world] to good
Was wont to boast two suns, whose several beams
Cast light on either way—the world's and God's.
One since hath quenched the other; and the sword
Is grafted on the crook; and, so conjoin'd,
Each must perforce decline to worse unaw'd
By fear of other.

The Church of Rome,
Mixing two governments that ill assort,
Hath miss'd her footing, fallen into the mire,
And there herself and burden much defiled.'

Cherry.

MM. Comte and Michelet; and, in some degree, by more religious thinkers in our own country, as Sir J. Stephen, and (for the early period of the struggle) Dr. Arnold. M. Guizot and Dean Milman, likewise, exhibit much candour and forbearance upon the subject. Nevertheless, however true it may be that (as Mr. Chenevix Trench remarks) ‘Papal Rome of the middle ages had a work of God to accomplish for the taming of a violent and brutal world, in the midst of which she often lifted up the only voice which was anywhere heard in behalf of righteousness and truth;’ it does not, of course, follow that a false claim could be other than false, nor in the long run fail to prove a seed of evil. By thus urging pretensions which they and their adherents have long since virtually resigned, the popes of Rome have for all time supplied an argument for Erastian statesmen, and weakened the cause of all true spiritual freedom. Churchmen can no longer maintain that the Pontificate can be safely entrusted with power, and is innocent of all designs against the authority of the *Regale*—for politicians are always able to make a short reply, by the mere pronunciation of the name of *Hildebrand*.

But far more widely extended—far more consonant to the tone of the nineteenth century—is the opposite danger which religion incurs at the hands of despotism. There have been historians and political philosophers, who have expressed a lively admiration of imperial governance, because they hoped, through its instrumentality, to extinguish every spark of religious freedom. The disciples of these teachers are at present very numerous. Such, we fear, was one main ground of David Hume’s preference for monarchical rule: such is the kind of attachment to individual sovereignty taught by Hobbes in the ‘*Leviathan*:’ such the homage paid to crowned heads by Diderot and Voltaire. But while true loyalty is a noble and ennobling sentiment, it is by religious principle alone that it can be leavened with that combination of humility with self-respect, which preserves it from degenerating into baseness and servility. There is no true dutifulness in blind submission to unhallowed commands.

‘Daniel nobly disobeyed, but not from a spirit of sedition;
And Azarias shouted from the furnace, I will not bow down, O King.’

When Hobbes lays down that the sovereign is necessarily judge of doctrines; that the pretensions of citizens to judge for themselves and determine upon public religion are dangerous to the state,—this may be a recommendation in some sense of authority, but it in nowise breathes the spirit of Christian loyalty. Justly does Hallam assert that it sears the heart,

destroys the sense of wrong that has consoled the wise and good in their dangers, and confounds the principles of moral approbation—the notions of good and ill desert—in a servile idolatry of the monstrous leviathan it creates.¹ When Diderot contemplates a statue of S. Ambrose administering to Theodosius that just and righteous rebuke, which was so honourable alike to the giver and the receiver, and bursts forth into wild invectives against the prelate for such daring; when he thinks, with delight, how pleasantly Frederick of Prussia, or Catherine of Russia, would have cropped the saint's beard and ears for his pains, and told him to have carried his fanaticism and his altars elsewhere;—who can fail to agree with Mrs. Jameson in denouncing such criticism as the narrow and one-sided bigotry of irreligion? Who but must think, with her, 'that if, after 'the slaughter at Ismaël, Catherine of Russia had been placed 'under the ban of Christendom, the world would not have been 'the worse for such an exertion of priestly power.'² Those who imagine, with Diderot, that only a weak emperor could have tamely submitted to the archbishop, will do well to look at the splendid eulogy which the character of Theodosius receives from Gibbon.

We much doubt if any exception can be made to the assertion that religion has in these latter days suffered from the hand of despotism. In China, a part of the prevailing indifference to all that concerns the world unseen, may be traced to the exertions of the Emperors Yao, Chun, and Yu, who, more than two thousand years (it is said) before the Christian era, destroyed the priesthood, making themselves sole Pontiffs;³ and to the irreligious syncretism of the Emperor Hiouen-tsong, who about A. D. 800, mockingly paid equal honour (and, therefore, in reality no true honour) to creeds so different as those of Confucius, Lao-tseu, and Buddha. Such conduct may win approbation from fanatic and Voltairian admirers of China, like the French Orientalist, M. Panthier, but they only cause regret to those who see how much additional difficulty is thereby placed in the way of Christian Missions among that civilized but unspiritual race. And if we return in thought to Christendom, do the past annals of despotic Spain—does the present condition of the upper classes in despotic Russia—speak well for the effect of despotism upon religion? We must not, of course, lose sight of the many evils in this respect of Great Britain or the United States; but,

¹ Lit. of Europe, vol. iii. cap. iv. § 3. We have mangled, for brevity's sake, a very fine passage.

² Sacred and Legendary Art; S. Ambrose.

³ M. Bazin, in the Preface to Malpierre's *La Chine*, (Paris, 1825.) M. Panthier (*Univers Pittoresque, La Chine*) makes an earlier emperor than Yao responsible for this change. But this is not important.

on the whole, we should be ready to maintain that a balance may be struck in favour of freedom.

There are many other points which deserve to be taken into consideration by those who would attempt to weigh fairly in the balance the evils and advantages of imperial government. Such are those connected with liberty of thought, with corruption and hypocrisy, with preparation for the enjoyment of freedom. These and some cognate topics will, we trust, receive some slight elucidation in the remaining sections of the present article; it may be well, however, to touch upon them briefly, while the reader's attention is directed to the general question.

The possibility of liberty of thought existing under despotism must greatly depend upon the climate, the race, and the age in which the problem is attempted. We know that such liberty had no place under the majority of the Roman emperors, excepting in so far as the Church by degrees obtained, first, a hearing, and then a triumph. But, at the epoch of the Reformation, several of the reformed countries appear to have presented the singular spectacle of an increase of authority on the part of the princes, together with a great development of licence of thought. M. Guizot, in his '*Civilisation en Europe*,' appeals to Denmark, Germany, Holland, and England, as exemplifications of this apparent anomaly. And, generally, it may be observed that the deprivation of liberty is a severer trial in northern than in southern climates; perhaps, as some have suggested, from the circumstance that mere existence is a greater pleasure in those genial atmospheres than amidst the fogs and long-protracted winters of less-favoured lands. The danger (as it seems to us) to the educated classes, in countries where political liberty of action as well as liberty of thought is interdicted, is, lest they should become mere minions of pleasure, and thus adopt less serious views of life, be less accessible to the influences of religion, than even those who are busied in the strife of politics.

The question of corruption and hypocrisy presents some difficulties. That they are very rife in courts and around despots is undeniable. Tacitus and Juvenal may bear testimony for imperial Rome. Lord Carlisle and Dr. Sandwith can tell of their palmy state under the sway of the Sultan. But we shall have occasion, further onward, to examine whether the Aristotelian charge in this respect, against democracies no less than despotisms, may not likewise be extended to oligarchies and constitutional monarchies.

That despotism can ever be a preparative for freedom, is one of those modern paradoxes which we find it hard to understand. If we may trust M. Nisard, in his reply to the Duc de Broglie's

recent discourse at the Academy, France is in course of time to try the experiment of associating greater liberty with her present form of government. But experience of the past seems to show that the political pendulum has a great tendency to swing with violent alternations from Absolutism to Anarchy, and back again; that too often, in the language of the Laureate,—

‘ He that roars for liberty,
Faster binds a tyrant’s power;
And the tyrant’s cruel glee
Forces on the freer hour.

‘ Greet her with applausive breath,
Freedom, gaily doth she tread;
In her right a civic wreath,
In her left a human head.

‘ Let her go! her thirst she slakes
Where the bloody conduit runs:
Then her sweetest meal she makes
On the first-born of her sons.’

It is the fear of that terrible form of freedom which, Saturn-like, devours its own offspring (the expression, if we remember rightly, belongs originally to the Girondist leader, Vergniaud), that makes the nations who have long been used to Imperialism still cling to it; that causes other nations who have tasted anarchy to take refuge in it. Sometimes, perhaps, men would be glad of one who, like a Cincinnatus or a Washington, should restore order and then retire. But such men are among the very rarest; and anarchy is so dreadful, so unnatural (whatever the school of Rousseau may proclaim), that we see not why respect should be refused to great nations who accept this far less trying alternative of autocracy, so but they can learn to accept it in a righteous temper. And as for those countries which prefer to preserve a royalty, which has not sunk into a mere chief magistracy; which regard this regimen not as a mere refuge from evil, but a positive good,—we may learn to own that forms of government do, like most earthly things, present but a balance of benefits and disadvantages—that what is not absolutely best, may often prove relatively best—and that Great Britain need not necessarily denounce every other form of government, however firmly she may adhere to her own as best suited for herself. Wherever Imperialism expresses, upon the whole, better than any other rule, a nation’s heart and mind; wherever, either from the invisible limitations of public opinion, or from the acquiescence brought about by a sense of duty or of interest, or a union of both, or, lastly, through dread of the worse tyranny of Socialism and disorder, a majority prefer such

governance,—*there*, surely, we may safely say, ‘Let it flourish so long as it pleaseth God!’

But as we have spoken freely of the nobleness of true loyalty, so let us add that a lurid light appears to be thrown by prophecy upon the possibility of a false loyalty in the latter days. It was certainly the teaching of the early Church—not, of course, as a dogma of the faith, but as the most probable interpretation of prophecy—that, as surely as there were those on earth to whom their fellow-men of right looked up, so, too, were there those who enjoyed power, and fascinated their brethren by the very terrors of wickedness; and that, as all beneficent royalty is sanctioned, embodied, and consecrated in the person of CHRIST, so, too, all lawless tyranny and craft and iniquity should, one day, become incarnate in *the* Anti-Christ. Of the Scriptural evidence for such a belief, this is not the occasion to speak; nor of the unwavering *consensus patrum*; nor of the remarkable resuscitation of this teaching in England, during the present century, by such writers as Bishop Horsley, Dr. S. R. Maitland, and Mr. Chenevix Trench. But it is not alien from this inquiry to observe, how greatly the events of the last seventy years have tended to remove the *onus* of improbability which appeared to rest upon the patristic theory of Anti-Christ. Is it possible, it used to be asked, that any Christian nation should avowedly proclaim itself to be infidel—or that men should rush from anarchy into despotism—or that many new states and kingdoms should be created in the space of a few years—or that one man should be able to issue rapid orders to the whole inhabited world? *We* know that these things are not merely possible, but have actually taken place. *We* know that a great people *did* close their churches, desecrate their altars, and write up over their burial-places that death was an eternal sleep. *We* know that Italy saw the Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Parthenopean Republics, and then became subject to a Viceroy; that Etruria, Wirtemberg, Westphalia, Bavaria, and Hanover, were erected into kingdoms; that a single Emperor made kings of his brothers and brother-in-law; and all this in a *very* few years. Since that date (as has been suggested to us), the invention of steam-ships, of railways, and of the electric telegraph, has made the feasibility of universal sovereignty infinitely greater. Alexander would often have been many months’ distance, as Mr. Grote remarks, from parts of his projected empire. *We* have seen a campaign in the Crimea influenced by messages, despatched in a few hours, from a capital three thousand miles away.

And, simply because an Anti-Christ is so possible, we would the more insist on the necessity of attempting to study politics from a religious point of view. Therefore, do we close these

very scattered and imperfect reflections upon Imperialism in general, by venturing to remind the reader how necessary it is that, while (in accordance with God's Word) we render *due* honour to the great ones of earth, it be not such honour as may, in anywise, clash with our homage to the common Lord and Father of all, and obedience to his righteous laws; that, when we cherish their memory, the grateful recollection should arise from our regarding them as ministrants of the Most High, and channels of his blessings to their fellow-men; so that we may never even in thought, with reference to the living or the dead, join in the shout of idolizing flattery which brought down divine vengeance on a king of old, 'because he gave not God the glory.' No less may we be called upon to brave that opposite force of *public opinion*, which is so often but 'the madness of the people.'

If we descend from a general consideration of Imperialism to more particularity, there are two questions of the day which almost force themselves upon our notice. The first is, '*How has France arrived at the adoption of this form of government?*' The second, '*Is it probable and desirable that England should follow the example?*' It would be taking far too much upon ourselves to pretend that we are competent to make answer to these queries: *neque hæc dicere . . . Conamur, tenuis grandia*. But some notice and comment upon the works named at the head of this article may be taken, perhaps, as a humble contribution of materials towards the contemplation (we dare not say the solution) of these problems. The work of the Comte Louis de Carné is as naturally associated with the former question, as are those of Mr. Congreve and of the Comte de Montalembert with the latter. And, firstly, then, of M. de Carné.

Those who have even a slight acquaintance with the French historians of the Revolution of 1789, must be aware that a school has arisen in Paris which apologises for every crime therein committed, under the plea of fatal and inevitable necessity. This teaching has never, we are thankful to say, become very popular or influential in England. A slight tinge of its doctrines may, perhaps, be traced in Lord Brougham's Sketches of the Revolutionary Leaders of France; and, again, in the 'Historic Fancies' of the present Lord Strangford. But a blind submission to fatalism is not yet, either in thought or action, one of the faults of Englishmen. Milton called *necessity* the 'tyrant's devilish plea,' and we have not learnt to think its character is improved, when urged as an excuse on behalf of the multitude, instead of an individual despot. Such notions were indignantly repudiated by the writers on the Revolution who are best known

in England, as may be seen by a reference to the pages of Sir A. Alison and Professor Smyth. The latter is especially and justly severe upon the works of M. Mignet and M. de Thiers.¹

Wordsworth found vent for his indignation, *more suo*, in the composition of three sonnets, which he made public in the latest volume issued before his death. As they are not much known, we may be pardoned for quoting one, and referring our readers to the others, which are equally excellent in tone.

'Portentous change, when History can appear
As the cool Advocate of foul device;
Reckless audacity extol, and jeer
At consciences perplexed with scruples nice!
They who bewail not, must abhor, the sneer
Born of Conceit, Power's blind Idolater;
Or haply sprung from vaunting Cowardice,
Betrayed by mockery of holy fear.
Hath it not long been said the wrath of man
Works not the righteousness of God? Oh, bend,
Bend, ye perverse! to judgments from on high,
Laws that lay under Heaven's perpetual ban,
All principles of action that transcend
The sacred limits of humanity.'

These are sentiments the more remarkable, as coming from one who, in early life, had been so enthusiastically hopeful of the most blessed results arising out of the French Revolution. But if such words expressed the current thoughts of Englishmen, there was no reason to suspect that they represented public feeling in France, or were likely to find their way into the ears and hearts of its inhabitants. There was deep need of some native author of character and ability to utter a warning voice; for, so long as a country glories in its shame, refuses to acknowledge national sins, and urges, as a palliation, the course of destiny—for *that* land there can be no mental health, no true peace for the present, no solid hope of amendment for the future.

It is the glory of Count Louis de Carné, that he has dared to undertake this unpalatable task. In a series of papers originally published in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, and now bound up with some letters in two handsome octavos, he has commented upon

¹ 'The general effect of the whole representation is, that everything in the way of folly, and fault, and crime, is the result of the operation of general principles, linked together by a sort of invincible necessity, which one may deplore indeed, but which we should in vain endeavour to burst through or prevent. . . . Let him not thus talk of events as if they are inevitable. Reason, and wisdom, and virtue, and everything, human and divine, is at an end upon any such supposition. We have nothing but fate, necessity, and irresistible connexion,

And helpless man, in ignorance sedate,
Rolls darkling down the torrent of his fate.'

Smyth on French Revolution, Lect. XXIII. (Cf. Wordsworth's second Sonnet, and Alison *passim*.)

the chief phases of French politics since 1789. The historical causes of the great Revolution; society in the eighteenth century; the ideas of '89 and '91 (as those years are familiarly termed in France); the Constitutionals, Girondists, and Republicans of that epoch; the Reign of Terror, the Directory, and the Consulate; the Empire and the Monarchy of 1815; the Monarchy of 1830, and the Revolution of 1848;—all are considered with great freshness and ability; and, what is more, with admirable candour, and in a religious spirit. In respect of style, our praise must be slightly qualified. We ought, indeed, to speak with diffidence in criticising a foreigner on this head; but those who have even a scanty acquaintance with some of the most famous French authors of the day will probably agree with us, if they make acquaintance with M. de Carné, that his style has not the calm clearness of Guizot, nor the richness of Victor Cousin, nor the attractive brilliancy of De Montalembert, nor the finished dignity and grave satire of Prince Albert de Broglie. Indeed, it is frequently involved; we have to wait at times so long for the nominative case, as to make us fancy that our author has been travelling eastward of the Rhine, and imported into his French a slight dash of contraband Germanism. Nevertheless, though not, perhaps, a model for imitation, M. de Carné's language has merits of its own. It bears the stamp of deep and earnest thought, of courage, frankness, and marked individuality. Imbued with a deep hatred of evil, with a still more intense hatred of sophistical defences of evil, he scatters all the clouds, and bursts into a glow of warmth and light, whenever he feels called upon to mark his reprobation of national offences, or of the flimsy arguments of their apologists.

‘ Si natura negat, facit indignatio versum.’

M. de Carné's metaphors (and Aristotle makes this a test of genius) are at times extremely grand; and if part of their force be derived from frequent allusions to the sublime imagery of Holy Writ, it is still evident that such reference is not forced, nor sought as a mere ornament of speech; but that it occurs naturally, as the most obvious expression of the writer's meaning.

And yet it must not, therefore, be supposed that these ‘ Etudes’ espouse the cause of some extreme political party. On the contrary, it has been justly observed that M. de Carné does not, with Count Joseph de Maistre, consider the revolution simply Satanic, nor, with M. Buchez, call it a new Gospel. In his own words, despite the temptation to wholesale praise or condemnation, *la révolution n'est pourtant ni une panacée ni une boîte de Pandore*. The merits of the work, in this as in other

respects, have obtained for it a highly flattering notice from Prince Albert de Broglie; and the opening pages of his critique may, perhaps, amuse as well as interest the reader. (We translate from the '*Revue des deux Mondes*' of February, 1855.)

'I have always rather envied men who have adopted, and who profess, extreme opinions. In times of uncertainty like ours, nothing, one imagines, can be so convenient; nothing can abolish so many doubts and scruples. When a man is so fortunate as to possess, either in philosophy or politics, a well-defined system which he follows out unshrinkingly, in all its consequences; when he feels perfectly certain that he holds the truth wholly, without limitation and without alloy; when, in consequence of this, he is brought to persuade himself that any other view can only proceed from incorrigible extravagance, or from interested falsehood,—he must draw from this complacency towards himself, and disdain of others, a great amount of mental repose. Persons thus constituted have found a way of placing themselves truly above the strokes of fate and the struggles of conscience. Every event confirms them in their opinion—the triumph, as well as the defeat, of their party. They have always an interpretation ready made, at the service of all occurrences. When the fortune of revolutions is against them, it becomes in their eyes a blind chance, often aiding intrigue and ambition; but if it should prove favourable to them, they see in it, unhesitatingly, the inexorable justice of the Divine hand, or the irresistible force of truth. No deception discourages them—no argument shakes them; they do not in the least require to know how things proceed, in order to be able to talk of them. Sure that no good exists amongst their opponents, they deem it perfectly useless to inquire what is said by them or what is thought. The study of history, especially, is for them as short as it is simple; for they find no problems to solve, no inconsistencies to reconcile. All is right on a particular side—all is wrong on the other. What perplexes and troubles minds less sure of themselves—those dark shadows which often disfigure the noblest causes—those vices and passions which human corruption will enlist even in defence of truth—nothing of all this concerns or arrests them. Cruelty is always justice when committed by their friends, whilst legitimate defence on the part of their adversaries is always fanaticism or persecution. All this is told you commonly in a quiet, derisive tone, without hesitation, but without anger; for a man is but little irritated when he is not at all shaken. Formerly a little drawing-room treatise was written on the happiness of fools; without comparison, I would willingly make one on the happiness that narrow dogmatical minds enjoy in a sceptical society.

'Next to this kind of privileged nature, the one that seems to me best adapted to promote happiness is a perfectly opposite disposition. To have but one single idea in the head, and but one feeling in the heart, is undoubtedly the best; if this cannot be attained, the best thing to be done is to take all ideas and all feelings either simultaneously or successively. To avoid vexations in this world, if one cannot be very narrow, one must be extremely comprehensive; if one cannot be very rigid, one must be very supple. To comprehend and admit almost everything; to take a place, obligingly, at the point of view of all parties, with indulgent and, if requisite, admiring intelligence; to find a good reason for all facts, an explanation of all actions, nay even for all crimes; to have no personal conviction; to be a warm partisan for the time, if the convictions of those amongst whom we live, or of the heroes whose history we read, as a wave reflects all the colours of the sky:—this is a less worthy, less haughty, but still a tolerably easy, mode of getting through these our days of doubts

and discouragements. And if you can add to this a certain tact in foreseeing the reactions of public opinion, of guessing what sentiment will be the fashion on the morrow, so as to make a few steps towards it in time, and to trim your sail to the right side for the coming breeze, that mental gift, well managed, may prove as profitable as it is agreeable.'

The critic proceeds to contrast with these easy lines of thought the hard and ungracious labour of those who attempt to reconcile conflicting opinions, to combine fixity of principle with freedom from exclusiveness, to listen to the ideas suggested by others without resigning their own, and join firmness of opinion with some degree of moderation in its expression. And while M. Albert de Broglie differs from M. de Carné in one or two points (at which we may glance presently), he cheerfully recognises these merits, and even more than these, and adds that the work is worthy of the political career of the author, as an *ancien député*.¹

A rapid glance at some of the main positions of the work will show how well calculated it is to interest those who are fond of the subjects which it handles, and to throw light upon the points of discussion here suggested. In many respects our author arrives at conclusions very similar to those of Smyth and Alison. As he is a very independent thinker, such agreement may at first sight cause surprise. M. de Carné is French, they are British; he is a statesman, they are historians; he has been trained in the Roman Catholic, they in the English, communion. What is there to lead them to any conclusions in common? The key is simple. All three are sincere believers in the Christian truth of God's moral government of the world: all three hold that, while the chastisement of the sins of individual men is frequently reserved for the world to come, the sins of corporate bodies receive their retribution here. Smyth implies this rule; Alison states it explicitly, after the fashion of Lord Lindsay in his 'Progression of Antagonism.' How completely, in this leading principle, M. de Carné is identified with them, may be judged from the very first words of his preface:—

'In studying the French Revolution in its most varied phases, I have been particularly struck with one thing; and that is, the promptitude with which principles have always wrought their consequences, and the immediate connexion of sufferings with faults. Whether unheard-of crimes have been followed by unexampled expiations, or baffled hopes have succeeded to the inebriation of confidence and pride, in each case is made manifest a direct relation between causes and effects, between the ruin of parties and the passions which provoked it.

'The poet of "Paradise Lost" proposed as his aim, the glorification of

¹ M. de Carné, who was born at Quimper, in Brittany, in 1804, is of a family of high position in that province. He was trained to diplomacy under Charles X. and held high offices of state under Louis Philippe. He was always with the Church party on the education question.

Providence, and the justification of God's ways before men. [M. de Carné here cites, in a note, the famous lines of Milton,—

“That to the height of this great argument
I may assert eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men.”]

‘Such, likewise, must assuredly be the mission (whether they know it themselves, or are ignorant of it) of the historians of the Revolution; for assuredly there never was an epoch in which lofty justice from on high has been more visibly displayed, or in which nations have more evidently created their own destinies.’

It is not part of M. de Carné's task to give the history of the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. These may be studied in the celebrated memoirs of the Duc de Saint-Simon, the recently-discovered work of M. Barbier, and in the ‘Life of Beaumarchais,’ lately given to the world by M. de Loménie. Certainly, some such work as the last is needed by him who would obtain a just idea of the moral and political corruption which preceded that volcanic outburst. Count Louis looks more closely, though not exclusively, to the strictly political causes: and, amongst these, points to the long struggle which had been waged in France against feudality. With an aristocracy of caste, originating in conquest, our author has not much more sympathy than Dr. Arnold; like Arnold, he can sympathise with the mediæval popes in their early struggles against the Empire, as embodying feudality. Following in the wake of the lamented M. Augustin Thierry, in his ‘Essai sur l'Histoire du Tiers Etat,’ M. de Carné shows the gradual, but decided and unrelaxing, efforts of the *bourgeoisie* to attain that civil equality in the eye of the law which the Constituent Assembly at length won for them. He shows how monarchs and great ministers, as Henry IV., Richelieu, Louis XIV., either openly, or virtually, took part with the citizens against the *noblesse*. He shows, though this point comes out perhaps still more vividly in other works, (as, *e.g.*, in Madame de Sevigné's Letters,) how the nobles played into this policy, by their disregard of rural life, their want of self-respect, their willingness to make position depend more upon the office held at court, than upon their own social condition and descent. In truth, Louis XIV. has been justly termed *that great leveller*; he hated birth, he hated talents, if they presumed to be independent of himself. He wished that every ray of light should seem to emanate from him, as from a sun; and his success in attaining this cherished end was certainly remarkable. The Duc de Saint-Simon was an exception to the general rule; *he* did take his stand upon his peerage, and his personal worth and attainments; but it is wonderful, if we look at that galaxy of talent around Louis, given some pages back, to see how little

independence *did* exist. Even those great preachers, marvellous as they were, can they be acquitted (despite some bold passages) of fulsome praise of Louis on the one hand, of very great reticence and abstinence from righteous rebuke upon the other? An earnest French Protestant *pasteur*, M. Bungener, declares indeed that after much study of the epoch, he thinks Louis a better man than is generally imagined. It may be so; we do not stop to argue the point: but the fact of his having ruled as he did, and of that rule having been so accepted by the French nation, if at one time it led by reaction to anarchy, was certainly a lesson, both for rulers and ruled, as to the means of re-establishing and consolidating Imperialism.

We must not dwell upon those scenes in the earlier history which M. de Carné, no less than Sir F. Palgrave among ourselves, considers almost typical of the events of 1789. Neither can we find space to consider the effects produced by the writings of Montesquieu, of whom our author considers M. Guizot to be the legitimate descendant in spirit, as clearly as Louis Blanc is a son of Rousseau. But on one marked and leading feature of these volumes we must dwell for a few moments.

The work of the great revolution was twofold—partly social, partly political. On its political achievements the different parties in France—Legitimists, Orleanists, Buonapartists, and Republicans—are still at variance. But on its social results,—the overthrow of feudality and primogeniture, and the creation of civil equality, equality of taxation, &c.—there is a far more general agreement than one might expect to find. MM. Thiers, L. de Carné, Albert de Broglie, and a hundred more, coincide in not merely accepting, but thoroughly approving, this side of the change. Such approval is perfectly intelligible on the part of democrats and imperialists. Neither a president nor an emperor need necessarily wish to see around him descendants of old families possessed of large territorial property. But we do not understand this feeling when displayed by the supporters of constitutional monarchy; and those who cherish it must have notions of liberty different from those entertained in England. Mr. Cobden published a few years since a clever pamphlet, entitled ‘1793 and 1853.’ We venture to think that its pages contain a collection of half-truths, and half-truths only. But as we have already quoted from it with approbation a passage concerning the power of the Emperor of the French, so too may we observe that nowhere, within our knowledge, is this distinction between the French and English ideas of liberty so clearly and acutely pointed out. Englishmen, while they enjoy the *habeas corpus* and the freedom of the press, are not annoyed by the

circumstance that one man possesses half a county. Frenchmen, so long as they remain secure from any privileged inequality in the social system, seem willing to part with all the defences which might secure their personal freedom.

The question of primogeniture, then, lies at the very root of our differences. We are well aware that the feeling against it is not novel, nor confined to France alone. Gavelkind (for which the Kentish men struggled successfully against William I.) obtained, says Blackstone, among the Britons, was agreeable to the Roman law, and continued among the Saxons till the Norman conquest. Hallam tells us of German princes in the sixteenth century, who denounced curses upon any of their posterity who should introduce the 'impious custom of primogeniture.' And attempts to revive it in modern Prussia have failed as completely as in modern France. Indeed, M. de Carné declares that the system of entails *can* only be preserved in countries which, like England, have colonial offices, and places in the army and navy, and in the Established Church, sufficiently well paid to attract and partially support the cadets of noble families. Our limits compel us to suggest, rather than to grapple with, these difficulties. But, although M. de Carné points to Belgium, Holland, and Sardinia, as examples of constitutional government without entailed estates, we join with a host of Englishmen, and with at least one distinguished Frenchman (M. de Montalembert) in doubting whether any *large* country can destroy the *droit d'aînesse* without becoming a despotism or a democracy.

M. de Carné, however, as we have intimated, is so far grateful to the men of '89; he thinks that they had got hold of Christian ideas, but unhappily were not prepared to carry them out in a spirit of truly philosophic and Christian statemanship. Assuredly not: a glance at his pictures of the society of that day would be enough to convince us of that. Here, for instance, is the portrait of the *bourgeoisie*: '*Elle s'était faite 'rationnaliste avec Rousseau, impie avec Diderot, et cynique avec Voltaire.*' He proceeds to expand this sentence:—'The generation, which was about to receive the mission of giving a definite form to the work of its ancestors, read "*la Pucelle*" on the eve of its entrance into public life. It had studied political science in the "*Contrat Social*," and philosophy in the "*Esquisse de l'Histoire du Progrès de l'Esprit humain*;" and the sentimental naturalism of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre occupied the place of religious belief.' This sketch is, we all know, but too true; and those who differ, as politicians, on the subject of social freedom, may well agree, as Christians, in despairing of the regeneration of the human race whenever and wherever it is

taken in hand by such a body of men as the French citizens of '89.

Of the personal character of the clergy, M. de Carné thinks more favourably than most authors; and recent inquiries seem to justify his view. But he observes that, as a body, they had applauded the savage conduct of Louis XIV. when he hunted his Protestant subjects, and imposed a faith as if it were an affair of royal ordinance; that during the regency they suffered the infamous Dubois to be consecrated as successor to Fenelon without a murmur; that they maintained a most culpable silence during the enormous wickednesses of the reign of Louis XV; that they displayed, throughout the eighteenth century, a lack alike of charity and wisdom; and allowed the sacred lamp of knowledge—one of the sevenfold gifts of the Spirit of truth—to pass into the hands of their enemies. Charges these the more serious and impressive, when it is remembered that they are made by an earnest Roman Catholic of evidently ultramontane tendencies.

M. de Carné does not wish to see the French Church again possessed of high station and great political power. But of the manner in which it was despoiled of its goods and its influence, he speaks with a power which of itself would serve to mark him for a thinker and writer of no ordinary stature. Passing by many other passages of equal force and solemnity, we give the following as a specimen of our author's best manner. *We are responsible for the italics:—*

'Political crimes rarely inspire contempt, because they spring from the shock of parties, like the lightning from the region of storms; but when an assembly, after having solemnly proclaimed individual freedom and liberty of conscience, is seen to attack, without any provocation, without the smallest interest, what twenty millions of men hold nearest and dearest; when it tortures souls, crushes existences, pronounces the annihilation (*exheredation*) of all rights, soon followed by terrible penalties against thousands of despairing and inoffensive citizens; when it assumes tyrannical powers in order to impose upon a nation the fancies of its own thought, and the corruptions of its own heart, one feels a bitter disdain for human nature, mingled with a strange feeling of religious terror. *It seems as if one were in the presence of one of those great crimes against the Spirit which are not forgiven unto nations, and one feels sweep by one in the atmosphere the near breath of the vengeance of God.*

'Never, perhaps, was chastisement so instantaneous, nor expiation so terrible. The Constituent Assembly, and almost the entire *bourgeoisie*, found themselves suddenly engaged, by the very resistance organized in all quarters of the country, in a series of violent measures which rendered inevitable the accession of the revolutionary democracy to power. Logical (*conséquente*) in its work of oppression, the Assembly decreed that every priest who should refuse to pledge his faith to the new ecclesiastical constitution, should, on the refusal of the oath, *ipso facto*, be deprived of his functions, and immediately replaced.

'They imagined that they would only have to encounter isolated resist-

ances, over which they would easily triumph by misery and intimidation; consequently, they experienced extreme disappointment on finding themselves suddenly in opposition to a clergy all but unanimous, and masses of people excited and shortly afterwards insurgent.'—Pp. 136, 137.

It is gratifying to remember that the mind of England at once perceived that this was an attack, not upon Rome, but upon Christianity. Burke and Mackintosh, Bishop Horsley and the eloquent Baptist preacher, Robert Hall, were here all of one mind, unanimous in their condemnation.

Having implied our disagreement with portions of Mr. Cobden's pamphlet, we must state one in connexion with M. de Carné. One leading object of the pamphlet on '1793 and 1853,' is to throw the *whole* of the blame of that great war which was ended at Waterloo, upon England. It is implied throughout that all Frenchmen are of this opinion, and that Englishmen who study the case with fairness must ultimately adopt the same conclusion. We trust that, without discourtesy or improper personality, we may be allowed to question the universality of this opinion on the part of our neighbours, and now (happily) allies. M. Charles de Remusat, in a recent and very laudatory article upon Fox, yet admitted, that 'France had declared herself the ally of all the nations who wished to overthrow their governments.'¹ The opinion of Count L. de Carné, who does not overflow with love towards England, may be judged from the following passages:—

'The great crime (*l'attentat*) of the 21st of January [the execution of Louis XVI.] drove to arms the cabinets most firmly bent upon peace. France took the initiative of a deadly war against all nations, being at as much pains to increase the number of her enemies, as it would have seemed natural for her to take to diminish them.'—*Preface*.

'The French Revolution had been pacific at its opening, like every idea which when ushered into the world believes itself strong enough to win the mastery; but, embittered by obstacles, it had soon imputed to others difficulties of which the greater part had been created by itself. *It had accused and menaced Europe*, whatever was the sympathy with which certain governments had welcomed this first application of the Encyclopedist doctrines, whatever the reserve with which the others had shown their disapprobation or their doubts. At the first period of the Revolution, the idea of an armed intervention was intensely repugnant to the principal European governments.'—Tome i., pp. 168, 169.

Is not this a very different tone from that of the pamphlet in question, which represents the contest as being, on the part of the allies, 'a war *so evidently unprovoked* and aggressive?' If it be said that this distinguished senator gives facts to justify his conclusion, 'that whatever faults or crimes may be fairly chargeable upon the French nation for the excesses and cruelties of the Revolution up to this time (April, 1792), it cannot be with justice made responsible for the commencement of the war,'

¹ *Revue des deux Mondes* (1^{re} Janvier, 1856).

let it be observed that M. de Carné, a few pages onwards, gives his array of counter-facts to prove the contrary, and adds, 'these facts defy all contradiction, and enable us to decide whether it was Europe that attacked the French Revolution, or the Revolution that attacked Europe.' Far be it from us to suppose that in such mighty movements *all* the faults can be laid upon one side only; but it really is of importance that when the conduct of England is condemned *in toto* by certain of her own sons, we should know the judgment of so gifted, so candid a Frenchman as Count Louis de Carné.

These remarks cannot fairly be esteemed a digression; for if France was, we will not say *entirely*, but something more than *half*-responsible for the great European struggle, her conduct in this respect was one of the chief preparations for what Burke foresaw so early—a military despotism. But a little onward we arrive, in the work before us, at a vivid picture of the intense misery of Paris, followed by an exclamation of gratitude to Dumouriez and the army, which reminds us of language we ourselves heard at a later date in the French capital. 'If the independence of our territory was preserved, France ought to render thanks, after God, to that religion of the banner which in the heart of her noble children survives all catastrophes, and by which nations preserve, amidst the most humiliating trials, self-respect and the germ of a future.' 'Society,' said a Parisian banker to us in the autumn of 1848, 'society at present only lives upon the army.'

We pass over our author's scourging condemnation of those writers who have dared to apologise for the massacres of September, his proof that France gained nothing by such wickedness, his declaration that the national conscience has probably been more injured by the sophistry of palliation than by the very crimes themselves. But to those who delight to see such sophisms torn to very shreds, and thrown to the four winds of heaven, we commend the reply of M. de Carné to the representation of M. de Lamartine on behalf of the Girondists in the matter of the death of Louis XVI. That eloquent writer tries to excuse his heroes on the ground that events had come to such a pass that *one* must be overthrown—Louis or the party of the Gironde; that they were compelled to sacrifice the king that they themselves might not be hurled from power.

For such reasoning (though, indeed, it is an abuse of terms to call it *reasoning*) M. de Carné has no mercy. He proves it to be as false in point of fact as it is hollow and wretched in sentiment. He calls it the most signal falsehood which has ever been introduced into a political narrative; adding that the Girondists were overthrown by this judicial murder (*ce meurtre*

juridique), and that it decided the conduct of countries that were yet in doubt what course to take.

Very striking is the inquiry which follows into the theory of *Jacobinism*, and the references to Milton and to Dante, which seem to rush into the writer's mind, as the Pandemonium of the terrible club is brought before his consideration. The abolition of the state of matrimony by the Jacobins, their hatred of intellect (which no less than wealth disturbed their dream of equality), their judicial blindness, are all touched with a masterly hand. One use for posterity he does recognise in that monument raised to the glory of the Jacobins, the 'Parliamentary History of the Revolution,' by Messieurs Buchez and Roux. 'The work of the two writers, who have collected the most overwhelming proofs against the men for whom they dare to claim the respect of future generations, recalls the mission of that people to whom God committed the guardianship of all the records which condemn it, and which carries a torch to enlighten the world, while itself remains in darkness.' And presently there occurs another passage of almost sublime awfulness, which exhibits with wonderful force the spiritual generation and descent of the men of action from the men of thought. M. de Carné maintains—and the idea does not to us seem strained or fanciful—that Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau sat in spirit on the benches of the Convention:—

'In the dark precincts where so many passions roar, where hatred alone dilates men's souls, and sorrow contracts them; on the benches of that formidable Convention which strikes with death whatever it touches, do you not distinguish three figures which, in the preceding age, have already received, and indeed, as it were, exhausted the homage and the untiring admiration of the world? Who is that man, of studied speech and pitiless laugh, who uses his wit as a dagger, and prepares by *bons mots* the work of the murderers? It is, perchance, Camille Desmoulins, but assuredly it is also Voltaire; it is Voltaire grown young again, come down from his pedestal in the wall, and speaking to the people his elegant and cruel language; it is Voltaire covering his work of desolation with the rich, cold ornaments of his style. In that powerful denagogue, with his rugged figure, with his sensual imagination and habits, whose head and heart drag him from the extremity of crime to the extremity of pity; in that man who, at the peril of his life, bends beneath the benediction of a priest at the entreaty of a young girl, to return the next moment to the fanaticism of annihilation, do you not recognise Diderot as well as Danton? What shall we say of that rhetorician, consumed by hatred, and shrunk with envy, who conceals, under an array of arrogant vulgarisms, the poverty of his thoughts? That inexhaustible talker, who makes the existence of God and the immortality of the soul the props of his dictatorship, almost as his master made them the themes of eloquent periods to crush his opponents, the philosophers—that proud and solitary man, who makes all revelation consist in a supreme adoration of himself—is he not the son, a very degenerate one I grant, but only too easily recognised, of that writer whose metaphysic vein nourished a whole generation? The most cruel chastisement of Rousseau is to have given birth to Robespierre, and the

test of the political opinions of the author of 'Emile' is the application of them attempted by the sanguinary triumvir. Robespierre was the obstinate and conscientious worker out of the doctrines built upon the triple foundation of natural religion, primordial contract, and the native excellence of humanity, such as they appear in every page of Rousseau's writings; and the master must be answerable for the disciple.

'They were, then, so to speak, personally present at that solemn trial of their wisdom; those doctors who had so long shaken France, and who in the infinite variety of their thoughts had agreed together to extinguish in the heart of man the Divine inbreathing which helped it to live! On those benches there crowded the pupils they had formed, in those tribunes were the public they had created. The female philosophers and the academic wits had passed from the *petits soupers* of the *fermiers-généraux*, and from the *salons* of Madame de Pompadour to the greasy *cortège* of Chaumette, and the apostate Gobel translated into the vulgar tongue the witty blasphemies that had so long charmed the court and the town.'—Tome i., pp. 246-248.

And then, after an energetic description of Paris under Robespierre,—which he represents as worse than even Rome under Nero; after a description of men reeking with the carnage of Lyons and Bourdeaux, engaged in carrying with impious solemnities the remains of Marat to the Pantheon; our author sums up this part of his narrative with these impressive, perhaps we may say golden, words:—

'When such horrors have been displayed in the face of the universe, and an entire generation of writers has found belief, when it has pretended to transform these shameful times into an era of masculine courage, there cannot be for a country (let us be well assured of it) expiations long enough, trials sufficiently severe. *Whether a nation undergo the torture of anarchy, or the humiliation of despotism, it ought to confess before God and man that it has deserved them all.*'

In laying before our readers such extracts from a work which has not, we believe, as yet been noticed by any portion of the English press, we trust that we may not even appear to minister, far less actually to minister, to any sentiments of unholy national pride. England has her own sins to answer for and lament: *non nobis, Domine*, must be our heartfelt acknowledgment if we have hitherto been spared the fiery ordeals undergone by France during the last seventy years. But, in truth, we do not regard such sentences as the above as in anywise degrading to the spirit of a great people. Hideous crimes, followed by wretched sophistical palliations, nay, by endeavours to exalt and glorify guilt,—these are the real sources of disgrace alike to individuals and to nations. But there is nothing degrading in repentance, nothing shameful in confession. It is while in the far country the prodigal devours his father's living with harlots, and is joined to a citizen of the godless land, and craves the food of swine, that he is unworthy to be called a son; not when (in the marvellous fulness of that divine expression) he *has come to himself*, and confesses, in the face of heaven and his brethren, his sin and its desert of chastisement. It is in the

utter repudiation of the vain-glorious narratives like those of M. Thiers, and in the thorough acceptance of such admissions as M. de Carné's, that there lies the best hope of the future for France, and for every other nation likewise, in so far as it has sinned like her.

It is some relief to change the scene. We pass over the earlier portion of the chapter *On the Dissolution of Society*, and hasten to the wonderful achievement of its re-construction. That achievement was, under Providence, simply and solely the work of one man. And whatever judgment be passed upon the subsequent career of Napoleon Buonaparte, whatever condemnation be uttered on the despotism of his rule at home, especially in the miseries of the Conscription, or the crushing and desolating misery produced by his conquests abroad, the voice of history will never falter in speaking of his domestic policy during the era of his Consulate. The reconciliation of the order of the *old régime* with the changed phases of society under the *new*; the profound insight into human nature, and more particularly French nature; the consummate tact with which all was attained that could be ventured upon, and nothing attempted that was hopeless; the promulgation of a Code which now gives the law to nearly half of Europe; the overthrow of irreligion; the pacification of La Vendée—the accomplishment of all this in a few years, under difficulties and novelties of position such as scarcely any legislator of ancient or modern times has had to cope with; this is beyond doubt one of the highest works of genius which the world has ever seen. Nor can it create reasonable surprise if many inhabitants of Paris in that day, who had lost all hope of preserving anything but life, and were but too well aware of the instability of that humble hope itself, were afterwards unable (we have known such) to judge calmly of the after-deeds of one who, whatever he had proved to others, had to them been a liberator and a saviour.

An outline of the history of the Consulate was dictated by Napoleon to Montholon at S. Helena; and eloquent as it is, we are bound to acknowledge that its main force arises from its truth. The leading feature,—the adjustment of the claims of two conflicting generations,—has been touched, with his usual felicity, by Manzoni, in a single stanza of that noble ode, *Il Cinque Maggio* :—

'He came: two rival ages
Arm'd 'gainst each other stood;
To him they turn'd submissively,
As waiting for his nod:
Silence he bade, and arbiter
Sate down the twain above.'

'Ei sì nomò: due secoli
L'un contro l'altro armato,

And when the present Emperor (at that time Prince President of the Republic) inaugurated at Lyons the equestrian statue of his uncle, he virtually, though perhaps unconsciously, translated the Italian poetry into French prose.

M. de Carné falls short of no admirer of Napoleon in his estimate of this portion of his eventful career. He declares that his native land has, of all countries, owed the most to its great men. 'La France a-t-elle fait un seul pas important dans le cours de ses destinées sans qu'un nom propre ne resplendisse au frontispiece d'une ère nouvelle? A-t-elle jamais été sauvée sans que la voix du pays entier n'ait acclamé son sauveur?' Charlemagne, Louis IX., Du Guesclin, Joan of Arc, Henri IV., Richelieu—such is his selection of names connected with the salvation of their country; and a very striking list it is, if we pause over it but for a moment's contemplation. With these our author would enrol the First Consul of 1799; whom he considers marked with the twofold seal impressed upon the brow of men raised up by Providence, inasmuch as his rôle was at once most unlooked for and most necessary.

We say the Consul, for on the Emperor our critic looks with a different eye. He considers the entire scope and spirit of the Empire to be something different from that of the Consulate. We have not room to discuss the differences, on this head, between MM. de Carné and de Broglie. The latter, though no Buonapartist, regards the policy of the Empire as the natural development of the first seizure of power resultant from the famous 18th of *Brumaire*. It might, we imagine, be possible to find a *mezzo termine* between these opposite views; to recognise, with M. de Carné, considerable differences of outward manifestation, while believing, with M. Albert de Broglie, that the moving spirit underwent but little change. But this is one of the many topics which must be left to the judgment of the reader.

Nor have we space to follow our guide through his criticisms upon the period of the Empire. How far the restoration of Poland might have been possible, and, if possible, wise; how utterly 'the continental system' ruined Napoleon's power; how the servility of his courtiers naturally resulted in their base desertion and treachery at Fontainebleau in 1814; how barren (as has been observed) was this epoch of works of genius: these points are all handled by M. de Carné, and though occasionally more from a French point of view than is natural to us, yet always with freshness and ingenuity. A poetess of our own

Sommessi a lui si volsero
Come aspettando il fato:
Ei fe' silenzio, et arbitro
S'assise in mezzo a lor.'

land, who, though rather hard upon the Allies, has treated the theme with great power and stateliness, has expressed one leading sentiment of this part of M. de Carné's work. Some of our readers will recognise the following lines from Elizabeth Browning's 'Crowned and Buried':—

'For, verily, though France augustly rose
With that raised NAME, and did assume by such
The purple of the world, none gave so much
As she in purchase—to speak plain, in loss—
Whose hands, to freedom stretched, dropped paralyzed
To wield a sword, or fit an undersized
King's crown to a great man's head. And though along
Her Paris' streets did float on frequent streams
Of triumph, pictured or enmarbled dreams,—
Dreamt right by genius in a world gone wrong—
No dream, of all so won, was fair to see
As the lost vision of her liberty.'

Her fitness for that liberty France has yet, alas! to prove. Her willingness to resign it must not, however, be wholly assigned to the dread of anarchy. There is there, as in other countries, a school of thinkers who sincerely believe in absolutism as best fitted for the nation; and we have seen the representatives of two of the noblest loyalist families of France, a De la Pastoret and a La Rochejaquelin, desert the cause of Henri of Bourdeaux for that of Louis Napoleon, because the former was pledged to constitutional government. And further, the French nation (in many respects so like the Athenian) does certainly sympathise heartily with the doctrine of Pericles, that it is better for a state to prosper collectively, though individuals may suffer, than that its single members should prosper, while the body politic is undone.¹ It is the proud consciousness that France occupied the foremost place at the recent Conferences,² that reconciles so many to the loss of personal importance under the existing dynasty. It was a similar feeling (and though it may be misdirected, it is in itself high and honourable) which induced them to bear the absolutism of Napoleon.

'He was a despot—granted;
But the *avtors* of his autocratic mouth
Said yea i' the people's French: he magnified
The image of the freedom he denied.
And if they asked for rights, he made reply,
"Ye have my glory!"—and so, drawing round them
His ample purple, glorified and bound them
In an embrace that seemed identity.
He ruled them like a tyrant—true! but none
Were ruled like slaves. Each felt, Napoleon.'

¹ Thucydides, ii. 60.

² This article was sent to press in June last, though too late for our July Number.

How wonderfully the captivity of S. Helena, and his death in the distant island, served Napoleon's memory, and the cause of those who clung to the possible re-appearance of his dynasty, we need not stay to remark. Such an effect was prophesied by himself; it has been sung by poets, and commented on by British historians, and by M. de Carné in these volumes; but by none, perhaps, so faithfully and eloquently as by M. de Lamartine. The judgments of men, more especially of Englishmen, would have been far less lenient had he perished in the zenith of his power. Such is the almost mysterious effect of dethronement and suffering, of anything like expiation for the past.

The verdict of M. de Carné upon Napoleon is, perhaps, occasionally more gentle than we usually, even since the commencement of the *entente cordiale*, form upon this side of the Channel. But his sympathies are only partially with the Emperor; and we are not on our side unmindful of the next stanza which follows those already cited from our gifted songstress:—

‘I do not praise this man: the man was flawed
For Adam—much more Christ!—his knee, unbent—
His hand unclean—his aspiration, pent
Within a sword-sweep, pshaw! but since he had
The *genius to be loved*, why let him have
The justice to be honoured in his grave.’

In arriving at the period of the Restoration, it is easy to see that M. de Carné writes in a more sympathising tone than in any other portion of his ‘*Etudes*.’ We do not know that the general impression differs from that given by any ordinary history of the time. There is the clever Louis XVIII., perfectly conscious of the changed times with which he has to deal; the emigrant nobles, perfectly unconscious (*ils n’ont rien oublié, ils n’ont rien appris*, as Talleyrand too truly said); the great English Duke, with his immense influence exercised, as our author grants, with as much moderation as firmness;¹ and, finally, the opposition, to the last degree unscrupulous and ungenerous in its tactics. It is to this last circumstance that our author attributes the failure of constitutional government in France. Instead of political parties there were factions, and the opposition has always aimed at the overthrow rather than the attainment of power. A lamentable confession! but one which seems but too well warranted by facts. We have heard of railway bills being thrown out in the Chamber of Deputies, purely and solely

¹ ‘Le duc de Wellington, qui avait hérité du patronage exercé par l’empereur Alexandre en 1814, et dont l’honorable rôle dans ces jours difficile mériterait d’être apprécié avec plus de justice, donnait surtout ces conseils de modération avec l’autorité qui s’attachait au plénipotentiaire victorieux du plus grand Etat constitutionnel.’—Tome ii. p. 33.

because they had been brought forward by the ministry of the day. Now, that the Blues should denounce a new lamp-post because it had been put up by the Buffs, in Mr. Dickens's Borough of Eatanswill, is ludicrous enough; but that the first assembly of a great kingdom should display such weakness is truly pitiable. It makes us hesitate over our author's denial, on behalf of his country, of the statement, that *la monarchie représentative . . . est incompatible avec notre génie*.

M. de Carné is not a Legitimist. He is opposed to the theory of a direct *jus divinum* in royalty; he does not think that France is in want of a territorial aristocracy; he proves that, in a number of respects, Charles X. and his adherents most fatally mistook the clock. But he does full justice to the Royalist party, in whom he recognises one characteristic almost, as he observes, worth all the missing qualities, namely, deep and unflinching sincerity; he does full justice to the monarch who, though inferior both to his predecessor and his successor as a politician, was probably superior to both as a man. Indeed, it is this comparison of his personal character with that of Louis XVIII., and still more Louis Philippe, that lends meaning to those touching lines on his memory by Jean Réboul, the baker-poet of Nismes:—

'O mon vieux Roi, dans ton exil attends,
Chaque jour te luit plus favorable;
Quand la justice est la fille du temps,
Son jugement en est plus équitable.

'Le caillou peut briser un vase d'or;
Mais ses débris, dispersés sur la terre,
A tous les yeux sont précieux encore,
Et le caillou reste une vile pierre.'

In criticising the events of 1830, which made Louis Philippe *Roi des Français* (though not *Roi de France*), and brought the *bourgeoisie* into the possession of power, M. de Carné considers that the victors made a great mistake in departing from the elder line. He thinks that the acceptance of the hereditary right would have been in every way better for themselves, better for the country at large. But he more than palliates the conduct of King Louis Philippe in accepting the crown, and, on the whole, much raises both the monarch and his policy in our estimation.

Nevertheless, it is from this portion of Count L. de Carné's work that Prince Albert de Broglie most seriously dissents. That account of *the monarchy of the barricades*, which to us appears if anything too favourable, falls short of his idea of its real excellence. Now, we always listen with respect to any opinion enunciated by M. Albert de Broglie; but for once we have reasons to distrust his power of forming an equitable judgment. It is no discredit to him, quite the reverse, if filial piety

tends in some degree to warp his sentiments. That the son and heir of the Duc de Broglie should think well of a sovereignty which his father was so instrumental in creating; that he should cherish the memory of a king whom that father served so faithfully, as President of the Council and Prime Minister, is only right and natural. But we are not the less of opinion that M. de Carné's views are the more correct. *He* too loved and served that monarchy; but, even during its existence, he showed his sense of its shortcomings in a series of letters, which he now appends to the volumes before us.

If we speak freely of such as appear to us the weak points of that rule, we utterly and entirely disclaim the charge of having formed our opinion since its fall. (Indeed, our judgment is, in consequence of the study of M. de Carné, more favourable than that which we had formed in 1845.) Neither do we intend to refer to personal failings, undue love of money, undue love of popularity, and the like, which are illustrated so fully (very probably *over-illustrated*) in Mr. Raikes's Journal. But the grand defect *in limine* of the Orleans monarchy was surely this, that it did not appeal to either of those broad principles upon which alone kingship can depend. Indefeasible hereditary right, or the call of the nation,—either of these claims are clear and intelligible. But it always seemed plain to our minds, and M. de Carné entirely confirms the view, that Louis Philippe's election was a compromise, and not strictly tenable on either theory. 'La monarchie de 1830,' writes M. de Carné, 'n'est sortie d'aucun principe; elle n'appartient pas plus à la souveraineté du peuple qu'à celle de la tradition héréditaire; ce fut un œuvre de transaction entre des combattants qui se redoutaient les uns les autres.'

On the faults of that fallen dynasty we do not wish to dwell. Many hints of its weaknesses may be found in Dr. Wordsworth's 'Diary in France,' (which we the rather mention, because the truth of its foreboding tone has hardly had justice done to it), no less than in the pages of M. de Carné. But the latter is likewise its eulogist, and he is not its only eulogist. Whatever be thought of the Duc de Broglie's portraiture of the present ruler of France (and we confess that, in our humble opinion, it is excessively one-sided and unfair), there can be but one opinion, we imagine, in England, concerning that portion of his address to the Academy which relates to the sovereign who, as the Comte de Neuilly, ended his days at Claremont. It is noble, courageous, and affecting—honourable to the king who inspired such devoted attachment, honourable to the faithful servant who, in such an hour, 'spoke so sweetly and so well.'

We remember, in the autumn of 1847, to have heard a man

of highly cultivated mind speak of Louis Philippe as one who 'seemed to have check-mated fate.' It was no uncommon nor unreasonable delusion, and thousands of Frenchmen appeared to have partaken of it. We know that that monarchy vanished like a morning dream; and it is one of the best features of these volumes that they do not pretend to fathom all the causes of its failure. How a monarch so politic, a minister so able, young princes so loved by both army and navy, all were unable to withstand a storm that looked at first like a cloud no bigger than a man's hand,—this is still a mystery, but M. de Carné draws from it a lesson that all of us may safely lay to heart. Do not the words we have italicised suggest the existence of a perilous temptation, to which we are all liable, in our own little spheres of action, no less than statesmen on their larger theatre?

'From the Congress of Vienna down to the Conference of London, we had become so thoroughly accustomed (*on avait pris une telle habitude*) to remain masters of events, that we believed ourselves in a position to control them at all times. *If we bowed before Providence, it was with the conviction that it had almost abdicated in favour of bankers and statesmen.* No epoch, probably, entertained more complete delusions on the omnipotence of skilfulness and talent; it was, if the expression may be allowed, offering a temptation to God to scatter them. . . . Such was the state of France, when there burst that thunderbolt, whose baleful lightnings suddenly disclosed so many new horizons, and unknown abysses. Never did God retake, in a more signally awful manner, (*avec un éclat plus terrible,*) possession of the government of human affairs, which He seems at times to delegate to us; never did Providence more completely baffle all the calculations of our prudence, all the speculations of our poor humiliated reason.'

The Count de Montalembert has since expressed the same thoughts concerning the same event, in the first chapter of his 'Avenir Politique.' 'Nous avons tous, depuis 1848, l'expérience personnelle de la vanité de nos prévisions, et de la fragilité de nos arguments. Jamais peut-être Dieu ne s'est plu davantage à démentir les calculs de la sagesse humaine, et à se jouer de nos espérances.'

We do not care to follow M. de Carné through his few remaining pages of his 'Etudes,' nor can we find room for more than incidental allusions to the letters which follow. But the very recollection of that Provisional Government, by the side of which the Orleans rule looks like the perfection of wisdom and patriotism; of those leaders whom our author, after a few heavy blows, leaves with a mercy with which contempt is largely mingled; of the reckless press, so ambitiously comprehensive in its would-be-large ideas and pretensions, yet so malignantly personal and unfair; of the dread, by no means an unfounded dread, of red-republicanism and socialism;—the recollection of these things, we say, is enough to remove all surprise that such

a nation should take refuge in Imperialism, however wonderful it may be, and we believe unexampled in history, that the successful aspirant after a crown should be one who had twice failed, and failed in such a manner as to make his hopes a laughing-stock in the eyes of Europe.

Here, then, though we may again have occasion for a passing reference, we take our grateful leave of M. de Carné's volumes. If any youthful student of history should be induced to read them, it may be well that he should first refresh his memory upon the principal facts of the different epochs which are criticised, inasmuch as the author's position is that of a commentator upon history, rather than an historian; but with this proviso, he will find them fully worthy of his best attention; and if he compare their tone with that of the fatalistic school, he will hardly, we trust, consider that our admiration of them is overcharged.

We have still to offer a few broken and hasty remarks upon the twofold question of the possibility and the desirability of Imperialism becoming the rule of England. It is well known that Hume regarded absolute monarchy as the most probable *euthanasia* of the British constitution; and Coleridge (in accordance, we believe, with Vico) has expressed a similar opinion upon representative government in general. We know that in several countries it has actually so failed; and although many writers, from Blackstone to Professor Newman, throw all the blame upon the sovereigns, yet this will not, we are sure, be the conclusion adopted by any fair critic of the annals of such countries as Spain, or even Austria. We quite agree with the remarks of Mr. R. C. Trench, in the preface to his 'Translations from Calderon,' that the Spanish rule of Philip II. was not such a despotism as would have been that of Charles I. in England, if his plan of dispensing with parliaments had succeeded. The latter would have been anti-national, and only upheld by the strong hand of armed authority; but the people of Spain accepted absolutism, as best suited to their national temper at that time, and not only acquiesced, but even gloried in it.

Now, it is idle to shut our eyes to the fact, that the indirectness and complication of constitutional government is a constant theme with writers of the day. Complaints of this kind have met our eyes in three journals, of most varied character, within the course of a single week. They may be heard, too, in very different grades of society. A Prince Consort did not hesitate, under the pressure of our war difficulties, to swell the cry. And, as generally happens when such ideas are to be found floating in different directions, some distinguished writers have aided in originating, or at least in powerfully expressing them. Thus

Mr. Merivale, if we recollect aright, calls attention to the fictitious character of the existing sovereignty in Great Britain, and is ready to acknowledge the justice of the celebrated *dictum* of Tacitus upon mixed government,¹ on the ground that England had long been a democracy, modified only by the indirect influence of the crown and the aristocracy. And the later volumes of his history of the Roman Empire seem to gravitate towards Imperialism. And, lest we should be in danger of unconsciously modifying the expression of doubts uttered by such thinkers as Mr. Grote and Mr. Hallam, it may be well to give an extract from each, *verbatim*. Thus, in a chapter adorned with that extraordinary richness of illustration which marks his work, does the latest historian of Greece depict the insuperable difficulty which Aristotle would have experienced in imagining a constitutional monarchy.

'The theory of a constitutional king, especially as it exists in England, would have appeared to him impracticable: to establish a king who will reign without governing—in whose name all government is carried on, yet whose personal will is, in practice, of little or no effect—exempt from all responsibility, without making use of the exemption—receiving from every one unmeasured demonstrations of homage, which are never translated into act, except within the bounds of a known law—surrounded with all the paraphernalia of power, yet acting as a passive instrument in the hands of ministers, marked out for his choice by indications which he is not at liberty to resist. This remarkable combination of the fiction of superhuman grandeur and licence, with the reality of an invisible strait-waistcoat, is what an Englishman has in his mind when he speaks of a constitutional king; the events of our history have brought it to pass in England, amidst an aristocracy the most powerful that the world has yet seen, but we have still to learn whether it can be made to exist elsewhere, or whether the occurrence of a single king, at once able, aggressive, and resolute, may not suffice to break it up.'

Mr. Hallam, in one of the supplemental notes appended to the most recent additions of his 'Middle Ages,' writes as follows:—

'A king is a person; to persons alone we attach the attributes of power and wisdom; on persons we bestow our affection or ill-will. An abstraction, a politic idea of royalty, is convenient for lawyers; it suits the speculative reasoner, but it never can become so familiar to a people, especially one too rude to have listened to such reasoners, as the simple image of the king, the one man whom we are to love and to fear. The other idea is a sort of monarchical pantheism, of which the vanishing point is a republic. And to this the prevalent theory, that kings are to reign but not to govern, cannot but lead. It is a plausible, and in the main, perhaps, for the times we have reached, a necessary theory, but it renders monarchy ultimately scarcely possible.'

There are those who regard such a possible consummation

¹ 'Nam cunctas nationes et urbes populus aut primores aut singuli regunt: delecta ex illis et consociata reipublice forma laudari facilius quam evenire, vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest.'—Annal. iv. 33.

with fear, and there are those who regard it with hope. Among the latter, strange as it may at first sight appear, are to be found republicans, who are willing, for a season at least, to welcome absolutism. The Laureate used to be considered a minstrel of somewhat democratic tendency, but his latest hero is ready to submit with cheerfulness to any single executor of vigorous and honest government.

'Ah! for a man with heart, head, hand,
Like some of the simple great ones gone
For ever and ever by,
One still strong man in a blatant land—
Whatever they call him, what care I?—
Aristocrat, democrat, autocrat; one
Who can rule, and dare not lie.'—*Maud.*

The truth is, that besides the other points of similarity between democracy and imperialism, to which we have already alluded, a sole master may in many ways gratify republican tastes. He may be chosen by universal suffrage; he may be induced, as often happened in the mediæval republics of Italy, to be the champion of the populace against the nobles; above all, if not surrounded by an ancient *noblesse*, and time-honoured institutions, he may be deposed without great difficulty, or his sway may perish with him, and the rule of democracy succeed.

It is some such form of Imperialism as this that Mr. Congreve comes forward to recommend for Britain. In a clever *résumé* of the history of the Western Empire, from Augustus to Augustulus, he enunciates the opinion that the government of the Cæsars was an improvement upon the republic; he reminds us of all its exploits in war and in legislation, and hence takes occasion to enforce upon us the duty of preparing our minds for the reception of a similar rule at home. The absolutism thus destined for us is not indeed to be hereditary; the monarch is to enjoy an absolute power of naming his successor (as, we believe, Hobbes recommends), without even the limitation of choosing from the royal family. Neither does our *doctrinaire* politician say, with Virgil's Jupiter, *Imperium sine fine dedi*; his theoretic autocracy is only intended to last for a time; it will prepare men for 'the new organization of society on the basis of industry;' and the ideal autocrat is to make way for this ultimate result without struggle or difficulty, inasmuch as he is supposed to recognise, amidst the exercise of his functions, 'their inherently provisional character.'

Mr. Congreve's recommendation of Imperialism is based, not merely upon its positive merits, exhibited (as he maintains) in the Roman empire, but likewise on its superiority to representative monarchy.

'Such states as the larger kingdoms of modern Europe, with no exception as to our own country, are not fit subjects for the constitutional system. That system, with its fictions and its indirect action, may offer advantages at certain times—as, historically, it has done with us—but, on the whole, I think it alien to good government. It has ever failed—and I appeal to the history of England in support of my assertion, and not merely to the present disgraceful state of our government, though that is so much in accordance with past history as to exonerate, in a measure, the men at the expense of the system. It is failing you now [February, 1855] in the presence of real dangers and war. It is of more than doubtful advantage in peace. For myself, I heartily wish that the time were come when we were clear of the government of boards, call them a cabinet or a vestry, with all their complications of personal and local interests, and under the government of one—a protector or dictator, if you like to call him so—the name is unimportant; the essential is, that he should be one who would rule England as she was ruled by Cromwell.'

This is at least plain speaking. But before such doctrine is allowed to pass unquestioned, two or three positions have to be established. In the first place, is it very probable that rulers can be found who will be content to pass over their own children, and bequeath their power to a stranger? Can any reasonable number of instances of such behaviour—say, for moderation's sake, some five or six—be pointed out, in the history of any state whatever, since the world began? We mean, of course, with the parent's real consent, for it will not do to refer to uncles who have displaced nephews, or successors forced upon an emperor by the voice of the Prætorian guards. Certainly, Aristotle, who is generally allowed to be no bad judge of human nature, seems to have regarded such a course of succession as all but impossible. He pronounces it, in a treatise which Mr. Congreve himself has edited, to be difficult, as demanding a degree of virtue above human nature.¹ Such conduct might be the mark of a character above the ordinary standard of human nature, but it might also be the sign of one below it. If there be one touch of deep tenderness in the character of Napoleon the First, it is his affection for his youthful son. We must wait to see the ideal dictator, before we can judge of his merit or demerit in this respect. Mr. Congreve's hero, Cromwell, had assuredly no idea of letting the chief authority depart from his own house. And when we call to mind that it was *one* of the Divine rewards (though not *the* reward) to the Father of the Faithful, that he should be the head and origin of a great nation; that Saul was punished by the withdrawal of the royalty from his family; that David thanked the Almighty for this, amongst other blessings, that He had 'spoken of his servant's house for a great while to come;' and that even Jehu, for a partial obedience,

¹ Χαλεπὸν . . . καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπινον φύσιν.—Polit. iii. 15 (ed. Bekker).

was promised the throne to the fourth generation; we are unable to see that the device of appointing a stranger, as the heir, derives any more sanction from Revelation than it does from history or philosophy.

Secondly, in what sense is it true that constitutional government has failed in England? It is, of course, easy to erect a transcendental standard of perfection, and to show that we fall, as a nation, very far short of that standard. But will Mr. Congreve, or any of his fellow-admirers of absolutism, have the goodness to point out which of the actual countries of Europe should be taken as our model? Switzerland, we fear, has hardly yet arrived 'at the organization of society on the basis of industry.' Is Austria, with her difficulties in Hungary and Italy, to be our model?—Austria, which Shakspeare apostrophised of old:—

'Thou ever strong upon the stronger side!
Thou Fortune's champion! that dost never fight
But when her humorous ladyship is by
To teach thee safety!'¹

Is it France, with its eight governments in seventy years? Or must we cross the Atlantic (for it is idle to speak of Asia or Africa), and compare the mother country with a daughter so very differently circumstanced? Until we have some concrete shape to deal with, the problem is far too ærial for discussion.

Thirdly, has our lecturer presented to us a fair portraiture of the Empire of Rome? Upon this, to a great extent, depends the justice of his conclusions. Now, of intentional unfairness we believe Mr. Congreve quite incapable. But it is possible that undue prepossessions have marred the clearness of his mental vision. The omission of literature was necessary, on account of the limits imposed by lectures, but was it not also necessary for his case? Mr. Congreve has brought into strong relief all the benefits of the Empire, but where has he alluded, in anything like just terms, to its ten wicked persecutions of Christianity? His apology for the intolerant emperors seems to us to withdraw from them the one palliation that ever can be offered for persecution; we mean the deep and stern conviction (such as marked that Pharisee who became S. Paul), on the part of the persecutors, that they are really engaged in extirpating an injurious falsehood, which dishonours God and injures the souls of men. Such persecutors, we know, *may* obtain mercy, because they did it ignorantly in unbelief.

But we are happily spared the necessity of examining into the chief features of Mr. Congreve's historical sketch. If it be

¹ King John, Act III. Sc. 1.

objected to Oxford, that a late Fellow and Tutor of one of her Colleges has been uttering paradoxes, and endangering men's loyalty, *Alma Mater* may reply that she has supplied the antidote as well as the bane. The volume of 'Oxford Essays,' for 1856, closes with a paper by a Fellow of another College, which professes to be a review of Mr. Congreve's Lectures. It might more correctly, perhaps, be described as a reply. We all know the story of the clergyman (and reviewers must often sympathise with him), who said that if he had more time he could make his sermons shorter. Mr. Goldwin Smith has had time, and he has thoroughly succeeded in achieving brevity. In less than seventeen pages he has compressed an amount of matter, which most of us, we fear (had we possessed it), would have diluted into thrice that quantity. For powerful reasoning, grave humour, and vigour of style, we have not, for some time past, seen anything to equal this essay.

Nevertheless, not being inclined in political science *jurare in verba magistri*, we cannot allow even the animated reasonings of Mr. Goldwin Smith to carry us entirely away. While ranging ourselves, on the entire case, most decidedly on his side, as against that espoused by Mr. Congreve, we claim the liberty, in one or two respects, of a slight modification of his case. Thus, for instance, we think it possible that his strong feeling against despots has led him to underrate the intellect (we do not say the character) of Julius Cæsar. And again, the merit really due to Imperialism, in enacting codes of law, might have been admitted more ungrudgingly. Whatever were the services of the Stoic philosophers, as a plain matter of fact, they *did* not, and it is more than probable that they *could* not, consolidate the Roman law. And we beg leave to question the correctness of the assertion, 'that the Convention left the *Code Napoleon* in their bureau.' The social changes adopted by the Constituent Assembly were doubtless ratified in that code; but what authority can the essayist produce for attributing any part of it to the Convention? If, however, as he seems to think, there exists a 'moral incongruity of a disagreeable kind, in the idea' of receiving a benefit from tyrants, we can hardly suppose that Mr. Goldwin Smith could feel any peculiar pleasure in receiving a code from the hands of Danton or Maximilian Robespierre. And, last of blemishes (as they appear to us) in this remarkable paper, we may mention an apparent non-recognition of the really deep influence which the Empire, with all its sins, did exercise upon the kingdoms of modern Christendom. Writers so far removed from any love of absolutism as Guizot and Palgrave, with many more, are strenuous in asserting that influence as being, on the whole, an element of good.

But, with these slight drawbacks, we cordially approve the general tenor of Mr. Goldwin Smith's masterly performance, and feel grateful to him, as for an intellectual treat, so no less for the high and healthy tone of his production. We cannot find space even for specimens of his successive rejoinders to Mr. Congreve, point by point; but we would name, as peculiarly happy, the proof that the succession to the Roman empire was, after all, practically hereditary.

The feeling against representative government has arisen perhaps, in part, among literary men, from its tendency to foster haste and shallowness of thought. This danger is well exposed in Mr. Macaulay's review of Gladstone upon 'Church and State.' With the main feature of that article, its denial of a state-conscience, we are not much more disposed to agree than was Dr. Arnold. But the particular peril referred to is pointed out with exceeding clearness.

Another cause of the distrust may arise from the discovery that self-interest and hypocrisy *do* play a part in other governments, as well as despotic ones. The great difficulty of dealing with the political offence of bribery, arises from our knowledge of the way in which appeals to interest may be made, without incurring its penalties. Thus, if Mr. A., the candidate for a seat, promises a sovereign to a poor man for his vote, it is bribery; but if he pledge himself to Mr. B., the eminent soap-boiler, as an ardent opponent of the iniquitous tax upon one of the articles most essential to the production of soap, this is not bribery. But the hope that this particular tax should be removed appeals to Mr. B.'s love of gain, quite as strongly as the actual bribe to the labourer. A somewhat similar effect is produced upon the minds of Presidents of Republics, and Members of the British Parliament, by the near approach of the time for re-elections. Both are in danger of speaking and acting with a sole view to popularity. It is notorious that the discussion of particular questions in the House of Commons will probably issue in a different result according to the age of that parliament. A motion may be carried in its first year of sitting which would almost inevitably be lost in the sixth. Such an eye to the opinion of constituencies of necessity involves a lamentable lack of moral courage, a virtue which Mr. Disraeli has termed 'the rarest and most admirable of public life.' Hence the origin of the accusation, on the part of admirers of Imperialism, that democracies and constitutional monarchies cover as much hypocrisy as the court of an autocrat.

Another cause of the reaction against representative institutions is unquestionably to be found in the somewhat extravagant admiration of them which has been displayed by their supporters. It was

the point] 'that there is no danger of their ever having practical experience of its working?'

It is almost enough to raise a blush upon our cheeks; to think that a foreigner should have depicted so forcibly the benefits which we ourselves are often slow to realize. The Count de Montalembert is, in many points, by no means prejudiced in favour of England. If we were at present concerned with the theological aspect of the case, there might be two or three topics of debate and difference to consider in his '*De l'Avenir Politique de l'Angleterre*.' We think that his opinion of the English Church, though evidently much raised since the publication of his treatise '*Des Intérêts Catholiques*' in 1852, would be still improved by further acquaintance with the Prayer-Book. We might be disposed to question the justice of parts of his portraiture of the English clergy; and we should most certainly combat his position, that the decadence and present powerlessness of Spain may be traced to political despotism alone, without any portion of the blame being justly assigned to the influence of Roman Catholicism.

But at present we are more especially concerned with the political portion; and in common, we are sure, with hundreds of our countrymen and countrywomen, we beg to tender to M. de Montalembert the expression of our hearty thanks for a work at once so brilliant and interesting, displaying so much *finesse* of observation; and so gratifying, upon the whole, in its reference to the past and present of our national life—so cheering as regards its future. What with the large circulation of the work in its original language, the translations, and the quarrels concerning their fidelity, the extracts given in magazines, and the criticisms, reasonable and unreasonable, we may venture to assume upon the part of our readers a tolerable acquaintance with its contents. Will they pardon us if, coming into the field at so late a period, when the harvest has been well-nigh reaped, we try to gain a few gleanings here and there, which are not wholly alien from our theme.

It is possible that the intensity of M. de Montalembert's regret for the loss of a free press and representative institutions in his own country, may have tempted him to paint England almost too much *couleur de rose*. Critics have already pointed out how little notice is taken of our manufacturing towns, or of the tone of our colonies—as, for instance, Australia; on the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the Count speaks strongly (as he always has spoken) against the foreign policy of England. And it would ill become us, after having said so much in this article of the national sins of France, to be hasty in rejecting the accusations thus made. We fear that there is too much truth in

them. Our governing classes have often proved extremely indifferent to our dealings with foreign nations, excepting where a party advantage could be gained by one side or the other. Take the case of our war with China, in 1840. We will venture to say, that no seriously-minded man can study that question without finding himself compelled to agree with the French traveller, M. Huc, with the American senator, Mr. Cass, with Lord John Manners and with Dr. Arnold at home, in denouncing that war as most flagrantly wicked and unjust. Yet, when a most distinguished Member of the House of Commons protested, at the time, against the part taken by Great Britain, he found that he was addressing almost empty benches.

We would willingly devote a page to an examination of that contempt of logic, on the part of English politicians, which is more than once alluded to in this volume. But a reference to the chapter upon the *Logic of Politics*, in the 'Treatise on Logic,' by Mr. J. S. Mill, compared with the remarks of Mr. Macaulay on the Toleration Act, in the third volume of his History, or with Lord John Russell's little work upon the English Constitution, will be found to suggest all that we could have pretended to offer, and must now omit for want of space.

But we cannot so lightly pass by the question of aristocracy, to which so large a portion of this book is dedicated; for it stands in the closest and most vital connexion with tendencies to democracy or to absolutism. The English writers who recommend either of these extremes, invariably direct their attacks against the nobility. They hold, and not without reason, that the Crown might easily be either abolished or made autocratic, if once the influence of the peerage were overthrown.

Waiving the insensate dream of those who would attempt to introduce perfect equality into the world, we may remark perhaps five or six main causes of the superiority of one person to another. These are strength, beauty, rank, wealth, talents, and antiquity of race. The first of these, strength, is, of course, only available in actual war, or in savage states of society. The second, beauty, is influential on a wider scale; very often for evil, as in the case of corrupt courts, or anarchical conditions of society; yet often likewise for good, more often, perhaps, than might at first sight be recognised. We know that once, at least, the beauty of a Jewish maiden was divinely overruled to the preservation of the chosen race. 'Mordecai commanded to answer Esther . . . Who knoweth whether thou art come to the kingdom for such a time as this?'

Rank may be, as in Turkey or China, or in the case of those who have in Europe procured their own elevation, dissociated from nobility of birth; but as this is only exceptional in England, we may fairly include both under one and the same

category.¹ The strong man affects the minds of his comrades, who choose him for their leader, and of the enemies whom he slays or routs; the beauty moves those alone who behold her, or who become acquainted with her charms through the skill of the artist or the lay of the bard.

But nobility and wealth take a wider range, and exercise influence upon numbers who have scarcely seen the possessors; and as these two gifts may often be dissevered, a rivalry is no unfrequent result. We hear, in our own day, complaints that money is gaining ascendancy over nobility of blood. But such complaints re-appear from time to time, and are by no means peculiar to the nineteenth century. To name a single proof. The works of the Greek poet, Theognis, in the sixth century B.C., are replete with complaints of the overthrow of the aristocracy of birth by the new aristocracy of wealth.

Genius, too, has often its own competition with birth. To leaven the thoughts of others long after death is a nobility, nay, a royalty of itself. But, forasmuch as God is not wont to impart too many of these coveted gifts to any one person, so do we see that the great stars of literature are not ordinarily permitted to become founders of families. Seldom do their descendants live for more than one or two generations. Shakspere and Milton have no heirs. Edmund Burke and Walter Scott cherished it as the one wish of their hearts that they might found families; but it was not permitted. The melancholy foreboding with which Mr. Hallam concludes his 'Literature of Europe' has proved but too true; and a very slight research will enable the reader to make a long catalogue of similar examples.

Wealth may be acquired as well as inherited; and acquired by the most discreditable means. Genius may owe much to cultivation. In both, therefore, though only existent, *juvante Deo*, the human element is often more or less conspicuous. But it is otherwise with birth. 'Birth is a possession which cannot be acquired by those to whom it has not been granted by the Father of mankind. It is a pre-eminence which may be rendered more useful or more illustrious by wealth, or intellect, or station, but which neither wealth nor station can impart. It is a power not conceded either by king or by people, and which neither the arbitrary will of the despot, nor the more arbitrary tyranny of the multitude, can obliterate. Man cannot bestow dignity of birth, man cannot take it away. Whatever results from time is incommunicable, and cannot be supplied by any

¹ We are not, however, forgetful of ancient families, who, like the Malets or Molesworths, have constantly refused the peerage; nor of the many cases in which an ennobled branch is not the eldest of its name. These must be considered to be included by us under the general term of aristocracy.

exceptions, a tendency to caste feeling, and too frequently a needless irritation of numbers, who would otherwise cheerfully acquiesce in the present condition of English society. When an ambassador will not even take the trouble to present to the sovereign of a foreign court, men of science who had a right to expect such attention, because they were visiting in an official capacity; when a duke, not content with bowing out an intruder, must needs eject him in a manner which, if ducal, is certainly not really dignified nor Christian; when an earl,¹ as unfortunately distinguished by *hauteur* as by undoubted courage and honour, cannot even preserve courtesy to one only a degree lower than his own condition; the chief actors in such cases are, we believe, really unaware how deep an injury they are inflicting upon their own order, how needlessly they alienate the affection and respect which thousands would yield so willingly to their other claims. Might they not frequently be addressed in the language which Lord Worcester is made to hold to Hotspur?—

‘You must needs learn, lord, to amend this fault;
Though sometimes it show greatness, courage, blood,
(And that’s the dearest grace it renders you,)
Yet oftentimes it doth present harsh rage,
Defect of manners, want of government,
Pride, haughtiness, opinion, and disdain;
*The least of which, haunting a nobleman,
Loseth men’s hearts; and leaves behind a stain
Upon the beauty of all parts besides,
Beguiling them of commendation.*’

At the same time, it would be well if those who, on such accounts, would rejoice to see the overthrow of the British aristocracy, would consider what they seek to substitute in its stead. Is it the *functionarism* of the Continent? Mr. Laing, with all his anti-aristocratic feelings, yet admits, in his ‘Notes of a Traveller,’ that such a change is a change for the worse. Is it Americanism? We are not going to say harsh things about America, but we know that many a partizan of democracy comes back to England, after a few months spent in the United States, with a tendency towards even oligarchy, from the intensity of the reaction which his sentiments have undergone. Is it the rule of the *bourgeoisie*, such as was in power under Louis Philippe?

The latter class has many great and noble virtues, but is it not

¹ ‘I can hardly find terms to express my indignation at the unwarrantable language in which your letter is couched. If, as a peer of the realm, your lordship considers this as a sufficient reason to be abusive to those who simply fulfil their duty, and tell you what is right, I, as a son of a peer of the realm, will tell your lordship in return, that such conduct will not escape the censure of the people of this land; and that it is by such pride, and by such tyranny, that the voice of the country has already cried out against the aristocracy, and it is by such means that their downfall will be accelerated.’—The Vicar of Glapthorne to the Earl of C—n, (Guardian, of 12th December, 1855.)

as often purse-proud, as nobles can be birth-proud? Our clever satirists, such as Thackeray, Dickens, and Mrs. Ormsby Gore, portray vividly all that is mean and debasing in connexion with tuft-hunting, and their satire is but too frequently just and salutary. But it should be remembered that both counter-pride and mean servility have a tendency to foster the very faults complained of. The one fault is exhibited in the restless vanity of Burns, the other by some of the gentry whom Moore used to meet at Holland House.

Neither can our *savans*, often so great in the closet, be always acquitted of restless desire of admiration when abroad.

'The man of science himself is fonder of glory, and vain ;

An eye well-practised in nature, a spirit bounded and poor.'

We do not believe that England would be happy under their rule, or that of literary men. The literary class (even Mr. Macaulay admits) have some very unpleasant faults. In power they would soon prove intolerable.

Therefore, while not insensible to the faults of our nobility, nor desirous of recommending anything beyond that deference which is compatible with true self-respect, so wonderfully displayed in the example of the great Apostle of the Gentiles, we still believe in a long career of honour and usefulness for our Peers, and, with their stability, in the freedom of England from democracy or imperialism. Even those who think themselves insulted or aggrieved, can often bear it more easily from those accustomed to power. Cassandra, in the grand tragedy of 'Æschylus,' congratulates herself in thinking, that, though enslaved, she is not going to be under the orders of *nouveaux riches*. The lover of *Maud* taunts his rival, not with his rank, but because he is 'this new-made lord.'

There is, after all, to quote again the language of Sir F. Palgrave, 'a value attached to noble birth by the natural and 'universal feeling of mankind ; *perhaps, most of all, by those who attempt to cry down that value.*' Assuredly the cry comes with an ill grace from those who, while denouncing what they call flunkeyism, are ready to pander to all the prejudices of republics, or the passions of mobs.

Perhaps it may be, that all orders are preserved by the salt of their worthy members, as the cities of the plain might have been rescued from their fiery doom by the presence of ten righteous men. And if it be lawful to think thus, there must still be hope, even amidst all discouragement, for England and her time-honoured institutions. For, take the different estates, Clergy, Lords, Commons, there is not one which cannot show specimens worthy of the country's brightest days. Even those instincts which seem more susceptible of gratification under other forms

of government, need not perish under constitutional monarchy. Attachment to persons can still rest upon a sovereign, and from time to time upon great men. Indeed, it is far grander and more healthful for the mind's eye to gaze upon a greatness, like that of a Wellington, content in dutiful loyalty to serve his sovereign, than to look at those who have made their successes a mere stepping-stone to the first place in the land.¹ To the charges of indirectness it is enough to reply, that, on the whole, the system *works well*. To Churchmen who, like ourselves, lament the degree of subjection to which their spiritual Mother is reduced, we would hint that their hope must *not* be based on a mere change of our earthly frame of polity. They must be content to learn, *sub Deo*,

‘That in ourselves our safety must be sought;
That by our own right hands it must be wrought;
That we must stand unpropp’d, or be laid low.’

For proof that popular government *need* not necessitate superficiality of thought, we may point to our recent works in theology, metaphysics, and classical history. The existing lack of moral courage is attributed by an acute observer, Mr. J. S. Mill, rather to the general effect of modern civilization, than to any particular form of government. Hypocrisy is at least more liable to reproof, more momentary (as M. de Tocqueville has suggested) under a free, than a despotic sway. It is rebuked by those brave men who dare (and we have always some such) to resist the current of popular opinion, and who invariably receive the respect of a large body of their countrymen, even of those who, on the particular point of controversy, do not agree with them. It is rebuked at times by that noble gift of eloquence, which can hardly ever enjoy long life under autocracy, which can never die, though at times it may languish, where there is liberty.

Perhaps it may be requisite for the most favourable display of constitutional monarchy, that it be tried among races which, like the Dorian, the Roman, and the Anglo-Saxon, and unlike the impulsive Celt, have a natural love of law and order implanted in their hearts. We do not seek to force it upon others, we only claim to cherish it for ourselves. These institutions have nursed

¹ Napoleon, as is well known, expected that his great opponent, the victor at Waterloo, would make an attempt to gain a crown. As M. de Montalembert most justly remarks:—‘His own career, so adventurous, so rapid, the many fortunes he had made and unmade, his habit of playing with the consciences of others as with his own,—all this prevented his being able to comprehend that an Englishman, even when arrived at the highest summit of glory and popularity, had no better object before him than to remain in his place, to do his duty, to enjoy his position in the Parliament of his country, to raise there a respected voice, and then to find in the creation of an agricultural patrimony, such as that founded by the Duke of Wellington at Strathfieldsaye, the occupation of his declining years, and the security of his posterity.’

our great and good ones for long ages. Britannia may say with the Athenian of old,

ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνα,
ἐξ ὧν ἄνδρας Μαραθωνομάχας ἡμὶ παίδευσις ἐθρεψεν.

They have proved elastic in many a crisis; they may prove elastic still. They are surely compatible with greater scope of personal action on the part of the sovereign, if talent and temperament so impel a future ruler, than has been exercised during the two or three latest reigns. Still, then, may we hope to be preserved from the political pantheism described by Mr. Hallam, and trust that Mr. Grote's semi-prediction may be but partially fulfilled, in another generation, by the appearance of a king who shall be 'able' and 'resolute' without being 'aggressive.' May that magnificent *Coronation Service* which, in its main substance, has been used in England for more than nine hundred years past, and which even Pepin and the Franks seemed to have borrowed from Britain, be repeated, if it please God, again and again; and may its prayers to the Throne of Grace on high preserve that earthly throne from lapsing into the despotism of one, or being overthrown by the despotism of the many! And if England's Laureate has for a moment swelled the cry for the stern authority of a single master, we appeal, we will not say from Philip drunk to Philip sober, but at least from our poet singing under the excitement wrought by the pressure of war, to the calmer lays which he poured forth in the days of peace, now happily again restored to us. We call to remembrance how he bade us love our land, with a love that was brought afar from out the storied Past, used in the Present, and transfused by thought into the Future. We bethink us how he vaunted his mother-country as the home of that free speech, which an individual sway is almost certain to restrain.

'It is the land that freemen till,
That sober-suited Freedom chose;
The land where, girt with friends or foes,
A man may speak the thing he will.'

We remember how he prayed, and it is a prayer which we have not unlearned, for the duration of a liberty that yearned for all things true, and therefore repelled violence from whatever quarter it might arise; a liberty imaged forth in a grave matron, who gazed down from this her island altar.

'Her open eyes desire the truth;
The wisdom of a thousand years
Is in them. May perpetual youth
Keep dry their light from tears;
'That her fair form may stand and shine,
Make bright our days, and light our dreams,
*Turning to scorn, with lips divine,
The falsehood of extremes!*'

ART. II.—*Poetical Works of Geoffrey Chaucer.* Edited by
ROBERT BELL. 8 vols. 8vo. London: John W. Parker & Son,
West Strand. 1856.

It has been often remarked that England has preserved more of the mediæval traditions than any other country in Europe. Our government is a modification of the constitutional monarchy of the Anglo-Saxons and Normans; the principles and maxims of our laws are the same which endeared those of Edward the Confessor to the people. Even the very act, which seemed to sever the connexion between our religion and that of the middle ages, tended, by stopping the centralizing system which was developing itself more and more strongly in the policy of the court of Rome, to preserve the shell of ecclesiastical traditions and associations, which, in other European nations, have been swept away by the pseudo-classical tastes of the *renaissance*. The material fabrics, at least, of our cathedrals and parish-churches remain in better preservation than in most countries which have preserved their connexion with Rome; and our universities, with their chapels and common dining-halls and quiet cloisters, present an appearance so mediæval as to strike M. de Montalembert with admiration, and Mr. Heywood with dismay. We seem to be animated by the old Roman spirit of pride and veneration for our country, not only in her present but in her past existence; and so valuable is this national feeling, and so conducive to sobriety and respect for the laws, that, even when it is falsely and absurdly applied, we cannot help regarding it with some degree of favour. If we only go far enough back in our appeal to our old institutions, we find ourselves in the midst of times when the necessities of mutual defence obliged men to cooperate for the common good; when an armed yeomanry and an independent clergy were able to command a recognition of their rights from those classes whose wealth and power tempt them to oppression. It is a significant fact that the country which has pre-eminently preserved her respect for her early traditions, is the very one which now enjoys the largest share of political freedom. We hail with pleasure, therefore, every symptom which we observe in the public mind of a desire to apply for a knowledge of our past history, manners, and customs, to authentic contemporary documents, rather than to the superficial and prejudiced compilations of our Scotch historians and philosophers, who, in their overweening veneration for their own fancied superiority, feel such a profound contempt for the ages which they attempt to depict, that they will not vouchsafe even to understand

them. Mr. Froude has pointed out our statute-law as the most authentic evidence of the politics of our ancestors; but the source from whence we can best derive a knowledge of their domestic manners, modes of thinking, and social condition, is obviously their popular literature.

It is for this reason that we feel a more than ordinary interest in the attempt, which Mr. Bell has been making, to render accessible to the generality of readers the works of a poet, who has described the social life of the fourteenth century in all its phases, with an elaborate accuracy and power which are unrivalled in any language. Chaucer stands in the same relation to the other poets of his own age, as the pre-Raphaelite school holds with respect to that of Claude or West. His matured genius led him to dismiss the conventionalities of his predecessors and contemporaries, and to seek his inspiration in the realities of common life; and the wisdom of his choice is abundantly proved by the fact that now, after the lapse of five hundred years, his poems are read by his countrymen with delight and admiration. The politics, the religion, the philosophy of his time, are represented in his writings in their most intelligible form. He introduces us to the hall of the feudal baron, and its amusements and conversation, the counting-house of the wealthy merchant, the lodgings of the undergraduate, the cloister of the monk, the 'limitation' of the begging friar, the parish of the country parson, and the cottage of the churl; his various personages are brought upon the scene in the full costume of their characters, and every particular of their dress and bearing, the topics of their conversation, and their modes of treating them, are so characteristic, that even at the present day we can recognise his portraits in the analogous classes of modern society. Here we find the military man of high rank and courteous manners; the purse-proud merchant; the lawyer in his highest and lowest developments, from the bench to the sheriff's officer and 'touter' in the ecclesiastical courts; the several specimens of clergymen,—the pompous and formal dignitary, the popular preacher, the retired scholar, the jocular parson, and the laborious parish-priest; the plain-spoken and clever woman of business who 'attends races,' and the sentimental religious lady; the rollicking sailor, the keen and roguish steward, and the jolly landlord of the inn. All these characters, and many more, are brought before us in Chaucer's poems, with a vividness and reality which make us regard them as old acquaintances, rather than as the fanciful creations of one who has been in his grave for four centuries and a half.

To every one who has made English literature his study, the 'Canterbury Tales,' at least, are familiar; but there is a large

class of readers whom the supposed obsolescence of the language in which Chaucer wrote deters from giving his poetry that attention which it merits, both from its intrinsic excellence and as a study of mediæval manners. We therefore make no apology for taking advantage of Mr. Bell's new edition of his works to enter into details respecting them and their author, which to scholars may seem trite and unnecessary.

Strange as it may appear, this is the first collected edition of the whole of Chaucer's poetical works published since Urry's wretched failure. Tyrwhitt confined himself to the *Canterbury Tales*, as did also Mr. Thomas Wright. The Aldine edition, published by Pickering, and edited by Sir Harris Nicolas, is, as far as the *Canterbury Tales* go, a mere reprint of Tyrwhitt, and, for the other poems, it reproduces, word for word, and error for error, the unintelligible and corrupt text of Speght; while, as if to render the whole perfectly useless, Tyrwhitt's excellent glossary and notes are entirely omitted. The *Memoir*, by Sir Harris Nicolas, which is prefixed to it, is the only thing about it of any value. In the annotated edition Mr. Bell has taken Mr. Wright's accurate text of the *Canterbury Tales*, published by the Camden Society, as the basis of his own, recurring in some cases, however, to the MSS. where they gave, in his opinion, a better reading. For the other poems he has had recourse to the MSS. in the British Museum, the Bodleian, the Public Library at Cambridge, and the Hunterian Museum at Glasgow. His object appears to have been to obtain the text, as nearly as possible, as it was written by Chaucer himself, with all its peculiarities of grammar and orthography, trusting to explanatory introductions to each poem, to exegetical foot-notes, and a copious glossary, to render the text easily intelligible to the general reader. This plan, as he shows in his general introduction, is, indeed, the only satisfactory one. The retention of the old spelling is essential to the integrity of the metrical and grammatical structure, and presents no serious difficulty to any one who is likely to read or relish Chaucer. To the whole is prefixed an accurate and readable memoir of the poet, and an introduction, in which these and other questions of interest are fully discussed. We can safely say that in this edition we have enjoyed the 'father of English poetry' as we never enjoyed him before, and that with it in our library we should never dream of using the black-letter folio of Speght, the corrupt text of Urry and Tyrwhitt, or the booksellers' worthless reprints, which have hitherto been our only resources. Taking our facts, then, from Mr. Bell's *Memoir*, we shall endeavour to trace the poet's life, with especial reference to the progress of his genius, from its first timid imitations and

translations of the French allegorical school, till its maturity in the masterly delineation of character in the *Canterbury Tales*.

The origin of Chaucer's family is involved in obscurity, but we are inclined to give credit to the general tradition, current in the time of Speght, that it was engaged in commerce. There seems little reason to doubt that he was born in London. Without pretending to trace all the particulars of his life in *The Testament of Love*, or to distinguish what is purely fictitious from what is intended to relate to real events, we cannot help thinking that, in the following sentence, he means to express his love for the place of his nativity:—'Also the city of London, that is to me so dear and sweet, in which I was first grown; and more kindly love have I to that place than to any other on earth, as every creature hath full appetite to the place of his kindly engendrure.' From a passage in *The Court of Love*, believed to be the earliest poem of his now extant, and written in his eighteenth year, he appears to have been educated at Cambridge. Oxford has, indeed, disputed the honour of being his *alma mater*, and it is possible that he may have studied at both universities. Certain it is that he gives sketches of student-life in the fourteenth century at both Oxford and Cambridge, and the pictures he draws are extremely curious and full of vigour. It appears, as Mr. Bell in his note observes, 'that the late measure permitting students at the University to live in private lodgings, is in accordance with the ancient practice.' In the following extracts we shall take the liberty of adopting the modern mode of spelling, as far as it is consistent with the metre. This would indeed have been improper in an edition which, like Mr. Bell's, aims at being a standard authority; but we have no such reasons for rejecting a course which may assist such of our readers as are unacquainted with mediæval English, and encourage them to consult the original.

'Whilome there was dwelling at Oxenford,
A richè gnof¹ that guestès held to board,
And of his craft he was a carpenter.
With him there was dwelling a poor scholâr,
Had learnèd art;² but all his phantasy
Was turnèd for to learn astrology,
And could³ a certain of conclusions,
To deemè⁴ by interrogations,
If that men askèd him in certain hours,
When that men should have drought, or elles showers;
Or if men askèd him what should befall
Of everything, I may not reckon all.
This clerk was clepèd⁵ hendè⁶ Nicholas;
Of dernè⁷ love he could, and of solace;

¹ An oaf.

² Who had learned art; that is, the quadrivium.

³ Knew.

⁴ To judge.

⁵ Called.

⁶ Courteous.

⁷ Secret.

And therewith he was sly and full privy,
 And like a maiden meckè for to see.
 A chamber had he in that hostelry
 Alone, withouten any company,
 Full fetously idight¹ with herbès swoot,²
 And he himself as sweet as is the root
 Of licorice, or any cetewall.³
 His almagest,⁴ and bookès great and small,
 His astrylabè,⁵ longing for⁶ his art,
 His augrym stonès,⁷ lyen fair apart
 On shelves couchèd⁸ at his beddès head,
 His press i-covered with a falding⁹ red,
 And above all there lay a gay psaltery,
 On which he made o'nightes melody
 So sweetley that all the chamber rang,
 And *Angelus ad Virginem* he sang,
 And after that he sang the King's note;
 Full often blessed was his merry throat:
 And thus this sweetè clerk his timè spent,
 After his friendès' finding and his rent.¹⁰

The following gives a still more curious picture of life at the University. The warden and fellows of Solar Hall—so called because it was distinguished by possessing a solar, or upper story—grew their own corn, it appears, and had it ground for the use of the community at the mill at Trumpington. The miller is suspected of taking more than the customary toll, and Allen and Johan, two 'canny' clerks from Strother, in Fife, lay a plan to circumvent him:—

'Then weren therè poorè scholars two,
 That dwelten in the Hall of which I say;
 Testy they were, and lusty for to play;
 And, only for their mirth and revely,
 Upon the warden busily they cry
 To give them leavè but a little stound,¹⁰
 To go to mill, and see their corn i-ground;
 And hardily they dursten lay their neck,
 The miller should not steal them half a peck
 Of corn by sightè, ne by force them reve.¹¹
 And at the last the warden gave them leave.
 John hight¹² that one, and Allen hight that other;
 Of one town were they born, that hightè Strother,
 Far in the North, I cannot telle where.
 This Allen maketh ready all his gear,
 And on an horse the sack he cast anon:
 Forth goeth Allen the clerk, and also John,
 With good sword and with buckler by their side.'

¹ Ornamented.² Sweet.³ The herb Valerian.⁴ The *μεγαλη Συναξαρις* of Ptolemy.⁵ An astronomical instrument.⁶ Belonging to.⁷ Stones used for counting on an abacus.⁸ Laid in order.⁹ A kind of cloth.¹⁰ Time.¹¹ Rob.¹² Was named.

We will leave Allen and John to pursue their adventure. They represented the class now commonly called 'fast men;' but Chaucer gives us an excellent specimen of the 'reading man,' in the character of the *Clerk of Oxenford*:—

' A Clerk there was of Oxenford also,
That unto logic haddè long igo.¹
All so lean was his horse as is a rake,
And he was not right fat, I undertake,
But lookèd hollow, and thereto² soberly.
Full thread-bare was his overest³ courtepy,⁴
For he had not yet got him a benefice,
Ne was not worthy to haven an office.
For him was lever⁵ have at his bed's head
Twenty bookès, clothèd in black and red,
Of Aristotle and his philosophy,
Than robès rich, or fiddle or psaltry.
But although he were a philosòpher,
Yet haddè he but little gold in coffer;
But all that he might of his friendès hent,⁶
On bookès and on learning he it spent,
And busily gan for the soulès pray
Of them that gave him wherewith to scholay.⁷
Of study tooke he moste cure⁸ and heed;
Not one word spake he morè than was need;
All that he spake, it was of high prudèce,
And short and quick, and full of great sentence.⁹
Sounding in moral manner was his speech,
And gladly would he learn, and gladly teach.'

Here we observe the zeal for Aristotle's philosophy, for which Oxford is still distinguished, and which induced Dr. Arnold to give it the preference over every other University. Even in the fourteenth century, too, it appears Oxonians were remarkable for the same sententiousness of manner which is said to be their characteristic at the present day.

It naturally occurs to the reader to inquire whether Chaucer, during his life at the University, belonged to the set of Allen and John, or to that of the studious clerk. That he was always fond of reading he himself more than once assures us; and there are many traces of his familiarity with dialectics; but we should imagine that his studies were by no means confined to the trivium and quadrivium. We possess at least one poem of great merit, written while he was still at Cambridge, and breathing a spirit by no means clerical. It is called *The Court of Love*, and betokens a more familiar acquaintance with the 'Roman de la Rose' than with Aristotle or the schoolmen. Here is the dedication addressed to his lady:—

¹ One.
² Moreover.
was more agréable to him,
³ pursue his studies in the schools,

⁴ Uppermost.
⁵ Care.

⁶ Short cloak.
⁷ Obtain.
⁸ Meaning.

With timorous heart and trembling hand of dread,
 Of cunning naked, bare of eloquence,
 Unto the flower of port in womanhead¹
 I write, as he that no intelligence
 Of metres hath, ne flowers of sentence;
 Save that me list my writing to convey,
 In that I can to please her high nobley.

'The blossoms fresh of Tullius' garden swoot
 Present they not, my matter for to borne;
 Poems of Virgil taken here no root,
 Ne craft of Galfride may not here sojourn:
 Why n' am I cunning? Oh, well may I mourn,
 For lack of science that I cannot write
 Unto the princess of my life aright.'

Indeed at this period Chaucer appears to have resembled the young squire rather than the clerk; for no doubt 'He couldè songes well make and indite.' But this poem claims our attention for various reasons; it is not only our poet's earliest known production, but it is the type of all his early poems, and proves the connexion between the poetry of that age and the 'Courts of Love,' of which curious institutions Mr. Bell has given, in his Introduction, the only account that we know of in the whole circle of English literature. We shall, therefore, proceed to give a slight sketch of its general purport, with short extracts to illustrate the mode of its execution.

The youthful poet, under the fantastic name of 'Philogenet of Cambridge, Clerk,' at the age of eighteen resorts for the first time to the Court of the King and Queen of Love. The latter is complimented under the emblem of a Daisy,—in French, *Marguerite*; and this, combined with similar eulogiums on this emblem in many of his other poems, and in *The Testament of Love*, has induced many to believe that Chaucer, as well as Froissart, was patronised by the celebrated Margaret, Countess of Pembroke. Here, being chidden for the lateness of his coming, Philogenet does homage to the god, and swears to observe the twenty statutes of his realm. These are curious, as examples of the excessive veneration for the sex, introduced, or at least fostered, by the spirit of chivalry. For instance:—

'The twelfth statute remember to observe:
 For all the pain thou hast for love and woe,
 All is too lite² her mercy to deserve,
 Thou musten think, whether thou ride or go;
 And mortal woundes suffer thou also,
 All for her sake, and think it well beset
 Upon thy love, for it may not be bet.'³

¹ To her who is the perfection of feminine bearing. In old English, *head* in composition corresponds with the modern *hood*.

² Little.

³ For it may be no better bestowed than on her.

Again, a vein of humour runs through others; as the fifteenth:—

'The fifteenth statute,—Use to swear and stare,
And counterfeit a leasing¹ hardly
To save thy lady's honour everywhere,
And put thyself for her to fight boldly;
Say she is good, virtuous and ghostly,²
Clear of intent and heart, yea, thought and will,
And argue not for reason ne for skill

'Against thy lady's pleasure ne intent:
For love will not be counterpleaded indeed:
Say as she saith, then shalt thou not be shent;³
The crow is white; yea, truly, so I rede:⁴
And aye what thing that she will thee forbid
Eschew all that, and give her sovereignty,
Her appetite⁵ follow in all degree.'

After being chidden for his long delay to acknowledge the sovereignty of the god, Philogenet is conducted over the Court by Philobone, as Dante is by Beatrice. At the Temple of Venus he first sees a crowd of wretches complaining of the untruth of their lovers; but their number is far exceeded by myriads who are thanking the goddess for the perfect felicity which they have found in her service. The following is a noble passage, and forms the key to much that is unintelligible to modern readers in the theology and philosophy of the middle ages:—

'Yet eft again a thousand million,
Rejoicing love, leading their life in bliss:
They said:—"Venus, redress⁶ of all division,
Goddess eternal, thy name yherried⁷ is!
By lovè's band is knit all thing, ywis,⁸
Beast unto beast, the earth to water wan,
Bird unto bird, and woman unto man.

'This is the life of joy that we are in,
Resembling life of heavenly paradise;
Love is exiler aye of vice and sin;
Love maketh heartès lusty to devise;⁹
Honour and grace have they in every wise
That be to lovè's law obedient;
Love maketh folk benign and diligent;

'Aye stirring them to dreadè vice and shame:
In their degree it maketh them honouràble,
And sweet it is of love to bear the name,
So that his love be faithful, true, and stable:
Love pruneth him to seemen amiable;
Love hath no fault where it is exercised,
But sole with them that have all love despised.'

¹ A lie.

² Spiritual.

³ Blamed.

⁴ Advise.

⁵ Wish, desire.

⁶ Redresser.

⁷ Worship.

⁸ Truly.

⁹ Anxious to converse.

With this passage we would compare another in the same strain from the *Troilus and Cryseyde*. It is a song supposed to be sung by a Trojan maiden named Antigone.

'She said: Oh love, to whom I have and shall
Be humble subject, true in mine intent,
As I can best, to you, lord, give I all
For evermore mine heartès lys¹ to rent:
For never yet thy grace to no wight sent
So blissful cause as me, my life to lead
In allè joy and surety, out of dread.²

* * * *

'Whom should I thanke but you, god of love,
Of all this bliss which that I bathè in?
And thanked be you, god, for that I love!
This is the rightè life that I am in,
To flemè³ allè manner vice and sin:
This doth⁴ me so to virtue to intend⁵
'That day by day I am in will amend.'⁶

Again, in the *Knight's Tale*:—

'The firstè mover of the cause above,
When He first made the fairè chain of love,
Great was th' effect, and high was his intent:
Well wist He why, and what thereof He meant;
For with that fairè chain of love He bond⁷
The fire, the water, the air, and eke the lond,⁸
In certain boundès that they may not flee.'

Here it will be observed, that in Chaucer's philosophy the love of the sexes is only one manifestation of that great principle of love, called in theology 'charity,' which is the leading attribute of God, and binds together the Creator and every part of his creation in one golden chain. It is the bond of families and of human society. Hence the union of man and wife is considered not merely as analogous to the union of Christ with his Church, but as the same in kind, since both are but the result of the one great law of creation; and those who were content to forego the pleasures of conjugal love, were supposed to do so only because the lower manifestation of the great principle was absorbed in the higher. The Manichean doctrine, which represents earthly love as inherently sinful, formed no part of this philosophy. It taught, on the contrary, that love is a virtue, whatever be its object, but that the higher its object, the more ennobling the sentiment. The theology of the middle ages loved to dwell on those mysterious passages in S. John's Gospel and Epistles, which seem to us

¹ Pleasure. I give my heart's pleasure into your custody.

² Banish. ³ Causes me.

⁴ To strive after virtue.

⁵ Without doubt.

⁶ Amended.

⁷ Bound. ⁸ Land.

moderns to have no definite meaning, and to embody them in such hymns as, for example, the following:—

‘Jesu, corona virginum,
Quem mater illa concepit,
Quæ sola virgo parturit:
Hæc vota clemens accipe.

‘Qui pascis inter lilia,
Septus choreis virginum,
Sponsus decorans gloria,
Sponsisque reddens premia.’

Thus Chaucer's monk wears a true-lover's knot as an emblem of his profession, and the nun a crowned A, with the motto, ‘*Amor vincit omnia.*’ Hence, also, there appeared no incongruity in prelates of the Church holding offices in the Courts of Love. Wherever love was observed to exist in any part of the creation, there it was honoured as a direct emanation from the Deity; for ‘God is love, and every one that loveth is of God.’ And, therefore, Chaucer meant no irreverence in representing the birds on S. Valentine's-day as singing a sort of parody on the Matins for Trinity Sunday, and offering their homage to the great sustaining Power of nature in the very words of Scripture. This idea, like every other, is no doubt liable to corruption, and was, in fact, the foundation of the ancient forms of pantheism; but every false religion that ever found acceptance with the human mind is founded upon some truth lying deep in man's nature, and is but the expression of cravings which can find their safe and adequate gratification only in the catholic faith. They are efforts to ‘feel after God,’ if haply He may be found in the inner consciousness of that soul which He created after his own image, and breathed into man's nostrils.

But to return to *The Court of Love*. After wandering for a time under the direction of Philobone, Philogenet is introduced to the presence of the Lady Rosial, whom he at once recognises as the subject of his day-dreams, and adopts as his mistress. She accepts him as her lover after some delay, and directs Philobone to initiate him further into the mysteries of the Court. Here occurs an *hiatus*, which Mr. Bell has been unable to fill up, as no MS. of this poem is known to exist. When the poem resumes, Rosial is inviting Philogenet to remain at the Court till May-day, when the birds sing a solemn service to the God:—

‘On May-day, when the lark began to rise,
To matins went the lusty nightingale,
Within a temple shapen hawthorn-wise;
He might not sleep in all the nightertale,¹

¹ Scaron of night.

But *Domine, labia*, 'gan he cry and gale,¹
 " My lippès open, Lord of Love, I cry,
 And let my mouth thy praising now bewry."²

* * * *

' The turtle-dove said, " Welcome, welcome, May,
 Gladsome and light to lovers that ben true!
 I thank thee, Lord of Love, that dost purvey
 For me to read this lesson all of due;
 For in good sooth of courage I pursue
 To serve my make³ till death us must depart :"
 And then *Tu autem* sang he all apart.'

We need hardly remind our readers that *Tu autem, Domine, miserere nobis*, was said by the reader immediately after he had read each lesson in the service for Matins.

This poem is, on the face of it, a description of an imaginary court, where the king and queen of love act as the viceroys of the god and goddess; but the names seem to point to an esoteric meaning. The god of love, as it appears to us, means simply the Deity; the king and queen, the catholic Church, his representative on earth. Philogenet, that is, one who loves the creature, is led by Philobone, the lover of moral good, to resort to the Church; there he swears fealty to the god, and promises obedience to his statutes; that is, he is initiated by baptism, and makes his baptismal vow. He is then accepted by Rosial, who represents divine grace, and is permitted to join in the solemn worship offered by all loving creatures to Him who is, in the truest sense, the God of Love.

This poem, and *The Assembly of Fowls, or Parliament of Birds, The Cuckoo and the Nightingale*, and *The Flower and the Leaf*, are all written in the same allegorical taste. The last has been translated by Dryden, and has lost less of its original character in the process than any other of Chaucer's poems. The following passages from the *Parliament of Birds* are curious and very spirited:—

' The weary hunter, sleeping in his bed,
 To wood again his mind goeth anon;
 The judge dreameth how his pleas be sped;
 The carter dreameth how his cartès gone;
 The rich of gold; the knight fights with his fone;⁴
 The sickè met⁵ he drinketh of the tun;
 The lover met he hath his lady won.'

This, as Mr. Bell observes in the note, is evidently the original of Mercutio's lively description of Queen Mab and her inspirations, in 'Romeo and Juliet.' The following enumeration of the trees which adorned a garden is highly poetical, from the bold-

¹ Sing aloud.

² Show forth.

³ Mate.

⁴ Foes.

⁵ Dreams.

ness of the figure by which they are personified, and the extraordinary contrast of the ideas which this personification suggests. It has been appropriated almost word for word by Spenser:—

'The builder¹ oak, and eke the hardy ash,
'The pillar² elm, the coffer unto carraine,³
The box pipe-tree, the cypress, death to 'plain,
The shooter ewe, the aspe for shafts plain,
The olive of peace, and eke the drunken vine,
The victor palm, the laurel, too, divine.'⁴

The various birds, assembled before Dame Nature on S. Valentine's-day, are called upon to determine the conflicting claims of several candidates for the possession of a beautiful female eagle. The falcon, like a warrior-bird, says, 'Let them appeal to the trial by battle.' The water-fowls, who seem to be considered a very low-bred race, are next called upon:—

'And for these water-fowls then began
The goose to speak, and, in her cackeling,
She said, "Peace now, take keep every man,
And hearken what a reason I shall forth bring!
My wit is sharp, I love no tarrying!
I say I rede⁵ him, though he were my brother,
But⁶ she will love, let him love another."

"Lo! here a perfect reason of a goose!"
Quoth the spar' hawk. "Never may she the!⁷
Lo such a thing it is to have a tongue loose!
Now pardi, fool, yet were it better for thee
Have held thy peace than showed thy nicety;⁸
It lieth not in his wit nor in his will,
But, sooth is said, a fool cannot be still."

* * * *

"Nay, God forbid a lover should change!"
The turtle said, and waxed for shame all red;
"Though that his lady evermore be strange,
Yet let him serve her alway till he be dead.
Forsooth I praisè not the geoses rede;
For though she died, I would none other make;⁹
I will be hers till that the death me take."

But while Chaucer was indulging his imagination in these ingenious fables, he was forming his style, and acquiring facility and copiousness of expression by translating two works which exercised a vast influence over the opinion of that age, 'Boethius de Consolatione Philosophiæ,' and the 'Roman de la Rose.' From the former, Petrarch, Dante, Boccaccio, and our

¹ So called, because the most durable for building.

² Because planted as a pillar to support the vine.

³ Used for making coffins for carrion, or corpses.

⁴ Called divine, because sacred to Apollo, god of divination.

⁵ Advise.

⁶ Except.

⁷ Thrive.

⁸ Folly.

⁹ Mate.

poet, obtained most of their knowledge of the Platonic philosophy; while John of Meun's great satirical poem fostered, if it did not give birth to, the communism in politics and free-thinking in religion, which are observable in much of the literature of this period. Indeed, it was eminently a revolutionary age. The rising of the *Jacquerie* under Jack Straw, and the movements of the Albigeois in the south of France, were all of a character partly political and partly religious; and even the tenets of Wickliffe might have served as a text-book for one of M. Louis Blanc's lectures on the rights of labour at the national *ateliers*, as has been shown by the late publication of his tracts, under the supervision of Dr. Todd. Of the translations of Boethius, we shall only say that as a study of the language of the fourteenth century, it is most valuable; and for an analysis of the curious and elaborate allegory of the 'Roman de la Rose,' we must refer our readers to Mr. Bell's introduction to Chaucer's translation. We shall extract, however, the following account of the authors of the original poem:—

'The "*Roman de la Rose*" is the earliest poem of its class in French literature. It consists of 22,000 verses, and was commenced by Guillaume de Lorris, who, after proceeding as far as 4,070 verses, died in 1260. The allegory was afterwards taken up and completed by Jean de Meun. Moreri and the biographical collections assign 1279 or 1280 as the date of Jean de Meun's birth; yet it is certain that in 1284 he translated the *Ars militaris* of Vegetius. Jehan le Maire, of Belgium, concludes from this circumstance that he must have been contemporaneous with Dante, who was born in 1265. Jean de Meun is supposed to have died about 1318.

'There was little in common between the genius of the two authors; and the parts they contributed to the poem are, consequently, distinguished by very different characteristics. Guillaume de Lorris possessed great constructive art, effectively displayed in the conduct of the allegory, remarkable skill in portraiture, rich invention, and exuberant fancy. Jean de Meun, on the other hand, was essentially a satirist; the poetical faculty in him was subordinate to more practical qualities; and his share of the work, deficient in imagination and variety, abounds in wit, sarcasm, and licentiousness. His revolutionary and dissolute doctrines produced a storm. The poem was denounced from the pulpit as a work subversive of religion, order, and social security; and the ladies of the Court of Philippe le Bel, are said to have conspired to procure his condemnation to death by blows of sticks, in revenge for his having written profanely of their sex.

Chaucer's translation, consisting of 7,699 verses, proceeds only as far as verse 13,105 of the original, where Malebouche kneels down to confess. Out of these 13,105 verses, 5,544 are passed over in the translation; but whether this passage, embodying as it does the violent democratic principles and communist doctrines of Jean de Meun, were omitted by Chaucer, or suppressed on account of their perilous tendency by the copyist, must be left to conjecture.'

As a specimen of Jean de Meun's respect for kings, we give the following passage, in the original, from Meun's edition. It is omitted in Chaucer's version. The poet is describing the origin of monarchy:—

'Ung grant vilain entr'eus eslurent,
Le plus ossu de quanqu' ils furent,
Le plus corase, le plus greignor,
Si le firent prince et seignor.'

Which may be thus translated. 'They [that is, the people] 'elected from among themselves some great churl, the most 'bony of them all, the boldest and tallest; and him they 'made prince and lord.' They assign him a demesne for his support, on condition that he will lead them in battle. He now gathers a number of idlers about his court, who pillage and oppress the people; and when his subjects entreat him to defend them against these harpies, he makes a further demand of taxes to maintain a standing army.

'Cil jura qu'adroit les tendroit,
Et que lors loges deffendroit,
Se chascuns en droit soi le livre
Des biens dont il se puisse vivre.'

'He swore that he would do them justice, and defend their 'houses, if each gave up to him a part of their substance to support 'himself with.' Philip the Fair was certainly more liberal than most modern princes in maintaining at his court the man who published sentiments so calculated to bring authority into contempt. But John of Meun goes further than this, and complains of the injustice of permitting any man to possess more than is necessary for his own support, while others are in want.

The allegorical personages described in the opening of the poem, which was written by William of Lorris, are very spirited. They have supplied Buckhurst and Spenser with many a hint. On the outside of the wall enclosing the garden in which blossoms the rose, are painted figures of those vices most opposed to the virtue of love, just as indecent figures and grinning demons are carved on the gurgoyles of churches; and amongst the rest, Covetousness.

'And next was painted covetise,
That eggeth¹ folk in many guise,
To take, and give right nought again,
And great treasures up to lain.²
And that is³ that for usure
Lendeth to many a creature
The lessè for the more winning,
So covetous is her burning.
And that is that pennies fele⁴
Teacheth to rob and steal
These thieves and these small har-
lots;⁵
And that is routh,⁶ for by their
throats
Full many one hangeth at the last.
She maketh folk compass and cast

To taken other folkès thing,
Through robbery or miscoveting.
And that is she that maketh treach-
ours.
And she maketh false pleadoùrs
That with their termès and their
dooms⁷
Do⁸ maidens, children, and eke
grooms,
Their heritagè to forego.
Full crooked were her handès two,
For covetise is ever wood⁹
To gripen other folkès good.
Covetise for her winning
Full leef¹⁰ hath other mennès thing.'

¹ Inciteth.² To lay.³ And that is *she*.⁴ Many.⁵ Dissolute persons of either sex.⁶ Pity.⁷ Judgments.⁸ Cause.⁹ Mad.¹⁰ Dear.

The allegorical pictures of John of Meun are not nearly so spirited as these; but in that of *Elde* or Old Age, at least, Chaucer has added some admirable traits to the original.

'Where Eld abit¹ I will thee tell
Shortly, and no while dwell,
For thither behoveth thee to go.
If Death in youthè thee not slo,²
Of this journey thou maist not fail.
With her Labour and Travail
Lodged be, with Sorrow and Woe,
That never out of her court go.
Pain and Distress, Sickness and Ire,

And Melancholy, that angry sire,
Be of her palace senators.
Groaning and Grudging her her be-
jours;³
The day and night, her to torment
With cruel Death they her present,
And tellen her, early and late,
That Death standeth armed at her
gate.'

This fine image of Groaning and Grudging, the gentlemen ushers in the Court of Old Age, always representing to her that Death is standing armed at the gate, and clamouring for admittance, is an addition of Chaucer's. The original, given in the note, is tame in comparison.

'Travail et Dolor la hebergent,
Mes ils la tient et enfergent,
Et tant la batent et tormentent,
Que mort prochaine li presentent.'

But the rancorous hatred he bore to the friars imparted more than ordinary vigour to John of Meun's pen; and it is in his satirical pictures of them that his genius seems to revel. False-Semblant, or Hypocrisy, is among the barons of the god of love who join in the attack upon the castle where the Rose is guarded; and gives a long account of himself, from which we shall extract some passages:—

'Sir, I will fill, so mote I go,
My paunch of goodè meat and wine,
As should a master of divine;⁴
For though that I me poore feign,
Yet allè poor folk I disdain.
I love better the acquaintance,
Ten timè, of the King of France,
Than of a poor man of mild mood,
Though that his soul be all as good.
For when I see beggars quaking
Naked, on mixens⁵ all stinking,
For hunger cry, and eke for care,
I intermit⁶ not of their fare.
They be so poor and full of pine

They might not once give me a dine,⁷
For they have nothing but their life;
What should he give that licketh his
knife?
It is but folly to intermit
To seek in houndes' nest fat meat.
Let bear them to the 'spital anon,
But, for me, comfort get they none.
But a sick rich usurer
Would I visit and draw near;
Him would I comfort and reheate,⁸
For I hope of his gold to get;
And if that wicked Death him have,
I will go with him in his grave.'

This last line alludes to the custom, which prevailed extensively, of being buried in the habit of S. Francis. False-Semblant, and Constrained-Abstinence, his companion, presently

¹ Abideth.

² Slay.

³ *Mattres d'hôtel*, or ushers.

⁴ Divinity.

⁵ Dunghills.

⁶ Meddle.

⁷ A dinner.

⁸ Cheer.

We will leave Allen and John to pursue their adventure. They represented the class now commonly called 'fast men;' but Chaucer gives us an excellent specimen of the 'reading man,' in the character of the *Clerk of Oxenford*:—

* A Clerk there was of Oxenford also,
That unto logic haddè long igo.¹
All so lean was his horse as is a rake,
And he was not right fat, I undertake,
But lookèd hollow, and thereto² soberly.
Full thread-bare was his overest³ courtepy;⁴
For he had not yet got him a benefice,
Ne was not worthy to haven an office.
For him was lever⁵ have at his bed's head
Twenty bookès, clothèd in black and red,
Of Aristotle and his philosophy,
Than robès rich, or fiddle or psaltry.
But although he were a philosòpher,
Yet haddè he but little gold in coffer;
But all that he might of his friendès hent,⁶
On bookès and on learning he it spent,
And busily gan for the soulès pray
Of them that gave him wherewith to scholay.⁷
Of study tooke he moste cure⁸ and heed;
Not one word spake he morè than was need;
All that he spake, it was of high prudènce,
And short and quick, and full of great sentence.⁹
Sounding in moral manner was his speech,
And gladly would he learn, and gladly teach.*

Here we observe the zeal for Aristotle's philosophy, for which Oxford is still distinguished, and which induced Dr. Arnold to give it the preference over every other University. Even in the fourteenth century, too, it appears Oxonians were remarkable for the same sententiousness of manner which is said to be their characteristic at the present day.

It naturally occurs to the reader to inquire whether Chaucer, during his life at the University, belonged to the set of Allen and John, or to that of the studious clerk. That he was always fond of reading he himself more than once assures us; and there are many traces of his familiarity with dialectics; but we should imagine that his studies were by no means confined to the trivium and quadrivium. We possess at least one poem of great merit, written while he was still at Cambridge, and breathing a spirit by no means clerical. It is called *The Court of Love*, and betokens a more familiar acquaintance with the 'Roman de la Rose' than with Aristotle or the schoolmen. Here is the dedication addressed to his lady:—

¹ Gone.

² Moreover.

³ Uppermost.

⁴ Short cloak.

⁵ It was more agréable to him.

⁶ Obtain.

⁷ To pursue his studies in the schools,

⁸ Care.

⁹ Meaning.

With timorous heart and trembling hand of dread,
 Of cunning naked, bare of eloquence,
 Unto the flower of port in womanhead¹
 I write, as he that no intelligence
 Of metres hath, ne flowers of sentence;
 Save that me list my writing to convey,
 In that I can to please her high nobley.

'The blossoms fresh of Tullius' garden swoot
 Present they not, my matter for to borne;
 Poems of Virgil taken here no root,
 Ne craft of Galfride may not here sojourn:
 Why n' am I cunning? Oh, well may I mourn,
 For lack of science that I cannot write
 Unto the princess of my life aright.'

Indeed at this period Chaucer appears to have resembled the young squire rather than the clerk; for no doubt 'He couldè songes well make and indite.' But this poem claims our attention for various reasons; it is not only our poet's earliest known production, but it is the type of all his early poems, and proves the connexion between the poetry of that age and the 'Courts of Love,' of which curious institutions Mr. Bell has given, in his Introduction, the only account that we know of in the whole circle of English literature. We shall, therefore, proceed to give a slight sketch of its general purport, with short extracts to illustrate the mode of its execution.

The youthful poet, under the fantastic name of 'Philogenet of Cambridge, Clerk,' at the age of eighteen resorts for the first time to the Court of the King and Queen of Love. The latter is complimented under the emblem of a Daisy,—in French, *Marguerite*; and this, combined with similar eulogiums on this emblem in many of his other poems, and in *The Testament of Love*, has induced many to believe that Chaucer, as well as Froissart, was patronised by the celebrated Margaret, Countess of Pembroke. Here, being chidden for the lateness of his coming, Philogenet does homage to the god, and swears to observe the twenty statutes of his realm. These are curious, as examples of the excessive veneration for the sex, introduced, or at least fostered, by the spirit of chivalry. For instance:—

'The twelfth statute remember to observe:
 For all the pain thou hast for love and woe,
 All is too lite² her mercy to deserve,
 Thou musten think, whether thou ride or go;
 And mortal woundès suffer thou also,
 All for her sake, and think it well beset
 Upon thy love, for it may not be bet.'³

¹ To her who is the perfection of feminine bearing. In old English, *head* in composition corresponds with the modern *hood*.

² Little.

³ For it may be no better bestowed than on her.

Again, a vein of humour runs through others; as the fifteenth:—

'The fifteenth statute,—Use to swear and stare,
And counterfeit a leasing¹ hardly
To save thy lady's honour everywhere,
And put thyself for her to fight boldly;
Say she is good, virtuous and ghostly,²
Clear of intent and heart, yea, thought and will,
And argue not for reason ne for skill

'Against thy lady's pleasure ne intent:
For love will not be counterpleaded indeed:
Say as she saith, then shalt thou not be shent,³
The crow is white; yea, truly, so I rede:⁴
And aye what thing that she will thee forbid
Eschew all that, and give her sovereignty,
Her appetite⁵ follow in all degree.'

After being chidden for his long delay to acknowledge the sovereignty of the god, Philogenet is conducted over the Court by Philobone, as Dante is by Beatrice. At the Temple of Venus he first sees a crowd of wretches complaining of the untruth of their lovers; but their number is far exceeded by myriads who are thanking the goddess for the perfect felicity which they have found in her service. The following is a noble passage, and forms the key to much that is unintelligible to modern readers in the theology and philosophy of the middle ages:—

'Yet oft again a thousand million,
Rejoicing love, leading their life in bliss:
They said:—"Venus, redress⁶ of all division,
Goddess eternal, thy name yherried⁷ is!
By lovè's band is knit all thing, ywis,⁸
Beast unto beast, the earth to water wan,
Bird unto bird, and woman unto man.

'This is the life of joy that we are in,
Resembling life of heavenly paradise;
Love is exiler aye of vice and sin;
Love maketh heartès lusty to devise;⁹
Honour and grace have they in every wise
That be to lovè's law obedient;
Love maketh folk benign and diligent;

'Aye stirring them to dreadè vice and shame:
In their degree it maketh them honourable,
And sweet it is of love to bear the name,
So that his love be faithful, true, and stable:
Love pruneth him to seemen amiable;
Love hath no fault where it is exercised,
But sole with them that have all love despised.'

¹ A lie.

² Spiritual.

³ Blamed.

⁴ Advise.

⁵ Wish, desire.

⁶ Redresser.

⁷ Worship.

⁸ Truly.

⁹ Anxious to converse.

With this passage we would compare another in the same strain from the *Troilus and Cryseyde*. It is a song supposed to be sung by a Trojan maiden named Antigone.

'She said: Oh love, to whom I have and shall
Be humble subject, true in mine intent,
As I can best, to you, lord, give I all
For evermore mine heartès lys¹ to rent:
For never yet thy grace to no wight sent
So blissful cause as me, my life to lead
In allè joy and surety, out of dread.²

* * * *

'Whom should I thankè but you, god of love,
Of all this bliss which that I bathè in?
And thanked be you, god, for that I love!
This is the rightè life that I am in,
To flemè³ allè manner vice and sin:
This doth⁴ me so to virtue to intend⁵
That day by day I am in will amend.⁶

Again, in the *Knight's Tale*:—

'The firstè mover of the cause above,
When He first made the fairè chain of love,
Great was th' effect, and high was his intent:
Well wist He why, and what thereof He meant;
For with that fairè chain of love He bond⁷
The fire, the water, the air, and eke the lond,⁸
In certain boundès that they may not flee.'

Here it will be observed, that in Chaucer's philosophy the love of the sexes is only one manifestation of that great principle of love, called in theology 'charity,' which is the leading attribute of God, and binds together the Creator and every part of his creation in one golden chain. It is the bond of families and of human society. Hence the union of man and wife is considered not merely as analogous to the union of Christ with his Church, but as the same in kind, since both are but the result of the one great law of creation; and those who were content to forego the pleasures of conjugal love, were supposed to do so only because the lower manifestation of the great principle was absorbed in the higher. The Manichean doctrine, which represents earthly love as inherently sinful, formed no part of this philosophy. It taught, on the contrary, that love is a virtue, whatever be its object, but that the higher its object, the more ennobling the sentiment. The theology of the middle ages loved to dwell on those mysterious passages in S. John's Gospel and Epistles, which seem to us

¹ Pleasure. I give my heart's pleasure into your custody.

² Banish.

³ Causes me.

⁴ To strive after virtue.

⁵ Without doubt.

⁶ Amended.

⁷ Bound.

⁸ Land.

moderns to have no definite meaning, and to embody them in such hymns as, for example, the following:—

‘Jesu, corona virginum,
Quem mater illa concepit,
Quæ sola virgo parturit:
Hæc vota clemens accipe.

‘Qui pascis inter lilia,
Septus choreis virginum,
Sponsus decorans gloriâ,
Sponsisque reddens premia.’

Thus Chaucer’s monk wears a true-lover’s knot as an emblem of his profession, and the nun a crowned A, with the motto, ‘*Amor vincit omnia.*’ Hence, also, there appeared no incongruity in prelates of the Church holding offices in the Courts of Love. Wherever love was observed to exist in any part of the creation, there it was honoured as a direct emanation from the Deity; for ‘God is love, and every one that loveth is of God.’ And, therefore, Chaucer meant no irreverence in representing the birds on S. Valentine’s-day as singing a sort of parody on the Matins for Trinity Sunday, and offering their homage to the great sustaining Power of nature in the very words of Scripture. This idea, like every other, is no doubt liable to corruption, and was, in fact, the foundation of the ancient forms of pantheism; but every false religion that ever found acceptance with the human mind is founded upon some truth lying deep in man’s nature, and is but the expression of cravings which can find their safe and adequate gratification only in the catholic faith. They are efforts to ‘feel after God,’ if haply He may be found in the inner consciousness of that soul which He created after his own image, and breathed into man’s nostrils.

But to return to *The Court of Love*. After wandering for a time under the direction of Philobone, Philogenet is introduced to the presence of the Lady Rosial, whom he at once recognises as the subject of his day-dreams, and adopts as his mistress. She accepts him as her lover after some delay, and directs Philobone to initiate him further into the mysteries of the Court. Here occurs an *hiatus*, which Mr. Bell has been unable to fill up, as no MS. of this poem is known to exist. When the poem resumes, Rosial is inviting Philogenet to remain at the Court till May-day, when the birds sing a solemn service to the God:—

‘On May-day, when the lark began to rise,
To matins went the lusty nightingale,
Within a temple shapen hawthorn-wise;
He might not sleep in all the nightertale,¹

¹ Season of night.

But *Domine, labia*, 'gan he cry and gale,¹
 "My lippès open, Lord of Love, I cry,
 And let my mouth thy praising now bewry."²

* * * * *
 'The turtle-dove said, "Welcome, welcome, May,
 Gladsome and light to lovers that ben true!
 I thank thee, Lord of Love, that dost purvey
 For me to read this lesson all of due;
 For in good sooth of courage I pursue
 To serve my make³ till death us must depart:"
 And then *Tu autem* sang he all apart.'

We need hardly remind our readers that *Tu autem, Domine, miserere nobis*, was said by the reader immediately after he had read each lesson in the service for Matins.

This poem is, on the face of it, a description of an imaginary court, where the king and queen of love act as the viceroys of the god and goddess; but the names seem to point to an esoteric meaning. The god of love, as it appears to us, means simply the Deity; the king and queen, the catholic Church, his representative on earth. Philogenet, that is, one who loves the creature, is led by Philobone, the lover of moral good, to resort to the Church; there he swears fealty to the god, and promises obedience to his statutes; that is, he is initiated by baptism, and makes his baptismal vow. He is then accepted by Rosial, who represents divine grace, and is permitted to join in the solemn worship offered by all loving creatures to Him who is, in the truest sense, the God of Love.

This poem, and *The Assembly of Fowls, or Parliament of Birds, The Cuckoo and the Nightingale*, and *The Flower and the Leaf*, are all written in the same allegorical taste. The last has been translated by Dryden, and has lost less of its original character in the process than any other of Chaucer's poems. The following passages from the *Parliament of Birds* are curious and very spirited:—

'The weary hunter, sleeping in his bed,
 To wood again his mind goeth anon;
 The judgè dreameth how his pleas be sped;
 The carter dreameth how his cartès gone;
 The rich of gold; the knight fights with his fone;⁴
 The sickè met⁵ he drinketh of the tun;
 The lover met he hath his lady won.'

This, as Mr. Bell observes in the note, is evidently the original of Mercutio's lively description of Queen Mab and her inspirations, in 'Romeo and Juliet.' The following enumeration of the trees which adorned a garden is highly poetical, from the bold-

¹ Sing aloud.

² Show forth.

³ Mate.

⁴ Foes.

⁵ Dreams.

poet, obtained most of their knowledge of the Platonic philosophy; while John of Meun's great satirical poem fostered, if it did not give birth to, the communism in politics and free-thinking in religion, which are observable in much of the literature of this period. Indeed, it was eminently a revolutionary age. The rising of the *Jacquerie* under Jack Straw, and the movements of the Albigeois in the south of France, were all of a character partly political and partly religious; and even the tenets of Wickliffe might have served as a text-book for one of M. Louis Blanc's lectures on the rights of labour at the national *ateliers*, as has been shown by the late publication of his tracts, under the supervision of Dr. Todd. Of the translations of Boethius, we shall only say that as a study of the language of the fourteenth century, it is most valuable; and for an analysis of the curious and elaborate allegory of the 'Roman de la Rose,' we must refer our readers to Mr. Bell's introduction to Chaucer's translation. We shall extract, however, the following account of the authors of the original poem:—

'The "Roman de la Rose" is the earliest poem of its class in French literature. It consists of 22,000 verses, and was commenced by Guillaume de Lorris, who, after proceeding as far as 4,070 verses, died in 1260. The allegory was afterwards taken up and completed by Jean de Meun. Moreri and the biographical collections assign 1279 or 1280 as the date of Jean de Meun's birth; yet it is certain that in 1284 he translated the *Ars militaris* of Vegetius. Jehan le Maire, of Belgium, concludes from this circumstance that he must have been contemporaneous with Dante, who was born in 1265. Jean de Meun is supposed to have died about 1318.

'There was little in common between the genius of the two authors; and the parts they contributed to the poem are, consequently, distinguished by very different characteristics. Guillaume de Lorris possessed great constructive art, effectively displayed in the conduct of the allegory, remarkable skill in portraiture, rich invention, and exuberant fancy. Jean de Meun, on the other hand, was essentially a satirist; the poetical faculty in him was subordinate to more practical qualities; and his share of the work, deficient in imagination and variety, abounds in wit, sarcasm, and licentiousness. His revolutionary and dissolute doctrines produced a storm. The poem was denounced from the pulpit as a work subversive of religion, order, and social security; and the ladies of the Court of Philippe le Bel, are said to have conspired to procure his condemnation to death by blows of sticks, in revenge for his having written profanely of their sex. . . . Chaucer's translation, consisting of 7,699 verses, proceeds only as far as verse 13,105 of the original, where Malebouche kneels down to confess. Out of these 13,105 verses, 5,544 are passed over in the translation; but whether this passage, embodying as it does the violent democratic principles and communist doctrines of Jean de Meun, were omitted by Chaucer, or suppressed on account of their perilous tendency by the copyist, must be left to conjecture.'

As a specimen of Jean de Meun's respect for kings, we give the following passage, in the original, from Meun's edition. It is omitted in Chaucer's version. The poet is describing the origin of monarchy:—

'Ung grant vilain entr'eus eslurent,
Le plus ossu de quanqu' ils furent,
Le plus corase, le plus greignor,
Si le firent prince et seignor.'

Which may be thus translated. 'They [that is, the people] 'elected from among themselves some great churl, the most 'bony of them all, the boldest and tallest; and him they 'made prince and lord.' They assign him a demesne for his support, on condition that he will lead them in battle. He now gathers a number of idlers about his court, who pillage and oppress the people; and when his subjects entreat him to defend them against these harpies, he makes a further demand of taxes to maintain a standing army.

'Cil jura qu'adroit les tendroit,
Et que lors loges deffendroit,
Se chascuns en droit soi le livre
Des biens dont il se puisse vivre.'

'He swore that he would do them justice, and defend their 'houses, if each gave up to him a part of their substance to support 'himself with.' Philip the Fair was certainly more liberal than most modern princes in maintaining at his court the man who published sentiments so calculated to bring authority into contempt. But John of Meun goes further than this, and complains of the injustice of permitting any man to possess more than is necessary for his own support, while others are in want.

The allegorical personages described in the opening of the poem, which was written by William of Lorris, are very spirited. They have supplied Buckhurst and Spenser with many a hint. On the outside of the wall enclosing the garden in which blossoms the rose, are painted figures of those vices most opposed to the virtue of love, just as indecent figures and grinning demons are carved on the gurgoyles of churches; and amongst the rest, Covetousness.

'And next was painted covetise,
That eggeth¹ folk in many guise,
To take, and give right nought again,
And great treasures up to lain.²
And that is³ that for usure
Lendeth to many a creature
The lessè for the more winning,
So covetous is her burning.
And that is that pennies fele⁴
Teacheth for to rob and steal
These thieves and these small har-
lots;⁵
And that is routh,⁶ for by their
throats
Full many one hangeth at the last.
She maketh folk compass and cast

To taken other folkès thing,
Through robbery or miscoveting.
And that is she that maketh treach-
ours.
And she maketh false pleadoürs
That with their termès and their
dooms⁷
Do⁸ maidens, children, and eke
grooms,
Their heritagè to forego.
Full crooked were her handès two,
For covetise is ever wood⁹
To gripen other folkès good.
Covetise for her winning
Full leef¹⁰ hath other mennès thing.'

¹ Inciteth.² To lay.³ And that is *she*.⁴ Many.⁵ Dissolute persons of either sex.⁶ Pity.⁷ Judgments.⁸ Cause.⁹ Mad.¹⁰ Dear.

The allegorical pictures of John of Meun are not nearly so spirited as these; but in that of *Eldre* or Old Age, at least, Chaucer has added some admirable traits to the original.

'Where Eld abit¹ I will thee tell
Shortly, and no while dwell,
For thither behoveth thee to go.
If Death in youthè thee not slo,²
Of this journey thou maist not fail.
With her Labour and Travail
Lodged be, with Sorrow and Woe,
That never out of her court go.
Pain and Distress, Sickness and Ire,

And Melancholy, that angry sire,
Be of her palace senators.
Groaning and Grudging her her be-
jours;³
The day and night, her to torment
With cruel Death they her present,
And tellen her, early and late,
That Death standeth armed at her
gate.'

This fine image of Groaning and Grudging, the gentlemen ushers in the Court of Old Age, always representing to her that Death is standing armed at the gate, and clamouring for admittance, is an addition of Chaucer's. The original, given in the note, is tame in comparison.

'Travail et Dolor la hebergent,
Mes ils la tient et enfergent,
Et tant la batent et tormentent,
Que mort prochaine li presentent.'

But the rancorous hatred he bore to the friars imparted more than ordinary vigour to John of Meun's pen; and it is in his satirical pictures of them that his genius seems to revel. False-Semblant, or Hypocrisy, is among the barons of the god of love who join in the attack upon the castle where the Rose is guarded; and gives a long account of himself, from which we shall extract some passages:—

'Sir, I will fill, so mote I go,
My paunch of goodè meat and wine,
As should a master of divine;⁴
For though that I me poore feign,
Yet allè poor folk I disdain.
I love better the acquaintance,
Ten time, of the King of France,
Than of a poor man of mild mood,
Though that his soul be all as good.
For when I see beggars quaking
Naked, on mixens⁵ all stinking,
For hunger cry, and eke for care,
I intermit⁶ not of their fare.
They be so poor and full of pine

They might not once give me a dine,⁷
For they have nothing but their life;
What should he give that licketh his
knife?
It is but folly to intermit
To seek in houndès' nest fat meat.
Let bear them to the 'spital anon,
But, for me, comfort get they none.
But a sick rich usurer
Would I visit and draw near;
Him would I comfort and reheat,⁸
For I hope of his gold to get;
And if that wicked Death him have,
I will go with him in his grave.'

This last line alludes to the custom, which prevailed extensively, of being buried in the habit of S. Francis. False-Semblant, and Constrained-Abstinence, his companion, presently

¹ Abideth.² Slay.³ *Maitres d'hôtel*, or ushers.⁴ Divinity.⁵ Dunghills.⁶ Meddle.⁷ A dinner.⁸ Cheer.

set out on an expedition to deceive Wicked-Tongue, the keeper of the gate. Their array is thus described:—

'And Dame Abstinence¹ strained
Took of a robe of cameline,
And 'gan her graithe² as a *Beguine*.³
A large coverchef of thread
She wrappèd all about her head;
But she forgot not her psalter.
A pair of beaddes eke she bare
Upon a lace all of white thread,
On which that she her beaddes bid.⁴

And False-Semblant, seynt,⁵ *je vous dis*,
And, as it were for such mistere,
Done on the cope of a frere,

With cheer simple and full piteous;
His looking was not disdainous,
Ne proud, but meek and full peace-
able.

About his neck he bare a Bible,
And squirely forth 'gan he gon;⁶
And for to rest his limbs upon,
He had of treason a potent,⁷
As he were feeble his way he went.
But in his sleeve he 'gan to thring⁸
A razor sharp and well biting,
That was forged in a forge,
Which that men clepen Coupe-gorge.⁹

Having arrived at the gate, Constrained-Abstinence thus addresses Wicked-Tongue:—

"Sir," said 'strained-Abstinence,
"We for to drið¹ our penance,
With heartes piteous and devout
Are come, as pilgrims go about;
Well nigh on foot alway we go;
Full dusty be our heeles two;
And thus bothe we be sent,
Throughout the world that is miswent,

To give example and preach also.
To fishen sinful men we go,
For other fishing ne fish we.
And, sir, for that charity,
As we be wont harbour we crave
Your life t' amendè; Christ it save!"

It is curious to observe how Chaucer, in the *Sompnour's Tale*, expands this sketch into one of his most successful pictures of contemporary manners. The monks and friars, indeed, received no quarter from either John of Meun or his translator; but the former, to judge by his works, was not a believer in Christianity; and Chaucer's own morals were not such as to qualify him for the office of a censor of the clergy. But unbelievers and profligates are always the most easily scandalized by clerical delinquencies.

All these poems were probably written before the poet's marriage, supposed to have taken place in the year 1360, or soon after. What were his more serious occupations, during the long interval between his sojourn at the University and his thirty-first year, there is no satisfactory clue to discover. He may, as Speght supposes, have been studying law at the Temple, where he is said to have incurred a fine for beating a friar in Fleet Street; or he may have been serving his apprenticeship to chivalry in the household of some of the high nobility. His knowledge of the law and lawyers, observable throughout his writings, and his accurate pictures of the roguish manceiple of the Temple, would seem to favour the former supposition; but what profession or branch of learning was he not intimate with?

¹ Clothe.

² A member of a religious order, so called.

³ Said her prayers.

⁴ Girded, *cinctus*.

⁵ Go.

⁶ Staff.

⁷ Thrust.

⁸ Endure.

The next authentic record of his life brings us to the year 1360, when he accompanied Edward III. in the French campaign; was taken prisoner, and liberated in the same year, probably on the conclusion of peace at Chartres. It was perhaps during this campaign that he was noticed by John of Gaunt, the youthful Earl of Richmond, whose marriage with his cousin Blanche, the sole heiress of the House of Lancaster, which took place in 1359, we find the poet celebrating, in one of his favourite allegories, entitled *Chaucer's Dream*; and from some allusions in the same poem we learn that the poet himself was married at the same time, or very soon after. This poem, like the *Romaunt of the Rose*, is written in dimetre iambics—a metre to which he had probably become reconciled by his study of the latter poem. It exhibits Chaucer's increasing powers of easy narrative and picturesque description, and affords many interesting pictures of the stately manners and high-bred courtesy of the Norman aristocracy.

Chaucer has now attained the mature age of thirty-two. He has established his fame as a soldier and a poet; and his marriage with Philippa, sister of Katherine Roet, a favourite attendant on the Duchess Blanche, and destined to succeed her as Duchess of Lancaster, brings him into more intimate relations with the Duke. The tide of Court favour now flows rapidly upon him. In 1366 the Queen confers a pension on his wife; and in 1367 he is made valet of the King's chamber; an office which, says Selden, was conferred on young heirs designed to be knighted, or young gentlemen of great descent and family. If Chaucer had been of great descent, we should no doubt have heard of it; we are, therefore, not disposed to question the tradition mentioned by Speght, and confirmed by the meanness of the poet's coat-of-arms, which at that period indicated in some degree the quality of their bearer, that his family was engaged in commerce. But his eminently social qualities, and keen appreciation of character, no doubt pointed him out to his royal master as a valuable diplomatic agent; and in 1370 he is absent from England on the king's service,—in what particular mission cannot now be ascertained. If a due appreciation of literary attainments be any proof of civilization, we must pronounce the age when Chaucer, Gower, and Froissart were courted by princes, and when Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, collected and translated the classics, to be in advance of that in which the Reformers, as Fuller relates, used these precious MSS. for the basest purposes, and strewed the quadrangle of Trinity with pages on which were perhaps preserved the lost decade of Livy.

In this his first diplomatic service the poet probably acquitted himself to the satisfaction of the Court; for in 1372, being now, according to the common computation, forty-four, he was joined

in a commission with certain citizens of Genoa to treat with the Duke, citizens, and merchants of that state, and to choose an English seaport where a Genoese factory might be established. From documents preserved in the Record Office, it appears that, in the execution of his mission, he visited not only Genoa, but Florence. We cannot help thinking that, in seeking employment in Italy, he was chiefly influenced by a desire to extend his knowledge of his art by personal intercourse with all, or some of the great poets who were then forming the basis of a native Italian literature. Edward III., also, was a man to be proud of the literary attainments of one of his servants, and to desire that his own taste should be appreciated in the person of his ambassador. But, alas! we are left in the dark as to all the particulars of this visit to Italy. Would that Chaucer had been animated by the spirit of the excellent Seigneur of Joinville, the 'Boswellizer' of S. Louis, whose diary is second only to that of Pepys in minuteness and *naïveté*! We should then perhaps have heard of Chaucer's meeting with Petrarch in the humble retreat where he retired to die among the olives and vines of the Euganean hills; his delight as he listened to the words of Virgil, Livy, and Statius, read with the true Latin intonation preserved in the vernacular of the Italians; his impressions as Petrarch related the touching story of Griselda, and Boccaccio translated for him some of the Homeric ballads; his surprise as they unfolded, in words that burned, the prospects and designs of the Ghibelline party, and the Utopian day-dreams of a perfect republic, based upon the eternal principles of reason and truth, which Dante had taught them to indulge. Then we should perhaps have had a clue to the seeming countenance which Chaucer affords in his writings to the revolutionary and communist doctrines advanced by Wickliffe. We should learn how he bought a Virgil from the copyist who kept the bookstall by the 'parvis' of our Lady's Church at Genoa; how Petrarch and Boccaccio presented him with copies of their works; how, while he admired the grandeur of the 'Divina Comedia,' he thought the 'Filostrato,' the 'Theseide,' and the 'Decameron' more in accordance with the practical and homely character of the English mind, and therefore the fitter models for one who, like himself, desired to be a popular writer. And we should no doubt find him determining to introduce a new spirit into the literature of his country, to desert the allegorical gardens and fountains which had hitherto fascinated his youthful imagination, and to seek for inspiration from thenceforth in the highways of real life.

This picture may seem fanciful; but Chaucer's subsequent career, both literary and political, shows that his visit to Italy

had the effect here described upon his tastes and sentiments. The poems produced after this period all bear traces of it. The *Troilus and Cryseyde* is founded upon Boccaccio's 'Filostrato'; into the body of it is introduced one of Petrarch's sonnets. *The Knight's Tale* is taken from Boccaccio's poem called the 'Theseide.' Throughout them all are numerous allusions to Dante, and translations of short sentences from the 'Divina Comedia;' everywhere are displayed a more accurate knowledge of Latin authors, and some acquaintance at least with Homer, who, it will be remembered, was first introduced to Western Europe by Boccaccio. But it is the general ease, force, and definiteness of Chaucer's views and taste subsequently to this period, which indicate, in our opinion, his intercourse, either personally or through their works, with the great Italians, who were undoubtedly at the head of opinion and literature in the fourteenth century.

On his return from his Italian mission he is loaded with favours. In 1372 John of Gaunt grants a pension to his wife; in 1374 and the two following years he is successively appointed Comptroller of the Customs in the port of London, allowed a pitcher of wine daily for the use of his household, and made 'committee' of the person and estate of the son of Edmond Staplegate, of Bilsynton in Kent, one of the king's wards. The office of guardian was one of considerable emolument, at the expense of the heir. In 1376 he is attached to the embassy of Sir John Burley; in 1377 he is sent to Flanders in the suite of Sir Thomas Percy, afterwards Earl of Worcester. On the death of his patron, Edward III., in the June of the same year, his pensions are continued by the young king, who employs him, in conjunction with Sir Guichard d'Angle, in negotiating the treaty for his marriage with the daughter of the French monarch. In 1378 he is attached to a second embassy to Lombardy, during which he leaves his friend, the poet Gower, to superintend his numerous affairs at home. In 1382, to his other pensions and offices is added that of Comptroller of the Petty Customs. Altogether, as Mr. Bell computes, his income from his pensions and places alone, without computing perquisites, must at this period have been at least equal to the salary of the Chief-Justice of the Common Pleas and the Chief-Baron of the Exchequer.

Here, then, was an instance of a poet who did not share the common fate of his brethren of the tuneful art. He was rich and honoured by the world, and reaped the fruits of his talents in his lifetime. But his day was approaching. In 1386 he was elected knight of the shire for the important county of Kent. This he, no doubt, considered a high honour, and welcomed as an opportunity of furthering the Ghibelline principles which he

had espoused; but it was indeed the beginning of all his misfortunes.

‘Quæ præclara et prospera tanto,
Ut rebus lætis par sit mensura malorum?’

This Parliament was eminently hostile to the party of John of Gaunt, with whom the poet was connected by the ties of friendship and interest; and it is probable that, in the course of the debates, he drew on himself the resentment of Thomas, Duke of Gloucester, who succeeded his patron in the ministry. In 1386 a commission was issued to inquire into alleged abuses in the department of the subsidies and customs, and the late Member for Kent was deprived of both his offices, which yielded him the bulk of his income.

Mr. Godwin, in his fanciful life of the poet, has taken it for granted that his dismissal was the result of his supposed participation in the popular insurrections which followed on the election of John of Northampton to the Mayoralty in 1382. Chaucer is supposed to have been obliged to fly from justice, first to Hainault, the seat of his wife's family, and next to Zealand, whence he was obliged to return in consequence of the dishonesty of his friends at home, who embezzled his property and left him in want. On his arrival in England, he is supposed to have been arrested and committed to the Tower, where he remained for three years. Richard II. having, in 1389, taken the government into his own hands, is then supposed to have released him at the entreaty of the queen, Anne of Bohemia, on condition that he should inform against his associates. This circumstantial history Godwin constructed from some allusions in Chaucer's allegorical treatise entitled ‘The Testament of Love.’

It would be rash to convict a man like Chaucer of the baseness of betraying his confederates, on the testimony of an allegory written with no intention, apparently, of giving the details of his life. Exile, prison, false friends, treason, rebellion, and confession of error, have all so obvious an allegorical reference to the state of the soul and its temptations, of which the ‘Testament of Love’ expressly treats, that there is no necessity to suppose that they refer to actual events. But, in fact, the whole fabric raised by Godwin has been demolished by Sir Harris Nicolas, who has shown, from documents still in existence, that ‘Chaucer was at large in London from 1380 to 1388, having, throughout the whole of that period, received his pension half-yearly at the Exchequer with his own hands. It is certain, also, that he held both his offices in the Customs up to December, 1384. In November, 1384, when, according to the narrative, he must have been in Zealand, he was obtaining permission to absent

'himself for a month from his duties; in the following February 'he was allowed to discharge them by deputy; and at the very 'moment when he is supposed to have been a prisoner in the 'Tower, he was sitting in Parliament as knight of the shire, 'for one of the largest counties in England.' It is satisfactory to find the moral character of one so highly endowed with intellect, thus vindicated from the unjust opprobrium with which it was gratuitously loaded.

During the period of his active employment and increasing prosperity, literature appears to have been his amusement, as it was his consolation in his hours of misfortune and despondency. Like Charles Lamb, every moment that he could snatch from the ledger he gave to the muses. Here is his own account of his manner of spending his time, taken from *The House of Fame*—one of the most admirable burlesque poems in the English language, which Pope thought he could improve, and has accordingly spoiled. An eagle sent by Jupiter is supposed to carry the poet away in his talons, and thus explains the object of his mission:—

"First, I, that in my feet have thee,
Of which thou hast a fear and wonder,
Am dwelling with the God of Thunder,
Which that men callen Jupiter,
That doth me flee full oftè far,
To do all his commandement.
And for this cause he bath me sent
To thee: now hearkè, by thy truth!
Certain he bath of thee great ruth,¹
That thou so longè, truely,
Hast served so attentively
His blind Nephew Cupido,
And fairè Venus also,
Withoutè guerdon ever yet;
And nevertheless hast set thy wit
(Although in thy head full lite² is),
'To makè bookès, songs, and ditties,
In rhyme, or ellès in cadence,
As thou best canst, in reverence
Of Love, and of his servant's eke,
That have his service sought, and
seek.
And painest thou to praise his art,
Although thou haddest never part;
Wherefore, all so God me bless,
Joves halt³ it great humbles,
And virtue eke, that thou wilt make
A' night full oft thine head to ache,

In thy study so thou writest,
And evermore of love enditest,
In honour of him and praisings,
And in his folkès furtherings,
And in their matter all devisest,
And nought him nor his folk despisest;
Although thou maist go in the dance
Of them that him list⁴ not advance.
Wherefore, as I said, ywia,⁵
Jupiter considereth well this;
And also, beausire, other things;
That is, that thou hast no tidings
Of Loves folk, if they be glad,
Ne of nought ellès that God made;
And not only of far country,
That there no tiding cometh to thee,
Not of thy very neighbours
That dwelleth almost at thy doors,
Thou hearest neither that nor this;
For when thy labour done all is,
And hast ymadè reckonings,
Instead of rest and newè things,
Thou goest home to thy house anon,
And, all as dumb as any stone,
Thou sittest at another book,
Till fully dasèd is thy look,
And livest then as an heremite,
Although thine abstinence is lite."

The 'reckonings' here mentioned are supposed to allude to the accounts of the Comptroller's office.

¹ Pity.

² Little.

³ Holdeth.

⁴ *Him list* means, is pleasing to him, or he likes.

⁵ Truly.

The House of Fame has not attracted so much attention as, in our opinion, it deserves. Warton supposes it to be a translation from the French—a supposition for which there are no grounds, and, in the course of his remarks, he displays an amazing want of perception, and ignorance of mediæval language. It is introduced by a sort of philosophical investigation into the nature of dreams, conceived in a style of covert humour which is highly characteristic of Chaucer:—

'God turn us every dream to good !
For it is wondrous thing, by the Rood,
To my wit, what causes swevens¹
Either on morrows or on evens;
And why th' effect followeth of some,
And of some it shall never come;
Why this is an avision,
Why this a revelation:
Why this a dream, why that a sweven,
And not to every man like even;
Why this a phantom, why that oracles,
I n' ot:² but whoso of these miracles
The causes knoweth bet than I,
Divine he; for I, certainly,
Ne ken them not, ne never think
Too busily my wit to swink,³
To know of their significance,
The gendres, neither the distance
Of times of them, ne the causes,
For why this more than that cause is;
As if folkes' complexions
Make them dream of reflections, &c.

But at my beginning, trusteth well,
I will make invocation,
With special devotion,
Unto the God of Sleep anon,
That dwelleth in a cave of stone,
Upon a stream that cometh from Letho,
That is, a flood of Hell unsweetèd,
Beside a folk men clepeth Cimmèrie;
There sleepeth, aye, this god unmerry,
With his thousand sleepy sonnes,
That alway for to sleep their won⁴ is.

And to this god that I of read,
Pray I that he would me speed
My sweven for to tell aright,
If every dream stand in his might.
And He that Mover is of all,
That is, and was, and ever shall;
So give them joyè that it hear,
Of alle that they dream to-year;
And for to stand all in the grace
Of their lovès, or in what place
That them were levest for to stond;
And shield them from povert and
shond,
And from unhap and each disease,
And send them all that may them
please,
That take it well, and scorn it not,
Ne it misdeemèd in their thought
Through malicious intention.
An[d whoso through presumption,
Or hate, or scorn, or through envy,
Despise, or jape, or villany,
Misdeem it, pray I Jesus God,
That dream he barefoot, dream he shod;
That every harm that any man
Hath had since that the world began,
Befal him thercof ere he starve,⁵
And grant he may it full deserve,
Lo! with such conclusion
As had of his avision,
Croesus, that was king of Lyde,
That high upon a gibbet died.
This prayer shall he have of me,—
I am no bet in charity.'

After seeing the story of Æneas and Dido painted on the walls of a palace of crystal, the poet is carried off by the eagle, as already mentioned. There is much humour in his conjectures about his probable fate.

'O God, thought I, that madest
kind,⁶
Shall I no other wayes die?
Whether Jovès will me stellife?⁷

Or what thing may this signify?
I neither am Enoch nor Elye,
Ne Romulus, ne Ganymede,
That was ybore up, as men read,

Dreams or visions.
Die.

² Ne wot—know not.
⁶ Nature.

³ Labour. ⁴ Wont, custom.
⁷ Make a star of me.

To heaven, with Dom Jupiter,
And made the Goddes' botiller.
Lo! this was then my fantasy!
But he that bare me 'gan espy
That I so thought, and saidè this:—

"Thou deemest of thyself amiss;
For Jovès is not thereabout,
I date well put thee out of doubt,
To make of thee, *as yet*, a star."

There is something very comical in the idea of Ganymede being made butler to the gods, and the poet's supposition that his apotheosis is incontinently about to take place.

The eagle then describes how every word spoken upon earth is borne to the House of Fame.

"——Take heed now
By experience; for if that thou
Throw on water now a stone,
West wost¹ thou how it will make
anon
A little roundel as a circle,
Peraunter² broad as a covercle;³
And right anon thou shalt see well
That circle will cause another wheel;
And that the third, and so forth,
brother,
Every circle causing other,
Wider than himselfe was.

And right thus every word, ywis,
That loud or privy yspoken is,
Moveth first an air about
And of this moving, out of doubt,
Another air anon is moved,
As I have of the water proved,
That every circle causeth other.
Right so of air, my levè⁴ brother;
Every airè other stirreth
More and more, and speech up-beareth,
Or voice, or noise, or word, or soun,⁵
Aye thorough multiplication,
Till it be at the House of Fame—
Take it in earnest or in game."

This is what Barrow enumerates among the various species of wit, under the description of 'acute nonsense.'

The second book is occupied with an exceedingly humorous dialogue between the eagle and the poet, in which the former describes the various objects which meet them in the aërial flight. The third book opens with the following quaint invocation:—

'O God of science and of light,
Apollo, through thy greaté might,
This little last book thou guye!⁶
Not that I wilne,⁷ for maistrie,⁸
Here art poetical be shewed;
But for the rhyme is light and lewd,⁹
Yet make it somewhat agreeable,
Though some verse fail in a syllable;
And that I do no diligence
To shewè craft, but only sentence.¹⁰

And if, divine Virtue, thou
Wilt helpe me to shewè now
What in mine head ymaked is
(Lo! that is for to meanen this,
The House of Fame to describe),
Thou shalt see me go as blive¹¹
Unto the next laurel I see,
And kiss it, for it is thy tree.
Now entreth in my breast anon.'

The poet next sees the Goddess herself, who is described in the light and easy manner of a troubadour who had just been reading Virgil and Ovid. For an analysis of the poem, we must refer the reader to Mr. Bell's introduction. We shall add one more extract. The House of Fame is built of wicker, sixty miles in length, and ever whirling round, and in it all the

¹ Wottest, knowest.

² Peradventure.

³ Lid of a pot. ⁴ Dear.

⁵ Sound.

⁶ Guide thou.

⁷ Desire.

⁸ Emulation.

⁹ Unlearned.

¹⁰ Meaning.

¹¹ Quickly.

clothed it in Tuscan, addressed it to his mistress, the natural daughter of Robert, King of Naples, whom he called by the pet name of 'la Fiammetta.' But Chaucer has departed widely from his Italian model; and in doing so has imparted to the tale an interest and a significance which are not to be found in the original. In his hands it becomes one of the most charming love-stories that ever was written. The coarseness of Boccaccio's pictures is eliminated; and the universal passion is traced, through all its phases and developments, with wonderful minuteness and truth. In *Troilus* it assumes its noblest, most delicate, and most chivalrous form. Pandarus represents its vulgarst ideas; while *Cryseyde* is a fascinating woman of the world, who loves indeed, and sincerely for the time, but has not depth and strength of character sufficient to resist the effects of absence and new associations.

The following passage is characteristic of Chaucer's manner of taking his illustrations from the commonest things. *Troilus*, like *Benedict*, has hitherto despised love; but is suddenly captivated by *Cryseyde*, whom he sees in the Temple of Pallas.

'As proude Bayard¹ 'ginneth for to skip
Out of the way, so pricketh him² his corn,
Till he a lash have of the longè whip,
Then thinketh he, Though I go all befor
First in the trace, full fat and new yshorn,
Yet am I but an horse, and horse's law
I must endure, and as my ferès³ draw.

'So fared it by that fierce and proude knight,
Though he a worthy Kingès sonnè were;
He wenè nothing had had suchè might
Against his will that should his heartè stir;
Yet with a look his heartè waxed on fire
That he that now was most in pride above,
Was suddenly most servant unto love.'

The nightingale has always been a favourite with poets; but we question whether she ever inspired a more beautiful simile than this. It is more true to nature in every respect than Virgil's celebrated one, beginning *Qualis populea*, in the fourth *Georgic*:—

'And as the new abashèd nightingale,
That stinteth⁴ first when she beginneth sing,
When that she heareth any herdès tale,
Or in the hedges any wight stirring;
And, after, sicker⁵ doth⁶ her voice outring;
Right so *Cryseyde* when her dreadè stint,⁷
Opened her heart, and told him her intent.'

¹ A name for a bay horse.

² With more confidence.

³ Incites.

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tidings in the world, and the shadows of those who on earth had uttered them, are collected.

' And every wight that I saw there
 Bouned¹ every in other's ear,
 A newe tidung privily,
 Or elles told all openly,
 Right thus, and said, "N'ost² not thou
 What is betidde,³ lo, right now?"
 "No," quoth he, "telle me what."
 And then he told him this and that,
 And swore thereto that it was sooth:
 "Thus hath he said," and "Thus he
 doth."
 And "Thus shall it be," and "Thus
 heard I say."
 "That shall be found, that dare I lay."
 That all the folk that is alive
 Ne have the cunning to describe
 The thingen that I heard there,
 What aloud, and what in ear.
 But all the wonder most was this:
 When one had heard a thing, ywis
 He came further to another wight,
 And 'gan him tellen anon right.
 The same thing that him was told
 Ere it a furlong-way was old;
 And 'gan somewhat for to eche⁴
 To this tidung in his speech,
 More than it ever was.
 * * * Then north and south
 Went every mothe⁵ from mouth to
 mouth;
 And that increasing evermo,
 As fire is wont to quick⁶ and go

From a sparkle sprung amies
 Till all a city burnt up is.
 And when that was full ysprung,
 And waxen more on every tongue
 Than ever it was, it went anon
 Up to a window out to gon;
 Or, but it mighte out there pass,
 It 'gan out creep at some crevasse,
 And flew forth faste for the nonce.
 And sometime saw I then at once
 A leasing and a sad-sooth⁷ saw
 That 'gonne⁸ of adventure thraw⁹
 Out of a window for to pass;
 And when they metten in that place
 They were acheckd bothe two,
 And neither of them must out go,
 For other so they 'gonne crowd,
 Till each of them 'gan cryen loud—
 "Let me go first!" "Nay, but let me!
 And here I will assuren thee
 With vowes, if thou wilt do so,
 That I shall never from thee go,
 But be thine owne sworn brother.
 We will mingle us each with other,
 That no man, be they never so wrath,
 Shall have one, or two, but both
 At once, as beside his leave
 Come we on morrow or on eve;
 Be we cried or still yrowned." ¹⁰
 Thus saw I false and sooth compounded,
 Together flee for one tidung.'

How full of light and frolicsome fancy is this explanation of the inseparable union of truth and falsehood in every relation of incidents! It recalls to one's mind Sir Walter Raleigh's vain endeavour to obtain an accurate account of what had just occurred in the court-yard beneath his window.

It is almost impossible to determine whether this admirable allegory, or the *Troilus and Cryseyde*, were first in the order of time. Mr. Bell mentions the assertion of Lydgate, that the latter was written in Chaucer's youth; but this is not incompatible with the supposition that it was subsequent to his first visit to Italy. It is a translation, or, to speak more correctly, it is founded upon Boccaccio's 'Filostrato.' Mr. Bell has, in the introduction, traced the origin of the well-known story of Cressida's unfaithfulness to the prose romance of 'Guido de Collonna,' from whom Boccaccio probably derived it; and having

¹ Whispered. ² Ne wottest. ³ Happened. ⁴ Add. ⁵ Word.
 Kindle. ⁷ Seriously true. ⁸ Begun. ⁹ Struggle. ¹⁰ Whispered.

clothed it in Tuscan, addressed it to his mistress, the natural daughter of Robert, King of Naples, whom he called by the pet name of 'la Fiammetta.' But Chaucer has departed widely from his Italian model; and in doing so has imparted to the tale an interest and a significance which are not to be found in the original. In his hands it becomes one of the most charming love-stories that ever was written. The coarseness of Boccaccio's pictures is eliminated; and the universal passion is traced, through all its phases and developments, with wonderful minuteness and truth. In Troylus it assumes its noblest, most delicate, and most chivalrous form. Pandarus represents its vulgarst ideas; while Cryseyde is a fascinating woman of the world, who loves indeed, and sincerely for the time, but has not depth and strength of character sufficient to resist the effects of absence and new associations.

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⁴ Causes.

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⁷ Ceased.

⁴ Ceases.

The close of the poem is curiously illustrative of the religious spirit of the age:—

‘ O youngè freshè folkes, he or she,
In which that love upgroweth with your age,
Repaireth home from worldly vanity,
And of your heart upcasteth the visage
To thilike¹ God that after his image
You made, and thinketh² all n’is but a fair,
This world that passeth soon as flowers fare.

‘ And loveth Him the which that, right for love,
Upon a cross, our soulès for to buy,
First starf,³ and rose, and sits in heaven above,
For He n’ill falsen no wight, dare I say,
That will his heart all wholly on Him lay;
And since He best to love is, and most meek,
What needeth feigned lovès for to seek?’

The translation of the ‘Roman de la Rose,’ and the ‘Troilus and Cryseyde’ were so displeasing to the ladies of the Court, that the Queen insisted that Chaucer should make satisfaction to the injured sex; which he did by writing *The Legende of Good Women*, or ‘The Saints’ Legend of Cupid,’ that is, ‘The Legend of the Saints of Cupid.’ It consists of the stories of Dido, Cleopatra, and other celebrated women of antiquity who died for love. This is the first of Chaucer’s poems which is written in the heroic measure. It is taken chiefly from Virgil and Ovid’s *Heroides*, and the prologue especially contains many striking passages; but our limited space will not permit us to extract them.

Whatever may be the merit of the poems which we have already noticed, it is upon the ‘Canterbury Tales’ that Chaucer’s fame is mainly founded. They are the offspring of his genius matured by incessant labour—for besides the voluminous works which have come down to us from his pen, he wrote many more which are now lost—and enriched by a thorough knowledge of the contemporary literature of France and Italy. Some minds are cowed and cramped by the study of the masterpieces of genius, and driven to despair of their own powers of competing with them: increasing knowledge of what others had done before him only indicated to Chaucer the true sources of poetic inspiration, and taught him to rely upon his powers of improving upon ideas which had been imperfectly developed by their inventors. There can be little doubt that the ‘Decameron’ suggested the plan of the ‘Canterbury Tales;’ but how differently it is treated by the two poets! Boccaccio’s

¹ That.

² Think ye; imperative mood, second person plur.

³ Died. German, *sterben*.

description of the plague is, indeed, unrivalled in its grandeur and simplicity; his glowing pictures of the villa and the gardens near Florence, and of the gay and thoughtless company who took refuge in them from the scourge which was devastating their country, are full of the sunny voluptuousness of an Italian sky. But his characters, being all drawn from the higher classes of society, want individuality; and there is something indescribably revolting in the close proximity of death, in its most ghastly form, with the thoughtless licentiousness of the gay cavaliers and *spirituelle* ladies, who are resolved to drown all thoughts of the calamities of their friends, and of their own danger, in the enjoyment of a refined but profligate epicureanism. The tales they relate are, indeed, admirable in their way; but their merit consists in their brevity and succinctness; the weight of the interest is thrown entirely on the incidents, and there is no place left for the delineation of character or manners. Chaucer's plan, on the contrary, is perfectly natural, and presents no incongruity. It possesses the variety and individuality which always exist in nature, and which are attained in art by adhering strictly to her guidance. A mere copyist of Boccaccio would have gathered together a company of ladies and gentlemen on some pretext or other, and set them to tell stories with as little discrimination of fitness as is displayed in the 'Decameron.' Or he might have adopted some such cumbersome vehicle for his tales as Gower employed in his 'Confessio Amantis.' But Chaucer adds to the original idea another of much greater value; he determines to bring all classes of his countrymen together, and to put into the mouth of each a tale which should be characteristic of his rank and profession. For such an assemblage he has not far to seek; the Kentish road supplies him with motley crowds of men and women of every grade and variety of character, hastening to perform the pilgrimage which they had vowed in sickness or distress to the most popular shrine in England. Here the contests which agitated the several orders of society find their counterpart; the rival tradesmen tell tales for the purpose of bringing the crafts of their adversaries into contempt; the jealousy which divided the secular and regular clergy, and convulsed the Church, is illustrated in the amusing squabble between the Sompnour and the Frere; the poet contrives to overwhelm with ridicule the extravagances of the popular romance by reciting one which calls forth the indignant reprobation of the company, and the jolly host of the Tabard begs of him pathetically to cease his 'rhyme doggerel,' which is sending them all to sleep for very weariness. One of the lower personages, of course, gets drunk, falls off his horse, and quarrels with his neighbour; and the

whole is enlivened by a running commentary, in the shape of a dialogue, in which the host gives his opinion freely of the persons and their tales. In short, all the ordinary incidents of a journey with a mixed company of English travellers, are thrown on the canvas with a breadth, a vigour, and a truthfulness which make this great poem no less admirable as a work of art than as a picture of manners.

The tales themselves are chosen with no less judgment than is displayed in the framework which connects them together. They represent the several species of composition which were then popular, polished and improved by the genius and art of a great poet. The shelves of the libraries of castles and monasteries groaned under the weight of romances of chivalry; the *Knight's Tale* is an example of what such a story should be. Humorous and not very delicate *fabliaux* were repeated at the fireside in the hall and grange on winter evenings, while the lady and her maids were spinning, and the master was roasting crabs in the fire for his evening tankard; the miller, the reeve, the nun's priest, and the merchant relate *fabliaux*, which must have cast all these evening exercises into the shade. The tales of the two nuns are specimens of the 'miracles' which used 'to stir men to devotion,' and the Pardoner relates one of the moral apologues which were often introduced into sermons to arrest the attention of a sleepy or ignorant congregation. The *Wife of Bath's* prologue and the tale of *Melibeus* represent those moral disquisitions described by Erasmus, with which the wandering minstrel used to vary his stock of ballads and romances; the *Squire's Tale* represents the popular stories of natural magic; the *Franklin* and the *Clerk of Oxenford* raise those nice questions in the casuistry of love which the Courts of Love delighted to discuss; and, finally, the parson's disquisition upon the seven deadly sins and their remedies, is Chaucer's idea of what a sermon ought to be. He evidently felt himself, in his character of poet, to be a teacher; and with a view to elevate the taste of his countrymen, he took up the several species of literary composition current among the people, and raised them to the highest perfection of which they were susceptible.

We have already given a few extracts from the 'Canterbury Tales,' for the purpose of illustrating the student-life of the period; space would fail us to enter further into the merits, or to give the reader any idea of the character of this great poem. We can only refer him to the original, which is now, for the first time, made accessible to all readers in Mr. Bell's elegant and scholarlike edition. The 'Canterbury Tales,' in all probability, occupied the latter part of the poet's life, and were circulated as they were produced. Some of them were certainly,

as Tyrwhitt shows, written subsequently to the year 1386, and were in all probability left unfinished and in confusion at the poet's death.

The variety of Chaucer's pursuits and attainments is no less surprising than his excellence as a poet. It is true, the arts are all akin to one another; but it is not often that a poet is also an architect and astronomer. In 1389 Chaucer was appointed Clerk of the Works to the King; and from documents preserved in the Record Office, it appears that he was engaged in the repair of S. George's Chapel at Windsor. His name is thus connected with one of the best architectural monuments of his time. But he appears not to have held this appointment long. In 1391, as we must believe, though Mr. Bell thinks the evidence unsatisfactory, he wrote a work in English on the use of the Astrolabe, an instrument for making astronomical observations, and addressed it to 'little Louis, my son,' in a preface which reminds us strongly of Scott's pretty dedication of his '*Tales of a Grandfather*' to Hugh Lockhart.

Misfortune was now pressing heavily upon him; he forestals his pension; borrows trifling sums of money; and in 1394 the King grants him a small pension of 10*l.* per annum; but this is not enough. In 1398 his Majesty still further befriends him by giving him letters of protection from arrest; but he appears to be still obliged to anticipate his means, till the accession of Henry the Fourth, the son of his old patron, throws a gleam of sunshine over his declining days. In 1399 the new monarch assigned him a pension of 36*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.*,—a large sum in those days; and the poet took a lease from the Abbot of Westminster of a house 'in the garden of the blessed Mary of Westminster,' which we should suppose meant Covent Garden, but which Mr. Bell supposes to have been on the site of King Henry the Seventh's Chapel. Here he died on the 25th of October, 1400, and was buried in the Abbey, where his tomb is still to be seen.

Of his two sons, Louis, to whom he dedicated his astronomical treatise, is supposed to have died young, for nothing more is heard of him; but Thomas, who was himself a poet, married Matilda, a daughter of Sir John Burghersh, and became a person of great wealth and importance. His only child, Alice, was united in a third marriage with William de la Pole, Duke of Suffolk. John de la Pole, her eldest son by this marriage, married the Princess Elizabeth Plantagenet, sister of King Edward the Fourth; and their eldest son, John de la Pole, was declared by Richard the Third heir-apparent to the throne, in case the Prince of Wales should die without issue. Thus the poet Chaucer narrowly escaped being the great-great-grandfather of a King of England.

Before closing our paper, we must warn our readers against judging of Chaucer from Dryden's and Pope's translations. They are as unlike to the original as Lord Cardigan is to the Chevalier Bayard, or the present Primate to S. Thomas à Becket. Many persons are prejudiced against 'the father of English poetry,' by a disgusting poem which Pope had the assurance to write as an imitation of his manner; but neither the language, the subject, nor the mode of treating it, bear the smallest resemblance to anything of Chaucer's which has come down to us. Chaucer, indeed, occasionally borrowed a coarse *fabliau* from the lower orders; but he so enveloped it in wit, humour, and picturesque description, that the coarseness is almost forgotten, and becomes innocuous.

- ART. III.—1. *History of the Jewish Nation after the Destruction of Jerusalem under Titus.* By the Rev. ALFRED EDERSHEIM, Ph. D., Old Aberdeen.
2. *Post-biblical History of the Jews.* By MORRIS J. RAPHALL, M.A., Ph. D. In two vols.
3. *Library of Biblical Literature.* London: William Freeman, 69, Fleet Street.

THE history of the Jews, as one among the nations of Western Asia, has no political lessons to teach of which the world is likely to stand in need. Their whole national record is one of an exceptional and isolated character. The Syro-Greek empire contained nothing like them; and even the Roman, within whose experience political analogies were more fully developed than throughout all the rest of the ancient world, found and left the Jews distinct and unassimilating. Egypt and her priesthood, iron-bound in the fetters of caste, gave way, in the last few centuries B. C., before the dangerous fascinations of Greek commerce, Greek science and art, Greek sects and schools. But in spite of every seducing flattery and persecuting stratagem, addressed in turn to the Jews by the rival monarchies of Syria and Egypt, the spirit of the nation retained its individuality. High-priests and magnates of the race might Græcize or apostatize, but the people on the whole stood fast, and remained amidst the vortex of distracting parties, without resources, or leaders, or any single united plan of action, in the face of the greatest power of the world, true still to the name and distinctive habits and feelings of the house of Israel.

Regarded therefore as a race, ineradicably tenacious of a highly-featured individuality, there is no people on the face of the earth whose history is so full of interest, and whose eventful annals are so deeply scored with appeals to our sympathy. The principal characteristics of those annals are ruthless oppression and resolute independence, the counter-friction of which at last ground them as a nation to fragments, and left them to be pulverized and scattered beneath the four winds of heaven; yet still, like the diamond dust, they remain indestructible, and exercise a friction upon every surface with which they are brought in contact. There is, indeed, no race of men whose fortunes history—that is, Providence on its human side—keeps so continually in view. With a degree of early civilization which, at any rate in Solomon's period, surpassed that of probably all, not even excepting the Egyptians, the nations who surrounded them, they kept

aloof from all, doomed to 'dwell alone,' and 'not be reckoned amongst the nations.' The civilization of the Western nations gradually arose, surpassed, and even encompassed, but did not overflow their boundaries, and but scantily mixed with theirs. The first plunge from the densely-peopled hive of ancient Egypt into the severe and hardening solitude of the wilderness seems to have set their character—to have moulded the outward form and settled the inward grain. It was the probation of extremes—the alternate ordeal of the furnace heat and the freezing point—which sent them forth, first to conquer, and then to endure for evermore. Yet the great interest with which we regard them arises from the fact that they were the reservoir of spirituality from which, as regards human *media*, the world was to draw its knowledge of that truth which is the sublimest point within reach of human faculties. The plant of Israel was to preserve it, to scatter the seed, and to be left the husk—not, however, without all remnant of vitality; but to become, in fulness of time, the last bud on the bough of promise, even as they were the first. As regards present facts, however, they are marked by an effeteness of spirituality, which forms the greatest possible contrast with their former monopoly of law and promises. They were, amid the waste of the olden world, the sole depository of that faith, of which they seem barren and vacant now that its legitimate province has grown to be the world at large; and fulfil the type of the fleece, dewy when all around was dry, and then dry when all around was dewy. It is gratifying to find an increase of literary attention paid to the history of the Jews. The works the names of which are prefixed to this article, are the most recent specimens with which the publishers' list furnishes us. The author of the first is a Doctor of Philosophy in Old Aberdeen, and his name, Edersheim, seems to point to German extraction. The author of the second is by name and office evidently a Jew. He combines with the same title of Doctor of Philosophy, that of Rabbi-preacher at a synagogue in New York. The object of the former appears to have been to give, in a series of rather loosely-connected essays, his views on all points of interest in the development or decline of the Jews as a nation and a race; that of the latter, to write in chronological form and sequence their 'post-biblical history,' and in a manner likely most favourably to impress the transatlantic branch of the Anglo-Saxon race. Two volumes of his history are alone at present before the world, with no expressed intention, although with a possibility open, of a sequel. In these he embraces the period from the close of the Old Testament to the destruction of the second Temple, A. D. 70. The two books differ largely

in their scope and execution. Both alike labour under a great defect in any work of history—the want of indexes and maps. Of the latter, Dr. Edersheim has one only, the other author none at all. The main point of diversity is, however, that the Rabbi skips Christianity. ‘We,’ he says, meaning probably himself individually, ‘do not feel called upon to enter into this subject; for, at its origin, and during its infancy, Christianity has no claim on the attention of the Jewish historian.’ He is, accordingly, content to indicate ‘the administration of Pontius Pilate,’ as that during which ‘the events related in the historical books of the Christian Scriptures are said to have occurred.’ Yet he cites not unfrequently passages from those Scriptures as authorities for minor points of fact; whilst his phraseology recalls not unfrequently the world-wide words of the author of Christianity woven into the texture of the Anglo-Saxon tongue: thus the Asmonæan prince Jannai (Alexander Jannæus) is said to have been ‘summoned to render *an account of his stewardship*,’ i. e. to have died, while meditating the siege of a trans-Jordanic stronghold; and although the phrase to ‘strain at a gnat and swallow a camel’ (vol. i. p. 138), was perhaps of rabbinical origin, yet its adoption in this corrupted form¹ from our authorised version shows that, although our author ignores Christianity, he does not forget that he is writing for a public chiefly Christian at least by profession. Surely it would have been directly in the path of a Jewish writer, who writes with the New Testament before him, to examine the claim which it advances to contain a prophecy of that awful woe which forms the catastrophe of his story. It would not have been remote from his legitimate province to sift the statements that, in that very siege, owing to their credence of that alleged prophecy, not a Christian perished; and to have considered generally, if only on political grounds, the effect which the eager propagation of Christianity in Judæa, during more than a generation, may have had in dividing the counsels, distracting the allegiance, and impoverishing the resources of the Jewish nationality in its struggle for existence.

Thus the mode of death which befel the first Herod is recorded because, it should seem, Herod was chiefly known as a persecutor of the Jews, and his frightful sufferings seem to mark a judicial vindication of the chosen race. The question of whether the Sanhedrin at the Christian era retained the power of capital punishment is briefly decided in the negative, with

¹ It is hardly necessary to refer to the Greek δυνάμεις, as showing that ‘to strain at’ is a rendering in which the original idea, that of straining liquor, is lost. Perhaps it is a mere misprint in the original version for ‘strain out.’

the further statement, marked by Dr. Edersheim as dubious, that they 'voluntarily renounced it'; the Talmud being appealed to as a final authority, and an allusion made to John xviii. 31. The case of S. Stephen, and the question whether the execution dealt on him was judicial or tumultuary, is carefully avoided, though directly in point, and for obvious reasons. The author has told us that 'it is not until the day of its power,' that 'Christianity enforces its painful claim on the reluctant 'notice of him who relates the tear-bedewed and blood-stained 'events of the Jewish history.' That is to say, when the Christians begin to persecute the Jews, it is the Jewish historian's business to mention the fact; but while the Jews only persecute the Christians, it is his business to suppress it. Thus with a series of authorities before him, partly if not wholly contemporaneous and independent—that is to say, the four Gospels and the Acts, together with the mass of illustration derivable from the Apostolic Epistles—he shrinks from contact with them save at a few carefully-guarded points; and passing over these first-rate sources of information, fastens on the pages of Josephus, whom he himself repeatedly disparages, and on those of different heathen writers, valuable mainly in confirmation only, and remote by their position or their period from all sympathy with the facts. It is only too obvious why a Rabbi should pursue this course; his reasons for it are clearly coincident, and his plan consistent, with those of Josephus, whom he censures.

But Josephus is ingenuity and sincerity itself as compared with his modern successor in Jewish history, who leaves, in the latter part of his narrative, chasms which confound the order and relation of events, solely, as it seems to us, to avoid dwelling on facts, which, if mentioned with the most passing touch, would give its true native prominence to Christianity. Thus, the tetrarchy of Herod Antipas in Galilee, his wars with Aretas the Arab, and his ambitious intrigues for extended dominion through envy of Agrippa, are dropped from the history of the Jews. That is to say, we *do* find *the name* of that tetrarch twice occurring¹ within eight pages; but the intervening space is devoted to the deeds of the Judean procurators sent by Rome; and the mention each time contains a bare notice of Galilee as in a state of tumult; but not a word of detail is bestowed, lest it should convey a hint, or seem to avoid one, of that vaster than human agency which was stirring there, and of Him who retired for a while lest 'the people should take Him by force and make Him a king.' In a word, the history of Galilee and its tetrarch

¹ Raphall, vol. ii. p. 365, 373.

during this period is left a blank; we hope that the party-coloured Christianity of the West, for whose benefit the author writes, will appreciate the reason why. To the readers of Josephus,—marked as is the aposiopesis with which he stops short of many interesting facts, of which he must have felt the force, as he ‘passed by on the other side,’—the length at which he dwells on the mission and adventures of S. John the Baptist form one of the most striking of his episodes. And, indeed, when we consider that that preacher was the son of a priest, and led the rare life of a Nazarite; that the chiefs of the nation sent from the capital a deputation of Priests and Levites to inquire into his prophetic pretensions, and that he stirred popular feeling far and wide by the vigour of his appeal to the light within themselves; that he was seized, imprisoned, and beheaded, by the ruler of his country, through an intrigue of the palace—we feel that no Jewish historian can omit such facts and be true to his assumed office. Yet Dr. Raphall passes the whole by in silence;—one would never from his pages gather that there had lived such a person as John the son of Zachariah, or that the sins of royalty against the law of the country were confronted by the bold champion of purity. In order to avoid mention of the Baptist, the incest with Herodias is omitted; and in order to avoid mention of the incest with Herodias, the whole Arabian war of Antipas, to which it led, is suppressed. The fact that Agrippa I. received ‘the tetrarchies’ from Caius Cæsar before the kingdom of Judæa became his, is just intimated (*ibid.* p. 384); but why is no word added to account for his succeeding to a living man? Why no hint of the fact that the tetrarch Antipas, whose wife Herodias was piqued at his eclipse by Agrippa, was by her instigated to become a suitor with the same Cæsar for royalty, that he failed through the counter-machinations of Agrippa, and not only failed in what he aspired to, but lost what he then had—the tetrarchy of Galilee, which Cæsar, provoked by his assurance, then gave to Agrippa as sovereign, whilst he banished Antipas to a remote province? Why, in short, are the sixth and eighth chapters of the eighteenth book of the ‘Jewish Antiquities’ avoided as if tainted with spuriousness, whilst the seventh is carefully searched for all its leading facts to ornament the career of Agrippa? It is only too plain, that to mention Antipas’ exile would have forced a mention of Herodias, and *that* would have had associations from which the author shrank.

Again, and even more indignantly, we demand why is the death of king Agrippa (Acts xii. 21–23), after a far longer dwelling on his really adventurous life than its importance required, slurred over with the following inuendo of a falsehood,—

comment on the name Pontius Pilatus:—‘Some,’ we are told, ‘derive his origin from Pontus, the kingdom of the great Mithridates, whence his name Pontius;’ (which we rather think Livy mentions as an old Samnite name before Mithridates was born or thought of;) ‘his surname, *Pilatus*, was probably derived ‘from his skill in throwing the spear, *pilum*, or *pila*.’¹ Would he derive *Torquatus* from skill in twisting collars, and *Barbatus* from dexterity in shaving? Then there is a note (vol. ii. p. 428-9) which seeks to illustrate the fate of Jotapata, where ‘twelve hundred captives were spared’ and ‘forty thousand slaughtered,’ by that of a Belgic town taken by Julius Cæsar, whose ‘alleged treachery so exasperated Cæsar, that having ‘assaulted and taken the place, he ordered all that resisted to ‘be cut down, and the captives to be sold as slaves.’ On turning to the passage in the Commentaries (De B. G. ii. 33), we find that the ‘exasperation’ of Cæsar is Dr. Raphall’s own discovery; that none were cut down or ordered by Cæsar to be cut down after the capture; that on the final assault no resistance was made; that the affair was in this stage bloodless, though the place had suffered severely the day before, in a *sortie* made in violation of terms accepted; and that all who were found at the final assault were sold as slaves; in every one of which particulars we find the illustration fails. He probably misunderstood the phrase of the original, if he ever indeed looked at it, *sectionem ejus oppidi universam Cæsar vendidit*. This is a most unlucky attempt to force a little needless scholarship into a note. But to take him on his own ground, there is a curious inconsistency in his first adopting (vol. ii. p. 197) the authority of Dion Cassius, who, differing from Josephus, makes Aristobulus at once, on his first interview with Pompey, be detained as a prisoner in the Roman camp, and then departing from that authority, where a few pages further on he speaks of the same Aristobulus, prisoner but just before, ‘from the lofty summit of ‘the temple mount’ viewing ‘the vast extent of the Roman ‘host, and their formidable preparations.’ He also (vol. i. p. 338) evidently takes Scythopolis to be still a Scythian colony, in the heart of Judæa, at the Maccabean era. His parallel between the battle of Azotus and Waterloo is a flight of fancy which might provoke mirth amidst the gravest criticism. To demolish the illustration, we have only to say, that the author’s own view of the tactic of Azotus is that it was that of a phalanx attacked on two of its faces at once; this is probably correct, but destructive of the parallel; nor is the matter mended by the further statement that, ‘like Appollonius (the Syrian general),

¹ Which reminds us of the genealogy supplied in the ‘Golden Legend,’ or ‘Vitas Patrum,’ we forget which—‘His father’s name was *Pil*, and his mother’s *Al*.’

'Maccabees they are given in words at length, not in letters, 'the usual numeral signs of the Greeks; and "famæ verum standum est,"' as Livy says.' Has Dr. Raphall then had access to the original MSS. of the books compiled by Jason of Cyrene? If not, of what value is the assertion regarding the absence of literal numeration?

The blemishes of style which strike us in the perusal of these volumes are perhaps scarcely felt on the American side of the Atlantic. To speak of a Roman emperor as the 'old crony' of a Judæan king, and to deplore the frequency with which the questionable chronology of Manetho has been 'again and again hashed up,' to serve prejudices, is perhaps elegant English in New England, and we should not expect severe rules of writing among purely free institutions, where probably one word is as good as another. It is, however, but fair to allow that the uniform buoyancy of the style, though it rises at times into that loose enthusiasm of the advocate, which imperils the veracity of the historian, has the effect of bearing off unperceived these surface-blemishes—at any rate, to the popular reader for whom he writes. 'We write,' he says, 'for the people; and the 'better to reach them, we will endeavour to amuse as well as 'to instruct them. Interesting narrations, a popular style, and 'respect for the belief and feelings of our readers, is what such 'a publication requires; and in these essentials we trust we shall 'not be found wanting.' We are bound to admit that the complaisant Rabbi has satisfied his own standard fairly enough, but to that standard we have shown grave reasons for demurring. Nor is it wholly uninteresting to watch the way in which Judaism catches the tone of the land and people of its sojourn; from the Neo-Platonism of Alexandria eighteen centuries ago, to the Neo-Franklinism of New York in our own day. Of course, we might expect the customary laudation of Washington, without which no author, especially of Jewish descent, could vindicate the genuineness of Western citizenship.

The less cursory reader will, however, turn the well-loaded pages of Dr. Edersheim with more confidence and satisfaction, though with some degree of hesitation and perplexity, owing to the want of organization which pervades their abundant matter. His one map appears, though small, yet clear; and Palestine Proper is a country so concise, that it may be mapped with some effect on the scale of a small octavo page. It gives the main lines of communication between great points, and corrects a

¹ The diphthong of *famæ* is printed with *o*. This might be an error of the press; but the apparent ignorance that *verum* is a conjunction, and its awkward misfit with 'and' just before, makes one hesitate to accept it in this light.

too late for even the close of the honoured list of the fathers of the later Jewish Church. Thus from 532 to 167 B. C. embraces a period which commences about seventy years too early, and ends about thirty years too late.

As might be expected, a slight tinge of the Puritanic and Presbyterian leaven is diffused in a book written by a North Briton, in which the analogies of the Christian Church, on such points as Scripture, tradition, and ecclesiastical government, come in as possible illustrations of Jewish views on the same particulars. We may mention pp. 146, 403, 408, of Dr. Ederheim's volume, as examples of our meaning. At the same time, we are bound to acknowledge a remarkable forbearance in general on such points. The chapter on the last war of independence, under Bar-Cochab, is the redeeming portion of the volume. The facts therein contained are probably new to a majority of educated readers; and although the struggle which it details was hardly more than the convulsive throes which marks the passage of the vital spark from the mortally wounded frame, yet the interest of the whole Jewish tragedy, especially as viewed in its Messianic relations, will be felt without this last act to be incomplete. We have next interposed a series of chapters on different highly-interesting points of Jewish antiquity, on the efforts in compiling which the author seems mainly to rest his claim to our regard; and, after the 'social condition,' the 'arts and sciences,' and lastly, the 'theology and religious belief' of the Jews, have been minutely and copiously treated, the course of history is resumed in the Jewish 'patriarchate under the last pagan emperors.' If the seventh chapter on Bar-Chocab be the fullest of interest, those which follow it on these points of Hebrew antiquity, however they may encumber the narrative, will perhaps be found the most valuable to the student. Yet we could here too wish for something which we do not find, and which we think the author could give; some clue, viz., to the various editions and translations, if any, of the Mishna and the Talmuds, to which he so frequently refers. This would have been a proper tribute to that craving for real authorities and ultimate sources of information which honourably marks the students of our age. These mountains of tradition, containing the mental *débris* of many ages of men, and which had hardly more than pushed up their first ridges when the Son of God and Man denounced their tendency to supersede Divine by human teaching, contain here and there, amidst their hoarded refuse, a pearl of great price. Schools, and families of schools, of interpretation, up to the extinct organization, if we so may phrase it, of an earlier world of thought, may here be traced in their remains. Another great defect, and one which

and skilled dialectician, this is more than compensated by the fact, that almost every thought which issues from his pen in argument bears with it the bold and absolute renunciation of his former prejudices. It is the impossibility, through his position and opinions, of appreciating the claims of the New Testament as an historical authority, which starves the later chapters of the animated and interesting work of the Rabbi of the New York synagogue. It is, however, most desirable for Christian students to throw on the study of their own peculiar, as distinct from the Jewish, Scriptures, a light gathered from a full comprehension of the several influences which had fluctuated through the great Jewish family during their latter centuries of doubtful independence. It is worth while to obtain the most intimate view, and to form the most accurate estimate possible, of the outward features and inward spirit of that great dispersed society and world-wide race. We have already noticed the influence which the sojourn in Egypt and the desert had upon the first stage of their history. That is concluded by the captivity, where the second begins, to close in the desolation of the Holy City by the legions of Titus. The work of Dr. Edersheim is valuable, so far as it has any strictly historical worth, in supplying the connexion between this second and the third period, which, as far as we can see, has no end, save that yet future one pointed to by the consummation of prophecy. On that final issue it is not our purpose to speculate at present. So far as it is yet unravelled, the interest of their temporal as well as spiritual history culminates in the second period; and this we suppose that even a Jew would admit. We proceed, then, to assemble a few considerations which may clear up the picture of those eventful days, within which falls the human history of the glorified Redeemer, rejected by the Jews, but embraced by the elect amongst mankind.

The two captivities of Israel and Judah are too often viewed as though they were identical in process and immediate in effect. It is, however, manifest that there was a difference in the policy pursued in either case by the conqueror. In the case of Israel, there was an actual deportation of the bulk of the population to remote provinces, and a planting in of a foreign colony, which grew in two centuries into a thriving population, with strong local attachments and jealousies. In the case of Judah, we merely find that the few leading thousands of the nation were taken into custody and removed to the capital of the empire, where, under the eye of the sovereign, they speedily raised themselves in consideration and importance. The ten tribes, moreover, had largely forfeited their nationality before their forced migration severed the last remaining tie, that of locality.

lords of human kind, 'lifting up the head' of this or that 'dis-crowned' captive, as a sense of merit, pity, or caprice, might guide him. His preference, we know, fell on the exiled royalty of Judah; and large privileges to the captive nation would be the natural consequence of the favour granted to their prince.

Matters, however, were not left to the law of mere natural consequence. The prophets Ezekiel and Daniel were raised up, not only to bear future witness to great events, but to keep alive among the children of the captivity the penitential lessons of their chastisement. Nor even when the standard of Jehovah was again lifted up for their return, were such influences wholly lost upon the many who declined to follow it back to the 'mountain of the Lord's house.' Those who remained behind yet knew the work which God was doing for His people; and that consciousness, no doubt, animated their principle of obedience, and checked any tendency to careless adoption of heathen rites. The prominent feeling of that period of their return was a direct reaction, as might be supposed, from that disobedience of the law which had developed into idolatry; and that reaction tended to a minute and rigorously precise devotion to it. There is throughout the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah a tone of severe and painstaking obedience, both in leaders and people, which marks the point of departure of what, in its exaggerated form, afterwards became Pharisaism. It is visible here only in its earliest and innocent stage, before it became a varnished shell of human tradition. Similarly in our own history, the sensitive and God-fearing spirit of the first Reformers degenerated, through the climax of reaction from the grossness of Romanism, into the sour fanaticism of the Stuart Puritans. The difference mainly was, that Pharisaism gradually suffocated spiritual obedience beneath forms of literalism, whereas the Puritans grew extravagant in their contempt of forms until the spirit of unity and humility exhaled away for want of them. The great consideration evidently enjoyed by the Jews under the kings of Babylon increased under the Persian sovereigns, who were prepared at once by the religious sympathy of the Zoroastrian teaching, and by motives of state policy, especially in regard to the Egyptian frontier, to obey the voice of prophecy, and promote the return of the exiles. The main conception of that teaching appears to be the recognition of the spiritual principle in man by which he is allied to Deity; yet also of the conflict of good and evil in him, by virtue of which his state here is one of probation. This conception combated the creature-worship of the Chaldeans, while it was probably reconcilable with their astrology, and made common cause with the purer faith of captive Judah. On the other hand, the two

tained in some degree by a wholesome awe of venturing on soil on which lingered the curse of a Deity whom they had learned to fear, and in part to serve. It is probable that the soil of Samaria had been, previously to the captivity of Judah, drained of any zealous Israelites by the extended influence of the southern kingdom under Hezekiah and Josiah. The painful strictness with which the long-indulged temptations to idolatry in alien marriages were forbidden by Nehemiah, repelled men of lax and careless minds, who found in Samaria something not quite heathen, nor yet so rigidly Jewish as the prevailing sentiment at Jerusalem demanded. Thither accordingly they took refuge. And the rich young community began, in the spirit of a *νεοπλῦτος*, to counterfeit and alloy everything, on maintaining the genuineness of which the poorer settlers of ancient race felt a national pride. The patronage of Persia, as is always the case when a worldly stimulus is applied to a spiritual duty, made the return to some extent popular and fashionable among those who cared little for their God and law; thus Samaria, no doubt, benefited by the steady draught of settlers from the region of the Euphrates which now set in upon the land of Israel. There were many, no doubt, of both captivities who had grown utterly careless in religion, but who clung, with that fibrous tenacity which characterises the traditions of an exiled race, to the usages of their national seat, and felt a mere earthly love of their fatherland. Feelings of interest and mere curiosity would draw many more; restlessness and hopes of greater independence, a smaller but still an important number. This desultory multitude, whether descended lineally of the line of Israel or of Judah, would wander gradually backward to Judæa or to Samaria, according as they wished to follow the strict law of Moses or the debased imitation of its rites. Hence the keen feeling of competition in every interest, temporal or spiritual, between the two communities. Sanballat, the watchful intriguer, had married his daughter to the high-priest's son; that son refused to sever the tie in deference to what he thought the needless preciseness of spirit then manifested in Jerusalem. He became a renegade, and went over to the rival side; a priest of Aaron's seed, but whose children were tainted by that alien blood which was a bar to Aaronic privileges. It was for his ministry that the Samaritan temple was built, and a further pretension thus put forth by Sanballat, the inheritor of the policy of Jeroboam. No doubt his kin forswore, and his countrymen abhorred his memory; and yet, probably, he had many followers, who found the abandonment of domestic ties too severe a test of human duty to a Divine law, and went away with execration on their heads. Thus as the 'vine of God' took root anew, the thorn had already pre-occupied a place of

(‘Sinai and Palestine,’ p. 210) identifies it, the later nomenclature is still further vindicated, as preserving the tradition of its successful recovery. It is far from clear where the Samaritan southern border ran at the Christian era. Josephus (*De Bell. Jud.* III., iii. 4, 5) makes ‘the Acrabatene toparchy’ the most northerly of those into which Judæa was then divided, and the limit of Samaria. If this correspond with the ancient Akrabbim, that limit included the site of Shiloh as well as Bethel in Judæa; and this seems the most probable view.

The Samaritans had envied Judæa in her hour of prosperity, coveted her hard-earned privileges, thwarted her long precarious revival, and deserted¹ her manful stand against the persecutors of their common faith, and they quailed before the renewed lustre of the Jewish monarchy under the dynasty of the patriotic priests. Although the Jordan remained their eastern border, northward, southward, and westward they were hemmed in by the dominant population; while the only accession to their power was one which increased the alloy of their race and institutions, viz., the encouragement given by Herod to every foreign element, which led to a large influx of Greek and Syrian settlers. It is no wonder then that thus, in Jewish eyes, corrupted and debased as the meet reward of their suppleness and perfidy, they earned that contempt which outlives hatred. Such rancour ever weakens those who indulge it. The Samaritans, posted in the middle of the region which owned allegiance to the authorities of Judæa, divided its unity, and became a centre of disaffection; and thus the lasting grudge which the Jews bore them recoiled on that uncharitable race, and, by keeping Samaria for ever unassimilated with the Jewish nationality, effectually barred the consolidation of the commonwealth. Had the victory of king Hyrcanus over them been followed up by the policy shown to the Idumæans, the Samaritans might, surrounded as they were by Judaic influences, have gradually woven up their own interests with those of their conquerors, and there might not have been that fatal chasm in the political outline of the country which their estrangement caused. But the opportunity of

¹ The story that the Samaritans, under the persecution of Epiphanes, invited idolatry to the temple of Gerizim, and put prominently forward the heathen side of their descent, as though they disclaimed any part or lot in the persecuted faith or race of Israel, and wished to make out their case to be that of mere strangers and sojourners, must be placed side by side with another, that, when they found Alexander the Great had granted the Jewish people remission of tribute in the sabbatical year, they put forward their claim to the same privileges, as being likewise of Hebrew descent, and a Sabbath-keeping people. The whole rather reminds one of the two prize odes of Simonides on the mules’ victory in the race, in which the horses’ and asses’ side of the pedigree came forward in turn as the poet was well or ill compensated for his strain. It has been suspected of being a Jewish scandal, perpetuated by Josephus; but it seems a fact that Ζεύς Ἰερίος occupied for a time the shrine on Mount Gerizim, and there is nothing in the statements intrinsically improbable.

magnanimity elapsed and never returned, and thus they had no stake in the war of independence; for, owing doubtless to the same jealousy of giving them the power to annoy, their resources had not been developed, nor their tenable posts occupied with garrisons, until the Romans came. The fortification of the Mons Itabyrius within their territory was only resolved on at the last moment, and executed in forty days by the Jews, when preparing to defend themselves against Vespasian. Josephus speaks of a tumultuous assemblage on Mount Gerizim, which, although there was no certainty that the demonstration was hostile, that careful commander thought it prudent to crush, before he marched on Judæa. The same authority informs us that, whilst the larger part of Galilee still remained unsubdued, the whole of Samaria was parcelled out by Roman posts,¹ who thus, commanding as they did the coast road by Cæsarea, completely intercepted all communications on the west of Jordan. So when Galilee fell, the fugitives from Gischala, as those from Itabyrius, had no refuge² but Jerusalem; nor was there a single fortified post to harass the march of the enemy upon the capital, where a barrier of strongholds might have prolonged resistance and husbanded the chances of war. This was in fact the case in the insurrection under Bar-Chocab, when the whole brunt of the struggle fell on Samaritan soil, and when a large number of Samaritans were enlisted amongst the Jewish troops. The town of Bethar, on the edge of the Samaritan territory towards the sea, was then the last stronghold in which the breath of independence was drawn; but there, too, it is said, the ancient enmity broke out in the crisis of the struggle, and to the treachery of the Samaritan allies was ascribed the last fatal advantage which secured the entry to the foe.

The Samaritans seem to have mimicked Jewish institutions, having a council like the Sanhedrin, and probably synagogues and schools; but they were ever ductile to the influence of a foreign element, which so largely mingled in their origin; and accepted indifferently Persian, Greek, Syrian, and Roman dominion. And when, on the death of Herod, the long-suppressed feelings of the country at once broke out in Judæa, Galilee, and Peræa, Samaria alone amidst the general disaffection was noticed by the Roman prefect as having been tranquil. The apathy of a neighbour is often more provoking than the active enmity of one more remote, and the supineness of Samaria amidst the eager glow of public feeling was likely not to be forgotten in the long score which the Jew reckoned up against her. And

¹ Φρουραὶς διέλιθοντο De Bell. Jud. III. vii. 32.

² Josephus relates that Joppa, after its capture and destruction by the Romans, was rebuilt and occupied by some such fugitives; but the exception only proves the statement in the text.

certainly those feelings, originally so bitter, became entwined in his bosom with his own rigid patriotism, grew more intense as Pharisaism despotized over the popular mind, and culminated at the moment when the staff of power passed away from Judah, and foreign oppression fanned intestine bigotry to a fiercer flame.

It may be noticed, in illustration of the ill-will of the Samaritan population towards our Lord, 'because his face was as though he would go to Jerusalem,' that Josephus mentions a fierce outbreak of the same populace on some Galilæans on their way to keep the passover. The affair, which took place in the reign of the emperor Claudius, became at last so serious, that, after a second investigation by the Roman local governor, it was remanded to Rome for the emperor's personal cognisance, and resulted in the punishment of some Samaritans and Jews, who had resented by outrage the wrongs of their Galilæan friends, as well as in the disgrace of the Roman officers, Cumanus and Celer, who had displeased the emperor by their decision. This result, however, was rather gained by the influence of Agrippa than by the merits of the case. (Joseph. Antiq. XX. v.)

The Samaritans, however, were far from being the only strangers on Jewish soil. The Seleucian monarchy, in several of its stages, promoted the settlement of Greeks and Syrians throughout the country, as is betrayed by the nomenclature of any map of Palestine which represents the period. This was followed by the conquests of king Hyrcanus, who probably reduced all these foreigners to the payment of a severe tribute; but the Jewish population resisted fusion with them, and left them so many seats of strange or hostile influence, not having perhaps any common bond of organization, but ready to be turned to account by the invader whenever he sought to make his footing sure. A number of these foreign cities were freed from Jewish supremacy by Pompey, and placed under the protectorate of Rome as portions of its province of Syria. Their names were Hippius, Scythopolis, Pella, Samaria, Marissa, Azotus, Jamnia, Arethusa, Gaza, Joppa, and Dora, afterwards Cæsarea.¹ In many of them were resident Jews and Syro-Greeks in two unblended populations, a state of things which kept enmities always at the mark for explosion. At Cæsarea, where this fact was more marked than elsewhere, some wanton irritation of Jewish feelings on the part of the aliens ended in a street fight and massacre, so that, says Josephus, 'all Cæsarea was emptied of its Jews.' The same ill-omened chapter which records this bears the heading, 'Calamities and Massacres of

¹ These, however, were not the only seats of alien population in Palestine; Ptolemais in Galilee, and Philadelphia in Peræa, were built by Ptolemy Philadelphus, as Egypto-Greek colonies; Herod's policy added others.

We are tempted to inquire into the causes which, not in Palestine alone, where local causes might account for it, but throughout the several great seats of empire, arts and commerce, both in the east and west, produced a nearly simultaneous outbreak against the Jews. Twice at Alexandria, and even at Damascus, where, shortly after our Lord's death, the Jerusalem priesthood had so much influence, onslaughts of persecution followed rapidly; whilst from Rome itself they had been expelled by a decree of the same emperor Claudius, the beginning of whose reign had seemed a new era of imperial favour for them. Some feeling generally diffused seems traceable in these movements against the Jews. It is remarkable that Antioch, the next great city to Rome and Alexandria, is expressly mentioned among those which showed forbearance to the Jews, especially when connected with the fact that the Jews of that city were universally despised by their brethren as the most degraded of their race.¹ Yet at Antioch, too, about the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, the populace, eager to credit any scandal of the Jewish sojourners, broke out into uproar on the false charge of a Jewish plot to burn the city, destroyed the synagogue, and burnt large numbers of Jews. The rise of Pharisaism, and its gradually general diffusion throughout the popular tone of Judaic practice, made the Jews of the last two centuries B. C. a far less amiable and interesting people than when they had drawn the respectful homage of Alexander. Nor had the Greek mind at that time, as shown in the anecdote² of Aristotle, lost its power of appreciating the better points of the Jew. Of all the Asiatic races which the Greek encountered, the Syrian was the one with which he most readily mingled. The effeminacy of that country seems to have been precisely the temptation most powerful for his sensitive and beauty-loving soul; accordingly it found out the weak point of his character, and penetrated its pores, and sapped its grain. As in the Saxon and Norman races, when mixed, the moral power of the former gave a new and firm basis to the intellectual and physical superiority of the latter, so, conversely, in the Syrian and Greek, the moral effeteness of the former seems to have palsied whatever of vigour the latter possessed. A similar influence, though to a less extent, was observable in Egypt, where the fusion of races was

¹ It seems clear that greater laxity of practice and a less rigid separation from heathen fashions prevailed among the Jews at Antioch than elsewhere. The great success of the Gospel in this city was also in some measure doubtless produced by the absence of that powerful bigotry which impeded it where the standard of Judaism was strict. Such an outbreak, therefore, at Antioch seems a climax of feeling against them.

² Given on the authority of Clearchus, the pupil of Aristotle, by Josephus. (Contr. Apion, lib. i.)

it may be called, was, together with Egypt, the latest source of influence to the political and social state of the Hebrew race, till the Romans came to gather the prickly fruit of conquest on its soil. And never perhaps was a country, amply dowered by nature with sources of wealth, so cursed by a dynasty of despots alike unscrupulous and incapable. It was an unhappy omen for Judæa that her last race of native sovereigns, the Asmoneans, borrowed their traditions of royalty from the worthless Seleucidæ, against whom they revolted, instead of 'looking to the rock whence they were hewn.' This was one thing which provoked the disaffection of the Pharisees, the growing representatives of popular feeling, and gave the royal sway almost the air of an external protecting power rather than that of an homebred and honoured chieftaincy. Like the kings of Syria, Hyrcanus and Jannæus had mercenary troops of reckless ferocity, who knew no ties of country, and owned no civil obedience, were directly at variance with the spirit of the constitution, and seemed to prove that the king was placed above the law; and like them, the latter sovereign affected the arrogant caprice of which Persian despotism furnishes the earliest examples. Under the Seleucian monarchy the army appears to have principally consisted of hireling Greeks, a fickle horde maintained by tribute or plunder, (two resources substantially the same, and chiefly differing in the mode of collection,) wrung at random from helpless provinces, and when this failed, by a shameless spoliation of shrines. It was a state necessity to divert these troops from rebellion by new wars. Almost equally ready to turn their arms against their paymaster, or his rival, or each other, they became, on an imperial scale, the bloody tools of that profligate perfidy of which, with its congenial vices, as having flooded the private life of Italy, the Roman satirist three centuries later complains. In the aguish state of the body-politic caused by such vicissitudes of excitement, the mutiny of an army became the revolt of a province, and threatened the dismemberment of the empire. But it was not the fact of the troops being hired foreigners, which so debased the chief instrument of power; for mercenaries, if well led, have achieved great things both in ancient and modern times. It was the mercenary spirit which prevailed in the leaders, in the state itself, which ruined it. The vast commonwealth of the West which later, though not slowly, followed in these degenerate traces, bequeathed at any rate its traditions of law and arts and arms to every conquered race. It bridged nations, gave the fairest part of the earth the self-consciousness of civilization, and was at last an imperial aqueduct of Christianity to the world. But the Syro-Greek supremacy, after the death of the first Seleucus, was little else than a *greekz*

scramble of base natures for the means of indulging their worst appetites on a vast scale. Embracing some of the richest and loveliest tracts which skirt the eastern Mediterranean, and sweeping thence in widely watered plains to the huge table-lands which connect the Caucasus with the Himalaya, the dominion of the Seleucidæ contained all the physical conditions of empire, together with sufficient compactness to adjust the relations of the extremities to the centre. And yet no empire at once so wealthy, so extensive, and so compact, was ever so viciously weak in organization, and in none did the frivolity of ambition make such sport with all the objects for which government exists, or vileness accumulate such vast powers for mischief. After the first debilitating blow given by the Romans to the power of the third Antiochus, from which Syria never fully recovered, it began to wane before the rising star of Parthia in the north-east; and against the despised and trampled Judæans in the south, its arms found their *prestige* fatally impaired. In a later stage its decay was indicated by those reptile-swarms bred by the dissolution of its vast frame, the plunderers by land and sea who broke forth to riot in the weakness of law. The Cilician angle of the Levant teemed with pirates, whilst the roving Arabs of the southern desert advanced as a superior race against the degenerate paradise of the Hollow Syria. Pompey, with the power of the Mediterranean at his back, was able to hunt the pirates into their creeks, and exterminate them; but the Petræan Arabs, though severely checked by Jannæus, the last substantial monarch of the Asmonæan race, were invited to rescue Damascus from the perils of Syrian power, and the connexion then established, although not perhaps continuously, survived at least to the days of S. Paul.

But the biography of its princes is the key to the moral state of the Seleucian empire. As a specimen of human character at its worst, let the reader open on the leading names so often repeated, in the two sexes—'Antiochus,' 'Seleucus,' 'Cleopatra,' 'Arsinoë,' in the index to Prideaux' work embracing the history of the period. That of 'Antiochus' shows a succession of fourteen personages of princely rank, of whom eleven died by violence, and of those eleven the majority by assassination. Similarly under 'Seleucus,' we find that six out of seven so called were poisoned or otherwise murdered, and that the remaining one died a Parthian captive, by accident in hunting. If we glance at the women's share of the plot in this court tragedy of two centuries, we shall find six Cleopatras and four Arsinoës whose connexions lie nearly equally in Syria and in Egypt, whose royal families were successively linked by several of their marriages. Accordingly the crimes and sufferings of both dynasties

mark their biography. The first Cleopatra on the list, own sister to Alexander the Great, was murdered by order of Antigonus. The second is the only one of the series who died without violence. The third, 'a queen of Syria' (we quote the brief epitome of the index) 'occasions the death of her husband' 'murders her own son to reign in his stead 'attempts to murder another son forced to drink 'poison.' The fourth was 'murdered by her own sister Tryphæna' (who was in turn slain by the husband of the victim). The fifth was 'killed by her son Alexander.' The sixth and last, the famous Queen of Egypt, has supplied a moral and a tale wherever either history or poetry is read. Of the four Arsinoes there was one banished, there were two put to a violent death, while the fourth tries our moral sense most severely of all, leaving a painful memory of womanhood debased, a quiet and gentle character befouled with the stain of incest. Such are the male and female traditions of royalty amidst which was nurtured the last effort of Judæa to be an independent monarchy. However pure the patriotism in which that monarchy was founded, and however moderate the constitutional powers at first assigned to it, such a colossal example of triumphant vice could hardly fail of influencing it for evil.

We learn from the history of S. Paul that there were several synagogues of Jews at Damascus, and, from that city being the first beyond the limits of Judæa marked for persecution, as well as from all the circumstances of the narrative, it is clear that correspondence was systematically kept up between it and Jerusalem, and that the Judæan hierarchy had obtained a complete influence, not only over the synagogue authorities, but over 'the governor under Aretas the king.' It is not unlikely that the public sympathy with S. John the Baptist was so far shared by the priestly party at Jerusalem as he was the son of a priest, and that the public detestation of Herod Antipas' unlawful connexion with Herodias may have led to some alliance between the Jerusalem authorities and Aretas, who made war on Herod because that connexion caused the divorce of his daughter. Thus at Damascus, where, as Josephus informs us, nearly all the women were of the Jewish persuasion (*De Bell. Jud.* II. xx. 2), and where male Jews were also numerous, the massacre of the Jewish population is a highly significant fact, as showing how widely spread the public feeling against them must have been.

None of the neighbouring countries offered so little to influence the Jew as Phœnicia. With her back to the mountains, and her face to the sea, and her narrow coast strip of territory sloping to the latter, it was towards the setting sun that the fertilizing genius of commerce looked for her floating empire.

nor is there a single country of the Mediterranean basin which up to a late period—probably that of John Hyrcanus—had so little intercourse with her as her nearest neighbour. There must indeed, from a very early age, have been a line of traffic passing through the north of Galilee, between Damascus and Zidon, doubling the southern shoulder of Hermon, and cutting the Jordan valley a little below the ‘waters of Merom.’ This no doubt tended to make and keep it ‘Galilee of the Gentiles.’ We know also that the last inland outskirts of the Phœnician territories lay on the very head of the Jordan, and from them was seized by some Danite rovers the town named after their tribe, which formed the northern limit of Israel. It was, like Berwick-upon-Tweed, a monument of successful encroachment; while the phrase applied by the sacred historian to the inhabitants, ‘dwelling careless, after the manner of the Zidonians, quiet and secure’ (Judges xviii. 7), shows how little anxious the Phœnicians were about their hold on the interior. It was probably a principal stage of the Damasco-Zidonian caravans; but there is no reason for thinking that the maritime power ever attempted its recovery. The only Phœnician development in Jewish history, besides the commercial treaty of Hiram and Solomon, was the affinity between the houses of Ahab and Eth-Baal, and that was cut short by the quickly-following captivity of the kingdom of Israel, and subsisted only during the period of that kingdom’s decline.¹ And, when the first Assyrian inroad swept away the independence of the Northern tribes, no doubt settlers poured in from the Hollow Syria, and scantily perhaps from Phœnicia too. Yet in later times the Jewish proved the dominant population of the border, even as the Anglo-Saxons in Scotland overflowed northwards, and the Celts retired before them. This is clear from our Saviour’s deigning a personal visit to the place, and from his reply to the woman (Matt. xv. 24), and indeed is implied in the exceptional particularity with which S. Matthew and S. Mark describe her nation and race. And even in Phœnicia Proper, whither our Lord did not go, many Jews were to be found settled in the great commercial towns of that coast, which still were seats of thriving trade, though no longer of first-rate importance since the rise of Alexandria and Antioch. We learn from S. Luke (Acts xi. 19), that the missionaries dispersed by the first persecution of the Church, ‘travelled as far as Phœnicie . . . preaching the word to none but unto the Jews only.’ It was in a Phœnician ship that

¹ There is one mention of ‘Tyrians’ in the Book of Nehemiah (xiii. 16), but the word is suspicious, as it does not occur in the LXX. Greek; nor is the fact of there being Tyrians then at Jerusalem employed as fish-merchants one intrinsically probable.

S. Paul returned from Patara after his last visit to the Churches of Asia Minor before his imprisonment; and it was at Tyre that on landing he found 'certain disciples,' and among them one with the gift of prophecy, who warned him of the perils to befall him in Jerusalem. The general policy of the Roman empire tended to promote communication and develop traffic, and no doubt more intercourse between Judæa and Phœnicia existed under Roman dominion than at any other period of their history.¹

The kindred southern nations of Idumæa and Arabia, the Edomites and Ishmaelites of the Old Testament, have a curious relation to the character and fortunes of the Jews. The Israelites represent the domesticated branch of the same stock originally, of which the Arabs are the wild species, and of which the Idumæans were a less perfect and intermediate development. Whilst the Jews have alone, of all the ancient nations, scattered themselves over positively all the modern world of civilization and commerce, the Arabs alone of all nations have maintained their hold unsubdued upon the same few hundred leagues' square area of territory which first received them in its arid bosom. They occasionally diverge and emerge from these unenvied seats, when some greater desolation than ordinary enlarges the practical desert, and widens the scope of their independent and half-chivalrous ravages. The dominion of the Turk in Syria has given them such an opportunity, and the black tents of the Bedouins, or the hovel walls which they have ceased to canopy, may be seen anywhere from Suez to the Lebanon, and to the promontories which push far south into the Indian Sea. They remain despite of every empire, from the Assyrian to the British, of gunpowder, printing, and the steam-engine, completely the monument of patriarchal mankind, as isolated as though the Saracens had never gone forth from among them on a career of conquest, civilization, and decay. With regard to their influence on Judæan history Dr. Edersheim says (p. 68):—

'As troubles at home and abroad obliged the Hebrews to seek shelter in more distant regions, the number of Jews in Arabia increased. Their comparatively settled mode of living, their cultivation and wealth, must have secured for them a peculiar influence among the Nomadic tribes of that country. No doubt they improved their position, amongst other ways, in attempting to gain proselytes. During the administration of Herod's father, the royal princes were, in times of danger, entrusted to the safe keeping of the Arabians. At a later period, many Jews passed with Gallus across the Red Sea into Arabia. The Talmud mentions the Jewish settlements in Arabia, and records some ordinances referring to them. When the Romans took possession of the Holy Land, a considerable number of Jews retreated to the neighbourhood of Medina. In

¹ The word *τρέφεσθαι* (Acts xii. 20) seems to imply a trade in corn, probably carried on by sea from Casarea and Joppa, between Phœnicia, a commercial and corn-importing country, and Palestine.

the Judæan solitudes during the Babylonish captivity, and had their head-quarters at Hebron, where they adopted the habits of Jews; and, when vanquished by John Hyrcanus, the best of the Asmonean princes, they embraced the Jewish faith, and were a toparchy of Judæa in the war with Titus. And, although many of their families may have been absorbed into the Jewish nation, there was still at that period a large body under native chiefs, who styled themselves a kindred nation, and the temple their ancestral sanctuary. After the fall of Jerusalem, all who had not shared its fortunes probably were gradually absorbed into the different desert tribes, and thus the intermediate branch of the patriarchal stock was lost in the two predominant types of the Arab and the Jew. Their chief influence on the later portion of Jewish history lies in the one fact, that they furnished the dynasty of the Herods, if dynasty it can be called,—for the first was the only substantial monarch of the line, and he, however hateful as a man and as a king, appears to have tyrannized impartially, and shown no invidious patronage to the race from which he sprang.

The adjacent pastoral tribes of Moab and Ammon similarly dissolved into the kindred races who roved over the Hauran. A 'land of Tob' (*i.e.* 'the good') is said to have lain somewhere east of Peræa, apparently where once was their territory, and to have been occupied by Jews at the period of the Maccabees. The Jewish settlements in Arabia have already been noticed. The roving dominion of an Aretas of the Herodian period had been so far consolidated, as for him to set up dynastic pretensions, and ally himself with the ruling house of Judæa. The daughter of that Aretas had been divorced by the tetrarch Antipas to make way for his brother Philip's wife, which gave rise to a war between them. In the account Josephus gives, it is clear that the Arab had levied his tribute right up to the walls of Machærus, on the eastern bank of the Jordan, and certainly at one time was master of the fortress itself. If, as seems most likely, Damascus had been in possession of the same Arabs during the last century before Christ, the permanent ascendancy which they thus acquired can have been due to nothing else than the decay of the great established monarchy which checked them, and the power which the vast traffic from Mesopotamia across the desert, and from Yemen up the gulf of Akaba, threw into their hands. Whether Rome or Carthage predominated in the West, a demand for the articles of Eastern opulence was sure to increase, and did in fact increase with every extension of Rome's western dominions. For these children of the desert to occupy wealthy cities and powerful fortresses, and command the entrepôts of the commerce of the East and West, although a

assemblages of families, or even of individual families, was entrusted the ordinary administration of justice. From the circumstances of the case, this was the only sovereign attribute which would be ordinarily in use. Legislation was not for them, for whom God had given laws, and to whom He could, when He pleased, speak again by 'His servants the prophets.' To declare peace or war was also a reserved attribute of the Divine Ruler. But questions would arise between man and man, and the supreme function of deciding them was, save in rare emergencies, part of the natural authority accruing by primogeniture.

The plan which Jethro, Moses' father-in-law, suggested for the adjudication of questions (probably civil only) was based on simple numerical divisions. The tribes were organized in thousands, subdivided into hundreds of families, an arrangement which is continuously traceable throughout the Old Testament history. Thus Gideon tells the angel that his 'thousand was the meanest (Judges vi. 15, margin) in Israel,' and Bethlehem is spoken of, in a well-known text, as 'little among the thousands of Judah.' When a tribe became territorially settled, the captains or chief elders of their thousands, &c., would naturally retain their office as 'judges and officers' in towns, and the arrangement would, from a purely numerical, become a local one. As a military organization, indeed, the numerical one remained a vital part of the national system. The 'seventy men of the elders of Israel' who shared prophetic privileges with Moses, were not, it seems, judges, but discharged the duty of teaching the will of God to the people, and maintaining obedience to it. In this they partook of the 'burden of the people' with Moses, and for this the 'Spirit which was upon' Moses was given to them. But they disappear from history and leave no successors, nor have they any connexion with the Sanhedrin of later days. The mere number of seventy proves nothing, for being a sacred number in the eyes of the Jews, it was sure to be selected on any grave and solemn occasion, for which it was not plainly unsuitable.¹ The only fixed authoritative elements in the civil state were the heads of tribes and heads of families, and between these two ranks more or less recognition was given, within limits which cannot be precisely fixed, to the heads of certain leading families. These were the arrangements common to all the kindred nations around them,² and always

¹ So Josephus, when sent to administer Galilee, finding its judicial affairs required rearranging, instituted a supreme court of seventy with inferior subordinate ones.

² See the case of the offence mentioned Numb. xxv. 14, 15, where there is a close parallelism between the rank of the Midianitish and Israelitish offender.

how far tradition and custom went in preserving the forms of law. If we apply to these princes and elders the term 'aristocracy' for want of a better, we ought to observe that it implies no exclusive privileges; for in this sense the only aristocracy were the tribe of Levi and family of Aaron, and the disqualification for holding landed property went far to balance any preference which they enjoyed. The organization of the commonwealth was always one of families, not of ranks or classes, and the sole preeminence which a few distinguished houses enjoyed was knit up in the same bond of brotherhood in which the highest and lowest were equally bound. Nor is the tone of the Book of Judges and of the records of the early monarchy reconcilable with the prevalence of anything except independence and equality. The chiefs or heads of tribes, together with the rulers or elders, wherever mentioned, (and their mention is rare,) only head and lead the people, but hardly guide, much less govern it. The predominant action of the narrative is popular throughout, and there appears to have been unfettered communication between the general mass of free Israelites and the prophet or judge whom Jehovah raised up to be the saviour of the moment. It is not till the later reigns of the monarchy of Judah that we trace the oligarchic influence of what are then called the 'princes.' No doubt, with idolatrous intermarriages must have come in a neglect of the laws which regulated descent and the tenure of property; and a few great holders began to rise and absorb the small freehold owners around them. Usury among brethren, in direct defiance of the Mosaic prohibition, must have followed the distress caused by the havoc of war; and usury, especially where there is little commerce to assist the development of capital, must soon eat up the equality of citizenship. The concentration of all the leading families within the walls of the capital, which, owing to the constant inroads of powerful enemies, became the normal state of the later monarchy of Judah, would necessarily further the growth of an oligarchy. Thus patriarchal simplicity was corrupted into palace etiquette. The heads of leading families who had saved within the city walls themselves and their moveable treasures, and had left the smaller folk whose natural stem and pillar they were, to be eaten up by Assyrian ravages, would seek to derive from the favour of the sovereign a dignity to compensate that which they had lost as the worshipful centres of local influence. Thus the patrimonial chiefs of the tribesmen became the minions of a court, or the caballers against its authority, according to the fluctuating strength of the monarchy. It is not, however, till its last deciduous stage in the days of Zedekiah that they appear as an organized body with some of

the functions of a privy council, having apparently (2 Chron. xxviii. 21) a treasury or common fund, a place of meeting, and collectively exercising a jurisdiction. A state¹ impoverished, a monarchy weak, and a growing oligarchy, are sure signs of downfall imminent, even without the overwhelming assault of the first power of the world. We may, in passing, remark that the local influence of the heads of thousands and other patriarchal dignities was probably the great obstacle in the way of extirpating the high-place worship. It appears from a passage in the Second Book of Chronicles (xxiv. 17, 18) that these 'princes' were the instigators of departure from the revived purity of Jehoiada's period. 'The king hearkened unto them, and they left the house of the Lord God of their fathers, and served groves and idols.' There is no doubt that these groves were mostly family sanctuaries, at first not idolatrous, but transitional towards idolatry, connected with the local influence of a leading 'elder.' Such was the case at Abiezer, as shown in the story of Gideon. The worship of Baal had evidently become domesticated there. Accordingly, in the earlier stages of the monarchy, the power of the king was too weak to contend with these strong local centres of divergent worship. The piety and long reign of Asa, succeeded and seconded by that of his son Jehoshaphat, failed, as is expressly recorded, to achieve this; and what we have just stated appears to be the account of the difficulty which they found. In the time of Hezekiah, however, when the centralizing influences of the later period had had time to operate, the difficulty was overcome. (2 Kings xviii. 4.) The abolition of high-place worship is there expressly recorded; and on referring to the parallel account in the Chronicles (2 Chron. xxix. 30; xxx. 2, 6, 12; xxxi. 8), we find the king and the princes mentioned as united in the effort then made for the reconstitution of religion. It seems, then, that whilst the nobles and elders held their native place among their tribesmen, their power, clinging, as it were, to the soil by the strong ties of nature, defied the influence of the monarch; but, when they were seduced or dislodged from that seat of tribune eldership, and gathered within the shadow of the throne, it found the means of swaying them for good or for evil; until, in the last days of foreign inroad and domestic oppression, all elements of government became uncertain, and unscrupulousness had its usual ascendancy.

We have endeavoured to elucidate the leading features of government, and the change from a patriarchal seniority to a

¹ The diminished resources of Judah are apparent from the extremely reduced tribute, 'an hundred talents of silver and a talent of gold,' to which the king of Babylon put the land, (2 Kings xxiii. 33.)

courtly oligarchy, which, under the late monarchy of Judah, the aristocratical element gradually underwent. It is clear that hardly anything in common with the hard-outlined scheme of local sanhedrims and synagogues of the Ptolemean, Maccabean, or Christian era, is traceable here. Dr. Raphall has a few flimsy and insufficient sentences on this head, which we quote, in order to impugn. He first propounds a view as that of 'orthodox Jews,' to which he then states certain objections, without pronouncing for or against orthodoxy; but continues as follows (Vol. ii. p. 108).

'If we examine the later books of the Old Testament, we shall find frequent mention made of the *Zekenim*, "elders." Indeed, on one occasion, before the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, we find the prophet Ezekiel (viii. 11, 12) speaks of the *Ziknay Israel*, "elders of Israel," as a constituted body, and even mentions the number of its assessors as seventy,—the very number originally appointed by Moses, and which afterwards constituted the Sanhedrin.' The view taken of the Sanhedrin by the orthodox is that its origin is due to Moses, and recorded in Num. xi.; and that it continued uninterruptedly, under a succession of chiefs, down to 500 A.D. The passage of Ezekiel to which our author refers is that in which he sees in a vision 'seventy men of the ancients,' or elders, of the house of Israel, 'with every man his censer in his hand,' standing before the forms of idolatry with which the Temple walls were covered. He saw a college of idolatrous priests, the number of which has already been accounted for; but there is no trace whatever of jurisdiction; and the term 'assessors' conveys a purely gratuitous insinuation that there was. In the ancient Hebrew polity there was, in fact, no room for a body like the Sanhedrin, unless the patriarchal seniority, in its latter days of oligarchical corruption, may be taken to be an approximation towards it.

But the purely patriarchal system became impossible after the return from captivity. The forced exile of those seventy years had indeed torn asunder that system in its vitals. One had been taken, and another left, of 'the thousands of Judah.' The tie which for several generations had been growing weaker between the 'princes,' or 'rulers,' and their tribesmen, was then rudely burst. The king of Babylon took all who were worth taking, and 'left of the poor of the land;' and the poor of the land, we may be sure, after the distress which the kingdom had undergone, must have increased out of all due proportion. This accounts for the very small numbers which are mentioned as carried away, and which Professor Newman¹ seems to think so improbable. Those who were taken went

¹ History of the Hebrew Monarchy, p. 323.

at several times, and perhaps to several different places, at any rate at first. But still, when they received permission to exercise self-government, as it seems clear, even during the Captivity, they did, they would naturally put the old fragments together, and let them grow into each other in whatever order was possible. The divulsion of elements was again renewed on their return. If we consider how, in the peaceful affluence of Babylonian and Persian patronage, the captives probably multiplied, and if we regard the numerous ties which enterprise and industry would form, it must be supposed that of kindred captive families many would remain, although many might return. The desultory flocking in of Israelites of the ten tribes, and doubtless of many refugees of Judah from Egypt and from the semi-Arab tribes of the southern and eastern borders, would strengthen the reviving state, but impair its genealogical symmetry. We must, however, beware of supposing that purity of race prevailed among the Jews at the period preceding the Captivity. At any rate, from the time of the Judges their lineage becomes more clearly mixed the later we descend in history. There was, firstly, the 'mixed multitude' from Egypt, who accompanied the people; there was the remnant of Canaanites who were 'put to tribute,' instead of being extirpated, among several of the tribes; there was the confusion incident to the oppressed state of the people under the Judges; there was, moreover, the pernicious example of Solomon, during whose long reign great impurity must have crept into the genealogical tables of his kingdom; and these several sources of pollution to the blood and lineage of the chosen race had more or less deeply tinged it before the worst and last period of its pre-Babylonian decline. No doubt the standard of purity was raised by Ezra (ix. x.) to a degree of strictness which had never prevailed in practice since Joshua's days; and many who were of blood repeatedly debased by such admixtures probably then joined in the renunciation of strange wives. From this period to the time of Alexander a mist descends on Jewish history, penetrable only at a few unconnected points; but when we begin again to read the face of the times, Pharisaism appears in its vigorous youth, before its fully-ripened acerbity provoked the reaction of Sadduceism. The gradual sympathy with Greek notions which, during the last two centuries before Christ, took hold on a large section of the nation, and divided it more and more widely into parties, factions, and civil enmities, must have caused a larger contamination of Hebrew pedigrees than before, till the pride of birth in those who resisted fusion, and boasted to be 'Hebrews of the Hebrews,'¹ was inflated into a haughty

¹ It ought not to be forgotten that the Mosaic prohibition extended only to intermarriage with those Canaanitish nations who are always spoken of as doomed

fanaticism, which, presuming itself to be born in righteousness, a child of grace, claimed a place on the highest round of the patriarch's ladder reaching from heaven to earth.

It is probably superfluous to inquire into the historical development of the synagogue and the Sanhedrin from its earliest germ. When brought into contact with the great thinkers of the Eastern world, amidst the profound peace of imperial Babylon, the more active minds among the Jews would certainly be driven to examine the wisdom which, so long neglected, lay hidden in the bosom of their nation. The captives, too, were the *élite* of their own people; and the advancement of some illustrious members of their body to high office would facilitate the admission of any who wished it, to converse with that class of state soothsayers who, whilst they professed the secrets of the invisible world, held a high rank and wielded vast influence in the visible. Those Jews who lived near enough to the focus of empire would be struck by the manner in which the supernatural penetrated the political element there; and, remembering that they had an oracle divinely given to organize a commonwealth, and to be, in fact, the inward life by which it performed its outward functions, would be led to feel the overpowering duty of studying the law of God, meditating therein, and elaborating knowledge to a discipline of perfection. Study and converse would ripen each other; and we find in the prophet Daniel, in his evident searching of the written text of Mosaic Scripture, and in his close intimacy with the grandees of Chaldaean mysticism, traces of a character which gave its tone to a large portion of the subsequent history of the Jews on its better side. In Ezra we have a man moulded as a vessel of the same Spirit, but apparently with a different function, and one which worked more on the ordinary level of human agency; but whether we watch the mystic and the seer, or the zealous priest of a repentant nation, seeking to elaborate their 'fruits meet for repentance,' there is the same anxious eye in both to what had been written as the ultimate standard of appeal in matters of obedience. We cannot but suppose that considerable progress had been made in the study of the law by the people—such study, at any rate, as earnest meditation, when brought to bear on oral instruction, would amount to. If, indeed, we compare the expressions used in Scripture on the occasion of the public reading of the Book of the Law, when newly found,

racés, and not to heathens generally. Ezra had (ix. 1) added 'Egyptians' to the list, as also 'Moabites' and Ammonites.' It is clear, however, that Pharisaism extended the prohibition to all races of men.

by Josiah (2 Kings xxiii. 2, 3), with the similar proceeding under Ezra (viii. 1—3, 5, 6, 8, 9), we cannot but be struck with the utter absence in the former account of any proof of sympathy or intelligence on the part of the audience; whereas the latter narrative teems with significant allusions to the devout and earnest reception of the Divine record by the people. 'The people stood to the covenant,' which the king made in his and their name to keep the law, is all we read in the Book of Kings; and this seems to signify the mere unthinking acquiescence of a multitude who had not yet been educated up to the occasion. The reception of the readings of Ezra is a proof that the study of the law had taken hold on the popular mind. Not, of course, that the thousands who listened were imbued with the zealous spirit of Scribes and Levites; but there was an interest in all, and a larger or smaller degree of knowledge in most. Whether there had been in Babylon small detached gatherings of the more zealous students of the Testament given by God to their fathers, is a question which can never be settled. If there had been, in proportion as they obtained regularity and method, they would approximate to what was afterwards the type of the synagogue. It is, at any rate, plain that from the time of Ezra that type must have rapidly approached its completed form; and probably in less than half a century an organized system of public teaching was diffused throughout Judæa.

Nor, whilst considering the gradual growth of the popular study of the law, should we omit to notice the formation of a class of men called by a name in reference to the most important function of that study—'scribes.' In the formal language of the decree of Artaxerxes, Ezra is called 'the scribe of the law of the God of Heaven,' (vii. 12—21.) We read (2 Chron. xxxiv. 13) that in the reign of Josiah there 'were of the Levites, scribes, officers, and porters;' but the word there probably denotes generally any function for which writing was necessary, and does not yet acquire the peculiar tinge of meaning which in the New Testament it uniformly bears. It seems clear, then, that there was a class of men called 'scribes' already existing at the period of the return; and although among them all the Levites were probably included, yet whosoever was ardent in the study of the law might also be of the same class. In short, the term 'scribe' seems to denote the transition of the written law from a dead *depositum*, rather guarded than used, to a speculative source of thought and practical fund of principles, and to mark the period when the law came out into the conscious life of all who wished to be accounted children of Abraham. From this period

dates the Rabbinical maxim, that 'the crown of royalty in Judah 'was in abeyance, the crown of the priesthood was with Aaron's 'seed, but the crown of the law was common to all Israel.' From this period, the character of a perfect scribe, expanded into that of a traditionist, became the most influential among the Jews, as all other elements of established authority became weak. The high-priesthood fell gradually into contempt, as the office became the object of corrupt intrigue with every successive protector, conqueror, or persecutor of Judæa. The royal power grew from a moderate chieftainship under Simon, the last brother of Judas Maccabeus, into a domestic tyranny under Jannai, and thence lapsed into a hateful foreign usurpation under Herod. As the high-priesthood grew despised, and the royalty hated, the popular crown, that of the law, flourished, and its votaries abounded.

Nor was the high-priesthood the only point of the old constitution which grew weak; there is a great question as we chase shadows in the mist which pervades Jewish history, what became of the once great influence of the tribe of Levi? The number of Levites who returned from captivity is represented as inconceivably small,—about three hundred and fifty only, not reckoning the 'Nethinim' and 'Solomon's servants,'—whereas the priests amount to over four thousand. Even in the time of Josiah they would seem, from one passage¹ to have been only about double the number of the priests. In the prophetic writings the name of Levite rarely occurs; and, if we except those of Malachi, where its prominence is remarkable, only in passages whose scope may be rather supposed to be Messianic, and their fulfilment referable to the Christian Church. The probability, if we may venture a suggestion, is, that the tithes of two tribes only was a maintenance insufficient for those who had before enjoyed the tithes of twelve, and thus that, when the Levites from the ten tribes took shelter in the kingdom of Judah, they either became ministers of the high-place worship, or ceased to retain any religious distinction. Accordingly, when, under the zealous Josiah, their scandalous occupation was swept away, they would not be allowed to retain any honours or share any emoluments of the Levitical office; and, under the ravages of the Chaldeans, which scoured the country up to the gates of the capital, they were probably in great numbers beggared and starved. Further, it seems on the whole not impossible, that, whereas the priests could not properly discharge themselves of their duty anywhere but in Jerusalem, and, therefore, the majority of the priests would probably return,

¹ 2 Chron. xxxv. 8, 9.

and 'Solomon's servants,' with whom probably, at the New Testament period, their fusion was complete.

On one occasion only in the New Testament history are Levites mentioned as taking part in a public transaction; that on which the Jews sent 'priests and Levites from Jerusalem' to inquire into the pretensions of the new teacher beyond Jordan; and the notice of those time-honoured titles, in their familiar juxta-position, recalls us for a moment to the olden period,—the heroic age of the chosen nation, whose last eventful crisis began in that 'voice crying in the wilderness.' But from all the public relations of Judæa the Levites' influence had passed away; and when Herod propounded his question 'Where Christ should be born?' it was addressed—and the style is significant—to the 'chief-priests and scribes of the people.' This latter was the class which had diverted the ancestral reverence of the nation for the sacred tribe. That tribe still officially existed; but their office was lowered and shared by others. Its genealogies were perhaps uncorrupted; but genealogy had ceased to be politically important.

The Hebrew name for scribe is Sopher; and this name, in its plural form, Sopherim, is given to a catena of sages, reaching from the time of Ezra, who, with his contemporary and proximate prophets, was reckoned among their number, to that

a fixed residence and public maintenance within the walls of Jerusalem. These became immensely valuable privileges when the open country was swept by invading armies, as in the latter days of the pre-Babylonian monarchy it constantly was, and the importance of the Nethinim rose accordingly. Their name, which means 'given,' was probably an allusion to Josh. ix. 27, where Joshua is said to have 'given' them (margin) to serve the sanctuary, and probably grew from a term of reproach to one of honourable distinction. Yet there is much question whether it was in general use before the Captivity. The course of time gradually fused down nearly all distinction between the Levites, the Nethinim, and 'Solomon's servants,' i. e. the remnant of the strangers of the land, whom he reduced to a helot state (2 Chron. ii. 18), and who were also regarded as in some measure sacred—a striking proof of the official sanctity which tinged every public institution—although there is no record, nor any likelihood, of an oath taken to spare them. Josephus mentions a request of the Levites who were engaged in the musical service of the Temple to King Agrippa, to be allowed to wear the priests' ephod—a direct breach of the law, as he notices (Antiq. xxviii. 6); and also a request of those Levites who merely helped in the other work of the Temple, to be allowed to learn the chants. This of itself illustrates the extent to which the popular importance and esteem of the sacrificial duties had declined. In another place (De Bell. Jud. II. xv. 4), he remarkably omits to mention Levites where the passage would seem to require it. We have there the priest and the *ὑμνοῦντες* distinguished as well as the musicians and singers, but no Levites as such. The *ὑμνοῦντες* of John vii. 32, 45, and xviii. 3, are clearly the same class of whom Josephus speaks in that place. Perhaps the musicians and singers might have been pure Levites; but it is far more likely that natural qualifications prevailed in such appointments, and that the mass of Temple ministrants, in which Levites and the other two classes were blended, furnished them. The chief thing to observe is, that office, and not lineage, became the leading idea. In post-Babylonian history the name Gibeonite merely means 'man of Gibeon,' e.g. Neh. iii. 7.

how, as the law, dogmatizing, as it was meant to do, on the details of every-day life, became a living principle in the bosom of the nation, in the scribes that principle found its personal expression. Ezra, his associates and successors, acquired a lead over the mind of the people which was knit up with the principles of national existence, and wrought itself deeply into the tenacity of the national character. Hence the men of 'the Great Synagogue,' as this school of scribes or Sopherim were called with venerating remembrance by later generations, went on educating their nation up to a point gradually more and more divergent from that to which the external tendencies of the age were pressing; and when, under the reign of Epiphanes, those tendencies assumed the form of intolerance and persecution, the remnant of orthodox Judaism, though scanty, yet powerful under compression, threw itself at once into the patriot ranks which rallied round the standard of the Maccabees. But we must not forget that, on the internal relations of the nation, the Sopherim developed a similarly powerful influence. Indirectly they tended to limit the political importance of the priesthood, weakened as that body was, in its practical bearings on the national life, by that gradual decay of the Levites, as a tribe and an order, to which we have already adverted. Dr. Raphall is, no doubt, correct in representing the Persian monarchy as opposed to 'municipal governments,' although we venture to doubt whether the diminished importance, or rather political¹ extinction, of the house of David was due to that policy. Whether or no the high-priests lost tangible influence through their being the great king's tax-farmers, it is not easy to say; but it is clear that a void was left in the national sympathies with their exalted functions; and that mainly for two reasons, a negative and a positive one. Firstly, they were no longer, as in the olden time, the vicars of autocratic Deity, and the oracular declarers of his will in a public crisis; but, as we have said, the *publicani* of a human and an alien ruler. Secondly, there had sprung up within the nation a devout conviction that the covenant of the law was the heritage of God's people; and although this conviction became full of the harshness of the letter, as the living voice of inspiration died away, yet the people at large, under the teaching of the scribes, felt that their own functions, as regarded the law, had a living fulfilment, while they had to look back to a vanished age for a similar recognition of the high-priest's.

¹ Yet the fact that the posterity of Hillel, who was of the seed of David, enjoyed for several generations the presidency of the Rabbinical school, has been alleged on the opposite side; perhaps it is but an instance of the strong hereditary tendency of all fixed institutions.

satisfied by the help of the scribes. Hence jurisdiction and pastoral care, and obviously also the education of persons qualified for office in Church and State, or indeed for the maintenance of the national character in this its new phase, all passed into the hands of the same class of persons; and whether we choose or not to give to these functions, as developed in the first post-Babylonian age, the names of Sanhedrin, Synagogue, and College of Rabbis, there certainly existed the things which grow up historically into those designations. Here then was laid, in the ample and expanding bosom of the people, a broad basis for the constitution in these leading particulars, wholly independent of the exclusiveness of tribe or family. All who had the gift might study, approve themselves, and rise to honour and eminence, as judges, rulers, and teachers. But the change was made under the guiding instinct of the nation itself; and the then leading men, the last patriarchal generation, themselves felt the impulse, and held the position of vantage from which to guide the change they shared. The priests and Levites were of all the best qualified to furnish the class of scribes; and next to them, in opportunity as in eminence, stood those nobles and rulers, or chief of the fathers, whose lineage, pure and lofty, singled them out from the mass of their nation. This is probably why so great a change passed with so little outward show; authority was shared in nearly similar degrees at first by the same individuals, and their body, no longer exclusive, was slowly enriched by the rising merit of the wider mass below. Nor could a development more full of promise have been hoped for, had not the letter gradually choked the spirit, and the study of the law itself become a gradual snare of apostacy from the truth.

We have hitherto reasoned on the broad facts before us, without taking a more microscopic view of detail, nor distinguished in the study of the law the preponderance given to Scripture and to tradition. Tradition at first, as distinguished from Scripture, there could hardly be; the inspired exposition of Ezra becoming at once a late record of Scripture and an early link in the teaching of the scribes. The oral teaching was at first the vehicle of the sense of the law; then a fine envelope of its letter, as what eminent sages had personally taught; then this envelope began to adhere to and to cohere with the sacred text; and, lastly, to gain density and lose transparency, and become a dry and rugged crust, through which oozed but a scanty and altered flavour of the juice within. And, no doubt, a proportion of minds would show a strong and early tendency, a precocity of development towards the traditionist type, which, perhaps, made them marked among their brethren. Hence there

such a combination as a 'departure from the law of God and the usage of Israel' (Raphall, vol. ii. p. 99); although, at the same time, it is curious that he should have stated on the very page before (ibid. p. 98), that 'as the functions of judge and magistrate were open to every Israelite, the high-priest, as such, was likewise not excluded from performing them.' Nay it is manifest, that the very fact of the Sopherim combining in themselves those three functions which, blending civil with spiritual power, found their final shape in the Sanhedrin, the Synagogue, and the School of Theology, was the very reason which filled them with instinctive jealousy of a powerful individual, whose combination of civil and sacred functions was fast growing into a title of dynastic legitimacy. The displacement of the patriarchal by what, for want of a better name, we may call the *scholastic* system, went, as we have seen, quietly enough; but it was a very different thing when that system, verging in the Pharisees to its extreme, and becoming instinctively intolerant, saw a powerful monarchy, professing a popular principle as its basis, springing up to control, by the power of the executive, the moral and political influence of the Scribes. It was precisely because both the sacerdotal monarchy and the Sanhedrin contained the same elements of temporal and spiritual power, that they felt themselves natural enemies to each other; and in that feeling, as it gradually gained the ascendancy, all the seeds of disunion which ruined the nation were gradually sown and ripened.

We must next notice how the supreme Sanhedrin, or court of seventy at Jerusalem, consisted of Scribes, or men learned in the law; and how, while it furnished rulers and teachers, and, in short, all the official staff of the synagogue from its own body, and from other similar and subordinate ones, it recruited those bodies from the scholars, who always sat in twenty-three rows, facing the judges, during the time of the exposition of the law. That there were other elementary schools of study need hardly be stated; but it curiously illustrates the close intertwining of the temporal and the spiritual element, to find that the same place which was a court of law was also at the same time a divinity school, and that the hearing cases adjudicated was a later stage of instruction in religious knowledge. The very same person, in fact, Simon the Just, already mentioned, filled the three offices of high-priest, chief rabbi in divinity, and nasi or prince of the Sanhedrin. In later times these were never united, although the two latter occasionally were; and when the Romans at last made the high-priesthood a matter of venal patronage, it was found necessary for the Sanhedrin to pass regulations providing for an illiterate person's discharging

mind. Under the later Asmonean princes, however, we have also seen how Pharisaism became antagonistic to that dynasty, in whose later members Sadducean tendencies strongly predominated. At that period, Sadducees found their way into the Sanhedrin, although traditions state that it was purged of them by a simple test,—that of the knowledge of the law, in which they were grossly deficient. Herod affected to favour the Pharisees, that he might seem to be a popular and national sovereign. The 'leaven of Herod' implies a party which had lost sight of distinctive religious principles in political time-serving. On the whole, however, the Pharisees, with a few exceptions, acquiesced with sullen duplicity in his sway. There is a strong appearance of Pharisaic predominance in the Sanhedrin of the Gospels, with a partial reaction in that of the Acts in favour of the Sadducees. The constant recurrence of the expression 'Scribes and Pharisees,' shows how complete was the identity of interest between them; nor, perhaps, is their ubiquitousness the least important feature of their public character. (See Luke v. 17, 30.) The same threefold institution—the Sanhedrin, the Synagogue, and the School—was organized throughout the land; and, wherever a sufficient number of families were resident together, this group of provincial institutions, with subordinate relations to the metropolitan one, sprang up. Accordingly, throughout both Judæa and Galilee, we find that they were never far from our blessed Lord when engaged in his public teaching. In the corn-fields where the disciples plucked the way-side ears, there were some of the fraternity to mark them. In the publican's house, detested as its owner was for his occupation's sake, they had cognisance of our Lord's being a guest; while of all matters in the synagogue and the temple they had, of course, instant information. Josephus has a remark on their maintaining intercourse with each other; and, throughout the New Testament, they seem well acquainted with the tactics of party. We cannot admit Dr. Raphall's theory, which identifies the Chasidim or Assideans of the period of the Maccabean war with the Pharisees. Those *Chasidim* appear to have been a set of fanatics, who carried to an extreme every view which regarded the independence of their nation, and the purity of the means by which it was to be attained and preserved. Most probably they were the same as the Essenes of Josephus, and had nurtured in retirement their

¹ We never hear of the 'Scribes and Sadducees' together, although members of the Sanhedrin must have been Sadducees sometimes; but it was the full character of knowing, teaching, and judicially applying the law, not the mere function of judging, which constituted the 'Scribe.' Compare our Lord's expression of a 'Scribe instructed unto the kingdom of heaven.' Matt. xiii. 52.

offenders, would be sure to stamp them with odium in a nation which, of all except the great classical homes of freedom, was the most remarkable for independence of political sentiment. The political Sadducees are the most important variety, and their period of chief influence lasts from the time when the Asmonean dynasty was firmly established until it had decayed into the factions which brought the Romans in as umpires; and of the political Sadducees, *Prideaux* and others consider the Herodians as a branch. That the Pharisees as a body were opposed to whatever power trenched on native independence, is clear; nevertheless there were individuals of eminence of that party who, at any rate at one time, favoured Herod's claims. Such were Hillel and Shammai, certainly not Sadducees, the only two of the Sanhedrin who, when he with the aid of *Sosius*, Pompey's lieutenant, took Jerusalem, were spared, and that in consequence of their having, like Jeremiah in the Chaldean siege, counselled a surrender. The name 'Herodian' implied a stigma, and continued to be applied, when Judæa was a province under a procurator, to all who countenanced submission to Roman authority, whatever their religious views might be. No doubt the Sadducean tenets were most easily reconcilable with that submission; and this again tended to keep alive popular feeling against that sect, which was only powerful from the individual influence of its members, and was by the necessity of the case without collective weight in public affairs. Indeed *Josephus*¹ asserts with great probability in his favour, that if ever they acquired any public function, the Sadducees were obliged to adopt Pharisaic measures for the time, to make themselves tolerable to the people. This characteristic of trimming to the times is an especial stamp of the Sadducees. They assumed a modified Græcism when the current of the times set that way; they opened their arms to Hyrcanus the First, when the pertinacious purism of the rival sect threw him upon unpopular support; and abetted the tyrannical cruelty of Alexander Jannæus, when he became an Oriental despot. Being mostly men of rank and wealth, and probably resident in the capital, as well as in constant intercourse with all the tools of foreign power, they were able to exercise a powerful check upon the Sanhedrin from without, although they rarely after the death of Jannæus commanded a majority in its counsels. Beyond the limits of Judæa, where latitude of opinion, owing to the closer contact of foreign ideas, was more prevalent, they hardly challenge notice as a sect, and after the final capture of Jerusalem they easily disappear. Their political importance ceased

¹ *Antiq. Jud.* XVIII. i. 4.

of the realm,) was enabled to govern for nine years with more tranquillity on the whole than had befallen her kingdom in the time of her husband, or than was experienced afterwards under her sons. The Pharisees became at this time the court party, and the Sadducees, had they been qualified for it, might have led the popular cause. The priests probably had felt that the union of the high-priesthood with the royalty in one person had a peculiar weight of oppressiveness for them; there is moreover great probability that Sadduceism, under court influence, had spread widely among the priesthood during the previous reign; and, while the former motive led them to desert Hyrcanus' cause, who was already high-priest, the latter drew them to the side of Aristobulus. So far had the usual bonds of party broken adrift, under the disorganizing influence of an *imperium in imperio*, that the Pharisees, who usually included the majority of the priests, and were the wonted leaders of the people, were now detached from both, and finding that, alike under Hyrcanus or his brother, the state influence which they had wielded through the queen regent was likely to vanish, formed a 'constitutional' party by themselves, while the people stood on the side of legitimacy in the elder brother Hyrcanus, and while the priests and Sadducees, content to allow him the high-priesthood, conspired to place Aristobulus his brother on the throne.

When, however, seventy years afterwards, they confronted Archelaus before the tribunal of Augustus, the Pharisee chiefs had long since resumed their place as popular leaders. The sufferings of many of their number under Herod for the cause of national independence had enabled them to keep up a desultory irritation against his government, though it was too strong to be seriously disturbed. No form of royalty was likely to be acceptable to the people, now that the Asmonean royal house had fallen, one by one, the victims of dynastic jealousy. Archelaus indeed was the heir of a double hatred, that towards his tyrant father and his Samaritan mother; no wonder, therefore, that the general mass of the Jews looked back fondly from the prospect of such a serpent-knotted sceptre to the revered memory of the 'men of the Great Synagogue,' and longed for the more popular government of the olden time, when the High Priest and the Sanhedrin divided the allegiance of the land.

The tendencies of the 'constitutional' party, as those of all innate Hebrew institutions, were no doubt aristocratic. Whether Pharisee or Sadducee ruled the scale of public affairs for the moment, the course of events for the last century B.C. had engendered an aristocracy of mingled wealth and birth, without distinctive rank or titles, save in respect of the priesthood, and with political influence based on the discharge of h

description. Herodianism must have lost credit and collapsed instantly. The high-priesthood had been studiously degraded too long for it to offer a rallying-point; the Sanhedrin had been too completely stripped of the greater judicial functions, to fill any large space in the public eye; whilst amongst the patriotic party there were individuals doubtless of much influence, but there was no organization ready on the moment, nor any one man of high name and great powers to command public confidence. After a nominal reign of nine years, amidst tumult and disaffection, Archelaus was exiled, and the rule of the procurators was more tolerable to the leading men who had a position to lose by public uproar, and to whom the temptation became every day stronger to lend their influence to government, by tightening their country's chains. 'The Pharisees,' we know, 'were covetous;' and amidst the terrible perils of a fresh struggle, they might think peace at any price the only policy for those who wished to die rich, although publicly in the Temple they would have shown a pious horror, if the question, 'Is it lawful to give tribute to Cæsar?' were answered in the affirmative. In enumerating the various social elements in Judæa, we ought not to omit notice of a *γένος βασιλικόν*, several times mentioned by Josephus, who were probably divers remote branches of the same priestly house to which the Asmoneans belonged, and were called the 'royal house' for that connexion's sake, although not ranking above the other priestly aristocracy. They mingled among those persons called *εὐγένεις*, a massacre of whom to the extent of twelve thousand was perpetrated by the Zealots on their first mastering Jerusalem. These 'nobles' were odious through their influencing public affairs in favour of order, and their large number seems to show that it was a settled thing for men of noble birth to reside chiefly in Jerusalem, where no doubt they shared the emoluments of office or intrigue. Thus, although wealth, family, and personal influence could powerfully affect the course of public affairs, the only recognised constitutional powers lay in the High Priest and Sanhedrin. The inherent weakness of a government which existed mainly to expound the law, conspired with the goading cruelty of the Romans to make men despair of all government, domestic or foreign. Hence they fell back on the state and the rights of nature; and a popular fury which renounced all law, when men discovered that the only law really operative was one which ensured their wrongs, seized on the masses of the people. Meanwhile the intellectual few were split into Pharisee and Sadducee, with the cross-division of Herodian veining both parties; and the Pharisees were split again into the faction of Hillel and the faction of Shammai, whose unscholastic wranglings came

pilgrimages to Judæa of which the world is not weary yet, that the romantic effect of distance on the imagination is seen in the great number of these votaries who come from the remotest seats. It is morally certain that the same influence operated in the Apostolic age, and the intense concentration of feeling with which devout Israelites at home met on holy ground their far-off kin from east and west, the many diversities of speech and manners setting off and interpreting the unity of spirit amongst all, is what no other age or race of men can ever see. At the same time, the want of a common language amongst a great number, and the brevity of the sojourn of many, would prevent any preponderance of the foreign over the home element, and keep the balance of exchange in the market of opinion steadily in favour of Judæa. Nor should we wholly omit the considerations of secondary importance, that the constant radiation of traffic, during many months of the year, to and fro between Jerusalem and its wide spiritual dependencies, must have given a great impulse to communication in general, and caused a regular flood-tide of demand in every market of the area so traversed. The ancient solemnities of concourse, by which the Greeks in early times had kept up the self-consciousness of race and nation, could never at their best estate have rivalled the vast Pan-Judaic festival; much less could the physical excitement of the athlete, or even the æsthetic stimulus of the stage, have approached the moral magnetism of that confluence which, without spectacle or pomp, poured in to keep the rite of fifteen hundred years. It can hardly have failed, however, that there was a harsh line drawn across society at the point where poverty disabled men from sharing the privilege. Mitigated as it may to some extent have been by the lively play of home and kindred charity which such occasions call forth, this must yet have existed. It is clear, however, from the Gospel narratives, that persons of humble station and slender means managed to make the journey from the distance of Galilee; and the constant interruptions to transit, through the unsettled state of the country, would cause the attendance in more favourable years to considerably exceed the average. When all this is taken into account, it gives us no mean opinion of the advanced state of police and economic regulations that so little of the misery of overcrowding is traceable in the copious accounts which have come down to us. Considering the vast concourse thither in some of the hottest months in the year, it would seem astonishing that there should not have been some sweeping instances of pestilence amidst the swarms of human beings seething under the fervour of religious enthusiasm, were it not reasonable to suppose that the Great Author and Object of their worship

influence chiefly in its political bearings, but it is impossible to leave the subject there. The prophet Malachi left his nation under the reproach of laxity in those very observances, for their mischievous minuteness in enforcing which their leaders of opinion in a later age were notorious. Hence we have no positive statements of Holy Writ to guide us in tracing the germ of Pharisaism as it began to open. To the elements of fact, and to the more subtle intimation of a tendency in them traceable in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah, attention has already been called. But as the means of study became more and more diffused, the law settled more and more deeply into the minds of the people, and a steadily-increasing proportion of intellectual activity became gradually devoted to it. It is easy to account for the strong temptations to the exclusive study of the letter which beset the Jewish mind, but it is strange indeed to observe the way in which that tendency, unresisted, won a gradual triumph over the inward dictates of feeling and conscience, and ended by a nice rigour of duty in everything, without a single ruling moral principle in anything—in acts of lavish beneficence done with a hardened heart. So imperceptible was the decline, and so strict the band of habit gradually formed, that the successive schools of doctors never once seem to have felt any qualm of conscience, or heart-question stirring them within, till they had bound on the backs of their nation of disciples the whole burden of traditions. Amongst the tendencies to the exclusive study of the letter, we may notice, firstly, the greatness of Moses, who was the giver of the law, as distinct from later prophets who left other writings. The intensely spiritual tone of a large portion of prophecy might have tempered the study of the letter, but for the secondary estimation in which, to aggrandise the lawgiver, the prophets were popularly held. Secondly, the law itself largely consisted of prohibitive precepts, in interpreting and applying which practically a closer adherence to the letter is probably allowable. Thirdly, the office of judge, exercised often on matters of minute detail, was associated with, or bore the closest relations to, that of theological professor, and beyond the office of a theological professorship, the lines of duty for a spiritual guide were not clearly drawn. Thus the theology became cramped by the narrow spirit of interpretation, which has been the besetting sin of a keenly legal mind in probably every age of thriving jurisprudence; and the narrowing theology thus imbibed was not tempered by any refreshing influence of the affections aroused by the pastoral office. Fourthly, it is, perhaps, not too much to assert that the universal spirit of the ancient world was literalism. How many heathen oracles are recorded as triumphantly satisfied in the letter? How many of the solemn forms of

the interest of society, to check at any rate those crimes which plainly lead to its own disorganization, no such vicious subtlety can, on civil points, affect it far. But men in the mass may set themselves to deal with the Divine law, at any rate in those points which have no obvious bearing upon temporal advantage, in the same spirit as that in which the cunning baffler of human justice deals with a statute. And something very close to this seems to have been the view which the Scribes and Pharisees took of the law of Moses; although, from the full mass of guilty evasion to which this spirit of quibble might commit them, there were contained in tradition itself, perhaps, certain safeguards in some particulars. But to the entire moral bathos to which that spirit presiding in *foro conscientie* must lead, they stood fully committed; and even to many violations of natural morality, which might revolt the conscience of a heathen of no extraordinary enlightenment. Thus the hateful associations which a Christian connects with the name 'Korban,' could never be felt for any merely heathen outrages of the moral sense. It is the heavenly sacredness of the whole apparatus of sinning which makes the sin so hateful, and which stands as the crucial instance, perhaps, out of all the history of mankind, how *corruptio optimi fit pessima*; or, in more sacred words than those of human proverb, 'if the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!'

Such was the result of removing from the province of the heart the principles regulative of human conduct, and resting that conduct on an external fence of precepts. It made knowledge of more importance than love, and ingenuity the most influential over the mind of all the organs of knowledge. Thus, while the moral temper was lowered, the standard of acuteness was raised; and at last that obedience alone was declared acceptable before God, which consisted of the scholastic operation of the intellect. The study of the law was that to which the kingdom of heaven was, in their view, open. Hillel 'the Great' may be viewed as the person in whom the fruits of literalism, as ripened in tradition, were first harvested. His long life and protracted career of public eminence gave him an authority which, in his own day, outshone competition, however his contemporary Shammai may have divided with him the suffrages of posterity. To him is ascribed the first attempt to arrange under six heads those traditions which had previously been dispersed in six hundred sections; and in his labours the Mishna, as a codified system of tradition, may be said to have begun. The following precepts have been ascribed to him:— 'Whoever does not increase in learning decreaseth. Whoever does not acquire knowledge becomes guilty.' 'Say not *when I shall have leisure I will study*, for, perhaps, thou mayest never

atmosphere of which he inhaled, yet without receiving the life of its truth into his heart.

In illustration of his character, we may quote the following remarks of Dr. Edersheim:—

‘Trifling as it may appear to us, such indulgences as having a figure carved upon his seal, bathing at Ptolemais in a place where a statue of Venus had been placed, and in general displaying a taste for the beautiful in nature and art, were serious innovations to a Pharisaical Jew. Gamaliel’s descent, position, and influence alone could protect him in such a course of conduct; and later writers have felt it necessary to frame certain excuses for those apparent deviations from strict rabbinical principles.’—P. 143.

No doubt Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, as well as the human teacher of Paul and Barnabas, ere they became direct pupils of the Holy Spirit, had both drunk of the same narrow rivulets of teaching, Hillel and Shammai. The former is indeed mentioned in the Talmud ‘as one of the three wealthiest men in Jerusalem.’ (Ibid. p. 144.) From what has been already said, as indeed from the general tenor of the New Testament, it may be assumed that the Sadducees had but little provincial influence. Whereas the ‘Scribes and Pharisees’ cross our Lord’s path everywhere within the limits of Judæa and Galilee, the Sadducees meet him only in the latter part of his public ministry as it converges towards the capital, where its last tremendous scenes were laid. They naturally kept aloof from the popular ministry of the synagogue, which, as far as we can trace it, seems to have lain everywhere in the hands of the opposite sect, who ruled opinion among the lower orders, and by their teaching fostered the intense sentiment of nationality till it broke wildly free from all leading in tumultuous outrage. The separateness and hallowed preeminence of Israel, fixed by the law as a barrier against surrounding Gentile corruptions, became a fierce text of insurrection when the hated power of the alien checked national spirit at every turn. The outlying districts of Upper Galilee, Peræa, and the Trachonitis, as they never felt the security of law, had never learnt to submit to its restraints. The unsettled life of borderers renders them everywhere the last whom civilization reclaims; but more especially those borderers of Judæa, who lay upon its desert outskirts, felt the wild attraction of nomad independence a constant temptation, whilst the *razzia* of disciplined troops was only an occasional restraint. More especially, when they saw all the interior of their country groaning under the oppressive presence of the alien, and marked how that oppression lay heaviest of all on the capital itself, they would congratulate themselves as the *chremnant* whom God had reserved, with knees and neck bended to the abomination, which made spiritually d

- ART. IV.—1. *Histoire de l'Eglise de France, composée sur les Documents originaux et authentiques.* Par L'ABBÉ GUETTÉE, Tomes 12. Paris: Jules Renouard et Cie., Rue de Tournou, 6, 1854.
2. *Supplément aux Décrets du Concile de la Province de Bordeaux, célébré à la Rochelle en 1853, et publié en 1855; ou, Défense de l'Histoire de l'Eglise de France contre les Imputations contenues dans ces Décrets.* Par L'ABBÉ GUETTÉE.
3. *L'Observateur Catholique: Revue des Sciences ecclésiastiques et des Faits religieux.* No. 1—23.
4. *Correspondance des Confesseurs de la Foi relativement au nouveau Dogme de l'Immaculée Conception.* 1855.
5. *Lettres Parisiennes; ou, Discussion sur les deux Liturgies, Parisienne et Romaine.* Deuxième Edition. Paris: Danton; Huet. 1855.

THE publications which we have grouped together form, more or less, a proof of the renewed struggle between Gallicanism and the Ultramontane tenets which, till lately, have seemed to hold undivided sway in France. Twenty years ago it almost appeared as if the four famous Articles of 1682, as if the truths for which Bossuet wrote, and acted, and suffered, had been utterly forgotten. All the earnest religion of France was Ultramontane. Under the dynasty of the Orleans family, the old views of the established Gallican Church were simply impossible; and we have seen in the later years of Louis Philippe a member of the Chamber of Deputies, in referring to some abuse in the arrangement of a church, declaring that he only happened to be there on the occasion of a marriage.

It appears, however, that beneath the Ultramontane surface, there was a deep working of the old principles, which was destined to bear fruit in due season. And within the last ten years, from every part of France, evidence has been given that the tenets of Gerson and Bossuet were only dormant, not extinct; and the exertions of the Abbé Laborde, of Lectoure, in opposition to the Bull *Ineffabilis*, manifested to Europe that struggle between the two parties in France, which has now attained such proportions as to threaten the disruption of the entire Gallican Church.

The history of the Church of France, which stands first in our list, is undoubtedly the greatest literary effort of the revived

in which the opposing principles came into collision (the volume in question embraces from 1226 to 1351), and briefly asserts, 'Nous déclarerons purement et simplement que nous sommes 'avec les Ultramontains sur certaines questions et avec les Gallicans sur d'autres.' The preface to the seventh volume (June 1st, 1851) shows that Ultramontane writers were vigorously attacking its author; and finally, on the 22d of January, 1852, the 'History of the Church of France' was put in the Index of prohibited books. On learning this, not by a formal intimation, but merely through the medium of the 'Augsburg Gazette,' our author addressed a letter to Monseigneur Garibaldi, papal nuncio in France, requesting to be informed whether the intelligence was authentic. By that authority he was referred to Rome, and accordingly wrote to Cardinal Brignole, president of the Congregation of the Index, to solicit further information.

'As a priest devoted to the Church,' it is thus that he expresses himself, 'I could not but be deeply afflicted in finding that I 'was classed, without any previous notice, by a Roman Congregation, among the writers whose orthodoxy the faithful are 'more or less enjoined to suspect. I know not on what motives 'the Congregation of the Index can have based its censure; for I 'can see nothing in my work which is not capable of a perfectly 'orthodox sense.' He concludes by requesting to be furnished with the document on which the censure was founded—in 'order to profit by the observations therein contained, and thus 'to make the book irreproachable.' The reply was to this effect: That it was not the custom of the Congregation in question to communicate the pieces on which its decisions were based; that the author should address himself to learned and orthodox ecclesiastics of his own nation; and after adopting the corrections which they might propose, should submit his revised work to the Congregation. The Abbé forthwith addressed himself accordingly to four prelates, who either declined the proposed examination, or coupled it with conditions to which the author found it impossible to submit. He again applied to Rome, with the reasonable observation that in order to correct his errors, it was necessary to be informed of them; and that his own efforts having failed in France, he now trusted to be furnished with the memoir for which he had previously applied. The answer was the same; the Congregation never communicated such documents, and the author must apply to other critics. He accordingly inserted a notice in the succeeding volume, that he should be thankful for any criticisms whatever; and this done, applied himself to the completion of his work.

In the eleventh volume, which contains the history of the Jansenist struggles, and of the four famous Gallican Articles of

second on our list. He undertakes to establish, and does establish, the following propositions; that the Council of La Rochelle had judged him without giving him an opportunity of defending himself; and that of the ten bishops who censured his eighth volume, two only had opened it; and even these two professed to have read but a portion of it. He then defends himself against the particular charges brought forward in the decree of the Council, especially that of his partiality to heretics, by which title, as he shows, the Port-Royalists are intended.

Among the journals which most powerfully undertook the Abbé Guettée's defence, the '*Observateur Catholique*' more particularly signalized itself. This review was established in the October of last year for the support of Gallican principles, and to oppose 'the pernicious tendencies of the party which finds its organ in the "*Univers*."'

'Depuis assez longtemps ce journal a seul la parole. Il a abusé de sa publicité pour répandre dans le monde catholique de nombreuses erreurs; et, ce qui est plus déplorable encore, il a prêché ces erreurs au nom de l'Eglise et du Saint-Siège. Il nous a semblé qu'il était bien temps de prendre, contre cet organe exagéré de l'ultramontanisme, la défense des vrais principes catholiques. On finirait par identifier l'Eglise avec son école, si des catholiques sincères n'élevaient pas la voix pour rappeler que l'ultramontanisme ne fut jamais qu'un système rejeté par tout ce que l'Eglise a possédé de plus nobles intelligences; et qu'en voulant transformer en dogme ce système faux, anti-catholique et anti-social, le parti ultramontain veut nous imposer un joug que la foi aussi bien que la raison repoussent.'

From the very commencement the nerve and vigour of the new periodical gave it considerable influence; and in order to be thoroughly independent it was determined that the contributors should be laymen only. The law by which contributors to periodicals are compelled to attach their names to their articles, would have exposed any priest who might write in the pages of the '*Observateur*' to serious trouble, and, therefore, where a paper is received from an ecclesiastic, one of the committee of directors makes himself responsible for its contents. The introductory article, which develops the scheme of the paper, is from the pen of M. Guélon, one of the ablest and most frequent contributors. MM. Eugène Secretant, Parent Duchatelet, and Virey, are also in the same rank.

In addition to reviews, theological dissertations, and notices of books, each number contains a *Chronique Religieuse*, which to a foreign reader is its most entertaining part. If any one is desirous of learning the lengths to which French Ultramontanism is pushing the worship of S. Mary, he can hardly find a better study than this chronicle. It must be confessed that there is here and there a bitterness which is scarcely suited to a religious periodical; but the constant and unscrupulous attacks of the

'Univers' are but likely to provoke a reply in its own strain. Some of these notices may interest our readers:—

'We have received a pamphlet containing the act of Consecration to the Blessed Virgin, pronounced April 4, 1855, by Cardinal Gousset, at Rheims. We remark in it the following passage:—"We are happy to be able on this day, on occasion of a ceremony so august and so consoling to our heart, to renew, on the faith of an oath, the vow which we long ago made, to teach and to defend the privilege which has made thee holy, more holy than holiness itself, from the first instant of thy conception." 'Holiness, (remarks the editor,) 'considered generally, is God Himself, who is essential holiness. Are we to conclude that Monseigneur Gousset regards the Blessed Virgin as holier than God Himself?'

'A preacher, in his sermon of the 16th of December, delivered in his church in this city, informed his astonished auditors that "perfect contrition is an easy thing, much easier than is generally imagined. Think of the enormity of your crimes and of the goodness of God—and you have perfect contrition and are justified. To say that perfect contrition is not an easy thing, is a monstrosity; it is to turn a religion of love into an impracticable religion. A hundred thousand sins! it is nothing in the world. One moment's repentance, and all is blotted out!" O Father Pichon,' (exclaims the editor,) 'verily you have fervent disciples.'

'Much speculation has lately been excited by a journal called the "Rosary of Mary." The number which is in our hands is that of Saturday, January 19th, 1856.... We especially notice an article which contains such blasphemies as the following:—"You who fear the face of Jehovah, who tremble when the hour of prayer to Him has arrived, pray to Mary with the faith of our fathers, and she will lay your wants before the Divinity; for it is by Mary that the incense of prayer ascends to the throne of God; it is by Mary that the virtue of grace, and the ineffable blessings of the Most High descend." Thus Mary is better, so far as we are concerned, than God; God is deprived of the infinite goodness which is His essential attribute; Mary takes the place of Jesus Christ as the Mediator between God and man. That no doubt may remain on the subject, we read as the motto of the "Rosary"—*All by Mary: nothing except by Mary.* This unfortunate magazine has recourse to simony in order to procure subscribers; for, at the head of the number which we hold in our hands, appears the following notice in bad Latin:—"Priests who will promise to send us twenty-eight intentions in the space of six months, will receive our journal gratis for a year, reckoning from the day of their promise." Subscriptions to a newspaper is a temporal object. To pay for it by masses is to apply to a temporal object a thing which in its very nature is spiritual. This traffic is, then, simoniacal; for, says the Canon Law, simony is committed by giving, or even by promising, the temporal for the spiritual, or the spiritual for the temporal, as principal end and object, and not gratuitously.'

And here is another notice of a French abuse which will apply with equal force to some of our own fashionable churches, at least at watering-places:—

'The Archbishop of Paris has just forbidden the clergy of his diocese to advertise in the newspapers the names of the artistes who have promised singing in their churches. It was time to put a stop to this scandal; for it needed that our churches were about to rival the opera. It is to be hoped, that there will be an end to the demand of three francs for a chair, as the Mass of the Holy Innocents in the Church of S. Francis; or one

franc, as in the Madeleine. Under similar circumstances, the countryman showed his good sense when he said, "If you demand this sum for my chair, well and good, but then I shall carry it away with me at the end of the service; for I could buy it at the same price!" Let us hope that the order which has just emanated from the Archbishop will put an end to the quantity of profane music which has been daily increasing, to the great sorrow of true Catholics.'

It may easily be conceived that a journal with such principles as the above, would direct its attention to three points connected with the present state of the Church of France—the so-called miracle of La Salette, the Bull *Ineffabilis*, and the substitution now taking place in Paris and other dioceses of the Roman for the Gallican Missals and Breviaries. The two former subjects are so intimately connected with the life—there have not been wanting those who have whispered also with the *death*—of the Abbé Laborde, that a short notice of that distinguished writer may not be out of place.

Jean-Joseph Laborde was born at Lectoure, a town which was a stronghold of so-called Jansenism in the eighteenth century, and which seems to have retained the same bias in the present. First curate of S. Mary at Auch, and then incumbent of a country parish in the same diocese, he distinguished himself by his 'Censure of Twenty-two Propositions of corrupt Morality, extracted from the Writings of a modern Author:' which 'modern author,' M. Gousset—seeing that corrupted morality is no obstacle to high places—subsequently became, what he still is, Cardinal-Archbishop of Rheims. For this censure our author was compelled by his own diocesan, the Archbishop of Auch, to apologise to M. Gousset. He took care, however, to do so in a manner perfectly intelligible to the latter, and followed up his first work with three discourses on the subject of relaxed morals. At this time the Abbé Guéranger's work, 'Institutions Liturgiques,' written on the most determined Ultramontane principles, was exciting great interest in France. Laborde composed in reply to it his 'Lettres Parisiennes,' a second edition of which has lately appeared. And, as the question of the Immaculate Conception was now everywhere discussed preparatory to its definition as an article of faith, our writer came forward with his 'La Croyance à l'Immaculée Conception, ne peut devenir un dogme de foi,' which was denounced to the Congregation of the Index by Mons. Lacroix. The condemnation which followed, insisted on by the Archbishop, but constantly declared by the priest, on the principles of Bossuet and Fleury, to be of no value whatever in France, led to the retirement of Laborde from his diocese and his settlement at Paris. He here occupied himself in a defence of the Gallican Church against the attacks of Count Montalembert. When it was understood

rition. The event occurred in the September of 1846. The words were: 'The potatoes will continue to rot, and this year at Christmas there will be none. Let not him that has corn sow it, for the beasts will eat it; and that which comes into ear, will become dust when you thrash it. There will be a great famine. Before the famine comes, children under the age of seven will fall into convulsions, and will die in the hands of those that hold them.' With the abundant harvest of 1847 before his eyes, the Abbé Laborde may well quote the text, 'When a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously; thou shalt not be afraid of them.' How, in the face of these facts, and in opposition to the declaration of the two prelates most interested in the miracle, the Archbishop of Lyons and the Bishop of Gap, an English Roman Catholic bishop can have had the courage to publish an account of his pilgrimage to La Salette, and to profess his unshaken faith in the miracle, is certainly a phenomenon.

We devoted, some time ago, a considerable space to the discussion of the questions connected with the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception; without going over our old ground, it may not be without interest to our readers if we notice a few of the facts connected with the subsequent history of the Bull *Ineffabilis*. The Abbé Laborde's open opposition to the dogma, his journey to Rome, and his arrest there, are well known. His 'Rélation et Mémoire des Opposants au nouveau Dogme de l'Immaculée Conception,' excited deep interest far beyond the limits of France. One of the most remarkable of his adherents was Father Morgaez, a Dominican, and theological professor at the University of Alcalá. In a letter dated December 19th, 1855, and addressed to Monsieur Laborde, of whose death he was not then aware, the Spanish divine thus expresses himself. After informing his correspondent that his book, under the title of 'Doctrinal Judgment on the Pontifical Decree of December 8th, 1854,' had been suppressed by the civil authority, and that he himself was in danger of undergoing the treatment due to a heretic, he continues thus:—

'Courage, my dear Sir; let us console ourselves in our common tribulations! we suffer them for the holy Church of God, against the profane novelties which are endeavoured to be introduced by men, whom the Apostle has described (2 Tim. iii.), and who, to attain their end, have abused the fervent piety, simplicity and devotion of the holy father Pius IX., towards our tender mother the Virgin Mary, Mother of God. Let us array ourselves in the arms of our warfare; they are not carnal, but mighty in God to overthrow everything that is opposed to them; it is by these arms that we destroy human reasonings, and everything that exalts itself with pride against the knowledge of God. Let us be rooted and grounded in

that when a priest of my order attacked me from the pulpit, and endeavoured to hound on his auditors against me, my life had been sacrificed. I foresee that at my last hour the sacraments of the Church will be refused me, and that my body will not be buried in consecrated ground. . . . Assist me with your prayers, and beseech God to preserve me from the teeth of the lions who surround and watch me continually.'

Another letter, equally touching, but which we forbear to quote, since it has already appeared in a contemporary journal, was addressed by Father Morgaez to the Editors of the '*Observateur*.' In the meantime, he had the satisfaction of receiving a communication from four Italian priests, which must have been a great consolation to the brave old man. It, as well as his reply, have been printed in the '*Correspondence of the Confessors of the Faith*,' which stands on our list. After speaking of the labours and (to human eyes) premature death of Laborde, they thus continue:—

'Besides the priest Laborde, of whom we have spoken with praise, four priests of Pavia opposed the Definition of the 8th of December, 1854, declared to their own bishop that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was quite new, and contrary to apostolical tradition; further, that the definition had been promulgated against all the canons and laws of the Church; so that, bearing upon its face the mark of its condemnation, the divine promises could not be applied to it. These priests, if you wish to know them—if not personally, at least by name and in charity—are none other than ourselves, unworthy and sinners, who desire to be united to you in the bonds of the Holy Spirit. The third day after the publication of the bull, that is to say, the 12th of February last year, we presented an act of opposition to our bishop, who, without examination or judgment, wrote to us that we were under the greater excommunication, pronounced against us by the letters apostolical, and suspended us from all priestly functions; we are still under this sentence, and doubtless shall be till our death. Nevertheless, though we were prevented, on account of the misfortune of the times, from causing our act of opposition to be printed, God took care that it should be divulged, through the French and Italian journals; and, through fear that it should not be hereafter known, Perrone has consecrated its memory by blaming our opposition in the thesis of the new dogma which he has added lately to his theology.

'At the end of last year, Athanasius Donetti, native of the Swiss mountains, formerly a distinguished professor of the seminary of Pavia, and curate in this city, remarkable for his science and eloquence, has published a work to which he has attached his name; in it he has opposed the definition as contrary to right, and proved the perversity of the new dogma, with invincible reasoning, and in an energetic style.

'Finally, Spain has also given her tribute, and it is not small, with regard to the difficulties of the times; for it has furnished from the laity a young advocate whom you have mentioned in your letters, and among the priests—you, who show invincible courage. But you, illustrious confessor, surpass the rest by enduring such shameful treatment for the truth; indeed, words and reasonings are of little use to enkindle faith in the hearts of men, if the divine grace of the Holy Spirit does not come to help and enliven them; but this grace rather works by means of tribulations and sacrifice. For our Redeemer and our Chief has redeemed the world by His cross and by His death; and it was necessary that the grain of wheat

'Among the priests of our country (we speak particularly of our own and a neighbouring diocese) there are few who believe in their hearts the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin; the greater part, before the definition, openly detested it; but afterwards, in presence of the danger, they have obeyed the orders which they have received, from different motives. Some rejected, at least apparently, the opinion which they had formerly supported, and said that they were convinced by the authority of the universal Church, and that they did not wish to risk their salvation by refusing to obey it. The greater number, by privately rejecting the dogma, respect it in public and in the Church, so that the great multitude of the faithful are led by them into this hypocrisy. A very small number regret having acted in this manner; but, through weakness, they cannot raise themselves from their fall. Finally, some, an extremely small number, among those who have no public ministry to fulfil, have not soiled their robes; they lament the silence which is imposed upon them; they pray God to come to their aid if they should one day be called to bear witness to the truth.

'The faithful are divided into two parties. The one having the appearance of piety, but denying it in reality, blindly embrace the pontifical dogma, refuse to instruct themselves about it, and hold us in abomination as heretics. Others are neither cold nor hot, but lukewarm; therefore they either ridicule the dogma, or they take no more interest in it than in the rest of religion. Nevertheless, through the grace of God, there are still some among the laity—a very small number, we must say—who serve God in spirit and in truth; these detest the perverse dogma, and are ready for anything. We can also mention several women, who, pressed by necessity, have engaged in the combat against the enemy with manly courage, and who for several months have been deprived of Confession and the Eucharist.

'Alphonse Tenca, priest, aged fifty-two years, latterly spiritual director in the house of the Jeunes-Orphelines. I sign on my bed of suffering.

'Joseph Grignani, priest, aged forty-six years, lately chaplain in the same house.

'Joseph Parona, priest, aged forty-seven years, formerly director of studies in the episcopal seminary, and in the last place spiritual director in the pious retreat of penitent women commonly called the House of S. Margaret.

'Aloysius, priest, aged thirty-one years.

'Pavia, February 27, 1856.'

But a far more important testimony to the ancient doctrine has been put forward by that persecuted but most courageous Church of Holland, to which we have on more than one occasion called the attention of our readers. It is printed in the '*Observateur*' of September the 1st, and its form and interest induce us to give it entire.

'MOST HOLY FATHER,—The year of the Incarnation, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, the sixth of the Ides of December, in the church of S. Peter, the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of our Saviour, was solemnly promulgated by your Holiness, as a dogma of the Christian faith. It is impossible to say how much such an event has astonished us; much more, has afflicted us. We might, perhaps, have been reproached for not having sooner made known our sentiments regarding so prodigious an event. The sincere faith of the Church of

to you, we will tell you the truth, most holy father! To raise the head higher than was right, the most illustrious members of the body have been humbled. Thanks be to God, we have not yet forgotten our dignity, and we complain to you of the injury which has been done to it.

'*The love of our Church*: this is the third reason which obliges us to reject publicly the false dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Holy Virgin. This love demands that we should take the greatest care to preserve our Church free from error. Through the grace of God, the faith has been preserved there pure, notwithstanding the events which have too often shaken it in our country. We have therefore thought that it was our duty to put far from her all novelty in that which regards articles of faith. After the confusion introduced, three years since, in the hierarchical order, the integrity of the Catholic faith might have been threatened. Our intention is to ensure ourselves from this danger; and we ought to use all our efforts to present our Church to Christ as a chaste virgin. Our duty is to transmit to posterity the ancient faith, in its simplicity and purity, as we have received it from our predecessors. Removed from all novelty, as friends of antiquity, we distinguish by this, with Tertullian, the true doctrine from the false,—“That comes evidently from the Lord, and is true, which has been from the beginning; but that is strange and false, which has been added in the course of time.” (Præscript. c. 31.) The Apostle of the Gentiles has warned us not less than Timothy, “avoiding profane and vain babblings (1 Tim. vi. 20); *babblings*, that is to say, novelties of dogmas, of things, of sentiments, which are contrary to truth and to antiquity; if these are admitted, the faith of the holy fathers must be violated in everything, or at least in a great measure.” Thus speaks S. Vincent of Lérins.

'About two centuries ago, the ambassador of Philip IV., king of Spain, asked, in the name of his master, your predecessor, Alexander VII., a decision on the Immaculate Conception of the Holy Virgin. This pope wished to know if he could decide the question, and he interrogated Cardinal Bona on this subject. The pious and learned cardinal replied to him that neither the holy see nor the Church herself could make new articles of faith, but that they could only *declare* what God had revealed to His Church, after having examined, according to rule, the traditions transmitted from the Apostles. “Could I not,” replied the pope, “under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, decide what we ought to believe on this point?” “Most holy Father,” said Bona, “that which might be divinely discovered to you, could only serve for you, and it would not be permitted you to oblige the faithful, any more than myself, to adhere to your decision.” Would to God that a procedure so wise and so catholic had been followed by all the successors of S. Peter!

'We have thought it a matter of honour and duty to offer to your Holiness the pastoral instruction which we have joined to this letter. In order that it may be better and more clearly known in our dioceses what Catholics ought to believe regarding the new dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Holy Virgin, we have published it for the Dutch in the language of our country.

'Our Church has often appealed to the future œcumenical council that shall be legitimately assembled. It appears necessary to us to renew that appeal. On account of the violation which this deposit of the faith has suffered, and because of the injury which has been done to the episcopal order, when it has been desired to establish, as a dogma revealed from God, the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of our Saviour, we reserve to ourselves the right to make our appeal in time and place fitting. May the Father of lights give to our

given rise, have been entirely avoided. But it is impossible to go entirely with Laborde and the Gallican party, in their preference of the more modern form. In one point on which they lay great stress, the hymns, those of Rome, reformed, or rather deformed as they were under Pope Urban VIII., are still every way superior to the pretty compositions of French literati in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: and there is often a depth of meaning in some of the rejected antiphons and invitationalies, ill compensated by the more commonplace, if also clearer, passages of the later books.

The 'Lettres Parisiennes' are eighteen in number. The first two are occupied with the general plan of the work: in the third, the inconveniences of the weekly office in the Roman ritual are pointed out. It is shown that while, on the one hand, the ordinary Sunday has eighteen psalms, and the ordinary week-day twelve, at matins, every saint's-day above a *simple* has but nine, and those selected are from among the shortest in the psalter. Hence, as might naturally be expected, the wish to shorten the service has so completely overloaded the calendar with doubles and semi-doubles, that the Ferial Psalms have scarcely ever a chance of being recited. 'It is easier,' says Laborde, 'on a week-day to recite nine very short psalms, varied with as many lessons, also very short, than to repeat at a single breath twelve psalms, without pause, at the risk of lighting on such an one as the 89th, the 78th, the 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th. We have,' he continues, 'a guarantee for this which cannot be suspected, Dom Guéranger. After having spoken of the Festivals of Saints, which they began again to add to the Breviary soon after the reform, he thus expresses himself: "Clement X. may be regarded as the author of a true liturgical revolution. Until his time, new doubles had not been admitted except with moderation, in order to save the prerogative of Sunday; semi-doubles also had only been created in a very small number." This then was the spirit before the time of Clement X.; that is to say, the spirit of the Council of Trent, which had maintained itself notwithstanding the blows which it had already received. It is clear as the day that the spirit to which France has been more faithful than any other Church has presided over our Breviaries.

'It is, then, under Clement X. that the Roman Breviary began to deviate from the principle of the reformation ordained at Trent, and it has not ceased to deviate still further from it.¹ The same Dom Guéranger agrees with this, in continuing thus on the subject of the same pope:—"This pope," says he, "derogated from this rule in such a marked manner, that after him,

¹ We must except the Pontifical of Benedict XIV.—*Editor's Note.*

The tenth letter is occupied by the false legends which, notwithstanding its reform by Pius V., have still retained their place in the Roman Office. The fable about S. Clement, notoriously given up by all good critics, and called by Tillermont a 'stupid and ridiculous story,' has its place in the Lessons for the 23d of November, where we are informed that on that day the sea annually retires from the coast of the Crimea for the space of a week, in order to discover the tomb of the saint. In like manner, the Lessons for Pope S. Marcellinus affirm, contrary to all historical evidence, that he apostatized; those for S. Marcellus, that in the persecution of Maxentius (which persecution never had any existence), he was reduced to take the charge of a stable; and those for S. Sylvester repeat the exploded fable of the leprosy and miraculous cure of Constantine.

M. Laborde did not live to see the grand object of the Ultramontane party accomplished in the substitution of the Roman Breviary for that of the Diocese of Paris. It was not to be expected that his surviving friends could allow the mandaman of Archbishop Sibour to pass without notice; accordingly, there is a very able critique in the '*Observateur*' on that document:—

"The moment appears to have come," says the Archbishop, "to re-establish the Roman Liturgy in this large Diocese."

'To re-establish' it, it must have been formerly established there, as we have already remarked; the Archbishop takes it for granted; but his Grace is deceived upon this point. The Roman Liturgy has never been admitted into the Diocese of Paris. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, one of the Gondys, who wished to be cardinal and to please the court of Rome, thought of establishing it, instead of reforming that of his Diocese according to the spirit of the Council of Trent. But he met with so lively an opposition in his Clergy that he was obliged to renounce his project.

'The time is come, according to his lordship, to *tighten*, by the Roman Liturgy, the bands of unity.'

'These words are a concession to the unfortunate idea put forth by our modern Ultramontanes, who make unity to consist in things which do not at all concern it. Never, in the Church of Jesus Christ, has it been considered as a gain to abandon local customs and traditions. The Church, destined to visit the whole world, and to enlighten it with the Divine light, suits all nations, so different in manners and language, precisely on account of this legitimate diversity of its liturgies and discipline, which renders possible the adoption of Christianity by nations, which would always be utterly alienated, if there were no means of facilitating the practice of her precepts, and if the faith had not, by prayer or liturgy, an expression in keeping with the nature of their character. To attack the diversity of liturgies or discipline, less conformable to unity, that is to say, as near schism, is to attack indirectly the true unity of the Church,—is to give reason to believe, that Christianity, according to the system of Montesquieu, is impossible for certain people, or, which comes to the same thing, that the Church cannot obtain *Catholicity*, which is, nevertheless, one of its essential and fundamental attributes.'

It is now time that we should turn to one or two of the more salient points of the Abbé Guettée's history. We have, on several previous occasions, directed the attention of our readers to several points of importance in the history of the Gallican Church. We will follow her new historian in his account of one of the most remarkable epochs of her existence—the adoption of the four celebrated Articles of 1682.

It was during the brief interval of the Peace of Clement IX. that the extraordinary controversy broke out which, for a moment, united the Jesuits with the Ultra-Gallicans and with Louis XIV., while it linked the Pope in close alliance with the school of Port Royal, or the so-called Jansenist Bishops. At the epoch of the Concordat, the kings of France had claimed and obtained certain rights of presentation, in contravention of the previous *régime*, over the greater part of the Gallican dioceses. The rights of some were still preserved intact, and among these were the churches of Languedoc. In 1673, Louis XIV., then in the height of his power, resolved to bring the whole of his kingdom under the same rules. The greater part of the prelates were too well bred—to say nothing of their possible expectations of richer sees or archbishoprics—to oppose the slightest difficulties to the will of the sovereign; but it so happened that there were two, and they previously suspected of Jansenism—Pavillon, Bishop of Aleth, and Caulet, of Pamiers—who were made of different stuff, and determined to defend the rights of their respective Churches at whatever cost. The dispute broke out in 1675. Louis XIV. in that year presented a clerk to a benefice in the diocese of Aleth, to which his predecessors had preferred no claim of presentation. Pavillon appealed to the assembly of the clergy, then in actual session, and demanded their assistance in the defence of his rights. That synod, with a prudent regard to temporal consequences, replied that the matter was too weighty for its own decision, and thus virtually left it in the hands of De Harlai, Archbishop of Paris, a man whose ambition and love of pleasure were about equal. It so happened that, at the same time, Caulet had occasion to visit Paris as deputy from the estates of Foix, of which he was, *ex officio*, president. The Jesuit party by whom the king was surrounded, and who had already been informed of his dispositions, sounded him as to his agreement or non-agreement with the Bishop of Aleth; and Père de la Chaise, the Confessor of Louis XIV., demanded formally whether he were willing to acquiesce in the new claims which the king's declaration had put forth. Caulet boldly declared his sentiments, and, having completed the business which had called him to Paris, returned into Languedoc. Assembling his chapter, and foreseeing the

storm which was about to burst over him, it is said that, after stating the full details of his conduct, he addressed his canons in the words of our Lord, 'Are ye able to drink of the cup that I shall drink of?' and that they replied without one dissentient voice, 'We are able.' He then, in his own name as well as theirs, addressed a letter to Père de la Chaise, in which he informed the favourite that neither his own conscience nor that of his chapter would allow him to subscribe to the king's mandate.

In the meantime, Pavillon, encouraged by his brother prelate, had suspended, *ipso facto*, the nominee of Louis XIV. and all those who took any part in his induction. The Parliament of Paris condemned his sentence to be burnt; on which the bishop appealed to Rome, and Pont Château, one of the most illustrious disciples of Port Royal, was despatched to inform Innocent XI. orally of the state of the case. By that pontiff he was received with the highest marks of distinction; and was curiously and minutely interrogated as to the health, habits, and diocesan institutions of the Bishop of Aleth, whose asceticism in a dissolute age had been the wonder of Catholic Europe. In the meantime, the suspended nominee of the king appealed to the Cardinal de Bonzi, Archbishop of Narbonne, the metropolitical see of Aleth. That prelate reversed the judgment of his suffragan, and installed the presentee. On this, Pavillon issued a pastoral instruction against the sentence of his metropolitan, and appealed to Rome.

While these events were proceeding, the Bishop of Pamiers was equally harassed. His letter to Père de la Chaise had enraged Louis XIV. to the last degree. It was deliberated in the Council of State whether the recusant bishop should not, by a *lettre de cachet*, be sent into exile; but the more moderate advice of the minister Tellier, and his son the Archbishop of Rheims, prevailed. Determined, however, to assert his pretended rights, on a vacancy of the archdeaconry of Pamiers Louis XIV. presented a person named Poncet to that dignity. It is clear that, even had the rights of the *régale* been such as they were pretended to be, the king could only have nominated to the archdeaconry during the vacancy of the see; but it was the intention of the court to consider the bishop, on account of his recusancy, as civilly dead, and thus at once to assume all his rights. Caulet, as his brother prelate had done, suspended the intruded archdeacon, and those who had assisted in his installation. They, in turn, appealed to their metropolitan, the Archbishop of Toulouse, who, without hearing the case, reversed the sentence of his suffragan. He, as in the former instance, appealed to Innocent XI., who took the case into his own hands.

While affairs were in this posture, Pavillon departed this life, in the eightieth year of his age, and the thirty-ninth of his episcopate, leaving the whole weight of the controversy to fall on the Bishop of Pamiers. Shortly afterwards, the Council of State issued a decree, to the effect that, unless that prelate submitted to the king's ordinance within two months, the temporalities of his diocese should be seized. On this Caulet addressed a letter to the king, in which, while protesting that he never could nor would obey man rather than God, he declared that he was perfectly willing to sustain the loss of all his worldly goods, but would still ask the king that the sums allotted to his cathedral, his two seminaries, and the poor of his diocese, might be exempted from the general confiscation. To this letter no regard was paid. At the day appointed, the agents of the police seized all the effects of the bishop with such rigour, that, though it was the depth of winter, they did not leave him a single fagot for his evening fire. On this, the incumbents of the diocese, who appear to have caught the spirit of the chapter, and had determined to show that they were able to drink of the cup that their bishop should drink of, met in its various localities, and taxed themselves at a certain rate for the support of their diocesan. They also made him a present of two mules, in order that he might be able to continue his diocesan visitations. A collection was also made in Paris for his support, and it was proposed in the Council of State that its principal agent and chief contributor should be sent to the Bastile. 'No,' said Louis XIV. 'I have seized on the temporalities of the Bishop of Pamiers, but I never intended that he should die of hunger; neither shall it be said that any one, in my reign, was punished for giving alms.'

In the meantime Innocent XI. had addressed two briefs to the oppressed prelate; and the high eulogiums which they passed upon him were the last consolations which the old man received in this life. While he was on his death-bed, the assembly of the clergy, under the direction of the courtier-archbishop De Harlai, presented an address to the king, occupied with the most fulsome adulation; and it seemed as if the majority of the Church of France were on the eve of schism with the see of Rome.

On the death of the Bishop of Pamiers, the chapter, not unmindful of its promise, elected for its two vicars ecclesiastics who were most opposed to the stretch of the *régale*. One of these was immediately exiled; the courageous canons, without considering his office vacated, gave him as coadjutor a priest of the same sentiments. The Archbishop of Toulouse professed to consider these appointments as *ipso facto* null and void, and

nominated, by his metropolitical right, two other ecclesiastics vicars-general of the diocese. Thus the wildest confusion prevailed; the magistrates imprisoned those who opposed the king, and the Pope suspended those who obeyed him.

A third source of dissension had its rise at this time. At Charonne there existed an institute of canonesses regular of S. Augustine, who, amidst all the usurpations and corruptions of the age, still maintained its right of electing their own superior. On the demise of the last of these, the king, in the plenitude of his power, nominated a certain sister Marie Angelique, of the Order of S. Bernard, to the vacant office. Her installation was only performed by main force, and the greater part of the sisters, while it was proceeding, rose and left the choir. For this they were punished, by a royal edict, by banishment to distant convents of other orders. A few, however, contrived to assemble, and to acquaint Innocent XI. with what had occurred. On this the Pope directed them to proceed to a canonical election. They did so, and chose another sister Angelique as their superior. Louis XIV. pronounced their election null; Innocent XI. issued a brief reversing the king's edict; and the Parliament quashed the brief, and condemned it to the flames.

It was evident that things could not much longer continue as they were without an open rupture. On the 19th of March, 1681, ten archbishops and forty bishops met, by command of the king, at Paris. The result of their deliberations was, that the king should be requested to permit the convocation of a national council in the following year; and a general assembly of the clergy was accordingly summoned. It was high time. In the diocese of Pamiers the whole chapter had been forced to fly; eighty incumbents were either in prison or in exile; Father Cerlat, the only grand vicar who had not escaped, had been condemned to death by the Parliament of Toulouse. Under these circumstances it was that the celebrated assembly of 1682 was convened: a memorable example how it sometimes pleases God to bring good out of evil, and in this respect to be compared with the miserable origin and the happy termination of the fifth Ecumenical Council.

The rising spirit of the times was Bossuet, then, after having been nominated to the bishopric of Condom, and having resigned it on his appointment as preceptor to the Dauphin, had just been raised to the bishopric of Meaux. It was he who digested in his own mind the proceedings of the assembly in which he was to take so distinguished a part; it was he who, after long consultation with the Archbishops of Paris and Rheims, preached the sermon at the mass of the Holy Ghost.

which was the *bonâ fide* commencement of the proceedings. Speaking of that sermon, 'the tender ears of the Romans,' says he to Cardinal d'Estrées, 'ought to be respected, and I have done it with all my heart. Three points might annoy them : the independence of the temporal power of kings ; the episcopal jurisdiction derivable immediately from Jesus Christ ; and the authority of councils. You know well that there is but one opinion on these matters in France ; and I have endeavoured so to speak that, without betraying the doctrines of the Gallican Church, I might not offend the majesty of the court of Rome. This is all that can be asked of a French bishop, obliged, by the force of circumstances, to speak of such matters. In one word, I have spoken clearly, for that is my duty everywhere, and, above all, in the pulpit ; but I have spoken with respect, and God is my witness that I have done it with a good design.'

The letter which the assembly addressed to the Pope has been confidently attributed to Bossuet ; he himself seems to assign its authorship to the Archbishop of Rheims. While it was on its way to Innocent XI., the assembly adopted those four famous articles of which he was the undoubted author, and which form the watchword of the Gallican party at the present day :—

'Desirous, then, to remedy these inconveniences, we, archbishops and bishops assembled at Paris by order of the king, with the other ecclesiastical deputies who represent the Gallican Church, have, after full deliberation, judged it fitting to make the rule and declarations which follow :—

'1. That S. Peter and his successors, vicars of Jesus Christ, and that the whole Church also, have received power from God over spiritual things only, and those which concern salvation, and not things temporal or civil ; Jesus Christ himself teaching us that "his kingdom is not of this world ;" and in another place, that we must "render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's ;" and that thus this precept of the Apostle S. Paul can in nothing be altered or shaken, "Let every one be subject unto the higher powers ; for there is no power but of God, and the powers that be are all from God. He, then, that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." We declare, in consequence, that kings and sovereigns are not subject to any ecclesiastical power, by the command of God, in temporal things ; that they cannot be deposed, directly nor indirectly, by the authority of the heads of the Church ; that their subjects cannot be dispensed from the submission and obedience which they owe them, or absolved from the oath of allegiance ; and that this doctrine, necessary for the public tranquillity, and not less advantageous to the Church than to the State, ought to be invariably followed, as conformable to the word of God, the tradition of the holy Fathers, and the examples of the saints.

'2. That the plenitude of power possessed by the holy Apostolic See and the successors of S. Peter, vicars of Jesus Christ, over spiritual things, is such that, notwithstanding the decrees of the holy Œcumenical Council of Constance, contained in Sessions IV. and V., approved by the holy Apostolic See, confirmed by the practice of the whole Church and the Roman pontiffs, and observed religiously through all times by the Gallican Church, remain in their strength and vigour ; and that the Church of France does not

approve of the opinion of those who attack these decrees, or who weaken them by saying that their authority is not well established, that they are not approved, or that they refer only to times of schism.

'3. That thus the employment of the apostolic power must be regulated by following the canons made by the Spirit of God, and consecrated by the general respect of the world; that the rules, manners, and constitutions, received in the kingdom and in the Gallican Church, ought to retain their strength and vigour; and the customs of our fathers ought to remain unshaken; and that it even tends to the greatness of the holy Apostolic See, that the laws and customs established by the consent of this illustrious See and of the Churches may have the authority which they ought to have.

'4. That, although the Pope has the principal interest in questions of faith, and his decrees regard all the Churches, and each Church in particular, his judgment is, nevertheless, not irreformable, at least if the consent of the Church does not intervene.

'And these are the maxims which we have received of our Fathers, and which we have resolved to send to all the Gallican Churches, and to the Bishops which the Holy Ghost has established to govern them, to the end that we may all speak the same thing, that we may all be of the same mind, and that we may all hold the same doctrine.'

These articles were adopted on the 19th of March, 1682. On the following day they were promulgated by Louis XIV. as the law of the State, and, three days later, registered in the Parliament as obligatory to be taught by all ecclesiastics.

It is singular that, from the peculiar circumstances by which these articles were elicited, Arnould and the Port-Royalists should—however much, on the whole, concurring with their doctrine—have been opposed to their form. At the same time that great divine, from his retreat in Holland, thus expressed himself as to their proposed condemnation by the Papal See:—

'I cannot help saying that it would be bad advice to give your Holiness, if they urged you to condemn the four articles of the clergy, touching the power of deposing kings, infallibility, and the superiority of the General Council. For the clergy will not want writers in their defence, although they might want them to support their other injustices. And that will produce a great number of writings on both sides, the effect of which will be to play into the hands of heretics, to render the Roman Church odious, to put difficulties in the way of the conversion of Protestants, and to be the occasion of a more cruel persecution against the poor Catholics of England. One may see the beginning already; for a pamphlet has appeared here with this magnificent title—"A reply to the Declaration of the Gallican Church on Ecclesiastical Power, humbly dedicated by Nicholas Ceroli, Marquis of Carreto, to Innocent XI., best, greatest, chief Pontiff, Vicar of Christ, Lord of the City and the World; and only Door-keeper of Heaven, Earth, and Hell; and infallible Oracle of the Faith," &c. I have not seen it, but M. de Ste. Marthe, who has written to me on the subject, adds:—"The contents of the book are proportioned to the magnificence of the title. He pretends that Jesus Christ, having been King over all the earth, and the Pope being His vicar, the latter has also sovereign power over the whole world, and by consequence over all monarchs." I lament for the Holy See if it has such defenders; and it is a terrible judgment of God on the Church, if Rome takes this way to defend itself against the French bishops.'"

The summary which the Abbé Guettée gives of the whole affair is worth quoting:—

‘The act had not, as we have seen, the approbation of Bossuet. He judged it inopportune; but the will of Louis XIV., strongly expressed, appeared to him, under the difficult circumstances of the times, a sufficient reason for acquiescing in it. The assembly had, certainly, the intention of expressing the doctrine of the Church of France in the form of canons and decisions. Had it the right? The general assemblies of the clergy were not councils, and were not usually convoked for any other purpose than the regulation of the temporal affairs of the clergy; however, since the famous assembly of Melun, the custom had been introduced, little by little, of discussing doctrinal questions in these gatherings. That of 1682, having been convoked extraordinarily, and for the express purpose of treating of them, believed itself in possession of this right; but we must remark that it attributed to itself no further powers than those which it truly possessed, and only undertook to give declaration to a doctrine which should be obligatory in France, but in France alone. Nor was it even, properly speaking, a decision for France, but simply a declaration of the opinions which had always been those of the Gallican Church; it was a protest, in the name of the clergy of France, against the Ultramontane exaggerations which had made so much way in the contest between the courts of France and of Rome. It is thus that we ought, if we would be just, to appreciate the act of the assembly of 1682.’

It was not to be expected that the four articles would ever be approved by the See of Rome. A special congregation was instituted by Innocent XI. for the consideration of their doctrine; and a censure was prepared by that body for the Pope’s approval and ratification. But Innocent XI. could never be prevailed on to sign that censure. Yet, anxious to give some proof of his disapprobation, he persisted in refusing his bulls for the elevation to the episcopate of those deputies of the second order who had assisted at the assembly.

The death of Innocent XI. did not end the contest. His successor, Cardinal Ottoboni, raised to the chair of S. Peter under the title of Alexander VIII., persisted in his refusal until the ecclesiastics, nominated to the vacant bishoprics, retracted their adhesion to the four articles. In vain was it that the French bishops represented to him that those articles were not to be considered in the light of a dogmatical decree—were not intended to be imposed on other Churches—but were a simple statement of the opinion which had always been held by the Church of France. It was intimated by Louis XIV. that, in case of continued refusal, the consecration of the bishops would take place without their bulls. This had actually been done, in some instances, during the wars of the League—had been threatened by the court of Lisbon when bulls were refused by Rome to the bishops nominated by the House of Bragança after the revolution which placed it on the throne; and the threat now held out was remembered and acted upon, as we have formerly related, by the Church of Utrecht, some twenty years

later. The Pope, after some fruitless negotiations, prepared a bull, by which he annulled all that had been done in the assembly of 1682; it was kept secret for some time, and only published when Alexander VIII. was on his death-bed. The intelligence of its contents, and the news of the Pope's decease, reached France at the same time. The Parliament was about to condemn it to the flames; but Louis XIV., unwilling to come to an open rupture with the court of Rome, represented that it should rather be attributed to the weakness of a dying man, than to the well-weighed determination of the Holy See; that the new Pope might evince greater moderation; and that the surest way to obtain an easy settlement of the difference was to take no notice of the bull that had just been issued. Cardinal Pignatelli, raised to the Papal See under the title of Innocent XII., hastened, in an autograph letter, to acquaint the King of France with his pacific dispositions. Louis XIV., for his part, suspended the civil law, which rendered the teaching of the four articles obligatory; and the Pope at once sent their bulls to those ecclesiastics who had been nominated to bishoprics since the assembly of 1682, but who had not assisted at it. It was understood that both these, as well as those who had been present, were to unite in a letter which should be so drawn up as to please all parties; and with such conflicting interests to be satisfied, it is not wonderful that the composition of this celebrated epistle occupied two years. The terms in which it was finally expressed are these:—

‘The subscribers declare, “that everything which might have been considered as formally decreed in the said assembly, ought to be held as not formally decreed, and that they themselves regarded it in that light; further, that anything which might be considered to have been then deliberated to the prejudice of the rights of other Churches, was held by them not to have been deliberated at all; that their intention had never been to pass a formal decree, nor to do anything that might wrong other Churches: that they hoped, for these reasons, that the Pope would re-instate them in his good opinion, and would issue the bulls now demanded.”’

Such was the conclusion of this famous assembly; a compromise which while it did not, to use Bossuet's expression, grate on the tender ears of the Romans, certainly left the balance of success on the side of the Gallicans. The doctrine of the four articles was neither directly nor indirectly condemned; simply their imposition on other Churches was disavowed, and their obligatory imposition upon France retracted.

The history of this event is related by the Abbé Guettée with great precision and clearness, and forms a remarkable contrast with the obscure and bungling manner in which Rohrbacher narrates it in the ‘History of the Church,’ which some time since we reviewed. At the same time we are bound to say that

our present historian, in the events that followed the assembly, seems to us unduly to depreciate Fénélon, in order that he may unduly exalt Bossuet. It is very true that Rohrbacher has more decidedly erred in the opposite direction; but the reverse of wrong is not necessarily right, and our historian might have been content with assigning to the Eagle of Meaux that place which was allotted to him by the verdict of the eighteenth century,—the most learned Gallican except Gerson, and the most eloquent preacher except Massillon. We remember, on a very fine evening in May, walking up and down the arcade of yew-trees, Bossuet's favourite resort, in his episcopal gardens; the western façade of the cathedral seen through the branches on one side, the town clustering below the palace on the other. We had been discussing the character of Bossuet with the vicar-general of the diocese, and he summed it up thus:—‘He was a great man, and he was a good man, and he is with the saints; but we must not make him into a saint himself.’

We had intended to notice one or two other of the more remarkable events in the later history of the Church of France, which the volumes before us contain. We might in particular refer the reader to the account, now for the first time fairly and dispassionately given, of the infamous Council of Embrun, and the deposition and imprisonment of the venerable Bishop Soanen, of Senez. But, above all other parts of the work, the portion which treats of the ecclesiastical annals of the first Revolution is the most curious. The bias of the Abbé Guettée is decidedly in favour of those who by other Church writers have been branded with every appellation of infamy, the constitutional bishops, and more especially Grégoire, whom he exalts into a hero, and into something like a confessor. But it will be fairer, both to the writer and to ourselves, to reserve that part of his work till the appearance of his ‘*Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de l’Eglise de France, depuis le Concordat de 1801 jusqu’à nos jours,*’ already advertised with the significant notice, ‘*Pour paraître dès que les circonstances le permettront.*’ To judge by his account of the Revolution, our author’s annals of the nineteenth century are likely to be as little pleasing to Imperialists as to Ultramontanes; and whether circumstances will permit their publication till after another Revolution, is a point which may reasonably be doubted. We shall look, however, for the promised work with great interest; and certainly to no author were the words ever more applicable:—

‘*Periculosæ plenum opus alex
Tractas; et incedis per ignes
Suppositos cineri doloso.*’

- ART. V.—1. *The State of the English Bible.* By the Rev. WILLIAM HARNESS, A.M. London: Longmans. 1856.
2. *Notes on the Proposed Amendment of the Authorized Version of the Holy Scriptures.* By WILLIAM SELWYN, Canon of Ely, &c. Cambridge: Deighton. 1856.
3. *A Vindication of the Authorized Version of the English Bible from Charges brought against it by Recent Writers.* By the Rev. S. C. MALAN, M.A. London: Bell & Daldy. 1856.
4. *Revised English Version of the Holy Scriptures.* By the American Bible Union. London: Trübners. 1856.
5. *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle: an original Translation, with Critical Notes and Introduction.* By JOSEPH TURNBULL, Ph. Dr. V.D.M. Honorary Secretary of the Anglo-Biblical Institute. London: Bagster. 1854.

WE believe that Sir George Grey was quite correct in his assertion that the people of England do not desire any alteration in the Authorized Version of the Scriptures. We believe that the great body of religious people would rather shrink from any attempt to promote such a change. They are, of course, generally speaking, unable to judge of the need of such changes; this can only be judged of by the learned; but they rely on the general testimonies to the excellence of our Version, and on the fact that the corrections called for seem not important; they find religious parties who differ most widely on all other points, yet concurring in their love and deference to their Bibles; their naturally conservative disposition is here combined with affection and religious reverence for those holy words which are entwined in their inmost souls, and the tones of which linger around the tenderest recollections of their lives; and they can see much difficulty and risk in making changes in a book so highly esteemed and widely accepted.

But, on the other hand, there are dispositions and movements in favour of a revision of our Authorized Version, which may become stronger, and which, in the natural course of things, are likely to do so, even were they now as a cloud no bigger than a man's hand. There are many, with whom we fully sympathise, whose deep reverence for Holy Scripture, and appreciation of its value, make them desirous that the version which is in the hands of our people should be as perfect as possible, and who do in consequence earnestly desire its correctness. There are those—too many—who have not any very deep reverence for Scripture, who are not accustomed to study it with devotion, to whom the Bible is a book for curiosity or controversy, and who seek only on general grounds that it should be correctly translated. The growing intelligence and wide-spread information,

seeing what is abstractedly best, but what is possible and practically attainable. All, we conceive, must agree that, if possible, our translation ought to represent, as faithfully as the differing idioms of the respective languages allow, the meaning of the original; but, like every other great and general truth, the difficulty lies not in seeing and admitting it in the abstract, but in applying it to practice; whilst there is a counter advantage in the general recognition of one and the same version by our whole people, not by ourselves in England only, but by the Scotch Presbyterians and dissenters of all shades of non-conformity; by the whole people of America,—all their various sects; and by the new world of Australia. If we have a Version made ever so perfect, can we secure its general acceptance? Can we make it be what the Authorized Version now is? Is it worth while to sacrifice our unanimity for a small benefit? or can the alteration be so made as to secure unanimity? It is surely well worth while to consider this.

The movements in favour of such a revision which have been most prominently manifested, have been by the Bible Union, and the Bible Revision Association, in America, and an obscure association in our own country called the Anglo-Biblical Institute, the honorary secretary of which has published a new translation of S. Paul's Epistles, and which with its chairman, Dr. Richard Wilson, and a hundred signatures, petitioned the House of Commons in favour of Mr. Heywood's motion. Judging from the work of its honorary secretary (though this is being reprinted), the English association appears to be unworthy of attention. The American societies are rather an indication of a wish among some of the sects known as Evangelical Protestants, and a few members of the Church here and in America, for a revised translation. But among Dissenters generally we believe there is no such wish. They acquiesce in the Authorized Version, if possible, more simply than Church people, being satisfied to have it corrected or elucidated by annotations. The fate of the American Bible Union would appear to be sealed, since the discoveries which have been made of the carelessness of the managers, the unfitness of the translators and 'revisers,' and the sectarian tendencies discovered among its promoters.

In England, owing to Dr. Cumming's unfortunate disposition to put himself into prominence on every occasion, though it be but to display his own ignorance, the columns of the 'Times' have become the chief, as they are the cheapest and most effectual, organ for drawing the attention of the public to the subject.

Two or three publications have appeared formally professing to treat on the subject, which therefore may require a more

formal notice from us. The first is an article in the 'Edinburgh Review' for October, 1855, by the Rev. W. Harness, advocating the appointment of a permanent Commission to be continually revising the Authorized Version, as from time to time may seem necessary. This article has since been reprinted, owing, as it is said, to the increased interest in the subject, and consequent request for its republication. Another is a very moderate and judicious pamphlet by Canon Selwyn, advocating only the appointment of a Commission, apparently by the Crown; and suggesting at first only the printing the corrections of the translation in the margin, or at the end of our Bibles, so that they might be gradually brought into the text, when people had become familiar with them. The author sets forth the many advantages which would arise from this, but omits all consideration of the difficulties and dangers incident to such a revision. On the other hand, Mr. S. C. Malan, one of our best Oriental scholars, has sent out in two parts a defence of the Authorized Version, which is rather an able criticism of portions of the revised versions sent out by the American Bible Union, and the honorary secretary of the Anglo-Biblical Institute, to which we may have occasion to refer incidentally.

If it be the case that the republication of Mr. Harness' article is called for by the interest taken in the subject, it is clear that 'straws show which way the wind blows'; for it is a very light article, indeed, even for a review, and quite unworthy of separate publication. It is made up of obvious remarks on the form in which our Bibles are published; and on the importance of a correct translation, with instances of overliteral, obsolete, obscure expressions, which would readily present themselves to any one. The only appearance of learning is derived from passages of Mr. Jowett and Mr. Stanley's volumes, some of the latter being unacknowledged (compare Harness, p. 25, and Stanley, vol. ii. pp. 312—314). Unfortunately in one point the reviewer left his authority, and attempted a little learning of his own. Mr. Stanley says: 'Some are not mistranslations so much as retentions of the original Greek or Latin words: e. g. . . . "charity" for ἀγάπη, from the Vulgate *caritas*, instead of "*love*."' Mr. Harness improves the observation thus:—

'Why is ἀγάπη *love* throughout the Gospels, but occasionally exchanged for *charity* in the Epistles; a word adopted from the Vulgate, and only intelligible to the classical theologian (!), who knows that *love* is a fruit of grace; that grace is English for χάρις; that χάρις is the etymological root of charity (!!), and that, consequently, *charity* may be used as a synonyme for *love*?'

It is evident Mr. Harness thinks that *caritas* is a derivative of χάρις. We thank him and the 'Edinburgh' for this discovery;

for laying open to the world the ignorance of the man who presumes, as Mr. Harness does, to ridicule and sneer at the English Version of the Bible, when he himself is unconsciously exhibiting an ignorance of Greek, Latin, and English all at once.

Mr. Harness dwells much on the division of the Bible into chapters and verses, and recommends paragraph Bibles, in which also the poetical parts of Scripture may be printed in lines; and he blames those whom it concerns, because the Authorized Version is not printed so. We entirely agree in the preference for paragraph divisions (they are used in the 'Church Services'), and for making the division of the Hebrew poets catch the eye. But the complaint against authorities, because Bibles are not printed so, is grounded on a mistake. Paragraph Bibles have been tried, and do not sell. Those that were printed some years ago at the Clarendon Press are still on hand. They may be had at the Oxford Bible Warehouse in all variety of binding. But so long as the common Bibles are cheaper, and the great Societies do not circulate paragraph Bibles, they will not come into general use.

Again, Mr. Harness complains that the Sacred Books are all made into one book, the Bible. He thinks they should be printed and purchaseable separately: speaking in contempt of the notion that the books acquire a unity by being bound up together; as if they were not 'the Book' marked off as one, and severed by their Divine original from all other writings. Also he would be very witty in his complaints of the inconvenient and awkward forms of our Bibles. Mr. Harness will find that many single books of the Scriptures are printed separately; he can buy them at the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and other places; but we believe few are sold. About fifty years ago (in 1802) Reeves, the King's Printer, published a very handsome Library Edition of the Bible in fine type, in nine octavo volumes, very well got up, which would range on your shelves with Hume or Gibbon, or the Library Edition of Sir Walter Scott—a book, in fact, which no one would suspect to be a Bible. But we presume it did not sell so well as to induce a repetition of the experiment. Mr. Harness says, 'Whatever the public may demand, will in some shape be supplied.' Bibles are not published in the style Mr. Harness desires for this very reason—that there is no demand for them.

Mr. Harness' other observations we may refer to in the course of this article. But there is one argument put forward by him and by others which it is necessary to consider at the outset; viz. That an incorrect translation is destructive of the end for which Holy Scripture was given,—to be, as he says, our sole guide into the truth.

If possible, indeed, one would have a version of the Scripture perfectly mirroring the original—correct, adequate, and precise. It is desirable that it should do this; and the more we esteem the Divine Word, and the more we feel the power and divinity of every part of it, the more we shall desire it. But desirable as this may be, it by no means follows that an inadequate or partially incorrect version may not very sufficiently answer the purposes for which the Holy Scriptures were given—the instruction and edification of the people. The inconsiderate things that are said on this subject make some observations on it not out of place.

We hear now again of the Protestant principle of each one judging for himself of the meaning of Holy Scripture, from its very letter; and consequently of the necessity of the version from which our countrymen are so to judge of truth, being made as perfect as possible. Does it never strike those who argue thus, that the very fact that the Holy Scriptures are accessible to the great body of Christians only through the medium of translation is fatal to this principle? It is absolutely impossible for any translation so exactly to represent the original as to make it as safe to argue from the version as from the original. It is absolutely impossible to daguerreotype those shades of meaning and force of words which the original expresses, and on which the precise doctrinal force of a passage turns in any translations. Besides, how is the 'Protestant' to know that the translation is correct? or if he desires to have a precise knowledge of the force of the original, why does he repudiate all notes and comments? The truth is, the great Protestant principle is an absurdity; and Mr. Harness, after laying down the theory in its broadest form, in all sincerity and simplicity, as the great Protestant principle, complains that it only exists in theory. It cannot exist in any other way. No version can exactly represent the original. But even a poor version may represent it sufficiently for all practical purposes; that is, for all purposes of faith and piety. They who wish to go further intellectually, and they who are able to go further, must have recourse to paraphrases and notes, or to the original. It is but an instance of the differences in the gifts and privileges afforded by God to His creatures, that some should have the power of entering more exactly into the meaning of His written Word than others. But to all is given sufficient guidance, if they will take the Scriptures in their own tongue, and study them by the aid of the Church as their outward, and the Spirit as their inward, teacher. This may be some comfort to us, if it should not be possible to have a correct Received Version; and if, as it is certain must be the case, we are at last obliged to be content with an inadequate one.

It is, indeed, alleged that statements, which are stumbling-blocks, and excite objections against the truth, the consistency, or the holy teaching of Scripture, as presented in our Authorized Version, would be altered by correct translation. Yet, surely, this would but remove the difficulty. The same persons who now find difficulties, or raise objections to Holy Scripture, on grounds arising from faulty translation, which difficulties and objections would, by the hypothesis, be obviated by a knowledge of the original, may surely, in our day, find what the meaning of the original is by comments and explanations, or by consulting those who know more than themselves. And if they be so minded as not to wish sincerely to have their difficulties solved, the same temper of mind would find, if not the same, yet other difficulties, perhaps more numerous, in the words of the original. Of course, it is not meant that we should willingly leave any such stumbling-blocks; but it is not sufficiently remembered that they cannot be entirely removed—and that persons who only use their understanding to find objections, and will not go forward to ascertain or understand the solution of them, must remain in darkness.

Now persons expect too much from a translation; the representing the original fully and adequately is the province, not of a translator, but of an expositor. No translation can adequately express the whole of the original: this must be done by paraphrases or explanations. There are many turns of expression in the original which have their own proper force, and the perception of which throws light on the meaning of the writer, as well as gives beauty and clearness and force to his words, which cannot be transfused into a translation—still less into a translation so precise as that of the Holy Scriptures ought to be. He, indeed, who attempts a translation so exact is in continual danger of trenching on the province of the expositor; as in such instances as the following, from recent translations, where '*which* is the mother of us all,' or '*whose* are the covenants,' are translated 'because she is,' or 'for theirs are;' the relative being held, probably correctly, to have an argumentative force. If you translate 'whose are,' you will be told that your version is inadequate—that the original implies a reason, which the translation does not necessarily do, though it suggests it. If you translate 'for theirs are,' you certainly determine the meaning, but it is undetermined in the original. Now a translation which exactly mirrors the original ought to represent its ambiguities, its indeterminateness, its occasional unintelligibility.

Difficult as the work of translation necessarily is, this difficulty is greatly increased when the subject of translation is the

of the scholar, and of which the force might be perceived and appreciated by the educated, but which would not be easily perceived by the poor or the unlearned.

Add to this; dignity and gravity befit a translation of the Holy Scriptures; and this is happily secured by the use of language which belongs to a former age, and which, from association, carries with it the impression of sacredness. The Apostles, it may be said, wrote in the language which their converts ordinarily used. This may be doubted; thus much at least is certain,—they used a phraseology partly derived from the ancient Scriptures of the Jews, and carrying with it all the sacred associations belonging to them, partly new, but Christian, connected with the ideas and doctrines which were now first made known to the converts, intimately connected with their new and peculiar life, the inward life of their souls, and with all the mysterious truths that were freshly revealed to them. They were the words of Apostles, who spoke in the plenitude of the Spirit, and wrought miracles, around whom was a halo of sanctity, which the nimbus but faintly figures. All these sacred features of the words of the Apostles, as first written, we not inadequately represent by a language different from that of our common daily life. It may be thought needless to say this; but in any rage for improving our version of Holy Scripture, it will be found most necessary to maintain our ancient phraseology on grounds of reason as well as of feeling.

But when persons speak as if a version with some few mistakes in it does not fulfil the end of a version of Holy Scripture, let them remember the very remarkable fact, that whereas the Holy Scriptures have ever been known to the great body of Christians through the medium of translations, those translations have always been imperfect; nay, more or less incorrect. The Scriptures of the Old Dispensation were read by large portions of the Israelites in the translation of the Seventy, often very wrong in its renderings, and adding to the sacred words; in the same form, or in translations from it, they were read by Christians. The more accurate versions of the critics of those days, brought together by the labours of Origen, did not avail to displace the old received version among the Greeks, though they may have modified it. Some centuries elapsed before Jerome's translation from the Hebrew supplanted the old and barbarous Latin versions of earlier times made from the Septuagint. Nay, even among ourselves the old version of the Psalms, confessedly incorrect, is much nearer our hearts, and much more connected with our devotional sentiments, than is that of the Bible, and it is the form in which alone nine-tenths of our Church people know the Psalms. By God's overruling care

and guidance it has been secured that the versions of Holy Scripture, which are received in the Church, even where they inadequately or incorrectly reflect the sense of the original, should not teach error either in matters of morals or belief. Such has been the guiding control of God's Spirit—such the sentiment of truth in His Church. According to God's appointment, the doctrine and teaching of the Church, and the inward unction of His Holy Spirit, accompany the written Word; and there is here a preservative from the effects of error in the versions of Scripture, as well as from a misunderstanding of the original. It is true persons have found a sanction for erroneous opinions in the imperfections of translation. But the Holy Scriptures themselves, read in their original language by those to whom that was their mother tongue, were equally capable of being wrested to their own destruction. One may trace in the history of opinions the influence of the phraseology and the ideas suggested by the Received Versions; but so may we also the effects resulting from misapprehension of the originals. They who spoke the original language of the New Testament were no less varied in their forms of error than those who know translations only. And a very poor version, devoutly studied by a believing and religious person, would be a much surer aid, in all matters of faith and morals, than the original Greek or Hebrew studied by one of perverse mind; because it is not the precise intellectual discernment which is valuable, but the appreciation of the heart; and it is the knowledge of the great truths—the essence, as it were, of Holy Writ—which is eternal life, not the correct understanding of this or that passage. In its jealousy of authority, and jealousy respecting the written Word, Protestantism has exaggerated the necessity of a precise acquaintance with the letter of Scripture, which, in fact, is quite impossible for any but the learned. The truth is, that the Divine Scriptures are so replete with spiritual nourishment, that even when injured by inadequate or incorrect rendering, they yet contain abundant food for the Christian soul; nay, some lessons of truth and holiness may be suggested even by an imperfect translation. Of this we cannot have a better proof than the citations of the Old Testament in the New, and the comments of the Apostles of our Lord upon them, even when they incorrectly represent the original: *e.g.* 'Be ye angry, and sin not,' is well known to be a wrong rendering by the Seventy of the Hebrew, 'Stand in awe, and sin not;' and yet the Apostle alleges it in its incorrectness. And so there has been many a holy thought suggested, many a profitable lesson of Christian piety learned, even from the imperfect and incorrect renderings of our Psalms.

The Holy Scriptures are not, nor ever were designed to be, the sole instructors of the people. The statement made on this point is simply self-contradictory. It is plainly not possible for the unlearned reader to master those questions which turn upon such points of difference as exist between the original and the translation. If Holy Scripture is presented to any through the medium of a translation, it must, like all other things so circumstanced, be in some degree modified by the imperfection of the medium through which it is presented.

The very nature of language makes it impossible for the version to represent the original precisely. Words have each in their own language shades of meaning for which no one word in another is an equivalent. Combinations of words express ideas which no other language can convey, except by paraphrases and explanations. What English word is an equivalent to the *φρονεῖν* of the Greek? or to the modified senses of *νήφειν*, or of the *νόμος* and *δικαιοσύνη* of S. Paul? The translator falls behind in any attempt even to grasp the full idea; still more, to express it by a single word. How then shall we express, in their fulness or precision, the thoughts and language of S. Paul? The knowledge of the original language, and a very refined and critical knowledge of it too, can alone enable a person fully to enter into the meaning of the words of the sacred book. They who have not this advantage suffer so far; and it is not possible in the nature of things to remedy the deficiency by a mere translation. It can only be done by paraphrases and explanations; but He who gives grace to the lowly, will, we may trust, abundantly compensate to the sincere such want of head knowledge by the illumination of the heart.

These considerations are, indeed, no argument against making a version as correct as possible. But if any circumstances hinder this, they may make us well content with a good version, even if it were possible there might be a better.

And it cannot be denied that the Authorized is a good Version. The consent of other countries as well as our own place it among the first of such compositions. It is not necessary for us to repeat praises which will suggest themselves to every mind, and find a response in every heart. In its majesty, gravity, simplicity, and the harmony and beauty of its phraseology, it cannot be surpassed: but it is not perfect.

Let us see something of what can be said against it. And here we will confine ourselves, from the very extent of the subject, to the New Testament; as it will scarcely be said that our knowledge of Hebrew has made any such *certain* progress, as to enable us to determine the correctness of renderings in the Old Testament with the same precision as those of the New.

'He' to 'God'—of God being inserted by the translator, as the italics show—see a testimony to our Lord's Divine Nature which is not in the original, on the other hand they lose one in the passage, John v., where the words, 'He said that God was his Father,' mean (we need scarcely say) 'his own Father;' that is, He said that God was his Father in a special, peculiar sense: and another in 2 Pet. i. 1, 'God and our Saviour Jesus Christ,' for 'our God and Saviour.' It has apparently been thought by the Baptists, that their views would gain by a more exact translation. We apprehend not, for they could not translate βαπτίζω, 'immerse;' no fair scholarship would authorize their doing this; and they would lose the wrong impression conveyed by 'Go, teach all nations, baptizing them,' from which they argue that the fit subjects for baptism must be fit recipients of teaching; and by John iii. 'Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit,' instead of, 'except one' ('a person') 'be born again,' &c.; and 'all the house' of the jailer at Philippi, who were baptized with him, instead of 'all his family.' So, if we lose the supposed support of apostolical episcopacy by the text respecting Judas, 'his bishoprick let another take,' being translated 'his office,' we gain by the right translation of 1 Pet. v. where he says to the elders 'not lording it over God's heritage,' which ought to be 'over your portions' of the flock, or 'the portions allotted to you.'

The old Puritans and their modern representatives in America and England may object to the translation of ἐκκλησία by Church, διάκονος by Deacon, and ἐπίσκοπος by Bishop; but it can easily be shown that the Church's rendering is correct. And indeed, now when 'congregations' call themselves Churches, we presume that the old objection would scarcely be alleged. In 1611 the term 'Church' suggested the true idea of the Church; and they who were for rejecting that, wished to take away the seeming Scripture argument for the Church by using the word 'congregation.' But now the long use of this version has led the sects to adopt the sacred name of Church, and we presume they would not wish to see it removed from Scripture. The American Baptists would translate βαπτίζειν 'to immerse;' whilst the retention of the original word leaves that point as open as it was left by the original.

2. *There are few actual errors in our translation; i.e.* but few places where the translators have made a mistake in the meaning of the Greek. We mean where they would be generally allowed by scholars to have done so, setting aside doubtful places; such as 'Search the Scriptures,' for 'Ye search the Scripture.' Of the Hebrew of the prophetic and poetical Books we will not speak so confidently; there, probably, the errors are more

Now these, we repeat, rather make the translation inadequate, or deficient in precision, than incorrect.

Still they are defects—that is undeniable. And *if they could be remedied, without producing greater defects or greater evils, let them be remedied.*

Professor Selwyn, at the close of his pamphlet, expresses the following sentiment:—

‘I had intended to notice some of the possible dangers attendant on the proposed revision; but when I think of them, they seem to sink into nothing before the sacred obligation to do for posterity what our forefathers did for us, to hand down the Word of God in the purest and most perfect form that is attainable at the present day. Let us be no longer deterred from this good work by vague fears of unknown difficulties: they cannot be so great now as they were in 1611. *O passi graviora, dabit Deus his quoque finem.* The providence of God and the Spirit of God will guide us through all difficulties.’—*Selwyn*, p. 42.

This pious sentiment we would gladly embrace; but we cannot think it inconsistent with trust in God, or love for truth, to look before us, and to see what it is proposed to do, and what is likely to be done, and what are likely to be the results. Surely it is fair to ask in what direction and to what point we are to be carried, before we commit ourselves—before we join in any plan for revision.

And on these points we confess we do not see much agreement, (1) as to the extent of the changes desired, or the principles on which they should be made; (2) the authority by which they are to be determined; (3) or the probability of their meeting with general acceptance,—subjects which are very much involved in each other.

And, first, we do not find any general agreement among the advocates of a revision as to the objects or extent of that revision. Mr. Heywood speaks of the changes desired as very slight. He, in common with almost all the advocates of revision, proposes to retain the Authorized Version, and only correct it; yet he would have the *text* altered as well as the translation. Selwyn says that all the corrections proposed by Professor Scholefield in the New Testament are but 500; and he reckons there would be as many in the Old Testament. But he speaks as if only 100 alterations would suffice in the New Testament. Mr. Malan, the defender of the Authorized Version, admits that some changes are desirable, but so few and of such a nature that they might be made almost without any one being aware of the alteration. But, on the other hand, Mr. Harness (p. 39) instances the ‘819th page of the “Annotated Paragraph Bible,” which contains no more than seventeen verses of the eighth chapter of Jeremiah,’ in which seventeen verses there are five corrections. Besides, if, on Canon Selwyn’s principle, Professor Scholefield’s im-

provements were adopted, consistency would require the introduction of many more, as his attention was chiefly directed to one or two classes of defects. And when we are told by other writers what they wish to see done, it is evident that the changes would be very great before the end was obtained of making the version as exact a representation of the original as possible. For one would correct the personal pronouns, the 'his' and 'her' by substituting 'its'; another the prepositions, the 'if' and 'by' and 'after'; another the irregular translations of the same Greek and Hebrew words, when used in the same sense, by different English words, or of different Greek and Hebrew words by the same English. This, which is very generally desired among advocates for revision, would very soon exhaust Professor Selwyn's limit of 1000. Another would, and with great reason, correct the inadequate and incorrect translation of tenses; another would render the proper names uniformly alike; another would correct the rendering of 'devils,' and introduce 'demons' and 'demoniacs,' as well as 'proconsuls,' 'magians,' and the 'rebels called Sicarii,' and banish such words as 'publicans,' which we have uncritically introduced. Messiah would be substituted for Christ by some, and Jehovah for LORD; while all would agree that the article should be correctly expressed. Obsolete expressions are objected to by most advocates for change; but 'obsolete' is not defined; over-literal translation is opposed by one, over-free by another. In all cases of this kind, which are matters of degree, it is well-nigh impossible to draw a line which shall be fixed and determinate.

Let any person or persons well acquainted with the Greek language take a few verses of an Epistle and begin to correct the English, so as to make it represent the original as precisely as they can, and it will be seen how difficult it is exactly to draw the line, and to say how far we are to go; and if they continue it, they will find the wish for change grow on them. And if, which is the only limit we can see, we go on to make the new version as perfect as possible, what becomes of the 'few' or 'slight' changes we hear of—of the retention of our old version—or of the prospect of the general acceptance of the new? We wish the difficulties of the subject to be considered; and the inconsistencies of those who speak of the changes as slight, or of the new version with those slight changes being generally acquiesced in as final. There are two lines to take: (i.) The correcting of what is clearly wrong in our version in material points, if it can be decided what is clearly better, which is really sometimes difficult: (ii.) the making a version as perfect as possible, only retaining, as far as may be, the rhythm and phraseology of the

present version. Either of these lines is intelligible, though indeterminate: between these two there is every conceivable degree of change possible.

And how are we to gain any unity of view about them?

It is obvious that one of the most difficult questions on which to obtain an unity of opinion, is the degree to which the *language* of a new version should depart from that of the old; or, if the expression be preferred, the extent to which the language of the received version should be corrected or improved. Every degree of variation is possible; and it is of the utmost importance that we should know what is to be done, or have great confidence in those who have to do it, before we encourage the undertaking of such a work. Since the affectionate reverence of our people for the Authorized Version makes a proposal for the introduction of a new one utterly impractical, all that is suggested is the correction of the old. And, no doubt, almost every person, even among the unlearned, has a view that the present version may be improved; but where are we to stop? Let us see the different stages in the road. Each knows something that could be altered for the better. There are expressions which shock our delicacy, and which clergymen avoid reading when they occur in the lessons. Why should not these be corrected? There are obsolete expressions, of which the Edinburgh reviewer enumerates 'ouches,' 'taches,' 'habergeon,' 'brigandine,' 'knops,' 'neesings,' 'mufflers,' 'wimples'—many of them good Shaksperian words, but of an unknown tongue to us now—which people think might as well be represented by words of known meaning. Then there are old phrases which convey a different idea from what they did formerly: as 'take no thought,' meaning, be not anxious; 'let,' meaning, to hinder; 'prevent,' meaning, to help beforehand. Again, 'publicans,' 'offend,' and 'offences,' would need alteration. Nay, it seems that 'pitiful,' in the sense of 'full of pity,' that sweetest of words, offends the modern mind of the Edinburgh reviewer; and in Mr. Stanley's translation, S. Paul 'regrets' when he used to 'be sorry;' and 'of,' and 'after,' and 'by,' in the senses of 'by,' 'according to,' or 'after the pattern of,' and 'near,' are objected to. It is plain that we may go on in this line indefinitely far, till we have modernised our whole version, and reduced it, not to the standard of pure classical English, but to that of the town populations of the present year. We say 'the town populations,' because (as is very well known to all who have experience among our poor, or even our middle classes) the English of the country—laying aside all provincialisms—and the English of the towns, are very different. The language of tracts made for the one is wholly unsuited to the other. The town language is book

'they are found guilty in a court of justice;' for 'branch and root,' 'the highest and lowest;' for 'the calves of our lips,' 'praises and thanksgivings;' for 'rising early,' 'acting with alacrity;' for 'I have given you cleanness of teeth,' 'extreme scarcity.' Now, first, we observe that no intelligent student of Scripture need have 'his understanding bewildered' by these expressions: their meaning is easily learnt, and may be noted in the margin of his Bible. Secondly, it belongs to the sacredness of Scripture that it should be translated as exactly and verbally as possible. Thirdly, the Edinburgh reviewer seems to have but little appreciation of the beauty or poetry of the Hebrew figures he would thus put out of our Bible. We apprehend that English people would not wish to have their Bibles revised on this principle: brief marginal explanations would remove every difficulty.

Another class would go further, and, like Newcome, adopt different terms from those used in our received theological vocabulary, as expressing the original more precisely; they would thus revolutionise our Scripture phraseology under the view of mirroring to us more accurately the force of the original. Now there is here a very important consideration bearing on the language of the Bible, and that is, that it has become the language of English theology, and also of our practical and devotional religion, not only that of us who are living now, but of the whole of our older theological and religious literature. We can well imagine that there are those who would on that very account wish to see it altered; there is a rising and a growing school among us, who would wish to see the people's minds unsettled, and their established religious phraseology broken down. They say that we rest in words instead of ideas; that if we were any of us compelled to abstain from using the words we are accustomed to, and to express ourselves in different, in common, terms—if we were to translate our religious statements into the language of ordinary life—it would clear our views, brush away cobwebs, destroy *idola*; enable us to be rational Christians, instead of merely repeating the (to us) unmeaning phraseology of hygone and worn-out theologies. We cannot doubt that such a school would gain by such a process, but it would be at the cost of the religion of the English people; because, useful and profitable as it is for us thus to place doctrines and religious sentiments in new lights, there are very few indeed who possess the capacity for doing it, as is plain enough from the fact that in becoming philosophical Christians, they do but change their vocabulary; and if the received Christian language be to them individually as unmeaning as a tinkling cymbal, still more so is that of the

respects in which he has tried to correct the Authorized Version. These are, where it was *incorrect, inexact, insufficient, or obsolete*. Now, if *incorrect* means a blunder (the Greek meaning one thing and the English another), let us ask, how many such incorrectnesses are there in our version? Allow that 'Ye see how large a letter I have written to you with mine own hand,' should be, 'Ye see in how large letters I have written unto you with mine own hand:' or to take the instances given by Mr. Stanley, that 'coming' is put for 'revelation'—being, in fact, the interpretation instead of the translation of the word; 'JESUS CHRIST' for Christ Jesus, and the omission of 'our;' or in 1 Pet. v. 3, 'Neither as lording it over God's heritage,' which ought to be, 'Neither as lording it over your portions (of Christ's flock);' or 'not slothful in business,' 'not slack in exerting yourselves,'—for Mr. Heywood, when he instanced this as an error of our Authorized Version, made as great a blunder himself by translating σπουδῇ 'zeal;' for 'not slothful in business,' i.e. in whatever you exert or busy yourself, is not far removed from τῇ σπουδῇ μὴ ὀκνηροί. Let such passages, it will be said, be corrected. But are we to stop here? There is one large class of words on which questions of correctness will at once arise, and indeed has arisen. The Baptists of America wish to translate βαπτίζω, 'to immerse;' the honorary secretary of the Anglo-Biblical Institute would translate ἐκκλησία, 'congregation;' ἐπίσκοπος, 'overseer;' διάκονος, 'attendant.' Of course, we have no doubt that they are wrong; each of these terms as used in the New Testament had a technical or ecclesiastical, as well as a common meaning. We speak of the 'washings' (not the immersions) of pots; of our Lord not having 'washed' before dinner. But when S. John came, he came performing a rite which was indeed designated by a word that had a common as well as an 'ecclesiastical' or technical sense. Our word 'immerse,' or 'wash,' has not that twofold sense, and accordingly we must use two English words to represent the one Greek word. So we translate ἐκκλησία 'an assembly,' when we speak of the ἐκκλησίας of the Greeks at Ephesus, but rightly express it by a word to which a sacred sense is attached when it refers to the Christian society, or its meetings. And why? Why, because the Greek word ἐκκλησία was seized on to represent the Hebrew לְקַהֵל, and לְקַהֵל was a sacred word, applied to the people of Israel considered as God's privileged and blessed people: and whereas, in the Old Testament, the ἐκκλησία Κυρίου means the ancient Israel, our Saviour Himself placed His new people in a corresponding relation to Himself when He said, 'On this rock I will build My ἐκκλησία, My Church;' so of ἐπίσκοπος and διάκονος, it is plain that they are sometimes used in their common sense, as

When a view is new, when it is the supposed discovery of the day, it engages a very undue amount of belief and attention. The scholar, like other men, is influenced by fashion; and if the fashion be for great accuracy, and there is a new theory, which is not old enough to have had its truth yet tested, he will be likely to be ever introducing it.

However, these very points are themselves in many respects debateable ground. The force of the aorist, as compared with the perfect (though quite clear in classical Greek), is not yet settled in the language of the New Testament. It seems even now to be the subject of controversy among scholars; and we apprehend that ultimately it will be allowed, at least, that the writers of the New Testament use perfects, where classical Greek writers would have used the aorist, as in *οὐδεὶς ἀναβέβηκεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν*; further, that in particular verbs the perfect form had taken the place of the aorist, as in *ἐώρακα*; and, perhaps, that aorists are used where Attic writers would have used perfects—*e. g.* in the simple statement, *Δάζαρος ἀπέθανεν*, the classic word clearly would have been *τέθνηκε*. On this and other subjects the New Testament grammar is in a transition state, and it is most necessary to guard against applying the rules of Attic Greek to the interpretation of the Hellenistic. Besides the investigation of Syriac, the modern Greek should be studied, because the language of some, at least, of the writers of the New Testament is the provincial spoken Greek of their day; not the Greek of the educated, as it is preserved in the later classical writers, but the vulgar tongue of the day, which was the early element of the Romaic; just as the Romance languages of the West represent the colloquial Latin of the humbler classes in Italy or the provinces. Hence the nice distinctions of Attic Greek may not hold good in the New Testament.

Scholars, however, lay much stress on classical distinctions, and feel obliged to mark them; and, accordingly, they mis-translate, because the ordinary English idiom requires us to use our 'have,' where the Greeks used the aorist—for instance, in speaking of recent events, 'I have seen your father'—*i. e.* have just now seen him: or in negative prepositions, 'No one has written so well as he:' or where we speak of a past action as a kind of possession of ours, as of some exploit or rare deed—'I have been on the summit of Mont Blanc;' 'I have sailed three times round the world;' 'I have conversed with Napoleon.' All these past tenses would be expressed by aorists in Greek. And though it is possible so to frame the sentence as in most, if not in all cases, to avoid the 'have,' yet it is not natural to do so. In teaching boys to construe, we admire Dr. Kennedy's rule of never allowing them to translate an

orist by 'have;' but the object of construing is to learn the Greek idiom; that of translating, to express the Greek thought in English idiom—and the scholar's crotchet must give way to the reader's use; because the consequence of strictly adhering to this rule is to destroy the force of the Greek; for instance, when aorists are combined with presents—'Now ye are full; 'now ye *were* rich (*ἤδη ἐπλουτήσατε*), without us ye reigned as 'kings: for I think God set forth us the apostles last, as it 'were appointed unto death; for we were made a spectacle 'unto the world, and to angels, and to men. We are fools for 'Christ's sake,' &c.

We submit that the wish to be accurate in translating the aorist has destroyed the sense and the force of the words in English; our usage requiring 'are rich,' 'hath set forth,' 'we have been made,' though the Greek usage introduced the aorist. Again, there is an anomaly when perfects and aorists are combined, as in 1 John i. 1, thus translated by the American Bible Union:—'What was from the beginning, what we have heard' (*ἀκηκόαμεν*), 'what we have seen with our eyes' (*ἐώρακάμεν*), 'what we gazed upon' (*ἐθεασάμεθα*), and our hands handled' (*ἐψηλά φησαν*). Mr. Malan has rightly pointed out that *ἐώρακάμεν* is used for an aorist, and perhaps *ἀκηκόαμεν*. We should prefer translating all of them 'have,' as laying a stress on the fact, though we admit that a scholar could see the beauty of 'what we (in times past) gazed on, and our hands handled.'

The subject of the Article, again, is full of difficulties, and though there are many places in which great force and clearness are added to the words by its being regarded, there are others where the rules for its presence or absence are undecided among scholars. The cases where it may be omitted are not settled. It appears to have given great trouble to the American Bible Union, as one of their 'revisers'—specimens of whose unfinished work were published and fell into Dr. Cumming's hands—had translated, 'He that immerseth in a Holy Spirit;' and Mr. Norton says, in defending them, though we do not put him forward as any authority, that—

'Bishop Middleton's view as to the use of the Greek article, to distinguish the Person from the influence of the Holy Spirit, has contributed to some of the reviser's errors. To one person the subject seemed sufficiently important to lead him to prepare and forward to the American Bible Union a critical analysis of the usage of the whole New Testament in reference to Bishop Middleton's views on that point.'—*Norton's Letters to the Times*, p. 7.

Without setting the least value on Mr. Norton or his friend's opinion on this point, it is evident that this subject runs into great difficulties; and it would be a mistake indeed to 'correct' the Authorized Version in doubtful places.

Thirdly, the Authorized Version is said to be in fault because

it does not adhere, as uniformly as it ought to do, to translating the Greek words by the same corresponding English words. There is no doubt that the translators were faulty in this respect. They seemed to enjoy varying their English. However, they justify this in their preface; first, from a wish to depart as little as possible from previous versions; secondly, in order to give as many words as they could the opportunity of having a place in their version.

Thus the very same Greek passage, as Archbishop Newcome has noted, is rendered differently in different places: 'He that is not against us is on our side,' (S. Matt. xii. 30,) but 'is for us,' (S. Luke ix. 50.) 'Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.' (S. Matt. xxvi. 41.) But the very same Greek words in S. Mark xiv. 38 are translated, 'Watch ye and pray, lest ye enter into temptation: the spirit truly is ready, but the flesh is weak.' So in the very same passage, Gen. xv. 6, as quoted Rom. iv. 3, Gal. iii. 6, James ii. 23, *ελογίσθη* is rendered by three different words, 'counted,' 'accounted,' 'imputed:' *κράτιστος* occurs four times; twice it is rendered 'most excellent,' when applied to Theophilus; twice 'most noble,' applied to Felix and Festus; *πατρία* occurs three times; it is rendered by 'family,' 'lineage,' and 'kindred;' *ἀναστατώω* occurs three times; it is rendered by 'to turn upside down,' 'to make an uproar,' 'to trouble.' So *μαρτυρέω* and its substantives are indiscriminately rendered 'record,' 'witness,' 'testimony'—words which in our day have different meanings. The reader is needlessly puzzled in some places, as in John ii. where 'the ruler of the feast,' and 'the governor of the feast,' seem to be two different persons; in others he loses sight of the connexion of the thought and argument in the original. The Edinburgh reviewer, borrowing from Mr. Stanley, points out how *παρακαλεῖν* is translated almost indiscriminately 'comfort,' 'console,' 'beseech,' 'entreat,' 'desire,' 'exhort,' as in 2 Cor. i. 3—5, where the force of the passage mainly depends on the recurrence of precisely the same word. It is a great fault thus to vary the translation without cause, but with cause it is the greatest excellence. The Greek words have various shades of meaning—one best expressed by one English word, another by another; and it is one of the very highest excellences of a translator to vary his English words accordingly. But what is the result of Mr. Stanley's rule. Why, *νήπιος* he translates 'a babe,' and keeps 'child' for *τέκνον*, and 'little child' for *παῖδιον*; he also translates *καταργεῖσθαι*, very incorrectly, 'to vanish away.' Accordingly, he renders a well-known verse, 'When I was a babe, I spake as a babe, I understood as a babe, I thought

'as a babe; when I am become a man (*γέγονα*), I have made 'the things of a babe to vanish away.'¹ 'When I am become a man,' is an awkward attempt to express the perfect, and comes under a former observation, the attempting to express the shades of meaning in the Greek tenses by un-English idioms: 'now that I am become a man,' would give what is required. But 'babes' do not speak at all, nor understand, nor think (*ἐλογίζομην* is the Greek word); nor is the being a *babe* naturally contrasted with becoming a *man*; so that over-accuracy in the translation of *νήπιος* introduces inconsistency in the passage, and really destroys much of its force. We need not observe on its general awkwardness. So in 1 Cor. iii. 2, to avoid the 'obsolete' English 'meat' used for solid food generally, which the Edinburgh reviewer complains of, Mr. Stanley translates it 'food,' and we have in consequence, 'I gave you milk and not food.' Now, 'milk' is 'food.' This would hold in the use of 'meat and drink,' in S. John vi. In another place, in order to translate *χάρις* uniformly 'grace,' we have (2 Cor. ii. 14), 'Now grace unto God, which always leadeth us in triumph;' in the margin, 'or thanks.' It is true we say 'grace' before and after meals, but this scarcely justifies such a usage; and how would it hold in S. Luke, 'If ye love them that love you, what grace have ye'? Again, there is the following very unhappy rendering produced by the same attempt (1 Cor. vii. 39), 'The wife is bound as long 'as her husband liveth; but *if her husband be fallen asleep*, she is 'free to be married to whom she will.' It would be very beautiful, if 'to fall asleep' suggested death as naturally to us as it did to the first Christians.

We ought to say, after having taken these instances from Mr. Stanley's translation, that he guards us against supposing that he suggests these minute changes 'as necessary or desirable for any general use of the English translation.' And several of his suggestions and corrections are of value. But they illustrate our meaning as to the risks of revising our version, both by showing how doubtful is the ground we come into, and how easy it is to spoil our present version: his translation shows also numerous places uncorrected, which need correction as much as those that are altered.

¹ *καταργεῖσθαι* means 'to be made,' or 'become useless'; it does not involve at all the idea of destruction, but of a thing becoming obsolete, being superseded, no longer of any use or importance. Hence it is, in 1 Cor. xiii., most beautifully applied to the superseding of the earthly by the heavenly. Prophesying or preaching shall become useless; when that which is perfect is come, that which is partial is superseded—is of no use—and is thrown aside as valueless. When I became a man I put aside my childish thoughts, views, words. Again, the law *κατήργηται ἐν Χριστῷ*, is made useless or forceless, being not destroyed, but superseded by the Gospel.

Again, the same English word is used to represent very different Greek words: as 'hell,' for both Hades and Gehenna; damnation, for κρίμα and κατάκριμα; and the like: especially is this the case in the neglect of the distinction between εἶναι and γίνεσθαι, which is not unfrequently found in the Authorized Version. But here the point is overstrained by revisers. It is very important, in order to teach learners of Greek to distinguish these words, to oblige them to construe them by different English words, and to see the force of each. But in a translation intended for general use, the English idiom must be regarded rather than the exact expression of the Greek word. Now, in English we say 'be,' where the Greek usage was to say 'become.' 'Be thou faithful unto death;' 'Be ye not as the hypocrites:' γινου and γίνεσθε are used in the Greek; and our modern scholars would wish to express this in the English. And so Mr. Stanley has—'Become not servants of men;' 'neither become ye idolaters' (1 Cor. x. 7); and, 'Brethren, become not little children in mind; howbeit in malice be ye babes, but in mind become perfect men' (xiv. 20). Yet he retains (1 Cor. iv. 16, and xi. 1), 'Be ye followers of me,' and, 'Be ye steadfast, unmoveable' (1 Cor. xv. 58). But Mr. Ellicott uniformly has 'become,' as Gal. iv. 12, 'Brethren, become as I am, for I am become as ye are;' and Eph. iv. 32, 'and become kind one to another, tender-hearted,' &c.; v. 1, 'Become therefore followers of God, as dear children;' v. 7, 'Become not therefore partakers with them;' v. 17, 'Do not become unwise.' These are over-refinements; in all these cases the proper—that is, the natural idiomatic—English, is 'be;' and the attempt to express the Greek precisely conveys a false notion to the English reader.

It may be well to consider what attempts have been recently made in this way, that we may see what prospect there is either of unanimity on the principles or details of a revision, or of any great improvement being made by it, unless it be conducted with the greatest caution.

In making these criticisms, we ought to say that whilst we would repress the presumption of sciolists, we should be sorry, indeed, to throw any hindrance or discouragement in the way of those who labour in so great and glorious a work as presenting the Holy Scriptures in the most perfect form possible to our countrymen. We sympathise fully with Professor Selwyn; nay, we would desire, if it could be obtained safely, even more than he suggests; but we see much need of caution as to those by whom the work is to be done, and the principles on which it is done; and, still more, we see the utmost difficulty in securing any unanimous reception of a corrected version. We should

retention of the language of our version contrasts favourably with the next version before us; that is, a new translation of the Epistles of S. Paul, by Joseph Turnbull, Ph. D. the honorary secretary to the Anglo-Biblical Institute. Dr. Turnbull tells us that he has been engaged in this work for six years; and in a wordy preface sets forth his view of the manner in which S. Paul's Epistles ought to be translated. He considers that they must have been quite plain and easy to the persons to whom they were addressed, and says that for some centuries they were popular reading, as in a sense they certainly are now. He appears not only to wish, but to believe, that if they were rightly translated, we should have 'the readable letters of the 'Apostle continuously, as letters should be read, without impediment, weariness, or hesitation.' (Pref. p. x.) Unfortunately, this unlucky word 'continuously,' belonging to nothing in the sentence, shows that when he is not translating, but writing his original thoughts, the honorary secretary's composition cannot be read without 'impediment' or 'hesitation;' and all attempt to go through his preface, to say nothing of his translation, will convince any one that his work cannot be read without weariness. Dr. Turnbull seems to think that the Epistles can be read in the original 'without impediment or hesitation.' If so, he is an object, shall we say, of envy or of pity? Does he not see the difficulties, or does he see through them? All we can say is, that the old Authorized Version more truly represents the Apostle's language, and can be read with much less of impediment, weariness, or hesitation, than Dr. Turnbull's version. A few brief specimens of the translation may show what it is:—

Eph. v. 32. 'This secret is important; I refer, however, to Messiah and to the congregation.'

Col. iii. 1. 'Enquire after things above. 2. Think most of those things above, &c.'

Col. ii. 18. 'Vainly inflated with the notion of his flesh.'

22. 'Injunctions, which are all detrimental by their improper use.'

23. 'Not to the credit of any one for personal appearance.'

1 Cor. x. 32. 'Be you *inoffensive* to Jews and Greeks, and also to the congregation of God: just as I comply with all in everything not seeking my own interest, but that *of the multitude*, that they may be saved.'

However, as heresy manifestly is the ruling spirit of Mr. Samuel Sharpe's translation, schism is that of Dr. Turnbull's; and we must remit our readers to Mr. Malan's annihilation of his arguments for using 'congregation,' 'overseer,' 'attendant,' instead of 'church,' 'bishop,' and 'deacon.'

We will pass on to translations recently published by men of position and name as scholars, though they only are of portions of Holy Writ.

Dr. Peile's translation of S. Paul's Epistles is professedly free:

tions from the Authorized Version,—many which they themselves, on the excellent grounds which we cited above, would not wish to introduce into an Authoritative Version; and certainly they do often bring out in a very pleasing way the meaning of the Apostle. But we must be allowed to doubt the improvement, either in force, beauty, or clearness, of such a translation as this:—

1 Thess. v. 16—18. 'In every season keep a joyful mind; let nothing cause your prayers to cease; continue to give thanks whatever be your lot.'

It is also obvious to remark that in this place *καιρὸς*, 'season,' is equivalent to 'circumstances.' There seems to be an attempt to bring out the force of the present imperative as indicating continuity, which, in our judgment, is overstrained.

So in 1 Cor. ix. 26, 27, we have a mixture of good and bad. 'I therefore run, not like the racer who is uncertain of his goal; I fight, not as the pugilist who strikes out against the air; but I bring my body into bondage, crushing it with heavy blows; lest perchance, having called others to the contest, I should myself fail shamefully of the prize.'

1 Cor. x. 1. 'But you, brethren, I call to remember our forefathers how they were all guarded by the pillar of the cloud, and all passed safely through the sea. And [as you were baptized unto Christ] they all, through the cloud and through the sea, were baptized unto Moses.'

For 'gospel,' we have 'glad tidings;' for 'preach the gospel,' 'proclaim the tidings;' gaining the idea conveyed by the original word; but losing its identity with all our associations.

Rom. xii. 11. 'Let your diligence be free from sloth; let your spirit glow with zeal; be true bondsmen of your Lord. In your hope be joyful; in your sufferings be steadfast; in your prayers be unwearied.' The article is expressed by the 'yours.' But here the paraphrase limits the original; the idea of 'patience' is lost in 'steadfastness,' when both, with 'perseverance,' seem implied in *προσκαρτεροῦντες*.

Many good hints may be obtained from this translation; and it is pretty and readable, but too modern. Its accuracy and exactness in representing S. Paul are often questionable.

We have already given many illustrations from Mr. Stanley's translation; we will only add one or two more.

'Why do ye not suffer unrighteous wrong?' *τί οὐ μάλλον ἀδικεῖσθε;* (1 Cor. vi. 7.) Can there be any 'wrong' which is 'not unrighteous?' If there be a fault in the English, it lies not in the 'wrong,' but the 'suffer,' which is quite liable to be understood in the sense of allowing persons to do wrong: 'why do ye not rather endure to be wronged?'

The most important alterations in the remaining part of this Epistle are:—

- iv. 17, 18. 'They zealously *entreat* you;' and 'to be zealously *entreated*;' for our 'affect,' 'affected.'
- v. 12. 'They would even cut off their members.'
- 17. 'So that ye *may* not do the things that ye would.'
- vi. 11. 'See in what a large letter I have written to you,' &c.
- But in the Epistle to the Romans we have *iii. 25* rendered thus: 'Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith, *by His blood*, to declare His righteousness, because of the *'letting go* of sins that are past.'
- ix. 6. 'God who is over all is blessed for ever.'

From these writers, whose merits do not lie in exactness of thought or of expression, we pass to Mr. Ellicott, who has with great judgment devoted himself chiefly to the grammatical interpretation of the Epistles, and has done his work really well. We will take a passage from his translation of the Epistle to the Ephesians, one familiar to us all—giving the words of the Authorized Version over the corresponding words of Mr. Ellicott's:—

desire that ye faint not

'Wherefore I *entreat* you *not to lose heart* at my tribulations for you, which *inasmuch as it is your glory*. For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father (of our Lord Jesus Christ), *from whom the whole family every race in heaven and on earth is (thus) named, that He would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might, through his Spirit, into the inner man; so that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith, that ye being ye having been rooted and grounded in love, that ye may be fully able to comprehend with all saints what (is) the breadth, and length, and depth, and height, and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might may be filled up to all the fulness of God. Now unto Him that is able to do beyond all things, superabundantly beyond what we ask or think, according to his power that worketh in us, unto Him (be) glory in the church in Christ Jesus, to all the generations of the age of the ages. Amen.'*

The words which we have enclosed in parentheses () are printed in italics by Mr. Ellicott, being additions to the original.

On the variations of translation in this passage we have to observe (v. 15), that Mr. Ellicott determines needlessly, we think, the meaning of the Greek in *αἰτοῦμαι*. The English, 'I desire that ye faint not,' might mean either 'I ask of God,' or 'I ask of you.' The latter is much the most probable, as it is the natural, meaning of the Greek; still this is not

simple readers. We should be inclined to say, let these be kept for the educated,¹ whose practised minds may be able to enter into refinements; or let them be reserved for paraphrases or expositions, where their full force could be brought out, without ambiguities; or let them be put in the margin.

The inference we may fairly deduce from all this is, that the state of *Biblical* scholarship, and of uniformity of view as to what a new version or revision should be, is scarcely such as lead us to have much hope of anything being gained by a revision on a large scale, or anything approaching to a new version, at present. It seems as if there was no line to be drawn as to where the alterations should stop; and if we promote a revision without strong assurance as to the parties by whom, and on the principles on which, it is to be made, we may only be encouraging at best crude—nay, it may be, heretical—attempts to corrupt the Sacred Word. We see how difficult it will be, if alterations are made, to satisfy those who now ask for them, but who probably are not at all agreed as to the extent to which they should go, from the hundred marginal corrections desired by Canon Selwyn to the new version of the Anglo-Biblical Institute. The abstract desirableness of corrections of our own version, nay, of a version as perfect as can be made, we fully assent to. But we wish to see our way as to what is proposed, and how it is to be done.

Besides this, it must not be forgotten that the advocates for a revision of our version would also wish for a *revision of the text* from which it is made. And this, we apprehend, is what the most forward of them would desire even more than the revision of the translation. The question is as to the duty of the Church in respect to the text to be followed, in case any revision were made.

Now, on this subject it is plain that many variations of text are such as would disappear in a translation. On the showing of critical editors themselves, a very large class of various readings belong only to the Greek inflections—the archaic or ungrammatical forms of the early copies being corrected: this was almost necessary when the Scriptures had to be read in Greek. The fact is only interesting as indicating the state of the language, and the want of literature in writers or copyists. The correction of these was something like the process adopted by Dr. Blayney, in removing the obsolete

¹ We find in Mr. Ellicott's new volume that he regards them as 'closet translations;' and for this purpose, to one who can read them with the Greek, they are very valuable.

was printed in a different type in Tyndale and Cranmer's translations. But this should only be done where there is very strong evidence indeed. It does not seem right for the Church to reject any portion of what may, in even a low degree of probability, be a part of the Divine Word. It is better to retain than to reject. The Church's Bible is the Bible she has received—the monument of the sacred text, as it has been read for a thousand years. It may be left to critics, or antiquarians, or controversialists, to say what evidence there is for any portion of this text not being genuine. If it be clearly understood that the Church's text is what has for so long been the received text, we do not see any falsity implied in her continuing to use it. We say this on the view that the received text does not teach anything untrue; holding that the most important texts in controversy do but express what is taught in other parts of Scripture; and that when there is uncertainty, it is right to retain the text that we have received. In this respect the Church must be content to bear the reproach of being behind the age. But we may well wait awhile till critics have arrived at some more settled views as to correct readings.

We have not as yet said anything of the danger of unsettling the minds of our people by varieties of versions. We do not underrate the possible danger, but we think it right to consider some few points.

First, so far as such things may unsettle them, they are exposed to this at present, from the oft-repeated assertion that our text and Authorized Version are incorrect. It is a very obvious and common argument for a sceptic to use to a simple-minded Christian, who rests on his English Bible as his guide, to say—Your Bible notoriously contains errors of translation. The fact will be mentioned that there have been shown to be ten thousand errors in the Protestant Bible; or that within the last few years a Bible was published containing 'twenty thousand corrections of the Authorized Version.' We have ourselves known instances where this very objection was made among educated people. A religious person who had relied very simply on the Authorized Version was much unsettled by it. People who hold loose notions about future punishment, or our blessed Lord's Nature or work, are very apt to allege generally that our version is confessedly incorrect. On this account we cannot but think that it would be an advantage to have a translation made by scholars of acknowledged fitness, *whether authorized or not*, which might be appealed to as representing the original as correctly as possible. Let every essential variation between that and the Authorized Version be noted, and there would

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then be a ready and patent answer to any such objection. The value of this would be felt by many; though objections would be made still, and could not anyhow be prevented.

Again, even now almost all persons know that the Authorized Version is at least imperfect, and that it does not exactly or adequately, nay sometimes does not correctly, represent the original. There are very few churches in which, a few times at least in every year, the congregation do not hear from their clergyman that the original would be more correctly rendered in another way, or that the exact and full force of the Greek or Hebrew is somewhat different from what our version expresses. In some churches there is very much of this kind of correction of our version, and the educated laity appear to be fond of it. We can scarcely read any work of annotation of Scripture, or doctrine, or interpretation of prophecy, which does not continually remind us of this. The publication of the 'Annotated Paragraph Bible' of the 'Religious Tract Society,' at once disseminates corrections of the Authorized Version among all classes. There are works published to assist persons who do not know the original languages, in ascertaining the precise meanings of the words used. Indeed, a correction of the Authorized Version would render useless a large part of our 'Annotations,'—of parts, sometimes of the whole, of many sermons, and of the stock-in-trade of those who are always pointing out, in public or private, what the force of the original is, or the errors of our translation. And yet we do not find, for all this, that the faith of our people in their English Bibles is diminished, or that the general and indefinite knowledge that it is inexact or incorrect hinders their relying on it. So that it may be at least a fair question, whether the existence of a version recognised and circulated as an exact representation of the original, would not confirm the confidence of people in their Bibles by reducing to something like a definite certainty what is now a vague and undefined impression of incorrectness. Indeed the existence of two versions of the Psalms seems to decide the point. We believe that no one ever felt his faith the least shaken by this circumstance. And often as Protestant controversialists have alleged the numerous variations between the two 'perfectly correct' Vulgates of Sixtus and Clement, we do not apprehend that any Romanist would feel his faith in the least affected by it. In fact, common sense comes in and shows how immaterial these variations are.

Indeed, our condition with a settled canon, a settled text, and a settled version, is very different from that of the Church in its best and purest ages; and great reason we may have to be grateful to God for it. The Church of the first three centuries

had not a perfectly recognised canon. The New Testament was not made into one book. One person had a roll of one part, another of another. Disputes on the part of the heretics as to the authenticity and text of Scripture were such that, on Tertullian's showing, they precluded an argument from Scripture between Church-people and heretics, since they were not agreed as to what was truly Scripture. This was one of the chief causes which precluded such heretics from appearing, as it were, in court. But even among Catholics there was some degree of uncertainty. There was a margin of unsettled books, not yet fully acknowledged. The Greek would find the Epistle to the Hebrews doubted of when he came to Rome; and the Westerns would hear that they of the East hesitated about the Book of the Revelation. But, so far as we can see, this partial uncertainty among Catholics never seems to have suggested a doubt about the authority of what was acknowledged, or tended in any degree to unsettle their faith.

Variations of texts, again, between the Scriptures, as received in different portions of the Church, were manifest and acknowledged. The same Father seems sometimes to have used one text, sometimes another, according, as it would seem, to the codex he had at hand. Preachers did not hesitate to discuss these differences in their popular discourses, and controversies brought them into special prominence. As to versions, there were extant in Greek no less than seven divers translations of the Old Testament, which were thought by Origen worthy to be brought together, of varying pretensions, and differing considerably from each other; and the Septuagint—that which we might regard as their Authorized Version—was altered and modified, in various degrees, from the more critical versions, and obelized and made critically correct by Origen. Thus there were extant in Greek, and by the labours of Jerome in Latin, copies of the Septuagint, in which all the parts in the Hebrew and not in the Septuagint, or *vice versa*, were marked,—and these marks, S. Augustine says, were sometimes found attached to almost every word. And this comparison of versions was probably designed by Origen for that use for which S. Augustine afterwards said that he considered the varying versions to be an advantage and assistance to a careful reader in the understanding of Scripture: for one translation aided in eliciting and determining the meaning of another, as, of course, any of us may find. As to the Latin Church, we have the testimony of the same Father¹ to the various versions which were in circulation. We presume that these were versions of portions of the Scripture, not of the whole. He speaks of them as passing number;

¹ *De Doctrina Christiana*, lib. ii. c. 11, 12.

for, in the earliest times, he says, when any man had got a copy of a book of the New Testament, and knew a little Greek, he translated it. And it was well known and allowed that these versions inadequately represented the original. S. Augustine speaks freely of their mistakes in the treatise '*De Doctrinâ Christianâ*,' and constantly, in sermons and treatises, refers to what is in the original; and before him, Tertullian had not hesitated to refer errors of opinion, among the unlearned of his time, to their simply following the words of the translation. Of course, it may be said that these comparisons of versions were for the more learned, and that the people probably were accustomed only to hear one and the same version read in any particular church, though they knew of these varying texts and varying versions; so that their differing translation, will rather find a parallel in the many new translations which have issued from the press of single books of the Old and New Testament, or the whole of them; few of which, however, have ever reached a second edition, and can now only be found in great libraries.

The great difficulty appears to us to be, not the unsettling the minds of Christian people—unless, indeed, in some sad hour a State Commission should sanction an heretical version—but *the procuring any general acceptance for a new or revised version*. It is not very easy to make such a version even to the satisfaction of the maker himself (unless he be a very vain person); but, supposing it made, how is it to gain general acceptance? What is it which stamps our present version with so much authority? Not its being *the authorized*, but *the universally-received* version. It is easy to 'authorize' a version—

'A breath can make it, as a breath has made.'

But will the Christian world accept it? It may come forth in all the dignity of a 'Blue-book;' but will anything, except general acceptance, secure it from remaining alone in its dignity: and, like so many private attempts, passing out of the remembrance of men? The present version was appointed by authority, but that most questionable, to be read in Churches; and it gradually made its way among the people. But would any authority now attempt to enjoin the reading a new or corrected version in our Churches, unless it met with very general approval? When the Authorized Version of 1611 came out, there was no generally-received version; and it did itself depart very little from the Bishops' Bible—the version previously appointed to be read in Churches. There was not then any version in possession. There was nothing to displace. At this day there is a version which has the wonderful prerogative of being *the* accepted version of the whole English-speaking world.

Suppose the Church could be brought to accept the revised version, what would those who differ from us do? What would our independent brothers in the United States do? Is it not possible that the breaking up of the old associations attached to our present version would give occasion to each class of religionists to have Bibles of their own? It is true that if such a result were to arise from our doing a plain duty, it would doubtless be overruled to good. But we must see that the course we take is our duty, and that the revision ought to be made, in the one way which we encourage.

The history of former ages of the Church shows the difficulty of introducing a new translation when the people have become accustomed to the old one. Augustine's well-known letter to Jerome, Epist. lxxi. (tom. ii. col. 160), relates a commotion in a church in Africa (which may remind us that even then there were irreverent disturbances in churches), in consequence of this circumstance:—The bishop was reading the Book of Jonah, out of Jerome's new version, made direct from the Hebrew. He read on till he came to something which was quite different from what the people had been accustomed to. The gourd was called 'hedera;' the people had been accustomed to 'cucurbita.' The excitement of the congregation and the populace was great. The Greeks, knowing the Septuagint, asserted that the translation was wrong; the bishop alleged it was so in the Hebrew, and they were obliged to consult some Jews to know what the Hebrew was. The Jews, whether from ignorance or malice, said that the Greek and old Latin were right; and the bishop was obliged to give up the improved version, or his people would have forsaken him. However, Jerome disregarded the entreaties of Augustine, who wished only to have the Latin version of the Septuagint (which he regarded as canonical) revised. The new version was made; having no authority to enforce its use, resting only on its own merits, infinitely superior as it was to the versions then received, it made way slowly; for several centuries the old versions kept their place; they were still transcribed, still cited; and when Jerome's version was ultimately adopted as a whole, the old version of the Psalms, as among ourselves, continued to be used. It was too deeply-rooted in the hearts of the people to be relinquished. And yet their old version had no such authority as ours has; and it was, we need not say, much inferior to it. It must be admitted, on the other hand, there is more intelligence, perhaps, among our people, and more readiness to accept improvements, than among the Latins in the ages following the irruptions of the barbarians; still, we see the difficulty of displacing a received version. It was the work of centuries.

It is then, we think, clear that, to obtain any such general

acceptance as the present version enjoys, the changes made must be sparing; though, perhaps, not so slight as recommended by Professor Selwyn.

This difficulty may have been in part the cause why several persons, who see the necessity for corrections of the Authorized Version, would have those corrections made, not in the text, but in the margin. Thus Professor Scholefield, in the Preface to his first edition of his 'Hints for an Improved Edition of the New Testament' (in the year 1832), in reference to the objection, that to call the public attention to the consideration of any supposed improvement in the Authorized Version of our Bibles, is needlessly to unsettle men's minds, says:—

'I do not underrate this objection; but my answer to it is, that in proportion to the importance of having the sacred text settled, is the importance also of having it settled on a true and safe foundation.'

And again, in regard to the obscurities of Holy Scripture, allowing that those obscurities which arise from the mysterious nature of the revelation are 'a fit exercise for patience and humility and childlike prayer,' yet he says:—

'If it possess any adventitious difficulty, resulting from a defective translation, then it is at the same time an act of charity and of duty to clear away that difficulty as much as possible, and present it to the English reader with the greatest attainable advantage.'

But in the Preface to the second edition (in 1836), he says:—

'The title of this publication has, not unnaturally, led to the inquiry, whether I was really desirous that a new translation of the Greek Testament should be undertaken: to which my reply has uniformly been in the negative. The real design of it was rather to assist toward the understanding of the old translation, than to supersede it by a new one; to furnish a kind of running commentary, for clearing up difficulties as they arose, by presenting the different passages in an English form more accurately corresponding to the original.'

His plan was to carry out and to extend the method of inserting more exact or fairly probable renderings in the margin. The same view is expressed by Dr. W. Wilson, of Winchester, in the Preface to his 'Bible Student's Guide,' where, after speaking of the 'disadvantage in our version of a more uniform rendering of the original not having been adopted by the translators; different renderings of the same word having been in many cases resorted to, as it would seem, rather for the sake of variety than for the purpose of conveying any precise meaning in distinction,' he says:—

'The author has no intention of invalidating a version so long consecrated by the reverent study of many generations, since it was first given to the Church with a providential blessing; nor would we propose to substitute any other version for one so long used: but an edition in which

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Or what is there, in the whole range of faults in the English version, equal to this? (1 Cor. vii. 39.) 'The wife is bound as long as her husband liveth; but if her husband *be fallen asleep*, she is free to be married to whom she will.'

What need will there be for expositions on the part of the parochial clergy, to show to their poor people, from other parallel passages, from the immediate context, and from the nature of the case, that 'a husband falling asleep,' in the common sense of the words, does not set his wife free to marry some one else! But the Greek is *ἐκοιμήθη*. True, but to 'fall asleep' is not in the English idiom used for death: among the Greeks and the early Christians it was.

By way of contrast to Mr. Stanley, Mr. Samuel Sharpe says that 'and when he' (Stephen) 'had said this he fell asleep,' should be, 'he went to his rest,' 'he died.'

Again, 'With me it is a very small thing that I should be judged of you, or of man's day.'

But one of the chief faults of this translation is the want of consistency. If these corrections are made, how many others ought to be? Mr. Stanley seems to correct or not, almost indiscriminately. The aorist, the article, the want of uniformity in translating the Greek words by the same English, are what he most thinks of. Thus he corrects what needs no correction, and he omits to correct what really needs it: as, (1 Cor. iv. 6,) 'that no one of you (*ἵνα μὴ εἰς*) be puffed up;' it means, 'that ye be not puffed up, each for the one against the other.'

1 Cor. vii. 21. 'But if thou canst be made free;' 'but *even* if,' *εἰ καὶ*, or rather, 'nay, even if,' &c.

Mr. Jowett, on the contrary, has made very few alterations indeed in our version. In the whole of his corrected version of the Epistle to the Galatians there are but fifty-one, of which twenty-six arise from his adopting a different reading in the Greek; twenty-five from corrections of the translation. These, from the first two chapters, are a fair specimen of the whole:—

- i. 6. 'Called you *in* the grace of Christ;' for our 'into.'
10. 'If I yet pleased men;' omitting 'for.' Var. Lect.
17. 'Neither went I to Jerusalem;' omitting 'up.' Var. Lect.
19. 'Cephas;' for 'Peter.' Var. Lect.
- ii. 4. 'But because of the false brethren;' for our, 'and that because of,' &c.
6. 'Accepteth *not* man's person;' for our 'no man's.'
8. 'The same *wrought*;' for our 'worketh.'
11. 'Cephas;' for 'Peter.' Var. Lect.
- 'He had incurred blame;' for 'he was to be blamed.'
14. 'Now compelled those;' for 'why,' &c. Var. Lect.

may seem to be needed in the Authorized Version. Such a committee might easily carry out Professor Selwyn's view, by confining itself, in the first place at least, to the most necessary corrections—to the hundred or the five hundred which he speaks of. It might be appointed with instructions to that effect. These might be sent out; and without being admitted into the text of our Bibles till they were generally approved, might be made generally known by being printed in a cheap form, so as to bind up with Bibles of various sizes. Such a committee would be conservative; and the clergy are best acquainted with the language suited to the people.

But besides this, let scholars individually, or in associations, labour to perfect the translation of the Bible into English. Let them do what individual scholars have been doing hitherto. Small bodies of men associated together, or consulting the wise, would more easily arrive at some agreement as to the extent of change desirable than larger bodies. Let the translations be submitted to the free criticism of Christian scholars. It will soon be found what their merits and defects are, considered as a version for the people.

Independently of such translations, or by making use of them, the Committee of Convocation might, as we have suggested, prepare what they regarded as necessary emendations of the Authorized Version. Such emendations must be few; and they must not touch the general style and structure of the version. They must preserve its rhythm and cadence—if, which is presumed, they are intended to be generally received. It might be well for communications to be made with other branches of our own Church—that great and widespread confederation in Scotland, America, and the Colonies, on whose close union, and free interchange of sympathy and mutual good understanding, the preservation of the faith and the Church seem to depend; or even with other bodies of Christians,—so as, if possible, to gain their adhesion to the revised version and to secure its general acceptance. But we conceive it would not be desirable to enforce, or even allow, the reading of the revised version in our Churches, unless there were a general willingness on the part of the people to receive it. A schism brought on by the compulsory introduction of an altered version of the Bible, would be the worst schism the Church of England has yet seen.

There seems, however, no reason why—coincidentally with the publication of such a slight revision of our version as would not hinder its early general reception—there should not be a version made as perfect as possible, consistently with our idiom, which might indeed retain the simple dignified English of our present translation, but might attempt, at least, to express the full force

of the original, by those finer shades of sense which must be sacrificed to simplicity and ease, in the version which is to be in the hands of all. How far a general acceptance of such a version might be the result of time we cannot say; but as there would be no contrariety between the two—the one only bringing out more distinctly the force of the original than the other—their co-existence and common reception would be possible. That there should be two Bibles in this sense, would not be very different from the state of things when the version of Jerome was passing into recognition, as in the days of Gregory the Great, who says, in the Epistle to Leander prefixed to his *Moralia*:—‘Cum ‘probationis causa exigit, nunc novam nunc veterem per testimonia assumo, ut quia sedes apostolica, cui Deo auctore ‘præsideo, utraque utitur, mei quoque labor studii ex utraque ‘fulciatur.’ It must, however, always be remembered that S. Gregory’s flock was not divided into innumerable sects, who, in the midst of the changes, would very possibly set up each a Bible of their own. Indeed, the divisions of English Christendom are the cause that makes the difficulties of the subject seem almost infinite.

But if a revision is to be made, it is the business of the Church in England to make that revision—for it is her Bible in a sense in which it is that of no other body. It is hers by its parentage. It is hers by the obligation she has to use it. But in another sense the revising it is her work; for she alone can do it. We say deliberately that, in respect of the New Testament, the Church of England alone, of all the Christian bodies speaking our tongue, possesses scholarship sufficient for the work. And such we apprehend is the respect felt towards her, such the appreciation of her fairness and moderation, that a revision made by her would be more likely to meet with general acceptance, both in England and our Colonies, and the United States, than one made by any other body or association, or a commission appointed by the Queen of England. Here happily the Church is a bond of union, where the Queen’s ‘Supremacy’ would only be a stumbling-block. Above all, it is never to be forgotten that the Church of England stands in a very different position from other religious bodies in reference to the Authorized Version of Holy Scripture. She is, we must presume, bound to adhere to it, whilst other bodies may adopt new ones as they will. So if by any force a revision of the Authorized Version were brought about, even against the will of the Church, it might turn out to be quite compatible with the *liberal* principles of the day to enforce the use of it on the Church by Act of Parliament. Let us remember, then, that a claim on the part of the State of printing the Bible, is usurping the highest office of the Church.

It is, indeed, 'tuning' her teaching. It is practically twisting Divine Revelation: and as to the existence of a permanent State Commission, to see to the perpetual correcting of our Bible, recommended by Mr. Harness, it would be a form of tyranny over the Church, which even the Popes in their highest claims ventured not to adopt; and any step towards the recognition of such a power in the State should be vigorously resisted. The care of Holy Scripture, and of its being presented purely and truly to the people, is the proper work of the Church; and so is it her part to look to it, and herself to do what is right and reasonable should be done. It may be that the people will still keep their old version unchanged. It is certain any such alterations will be exposed to the criticisms of ignorance and prejudice,—for the many read and criticise, the very few are able to judge. Still, good may come of it, or worse evils be avoided.

We will conclude this article with some excellent observations which we have seen since it was written; they are from the Introduction to Mr. Ellicott's 'Notes on the Pastoral Epistles of S. Paul.'

'With regard to this very important subject, the revision of our Authorized Version, I would fain here make a few observations, as I am particularly anxious that my humble efforts in this direction should not be misinterpreted or misunderstood.

'What is the present state of feeling with regard to a revision of our present Version? It seems clear that there are now *three* parties among us. The first, those who, either from what seem seriously mistaken views of a translation of the Holy Scripture, or from sectarian prejudice, are agitating for a *new* translation. The second, those who are desirous for a revision of the existing Version, but who somewhat differ in respect to the proposed alterations and the principles on which they are to be introduced. The third, those who, from fear of unsettling the religious belief of weaker brethren, are opposed to alterations of *any* kind; positive and demonstrable error in the representation of the words of inspiration being, in their judgment, less pernicious than change. Of these three parties, the first is far the smallest in point of numbers, but the most persistent in activities; the second class is daily increasing, yet at the present greatly inferior, both in number and influence, to the third.

'Which of these three parties will prevail? We may fervently trust not the first. Independently of the extreme danger of unsettling the cherished convictions of thousands, of changing language that has spoken to doubting or suffering hearts with accents that have been to them like the voice of God Himself,—independently of reversing a traditional principle of revision that has gained strength and reception since the days of Tyndale,—independently of sowing a strife in the Church, of which our children and children's children may reap the bitter fruits,—independently of all these momentous considerations, have we any good reason for thinking that, in a mere literary point of view, it would be likely to be an improvement on the old translation? The almost pitiable attempts under the name of New Translations that have appeared in the last twenty years, the somewhat low state of biblical scholarship, the diminishing vigour of

the popular language of our day, are facts well calculated to sober our expectations and qualify our self-confidence.

‘But are we unreservedly to join the third party? God forbid. If we are truly and heartily persuaded that there are errors and inaccuracies in our Version, if we know that, though by far the best and most faithful translation that the world has ever seen, it still shares the imperfections that belong to every human work, however noble and exalted,—if we feel and know that these imperfections are no less patent than remediable, then surely it is our duty to Him who gave that blessed Word for the guidance of man, through evil report and through good report, to labour by gentle counsels to supply what is lacking, and correct what is amiss, to render what has been blessed with great measures of perfection yet more perfect, and to hand it down thus marked with our reverential love and solicitude as the best and most blessed heritage we have to leave to them who shall follow us.

‘It is in vain to cheat our own souls with the thought that these errors are either insignificant or imaginary. There *are* errors, there *are* inaccuracies, there *are* misconceptions, there *are* obscurities—not indeed so many in number or so grave in character as the forward spirits of our day would persuade us of,—but there *are* misrepresentations of the language of the Holy Ghost; and that man, who, after being in any degree satisfied of this, permits himself to lean to the counsels of a timid or popular obstructiveness, or who, intellectually unable to test the truth of these allegations, nevertheless permits himself to denounce or deny them, will, if they be true, most surely at the dread day of final account, have to sustain the tremendous charge of having dealt deceitfully with the inviolable Word of God.

‘But are we to take no thought of the weaker brethren whose feelings may be lacerated, or whose conscience may be offended by seeming innovations? That be far from us. We must win them by gentle wisdom, we must work conviction in their minds by showing how little, comparatively speaking, there is that is absolutely wrong—how persuasively it may be amended—how we may often recur to the expressions of our older versions, and from those rich stores of language, those treasuries of pure and powerful English, may find the very rectification we would fain adopt, the very translation we are seeking to embody in words. No revision of our Authorized Version can hope to meet with approval or recognition that ignores the labours of those wise and venerable men who first enabled our forefathers to read in their own tongue of the marvellous works and the manifold wisdom of God.

‘Let there be, then, no false fears about a loving and filial revision of our present version. If done in the spirit, and with the circumspection that marked the revision of that predecessor to which it owes its own origin and existence, no conscience, however tender, either will be or ought to be wounded. Nay, there seems intimation in their very preface, that our last translators expected that others would do to them as they had done to those who had gone before them; and if they could now rise from their graves and aid us by their counsels, which side would they take? Would they stay our hands if they saw us seeking to perfect their work? Would they not rather join with us, even if it led sometimes to the removal or dereliction of the monuments of their own labour, in laying out yet more straightly the way of Divine truth?

‘How this great work is to be accomplished in detail is not for such a one as me to attempt to define. This only I will say, that it is my honest conviction that for any *authoritative* revision we are not yet mature, either in Biblical learning or Hellenistic scholarship. There is good scholarship in *this* country, superior, probably, to that of any nation in the world, but it

has certainly not yet been sufficiently directed to the study of the New Testament (for of the New Testament only am I now speaking) to render any national attempt at a revision either hopeful or lastingly profitable. Our best and wisest course seems to be this: to encourage small bands of scholars to make independent efforts on separate books; to invite them manfully to face and court impartial criticism, and so by their very failures to learn practical wisdom, and out of their censors to secure coadjutors, and, by their partial successes, to win over the prejudiced and the gain-saying. If a few such attempts were to be made, and they were to meet with encouragement and sympathy, such a stimulus would be given to biblical studies, that a very few years would elapse before England might be provided with a company of wise and cunning craftsmen, into whose hands she might hopefully confide her jewel of most precious price.

Under any circumstances, we may devoutly hope that no party feeling will be allowed for one moment to outrage the sobriety of thought with which this subject ought to be approached. It is humiliating enough to reflect that there are among us religious parties and animosities; but it would be doubly humiliating to think that a great work,—a work on which the hopes and salvation of thousands, aye, and tens of thousands, depend,—was either perversely obstructed or wilfully precipitated by the strife and turmoil of religious discord. If higher arguments do not prevail, let us remember that two good and learned men, who in their lifetimes were respectively claimed by very opposite parties, and who might not have had very many points in common—the late Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity, and the late Greek Professor of the University of Cambridge; the one, as transpires through his "Lectures on the Duties of a Parish Priest," the other, in his "Hints for an Improved Translation of the New Testament,"—appear to have held on the subject of the revision of our Version opinions that are very nearly identical.

Among the recent specimens of Revision we scarcely noticed that of the American Bible Union, whose translation of the Second Epistle of S. Peter, those of S. John, that of S. Jude, and of the Book of Revelation, has been published. We observe in it a disposition, on the whole, to adhere pretty closely to the language of the Authorized Version, but the scholarship displayed is miserable. Much pains has been taken to compare translations and annotations, with occasional success; but our readers will appreciate our neglect of the work when we say that in the text of four verses of the first chapter there are the following words, ζοή, κοινωνίαν twice, Ἰησοῦ, πεπληρωμένη, ἀκεκόσμεν, and φῶς, and αὐτῷ, &c. There is a table of *errata* at the beginning, but these blunders are not noticed; only there is this general apology about accents: 'In several instances the Greek accents and Hebrew points have been broken off in the press;' but were those in φῶς and αὐτῷ broken off? ἐγνώκα and ἐγνώκαμεν are translated 'we have known;' chap. iii. 4 is translated, 'Every one that committeth sins committeth also violation of law; and sin is violation of law;' 'Every one that hateth his brother is a *man-killer*.' There is, however, one excellent feature in the version,—it does not often alter the Authorized Version.

ART. VI.—1. *A Tabular View of Articles XXV., XXVIII., XXIX., with Considerations upon 'the True and Legal Exposition of Arts. XXVIII. XXIX.,' as set forth at the Court at Bath in the Trial of the Ven. the Archdeacon of Taunton.* By the Rev. C. S. GRUEBER, B.A. &c. London: Masters. 1856.

2. *The Defence of the Archdeacon of Taunton.* July, 1856. London: Masters. 1856.

If indignation, according to the poet, makes verse, in the case of the wise it suppresses prose. We have hitherto been but chary in our allusions to the Denison case, partly because we did not choose to say what would seem to be ungenerous, and yet what it would have been our duty, to express, our lack of sympathy with the discretion which in the first instance brought, or forced, into discussion in such a way such a doctrine. As the proceedings went on, we still hoped that the silence, or at least the visible restraint, under which many, like ourselves, kept their feelings, so long and so severely outraged, might in the end prevail, if not with Mr. Ditcher and those whose tool and instrument he is, at least with others higher in station and authority. We felt that the Archbishop and his advisers, and even his legal friends, must be aware of the feelings of Churchmen on the matter in question. They must have known, so we argued with ourselves, how deep was the stake at issue to such as ourselves and those whose opinions we represent. All these considerations of feelings outraged, of confidence shaken, of hopes and future usefulness possibly shattered, we thought it superfluous to urge. We gave credit to our opponents for at least feeling towards ourselves like Christians, if not as brethren; and we thought that our silence might at least be appreciated. It is an undeniable fact that many have of late declined openly to avow their estimate of the interests involved in the Denison case, neither from apathy towards the true doctrine of the Sacraments as held by the Church of England, nor from a lack of sympathy with the Archdeacon of Taunton, but solely to see if a conciliating attitude, and that 'keeping silence, yea, even from good words, though it was a pain and grief to us,' might not win upon adversaries whom, after all, we could not but look upon as fathers and brethren. In this hope we have been disappointed. That very reluctance to embitter dispute has but been the warrant for treating us with the greater injustice. The less we have provoked, the more certainly we have received an unfair trial. Nothing, as it seems, would satisfy the rancour

of party, but to crush a theological opponent even at the expense of the candour and the calmness of the judicial station. Archdeacon Denison has not had a fair trial; and at the present stage of the proceedings we confine ourselves to establish this fact, and this with such conciseness as considerations for our own temper and gravity require.

We omit all reference to the preliminary commission at Clevedon. A page so discreditable to our ecclesiastical annals, and in itself so utterly unimportant, may as well be blotted out from men's minds. The form of proceeding has in this instance received its mercy-stroke. The existing Church Discipline Act wanted but such an exhaustive instance as this to prove to demonstration its intrinsic worthlessness. Under all circumstances, the selection of a panel of preliminary inquirers entails a dangerous discretion on the ecclesiastical judge. Suffice it to say, that the judge in this instance was not above party influences. The Commissioners were not, like a Committee of the House of Commons, selected on the principle of representing both sides of the proposed inquiry. Clergymen all diametrically, and one notoriously, opposed to the Archdeacon, were selected. They reported, and we shall not condescend to characterize or to commemorate their report. It is enough to say that the Commissioners declined to hear the Archdeacon and his counsel in defence, thereby reversing the precedent set in the Monckton case.

On August 12, the trial of the Archdeacon of Taunton, before his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, was concluded. Whether it was 'by luck or management,' as the saying is—but the court did consist of men whose views were notorious. The Margaret Professor of Divinity at Oxford was the only theological authority in official station who could be depended upon. He was selected in preference to the Regius Professor. The Dean of Wells was equally safe. Dr. Lushington had just signalized himself in a notorious instance as ready to propose his private sentiments as law even at the expense of the sanctity of the judicial character. So much for the constitution of the court.

In the exercise of its functions we have to notice, and it is a deplorable proof, that the unhappy rule in ecclesiastical matters laid down by Lord Denman in the Hampden case, that strict law is to give way to supposed considerations of public convenience,—that is to say, that justice in Church matters is to be accommodated to popular prejudices,—was followed to the letter. We remark in the conduct of the case,

1. The summary and unjudicial rejection of the legal objections offered by Dr. Phillimore. These objections embraced, among others, the very grave ones, (a) that the commissioners

'manner of expression; and another thing positively to affirm 'that the Articles in any part of them are superstitious and 'erroneous.' (Ibid.) The present Archbishop through his assessors denies this latitude; he is 'so narrow,' he pronounces his Articles to be 'the continent of the Church's public doctrine.' Careless of the revisions of 1604 and 1662, nay careless of the Prayer-book, he pronounces for the first time that the XXXIX. Articles self-interpreted are the solitary standard of the Church of England. Dr. Lushington has excluded consideration of the weighty facts that since the 13 Eliz. the Catechism has been enlarged by the definition of a Sacrament, that the Liturgy has been changed, and that the Canons of 1603 pointedly refer to the Liturgy as containing and exhibiting, and therefore as teaching, the doctrine of the Eucharist; while in a very important matter since Elizabeth's time the Church has deliberately abandoned an Elizabethan mode of speech about this very sacrament in the Declaration suffixed to the Communion Service.

6. It is not to the reformers and divines of the Church. For they at any rate prove in the *Catenæ* published by Mr. Chambers, so fully and ably illustrated by Mr. Grueber, and brought forward by Dr. Phillimore, that a doctrine substantially equivalent to Archdeacon Denison's has constantly been held and taught in the Church of England; therefore that his doctrine is permissible. Further, we do not press a claim. That in all respects it is literally exact, still less that it is exclusive, we do not urge. That it is not irreconcilable with the formularies of the Church, the mere fact that it, or something equivalent to it, has been so reconciled, is sufficient for the fact that the Church is patient of it. If patient of it, it cannot be in the judgment of men quite as able and learned as Drs. Sumner and Lushington, such men as Andrewes, Bramhall, Grabe, Ken, Lake, Mede, Poynt, Ridley, Saravia, and above all Thorndike, 'directly contrary and repugnant to the XXVIIIth and XXIXth Articles.'

7. But, above all, we charge the Bath judgment with gross unfairness and injustice, because for a party purpose it reverses that freedom of interpretation which, in the Gorham case, this very Dr. Lushington was a party, and an influential party, in laying down. Then, as the Court took care to enforce, the standards of interpretation were the Articles and Liturgy. Then, the greatest and most scrupulous deference was paid to the crude speculations of all the ignoble herd of puritanical writers whom Mr. William Goode's perverse industry could rake up. It was enough to save Mr. Gorham that some forgotten scribbler of Elizabeth's time had said, and had said unpunished, some contradiction of common-sense morality like

Mr. Gorham's unnatural interpretations. This principle of latitude, which, whatever its dangers, had been laid down, is now abandoned. It was adopted for one party purpose, it is given up for another. The Lesbian rule, which had been unduly stretched in one direction, has suddenly collapsed in another, under the very hands which do not refuse to play fast and loose for the same sectarian and prejudiced objects. Whether rightly or wrongly the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has decided that the mere fact of holding and publicly avowing certain opinions unchallenged on the part of acknowledged divines, is an evidence and guarantee that the Church of England does permit in these days to its clergy an equal liberty. This is the principle of the Gorham judgment; that is, it is Dr. Lushington's principle in 1851. In 1856 this same Dr. Lushington lays down as law that it is no matter who has held the doctrine complained of; that it is not to be inquired into if the doctrine is or is not fortified by Scripture; is, or is not, in harmony with the Prayer-book;—if, in his, Dr. Lushington's, solitary opinion, it seems to be repugnant to his, Dr. Lushington's, solitary and unsupported interpretation of a single Article, the person who holds it is to be deprived.

Although we had purposed merely to confine ourselves to the legal wrong and judicial unfairness of the Bath judgment, we cannot but allude in a single paragraph to its monstrous folly. Professing to be guided by the most scrupulous reverence for the letter of a formulary, Dr. Lushington puts forth statements which if they are to be construed literally are absolute nonsense. He says that the doctrine—

‘It is not true that the consecrated bread and wine are changed in their natural substance, for they remain in their natural substances, and are not to be worshipped: it is true that worship is due to the real though invisible and supernatural Presence of the Body and Blood of CHRIST in the Holy Eucharist, under the form of bread and wine’—

is directly contrary and repugnant to the XXVIIIth and XXIXth Articles, &c.

That is to say, Dr. Lushington denies *both* statements of the Archdeacon: not only does he deny the Archdeacon's last and affirmative statement, but he pronounces his first and negative statement to be equally repugnant and contrary to the Articles. What the Archdeacon denies the Judge must, if his words have meaning, assert. Archdeacon Denison says, ‘it is not true,’ Dr. Lushington therefore says it is true, ‘that the consecrated bread and wine are changed in their natural substances.’ In short, considered according to the ordinary rules of construction, so loosely and slovenly is it worded, Dr. Lushington's judgment decidedly affirms the doctrine of Transubstantiation in its grossest form.

Further, as regards the positive statement, Archdeacon Denison asserts, that 'worship is due to the real though invisible and supernatural Presence,' &c. This Dr. Lushington asserts to be directly contrary and repugnant to the Article. The Article says nothing whatever of worship to the Presence, real, supernatural, or even corporeal; it simply asserts a fact, that 'by Christ's ordinance the Sacrament was not worshipped.' The Archdeacon never said anything about Christ's ordinance; he only asserted that worship was due, not to the Sacrament, but to the Presence. The Article denies a certain fact, viz. that the Sacrament was ordered by our Lord to be worshipped. Consistent, theoretically with this might stand the fact, that the Sacrament was in fact by the Church worshipped, or that even worship might be due to the Sacrament. We do not say that these things are so. We only say that the Article says nothing about them; still less does it say anything about the consideration whether worship is due to the Presence. The Archdeacon is condemned for making an assertion of which the subject is 'the Presence:' this assertion, he is told, is 'directly contrary to the Article;' whereas the Article never uses the word *Presence* at all—never says anything about it, one way or other. The Archdeacon is condemned for an assertion, true or false, about a certain theological term, the subject of his proposition, which term is never even alluded to in the Article. We cannot agree with those who say that the Bath Court has not condemned the doctrine of the Real Objective Presence. We say that the Court has condemned it, and has gone out of its way to condemn it, and has condemned it by the words of a document which does not even in terms allude to it at all.

And now, on the very day in which these remarks are published, the Court will proceed, we suppose, to fulminate its final decree—we had nearly said, to fill up the measure of its iniquity—a phrase which we will change for the measure of its folly; for very recently, as it seems, the whole aspect of the case has become changed. It seems to be pretty clearly established by the most seemingly conclusive evidence that the whole case will tumble down, carrying in its fall Dr. Lushington's legal character. In order to make the punishment as penal as possible, proceedings were taken under Eliz. 13, simply because this statute, and this statute alone, entails deprivation on a contradiction of the Articles. Mr. Ditcher and his friends might have prosecuted the Archdeacon under the general law of the Church, as having contradicted the Church's general teaching, the Articles included. This, because the less obnoxious and less penal course, was declined. They selected the old and vindictive statute because of its penalties. Investigation has since produced the notable fact,

that at the time of the passing of Eliz. 13, this very XXIXth Article had actually no existence. The penal statute Eliz. 13, alludes to a book lately imprinted. This book lately imprinted does not contain Article XXIX. It was well known to inquirers that Article XXIX. was contrary to Queen Elizabeth's taste, and her political views of comprehension, and was especially distasteful to a strong party of the time—to Bishop Guest among others—and that its final insertion in the Articles was the result of a severe conflict. Dr. Lamb's celebrated and very scarce *fac-simile* reprint of the successive editions of the Articles contains the book lately imprinted, which does not contain *the* Article. If this be so—and we cannot see how the force of the fact can be evaded—the Archdeacon's prosecution *under* Eliz. 13 falls to the ground.

'Solvuntur risu tabulæ: tu missus abibis.'

Of course Mr. Ditcher can begin again; but it remains to inquire whether, under any circumstances, any Clergyman can be convicted under Eliz. 13 by a Court conducted as that of Bath is. Is it not a fact that the Courts at Westminster will hold that the interpretation of an Act of Parliament is *ultra vires* of such a tribunal, and, therefore, establishes a *prima facie* ground for prohibition from the Queen's Bench?

NOTICES.

'THE Defence of the Archdeacon of Taunton,' (Masters,) consists of Dr. Phillimore's able argument *in extenso*, together with such subsidiary materials, *catena*, and the like, as were either rejected or laid aside during the progress of the trial. We have here not only a proof that the Archdeacon's doctrines were admissible, but strong approximating evidence that they may be 'the doctrine' of the Church of England. As a matter of surplusage, the second branch of defence was not entered upon. The volume is very complete, and embodies much of Mr. Grueber's learned and satisfactory investigations on the subject. Merely as an authoritative collection, we should have preferred Dr. Bayford's argument in a more authentic form: and the judgment of Dr. Lushington ought to have been appended.

This is not Mr. Grueber's only contribution to this important matter. In his 'Letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury,' and in his 'Tabular View of Articles XXV., XXVIII., XXIX.,' &c. (Masters,) he exhausts the subject; and, with much learning and argumentative power, has produced works which, far beyond their immediate and painful objects, rank their author as a theologian of great promise and large actual accomplishments.

In the Bishop of Ripon's recent 'Charge,' (Leeds: Harrison,) we notice and extract from it the fact, that out of 420 livings in that diocese, there are 243 of which the income does not exceed 150*l.* per annum; and we present it to the writer of the recent 'Church Articles' in the 'Times.'

'The Incomes of the Clergy, what they ought to be, and how to make them so,' (Seeley,) is a pamphlet by Mr. F. W. Harper, suggesting that the existing clergy should, by way of beginning, cut down their incomes by paying a Church Augmentation Fund of one-tenth of their incomes; and that all clergymen hereafter presented to livings, should tax them in whatever they exceed 500*l.* a-year. In other words, he proposes, in the end, to equalize all livings at 500*l.* per annum. And when this act of ecclesiastical communism is completed, he will suggest, we should think, to apply this principle to all property.

From Mr. Arthur Baker, now usefully at work in New Zealand, we receive a lecture on 'the Denominational (so called) System of National Education as best adapted to Colonial needs.' (Wellington, &c.) It is written not only with the results of experience, but with considerable force and spirit.

Appended to Mr. Gurney's 'Sermon at the Consecration of the Bishop of Gloucester,' (Rivingtons,) we find this gentleman's usual complaint of

the bad preaching in the Church of England. We admit the fact, but not in the way of contrast: we deny, judging from their published specimens, judging from Mr. Spurgeon's success, judging from the 'Pulpit,' which, at any rate, contains what answers Mr. Gurney's test, that of acceptability, that the Dissenters' sermons, merely as sermons, are better than our own. We admit that the University Professors of Pastoral Theology might usefully combine a practical course on homiletics with their ordinary theoretical disquisitions. But is not the real remedy to be found in the Theological Colleges? In these alone is the sphere where young men can be taught the clerical attitude. It is no less than a fact that we have, in one respect, over-educated the clergy. Their minds are too refined to be effective preachers. What makes us despair of coming to an understanding with the general herd of sermon critics, is our utter incapacity to arrive at what any of our instructors consider the model of a preacher. Mr. Gurney, for example, considers Dr. Guthrie and Mr. Robertson admirable specimens of the pulpit orator. The two men are as opposite in style as Bacon and Ossian. Robertson is plain, practical, severe, and familiar: Guthrie turgid, rhetorical, and diffuse.

'Lays of Memory, Sacred and Social, by a Mother and Son,' (Hurst & Blackett.) This volume does not rise above the average of pretty and religious album verses which any school-girl could write. The poems are well meant, and form a handsomely-printed volume.

Dr. Irons has printed a Sermon, which he preached, in 1850, on the Gorham case, and again, in 1856, on the Denison case, counselling patience and prayer in public ecclesiastical troubles. Its title is 'Christ's Promise to keep His People in Times of Trial.' (Masters.) It is warm and affectionate; and its object is to stay defections Romewards, not upon argumentative, but experimental grounds.

An article from our own pages, 'Mahometanism,' *Christian Remembrancer*, January, 1855, has been reprinted and authenticated by its writer, the Rev. J. G. Cazenove, of Cumbrae. (Mozley.) It has, we are convinced, recommended itself by its fulness and eloquence to our readers; and we are glad that, as a complete monograph of the subject, it has in this form become generally accessible.

Mr. E. B. Denison has a large share of self-consciousness; some would call it self-something-else. However, all that he writes is worth reading, or is, at least, quite readable. His 'Lectures on Church Building' (Bell & Daldy) are the expansion of some hints and advice which he delivered to the people of Doncaster, in connexion with the rebuilding of their parish church. In this work Mr. Denison did good service. We do not think that his Lectures have stuff enough in them to take the form of a regular treatise. The cool characteristic way in which Mr. Denison patronises such a person as Mr. George Scott is at least amusing.

'Sir Robert Peel's Memoirs,' vol. i. (Murray,) do not tell us much with which we were previously unacquainted. They do represent many persons,

George IV. among them, in a more unfavourable and perplexing light; and they elevate our estimate of the dutiful and conscientious character of the autobiographer. To clerical readers, what is preserved of Bishop Lloyd's confidential communications is important. But, after all, the work is a very fragmentary contribution to the materials of future history. There is very much more to tell in some quarters.

Another volume of poems from Mr. Archer Gurney, 'Songs of Early Summer,' (Longman,) lead us to acknowledge in this very pleasing writer a large flow of poetic diction, and an ear quite alive to melody. We think that perhaps his powers want concentration; and the habit of turning every thought into verse begets a facility fatal to enduring efforts. In the end of the present volume, we find some amusing satiric verses, in the shape of parody, on some of Mr. Gurney's poetical contemporaries.

Mrs. Phillipson, a name new to us, has published a volume of poems, called 'Lonely Hours,' (Moxon.) We must award to this lady acknowledgment for her undeniable claims to attention on the score of considerable acquirements and powers. She writes touchingly, and with much point, and with great variety of metre. But there is much in the volume which we cannot understand: we do not know, nor, were it not in print, are we concerned to know, whether the writer is speaking in her own or in another's person. If the former, she should have told us less, or more about herself: as the volume stands, there is so much scandal, detraction, false accusations, and so on, alluded to in the way of complaint, that we are perfectly puzzled about the whole thing. Mrs. Phillipson is a victim of some sort, and protests innocence with a vehemence of which we cannot understand the how or why: and in many poems the authoress attacks her friends or acquaintance in a way which we should think was libellous. But as we never heard of one of the parties, mystification is to ourselves the chief result of the volume, not uncoupled with regret at a certain unfeminine tone, which detracts from what would, under other aspects, ripen into respect for this writer.

Mr. E. A. Freeman has, in his 'History and Conquests of the Saracens,' (J. H. Parker,) chosen a subject very suitable to his brilliant and effective style. The subject, however, is too large for Mr. Freeman's canvas. He will scarcely expect us to sympathise with his estimate of Akbar's pantheism. Toleration is one thing, and the present writer may be right in his eulogies on it; but the fact of Akbar's religion was that he professed, and in the East an emperor's professions are preachings, that all creeds, Buddhism, Judaism, Mahometanism, Christianity, and the old Hindoo Monotheism, are all the same thing, which same thing, whether it was true or false, was quite unimportant.

The position of Dr. Thiersch, a German Irvingite, would of itself make his 'Christian Family Life,' translated by Mr. Gardiner, (Bosworth,) an extremely interesting volume. It is this, not only because it points out from experience the dangers of a relaxed marriage-law in a Lutheran community, but because it is very explicit on the dangers of Luther's own

views on the relations of the sexes. Besides all this, Dr. Thiersch writes very practically on the domestic relations, especially on education. We desire, however, that his condemnation of public schools should be understood only as what it is—an exception against the German gymnasia. Of schools conducted as we are glad to think our own great schools, almost without exception, are, Dr. Thiersch has no experience. His strictures on female education also must be construed as written under other auspices than our own.

'The Duties of the Parish Priest,' by Professor Blunt, (Murray,) remind us that in real usefulness the writer has perhaps never been excelled in these latter days. The wisdom, that is the calm sense of strength, which these lectures display; the utter absence of what is called party-spirit, and, therefore, the independent witness both to Catholic truth and ritual exactness; the liberality, charity, and largeness of view which they embody; their profusion of illustrative learning, and their close acquaintance with the practical matters of the priest's office, render this the most trustworthy handbook with which we are acquainted. We despair that either University will be blessed with a living Divinity Professor equal to Professor Blunt. We recommend this work as a manual in our Theological Colleges.

'Syria and the Syrians,' by Mr. G. M. Wortarbet, (Madden,) is a worthless book. The writer asks us 'to make allowance for his education and national style of expression.' Not to be able to write English, and to be very ignorant, are strong reasons against publication, not abatements of its folly.

'Bishop Torrey's Life and Times,' (Masters,) is a volume for which we are indebted to Mr. Neale. It is written in the picturesque style, and with that ample detail in which the biographer excels; but in our own judgment, looking at the volume in its merely literary aspect, Bishop Torrey scarcely fills such a space in Church history as to justify this large biography. Most important, however, in the way of recording an important chapter in our own history, are the details on the life and fortunes of the Scotch Communion Office and the S. Andrew's Prayer-book. Still, history ought to recede somewhat from its subjects: the groups want fusing and harmonizing; and whenever we get annals written too soon, the suspicion, at least, of partiality is unavoidable.

From the same writer we receive 'Mediæval Preachers and Mediæval Preaching,' (Mozley.) The substance of this very curious volume has appeared in this Review; and the article made, as it deserved to make, a considerable sensation. It is now expanded, and enriched with various illustrations; and among others, we commend it to Mr. Gurney; for Mr. Neale, equally possessed with Mr. Gurney's feelings as to the dryness of extant sermons, at least proposes in the way of remedy something which we can grasp and try. Mr. Gurney only finds fault; Mr. Neale offers an alternative.

There are many points of doctrine, and those very serious ones, in which we differ from Mr. Ashton Oxenden; yet his 'Pathway of Safety; or, Counsel to the Awakened,' (Wertheim,) is much, in practical teaching, in advance of the school by which the writer would probably consider himself best represented.

A little volume styled 'Epitaphs, collected and arranged by Mr. Hare, of University College, Oxford,' (J. H. Parker,) contains—it were impossible that it should not contain—much that is interesting; but the subject is beyond the compiler's powers and researches. A collection of extant epitaphs which bring out the permission of commemoration in prayer of the dead in the recent English Church, would have great value; but, judging from the chance medley way in which the present writer heaps together religious observations on stone, embodying the most opposite views of the condition of the Christian dead, it does not seem to occur to him that there is a doctrinal right and wrong as to the state of the departed. Nor are we quite satisfied as to the propriety of presenting in this form the ludicrous and offensive epitaphs of which we all remember too many. Some which Mr. Hare preserves are simply disgusting. Does Mr. Hare intend us to construe conjunctively 'the curious and beautiful' in the following among his Latin Epitaphs?—

'Hic jacet vir, perpendiculariter honestus;'

and this execrable trash—

'Musicus et logicus Wyal hic jacet ecce Johannes:
Organa namque loqui fecerat ille quasi.'

Both, we regret to be told, occur in English cathedrals.

'Threescore Years and Ten,' (Masters,) by Archdeacon Wilkins, is a pleasant, indeed affecting, memorial of a good man's sunset time. There is just that amount of gentle garrulity, mellowed by Christian experience and right feeling, which makes the picture at once engaging and accurate.

'Midsummer Holidays,' (Masters,) is a child's story-book of the most childish sort. There is a great deal of gabble, useful enough to talk to children, but not useful enough to print. And Church writers should remember, that in committing nonsense to the press—a serious matter at all times—they commit others beside themselves.

'The English Hymnal: a Hymn-book for the Church of England,' (J. H. Parker,) is inconsistent in its title—an inconsistency which illustrates its contents. It has no right to the exclusive '*The*;' and as regards '*a*,' we are already surfeited with Manuals not one shadow worse than the present. It is entirely uncalled for.

'Stories on the Commandments,' by Mr. Rockstro, (Masters.) Here we reiterate our old complaint. The collection is not wanted; the stories are very well, neither good nor bad; but, as far as we can judge, the only object in multiplying these Hymn-books, Story-books, Catechisms, Lec-

tures, Prayers, Illustrative Stories on Collects, Epistles, and what not, is to distract the attention of purchasers, to cause rivalry and ill-feeling among writers, and to make even commercial success impossible. Soon after the commencement of the Reformation, there was a royal order to stop preaching for a year. What if our Church publishers were to try the value, both to themselves and to the Church, of an abstinence for the next six months from all good little books? Certain we are that we have enough on hand to keep things going.

Mr. Whitehead's *Sermons, 'The Church and the People,'* (Rivingtons,) show—and we commend it with that view to certain cynical persons, who think, or affect to think, that it is impossible for the clergy of London to establish any personal relations with their parishioners—the amount of quiet, yet most real, work which attends the new churches in the metropolis and elsewhere. Mr. Whitehead labours in the 'slums' of the west of London: and we believe that one of the first, and, as all clergy find, most imperative calls on him was to release his church from pew-rents. Till this is done in every church in London, the work of Church extension is a delusion.

'*Scripture and Science not at Variance,*' by Archdeacon Pratt, (Hatchard,) is a large title for a small performance. As far as the writer goes, he has done something; but that far is but a small way.

In '*Agonistes, or Philosophical Strictures,*' by Mr. Lyall, (Rivingtons,) we detect considerable powers. They are desultory, and occasionally crude: and Mr. Lyall must have considerable confidence in his own strength to assume the critical chair towards so many, and those so distinguished, of his contemporaries. Is it a fact, that the English estimate of the sanctity of landed property has given the law to Europe on the subject? We know nothing to establish any exception as regards England in this respect. In his metaphysics we think the present writer is tentative; and in his political speculations he, like the old Sophists, generally seems to regard the subject eristically than on established convictions.

'*Sponsorial Stipulations at Infant Baptism considered,*' &c. (Darling.) This pamphlet professes to be by a clergyman. Certainly we hold the indelibility of orders, and we have no wish to see this anonymous person degraded: but we trust, for the sake of decency, to say nothing of higher feelings, that a person who so very plainly denies the truth and obligation of the Prayer-book, has ceased to minister in our Church.

A volume of '*Sermons,*' by Mr. Greville Phillimore, (Rivingtons,) is not above the average; and that average is, we are told again and again, not a high one. Who, may we ask, is '*Gregory of Nazianzen?*' p. 113. We do not say that these sermons are in any way objectionable, but our wonder is to see them in print. That a sermon is simply sensible and sound is no reason for publishing it.

Mr. Woodford has, by a previous and successful volume, established his right to print sermons. Here we have a preacher with most of a preacher's

gifts, natural and acquired: rich and varied language, a full command of his subject, powers of illustration, and that tact which, so important in the preacher's office, refers the Gospel precepts and sentiments to the emergencies of the day. This volume of 'Occasional Sermons,' (Masters,)—most were delivered on some public or special occasion—is really a contribution to our literature.

Lord Lyttelton's edition of the 'Gospel and Acts, with Short Notes,' (Rivingtons,) is a very pleasing memorial of a Christian nobleman doing his duty in the simplest and most practical way. A man of Lord Lyttelton's social and political eminence does not, as it was once the fashion to say, adorn the Gospel which he professes, by his earnest and resolute attendance at Sunday-schools, and in his quiet Scripture readings in his own household; but he illustrates the Churchman's character. He, among that cluster of noble persons, the Glynnnes, the Gladstones, and the like, recalls other and better days, or rather he auspicates a better future for us in State alike and in Church. The notes are, like the writer, of the most intelligible earnest sort: not without inaccuracies, some of which we had marked; but it is better to let the volume stand on its substantial merits.

'Memorialia Cordis,' (Masters,) is a small, very small, collection of poems, printed in minute and nearly unreadable characters. The writer is Mr. C. J. Black; and if, which will be a difficulty owing to the type, our readers can master them, they will be rewarded. They are mostly studies, prolusions, and essayings of the poetic wing: but full of promise. A volume of Mr. Black's, 'Messias and anti-Messias,' led us to anticipate well of him; and this little collection fulfils some of our expectations.

Among the many Manuals for establishing and keeping Aquaria, we must specify, both as cheap and really effective, Bishop's 'Plain Instructions for the Management of the Aquarium.' (Dean.) It is a working book; confined, however, to the fresh-water tank.

Dr. Maitland is, we must say it, a provoking writer. He seems to delight in tantalizing his readers. He begins a subject, exhibits the most rich and prolific stores of information and research in examining it, and leaves his premises without a conclusion. It is well known that for years he has been engaged in investigating the modern miracles and wonders. He began an Essay on Superstition and Science: he has said enough to stimulate us all on the subjects of alleged spiritualism, on mesmerism, and the like. Our curiosity, our interest, our duties, are probed to the quick; but we are left, after all, only excited and roused; never satisfied. We do not think this quite fair. Let us understand Dr. Maitland: if he has a clear view of the invisible world, and the present personal operations of evil spirits, is it not a duty to put Christians on their guard? Have we not a right to know how much of certain notorious phenomena, or of alleged phenomena, he believes to be fact—how much is illusion, conscious or other—how much sheer imposture and delusion. Occasionally Dr. Maitland seems to adopt as fact all Dr. Gregory's and Reichenbach's assertions about the odylie lights, and even to look favourably, as fact, at table-turning, and the like super-

naturalism. If Dr. Maitland is really certain of these facts, and is ready to assign them to demoniac influence, we ought to know this. Nothing coming from one like Dr. Maitland is unimportant: his writings are too valuable not to tell. And while he leaves things of this consequence vague, he may very unintentionally do as much harm as we are sure that his investigation of any subject would do good. What leads us to say this, is the appearance of a little work of surprising interest, and still greater learning, an 'Essay on False Worship,' (Rivingtons.) We perhaps should have styled it an Essay towards an Essay, &c. And the rather are we enforced to ask this plain speaking at Dr. Maitland's hands, since his speculations, or, perhaps, conclusions, are no recent matter. He has of late years reprinted his early work, 'Eruvin;' in which, and in certain disquisitions on the state of the pre-diluvian earth, the germs of his present views are to be detected. What, of course, we have to account for, is not the possibility of reconciling so-called 'Spiritualism' with Scriptural revelations, but the novelty of its present manifestations. One thing is quite certain, that if, as Dr. Maitland seems to intimate, we are to accept the facts, we must conclude that the notion of spiritual *intelligences* not only does not imply any superiority, but does not require any degree of intellect, as we understand it in the terrestrial spheres.

We group together a cloud, rather than a galaxy, of publications connected with, or suggested by, the late war. 1. 'War and Peace,' a Sermon, preached at S. Paul's, by Dean Milman, (Murray,) not equal to the preacher's most remarkable—why unpublished?—sermon after the Duke of Wellington's funeral, but one which will sustain, if it does not enlarge, Dr. Milman's reputation. 2. 'A Peace Thanksgiving Sermon,' by the author of 'National Humiliation,' (Darling;) an average discourse. 3. 'Peace: its Privileges and Duties,' (Darling;) tame and commonplace. 4. 'War: its Lawfulness; Peace: its Blessing,' by Mr. Jordan Palmer, (Skeffington,) of which the speciality is, that the author thinks Aquila was a woman, and spells *maritime* with two *a*'s. 5. 'Peace, God's Gift,' by Mr. H. Hayman, Assistant Preacher at the Temple, (Skeffington;) serviceable, but certainly within the preacher's great capacities. 6. 'The Lessons of the War,' preached at Leeds, by Mr. Barry, (Harrison;) better, but still not up to the preacher's powers. 7. 'Peace,' the substance of two Sermons preached at Crawley, by Mr. W. B. Flower, (Masters;) warm, and much more like pulpit addresses, and which we should commend without restriction, were it not for one affectation. Appended to a sentence containing the words, 'O Jesus, full of saving grace, fountain never-failing,' &c., we find the note, 'It is needless to add, that these ideas are contained in S. Bernard's beautiful stanzas,' &c. It is very needful to add, for (we speak for ourselves at least) not one reader in fifty thousand, if Mr. Flower gets—and he deserves—as many, is aware of the fact. 8. 'The English Church at Constantinople,' a Sermon at Grantham, by Mr. Street. (Hedge.) A very good sermon. In connexion with it, we may call attention to the lamentable proceedings connected with Bishop Gobat's proceedings in the East. Not only is this unhappy person,—unhappy in the actual

mischief which he is causing, unhappy in the scandal which he is attracting to the Church of England, and unhappy in the dismay which his schismatical proceedings have caused among our faithful members,—sedulously engaged in proselytizing from the Oriental Churches, and giving the lie to the pledge solemnly undertaken by the late Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop Blomfield; but in a recent tour in Scotland, he has openly held communion with the so-called English Episcopalians. Nor is this all; the Scotch Bishops have appealed to the Archbishop of Canterbury; and in his reply Dr. Sumner has not only fully adopted Dr. Gobat's proceedings, but adding affront to injustice, forgetting the Christian gentleman as well as the Primate of all England, the Archbishop of Canterbury has informed the Scotch Bishops that he is much pleased at Bishop Gobat's report of the flourishing state of the Scotch schismatic assemblies. Is there not a text about 'rejoicing in iniquity?' 9. 'The War and the Newspapers.' (Mayer.) A lecture, and a very forcible one, delivered by Mr. Kennaway, at Ottery S. Mary. It denounces—adopting much of the well-known and spirited protests of the 'Saturday Review'—the mischief and folly of 'Our own Correspondent.'

'Three Suggestive Discourses,'—we miss the *suggestive* force of the epithet,—(Hayes,) are by Mr. Skinner, of S. Barnabas. We cannot venture to pronounce upon local requirements, but however well fitted for individuals, we should have questioned the policy of preaching these sermons. Nevertheless, they are well reasoned, and suitable to their object—that of staying possible defections Romewards. Is Mr. Skinner quite accurate in his *precis* of the De Dominis case? and certainly Archbishop Laud never published anything against the book called 'Naked Truth.' (p. 45.)

On the subject of Social Burthens of the Clergy, one in which it was our privilege to lead the way in this Review, we have to mention, among others, 1. a complete and exhaustive 'Letter to Mr. Gladstone,' by Mr. Ridley, of Hambleden.' (Bell & Daldy.) This really says all that ought to be said, and it is much, on the indirect burthens of the Clergy, especially as to the abatements which, in justice, must be made from the assessment of the rent-charge. And it very forcibly brings out the amount of necessary though informal deductions to which every Clergyman's income is liable. Also, 2. which is more specially concerned with the legal and technical aspect of the case, Mr. C. A. Stevens' 'Remarks on the Rating of the Tithe Commutation Rent-Charge.' (Rivingtons.) By the way, Mr. Stevens corrects Mr. Ridley's—the popular—assumption that six per cent. is (Rex v. Capel) a fair estimate of the cost and risk of collecting the rent-charge. We desire especial attention to these two pamphlets. Mr. Stevens does good service in bringing very prominently forward the rating of the value of the personal labour of the parish priest, merely, to speak according to the card, as a skilled labourer.

On the Sunday Question, we select for commendation, 1. Dr. Hook's 'The Lord's Day,' (Murray,) a Sermon, with notes, &c. This is by far

the ablest publication on the subject; and among Dr. Hook's many and ill-requited services to the Church of England, we do not recal one which does him greater credit. In the midst of certain and wilful misrepresentation, boldly to vindicate the true and old Church of England doctrine on this subject, required just that sort of free, earnest, English spirit which marks the Vicar of Leeds. His suggestions, both on recreation, and the sort of recreation, allowable on Sunday, and his distinct protest against Sunday labour, are alike forcible and temperate. The only point which we could wish enlarged is the Catechism's interpretation of the Fourth Commandment as connected with the Christian rest from sin, that is, from our natural works, 'all the days of our life.' We note a literary oversight: 'Bishop Cosin, one of those most oppressed by the Puritans in the reign of Charles I., is' *not* 'regarded as the author of that portion of the Church Catechism which relates to the sacraments,' (p. 69.) seeing that it was added in 1604, and, as is generally believed, by Bishop Overall. 2. Mr. Roundell Palmer's 'Speech on Sir Joshua Walmsley's Motion,' (J. H. Parker): to say it was the best delivered on the subject is small praise. 3. Mr. De Burgh's 'The Christian Sabbath,' (Rivingtons,) is learnedly and closely reasoned. 4. 'How to keep Sunday,' (Hatchard,) by Captain Williams, R.N., begins by mistaking the object of Dr. Hook's Sermon, as though he taught that 'its religious duties are matters of human arrangement.' The cure, of course, is characteristic: Dr. Hook says that the religion of the Sunday is a matter of the *Church's* arrangement: Dr. Hook thinks the Church to be divine, Captain Williams human. However, the gallant Captain is a well-meaning person, only a little out of his depth in theology.

Mr. J. H. Parker has published the first part of 'A Plain Commentary on the Book of Psalms.' Here we have to remark that this undertaking supplies a great want. As *the* guide to the spiritual life, the Psalms are, after all, the fittest manual; and yet their very familiarity may be a hindrance to their understanding. This Commentary, devotional at once and expository, cheap and compact, and, above all, taking as its text the familiar,—may we not add better?—Prayer-Book Version, meets the case. It is more manageable than Bishop Horne, and will do much to supply the place of manuals, the popularity of which is to be attributed rather to the fact that they have taken up the ground, than to their doctrinal trustworthiness.

'The Oxford Sermons on the Atonement,' delivered against Professor Jowett's untoward speculations, have been collected in a handsome volume, (J. H. Parker,) and in this form are enriched by a catena—or sketch of a catena—of patristic and other authorities.—Dublin has added an able sermon on this subject, an 'Act Sermon,' by Mr. J. C. MacDonnell, (Hodges,) which deserves a place with the Oxford refutations.

Mrs. Bunbury, 'the kind aunt' of 'Henry Shirléy Bunbury, aged twelve years,' has done a very unkind and injudicious thing in publishing that little gentleman's 'The Error Corrected, or the Faithful Priest.' (Masters.)

When little boys write little books, a little fire is what a sensible friend would suggest. We have not read, nor do we counsel anybody else to read, this production. We are asked 'to judge leniently of . . . the motives that led to its publication.' As we are not informed what those motives are, we choose to condemn them *in toto*.

If our readers, for school-gifts and the like, want something which really suits children, and which are written by those who know what children ought to have, we suggest Miss Young's two little stories, 'Leonard the Lion-Heart' and 'Ben Sylvester's Word.' (Mozley.) It is astonishing what sharp discrimination of character and life-like touches of the true artist these miniature portraits display.

Mr. Molyneux, the Incumbent of Sudbury, has addressed a 'Letter to the Lord Bishop of Ely,' (J. H. Parker,) which is just the thing to make episcopal and other ears tingle. It is on the Pew System, and in the most sensible and common-sense way urges everything that can be said against appropriated seats. Sure we are that one-half of our actual expenses in building new churches might be saved by properly using the existing ones. Mr. Molyneux constructs a catena from the 'Record' to the 'Christian Remembrancer'—in processions the place of honour is the last—embracing the editor of the 'Times' and a dissenting teacher, all denouncing the Pew System on the score of propriety, religion, economy, justice, and policy. Sooner or later, (sooner rather than later,) appropriated pews must go.

Mr. Tinkler of Landbeach has, in the form of a pamphlet, 'Scripture and Tradition,' (Hamilton, Adams & Co.) with some amount of reading, and in an engaging style, arrived at the conclusion that the soul sleeps after death; that the ministration of angels has been put an end to under the Gospel economy; that Baptism is not the conveyance of a gift; and that the Eucharist is a symbolical teaching, rather than in itself a channel of grace. What surprises us is that Mr. Tinkler, on his own principles, does not see that all this is *his* tradition; and that as he will not accept the received conclusions of the vast majority of Christians in all ages, we are under neither obligation nor disposition to pay the slightest attention to his traditions.

The Society some time since established for making known on the Continent the position and claims of our Church, issues from time to time its useful publications. We have received—'La Supremacia Papal,' a Spanish version of Mr. James Meyrick's tract, and 'De la Validité des Ordinations de l'Eglise Anglicane,' a translation of a well-known publication by Mr. Oldknow, (J. H. Parker;) also a Spanish version of Mr. Frederick Meyrick's compilation from Cosin and others, which has already appeared in French and Italian. The title of this last is 'Religion, Disciplina y Sagrados Ritos de la Iglesia de Inglaterra,' &c. (J. H. Parker.)

A second completed volume of Mr. Newland's spirited and useful series, 'Sermons on the Seasons of the Church,' (Mozley,) shows no lack of vigour in the editor. This collection fulfils its claims, and we cannot give it higher praise.

Notices.

Bishop of Tasmania's Charge of 1855,' (Hobart Town: Best,) has reached us very late, or we owe an apology to the author for so late acknowledgment of it. It is important, not only on account of its pleasant tone which characterises it, but as announcing the establishment of a 'Church Sustentation Fund,' for the maintenance of existing Ministers and Schoolmasters, the support of aged and infirm Clergy, and for the building and repairing of churches, schools, and parsonages. This—among other signs—shows that the Colonies are awakening to the duty of maintaining their own churches.

Lecture on the 'Philosophy of Kant,' (J. H. Parker,) by Mr. Henry Martineau, though, from the nature of the case, quite inadequate to the great difficulty of the subject, shows the lecturer's fitness for his task. It may be criticised, however, remembering that, in its original form it was the first of a series. What, however, most concerns ourselves is the manner borne by Mr. Mansel, both to the fact of the Kantian pantheism, and the dangers of philosophical study, without the balance of a firm belief in a personal God.

Simple and appropriate 'Sermon, preached at the Bishop of Oxford's Convention,' by the Bishop of Moray, (J. H. Parker;) 2. a very deep and consistent sermon,' at S. Matthias, Stoke Newington, 'The Life of Objective Christianity,' by Mr. Carter, of Clewer, (Masters;) 3. 'The Fruits of Divine Love,' by James Anderson, preached at Bristol, for the Diocesan Clergy Fund, (Masters,) which is far in advance of this writer's works, as familiar, at least to ourselves; and 4. a Sermon to Mourners, 'Lessons of Bereavement,' (J. H. Parker,) by Mr. Barker, of Queen's College, Oxford, delivered in 1854, after the cessation of the yellow fever, and under circumstances of peculiar trial to the preacher, *haud ignarus mali miseris succurrere disco*, he drew himself from the crowd of single and occasional Sermons.

In the Wesleyan question we have several publications; the most important, 1. Mr. Gresley's reprint of John Wesley on the 'Christianity of Faith and Sacrifice,' (Masters,) which, if not in all respects equal to the doctrine, yet shows a deep and very spiritual estimate of the Christian mystery. If the Wesleyans now, which we much doubt, are teaching, the difficulties of their return are already disposed of. 2. Letter to the Members of a Methodist Society,' &c., (Masters,) which, what has been so often urged, the argument on the drifting of the Church from their founder's principles.

Sermons, 'The Son of Consolation,' preached at the school of All Souls, Oxford, the one by Mr. F. J. Manning, the other by Mr. Hake, (Masters,) on S. Bartholomew's day, are both good; but the first for suitability to the occasion and as a specimen of how schoolboys ought to be exhorted, might serve as a model.

In the United States we have received not much, but the chief matter to be acknowledged and recommended is 'Exclusiveness,' a Lecture delivered at New York by Dr. Coit, (Troy: Young,) which though having an immediate and being addressed to a specific opponent, in fulness, strength of

argument, and tone, shows that while our American brethren are necessarily led by their position into an aggressive attitude, yet that they can maintain it not only with firmness to their own principles, but with courtesy to the Sectarians.

The improved tone of public schools is one of the most hopeful signs of the times. Mr. Woodard's success may well be great if he can surround himself by such men as his general staff consists of. Mr. Lowe's Sermon, 'The Image of God,' preached at the College Chapel, Hurstpierpoint, (Masters,) higher as a composition and more scholarly in form than Mr. Manning's, which we have already commended, is not inferior to it in a religious and practical tone.

To those who have heard the Bishop of Exeter's very striking and really pastoral addresses to the young people at Confirmation, the substance of one of them delivered at Bampton, and published by the clergymen of that place, under the title, 'Confirmation, its Duties and Privileges,' (Masters,) will be a pleasant memorial of the Bishop; but to others this little tract will be useful.

'The History and Antiquities of St. David's,' (J. H. Parker,) by Messrs. Jones and E. A. Freeman, has reached us so late in the quarter, that we are prevented from doing more than acknowledging a sumptuous volume, which does credit to the publisher's taste, and to the interest and skill which he must have expended in producing it. St. David's, that ancient Menevia, presents great claims on the historian, and its history is because so melancholy, so instructive. The fruitless struggles to maintain, perhaps to acquire, the title—for the authority would never have accompanied it—of Metropolitan, seem rather to have weakened than to have condensed the real authority of the see, and perhaps, more than anything else, the peculiarly unfortunate site of the church has contributed to the same result. The anomalous condition of the see in recent times, with its non-resident Bishop as its Dean, and its imported English prelates, have combined with its other untoward fortunes against St. David's. A better future seems to loom, and already some creditable restorations of the fabric may be the forerunners of a spiritual re-edification of this deserted see. The Church, according to the present historians' account, exhibits many features of architectural interest, and the roof seems to be unique, and of a splendour almost barbarously rich. Our curiosity leads us to ask, why we have not a view of Mr. Nash's West Front? We observe a very racy sketch of Giraldus Cambrensis, which it must have been a labour of love to Mr. Freeman to draw. It is superfluous to say, in the case of one of Mr. John H. Parker's works, that the scientific illustrations are beautiful and complete.

Dr. Peter Maurice is well known at Oxford,—better known than—but, apologetically, is a useful figure. He has indited a Letter to 'My Lord Chancellor,' meaning Lord Derby, which, like the writer, is a curiosity. We cannot, as is our custom, give the publisher; for, much to the credit of the craft, we suppose the Sosii of our times declined the honour of Dr. Peter Maurice's



patronage. The doctor is his own publisher on the same principle, or at least with the same results, that some people are their own lawyers. If Dr. Maurice had confined himself to his own subject, that of music, we should not have interfered with his skimble-skamble writing. But he takes upon himself to settle the sense of Scripture; and he really hints that 1 Cor. i. 23 was prophetically said in reference to the present state of the University of Oxford. 'To the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness,' the learned doctor applies respectively to the two *Regius Professors*, Dr. Pusey and Mr. Jowett.—'Have we not a sect in Oxford'—anyhow it is two sects—'who stumble at the doctrine of the Apostle? &c. Is not reserve in the doctrine of the Atonement, the *Hebrew professor* being the avowed Choragus, the leading note of their scale? and can we be surprised if at last *Greek* should furnish an University, where heathen morals have been the food from tender years of its choicest alumni, with a *professor* to whom (to say the least of it) the doctrine of the Atonement is foolishness?' (p. 4.) Here is a piece of statistics which is important. 'As near as can be ascertained, upon inquiry at the respective Colleges, there are about 120 pianos, 10 harmoniums, 30 flutes, 20 violins and other stringed instruments, 30 concertinas and acordians (*sic*), 18 cornets, besides other instruments.' (p. 22.) With the 'Hebrew professor's' influence, it is well for the peace of Oxford that he has not revived the practice of the received national instrument—the Jew's harp.

If, which is not, and which is not likely to be the case, the question of the proper vestment for the preacher could be settled either by argument, or by authority, or by convenience, we should all long since have quietly subsided into the surplice. Such is not the case. We do not, therefore, anticipate much, if any, success for Mr. Cecil Wray's 'Short Inquiry, &c., whether the Surplice or Black Gown should be worn during the Sermon.' (Masters.) But it is an argument well constructed and ably conducted, and ought to command assent.

Among the confutations of Professor Jowett's recent attacks on the doctrine of the Atonement, we ought to single out, as especially remarkable for philosophical depth and power of argument, as well as especially valuable as coming from a disciple of Mr. Maurice, Mr. Llewellyn Davies's 'S. Paul and Modern Thought.' (Macmillan.)

Dr. Acland combines, and we trust that the union is not rare, the scholar, the Christian, and the physician. In his 'Suggestions on Health, Work, and Play,' (J. H. Parker,) a chapter from his remarkable and well-known 'Report on the Cholera in Oxford,' he says more and better on 'common things,' and in a higher spirit, than most of our lecturers. The tract is eminently beautiful.

INDEX TO VOL. XXXII.

(NEW SERIES.)

ARTICLES AND SUBJECTS.

A.

Arago, François [*Arago's Popular Astronomy, translated, &c., Herschel's Astronomy, &c.*], 103—140. Popular science, 103. Difficulties of popular science, 104—107; experiment, 108, 109; illustrative machinery, 110—114; popular astronomy, 114—116. Herschel's and Arago's works, 117. Herschel's manner, 119; discovery of the planet Neptune, 121—123. Arago's work, 126; criticisms on, 127—140.

B.

Bible, Proposed Revision of the Authorized Version of the [*Publications of Messrs. Harness, Selwyn, Malan, &c.*], 451—499. Popular assent to the Authorized Version, 451. Movement in favour of Revision, 452; in America, 452, 453. Mr. Harness in the *Edinburgh Review*, 454, 455. End and purpose of Holy Scripture, 456; what a translation must be, 457; always inadequate, 458—461; no material errors in the Authorized Version, 462—477; how far a revision is desirable, 477. Mr. Sharpe, 478. Dr. Turnbull, 479. Dr. Peile, 480. Mr. Stanley, 481, 482. Mr. Elliott, 483, 484. Revision of the text, 485, 486; effects of a new Version on the people, 487—490; difficulties of introducing a new Version, 490—493; by whom are changes to be made, 494—497. Mr. Elliott on the subject, 497—499.

Biography, Religious [*Memoirs of Hewitson, Miss Newton, Mr. Hedley Vicars, &c.*], 141—198. Popularity of biography, 141; religious biography, 142—144. Baillie's *Memoirs*,—Memoir of Mr. Hewitson, 145—161.

NO. XCIV.—N.S.

Memoir of Miss Newton, 162—171. Memoir by Mr. Horattus Bonar, 172—181. Memoir of Captain Hedley Vicars, 182—193. Reflections on religious biography, 196—198.

C.

Chaucer [*Bel's Edition of Chaucer*], 327—356. England still mediæval, 327. Bell's Chaucer, 328; previous editions, 329. Chaucer's extraction and education, 330—332. Testament and Court of Love, 332—336. Allegories, 337, 338. Poems of communism and liberalism, 339—342. Chaucer's personal history, 343—347. House of Fame, 348, 349. Troilus and Criseyde, 350, 351. The Canterbury Tales, 352—354. End of Chaucer's life, 355, 356.

Consistorial Court, Judgment in Westerton v. Liddell [*Dr. Lushington's Judgment in, Bishop of Exeter's Letter to Dr. Lushington, &c.*], 27—63. Westerton and his motives, 27. Dr. Lushington's Judgment, 28; the Homilies, *ibid*; Queen Elizabeth's Injunctions, 29; Crosses, 30; historical and documentary proof of the continued use of Crosses and other excepted ornaments, &c. 30—63.

D.

Denison Case, The [*Grueber's Tabular View, &c.*], 500—506. The Clevedon inquiry, 501; constitution of the Bath Court, *ibid*; rejection of the objections of Dr. Phillimore, *ibid*; characteristics of the trial, 502—505; prospects, 506.

M M

E.

England, Social and Religious before the Reformation [*Froude's History of England, Annals of England, &c.*], 64—102. Froude's history—documents, 64—66; England in the fifteenth century, 67; failure of materials, 68; laxity of discipline, 69; and corruption of social morals, 70—75; clerical abuses, 76—86; morals of the clergy, 87, 88; monasteries, 89—92; higher ecclesiastics, 93, 94; bishops, 95—98; abatement of the evil, 101, 102.

G.

Gallican Church, Present State of the [*Guettée's History of the Church of France, &c.*], 423—450. Renewed struggle against Ultramontaniam in France, 423; Guettée's heresy, 424; suspected, 425; defended, 426; *L'Observateur Catholique*, 427, 428; the Abbé La Borde, 429—435; declaration of the Dutch bishops, 436—438; the Gallican offices, 438; *Lettres Parisiennes*, 439—441; the articles of 1682, 442—449; prospects of the Gallican Church, 450.

H.

Herschel, Sir John's, Astronomy (*see* Arago).

I.

Imperialism [*Congreve on the Roman Empire, Montalembert on England, &c.*], 265—326. Nothingness of political rule to the Christian, 265; personal happiness independent of government, 266; but still the subject important to a Christian, 267. Imperialism, 268; fourfold, 268, 269; common characteristics of Imperialism, 270; its alleged advantages, 271—282; its evils, 283, 284; its influence on religion, 285—287; on liberty of thought, 288, 289; Antichrist, 290. How has France arrived at Imperial government? 291—311; is it probable that England will follow the example? 311, 312. Mr. Congreve, 313, 315. Mr. Goldwin Smith's reply, 316, 317. English institutions, 318. M. Montalembert, 319

—321. Social dangers, 321—325; and hopes, 326.

J.

Jewish Nation, the [*Edersheim's History, Raphael's History, &c.*], 357—422. Exceptional character of the Jews, 357. Edersheim's history, 358; criticisms on it and Dr. Raphael's work, 359—368. The New Testament the only reliable source of later Jewish history, 369. General sketch of the political state of the Jews at the time of the incarnation, 370—422.

L.

Lushington, Dr. (*see* Consistorial Court, Judgment in the).

M.

Mozley on Regeneration [*The Primitive Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, &c.*], 199—256. The author's previous work on Predestination, 199; objections to the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, *ibid.* Mr. Mozley's explanation, 200; limitations, 201; the rule of supposition, 202; illustrated by Scripture, 203—206; arguments against this view, 207—210. Whether regeneration implies actual holiness? 211—216. The nature of regeneration itself, 217—227. The Fathers misrepresented, 227—232; two senses of regenerate, 233. 8. Augustine's doctrine of regeneration, 235—242; as connected with that of final perseverance, 243—253. Sufficiency of grace, 254; conclusion, 255, 256.

S.

Stephen's Lectures on the History of France, &c., 1—26. Why so hastily published? 1, 2. Character and influence of Charlemagne, 3—11. Decline and Fall of the Merovingian and Carlovingian dynasties, 12—14. The Crusades, 14—17; relative growth of the English and French monarchies, 18—24. Theory of the Divine right of Kings, 25, 26.

SHORTER NOTICES OF BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

JULY.—Recent Publications of the Clarendon Press, Burnet's Life of Hale, Fell's Life of Hammond, Smalridge's Sermons, Carte's Life of Ormond, &c.—Brudenell Barter on the Progress of Infidelity—Lynch's Rivulet, Grant and Campbell, &c.—Lester's Letter to Lord Palmerston—Shaw on the Church and Wesleyans—Flemish Interiors—Essais sur la Réforme Catholique, par MM. Bordas Dumoulin et Huet—Dr. Mill's Lectures on the Catechism—Pye's Ordination Sermon—Instrumenta Ecclesiastica—J. H. Parker's Cottage Prints—Annals of England—Gilderdale's *Disciplina Rediviva*—Postscript, &c.

OCTOBER.—Defence of Archdeacon Denison—Grueber on Articles XXV. XXVIII. XXIX. and Letter to Archbishop of Canterbury—Bishop of Ripon's Charge—Harper on Clerical Incomes—Baker on School Systems—Gurney's Consecration Sermon—Lays of Memory—Irons' Sermon—Cazenove on Mahometanism—Denison on Church Building—Peel's Memoirs—Archer Gurney's Poems—Lonely Hours—Freeman on the Saracens—Thiersch on the Family Life—Blunt on Duties of Parish Priest—Wortarbet's Syria—Life of Bishop Torrey—Neale's Medieval Preaching—Oxenden's Pathway of Safety—Hare's Epitaphs—Wilkins' Threescore Years and Ten—Midsummer Holidays—The Eng-

lish Hymnal—Stories on the Commandments—Whitehead's Sermons—Pratt on Scripture and Science—Lyall's Agonistes—Sponsorial Stipulations, &c.—Phillimore's Sermons—Woodford's Sermons—Lord Lyttelton on the Gospels and Acts—Memorialia Cordis—The Aquarium—Maitland on False Worship—Sermons on the Peace by Dean Milman, Messrs. Palmer, Hayman, Barry, Flower, Street, Kennaway, &c.—Sermons by Mr. Skinner—Ridley and Stevens on Clerical Burthens—Dr. Hook, Mr. Roundell Palmer, Mr. De Burgh, and Captain Williams, on Sunday Observances—Commentary on the Psalms—Oxford Sermons on the Atonement—MacDonnell on ditto—Bunbury's Tale—Leonard the Lion Heart and Ben Sylvester's Word—Molyneux's Letter—Tinkler on Tradition—Tracts on Church for foreign use—Newland's Sermons on Church Seasons—Bishop of Tasmania's Charge—Mansel's Lecture on Kant—Sermons by Bishop of Moray, Messrs. Carter, Anderson, and Barker—Gresley on Methodism—Sermons by Manning and Hake—Coit's Lecture on Exclusiveness—Lowe's Sermon—Bishop of Exeter's Address at Confirmation—Jones and Freeman on St. David's Cathedral, &c.—Dr. Maurice's Letter to Lord Derby—Cecil Wray on the Surplice—Davies' St. Paul and Modern Thought—Dr. Acland on Health, Work, and Play, &c.



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